

CHAPTER-II

INDO-SOVIET RELATION IN THE POST-1947 PERIOD

In September, 1946, after the formation of the interim government, Nehru decided to make Indo-Soviet relationship closer by establishing diplomatic relationship. Being instructed by Nehru, Krishna Menon sought an interview with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov. though the British opposed the move, Krishna Menon met Molotov in Paris on September 28, 1946. Molotov welcomed the proposal. On June, 25, 1947 two weeks before the Mountbatten plan for the partition of India was announced, Nehru had made public the appointment of his sister Vijoy Laxmi Pandit as India's first ambassador to the USSR. On October 23, 1947, the Soviet Union also announced the appointment of its first ambassador to India, K.V.Novikov.

India's attainment of Independence in 1947 sounded the death knell for colonialism. In the initial years of India's independence the relationship between these two countries developed slowly because of Stalin. After the departure of Stalin from the political scenario of the Soviet Union, things began to change¹. V.P. Dutta also commented that India and the Soviet Union, after independence, could not be as close as it was expected "Partly this was due to the imperfect understanding of Stalin regarding the nature of change that was taking place in the newly independent countries and the phenomena of the collapse of colonialism and partly due to the exaggerated fears and suspicions based in certain sections of our country in regard to the intentions of the international Communist movement"². Robert H. Donaldson³ also indicated that Stalin's attitude was anti-Indian. He wrote, "Stalin was indeed deeply involved in promoting an anti-imperialist revolution in an economically backward Asian country, but the locus of his efforts was China, not India". In August 1953, Stalin passed away and soon after his death, the Soviet Prime Minister in his speech made an unprecedented friendly reference to India. He said, "The position of such a considerable state as India is of great importance for the strengthening of peace in the East. India has made her own significant contribution to the efforts of peace-loving countries directed to the ending of the war in Korea. Our relation with India are growing stronger and cultural

and economic ties are developing. We hope that relation between India and Soviet Union will continue to develop and strengthen with friendly co-operation as their keynote "4. From mid-1950's there has been a considerable acceleration in their relations without looking back. Nehru's concern about the cold war politics and its effects helped the initial growth of the Indo-Soviet relations. During 50's, the United States and its allies tried to create "Communist menace". But this was not to India's liking. The NATO and SEATO were created as steps towards the increasing tensions in international relations.

According to K.P.S.Menon⁵, relations between India and the Soviet Union after independence may be divided into two phases - one passive and the other active. The active phase, in his opinion, began in 1955. A period of transition may be marked from 1953 to 1955. In fact, a slow change can be discerned towards the end of 1952 and early 1953, in the last days of Stalin. "Until 1953 the economic relations between India and the Soviet Union", K.P.S.Menon wrote,⁶ "were of the scantiest order. In my first year in Moscow in 1952, the value of the out turn of trade between the two countries came to only 30 million rupees; in my last year 1961, it came to 1,000 million rupees".

The Bandung Conference

The Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian countries was held from April 18 to 24, 1955 in Java Island. It was attended by twenty-nine countries including India. The quintessence of this conference is that this conference was attended by those countries who freed themselves from colonial or semicolonial dependence. This conference has similarity with the First Asian Relations Conference of 1947 in India. This First Asian Relations was a major international forum which contributed a great deal to the development of a common ideological standpoint and organisation of the peoples' solidarity movement. An analysis of the final documents of the 1947 forum in Delhi and the 1955 forum in Bandung will make it clear that there lies an organic historical link between them. In order to promote regional co-operation, another Asian conference was held in Delhi in 1949. Nehru had firm belief regarding the Asian regional co-operation. In order to strengthen economic and political ties amongst Asian Countries, a number of conferences were held before Bandung Conference. One of them was held in Baguio in Philippines in May, 1950, another was held in Colombo in April, 1954. In this Colombo conference, the proposal was made to convene a conference in Bandung.

In this Bandung conference, the Leninist theory of peaceful coexistence between states with different social and economic systems was historically substantiated. With it, the “Five principles” (Panchsheel) were formulated by the initiative of Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enli. The Soviet Union supported Bandung and its principles⁷. The Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR sent a message of greetings to the forum. On April 16, 1955, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement wishing the Bandung Conference every success. With a view to diverting the attention from the colonialist essence of Western policies, Pakistan, Thailand, Philippines and some other countries tried to exploit the myth of the “Soviet threat”. Not only that, Pakistan fought for the replacement of the ‘Panch Sheel’ which was proposed by Burma to accept its five principles. The imperialist powers failed to turn the Bandung forum into a means of creating division and setting Asian countries against one another. The following ten principles were accepted in the Bandung forum⁸.

- 1) Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
- 2) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.
- 3) Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations - large and small.
- 4) Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.
- 5) Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the charter of the United Nations.
- 6) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any the big powers; and abstention by any country from exerting pressure on other countries.
- 7) Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.
- 8) Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

9) Promotion of mutual interest and cooperation.

10) Respect for justice and international obligations.

While commenting on the Bandung Conference, Mr. C.S. Jha⁹ wrote, "The ten principles of the Bandung Declaration were in essence the elaboration of the five principles of Panchsheel and of the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.... The Bandung Declaration did not merely set down on paper the norms of international behaviour; it crystallized the ethos and values of Asia and Africa. It powerfully influenced the subsequent course of international relations and became the code of the nations that emerged from colonial domination after 1955."

Soon after the Bandung conference, Nehru visited the Soviet Union for seventeen days in June 1955. In the same year, Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin and Secretary General Krushchev visited India and they stayed for twenty days in our country. These long visits made the relationships between these two countries concrete. Vinod Bhatia wrote,¹⁰ "There is no doubt that the first visit of Jawaharlal Nehru to the Soviet Union in 1955 after he became the Prime Minister of India was a major turning point in Indo-Soviet relations. The welcome he received in the Soviet Union was unprecedented." Jawaharlal Nehru told the Soviet people who had assembled there in thousands: "We did not come here as strangers, for many of us have followed with deep interest, the great changes and developments that have taken place in this country"¹¹. And while leaving the country, he said, "I am leaving my heart behind"¹². During Jawaharlal's visit in the USSR, one Indo-Soviet Joint Statement was signed by the heads of the governments of the two countries on June 22, 1955. This Statement emphasized that the relations between the Soviet Union and India rested on a firm basis of friendship and mutual understanding. The Statement said,¹³ "These relations shall continue to be formed and guided by the following principles: (1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) Non-aggression; (3) Non-interference in each other's internal affairs for any reasons of an economic, political or ideological character; (4) Equality and mutual benefit; and (5) Peaceful coexistence".

During Nehru's Prime-ministership, Soviet Union's attitude towards Kashmir issue became positive. It openly recognised Kashmir as the integral part of India. In February, 1957, the USA and Great Britain proposed the United Nations Security Council to deploy UN peace troops in Kashmir; at that juncture, the Soviet Union exercised its veto power to

stall the decision. This created the tremendous favourable impact in India. Again, on the question of Goa, the Soviet Union came forward to support India's stand to liberate this Portuguese colony. The case of Goa was referred to the United Nations Security Council and again the United States of America and the United Kingdom wanted to condemn India's action, but Soviet Union's veto once again prevented this situation. India also extended her unequivocal support to the Soviet Union in her handling of issues like the Korean War. This was the beginning of a fundamental turn in Indo-Soviet diplomatic relations.

Regarding Indo-Soviet relation, Abid Hussain¹⁴ remarked, "History has so made us, geography has so located us and our leaders have so willed it that we can not but be friends, Jawaharlal Nehru had once said that these two large neighbours can either turn foes or become friends, but they can not be indifferent to each other". In spite of different social and political systems prevailing in these two countries, we get a number of examples of how fruitful the relations between these two in the '50s and '60s. And the motivating force behind this friendship was the preserving and fortifying world peace raising the well-being of people. The Soviet Union and India cooperated constructively in the settlement of the Suez crisis during the autumn of 1956, in ending the Middle East conflict in the summer of 1958, in the peaceful settlement of Indo-China conflict and developing the all-embracing Geneva agreements.

Nikita Khrushchev came to India for the second time in February, 1960. He addressed the joint session of parliament on 11th February where he paid rich tribute to the policy of Non-alignment and remarked, "Herein lies India's wisdom and strength"¹⁵. After Nehru-Khrushchev talks, one Joint Communique was published where the Soviet side had appreciated India's non-aligned policy for its "substantial contribution" towards preserving and reinforcing world peace. On the Indian side, Nehru hailed the Khrushchev-Eisenhower initiatives to relax international tensions, and Nehru also expressed India's moral support to all such endeavours for peace and Khrushchev's proposals for total disarmament. In February, 1961, Nehru visited the Soviet Union for the third and last time. From the conference of Non-Aligned States in Belgrade, he flew away to the Soviet Union, one of the two super powers, with the "Peace Appeal" of Non-Alignment. The joint communique of the talks which were published after Nehru's visit stressed the two governments' call to secure a stable peace as their primary task. In Kremlin, at a friendly rally Nehru observed that 'war

can not lead to the victory of any nation, it can only lead to the common defeat of all, or even to the virtual annihilation of the human race'¹⁶. In the same year in December, 1961, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev arrived India on the eve of the liberation of Goa, Daman and Diu from the Portuguese. Khrushchev sent his heartiest congratulations for India's "determined action" regarding Goa and he also characterised it as a "Completely lawful and just act".

The Chinese attack on India in October 1962 put Indo-Soviet relations to a major trial. On the other hand, Caribbean crises also disturbed the Soviet leadership. However, Moscow could overcome both the crises with unparalleled efficiency. After the death of Nehru in May, 1964, new Prime Minister Mr. Lalbahadur Shastri sustained the relationship. He paid a visit to the Soviet Union in May, 1965. This time was very significant as the Indo-Pak conflict over the Rann of Kutch was gathering momentum and that was turned into Indo-Pak war in September, 1965. And it was Kosygin's personal initiative that brought the war to an end in first half of 1966. As the statement of Soviet news agency TASS noted in this connection,¹⁷ "it is necessary to realise the depth of the danger stemming from the events, display restraint and a sense of responsibility. All states should make efforts to end the conflict and stop the bloodshed..... No government has the right to add fuel to the fire. The dangerous trend of events should be stopped, peace on the borders between India and Pakistan should triumph". In Tashkent in late 1965-early 1966, the Indian Prime Minister and the Pakistan President met by the active initiative of the Soviet Union for establishing peace in this sub-continent. This meeting ended with the signing of the Tashkent Declaration in which both sides stated their firm resolve to restore normal relations and to promote mutual understanding between their peoples. The Declaration also expressed profound appreciation and gratitude to the Soviet leaders for their "constructive, friendly and noble role in organising this meeting which led to mutually satisfying results"¹⁸. Alexei Kosygin said at the Tashkent Conference,¹⁹ "The history of the people of India and Pakistan knows quite a few examples when they came out, shoulder to shoulder, in the heroic struggle against foreign domination. Victory over colonialism was achieved by common efforts and for it they bore common sacrifices. Today, as in the past, only enemies of Pakistan and India may be interested in a clash between them. Things which make the Indian people and Pakistani people close to each other do not relate only to the past. The tasks confronting them coincide in many respects. The peoples of both countries are striving to solve major

economic problems upon which the welfare of the population and further progress depend. We understand these strivings; we want to see Pakistan and India living in peace and solving peacefully all the problems arising between them and successfully advancing the road of national development". "The same sentiments were expressed by Lal Bahadur Shastri. He declared at the Tashkent Conference, "A heavy responsibility lies on our shoulders. If India and Pakistan have to progress and prosper, they must live in peace.. Instead of fighting each other, let us start fighting poverty, disease and ignorance."²⁰

While commenting on the Tashkent accord, K.Neelkant wrote,²¹ "The accord at Tashkent blazed a new trail and showed a new way of solving disputes between neighbours. Kosygin used his powers of persuasion, tact and diplomatic skill to get the leaders of the two nations to sit around the negotiating table and conduct their parleys without rancour".

At Tashkent, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri died, and Mrs. Indira Gandhi took over the charge of Prime-Ministership. In her first visit to the Soviet Union in July, 1966, Mrs. Indira Gandhi made it clear that she would not deviate from her father's line of thought in respect of non-alignment, Indo-Soviet relations, Vietnam and disarmament. Speaking at a meeting of Soviet-Indian friendship at the Grand Kremlin Palace on 14 July 1966, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi Justly noted that political freedom is incomplete and there is very little sense in it without economic independence, and that until the battle for economic independence is won, foreign pressure will be brought to bear against the developing states, which they must be able to counteract²². From this point of view, the policy of nonalignment became the source of inspiration to organise the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle all over the world. The Joint Communiqué published at the end of the talks between the Prime Minister of India and the President of the Soviet Union reaffirmed their common goal of ensuring peace.

Mrs. Gandhi again visited the Soviet Union in November 1967 to attend the 50th anniversary celebration of the October Revolution. This visit reaffirmed the tie of friendship. Mrs. Gandhi's visit was reciprocated by the visit of Kosygin on the sudden demise of President Zakir Hussain in May 1969, though he visited India in January 1968. In his 1968 visit, Kosygin asserted that the deteriorating international climate "persistently demanded from all who cherish peace and security of peoples, to take united action aimed at combating the aggressive forces of imperialism and colonialism,"²³.

Around 1970s, India had to face a grim situation in the international affairs. The Awami League in the East Pakistan got absolute majority in the general election and on the basis of peoples' verdict they should have been given chance to form the popular government; but on the contrary, the then rulers of Pakistan disregarded peoples' sentiment and instead they started military rule that led to the millions of people coming to India as refugees, thus creating considerable socio-economic and security problems for India. In such circumstances, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi worked hard tirelessly to mobilise world public opinion against the military rulers of Islamabad. The West did not come forward to help India restore normalcy in India. On the contrary, this problem coincided with the developing Sino-US alliance punctuated by Kissinger's secret mission to Beijing via Islamabad and declaration of US President Richard Nixon's plea to visit China. As the influx of refugees to India escaping from Yahua Khan's brutalities, continued, clouds of war gathered on the horizon with the concretisation of the sinister Sino-US-Pak axis to keep India at bay and ensure Islamabad's domination over Dacca. It was that in order to defend peace and security in the subcontinent and to raise Indo-Soviet ties to a qualitatively higher level, this Treaty of Friendship was signed. The Treaty embodied everything good and mutually beneficial which had accumulated in the bilateral relations and laid a reliable legal basis for the vast experience of cooperation.

The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation - 1971

The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed on August 9, 1971. This 9th August is a memorable date in the Indian calendar from another angle also. It was on that day in 1942, "Quit India" movement was launched by Mahatma Gandhi. This Treaty of Friendship was of great importance for the development of cooperation between these two countries. This treaty was a great historic event in the mutual relations between India and the USSR. This document summed up the results of more than two decades of the successful development of Indo-Soviet relations. No period in the Indian history of foreign relations can be compared with time of signing the Treaty as greater or more significant event. The Treaty played an extremely important role in developing and expanding co-operation between the USSR and India on the world scene, in reducing world tension, preventing a nuclear catastrophe, and in asserting the principles of peaceful coexistence and equitable co-operation between countries with different political, social

and economic systems. T.N. Kaul said²⁴. "The Treaty is a bulwork of peace and an example of how two countries with different social, political and economic systems, such as India and the Soviet Union can cooperate with one another in order to safeguard peace, promote development and benefit of not only these two countries but the whole region."

In a joint Indo-Soviet statement issued during the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, while signing the Treaty in New Delhi, he declared that the Treaty was a "logical outcome of the relations of sincere friendship, respect, mutual trust and the many-sided ties which had been established between the two countries in the course of many years and which had stood the test of time"²⁵. On the very day of signing the Treaty, i.e. on August 9, 1971. Andrei Gromyko said²⁶, "There are moments in relations between states when important events occur which take decades to ripen and are in fact a result of the entire preceding development of these relations. For the Soviet Union and India such an important landmark is the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation which has just been signed". The long-term significance of the Treaty for the future of the two countries was realised by all. Mr. Jagjiban Ram, then Defence Minister, said²⁷ that the Treaty "provided a strong juridical basis and concrete framework" for developing further Indo-Soviet friendship. "It provided a powerful framework for growing economic cooperation". He added, "It is indeed a model for governing the relations on the basis of total equality between an industrialised nation and one which is developing". H.N. Bhugwana, then Union Minister for Petroleum, Chemicals and Fertilisers, said,²⁸ "It is immaterial who signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty what matters is its message of peace, friendship and cooperation which is inherent in the ideals of the October Revolution and India's freedom struggle". This Treaty, according to him was the embodiment of Lenin's vision about the friendship of liberated nations and these ideals were engendered in the outlook of the world's first state and in the freedom struggle of the Indian people. The Treaty was widely accepted and welcomed by the Soviets. The voice of the Soviets was expressed by L.I. Brezhnev²⁹, "... our friendship and cooperation have been well tested in practice, ... we started from a few contacts and have arrived at board and close cooperation in the most varied fields, which is based on the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. In another occasion he said, "The idea that Soviet-Indian friendship is indispensable and beneficial has gripped the minds of millions both in India and in the Soviet Union. This constitutes the most solid foundation for the

further successful growth of our relations". Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh narrated this Treaty as "establishing factor" for peace, security and development of this continent as a whole.

At the time of conclusion of the Treaty, there aroused an opposite view of this Treaty within and outside India. Some thought that this Treaty might hamper India's basic character of Non-alignment. Regarding the reaction of the USA, China and Pakistan, S.P. Singh wrote³⁰. "Strangely enough, no immediate and direct official comments on the Indo-Soviet Treaty were offered by the USA, People's Republic of China and Pakistan. While replying to a question by a reporter in New York on 9 August, the US Secretary of State, William Rogers expressed the hope that the Indo-soviet Treaty would have a good effect. "Within the Country, various comments aired the sky. As Samar Guha remarked,³¹ that clauses incorporated in this Treaty might stand in the way to support independence of Bangladesh. Bimal Prasad remarked,³² "The Indo-Soviet Treaty has fully vindicated its role as pillar of peace in South Asia. It has made a significant contribution towards the end of tyranny and oppression in Bangladesh and the emergence of a new nation - the eighth largest in the world". While commenting on the Indo-Soviet Treaty, Mr., V.D.Chopra³³ wrote, "The Treaty has become a shield for India to safeguard its integrity and sovereignty and defend and enlarge its foreign policy - the policy of non-alignment and peace. The Indo-Soviet friendship has become a single important factor for the cause of world peace".

The Treaty laid down that "Each High Contracting party solemnly declares that it shall not enter any obligation, secret or public, with one or more states, which is incompatible with this treaty. Each High Contracting party further declares that no obligation be entered into, between itself and any other state or states which might cause military damage to the other party"³⁴. This clause of the Treaty, which its critics both in India and abroad cleanly forget unambiguously stipulating that neither India nor the Soviet Union would enter into "any obligation" which might cause military damage to the other country is of fundamental importance.

K.Neelkant³⁵ was of the view that this was the first political treaty India had made with any big power, and to that limited purpose it marked a turning point in India's foreign policy. It did not mean India had abandoned its policy of nonalignment but it was a recognition of the realities flowing from Pakistan's war postures and warlike threats.

Socialist Party and Jana Sangh commented,³⁶ "Some of the terms of the Treaty were fraught with dangerous possibilities". A.G. Nooran³⁷ was of the opinion, "It is very unlikely that the Treaty will make the end of Russia's Tashkentian diplomacy of equivocation". Acharya Kripalini³⁸ said, "There was no threat of war". Swatantra Party, Jana Sangh, Congress (o) and the Bharatiya Kranti Dal organised one seminar in Delhi in 1971 regarding the Indo-Soviet Treaty. And the collection of speeches of the seminar was published in the form of a book "The Shadow of the Bear: The Indo-Soviet Treaty" edited by A.P. Jain. This book was full of criticism of the Treaty.

While writing about the Indo-Soviet Treaty, Mr. G.P. Deshpande³⁹ remarked that the visible things about the Indo-Soviet Treaty were indeed mysterious. In this context, he mentioned Oscar Wilde quotation, "It is only shallow people who do not judge by appearances. The mystery of the world is the visible, not the invisible". It was mysterious, according to him, that all political parties from the Jana Sangh to the CPM should be unanimous in welcoming the Treaty. and it was perplexing that everybody should have either forgotten or ignored the fact that the Treaty would happen to be valid for twenty long years. He also mentioned that the near-unanimity with which the Lok Sabha approved the Treaty had not reflected a consensus on the struggle in Bangladesh or on policies towards it and Pakistan but rather the acute sense of insecurity that had gripped the elite of the country - left, right and centre. This fear complex grew so enormously that the elite had required a patron. The reasons behind the insecurity of the elite was that the Pakistani aggression seemed to be inevitable and the Treaty was a kind of a deterrent against it. This Treaty would prevent or deter Pakistan's sabre-rattling against India. Another question also cropped up that time - why was the Soviet umbrella necessary to combat the Pakistani threat specially when the eleven hundred odd crores of rupees had been spending on defence? Did this huge expenditure not equip India well enough to meet the Pakistani threat? It was argued that Pakistan was not alone, the presence of China was behind Pakistan. It was also China that worried the elite.

Deshpande⁴⁰ raised an important question regarding the Treaty of Friendship - were we worried more about our Bengal or their Bengal? At that juncture, it was not easy to answer this question. It might seem far fetched to raise this question in relation to India's alignment to the Soviet Union to sign the treaty. But it was not so. Who entered into a treaty

or alignment - it was also a question raised by Deshpande, "If we look around in Asia". He wrote, "we notice that when a state perceives a danger to its political system, it enters into an alignment. The Chinese revolution was far from safe in 1949. The Chinese Government was forced at that time to enter into an alignment with the Soviet Union. Countries like Thailand, Philippines and Taiwan had similar problems. They saw a threat to their systems and their alignment with the United States came into existence. Pakistan's vision of India as a power bent upon breaking Pakistan led it to join the SEATO and the CENTO. It would be pertinent to ask whether the ruling elite in this country visualises a similar threat to itself or to the socio-political structure which sustains it". It was viewed that all the euphoria about the 1971 elections, the mandate and so on could not hide the simple fact that there existed a very serious threat. And this threat did not originate in Pakistan, but rather it was engendered in our own country.

The Treaty was criticised on the ground that it might make us a power-player. But one country can not join the power game with a vitiated, deteriorating social fabric what India had at the time of signing the Treaty. Alignment is no substitute for a vigorous socio-political system. The dominant partner of the treaty is the only one to benefit, as happened in Thailand or in Philippines. The nations concerned never reach the power-status they so earnestly desire. The ruling elites do benefit in the process but hardly the nation. The net result of the Treaty, it was apprehended, might have been that the freedom of Bangladesh would be an issue between India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Soviet Union. It was also said that the Soviet Union had committed itself to India's position on the question of refugees and their return to Bangladesh. But India did not commit to a free and sovereign Bangladesh and to a political settlement between the Awami League and Yahya Khan. India had signed a document with the Russians without making it clear that it stood committed to a free, sovereign Bangladesh and nothing less. Criticism was levelled against the Treaty in such a way that this Treaty left the field free for the Soviets to dictate to us a policy for this sub-continent under the name of what Treaty had described as "mutual consultations for peace in the region".

Mohit Sen⁴¹ was of the opinion that it would be quite wrong to imagine that there is a national consensus around the Indo-Soviet Treaty. He said, "With Morarji as Prime Minister, Masani as Finance Minister, Vajpayee as Home Minister and Raj Narain as the Minister for

Culture, one could scarcely have expected such a Treaty to be signed". Mohit Sen remarked that the Indo-Soviet Treaty's paramount significance had been its deterrent effect it would have on Yahya Khan's proclaimed desire to settle accounts with the people of Bangladesh through a war of aggression against India. Prevention of Pakistani aggression against India was precisely the best help that any international power could render to both India and Bangladesh at that juncture.

Two other points were noted by Mr. Sen. The first was that the Treaty was "an unequal treaty"; unequal from two sides: one was that the Soviet Union was much more powerful than India and the other that "servile pro-Soviet elements" would easily infiltrate the government of India.

The second point is that the Indo-Soviet Treaty would help to maintain the "status quo" in India, and was therefore, to be opposed. This is an ancient argument with which one is familiar from the days of Lenin's struggle against the "Left" communists during the Stalin-Trotsky controversy. Any political and economic relations with a non-revolutionary or anti-revolutionary government could be called an act of betrayal on the part of the Soviet and other socialist states. Socialist states can not substitute for the forces of progress and revolution within a country. Their relations with a given country should, however be such as would facilitate the cohesion and advance of these forces. To do more would not only tantamount to interference in the internal affairs of countries but would help precisely the reactionary and status quo forces.

"If one adopts this set of criteria", Mohit Sen remarks⁴², "then the Indo-Soviet Treaty certainly is a highly positive development in this sense as well. And this is how it has been seen by the progressive and revolutionary forces in the country. And this, incidentally, was the attitude that these forces adopted towards China in the days of Panch Shila and Bandung". It was expected that on the basis of the Indo-Soviet Treaty the government of India would be able to improve relations with China at state level.

While giving reactions after signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, "Frontier"⁴³ raised two points. First, the Treaty was a diplomatic checkmate on the new level of Sino-United States relations. Secondly, the Treaty had in practice meant a slide-back on the Bangladesh issue. The Soviet Union was not prepared to alienate Pakistan whose goodwill

had been assiduously built up since Tashkent. "Frontier" considered that the joint communique had shocked everyone into this realisation because it had talked of a "political solution" as distinct from a "political settlement" and one acceptable to the entire people of Pakistan. This clearly did mean that the Soviet Union had wanted a settlement within the framework of the present Pakistani set-up and one-ness of Pakistan was recognised by Moscow.

Mr. Satya Biswas⁴⁴ remarked in October 1971, "All those who thought that the Treaty with Russia was a shot in the arm for Indira Gandhi to recognise "Bangladesh", were soon disappointed. The joint communique that followed immediately referred to East Pakistan and not to East Bengal". He added that English version of the communique had mentioned "Eash Bengal" in stead of East Pakistan. But the Russian version mentioned "East Pakistan". This was nothing, according to him, but an example of social-imperialist fraud and deception. Biswas said that those who had believed that the Treaty not being a submission to Russia were rudely shaken at the 59th Inter-Parliamentary Union conference (IPU) in Paris, in which the Soviet Union did not support India's move in favour of Bangladesh and India lost. "Such is the character of the Social-imperialists"; Biswas wrote⁴⁵ about the USSR, "Their words are one, but their deeds are something quite opposite. It is to these social-imperialists that Indira Gandhi chained the Indian masses on August 9". Biswas was of the opinion that the Treaty had increased the strangehold of Russian social-imperialism, in the name of cooperation, over neo-colonial India. The fascist Indian government could wear a tiger-skin to scare the Indian people, and then doubly armed with the Treaty carry out bloody armed suppression of our working people's struggle.

It was remarked in the "Forntier"⁴⁶ in November 1971, "Far from reducing our defence expenditure, the treaty will increase it. For, if the threat from Pakistan is real, as it is, the treaty has failed to deter aggression on India. The signing of the treaty might have postponed the Pakistani attack predicted in Indian quarters for August 12, but it has not eliminated the threat. The treaty will only add to the escalation of the arms race on the subcontinent revived by the Soviet Union in the name of containing China".

Mr. S.Roy⁴⁷, in an article "The Treaty" published in 1971, wrote, "On 9th August 1971, a new link was forged in the chain of neo-colonialism that enslaves India". He is of the opinion that the Indo-Soviet Treaty was drawn up in 1969, as a part of the "Brezhnev

Doctrine"; a mutual security pact for Asian nations to go on opposing China. This Treaty gave Russia the right, at will, to descend upon India with arms (Article 9). This Treaty gave Russia the right to veto over India's foreign policy (Article 8 & 10). He also added that this Treaty, by its commitment to the "security" of Asia, promised to maintain the status quo of injustice and butchery. By declaring "cooperation" to be the method for "solving contradictions" it peddled the Khrushchevite thesis of co-existence of the exploited with the exploiters. This Treaty (Article 5) by committing itself to the "territorial integrity" of Russia and India, froze the frontier and lighted a permanent flame of conflict with China. "Tied to the chariot wheels of Soviet social-imperialism, India will be dragged into abetting Russia's aggressive designs on China", he wrote⁴⁸. He concluded by saying that this Treaty had aimed to attack and destroy the Indian revolution; and would inevitably affect the political and economic structure of India, for "the master must shape the servant in his image".

One logical criticism in recent times has been levelled against the Treaty from different angles by Aswini Kr. Roy⁴⁹. He is of the opinion that, "if India and the Soviet Union committed to different political, economic, social and ideological value norms could come together with a Treaty of Friendship to mutual advantage, it would normally be assumed to be easier for such treaties among the countries in the region, including Pakistan, with closer affinity in terms of basic social, economic and cultural values and united by common bonds of history and geography". But after a long gap, this Treaty could not be replicated in this region except SAARC formation. In other words, the immediate effects of this Treaty on this region was a complete failure. Aswani Roy said that the genesis of Indo-Soviet relations are not due to ancient linkage or mechanical linkages as is often demanded by many historiographers. Instead, he advocated that the "crucial determining variable explaining the origins of Indo-Soviet friendship was the subjective factors."

The Treaty of Friendship was evaluated by a number of writers before the expiry of twenty-year term, though, according to the clauses of the Treaty, it was renewed automatically after twenty-year term as neither party of the Treaty objected to enhance the time period. K.P. Misra wrote,⁵⁰ "It was and continues to be the watershed in Indo-Soviet relations. Though it was not a military alliance and was also not antithetical to the basic principles of nonalignment, it did give much needed political and psychological support to India at a time when there was a fear that China and US might support Pakistan. The treaty greatly

facilitated India's support to freedom fighters of East Pakistan which resulted in the creation of a new state - Bangladesh." Rasheeduddin Khan⁵¹ is of the opinion that during the turbulent period of 1971, when the civil war spilled over to Indian borders by the huge influx of the refugees whose increasing numbers had upset the demographic composition in Tripura and West Bengal, and created problems of communal harmony, the Soviet understanding and diplomatic support was of immense help and sustenance. He remarked, "The historic Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation signed on 9 August 1971, was not only a mere formal regularisation of an already established cordial relations, but was also a message to the world to note the special bonds of bilateralism that have now been ratified in a treaty relationship covering vital areas of inter-state cooperation including defence and security"⁵². In 1987, R.L.Bhatia⁵³ commented, "The Treaty is still the fundamental framework of Indo-Soviet relations". Vinod Bhatia evaluated, "The treaty was put to a severe test during the conflict in the subcontinent at the end of 1971. It, however, stood like a rock in those storm-tossed days."⁵⁴

The major fact that happened immediately after the Treaty was the worsening situation in the Indo-Pak border that threatened the security of India. At that time, New Delhi and Moscow started top-level discussion. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister N.P. Firyubin arrived in Delhi for urgent consultation with the government of India. Being invited by the Chief of the Air Staff of India, the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Force arrived in New Delhi on October 30, 1971. The Soviet Air Chief, in Poona, in a bilateral meeting said, "Military experts always discuss things secretly. But let me tell you that in the event of any attack in madness, either by a person or by a nation, the 25 crore people of the Soviet Union, with all their might shall back India as her trusted friend"⁵⁵. Ultimately when Pakistani armed attack came on India, the Soviet came forward with all kinds of help for India. The US Seventh Fleet, coming for the help of Pakistan, was charged by the Soviet submarines. This was remembered by Jagjivan Ram on the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution. He said that the Soviet Union had been a sincere friend and had stood by India in difficult period of the country. It was proved by the events of 1971 and after that the Indo-Soviet Treaty had served as a pillar of peace in Asia.

The follow-up action of the Indo-Soviet Treaty was tremendous. In 1972, the Soviet-Indian Joint Commission for Economic Trade, Scientific and Technical Cooperation was

set up. This was the first Indian joint commission with some other foreign country. In 1973, another agreement on economic and trade cooperation was signed between these two countries. In the same year, agreement between the USSR State Planning Committee and the Planning Commission of India was signed which was proved to be very much helpful for exchanging experience and methodology of planning. In November, 1973, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Mr. L.I. Brezhnev visited India. This visit was earmarked as the striking landmarks in Indo-Soviet relations. Brezhnev declared at the Red Fort ground on November 27, 1973, "Friendship and cooperation with India is part and parcel of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. We were with you when India's new statehood was emerging. We were with you in difficult and trying periods for India. We were with you when various external forces were trying to bring pressure on your country when it was upholding its vital interests. We shall be with you in the days of joy and in the days trial"⁵⁶. On the friendly soil of India, he wanted to initiate the programme of world peace. At the end of his visit, a joint Indo-Soviet Declaration was signed. This Declaration highlighted the identity of views between the two countries on nearly all important international issues. Complete understanding was also reached on outstanding international issues like ending the arms race, achieving general and complete disarmament, minimising the military budgets of permanent member states of the Security Council as proposed by the Soviet Union. The Declaration wanted to see the Indian Ocean to be zone of peace.

In the next three years of Brezhnev visit, a number of important events happened in the world political scenerio. Among these, victory of the Vietnam's liberation Struggle, Independence for Laos and Kampuchea, the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire, attainment of freedom by Angola and Mozambique, transformation of Ethiopia into socialist setup were of prime importance. In this changed situation, Mrs. Indira Gandhi visited the Soviet Union in June 1976. In this visit, she emphasised on the disarmament programmes. She wanted to establish a positive correlation between the disarmament programme and the economic development. The joint statement issued after her visit also mentioned this relationship between the disarmament programme and the economic development.

Mrs. Indira Gandhi's defeat in the genral elctionof 1977 changed the leadership in India. Mr. Morarji Desai became the Prime Minister who was, at the very outset, averse to the Indo-Soviet Treaty and wanted to have it abrogated. But, the majority in the government

did not want it and the new Prime Minister was made to understand the importance of keeping relation with the Soviet Union in the spirit of the Treaty. Soon after the new government took office, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited India to have talks with the new leaders. The result of the discussion with the Indian leaders dealt a telling blow to the calculations of those forces which did not want a closer Indo-Soviet relations. Ultimately Prime Minister Desai told, "We are very happy with the relations we have had and we are continuing to have with the Soviet Union - a relationship which is completely in accordance with our foreign policy of non-alignment."⁵⁷

Subsequently, Prime Minister Desai choose the Soviet Union as the country of his first state visit in October, 1977. He said at the banquet hosted in his honour in Moscow, "During our recent elections there were many subjects of fierce controversy, but foreign policy and the principle of non-alignment which has been the corner-stone of this policy was never a subject of debate. It is a policy which gives us the freedom to nurture friendship on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. As I have said earlier on the basis of this criterion, Indo-Soviet relations have stood the test of time and this in no way need detract from our policy on non-alignment. We shall persist in this policy and in our friendship"⁵⁸. A Joint Indo-Soviet Declaration was signed in Moscow in which two sides recognised the importance of not only preserving but further strengthening friendship and allround mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries in the spirit of the 1971 Treaty of Friendship. In this declaration, great importance was placed to the termination of arms race and the prevention of a nuclear war.

Nearly a year after, at the invitation of the Soviet Government, Indian External Affairs Minister Mr. A.B. Vajpayee visited Moscow. It is, in this context, to be made clear that Mr. Vajpayee sitting on the opposition bench supported the signing of the Treaty of Friendship in 1971. Mr. Vajpayee and his Soviet counterpart Mr. Gromyko agreed that disarmament was the most urgent task facing the international community. In March, 1979, Kosygin came to India on a seven-day state visit. He utilised this trip to issue a stern warning to China which had then attacked Vietnam. Reviewing the situation in South-East Asia following the Chinese aggression on Vietnam, Desai and Kosygin "considered it necessary to exert further efforts in the interest of strengthening peace in Asia, developing cooperation among all Asian countries on the principles of sovereignty equality and independence, non-

use of forces, inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity of states”⁵⁹.

In June, 1979, SALT-II accord was to be signed by US President Jimmy Carter and Soviet counterpart Brezhnev. Before leaving for Vietnam to sign the accord, Desai visited Moscow to talk to Brezhnev. This time witnessed an encirclement of world peace by many factors. Tension had mounted in South-West Asia with the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in the after-math of Sino-US-Pak plot to overthrow the Kabul government. This was amixed by Chinese attack on Vietnam following the liberation of Kampuchea. The Iran-Iraq war could not show any sign to come to a halt; the Arabian region got decomposed, caused by the betrayal of Egypt at Camp David. Pakistan also was posing a new threat to India. In this crucial juncture, Mrs. Indira Gandhi was sworn in power and Brezhnev visited India which was of great importance. Brezhnev, in his speech at a joint session of parliament, gave a five point plan for peace in the Persian Gulf area. This type of peace plan pronounced on the Indian soil could not be underestimated. After his visit, within three years the situation became graver. The threat of a third world war rounded about as the war-mongers were in active form. Against such a background, the Soviet Union took great initiative with extraordinary maturity to fight against war madness. At the same time they extended their support to all the liberation forces, especially the Palestinians.

Mrs. Gandhi, on 20th September, 1982, visited the USSR where the two heads showed the close identity of views of the two countries on many international issues, particularly the prevention of peace and avoidance of a nuclear war. Mrs. Gandhi's visit also strengthened the Indo-Soviet cooperation. The Joint Indo-Soviet Declaration signed by Indira Gandhi and L.I. Brezhnev stated, “The two sides reaffirmed that the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation concluded between them is a symbol of the traditional friendship between the USSR and India and of their commitment to international peace”⁶⁰. What is important is that these two leaders of these two countries, that is, Indira Gandhi and L.I. Brezhnev had personal contributions for strengthening the ties. While reviewing the international situation, both the leaders condemned Israel's aggression against Lebanon and they wanted immediate withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon.

After Indira Gandhi's tragic assassination in October, 1984, Rajiv Gandhi became the Prime Minister of India. Within a very few months of his assuming office, Rajiv Gandhi, in general election, got massive mandate to govern the country for next five years. This is

the first Prime Minister of India who was not a product of India's freedom movement. Rajiv got something extraordinary thinking for the days to come. Though his first visit to U.S. created a doubtful atmosphere regarding the future of Indo-Soviet friendship among some political experts, even the Soviets felt somewhat concerned about it, but his subsequent visit to Moscow in May 1985 made the picture clear⁶¹. In this visit, several long term agreements were entered into. In this visit, it was decided that the two countries would develop and strengthen their ties on the basis of 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. This visit also reaffirmed the high level of trust between these two countries and the stability of their relations. In this visit, a joint statement was signed which states:⁶² "The two sides believe that relations between the USSR and India demonstrate fruitful character of ties between states with different socio-economic systems, if they are committed to the principles of peaceful coexistence, equality and mutual respect, strict observance of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other" During this visit of Rajiv Gandhi, Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, made the following observation⁶³; "Our cooperation with India, which now has so many dimensions, is free of pressure of any kind, of any strings attached. The Soviet Union has consistently supported India at every stage of India's struggle to consolidate its independence and has always shown effective solidarity with that great country, upholding its sovereignty, dignity and the right to independent development." Before Rajiv's visit to the Soviet Union in 1985, India took initiative along with Argentina, Greece, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania to call for a comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapon testing and the Soviet Union responded most favourably to this six-nation calls. In January, 1985, India hosted the six nation conference on nuclear disarmament that led to the basement of the Delhi Declaration.

DELHI DECLARATION

The Soviet leader and Indian leader - Mikhail Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi believed that mankind's most important task was to strengthen peace and remove the threat of nuclear holocaust. In order to achieve this great goal, these two leaders, on behalf of one billion peoples of the two countries - one-fourth of mankind, issued jointly the Delhi Declaration on November 27, 1986, on the principles for a 'Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World'. This vital political document reads in part⁶⁴, "In the nuclear age, humanity must envelope a new political thinking, a new concept of the world that would provide credible

guarantees for humanity's survival .People want to live in a safer and more just world. Humanity deserves a better fate than being a hostage to nuclear terror and despair . It is necessary to change the existing world situation and to build a nuclear-weapon free world, free of violence and hatred, fear and suspicion ". The declaration consists of ten basic principles⁶⁵.

- (I) Peaceful Co-existence must become the universal form of international relations
- (II) Human life must be recognised as supreme .
- (III) Non-violence should be the basis of community life.
- (IV) Understanding and trust must replace fear and suspicion.
- (V) The right of every state to political and economic independence must be recognised and respected.
- (VI) Resources being spent on armaments must be channelled towards social and economic development.
- (VII) Conditions must be guaranteed for the individuals' harmonious development.
- (VIII) Mankind's material and intellectual potential must be used to solve global problems
- (IX) The " balance of terror" must give way to comprehensive international security.
- (X) A nuclear weapon free and non-violent world requires specific and immediate action for disarmament.

From the principles mentioned above it is clear that the idea of non-violent world is a Gandhian concept and naturally this has been widespread on our thinking . But for the Soviet Union to subscribe to the idea of a non-violent world was something novel . It indicated India's influence on Soviet thinking⁶⁶. The Declaration combined Lenin's ideas and Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy to put before the world a code of ethics and a code of action based on non-violence and rejection of hatred and fear.

The Delhi Declaration's significance lies in the fact that the globe possesses over 50,000 nuclear charges which are capable of destroying the total human civilisation many times. Their existence is dangerous because if they exist , they , in some day in some way or other; will be used- by design, by error, by accident, by malfunction. All life will come to

a halt. This is the Delhi Declaration that calls for elimination of all nuclear weapons . It is the only way for saving the humanity from a nuclear holocaust.

The United Nations circulated the Declaration as an official document . The UN member -states with an over-whelming majority endorsed the concept of a comprehensive international security system enveloped in the Delhi Declaration which intends to replace "balance of terror." On December 4, 1986, in the 41st session of the General Assembly , "A Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security" in resolution form was adopted . This resolution was supported by 102 countries; but the United States and France opposed the resolution regarding the Delhi Declaration⁶⁷ .

Yevgeni Rummyantsev, former Vice-Chairman of the Board of the Novosti Press Agency(APN) wrote⁶⁸, "The Delhi Declaration is a vivid demonstration of the mutual understanding between the two countries both as regards their bilateral relations and their global approaches to cardinal world issues. It is from this point of view that the Soviet-Indian factor can be said to be of general human significance ... The Damocles' sword of a possible nuclear catastrophe, the aggravation of global problems and their growing interconnection as well as the need for international cooperation to solve these problems - all point to the new priority role, common human values must play as the core of practical policy. This idea was fully reflected in the Delhi Declaration". He is of the opinion that the Delhi Declaration is a product of our times and new political thinking because it gives support to the idea of peace as the supreme value. Such is the Indo-Soviet approach to the global issue of today, which accounts for the constructive influence of the Indo-Soviet factor. "The Delhi Declaration is not the Ariadne's thread." said C. Raja Mohan".⁶⁹ "But it offers a set of principles that can help us in the struggle to restructure the international relations towards a cooperative framework." The most important comment was made by Grigory Bondarevsky,⁷⁰ a leading Soviet specialist on Indo-Soviet relations, "The Declaration is a logical combination of most important Marxian values, Leninist foreign policy of the Soviet Union, humanism, great Indian tradition of culture and history and aims and tasks set before Indian politics by Mahatma Gandhi, Rabindra Nath Tagore, Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi."

The Delhi Declaration 'is an appeal to the peoples and governments of all countries to give thought to the future of mankind and take immediate joint action in order to create a world without weapons of mass destruction, without wars, a world in which there would be no place for hatred or violence, racial or economic discrimination, a world where every state, whether large or small and every nation would have the right to independent choice and the respect for this choice by others'⁷¹. Gleb Ivashentsov and Nikolai Koltsov⁷² are of the opinion that the Delhi Declaration based on the age-old wisdom of the two great nations and imbued with new thinking outlined methods not merely for the survival of the human race, but also for the fullest perfection of the individual and civilisation's rise to new heights. It is only future generation which will be able to fully assess the profundity of the Delhi Declaration. The concluding paragraph of the Declaration says, "The gathering strength of the coalition for peace embracing the efforts of the nonaligned movement, the six-nation five-continent initiative for peace and disarmament, all peace-loving countries, political parties and public organisations gives us reason for hope and optimism"⁷³.

Rajiv Gandhi said that the ten principles of the Delhi Declaration " must determine new thinking necessary for creating a non-violent world free from nuclear weapons"⁷⁴. Gorbachev characterised the Delhi Declaration as a document in which "our philosophical and political approach to the construction of a nuclear weapon-free and non-violent world merges with the approach of the great India and billion of people represented by the non-aligned movement"⁷⁵. The Delhi Declaration is nothing but an embodiment of humanism of the two countries' time-honoured traditions. Darbara Singh⁷⁶ said, "The Delhi Declaration provides not only the beacon light but also a clear-cut action programme to advance towards the cherished goal of humanity's survival".

A Note on Soviet Studies in India in the Post-1947 Period

Throwing off the yoke of colonial enslavement, India gained its independence in 1947. And her embarkation on the way of independent economic policy being departed from semifeudal economy heralded a new age of relationship between the Soviet Union and India. A spiritual affinity always exists in this relation. More than 1000 different books by Indian authors were published in the erstwhile Soviet Union. The works of Indian authors have been translated in 77 languages of the country. The Soviet Union and India

jointly published 'Readings of Friendship' - a collection of literary works and documents since the ancient period. This is but a reflection of the images of India and Russia. Another important publication is 'Soviet-Indian 20th Century Library'. Each of these collections consists of 20 volumes. The Indological research done in the Soviet Union was mainly based on the history of India. 'A Contemporary history of India' published in 1959 and 'New History of India' published in 1961 were worth mentioning. Each book having two volumes was published from Moscow. The first book was edited by V.V. Balabushevich and A.M. Dyakov; and the second one was edited by K.A. Antonova, N.M. Goldberg and A.M. Osipov. The Soviet Indologists had an intension to examine the historical process of India in respect of the development of production and social relations, political institutions and spiritual culture, revolutionary transformation of the people. The Soviet scholars' not in the initial period, but subsequently was attracted to the Indian civilisation in the remote past. The main problems facing the scholars were to determine the nature of India's socio-economic system. G.F. Ilyin⁷⁷ in a number of books on India wanted to establish the view that ancient Indian society was dominated by slavery. In this respect, V.V. Balabushevich and A.H. Wafa wrote⁷⁸, "His writings abound in factual material proving the existence of the exploitation of slaves.... The second half of 1000 B.C. in the works of Ilyan is represented as a period of intensive development of slavery when it was the determining feature in the class structure of Indian society and left an imprint on all its aspects: the state system, family relations, morals etc. Depicting ancient India as one of slavery the scholar emphasises that the transition to slave ownership and the new society was a progressive phenomenon compared with the preceding tribal relations".

T. V. Grak, E.G. Pcholkina and B.Y. Staviski jointly published a book 'Kara-Tepe-Buddhist Cave Monastery in Old Termez' in 1964 from Moscow and B.Y. Staviski alone wrote an article 'International Contacts of Central Asia from the 5th to the mid-8th centuries' in 'Problems of Oriental Studies' in 1960. In these works, the author established the fact, based on archaeological excavations carried out in Central Asia that the economic and cultural ties of Middle Asia and India date back to ancient times. G.M. Bongard-Levin, in an article "Ancient Indian Raja-Sahab and Parisad in Megasthenes' India" published in the 'Problems of Oriental Studies from Moscow in 1959, pointed out that Megasthenes and Ashok had made it possible to give concrete meaning to many of the terms of Indian

epigraphy. In 1965, K.Z. Ashrafyan, in his book 'North Indian Agrarian System in the 13th - mid-18th Centuries' published from Moscow examined the struggle between the state and the private landownership. Soviet Indologists K.A. Antonova, K.Z. Ashrafyan, A.M. Osipov and others examined the problems of the mass national movements of India from the point of view of the evolution of the socio-economic system in mediaval India. I.R. Reisner in his book 'Mass Movement in India, 17th - 18th Centuries' published from Moscow in 1961, summed up all the research works, particularly of the Sikhs, Jats and Marathas. Most of the Soviet scholars concentrated on the internal process of the development of Indian Society, and they did agree on the point that colonialism was negative factor in India.

The Soviet Indologists were very much interested about the freedom movement of India. A.M. Osipov, in his book 'Great Indian Mutiny, 1857-59', published from Moscow in 1957 showed that the motive force of the mutiny was the peasants and the urban people. On the same topic, P.M. Shastitko's 'Nana Sahib : Narration of the Mass Uprising in India(1857-59)' was published from Moscow in 1967. The Indian freedom struggle in the last half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century was vividly outlined in a series of articles by N.M. Goldenburg, I.M. Reisner, L.A. Gordon and A.I. Chicherov. Most of the articles highlighted the role of B.G.Tilak in the freedom movement of India. The development of capitalism in Indian agriculture was analysed by G.G.Kotovskiy in 'Agrarian Reforms in India' (1959); R.P. Gurvich in 'Agriculture in India and the Position of the Peasantry' (1960), V.G. Rastyannikov and M.A. Maximov in 'Development of Capitalism in Agriculture of Contemporary India' (1965). Another important problem that was touched upon by the Soviet Indologists was the Indian national bourgeoisie. V.I.Pavlov's 'Formation of the Indian Bourgeoisie' (1958) and L.I.Reisner and G.K.Shirokov's 'Indian Bourgeoisie Today' (1966) indicated that the bourgeoisie had developed into a leading force in the regeneration in anti-imperialistic and anti-feudal potentials. On the Indian economy, we get some good works. Regarding the role of foreign capital in Indian economy, S.M.Melman's 'Foreign Monopoly Capital in Indian Economy' is a vital one. Rest it, L.I. Reisner's 'Foreign and National Capital in India's Industry (Uttar Pradesh State) published in 1959. I.L.Batalov's 'Transport in India Today' (1961), N.D. Gorodko's "India's Credit-Monetary System" (1956), V.A. Kondratyev's 'Industry in India' (1963) and three books written by G.I.Mamrykin; 'The Building of India's National Economy' (1964); 'Industrial Development in Independent

India' (1964) and 'Economy of Modern India'(1960) dealt with the problems of development of industry, transport, domestic trade and finances in Indian perspective. Ethnography, geography, literature, sociology, linguistic, philosophy and other sides in Indian context were discussed by many Soviet Indologists which can consist of a separate section of the study.

Soviet studies in India after India's independence increased to a greater extent in comparison with the pre-independence period. Russian language courses were started in the universities of Delhi and Allahabad in 1946 and 1948 respectively. The Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay started it in 1950. After that a number of centres were opened to teach Russian language in Aligarh, Calcutta, Lucknow, Banaras, Bombay, Madras, Bangalore and other cities in India.

After independence, M.N.Roy's 'The Russian Revolution' published from Calcutta in 1949 was an important publication. In English, K.P.S. Menon published two books within two years (1962-63) from Bombay. These are 'The Russian Panorama' and 'The Flying Troika'. Other important publications are D.Kurup's 'The Evolution of the Soviet Society' (1961, Bombay), Anand Gupta's 'India and Lenin' (1960, New Delhi), Ramkrishna Bajaj's 'The Young Russia' (Bombay, 1960); K.C.Mohanta's 'Three Yeas in Soviet Russia'. Regarding Menon's book, R.Vidyanath remarked, "The Russian Panorama is a fascinating travelogue abounding with a lot of interesting details on places visited and persons encountered by the author in the USSR The Flying Troika gives a kaleidoscopic account of the changing Soviet sceince and the author's reaction to it"⁷⁹. In regional languages, a number of books was published, though its readership is limited but its appeal is not limited. In Hindi, Rameshwari Nehru's 'Manav Vikas ki Jhalak' (Varanasi, 1963), Yashpal Jain's 'Rus men Chalis din' (Delhi, 1960); Annapurna Khanna's 'Kale Sagar god men'(Allahabad, 1961); Harshadev Malaviya's 'Rus ki Yatra' (Delhi, 1959); Banarasidas Chaturvedi's ' 'Rus Ki Sahityak Yatra' (Delhi, 1962); R.R. Khadilkar's 'Badalte Rus men' (Varanasi, 1959) are worth mentioning. In Bengali, Subhamay Ghosh's 'Moscow Smriti' (Calcutta, 1963), Nagendra Bhattacharjee's 'Desh Deshante' (Calcutta, 1961) Deven Sen's 'Amar Rus Bhraman' (Calcutta, 1960); Sochin Sengupta's 'Manaver Sagar Sangame' (Calcutta, 1962) are few of them. In other Indian Languages, similar types of books are found. Most of these books

belong to the category of travelogues or personal memories.

In 1989-90, dictionaries of Hindi, Urdu, Bengali, Tamil, Malayalam, Telugu and Punjabi languages were published in the USSR, along with concise grammar of these languages. The Soviet Union's multinational theatre had a big role in promoting Indian culture. The Indian theme in the Soviet theatre took a prominent place in the 1970s and 80s. The 'Ramayana'-the Indian epic produced by Moscow's Central Children's Theatre has become the most popular one among the Indian plays staged in Soviet theatres. The first Soviet film festival was held in India in 1950. The story of Russian merchant Afanasi Nikitin's journey to India was filmed as joint production of the two countries: 'Pardesi' or 'The Journey over Three Seas' in 1957. Khwaja Ahmed Abbas⁸⁰, in a seminar on 'The Great October Socialist Revolution and India Struggle for National Liberation' held in New Delhi on August 20-21, 1977, told, "The humanism which inspires Soviet film-makers, also inspires Indian film-makers,.... The outlook is optimistic and, since the foundations have become correctly laid, only the super-structure has to be fashioned", 'The foundations have been correctly laid' over the decades by both Soviet and Indian writers, artists, scholars, musicians, journalists, actors and overall the masses who feel a closeness in their blood.

Notes and References:-

1. Misra, K.P. : 'Indo-Soviet Relations: An Overview' in Bhatia, Vinod(ed) The October Revolution & 70 years of Indo-Soviet Relations. Panch-sheel Publishers, New Delhi. 1987. P-80.
2. Dutta, V.P. : 'Indo-Soviet Relations' in Bhatia, Vinod (ed);1987. P-89.
3. Donaldson, Robert H. : Soviet Policy towards India : Ideology and Strategy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1974, P-21
4. Menon, K.P. S.: 'Steady Growth of Relations' in Balabushevich, V.V & Prasad, Bimla (ed): India and the Soviet Union — A Symposium. People's Publishing House, Delhi. 1969. P-25.
5. Kaushik, Devendra.: Soviet Relations with India and Pakistan. Vikash Publishing House Pvt.Ltd.Delhi. 1974. P-30.

6. Op cit. No.4.Menon K.P.S. etc. P-29.
- 7.Rumyantsev, Yevgeni.:The Bandung Spirit Today, Allied Publisher Ltd.New Delhi.1990 P-28.
- 8.Ibid.P-17
9. Jha, C.S.: From Bandung to Tashkent - Glimpses of India's Foreign Policy. Sangam Books. Madras, 1983. P-69.
10. Bhatia, Vinod.: 'Indo-Soviet Relations: An Over View' in Bhatia, Vinod(ed): Indo-Soviet Relations-Problems & Prospects. Panchsheel Publishers, New Delhi.. 1984. P-21.
11. Ibid. P-21.
12. The Hindu. July 12, 1955
13. Ivashentsov, Gleb. & Koltsov, Nikolai: The Soviet-Indian Phenomenon. Allied Publishers New.Delhi. 1989. P-48.
14. Hussain, Abid: 'The Logic of Indo-Soviet Cooperation' in Bhatia, Vinod (ed).: The October Revolution etc P-161
15. Chakraborty, Sumit.: 'Indo-Soviet Summits: An Assessment' in Bhatia, Vinod. (ed) : Indo-Soviet Relations -etc P-91.
16. Ibid. P-92.
17. Op.Cit Ivashentsov, Gleb. & Koltsov, Nikolai. : P-51.
18. Ibid. P-51.
19. Anand, Jagjit Singh.: Indo-Soviet Relations -A More Glorious Future. Sterling Publishers Pvt, Ltd. New Delhi 1979. P-28.
20. Ibid. P-29.
21. Neelkant, K. : Partners In Peace -A Study in Indo-Soviet Relations. Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd. Delhi, 1972. P-19.

22. Pavlowsky, V.: 'The USSR and India in the Struggle for Peace' in Balabushevich, V.V. & Prasad, Bimla. (ed) : P-48.
23. Op Cit. No. 13, Chakraborty, Sumit. etc. P-95.
24. Kaul, T.N. : 'Indo Soviet Friendship' Mainstream, Nov. 22, 1986, P-27.
25. Op Cit. No. 17. Anand, Jagjit Singh etc. P-47.
26. Selected Speeches and Writings of A.A.Gromyko. Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi, 1985. P-9.
27. Op Cit. No. 17. Anand, Jagjit Singh, etc. P-48.
28. Ibid. P-49
29. Ibid. P-48.
30. Singh, S.P. : Political Dimensions of India-USSR Relations, Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi, 1987. P-176.
31. Choudhary, Sukhbir. :Indo-Soviet Treaty - A Close-Up View; Kalamkar Prakashan Pvt. Limited, New Delhi, 1973. P-5
32. Prasad, Bimal.: Indo-Soviet Relations (1947-1972) -A Documentary Study. Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi, 1973. P-386
33. Chopra, V.D. : India and the Socialist World, Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi. 1983. P-89.
34. Ibid. P-85
35. Op. Cit Neelkant, K. etc P-113
36. Ibid. P-5
37. Ibid. P-5
38. Jain, A.P. (ed): The Shadow of the Bear: The Indo-Soviet Treaty; New Delhi, 1971. P-91.
39. Deshpande, G.P.: "The Indo-Soviet Treaty" Economic and Political Weekly; Vol. 6, No. 34, August 21, 1971. P-1802.

40. Ibid. P-1803
41. Sen, Mohit.: "The Indo-Soviet Treaty"; Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 6. No-39, September 25, 1971. P-2047.
42. Ibid. P-2048
43. View from Delhi; "From Russia With Pity"; Frontier, August 21, 1971, P-4.
44. Biswas, Satya.: "After the Treaty", Frontier, October 23, 1971, P-6
45. Ibid. P-7
46. View from Delhi. "Arms For the Treaty"; Frontier, Nov.6, 1971. P-4.
47. Roy, S.: "The Treaty"; Frontier, September 4, 1971. P-5
48. Ibid. P-7
49. Ray, Aswini K. : "Indo-Soviet Treaty: Long-Term Relevance" in Bhatia, Vinod (ed), The October etc, P- 12.
50. Misra, K.P. : "Indo-Soviet Relations : An Overview" in Bhatia, Vinod (ed) : The October etc. P-84.
51. Khan, Rasheeduddin. : "Defence of Indian Sovereignty and the Role of the Soviet Union " in Bhatia, Vinod (ed) : The October etc P- 109.
52. Ibid. P-109.
53. Bhatia, R.L. : "A Time Tested Friendship" in Bhatia, Vinod (ed): The October Revolution etc P-134.
54. Bhatia, Vinod. : "Indo-Soviet Relations - An Overall View" in Bhatia, Vinod. (ed) : Indo-Soviet Relations etc P-24.
55. Op cit. No-17. Anand, Jagjit Singh etc. P-50.
56. Chakravarti, Sumit. : "Indo-Soviet Summits -An Assessment" in Bhatia, Vinod. (ed) : Indo-Soviet Relations -etc P-97.
57. Op cit No. 17. Anand, Jagjit Singh. etc. P-70.
58. Ibid. P-71.

59. Op cit. No. 45. Chakravorti, Sumit. etc. P-99.
60. Ibid. P-101
61. Misra, K.P. : "Indo-Soviet Relations - An Overview" in Bhatia, Vinod (ed.) : The October etc, P-85.
62. Rumanyantsev, Yevgeni. : The Bandung Spirit Today; Allied Publishers Ltd, New Delhi, 1990. P-163.
63. Muravyov, Andrei. : Soviet Indian Economic Relations; Panchsheel Publishers, New Delhi, 1988, P-4.
64. Muravyov, Andrei. : Soviet Indian Economic Relations;- Trends and Prospects. Panchsheel Publishers. New Delhi. 1988 P-3.
65. Singh, Darbara. : "Delhi Declaration: Its Significance" in Bhatia, Vinod (ed): The October etc P-151 and Indo-Soviet 10-Point Delhi Declaration; Southern Economist, December, 1986. P-25.
66. Op.Cit. Misra, K.P. etc P-86.
67. Op. Cit No.52. Singh Darbaraetc. P-152
68. Op. Cit Rummyantsev, Yevgeni. : P-169
69. Raja Mohan, C. : "Indo-Soviet Efforts to Restructure World Order"; Mainstream Nov. 19, 1988. P-16.
70. Bondarevsky, Grigory. 'Two Years of the Delhi Declaration: Some Reflections"; Mainstream, November 19, 1988; P-20.
71. Op. Cit Ivashentsov, Gleb. & Koltsov, etc .P-60.
72. Ibid. P-61.
73. Op. Cit Misra, K.P.: etc P-86.
74. Dutt, V.P. : "Indo-Soviet Relations" in Bhatia, Vinod. (ed) : The October etc P-97.
75. Ibid. P-97-98.

76. Singh, Darbara. : "Delhi Declaration : Its Significance" in Bhatia, Vinod.: The October Revolution etc. P-154.

77. Ilyin, G.F. :(i) Ancient History Herald, Moscow-Leningrad, 1950.

(ii) History and Culture of Ancient India; Moscow, 1963.

78. Balabushevich, V.V. Wafa, A.H. : "Indology in USSR in Balabushevich, (ed) etc. P-201.

79. Vaidyanath, R. : "Soviet Studies in India" in Balabushevich, V.V. & Prasad, Bimla. (ed) : etc P-225.

80. Op. Cit Rummyantsev, Yevgeni. : P-161.