

CHAPTER-III

KANT'S TREATMENT OF IMAGINATION

In Kant's critical framework Imagination is treated as transcendental faculty, though its empirical, psychological character has also been taken into consideration. Kant, unlike Hume and Descartes has given a positive evaluation of imagination in the context of acquiring knowledge. For Plato, Descartes and Hume, it is antithetical to reason, in Hume imagination is particularly associated with belief which itself results from the association of ideas. But for Kant the transcendental imagination is the ground of the possibility of knowledge. In Kant we find a distinction between the transcendental and the psychological aspects of the concept of imagination. However, before elaborating upon the epistemological function of imagination in Kant, it is useful to have a brief synoptic survey of Kant's treatment of imagination in his work. As far as the *Critique of Pure Reason* is concerned, there are two important issues to be discussed. These are (1) the distinction between the transcendental and the empirical imagination, (2) the idea of schematization as connected with the productive imagination.

In the *Critique of Practical reason*, the Kantian treatment to imagination is very complex and difficult to understand. For there is a denial of the role of imagination in this second Critique. However, one can still trace the functioning of imagination in the notion of "types" which Kant uses in the discussion of the moral sphere.

In the *Critique of Judgement*, however, imagination plays a much more important role, Imagination is, here, shown to be involved in the aesthetic judgements. A judgement of beauty is explained in terms of a natural affinity between imagination and understanding.

The Critique of Pure Reason : The Philosophical Background

In order to understand the role of imagination in Kant's works, we must first clarify the role which he assigns to imagination in the epistemological context. It for this reason that in the initial stage of discussion, we shall focus on the role and significance of imagination in the first Critique. We shall therefore first consider the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the background against which

it was written. In discussing the general background we may also try to give a somewhat definite meaning of certain concepts which Kant uses throughout all the three Critiques. Such attempt would be useful for understanding Kant.

Kant's epistemology, as Lewis W. Beck has pointed out, stands for a strategy. (Beck, 1969, p.4). It is not an erratic effort, rather, it is an organized programme to safe-guard the interests of scientific knowledge on the one hand and of morality on the other. Kant was equally and profoundly influenced by the Newtonian physics and by Rousseau's thought. He believed, following the implications of the Newtonian physics that knowledge of the world is possible and that a rational explanation of the world is also possible. However, the scientific explanation of the world does not mean for Kant that morality must be meaningless. Moral discourse and notions are rooted in the facet of the human personality which includes the application of scientific laws. "Most people care primarily for one side or the other, look at science with the eyes of a moralist or at morals with the eyes of a scientist. Kant was remarkable in his determination to vindicate alike both these activities of the human spirit". (Lindsay, 1934, p. xx). However, Kant also wished to banish the rationalist dogmatic meta-physics completely. He was concerned with the metaphysical status of science and the scientific status of metaphysics. He wished to safeguard the claims of the objectivity of scientific knowledge but was opposed to metaphysics. He felt that knowledge must be saved from the attacks of skepticism. And yet the attempt to save knowledge must not degenerate into a mere speculative metaphysical system. Hence, he condemned both rationalists as well as empiricists "dogmatists" and 'nomadic tribes' respectively. This is very apt image used by Kant which conveys precisely the activities of the rationalist and the empiricists. Both emphasized only one faculty of the human mind to the exclusion of the others. And it is at this point that Kant was basically at disagreement with both of them. He was aware that both the schools had certain justification for their claims. That both sense-experience and reason are useful for knowledge, he never doubted. But he did not accept the views which gave top most position to any one of the two at the cost of the exclusion of the other. As Beck remarks "His (Kant's) question was : How not to be a dogmatist in metaphysics without being a skeptic in our knowledge of nature, Hume's skepticism was all of one piece : no objective necessary knowledge of matter

of fact either in or beyond experience. Leibniz's dogmatism was all of one piece : a priori knowledge of both what is in and what is beyond experience. Kant wanted to break these two continuities and he saw that each was based on a theory of one source and one kind of knowledge" (Beck, 1969, p.14). He was, however, aware of the merits of these theories, and he strove to bring these together in the form of a more balanced position which is not merely a patch-work. He brought about a fusion of their basic principles and gave them a totally new dimension. As Beck points out, "... the mature Kant was never entirely uncritical of rationalists, and never fully committed to a skepticism based on empiricism". (Beck, 1969, p.5) With reference to knowledge, Kant claims, that it must be an outcome of the harmonious functioning of sensibility and understanding. There are the faculties which stand for empiricism and rationalism respectively. None can function without the aid of the other. Hence, his oft quoted saying : "... though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows, that all arises out of experience." (Kant, 1934, p.25). Knowledge, in other words, consists of a synthesis of our sensible intuitions, by the concepts of the understanding.

Some important concepts in the Critical Philosophy :

At this point we must pause and consider certain concepts which are important to understand the further development of Kantian thought, because these concepts have methodological significance in Kant's texts.

(a) Transcendental :

Let us first consider the concept of transcendental. By transcendental what Kant means is the conditions of the possibility of certain experiences which are accepted as real. Kant writes, "I call transcendental all knowledge which has to do not so much with object as with how we know objects in so far as with this may be possible a priori." (Kant, 1934, p.12). From this we can say that transcendental arguments are concerned with the possibility of knowledge or experience. But what are "experiences"? They are exemplified by such facts which we all take as obvious in our non-philosophical moments, such facts as that we can make mathematical judgements, discriminate statements about what is happening in ourselves, generally distinguish the real from the apparent, and so on. But even though we accept these and other experiences how can we be certain that these are possible on the basis of only a few specific

conditions? In what sense do these conditions necessitate those experiences? And what is the nature of the necessity involved? These are a few questions which can be raised, though I do not attempt to answer them at this point. What I wish to stress upon is that the Transcendental argument which involves spelling out the possibility of all our experiences in terms of certain a priori principles, seems to establish the centrality and the active participation of the Human mind in the pursuit of knowledge. Kant's approach is hence often described by using such phrases as the "Transcendental method."

There is a way in which the transcendental method of Kant may be understood. We have seen, how Kant avoids both the extremes of empiricism and rationalism. This is what compels him to accept the transcendental method which is neither purely empirical nor completely rational. What the transcendental method consists in, is, given the fact that we have experiences, there are certain a priori conditions which make them possible. However, a mere statement of such a transcendental method does not constitute its justification, nor does it satisfactorily explain the notion of necessity involved in the transcendental method. This method has its origin in the Copernican turn. It consists in, that instead of treating human mind as something which should conform to the object of experience, Kant holds that the objects of experience must conform to the a priori conditions of the human mind. The thesis that the object must conform to the conditions of the human mind, has rich implications. The first implication is that it gives man an important status in the process of acquiring knowledge by placing him at the centre. Man is regarded not as passive recipient but as an active synthesiser. The second implication is ontological, it involves a clear-cut distinction between the phenomenon and the noumenon. But most importantly, the Copernican turn suggests the notion of a transcendental method which consists in the deduction of the transcendental conditions of experience as has been pointed out before. Kant arrives at the notion of the Copernican turn through an examination of the potentialities and limitations of human rationality. This is what he means by a "Critique".

(b) Critique

The concept of Critique is important in Kant's philosophy because it in a way contains Kant's entire philosophical programme. In chalking out his programme, he makes a declaration which he tells us about the concept of the

Critique, "I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to the cognitions to *which it strives to attain without the aid of experience*, in other words, the solution of the question regarding the possibility or impossibility of Metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this science. All this must be done on the basis of principles". (Kant, 1934, p.3).

A careful analysis of the above declaration reveals Kant's basic strategy for overcoming the shortcomings of both dogmatism and skepticism with the same method. He points out that reason is capable of undertaking an examination of itself and can be aware of the extent as well as the limits of its application. The functioning of reason is very much restricted by the limits of sense, and within those limits, knowledge is possible. But if these limits are crossed, reason finds itself indulging in dogmatic metaphysics.

(c) Deduction :

As pointed out before, Kant wants to preserve the sound claims of both the traditions. This reconciliation between rationalism and empiricism is brought about by the transcendental deduction. The term 'deduction' in the Critique has two connotations : (1) it signifies a logical argument in which a thesis is demonstrated on the basis of principles; (2) it also carries the juridical meaning of justified right or claim. Kant writes, "Teachers of jurisprudence, when speaking of rights and claims, distinguish in a cause the question of right from the question of fact, and while they demand proof of both, they give to the proof of the former, which goes to establish right or claim in law, the name of Deduction". (Kant, 1934, p.85).

Kant in this context, is concerned with claims of knowledge. According to him, in the epistemological framework, the claim that we can apply pure concepts of the understanding to the sense manifold requires justification. Understanding is an independent human faculty which cannot be derived from sensibility. And yet it requires sensibility for its legitimate functioning. Now the question is how can such heterogeneous faculties work together in a harmonious way? Kant's claim is that these faculties do in fact cooperate. The knowledge which we have is itself an evidence of their cooperation. This is evident in Kant's very

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formulation of the basic epistemological problem. He does not ask whether I have knowledge, but now do I come to have knowledge at all. The Transcendental Deduction, therefore, is to be taken as an argument justifying an epistemic right.

An analysis of the concept of 'right' may reveal certain features of the programme of the Transcendental Deduction. (a) A right in general, can be justified only if we can indicate the functionality of it, i.e., if we can show the necessity of the right. It must be shown why a certain right is needed. In this context, the functionality of the right is to render knowledge possible. Acquiring knowledge is the basic goal of man since Kant takes man to be a rational being. It is therefore, a basic need of man to have a coherent understanding of himself and of the world. (b) The concept of right presupposes the limits of its proper application. Here, the right to apply concepts is justifiable only on the admission of the limitation of that right. The concepts, as the limitation points out, must apply only to the contents of the sensibility. Beyond the boundaries of sense-experience the application of the concepts would mean that they are being improperly used. (c) A right is justified if we show the existence of the capacity to exercise that right. The right here, is the application of the concepts to the sense-manifold. Since this right is relational, it cannot be justified merely by reference either to sensibility or to understanding. Understanding by itself cannot apply the concepts to the manifold, it merely exhibits the conceptual structure. Hence in addition to the sensibility and understanding, there must be a third power, namely imagination, which is capable of bringing the manifolds of sense in relation with concepts. This power, says Kant, is a hidden power. One can only understand it in terms of its functioning in the transcendental deduction as well as in the schematization. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, imagination plays an important role in both metaphysical and transcendental deductions. Let us take this issue in some detail. As pointed out before, Kant does not question the co-operation between the understanding and the sensibility. That they do co-operate is evidenced by the fact that we do have knowledge. The kantian question is to give a justification for such a co-operation.

(d) Productive and Reproductive Imagination :

Kant's account of the two imaginations is as follows : "Now, in so far as imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes call it also the productive imagination, and distinguish it from the reproductive, the synthesis of which is subject entirely to empirical laws, these of association namely, and which therefore, contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of a priori cognition, and for this reason belongs not to transcendental philosophy but to psychology" (Kant, 1934, p.105). A discussion of these two imaginations has been carried out in this very chapter.

KANT AND HUME : A BRIEF COMPARISON

Basically, the equation of imagining with imaging presupposes the context of perception. Hence, any discussion of imagining or of imagination is a discussion of the relationship between imagination and perception. In this regard, Strawson has given an excellent account of this relationship as conceived by Hume and Kant. In what follows I make a brief note of Strawson's account.

Both Hume and Kant regard imagination as a connecting or uniting power. However, this power operates in two different domains. These are - (i) where imagination connects perceptions of different objects of the *same kind* and (ii) where imagination connects different perceptions of the same objects of a given kind e.g. in the first case imagination would connect perceptions of say table 1 and table 2 which are of the same kind. And in the second case imagination would connect different perceptions of that given table (which is of a given kind). First is the illustration of what Strawson calls *kind identity*, that is to say, of recognizing two different objects as of same kind. The second is the illustration of what Strawson calls *individual identity* that is to say, recognizing the given object as *such and such*. It is obvious that both these functions of imagination are complementary and not exclusive of each other. As far as the point of comparison is concerned, the Strawson points out that Kant's *Schematism* and Hume's *of Abstract Ideas* are concerned with the first, that is,

with kind identity. Kant's argument for the transcendental scheme and that of transcendental imagination is discussed below.

As far as the discussion of imagination in the case of individual identity, i.e., recognizing the given object as such and such is concerned, Kant discusses this issue in Transcendental Deduction, and Hume in the chapter entitled Skepticism with regard to the senses in his *Treatise*.

According to Hume, senses, reason or understanding and imagination are to be distinguished. The question then is, which of these faculties lead us to the continued and distinct existence of bodies? Of the three, senses or reason by themselves do not lead us to the continued and distinct existence of bodies. Hume gives his own reasons for saying so. What is important for us is to note that he ascribes this function to imagination, i.e., our belief in the continued and distinct existence of bodies is due to imagination. But on Hume's account, imagination fails to do precisely this because imagination confounds the "Similarity of temporarily separated and hence non-identical perceptions with strict identity through time As a result we "believe in a continued existence of perceptions where there is patently no such thing." (Strawson, 1974, p. 49). It is in this way that Hume denounces imagination.

Kant on the other hand, would argue that Hume takes a certain character of perceptions for granted. Hence, the question is not "how it can be that on the basis of perceptual experience as it is we come to have the beliefs in question, but how it is that perceptual experience is already such as to embody the beliefs in question; or, perhaps better, *what* it is for perceptual experience to be such as to embody the beliefs in question". (Strawson, 1974, p.50).

The differences between Hume and Kant are to be located within the framework suggested by the above question. And accordingly one also gets an answer to this very question, namely, how imagination comes into the account given by Kant. The crux of the entire discussion in this regard lies in recognizing that in the actual perceptions that we have there is also non-actual or possible perceptions involved in it. Imagination in one of its aspects is a faculty which represents such non-actual perceptions in the case of our having actual perceptions. This is done through images. This function of imagination, namely to represent with the help of images some non-actual perceptions in the present

one points out what Strawson calls a 'kinship' between the two functions of imagination as far as establishing the relationship between kind identity and individual identity. No knowledge claim will be valid or justified if we ignore the recognition of these two identities. It is in this sense that for Kant there is justification which imagination offers for making imagination necessary in the process of knowledge. In the case of Hume imagining can offer no justification for knowledge. As has been pointed out before, it is the transcendental approach taken by Kant that lies at the root of this basic difference between him and Hume. "We know that Kant thought that perceptual experience did not just *happen* to have the general character it has, but *had* to have at least something like this character, if experience (that is the temporarily extended experience of a self conscious being) was to be possible at all" (Strawson, 1974, p. 50).

Hence for Kant the functioning of imagination was bound upon with the problem of justification of perceived knowledge Kant assigned to imagination a role in the validation of knowledge. As pointed out before, the Kantian problem is to offer justification for applying the pure concepts to the manifold of sense. Kant deals with this issue extensively and his programme consists of our parts, viz. the metaphysical deduction, the transcendental deduction, schematism and the analogies of experience.

THE METAPHYSICAL DEDUCTION

The first part constitutes the Metaphysical Deduction which is a preliminary to the question of justification. Metaphysical deduction gives us a complete account of concepts whose use requires to be justified. In this context, Kant makes a critical comment on Aristotle who talked about categories but failed to offer demonstration for their justification and for their completeness. According to Kant, Aristotle seemed to have stumbled upon the categories for he never stated them on the basis of any principle.

"Destitute, however, of any guiding principle, he (Aristotle) picked them up just as they occurred to him, and at first hunted out ten, which he called categories. Afterwards he believed that he had discovered five others, which were added under the name of *post predicaments*". (Kant, 1934, p.80).

CHAPTER-III

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For Kant, Aristotle's deduction is defective since it does not involve any rule of derivation. On the other hand, Kant claims that his list is a complete and exhaustive one based on the systematic application of principle. However, when we actually examine the metaphysical deduction, we face a puzzling element. For nowhere does Kant formulate any rule of derivation by using which the categories could be derived. He only presents a classification of types of judgements. This classification divides the categories into four types viz. Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality, each having three judgement types.

Hence, a new element in this classification comes to the forefront. The judgement is considered, in this context, as being devoid of the content. It is merely a form or a schema of the synthesis between the subject and the predicate. This, according to Kant is only a logical counterpart of the epistemological synthesis which can be justified on its basis. In other words, in an epistemological situation, there is a corresponding synthesis between the sense manifold and the pure concepts. Hence, if there are twelve types of logical judgements, then there are corresponding twelve forms of synthesis. Each represents a type of objective, epistemological synthesis. Therefore, says Kant, there are only these twelve and necessarily those twelve categories.

In recent years, this programme of deducing epistemological categories from the logical ones has been called into question. There have been in main two criticisms. The first criticism points out that Kant is using an out dated Aristotelian table of judgements. The second criticism consists in saying that content cannot be derived from form. Formal judgements are empty, whereas categories are made of combination in content. Both these criticisms are made by Walsh. (Walsh, 1968, p.61).

At this point, we can think of a certain perspective which may satisfactorily answer the second criticism. If we consider the kind of thinking that is involved in the metaphysical deduction, we find that it has specific pattern. This thinking involves starting from a certain point and arriving at certain other point that is not directly given to us in experience. It is not an inference for there is no logic which necessitates it. It might be likened to what Kant himself has termed 'reflective thinking' which passes from a given instance to a rule which has not been given. However, it is clear that the metaphysical deduction is *not* a movement from an instance to a rule. But the point of similarity is only that there is a movement from the given to that which not been given. This is an exercise

which quite clearly involves imagination. This is an important point for the present context, given the particular judgement of logic, the thinking hints at a corresponding category thus carrying out fully the metaphysical deduction. Imagination aids the process of the derivation of categories. Since the categories are said to be the necessary conditions of knowledge the role of imagination can be said to be functional for knowledge.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION

The more important aspect of the critical programme is the justification of applying the pure concepts of thought to the manifold of sense. This is the transcendental deduction we shall first undertake a brief description of the stages of the transcendental deduction. But it is important to note that our concern is not with the detailed discussion of the transcendental deduction. The account is meant only for exhibiting the role of imagination in the programme of justification.

In the transcendental deduction, Kant begins with the classical empiricist thesis that we have representations. However, for Kant, the next step is quite different from the general line of empiricism. It holds that the fact that there are representations means that there is a "Unity of Apperception" (a self) which is having them. Representations cannot be had by tables and chairs. The fact that there are representations implies the existence of a conscious perceiver. The representations that we have are "Organized" or "Conjoined" in certain ways. This organization or conjunction is carried out by the perceiver. Wilkerson restates the initial two steps of this deduction in the following manner:

- (1) "There is a series of representations, order in time.
- (2) For such a series to be possible, the representations must be synthesized, i.e., taken up and connected in one consciousness, brought to the necessary unity of apperception." (Wilkerson, 1976, p.43).

No one can dispute the fact that we actually have representations or experiences. According to Kant, these are possible only on the assumption of the synthetic unity of apperception. The existence and the working of the self can never be doubted according to Kant. For him, it is the most fundamental assumption which underlies the entire sphere of our mental activity. This awareness of the self is most basic and spontaneous. No proof is needed to justify it. 'The "I" think' must accompany all my representations, for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought, in other words, the representation would either be impossible, or at least be, in relation to me, nothing" (Kant, 1934, p.94).

The unified "self" is the precondition of the possibility of having representations. Similarly, Kant holds that the existence of an object independent of the subject is another condition of the possibility of experience. This argument emerges in the further stages of the transcendental deduction.

These next steps are restated by Wilkerson as follows :

((3) "The representations must be connected according to the various a priori forms of synthesis.

(4) The forms in question are the *categories* already listed in the metaphysical deduction.

Therefore,

(5) The categories, pure concepts of understanding, concepts of objects, must have application in experience". (Wilkerson, 1976, p.54).

According to Kant, the existence of objects is an important condition for the possibility of experience. If it was not so, our experiences would become subjective fantasies. Just as the perceiving unified self is one fundamental prerequisite of objective knowledge. Similarly, the existence of an object, (independently of the self) is another important pre-condition of experience. The result of the transcendental deduction is the thesis that the conditions of the possibility of knowledge are simultaneously the conditions of the possibility of the existence of the objects of experience. The categories cannot be intelligibly employed without presupposing the *existence* of objects. Thus, in

the transcendental deduction, Kant attempts to justify the objective validity of experience in which the categories are employed. The transcendental deduction attempts to give justification of our knowledge - claims. It seeks to transform a subjective habit of association (as understood by Hume) into an objectively valid claim. Whenever, we make statements about reality they are justified on the basis of the concepts of the understanding e.g. when we claim that X is the cause of Y, it is not out of mere psychological habit, but is out of certain way of perceiving that justifies the perception.

It is therefore, necessary to look at the achievements of the transcendental deduction from the points (1) objective validity and (2) subjective tendency to have representations. These are the two objective and subjective deductions. If we look at the issue in these terms, Kant can be seen to be attempting to justify a thesis that any adequate theory of knowledge must justify the demands of objective validity as well as of subjective accessibility. For our present purposes, it is important to note that imagination is involved in both, the objective and the subjective deductions.

Subjectively speaking, objects of experience are seen only because we can schematise the pure concepts of the understanding with reference to the sense-manifold. Schematization makes objects accessible to human beings by relating sensibility with understanding. At the same time, the object is that which can be located in the human conceptual framework. This background framework which constitutes objectivity for us is the working of the understanding. Therefore, without the understanding, there can be no notion of objectivity.

Transcendental Imagination and Transcendental Schema

The actual question here is how to sensibility and understanding come together to give rise to knowledge? The Kantian answer is in the form of transcendental imagination which brings together the sense-manifold and the pure concepts of the understanding and thus justifies knowledge.

The actual operation of imagination in this context is called the transcendental schema. The entire discussion of schematism presupposes the transcendental deduction because it deals with the union of the sense-manifold and the pure concepts. Speaking very generally it brings about a reconciliation

between the 'empirical' and the "a priori".

Kant writes, "The theory of schematism deals with the direct a priori of the a posteriori and points to the fact that the posteriori already having a structure lends itself to being conceived by concepts whose validity has been shown in the transcendental deduction". (Kant, 1934, p.30).

He points out that the 'a posteriori' already has a structure. According to him, there is no pure impression as such. Anything that enters into our consciousness must be located in the framework of time. The understanding presents the categories. But it does not activate itself to embrace the manifold offered by sensibility. Rather, some "third thing" is required whereby these two faculties can be synthesized. It is transcendental imagination, which through the schema translates the categories in terms of time, thus giving them a natural affinity with the sense-manifold that has already been ordered in time. This is the most important function of imagination, for it is only through the combining of the sensibility with the understanding that knowledge is possible.

The concept of schema is one of the controversial concepts in the First *Critique*. There are various interpretations of the concept of schema itself, each offering a different account. However, a discussion of the concept may reveal certain points which are important in bringing out the role of imagination. Kant introduced the transcendental schema to perform a certain function, that of uniting the sensible intuitions with the concepts of the understanding.

While explaining this, Strawson writes, "The doctrine of synthesis rests firmly on the distinction of faculties, what is given in sense alone, is mere receptivity, is one thing; what is made out of it by understanding, with the help of its no less active lieutenant, imagination, the go between of sense and understanding, is quite another." (Strawson, 1966, p.97).

Kant called schema the "third thing" for obviously it could not be identified either with sensibility or with understanding. Its function was to bring about a fusion of the two. "It is clear that a third thing must be given which must stand in a relation of being of the same sort with the category on the one hand, and with the appearance on the other, and which makes possible the application of the former to the latter. The mediating representation must be pure (without anything empirical) and yet not simply intellectual it must at the same time be

sensuous. Such a thing is the transcendental schema." (Kant, 1934, p.37).

Two points become quite clear in this context. These are as follows :

The schema must be something which is (1) different from both intuitions and concepts and yet (2) resembles both in same way. As has been pointed out, "The image is a particular, and the concept is a universal, while the scheme is a "third thing" mediating between the particulars and the universal." (Swing, 1969, p.42).

The schema is actually intended to be seen by Kant as a dual thing. For him it has a two-fold character by virtue of which it can bridge the gap between sensibility and understanding. Kant's obscure account of schematism does not clearly explain the function and management of this dual character. This is where interpretations become important, and I propose to consider a few of them. Strawson has not given much importance to this part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He writes about the statements made regarding the notion of the schema as follows :

"It is useless to puzzle over the status of these propositions. They belong neither to empirical (including physiological) psychology nor to an analytical philosophy of mind *though some of them may have near or remote analogues in both.*" (Strawson, 1966, p.97). Rotenstreich explains schematism by suggesting that there is a simultaneous two-way moment between sensibility and understanding. He holds that the productive imagination works from the concepts to the sense-manifold, whereas it is schematism which operates from the sense-manifold to the concepts. He writes, "Imagination is the bridge stretched from concepts to the data, while schematism is the bridge stretched from the data, to the concepts by the structure of the data themselves, a structure bestowed on them by time. Now, that what imagination does for concepts, time does for data. Time elevates data to the level where their meeting with concepts is possible." (Roentstreich, 1972, p.34).

Ernst Cassirer gives an interpretation which is quite different from the one given by Rontenstreich. According to Cassier, schema has a certain significance in the Critical framework. According to him, it suggest a structure which is at the same time, not devoid of content. He regarded scheme as a "form of a new kind." Cassirer points out the superiority of the schema over both intuitions

and categories. Schema is both categories and intuitions in their synthesis, Hence, it is "more complete" than the concepts of the understanding. "Thus the schemata of the pure concepts of the understanding are the true and sole conditions that make possible any relationship of the concepts to objects, and consequently the conditions of their having any meaning" (Kant, 1934, p.38). However, Cassirer did not think of the scheme only as a logical synthesis of the intuitions and the concepts. Rather, Schema for him was much more real, it had a phenomenal character. He interpreted it not as a transcendental but as a phenomenal factor given in our experience.

Transcendental and Empirical Imagination

However, according to Kant it was transcendental and not empirical imagination that was at work in schematism. Transcendental imagination, for Kant had a highly mysterious character. Its function was to give rise to schema. However, *Kant does not make clear how exactly imagination gives rise to the schema and how the schema functions*. His programme of the reconciliation between empiricism and rationalism hinges upon the function of the schema. Kant assigns an important place to imagination, which according to him brings about such a reconciliation. This makes imagination an important condition for the very possibility of knowledge. But his own account of schematism is quite sketchy and does not offer clear answers. Kant has also failed to explain the exact functioning of the productive imagination.

"The productive role of the imagination remains that of mediating between sensation and discursive thought, between the empirical manifold and the universal propositions of science generated through the agency of *a priori* concepts. But the act of synthesis, despite the ostentation of the Kantian apparatus, remains a mystery. The synthesis combines discrete representations into a manifold constituting an item of knowledge, but the power of imagination effecting this synthesis is itself" a blind but indispensable function of the soul "without which knowledge is impossible, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious". (Levi, 1964, p.189).

It may therefore, be said that the exact functioning of the productive imagination has not been properly explained and articulated by Kant himself. Apart from the functioning and nature of the productive imagination, there also arises another question, namely that of the relationship between the productive

and reproductive imaginations. This question is important not only in the context of schematism but in the Critical Philosophy at large.

As has been pointed out before, Kant uses the word imagination in both the technical and ordinary senses of the term. And the problem that arises is that of the relationship between these two understandings of imagination. These two have been left unconnected by Kant himself. Nowhere does he try to offer a complete account of their relationship with each other. It becomes necessary to locate the connection between the two imaginations because one feels a lurking suspicion that the notion of the transcendental imagination is systematically misleading. The functions of the transcendental imagination seem so radically different from those of the empirical imagination that only the name imagination seems common to both.

Similarly, within the context of schematism itself, Kant insists that it is the transcendental imagination which is at work. The transcendental imagination does not involve images for it is not empirical. But if it is performing the function of combining sense manifolds with the help of an image which is intermediate. If this is so, the transcendental imagination seems to be functioning like the empirical imagination seems to be functioning like the empirical imagination in some way. Levi writes about the transcendental imagination, "the term" "imagination" always connotatively close to its origins of image making should now become almost the chief inhabitant of a realm of purely logical subsistence the manifold of appearances with its singleness and separateness of component parts recurs as the epistemic problem; and the active faculty for their synthesis again becomes the virtual imagination which produces almost simultaneously an image and a connection of impressions in time ... This is essentially the reproductive function of an imagination whose operations are merely empirical." (Levi, 1964, p. 188).

This is a serious charge which can be legitimately made, for Kant has not clearly worked out the functional similarities of dissimilarities between the two imaginations.

Imagination in the Analogies of Experience:

In the previous discussion I had suggested that we may study the role of imagination in the *Critique of Pure Reason* in three different contexts :

- (a) methodology of the metaphysical deduction ;
- (b) schematism and
- (c) the analogies of experience.

I have commented briefly on the function of imagination in the case of methodology of the metaphysical deduction and that of schematism. We shall now consider the functions of imagination in the argumentations involved in the analogies of experience.

Some of the recent commentators of Kant have given a considerable attention to the discussion of analogies. But in what follows I shall not follow that analysis. Rather I would try to suggest in a more or less independent manner how the problem posed in the analogies of experience may be connected with imagination. For this purpose I may state all the three analogies in brief, and mention their contention.

THE ANALOGIES OF EXPERIENCE

(a) The First Analogy :

The first analogy suggest that the category of substance is available in our empirical thought and experience by way of the notion of "permanence in time." We here think of object as having a core of substantial permanent powers and as being capable of entering into changeable relations and accidents into each other. The first analogy, therefore, is connected with empirical substance.

(b) The Second Analogy :

The second analogy deals with the type of law-governed relations and sequences among phenomena. Here Kant gives two types of order given in

our experience - reversible and irreversible.

Reversible is that in which the order in which perceptions are given in experience is not constitutive of the experience itself. Although there is a sequence, it is possible for us to think of the order in a different way without changing the experiences. Here Kant gives the example of seeing the front and the back sides of a house. In this case the order of perception is not the order in the experience itself. As contrasted with this, the series of representations of a boat sailing down the river present the irreversible order which is constitutive of a series of objective successions. Kant distinguishes there two as - reversible order as being succession in us and irreversible order as being succession in the objects. Kant argues that sequentiality is possible only on the basis of the assumption of a law like connection between various perceptions. Unless we assume that the later part follows upon the earlier one in accordance with a rule or law, we cannot obtain a meaningful perception. This idea of the irreversible order, of a rule governed sequence in experience is a representation of the law of causal connection. The second analogy, therefore, is a mode of the category of causality.

(c) The Third Analogy

The third analogy describes a similar representation in our empirical experience of the idea of reciprocity. The category of reciprocity suggests that substances are naturally interactive in the sense that the state of one substance is explainable only in terms of its relation with other substances. here, Kant uses a term which is stronger than reciprocity, he calls it the "community of substances". The objects are not merely isolated but they form a network of a possible natural order in which each is related with the others in a law-like manner.

The three analogies taken separately may be regarded as providing empirical representations of constant categorical determinations. The category of substance, e.g. is represented sensually as permanence in time in the first analogy. In the second, the category of causality is termpralized as a necessary sequence. The category of community becomes interaction between things in the third analogy. From this point of view, the three analogies, as understood separately, give models of the categories in sensuous experience. To this extent, all the three analogies, in a way, reiterate, what the arguments

for schematism establish. But the analogies go a step beyond schematism because behind each analogy, there is a fundamental scientific principle of Newtonian theory. Schematism does not involve this element. It is purely on the epistemic level, suggesting a link between the sensibility and the understanding. The analogies are built upon this aspect of schematism and also show how the link between understanding and sensibility may be productive of specific principles. In this sense, the analogies extend the scope of issues discussed in schematism. In so far as the analogies are a continuation of schematism, one can see that as in the case of schematism, the analogies too involve imagination. But we can go a step further if we take the three analogies together. If they are taken together, they provide the picture of a natural order as a whole. Each analogy is intelligible only on the presupposition that there is a world of nature in which there are individual things each having properties which influence the properties of other things in a law-like manner. The implication of this is, to know anything is to have a capacity to think of it as a part of the natural order. This presupposition itself is not offered by sensibility. Nor is it supplied by the understanding. For the understanding has only the pure concepts to offer. This presupposition of a coherent natural order therefore be the product only of imagination. It is the creation of the productive imagination. Imagination, thus can be said to have a specific role in the analogies of experience. It is easier to understand its role here than in schematism for schematism does not involve any such presupposition like a natural order. Thus, it is the productive imagination that supplies the presupposition necessary for the possibility of cognition.

Imagination in the Critique of Practical Reason and in the Critique of Judgement:

REASON AND IMAGINATION

When we move from the *Critique of Pure Reason* to the *Critique of Practical Reason*, what immediately strikes one is Kant's emphatic rejection of the role of imagination in the context of morality. The reason being the distinction Kant makes between understanding and reason. As has been discussed earlier, the faculty of understanding requires certain material to be given to it in the form of sense manifold. The function of the understanding is to effect an ordering

and systematization of the sense-manifold. Understanding is not autonomous, for it presupposes the functioning of sensibility which provides the sense-manifolds. Because understanding is not autonomous the question of its relationship with the other faculty, namely, sensibility, arises. It is at this point that imagination performs its function in the *first Critique*. But reason, which is operative in the sphere of morality is not dependent upon any other faculty for its functioning. It is autonomous. It can determine a particular action or decision on its own. The rational moral will is such that it can by its own autonomy give rise to the moral action. Because of this autonomy of reason, there is no need for schema in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. For schema, as we have seen before, is essentially a bridge between two different faculties. And no such bridge is required in the second Critique because reason is the sole faculty which is operative in the sphere of morality.

According to Kant there is no need of a schema in the realm of praxis though, there is a need for the notion of a type. Kant suggests that there can be only types but not schemas in the sphere of morality.

There are however, fundamental differences between the notion of Types and Schema. In order to appreciate them, let us first consider the notion of the Type.

The Notion of the Type :

Lant jad ,aomtaomed tjat pme jas tp ne guided by abstract and universalizable principles in the sphere of morality. Moral principles are independent of any personal or subjective considerations. To us Kant's own words "It must abstract from all material content and from everything contingent, for our analysis of duty shows that moral laws commands unconditionally and universally. Abstraction from any particular content leaves us with only the form of law as such. (Kant, 1959, pp. 420-21).

The question which now arises is that, how can such an abstract principle actually guide us in our subjective and particular moral situations ? the moral law belongs to the realm of freedom. If this, is the case, how can it have any bearing upon human action which belongs to the sphere of natural phenomena?

How is the gap between freedom and nature to be bridged, and how can the formal moral law be related to human action? Kant's solution is that, while there can be no direct presentation or schematism of moral law, there can be an indirect or symbolical presentation. Kant offers his solution in the form of the notion of type.

"A schema is a universal procedure of the imagination in presenting a priori to the senses a pure concept of the understanding which is determined by the law; and a scheme must correspond to natural laws to which objects of sensuous intuition as such are subject. But to the laws of freedom (which is a causality not sensuously conditioned) and consequently to the concept of the absolutely good, no intuition and hence no schema can be supplied for the purpose of applying it in concrete. Thus, the moral law has no other cognitive

faculty to mediate its application to objects of nature that the understanding (not the imagination) and the understanding can supply to an idea of reason not a schema of sensibility but a law. This, law, as one of which can be exhibited in concrete in objects of the senses, is a natural law. But this natural law can, for the purpose of judgement, be used only in its formal aspect, and it may therefore, be called the type of the moral law." (Kant, 1968; p.70).

So, even though there is no schema for the abstract moral principle i.e., the categorical imperative, it does have a type, an indirect or analogical presentation of it. This type is a "rule of judgement" supplied by understanding to guide as in making practical judgements that assess particular maxims. Kant, as we have seen above, does not accord imagination any role in this process of typification. However, one can see that imagination is involved in the notion of a type.

Type and Imagination :

It has been argued by scholars like Mark Johnson that the notion of the type can be interpretatively understood as a 'figurative process' (Johnson, 1985, p.265). Paul Dietrichson also has understood type as a figurative substitute for schematization. The function of a type is "to supply the moral law with a non-constitutive, purely heuristic, illustrative mediation - principle enabling me to

make us of the moral law a practical standard for spraising my material maxims. The gap between the abstract moral law and my material maxims of action cannot be bridged, then, by a literal schematizing of the moral law. What is needed is a merely figurative substitute for a schematization of the moral law, i.e., typification." (Deitrichson, 1969, pp. 176-177).

Following this, Mark Johnson holds that, "it would be correct to claim that the type is a figurative substitute for a schematization because applying the categorical imperative requires an imaginative leap by which laws from one domain (nature) are taken as acting like (with respect to their form) laws in another domain (freedom). In other words, the typification of the categorical imperative is essentially a metaphorical process, that is, a transfer of structures functioning in one realm, which is thus organized by these projected structures." (Johnson, 1985, p.265).

What becomes clear from the above comment is that moral reasoning involves an act of imaginative envisionment of a non-existing world as a means for judging a proposed maxim. This whole process is clearly metaphorical, involving the process of imagination. The metaphor involves taking what we know of natural law and projecting it on to the realm of freedom so as to transform free action into naturally necessitated action. Based on this metaphorical transformation, we must then determine whether the envisioned world would involve some sort of internal contradiction. Such a metaphoric understanding is a projective process in which we employ imagination to evaluate our proposed maxim.

In the end of this section, it may be fruitful to summarise the role of imagining in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. In doing so, I may refer to Mark Johnson.

(1) To recognize that a rule might be relevant to our present case involves imagination.

(2) We have to use imagination to weigh similarities and differences between the situation at hand and others.

(3) Even if we have discovered a relevant rule, it will typically involve underlying metaphors, the understanding of which involves imagination.

(4) Finally, the situation which I now grasp and evaluate must be compared and contrasted with an envisioned, projected world. This clearly involves imagination. Thus, even though Kant denies imagination any role in the sphere of morality, it can be easily seen that the phenomenon of moral action and evaluation as understood by Kant does involve imagination.

Imagination in the *Critique of Judgement*:

Kant's Critique of Judgement can be described as the crowning achievement of the Critical Philosophy as a whole. This view of the third Critique is based on the fact that in the *Critique of Judgement*, Kant is essentially concerned with a massive reconciliation of two notions, namely nature and freedom which have been the guiding concepts of the first and the second Critiques respectively. The first Critique seems to yield the conclusion that nature can be regarded as an object of knowledge only on the presupposition of the pure concepts of understanding. On the other hand, the second Critique yields the importance of the seemingly opposed principle of freedom as a ground of moral action. These two presuppositions vis., that of nature, (and with it, the principle of cause and effect) and freedom have been reconciled in the third Critique, namely, the *Critique of Judgement*. What is important for us in this context, is to know how Kant brings about this reconciliation. For one of the key concepts used in the third Critique is that of the Reflective Judgement which clearly involves the use of imagination.

The third Critique distinguishes judgement as a unique and irreducible faculty, separate from both sensibility and understanding. At the same time, in the introduction to the *Critique of Judgement*, Kant insists that judgement is very much needed for the proper employment of both sensibility and understanding. Objective knowledge requires the identification of an object under a concept which involves the working together of the sensibility and understanding. The judgement by which an instance is subsumed under a rule is called 'determinant judgement' by Kant. This is where imagination performs an "applicative function". It is due to this application that knowledge becomes possible. In its applicative function, imagination sees to the proper employment of rules. In this case imagination itself is rule-bound. It does not give rise to rules. Rather, it takes care of the correct implication of the rules that already are. But Kant argues that even though this imagination follows rules, it is also