

MARXIST ETHICS — AN EVALUATION

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Bidhuranjau Nath
Signature

Introduction

INTRODUCTION

We know an individual only as a member of a society or a group or a community. The individual man is a rational animal — as animal he has impulses and instincts, but he is more complex in his impulses and desires than any other animals; as a rational animal he has a choice what to do and what not to do. There is a constant conflict between animality and rationality and through this constant conflict in the nature of man that the need of ethics arises. Man has impulses no doubt but it is within his power to control such impulses and in doing this job his difficulties arise. Man is not only an individual being but also a social being and he will have to meet the demand of the universal nature to which he belongs. He has to acquire wisdom as regards the action of social groups — the motives governing the behaviour of the individuals and groups living in a society. He should be after a wise social system where he is to encourage the purposes of all individuals to be satisfied and discourage egoism, greed, hatred or malice — its fundamental principle being — "one for all and all for one". This means that the individual attains the awareness that his life is meaningful, that he has freely adopted a noble ideal and this awareness gives him dignity and a profound sense of decency as a man and allows him to live with a class conscience.

Marxist ethics regards conscience as an attribute of man's social nature, a subjective expression of a certain social and historical imperative — it, together with a sense of duty, makes man aware of his moral responsibility towards himself and towards the other people and

the society at large. The idealist and the subjectivist thinkers hold it to be an individual affair. But this view ignores the fact that conscience serves as a vehicle for different social and class substance and that it has emerged in history in the process of man's social development. Marxist ethics takes a dialectic approach to the interaction of the sensual and the rational in morality. It does not isolate the sensual from the rational - morality fuses the rational, the emotional, the volitional elements into integral mechanisms which regulate our behaviour.

As to the solution of the key-problem of ethics — what the source and basis or foundation of moral ideal is ? - attempts are made by pre-Marxian thinkers to find a basis or source of moral ideas. It has been held by some thinkers that it lies in certain general laws and principles which exist in their own right without reference to any individual experience. They are, therefore, absolute and unchangeable. The contrary view holds that it is to be found in the results or ends or consequences of our experience and these results are relative to time and circumstances. Even those who hold the first view are not unanimous as to the locus of it. If it exists outside the human mind and is wholly independent of it, where does it exist then ? One group answers that it is in the nature of things, while the other group places it in the will of the God. Again, others, e.g., Kant, hold that it is embedded deep in the nature of human reason. Kant postulates an apriori law of reason and morality, according to him, is a question of duty — one must be guided by it regardless of and despite everything. The contrary view which insists on consequences to be of great moral significance assumes three forms, viz., hedonism, perfectionism and asceticism. The common thesis of the hedonists, either Epicurean or Utilitarian, is

that pleasure is the standard by which the goods of life are to be distinguished. Bentham regards pleasure as the highest good — it is not pleasure of the moment but of the life-time and nor the pleasure of the individual but the pleasure of the greatest number. Bentham distinguishes pleasure only quantitatively. J. S. Mill, however, admits of qualitative differences among pleasures and by his own admission of this difference Mill becomes, by implication, a perfectionist; for it introduces some other standard for right conduct than pleasure. This qualitative difference in pleasure seems to weaken the logical position of hedonism. Perfectionism, on the other hand, urges that not pleasure alone but all other capacities of man's nature constitute the foundation of morals. The hedonists, they say, are guilty of one-sidedness, of emphasising of one aspect of human experience to the exclusion of others. But here also a division crops up - Utilitarians hold that the capacities of the individual which are to be developed are to be conceived primarily in their social significance - the capacities that are to be given free play are those that are turned in the direction of attaining the interests of the society either directly through social activity or indirectly through the development of loyal individuals. Egoists, on the contrary, hold that the standard of goodness is the expression of the capacities of the individual without any regard or with any secondary regard to social consequences. Asceticism, however, is largely a theory of goodness - it seeks its standard in some form of self-denial and self-sacrifice.

The thesis that the standard of goodness lies external to the human mind, the view that there are absolute unchanging moral

standards involves so many difficulties. This thesis has been subjected to severe criticisms by the logical positivists who hold that the so-called moral judgment cannot be really a judgment at all, still less a universal scientific judgment. Their view that moral judgments are based on emotions has encouraged the belief in ethical relativity, for emotions not only vary from individual to individual from time to time but also even in the same situation. Ethical relativism or emotivism leads to subjectivism as they hold that ethical utterances are only emotive in nature and are used only to express speaker's moral emotions. Its chief drawback lies in the fact that it restricts itself to registering and explaining moral facts and in doing this it would acquire a formal character, lose its impact and prove unable to influence moral processes. Ethics which does not help people to become better is as useless as an ineffective medicine.

Hedonism, egoistic or altruistic, is not also satisfactory, because it tends to make goodness wholly relative to the passing experience. Again, the theory which identifies goodness with individual interests exclusively is open to question, because it fails to take into account of the society of selves of which each individual member is a part; it forgets that the welfare of the individual is intrinsically bound up with the welfare of the society. The life of each individual, as Hobbes pointed out, would be 'nasty, brutish and short' in a community where each individual seeks his own interests in utter disregard of the interests of the others. The ascetic or saint may find his station and duties away from the society but for a common man morality is a social business. Our moral ideas develop only in association of other people and are

being constantly modified by the public opinion. Altruism stands for self-sacrifice - it will also lessen the general good, for if a man neglects his own health in his eagerness to serve others, one day he will find himself unable to do things for others.

Naturalistic ethics derives morality from human nature. Moral standards are deduced not from the laws of man's social being but from the nature of man as a natural being, his needs and interests stemming from his unchangeable biological and psychological make-up and regard realisation of these needs as the main purposes of life. Evolutionary ethics founded by H. Spencer has been developed in the framework of ethical naturalism. It regards man's moral behaviour as a function of his adaptation to the environment. By and large, evolutionary ethics has serious methodological drawbacks because a biological interpretation of society and morality cannot be considered scientific. According to Moore moral concepts cannot be derived from natural concepts and to do this is to commit a 'naturalistic mistake'. The main drawback of the naturalists is the lack of a clear understanding of the basic differences between the socio-historical laws of the development of morality and those of anthropology and psychology. According to Marxism morality is a social phenomenon.

Again, as to the nature of ethics, its foundation, its goal to be attained there is a long-drawn debate between the materialists and the idealists. The materialists develop empirical doctrines in ethics and refuse to grant morality a divine status depending on the will of God and they hold an optimistic view that moral ideal can be attained even in this mundane existence — the end is practically attainable. The

idealists, however, perceive the source of morality either in the subjective or in the objective spirit. It occupies a place outside of or prior to the individual's actual existence - the ideal is beyond the ordinary person's ability to attain. The empirical ethics aims at changing the position of man in the world, the latter at changing the attitude towards the world. While empirical ethics is consequential, the idealist ethics gives emphasis on motives, attitudes and inner orientations of the individual.

All the pre-Marxist philosophers including the materialists were idealists in their understanding of social life and they were unable to overstep the narrow boundaries of relations of private ownership. Things change drastically with the emergence of Marxist ethics - morality is described as a property of man's behaviour conditioned by his social and historical existence. It is anti-idealistic emphasising social reality against social utopia, history against theology, experience against speculation, men against gods. It brings about a fundamental revolution in moral ideas and ideals. Marxist ethics is consistently materialistic in the sense that it demystifies morality - the ideals, the standards and values are interpreted as a reflection of actually existing inter-personal relations. It is also dialectical as it maintains that each of its manifestations, each standard and virtue is in perpetual motion, emerging, developing, dis-appearing, passing from one qualitative standard to another. There is a continuity in the evolution of morality.

Marxism believes that it is possible to give a scientific theoretical substantiation of moral ideas only through the cognition of the laws of history and that these ideas reflect the objective logic of the development of the society. The morality of the communists is the basis for the

formation of general human morality in a classless society. It is a qualitatively new ethical theory not only by virtue of its philosophical ground work but also due to its social class orientation. It represents the interests of the suffering humanity and opens up for men unprecedentedly broad and drastically new opportunities of moral advancement and activity.

The transition from capitalism to socialism is marked by a moral turning point in the relations among people. Inheriting the valuable experience of mankind in general it fosters humane incentives for man's and society's moral improvement - there being no class inequality and no oppression of man by man. Free development of the individual is no longer a mere phrase but it becomes a reality. Thus a new morality emerges which declares man the supreme value, promotes the all-round development of each person and enrichment of human relations. It rests on comradely mutual assistance, co-operation, friendliness, honesty and sense of duty - all men are friends, comrades and brothers. This Communist humanism demands equal justice, equal right, equal freedom, equal opportunity for all keeping in mind that each man and every member of the society has a equal right to happiness. Its ideal is to fight for man for his free and harmonious development. Not violence but love is the key-note of the Communist society. Violence is justified only when it is unavoidable - it is not an end in itself, for it deprives us of our manhood. The Communist social ideal will make it possible to put an end to all kinds of exploitation, oppression, poverty, famine and open new prospects for moral evolution. Moral problems are to be solved with humanistic outlook, a more humane type of consciousness. Thus

a qualitatively new stage of moral progress will begin with the emergence of a new type of man, a harmoniously developed socialist type of the individual. It indicates a major milestone on the road of humanity's moral advancement. The transition from socialism to Communism indicates more harmonious development of personality. There will be no hankering after wealth. The main objective of human activity is not to obtain material wealth but a man's life for the good of all - a life aimed at most fully developing the creative potential, original talents and abilities of each member of society. It is at this stage that man becomes the supreme value, the goal of historical and social development.

With the formation of classless society state power would lose its function and the state would 'wither away'. The victory of socialism radically changes the character of the working people - they can no longer be called proletariat - there will be no distinctions among men. The passage from socialism to Communism is based on the gradual obliteration of essential distinctions among workers, peasants and intelligentsia. It establishes truly humanistic relations based on the principle that man is to man a friend, comrade and brother. It steers the colossal ship of the society against the natural currents and storms of history to the shore of living creative humanism.

The passage from Hegelian dialectical idealism to the Marxist dialectical materialism, from Hegelian concepts or notions to the Marxian ideas as class struggle consists in the transformation of ideals into ideologies, economic determinism, of nationalism into internationalism, of philosophical mysticism into a new profoundly scientific outlook. But

the so-called Hegelians of the left-wing or the young Hegelians, a radical wing of Hegel's philosophical school, thinkers like D. Strauss, Feuerbach, B. Bauer and Ruge represent the link between Hegel and fully developed Marxism. They saw the essence of man as the one and only universal and supreme subject matter of philosophy. They advocated humanism and in this respect they facilitated the establishment of Marxism. But the bankruptcy of the young Hegelian movement is seen most clearly in its under-estimation of the role of the masses in the history. The ideas of class struggle, the objective laws of social development and of the role of economic relations in the life of the society are alien to them. The task was fulfilled by Marx and Engels when they arrived at a radically new understanding of social development — the theory of dialectical materialism. The term materialism here has a polemic meaning - it is directed against Hegel's absolute idealism. In a complete reversal of Hegelianism, the interpretation of history and of all forms of human life moves from below to above, from feet to head and not from above to below, from head to feet. The individual being is regarded as economic and social being. Dialectical materialism is a determined and irreconcilable enemy of all conceptions of supernatural essences shrouded in mystery, no matter what garb they are clothed in by religion or idealist philosophy. Marx and Engels drew up the famous *Manifesto of the Communist Party in 1848* which outlined a new world conception, consistent materialism which embraces the role of social life, dialectics as the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development, the theory of class struggle and of the world-historic revolutionary role of the proletariat — the creator of a new, communist society.

Karl Marx (1818-1883) was not a proletarian by birth or by his way of living. His open mindedness, his profound sense of facts, his ardent desire to make man the master of his own social environment, his sympathy for the working community, his aim to give men more freedom, more equality, more justice and more security, the burning desire to help the poor and oppressed and genuine feeling for the whole mankind — all these made him one of the world's influential fighters against hypocrisy and all kinds of exploitation prevalent in the society. His humane appeal, the humanistic basis of proletarian movement appeals to many honest members of the society. For this Marx left no stones unturned and he devoted immense labour to forging what he believed to be scientific weapons for the fight to improve the lot of vast majority of man.

Capitalism Marx hated because in this system labour power is made a commodity - that means that men must sell themselves on the market. This system resembles slavery, it does not grant dignity of man as man. His main work, '*Capital*', contains a profound scientific analysis of the economic laws of the movement of capitalism and proof of its inevitable demise and the victory of the Proletarians in forming communist society. His work '*Capital*', is not only 'the greatest work on political economy of our ages' as Lenin calls it, but also, in fact, largely a treatise on social ethics and by implication it contains his ethical ideas, It reveals to us the secret of exploitation and encourages people to build up a new, scientific, socialistic society in transforming socialism from utopia into a science.

The critics, however, accuse it of neglecting the role of the

individual as the subject of morality. Marxist ethics, they say, by its exclusive concentration on the social sources of morality, makes man feel that he is an obedient tool in the hands of 'social will' which is entirely alien to his wishes and initiative.

But each new stage of social progress to which mankind arises is costly, often even costlier than was believed to be at the outset. To build up a new society is not an easy task - it is an Herculean task which cannot be fulfilled without persistent endeavour and selflessness and doing this job people rise to new heights of moral maturity. Keeping in mind the ideal of humanism, the lofty ideas of duty and responsibility and taking reason as '*Ariadne's thread*' in hand they start their journey and after combating insurmountable difficulties in their way to cherished goal they will find out the right road leading to the land of human values by avoiding blind alleys of egocentricism, indifference, malice and egoism.

The work to realise communist ideals of humanism, collectivism, internationalism is hard and has many facets. As Lenin wrote : "the most complicated part of revolutionary change is the building of a new society, not dismantling the old one. Essential here is a clear idea of what one wants to achieve, persistence, enthusiasm and staunchness."

It cannot be denied that Marxism has an astonishing moral and intellectual appeal. Marx's contribution to philosophy as a whole is of immense importance. If we go through the contents of his writing we shall see how forcefully they impress upon us a particular, distinct notable trend of thought under the official stamp of 'Marxism'. So it is very interesting to note how Marxist ethics takes its rise and has been

developed into a distinct discipline of mind, an organic system of moral philosophy nurtured by his compassion and love for the suffering humanity and scientific rational outlook. This explains its tremendous influence.

In his Ph. D. thesis on "*Difference Between the Democritus and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*" (1841) Karl Marx drew a very atheistic and radical conclusions from Hegel's philosophy. For an understanding of the ethical background Marx's doctoral thesis, his critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, and his Economico-philosophical manuscripts are very important. "*Theses on Feuerbach*" written by Marx in the spring of 1845 were published by F. Engels in 1888 as an appendix to his work "*Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*". In these eleven theses Marx formulated the cardinal principles of his new philosophy, viz., dialectical and historical materialism. '*The Holy Family*', '*The German Ideology*' and '*The Communist Manifesto*' were also written by Marx in collaboration of Engels. In '*The Holy Family*' they (Marx and Engels) arrived at a major idea in the materialistic understanding of history. In '*The German Ideology*' they criticised the idealism of young Hegelians and the limited nature of Feuerbach's materialism. They expounded their philosophical outlook and developed the theory of scientific communism. The "*Poverty of Philosophy*" was an early work of Marx in which he set forth the fundamentals of socialism. It gave an analysis of the capitalist mode of production and laid the foundations of Marxist political economy. '*Capital*', the main work of Marx, is the fundamental substantiation of communist world outlook. Volume I of '*Capital*', prepared by Marx himself, was published in 1867; subsequent three volumes of '*Capital*' were published after his

death. *'Capital'* develops Marx's theory as a whole in the unity of all the three component parts : (a) Philosophy - dialectical materialism, (b) Political economy, (c) Communism.

Marxist philosophy became widespread in the U.S.S.R. with the victory of great October Socialist Revolution in 1917. In 1922 the first Marxist Philosophical journal appeared. In 1925 *'Dialectics of Nature'*, an unfinished work of Engels, was first published consisting of key - problems of dialectics of natural science. "Philosophical Notebooks" by Lenin (i.e., Lenin's notes on Philosophy) were published in 1933. *'On the question of Dialectics'* Lenin gave an exposition of the materialistic dialectics. The leading journal "*Voprosy filosofii*" (Questions on Philosophy) has been published since 1947. It pays special attention to the fundamental principles of dialectical and historical materialism, Marxist-Leninist ethics along with other related problems. The Soviet philosophers, e.g., A.F. Shishkin and others attach great importance to the problems of ethics. Soviet philosophers generally worked out philosophical problems in Marxist line. The emergent communist parties of other countries regarded dialectical and historical materialism as their philosophical banner. Reformists, mainly the right social democrats, continued their revision of dialectical and historical materialism from the viewpoint of ethical socialism. Rejecting Marxist Philosophy, the followers of Kant, e.g., Cohen Hermann of Germany and others tried to marry socialism to Kant's moral philosophy.

Marx himself did not, of course, write any treatise bearing the title 'Ethics'. His ethical ideas are only the by-products of the social and historical development. Prof.K. R. Popper writes :

"..... Capital is, in fact, largely a treatise on social ethics,..... ethical ideas are never represented as such. They are expressed only by implication, but not the less forcibly on that account, since the implications are very obvious", (The Open Society And Its Enemies - Vol. 2, P. 199.)

Marx and Engels also wrote : "The Communists do not preach morality at all.... They do not put to people the moral demand : love one another, do not be egoists, etc.; on the contrary, they are very well aware that egoism, just as much as selflessness, is in definite circumstances a necessary form of the self-assertion of individuals". (The German Ideology-collected Works, Vol. 5, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, P. 247). So a student or a researcher wishing to tackle Marx's ethical theory seriously will come across insurmountable difficulties in their way to do justice to the subject. Often the writers of high repute consciously avoid a serious undertaking of Marx's ethical theory with a view to developing it into a coherent view of Marxist ethics. Later Marxists have been failed to develop an original and comparatively coherent view of ethics. Many writers avoid discussion of Marx's ethical theory under the title "Marxist Ethics", for they think that such a title would have been misleading.

Soviet scholars, Marx's disciples and other writers wrote books on Marxism, on its various aspects — dialectical materialism, political economy, socialist humanism etc. but many of them, except a few ones, did not approach the subject of Marxist ethics with a view to developing it into a logical and coherent system so that it may find its natural logical place in the history of the ethical thought, so that it can be regarded as

a great and grand theory like utilitarianism or Kantian ethics.

In the 20th century the ideological struggle between the communists and the anti-communists enhances the importance of morality. Scholars, e.g., Sydney Hook, K.R. Popper, Paul Tillich and others have considered Marx's view on socialism, on morals. Karl Popper, e.g., calls Marx's ethical theory a historicist moral theory and advances arguments why this theory is untenable. In *"Marxism AND Ethics"* E. Kamenka has made a critical survey of Marx's positive ethics of the 'truly human' man freed from alienation and Marx's materialist critique of moralities as classbound ideologies. According to him, Marxism has conflated a number of ethical propositions - the ethics of self-realisation, utilitarianism, ethical relativism, evolutionary ethics.

From this we should not conclude that Marxist ethics is peripheral to Marxism or to Marx's own thinking about society, rather it occupies a central position in Marxian philosophy. For Engels moral development does not stop at a particular point, it progresses with the social progress through successively higher stages until it reaches the ultimate rational truly human condition and Engels proclaims that proletarian morality is the ultimate, highest, truly human morality and is destined to become the morality of all mankind. If morality is dialectical why should it stop with the coming of communism or when the classless society will be established? Hence his philosophical writings are not free from inconsistencies. Karl Marx was too able and subtle a thinker to fall into Engel's flagrant inconsistencies.¹ "Marx admits that there is scope for 'social evolution' even after the communist society is established". (Religion and Society -Radhakrishnan, p. 34). It is evident that Marx

worked for the coming of communism because he saw it ethically higher than other forms of society, even as first truly ethical society. He was against all kinds of exploitation, slavery, fetishism, division of man into classes but not against the exploiters or classes themselves. The individual, Marx adds, cannot be made responsible for conditions of which he is the creature.² In general terms Marx's view implies that systems, not people, are the objects of moral judgment. This unbiased attitude of Marx is undoubtedly praiseworthy from the ethical point of view. So a gap has been created between the real teachings of Marx and what others consider to be his real teaching.

Among the various types of ethical theories from the Greek age to the modern age, Marxist theory of ethics can be ranked as a type of ethical theory beside utilitarian ethics, ethical intuitionism, existentialist ethics. It is the philosophy, the only philosophy which takes science seriously and makes man the supreme value. The necessity arises to understand Marxist ethics in its true colour and genuineness as the writings of Karl Marx have had an enormous practical and theoretical impact on modern man. In our humble attempt to do this our study bears the simple title - "**MARXIST ETHICS - AN EVALUATION**".

1. "I do think, however, that it should be frankly admitted that intellectually and especially as a theorist he stood far below Marx. We cannot even be sure that he always got the latter's meaning. His interpretations must therefore be used with care" - Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 4th edn., London, 1959, P. 39).

2. (Preface to the 1st edn. of *Capital*, vol. I).

In our examination of Marxist Ethics we shall consider the following questions :

1. What are the main stages in the evolution of Pre-Marxist ethics and what are their features ?
2. What is dialectical materialism ? How does it originate as a polemic against Hegel's Absolute Idealism ?
3. In what sense Marxian ethics is dialectical and materialistic?
4. What determines the contents of moral standards in society?
5. What are the main tenets of Marxian theory of ethics ?
6. Does the evolution of morality stop with the establishment of a classless society ?
7. What will be the place and function of morality in a classless society ?
8. Are moral codes and principles derived genuinely from human activities and human and social demands ?
9. What is the standard by which an action to be judged as right or wrong, good or bad ?
10. What is the ideal or the end to be achieved ? Is it an utopian ideal or a practical end ?
11. Is Marxian view of ethics justifiable ? If so, what is its place and function in a modern society ?

In our examination of Marxist ethics other relevant questions may crop up and we shall try our utmost to solve such questions.

The morality of a classless society of the future embracing lofty humane ideal is a hypothesis which can be put to test to determine its validity. It may prove to be correct or incorrect. In any event, it leads to an empirical test. Whatever the outcome, the hypothesis is a question put in such a way that an answer of some kind can be forthcoming - if it does not stand with empirical verification, we have every right to refuse it. This is true of Marxist ethics too. Thus Marxist ethics stands or falls with the empirical test it is subjected to. But its genuine feeling of social responsibility, love for freedom and humanistic moral appeal to all mankind must survive for ever.

In the first chapter we shall consider the pre-Marxian ethics in general with the empiricist and the idealist trends in ethics, We shall also examine two views, intuitional and teleo-logical, concerning the criterion of conduct by which we judge an action to be right or wrong in the development of ethical thought.

In the second chapter we shall consider the basic tenets of Marxist ethics - the emergence of a new humanitarian morality in a classless society which declares man the supreme value and promotes the all-round development of each individual in an environment of humane relations within a collective society.

In the third chapter we shall consider how dialectical materialism has been evolved as a polemic against all kinds of idealism, relativism in ethics and especially dialectical idealism of Hegel and how forcefully it impresses upon us a distinct notable trend in ethics under the official

stamp of Marxist ethics.

In the fourth chapter we shall consider and examine Existentialism as one of the main trends in the 20th century ethics.

In conclusion we shall sum up our findings and try to indicate, in brief, our own estimate of Marxist ethics.

Chapter - I

CHAPTER - I

PRE - MARXIAN ETHICS

Three stages in the development of morality

To approach the difficult subject of the development of human conduct it is simply better to go back to the life of the lower animals, especially those living in social groups like ants and bees. It is in the life of these lower animals that we find a life nearest to the purely instinctive level. Right or wrong, good or bad — these terms may not be applied to the behaviour or actions of these little tiny insects but one thing is clear and explicit that they certainly exhibit in their instinctive actions a very high degree of co-operation towards a certain end, however proximate or remote, it may be, that is the end of the well-being of the group they belong to. They are concerned mainly with three things - food, protection and reproduction, i.e., in one word 'life', not the life of the individual but the life of the group as a whole. The gregarious or social instinct along with other general tendencies connected with it, this behaviour which we call instinctive behaviour, renders the animal's action such a perfection that it is directed quite unerringly towards the well-being of the group without the presence of any laws and law-givers, without any standard of good behaviour. It is very interesting to note the fact that among these tiny little creatures the welfare of the group or the species is the highest goal or summum bonum of their actions and the good behaviour (which is instinctive) is the condition of the well-being of the

society of bees or ants. Ants or bees do not have any moral laws, nor duties, nor conscience, nor any moral sense. The conduct of the animals at the level of the instinct cannot be regarded as right or wrong, good or bad. It is said to be neither moral nor non-moral, neither right nor wrong - the conduct to which moral predicates are not really applicable at all. But it is not unreasonable to suppose that in some dim way the animal carries out its instinctive impulse in action as the right thing to do.

At the instinctive level the conduct of the primitive man is governed by his fundamental needs and instinctive drives and these tendencies McDougall called innate tendencies. The development of conduct in a primitive society takes place mainly in two directions — (i) Conduct becomes more social and co-operative, (ii) Conduct becomes more rational as man uses his rationality more and more in satisfying his needs.

The isolated man can do very little to protect himself against his enemies and some of his innate tendencies like the gregarious instinct, the sex instinct imply the existence of other people and his having relations with them. This leads to the division of labour between men and women — the man does the work of hunting, protects the group from common enemies, i.e., man does the outdoor work while woman gathers vegetable foods and does the work inside the home. Further division of labour, specialization in different fields of labour are the marks of a developing society.

When the conduct of man becomes rational, it is used chiefly in the choice of means for attaining ends. At this lowest level man shows the capacity, however rudimentary, of judging his own behaviour —

this capacity of judging being entirely alien to the animal kingdom. Now the man is not only a rational being but a moral being too, consciously reflecting upon right and wrong behaviour, approving or dis-approving, voluntarily choosing and suffering regret for wrong doing and with this rational behaviour arise morality, conscience and ethical judgment.

Recent historical investigation and sociological studies have shown that the life of primitive man is a group-life and the individual in a primitive society derives his rights and obligations from his membership within the group. One of the main features of the early group life is its feeling of solidarity. The members of the group, bound by the ties of blood, thought of themselves only in terms of the group to which they belonged - they looked upon themselves as one living whole. When one suffered all suffered, when one was injured all felt to be injured not in sentimental phraseology, but in real fact. When the individual enjoyed rights, he enjoyed these rights by virtue of his membership of the group. The primitive group was communistic in character in the possession of property - the individual owned the property only as a bonafide member of the group.

Collective responsibility is another fundamental characteristic of early group life. Whether protecting the group from the enemies or outside intruders or avenging of any injury done to one of its own members the entire responsibility lies with the group, the primitive social organization and not with the particular individual member. At this stage or level man considers those forms of conduct which are approved by the customary modes of behaviour of the group-life or the social group to which he belongs. At this level the bad action is the action that is

'not-done' and the good action is the action that has been 'always done'. 'What is done' is 'ought to be done' — this is, in short, the customary morality approved by the group. The actions of these primitive people are to a great extent customary and show little signs of forethought with regard to the remote consequences — moral consciousness has not yet been fully developed, it is still in the rudimentary level. Their actions, moral opinions, if any, are guided and governed by moral opinions of the group. The customary morality is the flowering of man's social instinct and the innate tendencies of sympathy, imitation and suggestion which are closely bound up with the herd-instinct. It is because of this common instinctive basis that it is impossible to make a sharp distinction between the level of custom and the level of instinct. Even after the mankind have to a considerable extent emerged from the primitive groups, the influence of custom in the determination of conduct continues for a long time to be of paramount importance.

A striking feature of customary level is that it is not merely a political unit for the protection of its members but also a economic unit generally providing the individual members of their own needs. The conception of private property or private ownership has not yet come into being - all property is public property, and collective ownership is commonly agreed upon in the possession of property. It makes scope for a certain amount of specialisation and division of labour. It also works as a moral unit, for a wrong done by any member of the group is a wrong for which the whole group or the tribe is held responsible and when a wrong is done to a member of the group, the group or the tribe, as a whole, holds itself responsible for avenging the wrong done to one of its members.

The individual has no right to do any action on his own choice — he has to obey the group-cumtom. It is the group opinion which determines his behaviour. He is also aware of the fact that he is an individual only in so far as he is the member of the group and apart from the group he has no existence, no protection whatsoever - he will be left out absolutely without protection if he dis-obeys what the group thinks to be right. Again there is an irrational belief that if an individual does something forbidden by the custom, supernatural powers will inflict a punishment of illness, accident or even death upon him. Ritual, especially religions ritual, is a most powerful ally of customary morality. Rituals are generally performed on the great occasions of group-life-at the time of child-birth, marriage and death, at the time of harvesting of crops and declaration of war. The individual has no alternative but to submit to the authority of the tribe or group in the observance of rituals. Often the group takes recourse to or employs physical force to compel the unwilling individual to observe its rituals and thereby assumes its authority over its members belonging to the group. Routine and ritual play a fundamental role in the group life. Thus the standards of customary morality are too rigid, stringent, rigorous, making no allowance of individual circumstances and taking little or no account of the motive of the doer of an action. They provide no room for individual choice which is the very characteristic of developed morality. It is to be noted here that human actions are not wholly instinctive although the social instincts are still present and play a fundamental role even in the most developed modern society as when a mother instinctively defends her child or a man instinctively loves the company of his fellow beings. In the customary level pressure is brought upon the individuals to do or

not to do certain things with an eye to the common good or well-being of the society.

With the happenings of all these in the primitive society one thing stands out clearly that judgment may be passed upon one's own conduct or that of others as it is supposed to bear upon the common good. Not the individual good but the common good shall be the criterion for judging an action to be right or wrong - hence arises the moral judgment.

In course of man's social development, there have grown, through a period of history, relatively larger groups from the innumerable small groups of primitive society. Two important characteristics of this development are :

(1) It is a passage from relatively simple groups to the exceedingly complex groups - the development is marked by an ever-increasing complexity of organisation. The primitive groups are simple organisations having a relatively few simple customs and traditions handed down from the ancestors but modern groups are tremendously complex organisations having multiform institutions such as the family, the church, the state, industrial groups accompanied by an ever-increasing intricacy of their internal organisations. With the growth of population, the problem becomes very grave and serious.

(2) The development is marked by the progressive emphasis on the individual. Previously, apart from the group, the individual is no individual at all, i.e., he has no significance or importance as an individual. But in the course of social evolution the individual becomes more and more important. Now he has rights of his own, he can assume

responsibility by dint of his individual capacity, he can actively choose an action, he may worship gods or not. The moral authority is inside the individual - it is his voluntary will that guides him-he does his duty only at the dictate of his own conscience. In short, the individual is granted importance and intrinsic worth. It is to him a new birth, something positive is achieved. Customs and moral standards are being constantly revised. When we get rid of human slavery, we see that there are other forms of slavery which are also wrong as that is exhibited in child or women labour in factories or the exploitation of the poorer classes. Now it is what conscience commands that appears to be the obvious and proper thing to do. Antigone in Sophocles' drama refused to obey the order of the king, because her conscience did not admit it. Socrates, the great individualist, died a tragic death as he was true to his conscience.

At this level of conscience moral authority is not outside the individual - the standards of morality are now actively chosen by the individual after a greater or less amount of deliberation. Morality now tends to become the sphere of the individual alone.

Apart from historical events, viz., development of christianity as an universal religion and its emphasis on the value of the individual, breaking up of Greek city states in the 4th Century B.C., the renaissance with its rich unfolding of individual human capacities, the development of morality depends upon the two fundamental tendencies of human nature : hormic and mnemonic tendencies, liberal and conservative tendencies. The mnemonic tendency favours to remain in the ways of past and the hormic tendency favours to go forward to the unknown —

the struggle between these two tendencies within the individual arouses in him individual reflection. Another potent factor which makes this development possible is the struggle between the interests of the individual and the group.

As the individual breaks away from the bondage imposed upon him by the group and assumes greater responsibilities and privileges in his own right as a bonafide individual of a greater developed society — his solidarity with the group is loosened but his obligations are multiplied. He has attachments to various groups - to his family, to his business or profession, to his neighbours, to his church and to his state. The fact that different groups or institutions to which he belongs make different demands, sometimes conflicting demands on the individual makes the modern man realise that he himself has to decide what action he shall take in the face of conflicting demands or when such a conflict arises and this makes him self-assertive.

The development of moral standards, religious beliefs and practices, types of Government, industrial enterprises, systems of thoughts is due to the social evolution in which human beings participate actively. The modern man cannot remain to be a passive spectator of this whole drama of development, he takes active role in it. Man's convictions, reasoned judgments expressed in his systems of thought are not entirely free from the institutions into which he was born — yet the reflective drive is in the uppermost, in the upper rung of the ladder. For the continuance in existence, to provide itself with basic needs of bare subsistence, to provide itself with amenities of modern civilised society, the human race is forced to make provisions of all these and

this makes thinking a necessity and necessity, as the adage goes, is the mother of invention. In modern times, science has invented miraculous techniques in preparing natural products for human use. It provides us with comforts and amenities of every kind, e.g., rapid and luxurious transportation, instantaneous communication, supply of gas and electricity, sanitary disposal of waste, newspapers, television and so on. The mother of all this is work, human activity and by work we should not simply mean the physical labour but mental alertness exhibited in the primitive forms of occupation — hunting and fishing, inventiveness shown by our ancestors in inventing tools and machines, the capacity to guess plans of others, to understand another's point of view. Thinking, reasonable thinking, scientific thinking is absolutely necessary to resolve mental conflicts. Such a conflict does not arise when the members of a society are almost at the same level of ability and education, but such conflicts are inevitable in a society where work is done not for the common good, where exploitation of poorer classes is limitless.

With the industrial revolution, modern developments of technology, scientific discoveries and inventions a great specialisation of labour has been resulted. But specialized work has not eliminated the necessity of thought. It has placed upon the shoulders of a few who threaten to convert the majority of workers into mere tools. The desire to get rich, thirst for personal enrichment is predominant in a capitalist society-where all activities, either economical or social, are concentrated at one focal point, i.e., wealth. It begins with the free competition which gradually leads to a high development of productive

forces, improvement of technology, the formation of monopolies. The modern form of capitalism is marked by its emphasis on the internationalisation of production, development of common market, the arms-race, strengthening of state monopoly capitalism, selling of military products and to find a market for them in the developing countries. Contradictions are sharpening between imperialist states and the developing countries and the political, intellectual and ideological crisis is deepening. The system of exploitation is extended and refined. The class polarisation is developing, the income gap is widening, the working class or the poorer class is growing numerically. There is increasing proletarianisation of the middle classes and the intellectuals. New social antagonisms are arising.

In such a state of things individualism becomes the most general characteristic and the essence of morality. If money is the basic value of life and if making money is the sole purpose of man's business activity, there is hardly any need to think about morality.

If one finds the moral standards of a prevalent society not in accordance with the humanitarian ideals one may adopt new moral standards. The most powerful factor in social evolution is the outstanding individuals who think beyond their co-fellows. The poets and philosophers, scientists and great religious teachers, statesmen and social thinkers dig the channels in which future social change is to run. The desire to help the poor and oppressed and their love for humanity make social change possible. When social reformers go ahead for the overthrow of our present social system, they have in mind some ideal social order in which there will be no injustice arising from inequalities

of wealth, of social position and of political power - an ideal social order in which all our freedom and security and the comforts of modern era are to be retained and the glaring imperfections such as defeat, thwarted ambitions, disappointments, crime and misery removed.

The Development of Ethical theories - Greek, Mediaeval and Modern

So long as bees or ants are concerned there is no great difficulty in defining the welfare of the herds of animals - it is mainly the physical survival of the group. But when we turn our attention to the human society, it is found that mere physical survival is not enough, human beings have higher aims than mere physical survival. The man is not contented with food and shelter, he has other needs and desires. Besides these his efforts or strivings are directed to the realisation of certain higher values of life for bringing in a new social order for the well-being or good of all - for the individual as well as for the society. It is just here that the disagreement has arisen among the schools of writers on the theory of ethics.

The history of European ethics can be divided broadly into three periods - the Greek period, the Mediaeval period and the Modern period - each period having its own special characteristics. In the Greek period the Greek city states formed the background of moral life and the man who performed his duties as a citizen was regarded as a good man. In the mediaeval period morality was dominated by the church and the good life was identified with the religious life. When we come to the modern period we find neither church nor the state are so important in

the moral life. Morality is more concerned with the free individual and his rights and duties in relation to other free individuals.

The reflective thought on ethics, as on most other scientific subjects first took definite shape among the Greek thinkers. It is the reflective thinking which enables them to raise certain fundamental problems of ethics : what is it in an action that makes it right or wrong ? Or, what is the standard by which we can judge an action to be right or wrong ?

The earliest thinkers among the Greeks directed their attention chiefly to physical inquiries, e.g., what is the world made of ? Heraclitus (530-470 B.C.) and Democritus (460-370 B.C.) seem to have touched with some definiteness upon the ethical problems. Sometimes, they are known as the 'weeping' and laughing' philosophers. They are founders of two types of ethical thought or two modes of thinking which afterwards develop into Stoicism and Epicureanism. The antithesis may be roughly expressed as between the reason and the passion. Heraclitus distinguished between sense and reason and placed truth in rational cognition. It is by reason that we have the knowledge of the 'law of Becoming'. In the comprehension of this law lies the duty of man - man becomes resigned and contented when he understands this. He takes fire, i.e., 'bright and dry' as his fundamental physical principle and this has been incessantly struggling with the 'dark and moist principle', which is opposed to fire. The fire is the rational element in things — the more fire there is, the more life, the more movement; the more dark there is, the more cold, the more death, the more non-being. 'Strife', he says, "is the father of all things". He thinks that even in the life of man this struggle

can be found going on. The great aim in the moral life of a man is to secure the victory of the 'bright and dry'.

With Democritus, however, the fundamental moral principle is pleasure. Contrary to the view of Anaxagoras that all motion of things is produced by a world-intelligence or reason, Democritus holds that there is no reason or intelligence in the world and all phenomena are completely determined by blind mechanical causes. His ethical theory is not consistent with his metaphysics, his atomic theory in any way. He did not, however, develop a full systematic ethical theory and in its place what we have are only, a good number of ethical maxims. That one should enjoy oneself as much and vex oneself as little as possible seems to have been his principal idea. This, however, is not to be interpreted in a degraded or sensual way.

The first period of Greek philosophy has for its problem the origin of the world and the explanation of 'Being' and 'Becoming' of nature. But the second period opens with the Sophists and with the problem of the position of man in this mundane existence. While the teaching of the early philosophers was exclusively cosmological, the teaching of the Sophists was humanistic. It was that remarkable group of teachers, known as the Sophists, who have brought the ethical problems to the citizenship. To have a clear and distinct picture of their activities and teaching, it is necessary to have some knowledge of religious, political and social conditions of the time. The long struggle between the ordinary people and the nobles made an way for democracy everywhere in Greece. But this democracy is not a democracy as we understand it in our time — it is not a form of government by the people through their

elected representatives. Ancient Greece was not a single state under a single government. Every city, every hamlet was an independent state. Each had its own laws and the government was governed by these laws. Every citizen takes active role in politics, enacts the laws and transacts public business as these states are small comprising merely a handful of citizens. In these circumstances, men forgot the interests of the State in their own interests and the result was that greed, ambition, selfishness become the dominant notes of the political life of the people.

With the rise of democracy, advancement of science, philosophy, religion collapsed. Belief in God was almost ridiculed everywhere. What was regarded with awe and reverence by their ancestors was looked down upon as fit subjects for jest and mockery. Any action, however, scandalous or mean or disgraceful, could be justified by the glaring examples of the gods depicted in the epics by the poet, Homer. All morality, all norms were criticised and rejected. The age was an age of negative, critical, destructive thought.

The Sophists, though they were the most enlightened men of their time, could not rise above the age and they may be called 'the children of their time and the interpreters of their age'. They did not form a school of philosophy of their own, nor did they build up a system of philosophy in common by them all, nor did they construct a profound system of thought; they were a professional class, professional teachers. They wandered from one place to another in Greece, they delivered lectures as and when called for and in exchange they took large fees. Their tendency was purely practical and mundane — it was to attain to the high political position and for that purpose what was needed at that

time was eloquence and in the absence of it at least ready speech with a view to meeting every point with all cleverness and smartness. They were not true searchers of real truth for its own sake, they were not honest in their search for truth. They devoted all their energies only to persuade people of whatever they wished them to believe; they used their abilities to make the worse appear better and in their attempt to do this they employed strange and flowery metaphors, epigrams and paradoxes with the intention to confuse their opponents. They loved smartness and clever sayings. Protagoras, the earliest known Sophist, was the author of the famous saying : "Man is the measure of all things". This saying of Protagoras contains in it the germ of the thought of the Sophists as a whole. By 'man' Protagoras did not mean the whole mankind or human race, but the individual man and by 'measure of all things' he meant the criterion of truth of all things. What is true to the individual man is true for that individual, i.e., no truth is independent of the individual subject. Thus his philosophy demolishes all objective knowledge - it amounts to a declaration that objective truth is impossible.

The later Sophists extended their teaching to the spheres of politics and morals. If 'man is the measure of all things' is true, we can not assume objective truth whatsoever. This teaching, if applied to the moral sphere, makes morality purely and fundamentally a subjective, private affair — there can be no objective moral code and it amounts to a saying : what seems right to an individual is right for that individual and what seems wrong to an individual is wrong for that individual. If there is no such thing as the objective right or the existence of an objective norm of goodness and justice with which we may judge the

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laws of the State as good or just what then, according to the Sophists, is the standard of judging a law to be good and just ? To Polus and Thrasymachus the law of force is the only law which nature admits of. What does it mean ? It advocates the doctrine that 'might is right'.

All emphasis is laid on the individual - individualism is the dominant note utterly neglecting the object; therefore thought becomes ego-centric. But like any system, it has its merits too. The Sophists were the founders of the science of rhetoric. They aroused genuine interest to the study of ethical ideas. They had introduced into Greek philosophy the problem of man and of the duties of man. 'Man is the measure of all things' - certainly, but man as a rational being, not man as an impulsive being. If 'my right is my right' or 'your right is your right' is true then there will be utter chaos in the society in which we live in and have our being. It is only as a rational being, as a potentially universal being, as a bonafide conscientious member of the society that I have rights, but as a mere ego I have no rights whatever. It is surely a fact that there can be no society without the individuals, society apart from the individuals is an abstract society, a pure fiction so to say, and similarly an individual who is the absolute lord of his own person caring little for others is no less a pure fiction. The truth lies in between the two extremes - society exists in social beings and the individual, by nature, is a social being and that alone which entitles him to the sacred rights of a 'person' in his universal and rational nature.

The period to which the Sophists belong follows upon an era of constructive thought. Socrates (470-399 B.C) was born among the Sophists, he was educated by the Sophists, he used the method of the Sophists but he was not a Sophist. There is no denying the fact that he was closely associated with them, rather he was a typical example of

them, he shared to the full the tendency of the Sophists to ask questions about matters of conduct. But he did not set himself up as a professional teacher, he took no fees for his teaching, but rather regarded himself throughout his life as a student of moral science.

The Socratic theory of knowledge is not, however, formulated for its own sake - it is a preparation for subserving ethical ends. He wants to know the concept of virtue in order to be able to practice virtue in life. His aim was not to construct a system of philosophy but to arouse in men the love of truth and virtue so that they might think properly in order to live properly. The Sophists brought to the fore-front the problem of man and Socrates falls in line with them in recognising that the proper subject matter of philosophical study is man. Added to the Sophistic influence was the Delphic inscription - "Know thyself". Get acquainted with your own self — the human self and all that it stands for. This should be the starting point of all philosophising. Socrates is, besides, dismayed at the lack of the moral perceptive in the conduct of his fellowmen. He finds complete chaos in the field of morality partly brought about by the negative teachings of the Sophists. He considers it to be his duty to make his fellowmen truly wise and morally good. So he thinks that the primary task of philosophical thinking is to find answers to the questions like :

- (i) What are the attributes of good life ?
- (ii) What is the rational way of living ?
- (iii) How should a rational being act and live ?
- (iv) What is the highest good for the sake of which all else is to be judged good ?

The chief concern of Socrates, therefore, was to discover the ethical concepts to make his fellowmen acquainted with the true meaning of virtues and duties. What are true meaning of justice, temperance, courage etc. ? What are the concepts involved in them ? Socrates thought that true knowledge of these concepts would lead to their realization in practical life. The Socratic ethics may be summed up in the four cardinal doctrines mentioned below :

- A. Virtue is knowledge;
- B. Virtue can be taught;
- C. Virtue is one;
- D. Virtue leads to happiness.

It may just be mentioned that Socrates made a lucid exposition of several individual virtues, but he did not give a final and convincing definition of the concept of virtue itself. What is goodness itself ? What is that constitutes goodness and the ultimate good for man ? It appears that he merely posed the question and could not find a suitable reply. This, however, is the most fundamental ethical problem that has ever since taxed the intelligence of moral philosophers all the world over.

Let us now study the implications of the four ethical doctrines :

- A. "Virtue is Knowledge".

The doctrine has been the subject matter of conflicting interpretations. Socrates however seems to leave us in no doubt as to what he actually means. Too much logical and metaphysical analysis added to one or two vulnerable weakpoints in the Socratic teachings

have resulted in some confusion. Any way the Socratic teaching primarily means that to know the right is to do the right. Virtue consists in the knowledge of good. Knowing what virtue is, a man will be automatically virtuous. Moreover none can be virtuous without a prior knowledge of the concept of rightness. To sum up : "No man is voluntarily bad or involuntarily good." The second alternative is intelligible in the sense that in order to be judged as morally good an action must emanate from a knowledge of its goodness. Automatic actions, however good or useful in effect, are not classed as morally good. It is however difficult to accept without a protest the thesis that none can be voluntarily bad, that he who knows the good will do good. Someone might retort : "I see the good, approve of it and yet pursue the evil." Aristotle also finds fault with the Socratic doctrine and declares quite rightly that men's actions are very often determined by passions and emotions, the 'irrational parts of the soul'. To understand however the true meaning of the Socratic doctrine we have to probe deeper into the Socratic mind.

When Socrates solemnly declared that virtue is knowledge, by knowledge he means not mere theoretical knowledge but an unmistakable conviction based on the deepest insight into and realisation of what is really valuable in life, "a conviction that he himself possessed". Moreover, being himself above the influence of passions and unbridled emotions, Socrates is unable to understand how men, knowing the right, can yet do the wrong. Socrates here pays a great complement to the ordinary man by taking his rationality at its face value. The Socratic assumption may be wrong. But if men fail to act rationally, the stigma applies none to them than to the Socratic doctrine.

Again, the anti-Socratic thesis that 'we know the right and yet pursue wrong' is to be treated with caution. Is there real knowledge in such cases, i.e., true insight accompanied by a genuine conviction? Socrates will shake his head and declare that very often knowledge is confused with 'make-believe'. When it is stated that a man believes one thing and does another, does he really believe what he says he believes? Many people declare that it is wrong to hanker after material possessions and that spiritual uplift is the proper objective of human endeavour. And yet in practical life they are found to run after material goods as if these were supreme good for man. What do these men actually believe? Do they believe as they speak or as they act? Socrates would say that such men do not really and genuinely believe what they declare their belief in the goodness or spiritual uplift does not amount to the insight and genuine conviction and it is mere 'make-believe' even perhaps hypocrisy. Had they been genuinely convinced of the superiority of spiritual greatness, they would seek it and not material property. Socrates would not admit that anybody could know the good without immediately doing it. It is however impossible to accept the Socratic maxim without reservation even after giving Socrates all the credit that is his due. Aristotle's criticism seems unanswerable.

B. "Virtue can be taught".

This could follow from the first maxim. If virtue depends upon knowledge, virtue can then be taught since knowledge can be imparted by teaching. The teacher must be some one who knows the concept of virtue. One may, however, ask: what the meaning of the concept of virtue is? We can understand individual virtues; but has the concept of virtue in general been discovered by the moral philosophers?

C. "Virtue is one".

The proposition that virtue is knowledge leads to the further corollary that 'virtue is one'. Although we recognise several individual virtues like kindness, temperance, courage etc. their common source is knowledge or practical wisdom. This proves the unity and identity of all virtues since the intellectual discernment that conditions the right act is universally one and the same. Knowledge or practical wisdom is therefore the all-comprehensive virtue; it includes all virtues. Here we find something analogous to the Fichtean doctrine of supremacy of the 'Practical Reason.'

D. "Virtue is (leads to) happiness."

This doctrine of Socrates has led to some mis-understanding. Socrates here seems to have descended from his lofty height to the level of the common man. But there is no insincerity in him - he speaks from the courage of his conviction. In this doctrine he discovers an additional reason as to why knowledge is followed by virtue. Virtue means happiness, or well-being is the necessary result of virtue. Since a man naturally seeks what is advantageous to him, a true knowledge of what the good is, will make him do the good and thereby attain happiness. Here then Socrates combines his psychological intellectualism with ethical eudaemonism. The result, however, is not a particularly happy one. Virtue for Socrates was the "road to the realisation of specific objects of well-being, happiness, contentment, power and honour". (Schwegler). Now, as no man can be intentionally bad or vicious, i.e., non-virtuous since to know the notion of virtue is to be virtuous, it follows that to have knowledge of the notion of virtue

means at the same time to be happy. Of course, this involves the fallacy of "Petitio principii" since it regards virtue, ex-hypothesi, as leading to happiness and then tries to prove it again.

If the end for which virtues are practised is happiness or utility, does Socrates mean thereby that happiness is the most desirable end for man - the summum bonum of life ? According to Xenophon the good in the opinion of his master always coincided the profitable or the useful. But we do not feel inclined to accept this interpretation - the whole thing appears to be un-Socratic. There are several passages in Socrates' dialogues which would give a totally different impression. Moreover, according to Xenophon, himself, who wrote voluminously about Socrates, Socrates has declared times without number that man's true fortune is to be sought not in outward goods nor in luxurious life or the merely advantageous but in virtue itself. Now if the sole end of virtue is again declared to be merely one's own advantage or virtue is identified with the useful, does it not end in a vicious circle ? The truth of the matter is that Socrates failed to find the objective determination of the conception of the good (virtue in general). At any rate he was not clear on this point. Let it be noted here that when Socrates declares that virtue leads to happiness or that doing good itself is 'eudaemonia' he means by happiness not merely pleasure or even felicity in the ordinary sense; it is the calm serene contentments of the mind, the joy or bliss, or as Schwegler puts it, "an exaltation over sensuous greeds and cravings, a freedom from desire such as lifts man nearest to God, a calm of mind whose equilibrium is never to be ruffled, a glad consciousness of undiminished strength and integrity of soul". It is necessary to keep this in mind since Socrates' doctrine has been

repeatedly misinterpreted by people who ought to have known better.

Though very little is known about him it is commonly agreed that he was very ugly having a snub nose and a considerable paunch. He was always dressed in shabby old clothes and went barefoot everywhere. His endurance was simply marvellous; his indifference to heat and cold, hunger and thirst was amazing. His mastery over all bodily passions amazed every one. He seldom drank wine but when he did it in one or two occasions, he could out-drink anybody. He was above all temptations. Before his execution when he was in prison his friends and disciples urged him to escape - a little silver at the hands of jail guards would probably settle the matter. But Socrates refused. His indifference to death at the last hour of his departure is the final proof of his mastery. When the poison cup was brought to him, he drank it without flinching - this was the end of a man, a philosopher, a perfect orphic saint, a devoted teacher, as we may say, the best of all his time and the most wise and just.

Upon the death of Socrates his disciples could not grasp the great man's thought in its wholeness. Only one man among his disciples grasped his teaching and that was Plato, a writer of great genius. Among other followers there were two who founded the schools of philosophy, each partial and one-sided but each claiming to be the exponent of true Socraticism. Antisthenes founded the cynic school and Aristippus the cyrenaic school. His disciples agree that virtue is the sole end of life but each interprets his teaching in his own way.

Antisthenes, the founder of the Cynic School, repeated the familiar propositions of his master that 'Virtue is knowledge', 'virtue is

teachable', and 'virtue is one' but he interpreted his teaching to mean that the independence of earthly pleasures and possessions is in itself the main end of life. Aristippus, though he proceeds from the thesis that virtue is the sole object of life, comes subsequently to a conclusion in consonance with his own temperament. No doubt 'virtue is the sole end of life' but the 'sole end of virtue is pleasure', i.e., the sole end of life is pleasure. Nothing is wicked, nothing evil provided only it satisfies the thirst of pleasure of the individual. But in the pursuit of pleasure wise men must exercise prudence, because unrestrained pursuit of pleasure may lead to pain, misery and disaster.

These two tendencies have persisted throughout almost the whole course of ethical speculation. The Cyrenaics were followed by the Epicureans who developed a conception of pleasure and founded morality upon pleasure - pleasure is the only good, it is alone an end in itself. Virtue has no value of its own account but derives its value only from the pleasure which accompanies it. On the contrary, the Cynics were followed by the Stoics who found the meaning of good life in the avoidance of the feeling of pleasure and in the rational pursuit of duty. Virtue is the life according to reason, morality being simply a rational action. The Epicureans held that good things are those that satisfy our human desires, particularly the desire for pleasure. This is the fundamental view of the moralists called utilitarians in modern times. The Stoics held that a good action is an action done in accordance with the principle of reason. This is the view of Kant and many moralists influenced by him in modern times.

Plato (427-347 B.C.) made more definite efforts to connect ethical

ideas with the general principles of philosophy and so to get beyond the one-sidedness of the opposing schools.

According to Socrates knowledge must be attained, for virtue is knowledge; and since there must be virtue, there must be knowledge and all knowledge is knowledge through concepts. But for Plato this knowledge was a metaphysical knowledge, chiefly the understanding that the real world is not the world of the objects of sense but 'a world of Ideas' which is absolutely real and that the concept is not merely an idea in the mind but it has a reality of its own, outside and independent of the mind. For example, what do we mean by 'whiteness ?' — 'whiteness' we may say is an idea or a concept in our mind. But this is not Plato's view. If we consider 'whiteness' to be an idea in the mind then, it is clear that if all minds were abolished no such thing as 'whiteness' would remain. Whiteness is not, therefore, something which is mental, nor is it in itself an object. What is it then ? It is a 'Form' or an 'Idea' — it is a substance, it is rational, it is beyond space and time, it is immutable, changeless, perfect, eternal, an inhabitant of the real world. The world of sense has no reality at all — whatever reality they have they owe to the Ideas, the world of reality. The Ideas are eternal, changeless, immutable, whereas sense objects are changeable and in a perpetual flux. Among these Ideas the most fundamental is the 'Idea of the Good' and it is in approximating to this the ideal of virtue is to be found. It is the Idea or Form of the Good from which all good things derive their goodness. And to have an understanding or a clear knowledge of the 'Good', it is fundamentally necessary to go through a metaphysical course of training and hence the highest form of virtue is attainable only by the philosophers. This philosophic virtue is the primary

and the fundamental virtue and Plato attached absolute value only to this kind of virtue. The customary or conventional virtue is only a means to attain true virtue which can be cultivated by the good citizens. All citizens, especially the irrational masses, will not willingly or voluntarily submit to the rational laws framed by the rational men, i.e., philosophers who have known the reality. Since the work of the state must go on and the laws must be obeyed, the application of force, to some extent, is necessary.

Now what is an ideal state ? How is justice to be done ?

The *Republic*, the main concern of which is to discover the nature of justice, consists of dialogues, i.e., conversations between a group of peoples usually confined in a particular topic. The dialogues may proceed somewhat as follows. Somebody may begin the conversation in which the word 'justice' appears. Socrates, the chief figure in Plato's dialogues into whose mouth Plato puts the exposition of his own philosophy, asks him what he means by the word 'justice'. He endeavours to explain but very soon he involves in difficulties. Then other speakers come forward to his rescue giving different suggestions as to what he may have meant. Socrates then elicits from them all their views on the subject of justice and gradually exposes their mistakes and makes them contradict themselves. In the "*Republic*" various definitions of justice are suggested which Socrates shows to be inadequate. Glaucon and Adeimantus come to put forward their arguments with regard to the nature of 'justice' and they challenge Socrates to refute them. The remainder of the '*Republic*' is Socrates' answer to this challenge. Faced with the necessity of defining justice

and proving its intrinsic value and superiority Socrates points out that the best way of discovering its nature is to look for it in the principles regulating the intercourse of men in society, i.e., in the State. It will be manifested in an ideal State the arrangements of which are regulated exclusively by a rational consideration of what is good.

The ideal state is ruled by a 'guardian class' who are chosen in virtue of their intensive education and ability to do what is just or what is right, i.e., by philosophers who have known the reality. In any circumstances they should not be tempted by considerations of self-interest — their main concern being the welfare of the state. The rest of the population is divided into two classes - soldiers and workers. The soldiers are entrusted with the duty of protecting the country from external hazards and the workers of producing for the state. Justice is to be found in the contended performance of the functions of each class with the resolute determination not to interfere in the business or affairs of other classes. Plato's ideal state is founded on a division of labour or specialisation of function which springs from the principle that everyman should do that only for which he is best fitted. From this Plato concluded that everyone should mind his own business, that the ruler should confine himself to ruling, the soldier to protecting the country, the shoemaker to making shoes, when each class minds its own business then it is justice, its opposite is injustice. Therefore, the state is just if the ruler rules, if the worker works and the soldier protects the country.

This division of classes into rulers, warriors and workers is based upon the tripartite division of the human soul, viz., the rational part, the

emotional part and the desiring part. 'Wisdom' is the virtue of the philosopher, 'courage' of the warrior and 'temperance' of the worker. The guardian of the state, i.e., the philosopher corresponds to the 'rational' part because in him the rational part of the soul is fully developed. The warrior corresponds to the 'emotional' part and workers to the 'desiring' part of the soul for they may be subjected to the sway of a variety of different desires. The harmonious co-operation of these three virtues - wisdom, courage and temperance — produces justice. Each part of the soul must perform the function proper to itself. The reason must rule the passions in the interest of the state and the emotional part must assist reason in its task by encouraging the development of nobler emotions and discouraging what is base and shameful. The rulers must not cease to be philosophers. The duty of the warrior is not only to protect the state from external enemies but also to protect the state against irrational impulsive actions of the masses, i.e., ordinary citizens.

The ideal state may be realised in practice only when the philosophers become kings or rulers, for they know reality and know also what is good in itself. So the laws of the state prescribed by the philosophers will consist of knowledge of what is good and, therefore, the laws will be best possible laws. Not being philosophers, the citizens will be ignorant of what virtue is and of why they should pursue it. They will lack self-conscious morality and by following these rules they will attain such a virtue of which they are capable of. From this it follows that morality of the ordinary citizens in Plato's ideal state is conventional. It is the duty of the ordinary citizen to live in complete and full obedience to the laws of the ideal state. The ordinary citizen cannot be trusted to

decide what is best for him or to prescribe what is good for the society to which he belongs. Thus what it amounts to is that philosophers will rule and the rest will follow them. The ordinary citizens should be educated in the primary duty of obeying the best and in this their good of life is to be achieved. Hence in morality as well as in politics, his social system involves a denial of the fundamental tenet of democracy. As C.E.M. Joad remarks : "Plato's view seems to have been that a people who were capable of putting their wisest man to death simply because he was the wisest, were not, and never would be, fit to govern themselves; hence his antagonism to democracy."¹ (Great Philosophers of the World, Ch, I, Plato P.7).

Since the highest end or summum bonum of the State is to attain true virtue this involves the encouragement of what is good for the State and the destruction of whatever is evil. Therefore the individual should have not any interest apart from the interest of the State. There will be no private property, private interests and private endeavour. All belong to the State - this involves the community of goods, community of wives and the state-ownership of the children from their birth. This is, in short, Plato's ethics of the community.

Plato frequently speaks of all moral activity aiming at, and ending in, happiness and happiness has nothing to do with pleasure. The utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill places the end of morality in happiness - it is not happiness of the individual but of the community. That an act is right which leads to 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number'. But the fact is that what Mill calls 'happiness' Plato would have called 'pleasure'. Happiness, in Plato, is the summum bonum which is not a

single end but "it is a compound consisting of : (i) knowledge of the Ideas as they are in themselves, philosophy; (ii) the contemplation of the Ideas as they reveal themselves in the world of sense, the love and appreciation of all that is beautiful; (iii) the cultivation of special sciences and arts; (iv) indulgence in pure and innocent pleasures"². (A critical History of Greek Philosophy - W.T. Stace - Page 223, chapter XII-Plato).

In his '*Republic*' Plato insists that true happiness is achieved only by justice, i.e., by keeping one's own place in an ideal State. The ruler must find happiness in ruling, the warrior in warring, the worker in working. It is not the happiness of the individual, nor of any particular class but only the happiness of the whole. That only justice can lead to true happiness is one of the main theses of the *Republic*.

To the question : who should rule ? 'If I wanted a shoe-mended, whom should I employ ?' To which some ingenious youth would answer : 'A shoe-maker, O Socrates.' To the question: 'who should mend the Ship of State ?' or who should guide the ship of the State ? Plato's Socrates would answer : "The Philosopher". i.e., the wisest and the best should rule. The wise shall lead and rule and the ignorant shall follow. Here Kant differs from Plato. "That kings should become philosophers, or philosophers kings, is not likely to happen; nor would it be desirable, since the possession of power invariably debases the free judgment of reason. It is, however, indispensable that a king — or a kingly, i.e., self-ruling people — should not suppress philosophers but leave them the right of public utterance."³ (Kant, On Eternal Peace, Second Supplement, Werke, ed. Cassirer, 1914, Vol. VI, P. 456).

Quoted from K. Popper — *The Open Society And Its Enemies*, Ch. 8, P. 152).

The humanitarian theory of justice demands that the citizens should be treated impartially. The laws of the state should provide equal justice to all. There should be equal opportunity for all irrespective of caste and creed, not as a privilege but as a reward for his merit or excellence in the field. Poverty or class should not stand in the way. It is the demand that birth, family connection, money or wealth must not influence the administrators of law. Equalitarian justice is against all natural privileges. K. Popper remarks that "Plato's principle of justice was, of course, diametrically opposed to all this"⁴ (K. Popper : *The Open Society And Its Enemies* Vol. I, P. 95) "We see", says K. Popper, "here that Plato recognizes only one ultimate standard, the interest of the state. Everything that furthers it is good and virtuous and just; everything that threatens it is bad and wicked and unjust. Actions that serve it are moral; actions that endanger it, immoral. In other words, Plato's moral code is strictly utilitarian; it is a code of collectivist or political utilitarianism. The criterion of morality is the interest of the state. Morality is nothing but political hygiene.

"This is the collectivist, the tribal, the totalitarian theory of morality: 'Good is what is in the interest of my group; or my tribe; or my state.'⁵ (*The Open Society And Its Enemies*, K. Popper, Vol. I, P.107).

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) accepted in general the ethical position of Socrates and Plato, but there is a marked difference in his philosophical outlook. Plato despised the world of sense, indulged in the abstract underlying principles beyond the common life of the senses.

Aristotle, with his profound love of facts and of the concrete, was more interested in the concrete details of the moral life; he is a practical moderator and sits down to make practical suggestions. We have in his treatise on ethics, viz., '*Nicomachean Ethics*' not a description of the ideal community or ideal state as we have in Plato's *Republic*, but an analysis of moral life as it was found in the Greek city states of his own day.

According to Aristotle what all men seek is happiness - it is an end in itself, the summum bonum at which all human actions ultimately aim. But we must not confuse Aristotlian doctrine with modern utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill. For Aristotle an action is not good because it yields enjoyment; on the contrary, it yields enjoyment because it is good. According to utilitarianism the enjoyment or the feeling of enjoyment is the ground of the moral value, but, for Aristotle, the enjoyment is the consequence of the moral value. What alone is good in itself is an end in itself, is virtue. The good is happiness which is an activity of the soul. Aristotle holds that Plato was right when he divides the soul into two parts - one rational, the other irrational. The irrational part he divides into the vegetative and the appetitive. The good for man will not consist in the pleasure of the senses, the proper activity of reason is the summum bonum, the good for man. The appetitive part is essential to the account of virtue, for reason alone is purely contemplative and does not, without the help of appetite, lead to any practical activity.

There are two kinds of virtues - intellectual or dianoetic virtues and moral or ethical virtues, corresponding to the two parts of the soul.

The intellectual virtues will be found in the life of the reason, and the life of thought, philosophy. The ethical virtues will consist in the submission of the passions and appetites to the control of reason. Intellectual virtues result from teaching, moral virtues from habit. How is reason to gain control over the appetites ? Only by practice. It is by constant practice that the unruly passion can be checked and if the practice is continued, their control becomes habit. Aristotle lays utmost emphasis on the importance of habit in morality. It is extreme to attempt to uproot passions and it is extreme to allow them to run riot. Virtue means moderation — it is a golden mean between two extremes — each of which is a vice. Courage, e.g., is a 'mean' between cowardice and rashness; liberality, between prodigality and meanness; modesty, between bashfulness and shamelessness.

Our humanitarian theory of justice demands that all must have equal rights and, therefore, justice involves equality. But Aristotle thinks that justice involves, not equality, but right proportion, which is only sometimes equality.

The magnanimous man must be good in the highest degree for the better man deserves more and the best man most — greatness in every virtue should be the characteristic of the magnanimous man. According to Aristotle the highest virtue is for the few, and not for all. The highest virtue is only open to the philosopher. As regards virtue as an end or means, Aristotle holds that virtues are means to an end, namely, happiness.

A considerable part of Aristotelian Ethics is occupied with the discussion of friendship including all relations that involve affection.

Perfect friendship is only possible between the good and it is impossible to be friends with many people - one should not be friend with a person of higher than one's own. The good man should love himself but nobly. According to Aristotle pleasure is distinct from happiness though there can be no happiness without pleasure. Happiness lies in virtuous activity and perfect happiness lies in the best activity which is contemplative, because it allows leisure and leisure is essential to happiness. Practical virtue brings only a secondary kind of happiness. The supreme virtue is in the exercise of reason. The philosopher is the most god-like in the activity and therefore the happiest and best.

Though Aristotle's Ethics is consistent with his metaphysics, there is an 'emotional poverty' in his Ethics. As B. Russell points out :

"There is in Aristotle an almost complete absence of what may be called benevolence or Philanthropy. The sufferings of mankind, in so far as he is aware of them, do not move him emotionally; he holds them, intellectually, to be an evil, but there is no evidence that they cause him unhappiness except when the sufferers happen to be his friends."⁶ (B. Russell, Hist. of Western Philosophy, chapter XX - Aristotle's Ethics, P. 195).

Mediaeval ideas on Ethics were much influenced by those of Plato and Aristotle and partly also by those of the Stoics and by conceptions derived from christianity. With the spread of christianity in Europe a new emphasis was given to the individual. It allows the individual to conceive of an ideal kingdom of which all are members and in which even the humblest citizen may actively participate by faith, though unable to understand with any fullness the nature of the unity

within which his life is passed. The spread of christianity helped to change the Greek outlook which had identified the good man with the good citizen and regarded ethics as a part of politics. Attention was given to the inner aspect of morality; it was the man's inner motive that indicated his true spiritual state and fitted him for the life of the heaven which was the aspiration of every good man. Yet, on the whole, Middle Ages did not encourage moral speculation and the standard of right and wrong was shifted from man to the revelation of God's law in the Bible as it was interpreted by the church. To raise any question or doubt was dangerous heresy which the church had the power to punish with a becoming severity. What remained as the function of ethics was to deduce principles and illustrations provided with the Bible and to apply these to particular individual cases. The fundamental tendency was to give emphasis on the religious aspects of morals and a good deal of attention was given to the application of these ethical ideas to the guidance of individual life.

In the Mediaeval Ages the dogmas of the church remained unchallenged in spiritual affairs and Aristotelian philosophy in things temporal. The close of the 15th Century and the whole of the 16th Century was a period of transition - so much going out, so much coming in that the previously established framework of things seemed unsubstantial. Scientific discoveries created in man new hopes and expectations, an undaunted daring spirit in man with its devout aim 'to strive, to seek, to find and not to yield'. War has been declared by the modern man against all kinds of authority - divine or temporal. The freedom of thought is the key-word. From the 16th Century onward, the history of European thought was dominated by the Reformation - it was

the first successful attempt to vindicate personal rights against organization and it gave the signal for the rise of individualism in politics, in religion as well as in morals.

The results of Reformation and counter-Reformation in the intellectual sphere were at first wholly bad but ultimately beneficial. The thirty years' war persuaded people that neither protestants nor Catholics could be completely victorious - it enhanced men's freedom to think for themselves. Monkish monopoly was ended, mantle of mystery was withdrawn from truth, the barrier between minister and laity was narrowed down. Everywhere prevailed a free atmosphere. After a feverish night men breathed the fresh air of the morning. Men were disgusted with theological warfare - now they turned their attention to secular learning.

Broadly speaking, the two types, throughout the history of speculation of ethical thought, come up again and again as opposing points of view - the types represented by Heraclitus and Democritus, Antisthenes and Aristippus, Zeno and Epicurus, Cudworth and Hobbes, Reid and Hume, Kant and Bentham. The main line of opposition may be said to consist in the antithesis between reason and passions - one group laying emphasis on reason and the other on passion. The one tendency laying emphasis on passion can be best illustrated and represented by such a doctrine as that of David Hume. We find him saying : "reason is and must always be the slave of the passions"; "that actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason, nor their blame from a contrariety to it"; "moral distinctions, therefore, are not the offspring of reason. Reason is wholly inactive and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals."¹⁷

what is right to do; while the line of thinkers from Democritus, through the Epicureans, to Bentham and Mill think of the 'good' or happiness at which men aim and by reference to which their actions are to be considered as right or wrong or are to be praised or blamed. Besides these opposing schools we find another point of view which lays emphasis on the concrete personality of man.

It is generally held that the object of Ethics is to discover the good. It is assumed that there is one thing and one thing only that is good, viz., 'The Good,' and everything is good in so far as it tends to promote it or is a means to the 'Good.' Many philosophers are not unanimous with this view as they hold that a thing is good in itself, it is desired for its own sake as an end and not as a means to some other thing. The thing is to be desired or ought to be desired for its own sake and not for some other thing for the sake of which it ought to be desired. But if it is desired for the sake of other thing, it is not good in itself but good as a means to something. Quinine, e.g., is not in itself good, it is good as it promotes pleasure, i.e., relieves us of our malarial fever which causes discomfort to us. But why pleasure is good ? For its own sake or as it promotes something else that is good ? What establishes the criterion of morality by which we judge an action to be right or wrong, good or bad ? Are actions right or wrong without any reflection upon their consequences ? How is right action to be distinguished from a wrong one ?

It has been held by one group of thinkers that the ideal or standard lies in certain general laws and principles which exist independently in their own right **without** reference to individual experience and is,

therefore, absolute and unchangeable. This view has not been universally accepted. Other thinkers, in opposition to this view, hold that good or bad, right or wrong are only ideas which the human mind gradually acquires as a result of the consequences that experience brings, that rightness or wrongness of an action depends on its consequences or results. As they are created in the course of human experience, they are not absolute but relative to time and circumstances in their creation and in their significance. The first view is called *Intuitionist view* and the second *Teleological view* - from the first view we have Intuitionist theory and from the second Teleological theory.

The Intuitionist view assumes two forms - (i) according to one form of it the standard of goodness is an immutable principle which lies outside the human mind and is wholly independent of it. Granted that it exists outside the human mind, but where? one group answers that it is in the nature of things, while the other group places it in the will of God. The standard of goodness exists in the nature of the world; it is absolute and eternal; and is not relative either to the will of man or the will of God. The contrary view holds that the standard of goodness exists neither in the natures nor in the essences of things, but in the will of the God, for the will of the God there is no standard, save that will itself. (ii) The other form of the Intuitionist view holds that the standard of goodness is inherent in the human mind itself. Good is good, evil is evil as man wills - not individual men but humanity, the mind of man. The standard of moral values lies within the will of mankind. The classical formulation of this intuitionist point of view is found in the ethical writings, viz., '*Fundamental Principles of a Metaphysics of Morals*' and '*Critique of Practical Reason*', of Immanuel Kant.

According to Kant moral law is unique. It is only Categorical imperative which holds unconditionally and universally. Moral laws do not depend on the ends at which men aim like the laws of the nations, or of the rhetoric or even assertorial laws. Kant denies all teleological theories of ethics which hold that an action is right because it leads to certain consequences. The supreme moral principle lays its command upon us absolutely and admits of no question - what we ought to do we ought to do. There can be no higher law by which the moral imperative might be set aside.

There is inborn in every human mind, Kant holds, a moral law which is the same for all, i.e., universal and about which there need be no dispute. Since the moral imperative is categorical it cannot be derived from the consideration of any end outside of the will of the individual; for every external end is empirical and can give rise only to a hypothetical imperative. Kant holds that the absolute imperative of duty has no reference to external ends to which the will is directed, but simply to the right direction of the will itself. We find Kant saying:

"There is nothing in the world or even out of it that can be called good without qualification except a good will."

Goodness is definable only in terms of this Categorical imperative-the universal law of the mind. "Duty consists in the obligation to act from pure reverence for the moral law. To this motive all others must give way, for it is the condition of a will which is good in itself, and which has a value with which nothing else is comparable."⁹ (J. Watson, Selections From Kant, P. 241). Consequences have no significance for the determination of the goodness of conduct because "a man's will

is good, not because the consequences which flow from it are good, nor because it is capable of attaining the end which it seeks, but it is good in itself or because it wills the good. By a good will is not meant mere well-wishing; it consists in a resolute employment of all the means within one's reach, and its intrinsic value is in no way increased by success or lessened by failure".¹⁰ (J. Watson, *Selections From Kant*, P. 225-226). A good will is a will which unconditionally and absolutely obeys a moral law - it acts in such a way that the resulting conduct might be done by everybody else. The good will is good intrinsically — it is 'a jewel which shines by its own light'.

All moral concepts have their seat and origin wholly apriori in the reason. The essence of morality is to be derived from the concept of law. When we act according to the idea of law, i.e., by will we are lifted out of the phenomenal world, we are free. But if we act according to our desires we belong to the phenomenal world and we are not free. The exercise of the will brings with it a capacity for free activity. The right action determined by such a principle would be the same for every individual, no matter what the tastes or inclinations or circumstances of the particular individual are. The moral law cannot tell us what the matter or content of our actions ought to be; it can only instruct us with regard to the form. But the pure form, without the matter, must be simply the form of law in general. So Kant provides us, as the content of the categorical imperative, this formulae: "Act only on that maxim which thou canst at the same time will become a universal law."

"Kant gives as an illustration of the working of the categorical imperative that it is wrong to borrow money, because if we all tried to

do so there would no money left to borrow But there are some acts which Kant would certainly think wrong but which cannot be shown to be wrong by his principles, for instance suicide; it would be quite possible for a melancholic to wish that everybody should commit suicide. His maxim seems, in fact, to give a necessary but not a sufficient criterion of virtue."¹¹ (B. Russell — History of Western Philosophy, P. 683).

This maxim, C.E.M. Joad remarks, "gives us no guidance in the actual circumstances of daily life But there are occasions in which the telling of a lie may be justified in actual life on the ground that the consequences of truth telling would be harmful. Ought we, for example, to tell the truth to a potential murderer, who asks where an innocent person whom he proposes to kill is hiding ? Most people would say that we ought not, but, whatever view we take of the matter, Kant's universally binding principle affords us little assistance."¹² (C.E.M. Joad, Great Philosophers of the World, P. 54).

According to Kant the human mind knows intuitively what is right and what is wrong and duty must be done for duty's sake. It needs no explanation and does not come from experience - the practical reason expresses itself in the form of a categorical imperative, a voice of duty, an unconditional command of the reason. The will issues order categorically — unconditional obedience to the moral law is demanded. Respect for the dignity of the moral law is the sole motive of moral action. Royce in his book, 'Spirit of Modern Philosophy', writes :

"Kant loves to dwell on its awful sublimity Absolute truthfulness, absolute respect for the rights and freedom of everyone of your fellow men, with devotion to the cause of high mindedness, of

honesty, of justice, of simplicity, of honour - such is Kant's ideal, and so far as in him lay, he was always true to it"¹³ (P.133).

Kant's life reminds us of 'categorical imperative of duty' which is for him kernel of morals. Caird in his book, 'Critical Philosophy of Kant', vol. I, P. 63) quotes the following account of Kant from Heine.

"The life of Immanuel Kant is hard to describe : he had indeed neither life nor history in the proper sense of the words. He lived an abstract, mechanical, old bachelor existence in a quiet, remote street of Konigsberg I do not believe that the great Cathedral clock of that city accomplished its day's work in a less passionate and more regular way than its countryman, Immanuel Kant".¹⁴

It is not enough to say : It is your duty : therefore, do your duty. To this one may say : what is my duty ? Kant gives us a formula which may be applied to all and every situation : "So act that the maxim of thy will may always hold good as a principle of legislation." Let me suppose that a sum of money were left in trust with me. But under compelling circumstances, I spend a portion of the money to be paid back within a limited period of time. Am I right ? Should I wish it to be universalised ? May I wish this rule to become a general rule of action ?

To this rule Kant adds another : "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another always as end, never as a means." NO child, no woman, no labouring man can ever be treated as a means to one's own pleasure or profit.

Some people may say that we are constantly using other peoples as means to our purposes - we use a porter as a means of carrying our

luggage, we use a labouring man as a means of doing our jobs for us. But this way of thinking is wrong, for Kant never stated that we should not use the services of other people or they should not use our services. Certainly moral wrong is done when we use other people as a means in a bad way as when a woman is used as a prostitute or a child is used as a cheap means of production. What does Kant mean when he says that one cannot be treated as mere means? He tells us that we should remember that they are ends, things of value' in themselves apart from their services that they render to us.

"Kant maintained", Russell observes, "that every human being is an end in himself There is, however, a logical difficulty in Kant's view, since it gives no means of reaching a decision when two men's interests clash. If each is an end in himself, how are we to arrive at a principle for determining which shall give way? Such a principle must have to do with the community rather than with the individual."¹⁵ (B. Russell, *Hist. of Western Phil.*, Page 194-chapter XX - Aristotle's Ethics).

If our civilization is to survive we must learn the lesson of good will and co-operation - all men have to learn to live together with responsible freedom and respect for others and with dignity. As Radhakrishnan observes: "Democracy is the political expression of the ethical principle that the true end of man is responsible freedom. Kant's celebrated moral principle, 'So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, always as an end, never merely as a means,' is a formulation of the democratic faith."¹⁶ (*Reli. & Society* P. 90).

When this moral law or ethical principle is not obeyed, what will happen ? This is a problem more vital for human existence and its survival and human happiness or social well-being. Our strong inclinations may stand in the way. For example, in choosing a wife or a profession one may take one's own inclination into consideration totally ignoring the moral law or the law of reason altogether. What will happen if morality grows lax and the society no longer frowns upon the evil-doer ? 'Everybody is doing it' may encourage others to do the same thing. What will happen in a community when offenders, by dint of their position and power, escape the law, public opinion becomes lax and men are made mere means in a bad way ? In a circumstance like this virtuous and honest men will suffer. There may be a very few persons who may live a life of categorical imperative of duty in the midst of social decadence with its accompanying poverty and hunger, dirt and disease, infinite pain and incredible suffering. The eternal law of justice seems to demand that there be some compensation, relief somewhere. If it is not in this life, it must be in the life here after. Virtuous must be rewarded, if not in this world, then it must in the other world. This was the well-known argument for the existence of God and for the immortality of the soul put forward by the philosopher Kant. Kant considered it necessary to postulate the existence of God. In his '*Critique of practical Reason*' he thought that the existence of God is a necessary condition of the universe to secure the guarantee that the virtuous will be rewarded and the wicked punished. In his '*Critique of Pure Reason*' his fundamental position was that of an agnostic, but in his '*Critique of Practical Reason*' he postulated the existence of God. Kant considered that human immortality is a necessary condition of attaining to a perfectly

'good will', for our human nature is in such a degree sensuous that it will require an infinite time for the 'will' to become rational and perfectly good.

No theory is above criticism. Critics point out that what is wrong with Kant's moral principle is not that it is in itself formal but it cannot be validly applied. The pure will of Kant, being devoid of particular content, has been described by Jacobi as 'a will that wills nothing'. Many have even considered Kant's principle to be too rigid, too inflexible, too stringent in its application. Can an action be morally wrong if the doer is guided by love instead of performing it from a sense of duty? Kant does not admit the possibility of such an attitude. But Kant should have taken into consideration our nobler emotions like love, sympathy, neighbourly feeling.

Bradley, in his *"Ethical Studies"*, characterised Kant's view as 'duty for duty's sake' and contrasted it with the utilitarian view, 'Pleasure for pleasure's sake'. Kant considered that we must do our duty out of pure respect for the law of reason and not from any anticipation of pleasure. Though he does not regard happiness as the direct end, yet he believes that happiness must be included in any complete account of supreme human good - the complete well-being of a human being includes happiness as well as virtue. His moral rigorism is not in any way opposed to human happiness. He, however, thought that the moral end consists in the promotion of our perfection and the happiness of others.

"Kant's error, we may say, consisted in this, that he understood the term Reason in a purely abstract way. He opposed it to all the

particular content of our desires; whereas, in reality, reason is relative to the whole world which it interprets. The universe of rational insight is the universe in which the whole world - including all our desires — appears in its true relations ... The universe of rational insight is a universe into which they can all enter, and in which they will find their true places."¹⁷ (Mackenzie - Manual of Ethics - P. 215).

The intuitionist view thus holds that the standard of the good is absolute and immutable wholly untouched by the vicissitudes of human frailty. The intuitionists do not agree in common as to where the standard may be said to exist. Some hold that it exists in the nature of things; some hold that it exists in the will of God; while others hold that it is in the nature of human reason. All intuitionists, however, do agree that consequences are of no moral significance - actions are proved right or wrong apriori without references to their consequences.

What Intuitionism denies the Teleological view lays emphasis. They insist that consequences are of great moral significance. According to teleologists, the rightness or wrongness of an action depends on the consequences or results and not on the action itself.

Hedonism stands for those theories which regard pleasure or happiness as the supreme end of human life or the highest good. There have been many representatives of hedonism from the Greeks to the present, prominent among whom may be mentioned *Epicurus* and his school, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and J.S. Mill (1806-1879). They differ among themselves on various points in the formulation of the theory that pleasures are the end in terms of which goodness is to be measured.

Aristippus, a renowned disciple of Socrates, first proposed the view that pleasure is the highest good, that pleasure is the sole end of life. Nothing is wicked, nothing evil, nothing wrong, provided only it satisfies the individual's thirst for pleasure. Pleasure alone is the good, the end in itself, the only good and its opposite pain is evil. Virtue has no intrinsic value of its own but derives its value from the pleasure which accompanies it. What each man ought to seek is his own pleasure, not the pleasure of all human beings, As for pleasures, he held mere physical or bodily pleasures in the highest regard.

Epicurus (born in 342 B.C.), the founder of Epicurean School refined the theory. Though pleasure is the highest good, by pleasure he does not mean, like cyrenaics, merely the pleasure of the moment, but the pleasure that endures throughout the life-time. He lays emphasis on mental pleasures rather than physical pleasures and of all mental pleasures most emphasis has been given upon friendship. He does not aim at the feverish pleasures of the world but rather at a negative absence of pain, at tranquillity, quiet calm, repose of spirit undisturbed by fears and anxieties. According to him pleasure does not consist in the multiplication of wants and their subsequent satisfaction, for it complicates life without adding to happiness. Epicurus himself lived a very simple and abstemious life and advised his disciples accordingly.

In modern times a much more serious attempt to construct an ethical philosophy on the basis of happiness was made by the eminent English thinkers like Bentham and J.S. Mill. According to Bentham and Mill the criterion of a right action is to be found in the consequences of the action.

With Bentham the pleasure is the highest good, not the pleasure of the moment but of the life time, and not the pleasure of the individual but of the greatest number. This newly added qualification, 'pleasure of the greatest number', more accurately 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' marks the arrival of the social element in ethical theory. The way to secure the greatest pleasure for oneself is to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number and in doing this one can achieve happiness. For example honesty is a social virtue and being honest a man derives his greatest pleasure for he is rewarded by the public consideration and esteem. There is no contradiction between pursuing one's own greatest pleasure on the one hand and promoting the social good on the other.

Bentham, being a social reformer working for the betterment of the humanity, was in search of a universal principle and he found it in the principle of 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number', called the 'principle of utility' and hence the name 'utilitarianism'. It is the theory that what we ought to aim at is the greatest possible amount of pleasure of all human beings or of all sentient creatures. Bentham's theory is best represented in the following classic statement of J. S. Mill.

"The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends, and all desirable things are desirable either for

the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain."¹⁸ (J.S. Mill, *Utilitarianism* chapter II, fifteenth edition, 1907, PP. 9-10).

In support of his theory Mill has put forward his argument in the fourth chapter of his little book, entitled '*Utilitarianism*'.

"No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, is good to the aggregate of all persons."¹⁹

He goes on to argue that happiness is the only good on the ground "that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same phenomenon; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact : that to think of an object as desirable ... and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing."

Mill introduces an important modification as he admits of a distinction between the pursuit of one's own greatest pleasure and the promotion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, i.e., to promote the social good is the duty of all. By this admission Mill commits us to the position that it is possible to desire something other than our pleasure.

Sidgwick, in his *Methods of Ethics* (Book I, ch. IV), criticizes Mill's saying that 'desiring a thing and finding it pleasant are two modes

of naming the same psychological fact', He says that if we understand pleasure in a more exact sense it is not obvious that what we desire is always pleasure; in fact, what we desire is very frequently some objective end and not the accompanying pleasure. Even when we do desire pleasure, the best way to get it is often to forget it. If we think about the pleasure itself, we are almost sure to miss it. This is the 'paradox of hedonism'. The ambiguity in the word 'pleasure' arises as the word 'pleasure' is sometimes understood to mean agreeable feeling or the feeling of satisfaction and sometimes to mean an object that gives satisfaction. The pain of tooth-ache is not merely a feeling of disagreeableness or dis-satisfaction but a distinct sensation.

That the ultimate object of desire is pleasure is a doctrine, called psychological Hedonism, of which the best known exponent is J.S. Mill - this doctrine is called Psychological Hedonism because it affirms the seeking of pleasure as a psychological fact; it is simply an statement of fact.

It may be held that if we always do naturally seek pleasure then there will be no point in saying that we ought to desire it. Ethical hedonism teaches us that we ought to seek the greatest pleasure, whether our own or that of others. It is a theory of value, it provides us with a ground upon which one form of action ought to be preferred to others. So there is no necessary connection between these two theories - psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism. Mackenzie remarks : "Ethical Hedonism, however, does not stand or fall with this."²⁰ i.e., with psychological hedonism. (Mackenzie — A Manual of Ethics P. 168).

The confusion is largely due to an ambiguity in the word

'desirable'. Let us quote a passage from Mill to illustrate this point.

"The only proof", Mill says, "capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it ... In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it."²¹ (Quoted from : A Manual of Ethics - Mackenzie P. 169).

Mill uses the word 'desirable' to mean what people do actually desire. In common English use 'desirable' means 'what ought to be desired'. Mill assumes the meaning of the word 'desirable' as analogous to that of 'visible' or 'audible'. 'Visible' means 'able to be seen' and 'audible' means 'able to be heard'. Therefore, 'desirable' means 'able to be desired'. This is Mill's conclusion. When we say that a thing is desirable we do not usually mean that it is 'able to be desired' but it is reasonably to be desired or that it ought to be desired; Hence Mill has committed a 'fallacy of ambiguity of term' as the word 'desirable' is not similar to 'visible' or 'audible'. It is rather analogous to the word 'detestable' which implies not that a thing is detested but that it ought to be detested. We cannot directly infer from the premise - 'what men actually do', the conclusion - 'what men ought to do' and in breaking the rule Mill has committed a naturalistic fallacy. According to Dr. G. E; Moore 'Good' is indefinable, i.e., incapable of definition and Mill in his attempt to define good or in doing so has committed naturalistic fallacy - it is a tendency to define good or to explain the meaning of the good by reference to a particular mode of action which may be more or less good but does not enable us to see what really 'Good' is. Mill has committed another fallacy, known as the fallacy of composition in logic,

when he says that "each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons". Mackenzie observes :

"It is inferred that because my pleasures are a good to me, yours to you, his to him, and so on, therefore my pleasures + your pleasures + his pleasures are a good to me + you + him. It is forgotten that neither the pleasures nor the persons are capable of being made into an aggregate. It is as if we should argue that because each one of a hundred solidiers is six feet high, therefore the whole company is six hundred feet high. The answer is that this would be the case if the soldiers stood on one another's heads. And similarly Mill's argument would hold good if the minds of all human beings were to be rolled into one, so as to form an aggregate. But as it is, "the aggregate of all persons" is nobody, and consequently cannot be a good to him. A good must be a good for somebody."²² (Mackenzie, A manual of Ethics, P. 174).

With Bentham Mill accepts the principle of 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' but he makes a very important modification of Bentham's theory. He recognizes a difference in quality among pleasures; some pleasures are better not being differing in quantity, i.e., in intensity and duration but being qualitatively different. Bentham has consistently denied any such qualitative differences, pleasures being measured only quantitatively — the pleasures of art, poetry or philanthropy are no better than the pleasures of the senses. According to him quantity of pleasure being equal a push pin is as good as poetry. This Mill denied. According to him : "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."²³ (Mill, Utilitarianism, P. 14).

If this be the case, it amounts to the abandonment of the strict hedonistic ethics that pleasure is the only good. Because it introduces some other standard for the right action than pleasure itself. One pleasure is desirable than another not on account of its nature as pleasure but on account of some other quality that it possesses. Thus the admission of such a qualitative difference in pleasures weakens the logical position of Hedonism and by admitting such a difference in pleasures Mill remains no longer a hedonist and he, by implication, becomes a perfectionist.

Hedonism has been weakened also by a better knowledge of the psychological motives of human actions. A soldier or a martyr, e.g., may undergo hardship and suffering for the sake of a noble cause involving discomforts of his own. The unselfish man, who denies himself in order to benefit others, takes a pleasure in self-denial or self-sacrifice for the cause of others. A sadist, e.g. may find pleasure by torturing his 'object of love' or a masochist may find satisfaction by endurance of pain and self-persecution. The tyrant in the old story who would take a new wife every evening only to kill her the next morning illustrates the extreme type of sadism. By instinct, habit or custom we crave not pleasures, nor happiness but specific things - we want a wife or husband, a piece of land, a position, a child and so on. Pleasure ensues upon the satisfaction of wants and wants must be prior to the satisfactions.

There are certain things we value much, viz., devotion to ideals, self-sacrifice, courage and heroism etc. we prize innocence in children, we prize force of character in men, the ability to stand firmly against all kinds of temptations, to overcome the frailties of human life. These facts imply that there are other elements of value in a good whole of the

universe of rational insight besides pleasures or happiness.

The criterion of a right action, according to hedonists, is to be found in the consequences of the actions. But it may so happen that in doing an action I may expect good consequences but when the action is done it yields bad consequences. For example, when I save a man from drowning, my action is for the promotion of social good. The consequences of his being saved are better than the consequences of his dying. But the man whom I have saved commits a murder. The actual consequences of my action (i.e. act of rescue) will have been bad. From the view point of actual consequences I have done a wrong action but at the same time it was my duty to rescue him from drowning with a view to promoting social good. From it follows that it is not possible to know all the consequences of any action and we are not certain whether our action is right or wrong from the viewpoint of consequences, Thus it provides us with a criterion which cannot be applied with absolute certainty.

Further, the conception of happiness, taken by itself, fails to furnish us with a moral principle from the lack of a universal point of view. Hedonism ignores or overlooks the fact that what we really seek to satisfy is not our desire but ourselves - the value of our satisfaction depends on the kind of self to which the satisfaction is given. To consider it in this way is to consider our desires with reference to the form, with reference to the universe in which they have a place. Socrates was executed, Jesus was crucified, Gandhiji and Lincoln fell victims of a noble cause. We honour all these men, why ? Because they suffered for the good of the humanity. What they did, they did for the humanity. Are they not martyrs to their efforts for achieving something noble or

good in themselves, viz. righteousness, wisdom, freedom?

We assume that happiness accompanies the good life, but the stark fact is that there are many lives that are not happy. Socrates died in the quest for wisdom and knowledge. Should we say that wisdom or knowledge is not good unless it leads to happiness? We love and honour Socrates not because his love of wisdom is a means to reach happiness but because wisdom, with him, is an end in itself.

Perfectionism or Self-realization or Energism or Activism is the theory that the end by which goodness is to be measured is the full expression or the development of the capacities of human beings. The capacity to enjoy is one of these capacities but only one. The hedonists, according to this view, is guilty of one-sidedness in emphasizing only one aspect of experience to the exclusion of other capacities - the capacity to grow, to acquire wisdom, to sacrifice one-self for a noble cause, to love and sympathise other fellow beings, to create art and to do innumerable other things which are equally valuable and worthy ends. So the perfectionists would urge that, not pleasure only, but all of the capacities of man's nature constitute the foundation of morals, the standard of goodness.

To the question : what is the highest good or summum bonum at which all human activity ultimately aims? For Plato man's highest good is a harmoniously developed personality, a condition in which every faculty functions in a perfect way, works in harmony, no one of them being in excess. Aristotle gave to this end the name 'eudaimonia' or happiness and defined it as the exercise of man's soul or the realization of a man's capacities in accordance with virtues. Happiness

lies in virtuous activity and perfect happiness lies in the best activity which is contemplative in character. Supreme virtue lies in the exercise of reason - it is intellectual. It is only in the life of reason man resembles God whose life is a life of Pure thought. God to Aristotle is essentially a thinker, the thought of thought - pure thought. The philosophers are most God-like in their activity and in their life of reason and therefore, they are the happiest and best. Rational activity is the highest good expressed in philosophical thought, in scientific research, and in the quest for truth. What alone is good in itself, is an end in itself, is virtue and the realization of virtue in a man's life is the supreme end. The idea that the end at which we are to aim is the realization of the self or the development of character, leads us at once to regard the moral life as a process of growth or development. The idea of growth or development is applied to the moral life also. Darwin and Lamarck applied this idea of development or evolution to the origin of species. According to Darwin, the development of animal species takes place by means of struggle for existence and in this struggle the fittest will survive. H. Spencer, in recent times, has extended its application to the origin of social institutions, forms of government and the like. But it is brought into prominence in the treatment of philosophical studies by Hegel. Our moral life then is, in its very essence, a process of development.

There is in the moral life of man an ideal - moral life consists in the pursuit of such an ideal and the gradual attainment of it. In all development there is a beginning, a process of development and an end. In ethics we are concerned partially with 'what is' but wholly with 'what ought to be'. "Man partly is and wholly hopes to be." It is what he hopes or wills to be that determines the direction of his growth.

According to H. Spencer evolution is a movement from indefinite, incoherent and homogeneous to the definite, coherent and heterogeneous. Long before H. Spencer Aristotle has all this; he calls it a movement from matter to form - the matter being indefinite, form definite, matter incoherent and form coherent, matter homogeneous and form heterogeneous. Coherence is the same thing as organisation and Aristotle has defined the form of a thing as its organisation. For Aristotle, as for Spencer, the higher being is simply that which is more organized. Aristotle invented the idea as well as the word.

The process of development is from lower to the higher. Now the question crops up : What rational ground have we for calling them higher and lower ? To this Spencer's answer is man is higher, because he is more organized. But why is it better to be more organized? Spencer has no answer but when we turn to Aristotle, he has an answer. It is meaningless to talk of development, advance, higher and lower, except in relation to an end. Advance is called advance, development is called development when it is advance or development towards an end and this end, says Aristotle, is the actualization of reason. The God is reason, matterless form, Pure thought, thought of thought. The whole process is nothing but the struggle of reason to express itself, to actualize itself, to become existent in the world.

When we turn to the philosophy of Hegel, we find that his point of view is fundamentally idealistic. "What is reality? Reality, he answers, is thought, reason. The world is a great thought process. It is God-thinking ... what we call nature is thought externalized; it is the Absolute Reason revealing itself in outward form. But nature is not its final goal. Returning, it expresses itself more fully in human self-consciousness

and in the end finds its complete realization in art, religion, and philosophy.”

“Such a philosophy as this takes our breath away. It seems like Idealism gone wild. It is magnificent, divine, but is it true? It reminds us of Plato, who takes us to the heavens and makes us see that our home is there.”²⁴ (G.T.W. Patrick - Introduction to Phil-Revised ed. Idealism - P. 221).

Hegel regarded the universe as a process of development or evolution but not as a biological evolution determined by mechanical laws but as a spiritual evolution taking place according to a dialectical process and the end at which man aims is the fullest realization of his spiritual nature. Our human history has been interpreted as a gradual process of development upwards towards the realization of the truest and most perfect form of self-consciousness. Hegel conceived the process of development as a dialectical or logical movement from thesis to antithesis and then to a synthesis which combines both the thesis and the antithesis and this synthesis may serve its turn as a new thesis. Similarly, in moral evolution there is a process of development from a goodness that is simply an outward obedience to externally imposed rules to a goodness that consists in the inward submission to the internal faculty of consciousness and these two find their synthesis in a social morality, a life 'that is gradually shared by the developing consciousness of the community in its efforts to attain the highest perfection of which human nature is capable. 'The good will' of Kant is with Hegel no longer the will of the individual imposing rules on himself, but the universal will which becomes self-conscious in the course of evolution. Hegel did not hold that goodness consists in the isolated individual seeking his

independent good by realizing more and more fully his own capacity for self consciousness - his emphasis was on the social system to which the individual belongs rather than on the individual himself.

In his *'Ethical Studies'* F. H. Bradley has pointed out that each individual has a particular 'station' in a social system to which he belongs as a teacher, as a farmer or as a labourer and the most fundamental part of his moral life consists in carrying out the duties of the particular station. Each person is regarded as having his place and function in a social system that is aiming, with more or less complete consciousness, at the realization of a perfect humanity. What is important for each individual is to find his appropriate station within the social system and to fulfil his duties that belong to that station. His true happiness lies only in this, not in the enjoyment of individual pleasure. Let us conclude with G.T.W. Patrick's observation : "Every man now and in succeeding generations demands a fair field for exercising his powers and developing his personality. This can only happen in a social order where justice prevails and where it extends beyond the narrow limits of one's own community to the whole of mankind. So fundamental are our duties to others, so ingrained by social if not bio-logical inheritance, that they seem indeed like the very voice of God in the form of human conscience."²⁵ (G.T.W., Patrick, *Introduction to Philosophy*; Revised ed. P. 441).

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Chapter - II

CHAPTER -II

**BASIC TENETS OF MARXIST ETHICS - EMERGENCE
OF A NEW HUMANITARIAN MORALITY**

Vaiṣṇava Sahajiyās declare to the world abroad :

*“Śuna he mānuṣ bhāi |
Savār upare mānuṣ Satya
Tāhār upare nāi ||”*

(“Listen, O brother men-man is the truth above all truths, — there is nothing above that.”)

This song, ascribed to a renowned Vaiṣṇava poet, Chandidās, tells us that all truth underlying the universe as a whole is contained in man. But here divinity is attributed to man — the realisation of the true nature of man as Kṛṣṇa and that of woman as Rādhā, as the enjoyer (Rasa) and the enjoyed (the object of Rasa, i.e. Rati). The Absolute Reality divides Itself into two, the enjoyer and the enjoyed, the Rasa and the Rati; as Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa, the Absolute Reality enjoys the eternal love which is superme and purest of all love. When man and woman can realise their true nature as Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā between them, their love transcends all the categories of sensuality. Love is then not human but becomes love divine and 'sahaja' (natural) is the realisation of such an eternal, divine love.

The Bāuls of Bengal have no images, temples, scriptures and Ceremonials, These wandering village singers who beg alms from door to door declare in their songs the divinity of man and express for him an

intense, profound feeling of love. They are not sophisticated men; they live a life of simplicity in the remote rural villages but their songs move our inner spiritis, inner depths of our hearts. Their religion is not about the God or a cosmic force but about the God of human personality.

“Humanity is the essence of divinity, - and man becomes God in the strength of his love; man is the highest in the world, for it is only he revels in supreme love. The religion of the Vaiṣṇava Sahajiyās was thus a religion of humanity. The Sahajiyās have no god or God other than man. Even Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa are never regarded as deities to be worshipped, - they represent principles to be realised in humanity. Humanity itself is thus viewed from a sublime perspective.”²

(Dr. Sashibhusan Dasgupta, 'Obscure Religious Cults', p 136).

This attitude is depicted in the Sahajiyā song ;

Mānuṣ dever Sār I
Yār prem jagate Pracār II
Jagater Śreṣṭha mānuṣ Yāre bali I
Prem-Pṛīti-rase mānuṣ Kare Keli II³
 (Sj. S. Song No.27).

(Humanity is the essence of the divinity. It is through love man becomes God. Man who revels in supreme love is the highest in the world.)

or

“Mānuṣ dhara mānuṣ dhara
Deva haite mānuṣ baḍa I”⁴
 (Sadunāth : 'Guru Satya')

(Not God, but man, is the highest truth. One can attain divinity only through man.)

The same tone and spirit we have in Swāmi Vivekānanda when he wrote :

“Man is the highest temple of God, and worship of God through man is therefore the highest ...”⁵

(Swāmi Vivekānanda, Brahmavādin, Dec I, 1897).

One day Tagore Chanced to hear a song from a beggar belonging to the Bāul sect of Bengal — it was simple and was alive with an emotional sincerity. Through his song he (the beggar) worships the 'ideal man', the man of the heart.

*“Temple and mosques obstruct thy path,
and I fail to hear thy call or to move,
When teachers and priest angrily crowd round me.”⁶
(Tāgore : The Religion of Man, Ch. VII. p 69)*

This love song of the mystic Bāul has deeply moved Tāgore. Tāgore himself is a Bāul of Bengal and he sings of an Infinite Supreme Being underlying the whole cosmic process of finite creation. Like the Bāuls of Bengal he does not follow any tradition of ceremony but only believes in love which is the paraśmaṇi (Magic stone) that transmutes by its touch 'greed into sacrifice' and for the sake of this love even gods long to become man. The man is both finite and infinite—the infinite and the finite have embraced each other in the personality of man and in the religion of man. There is an ideal unity and our world-process as a whole is moving towards that ideal end. The realization of the divinity in man is

the ideal realization of truth. It is Tāgore's faith that 'We can never go beyond man in all that we know and feel'. Man is the abode of 'ideal man', the infinite. His religion is the religion of man — this religion of man does not end in God but in man 'who dreamed of his own infinity and majestically worked for all time, defying danger and death'. The realization of the 'ideal man' in man, to overcome the barrier of separateness from the rest of existence, i.e. in the realization of the unity, oneness, 'advaitam' lies the real freedom. Man's sole aim is to achieve ideal perfection which is to be attained by the realization of our deeper relatedness with the Infinite Being. The world process is an eternal process of self-realization through self-manifestation of the Supreme Being. His conception of man and religion, though, may have some striking points of similarity with Hegelian and neo-Hegelian thoughts but his ideas are fundamentally based on the teachings of the upanishads. He was influenced to a great extent by the Vaiṣṇava love poets and Bāuls of Bengal and other mystic poets of Northern India. But this does not minimise his originality. Above all he is a poet, a poet-philosopher. His intuitional realization of the reality, developed in his songs, accompanied with subtle artistic expression, keeps us in a fix as to whether we should eulogise them as the masterpieces of art or as the best expression of his religion of love experiences.

What is unique in man is the development of his consciousness which gradually deepens and widens the realization of the immortal being, the perfect, the eternal. There is divinity in man which is humanity.

*"Mānuṣ goṣāmi birāj Kare,
Kyān cinline Sāmānya Jñāne re I"*
(The song is ascribed to Fakircānd).

('In man resides the Lord, why hast thou not Known Him with thy common sense ?')

or as *Lālan Fakir* sings :

"rūper ghare atal rūp bihāre

*Ceye dekh nā tāre I"*⁸

(Changeless beauty resides within this house of the man - it is to be realized there.)

Tagore urges that the individual must express him in disinterested works, in science and philosophy, in literature and arts, in service and worship. Mukti or liberation lies in the realization of the unity of two selves in their realization of oneness. It is only through love that we can have the direct communion with the Divine. It does not soar heavenward, rather it is realized even in this mundane existence amidst the various bondages of life.

"Asaṁkhya vandhan - Mājhe Mahānandamay,

*Labhiva Muktir Swād I"*⁹

(From the poem - 'Mukti' - 'Naivedya Kāvya' - Tagore)

In mukti or liberation we go to the 'City wonderful', the anirvachaniya, the ineffable, the supreme unity of the many in 'One'. One can remain in the world carrying on one's daily vocation, yet one can attain the state of liberation - it is freedom from isolation of self, from the isolation of things. The liberated man enters the realm of the light and knows what freedom really is.

We are alienated from the world of truth when we confine ourselves in the realm of the finite and give undue emphasis upon 'me' and 'mine' and when we allow ourselves of being tossed about 'by the tidal waves of pleasure and pain.' We must have a constant urge to go beyond the world of appearances in which facts as facts are alien to us 'like the mere sounds of foreign music.' It is only through the realization of the ideal unity we enter into the unlimited domain of freedom and we become unalienated. Disunion constitutes alienation and this is overcome in the realization of the ideal unity between man and the 'ideal man'. The unalienated man sings :

*"To him who sinks into the deep, nothing
remains unattained."¹⁰*

(Tagore-The Religion of Man, P 115).

Let us now turn to Marx's concept of man in the following sequel.

Marx was **not** at all interested in the question of divinity as the essence of man; he would dismiss it as a mere religious speculation. His main task was to change the world in which men are enslaved. According to him **everything** about the individual person is determined by the material conditions of his life. Man has an essentially social nature- the real nature of man is the totality of social relations.

The mute pangs of the lowly humanity, the injustice of the powerful, the sufferings of the vast majority of men, exploitation of man by man in the name of religion, the cry of the proletariat and the triumph of the bourgeoisie, the inequity of the social machine, crashing of the innocent

hearts, the sternly acute problems of the grossly real life-these are the things by which Marx was deeply moved. As a matter of fact, rarely have we seen any one sink so deep in the unfathomable depths of his heart and come out with priceless gems of love and sympathy for the whole of suffering humanity.

"The marxian system," says E. Kamenka, ".....begins with a 'philosophy of man'. It proclaims man to be the pre-supposition and the end of all philosophy, all science and all human activity; for Marx man is the subject in terms of which these latter are to be understood and judged."¹¹(E. Kamenka, *Marxism and Ethics*, Ch.II, P. 15).

Marx was inspired by a young Hegelian, Ludwig Feuerbach, who had declared that God was merely a projection of desires that man found himself powerless to realise and thus that man was the true subject and God the predicate. In the "*Essence of Christianity*" Feuerbach added :

"There is no other essence which man can think of, dream, imagine, feel, believe in, wish for, love and adore as the 'absolute,' than the essence of human nature itself,"¹²

(Ludwig Feuerbach, "*Essence of Christianity*," trans, by Marian Evans, New York, 1959, P 270).

Marx applies this Feuerbachianism to his ethical philosophy and makes man the subject, the hero of his moral drama which can not be staged without man as 'Hamlet' cannot be staged with the prince of Denmark left out. Man is at the central point round which moves everything. Those things which enslave man, alienate him, make him means to an end are the main targets of his criticism. For Feuerbach as well as for Marx, man is the sole and absolute standard in terms of which all else to

be judged. And thus Marxism becomes the philosophy of man. As long as man remains sectional, class-bound, dependent on circumstances and economic conditions over which he has no control, he is not truly human and free in the real sense of the term. He cannot be the subject of ethics in the truest sense of the term as long as he is alienated, he is forced to act by the compelling circumstances, he is a prey to the system. His morality is not human morality for it is not a free expression of his humanity but simply his reactions to inhuman conditions of life which ignore his creative nature as a social being destined to become the master of himself and the universe. Truly free man need no rules imposed upon him from outside, no moral exhortations to do his duty—moral responsibility is the outcome of his true being.

“Marx's condemnation of Capitalism”, Prof. Karl Popper remarks, “is fundamentally a moral condemnation. The system is condemned, for the cruel injustice inherent in it which is combined with full 'formal' justice and righteousness. The system is condemned, because by forcing the exploiter to enslave the exploited it robs both of their freedom He hated capitalism, not for its accumulation of wealth, but for its oligarchical character; he hated it because in this system wealth means political power in the sense of power over other men. Labour power is made a commodity; that means that men must sell themselves on the market. Marx hated the system because it resembled slavery.”¹³

(Karl Popper, *Open Society And Its Enemies*, Ch. 22, P 199)

Quoting the French Revolution constitution of 1793, Marx wrote;

“The right of man to freedom is not based on the union of man with man, but on the separation of man from man It leads man to see in

other men not the realisation but the limitation of his own freedom,¹⁴ (K.M.S.W. - P 53).

For him, "man is the world of man, the state, society; man is the highest being for man, that is, with the categorical imperative to overthrow all circumstances in which man is humiliated, enslaved, abandoned and despised". 15 (K.M.S.W. - P 69).

Thus Marxism is a doctrine of human freedom, man's emancipation from all evils along with a vision of the fully social man who makes his own social standard. This man, the social and the rational man, the creative man is the measure of all things.

The concept of man as the subject occupies a central position in the philosophy of Kant. In this '*Critique of Pure Reason*' Kant has shown that to be knowledge the raw materials coming to us direct from the outer world must be worked up, modelled, subsumed under the categories of understanding in the process of being Knowledge. Objects i.e., raw materials must conform the general laws which our understanding prescribes. His fundamental contribution to philosophy lies in the fact that he stresses the activity of the experiencing subject. The human mind is not passive but active — it acts as a law-giver to nature. The laws of thought apply to the world that we know, i.e., the world of phenomena. We know only the phenomenal world which our thought itself has constructed. Even the concept of God was merely one of the regulative ideas of pure reason. In the '*Practical Reason*' he argued that morality presupposes a pure rational will and when we act in accordance with the law as our will prescribes we are no longer bound up within the phenomenal world, we are in direct touch with the noumenal world. We

are emancipated, free; we are no longer under the domination of the phenomenal world, its law of cause and effect or of necessity by which the operations of reason are constrained. We are free and act freely. This will is self-determined, it is not subjected to any laws whatsoever and there is nothing in the world which can be regarded as good without qualification, except the good will' to treat humanity in every case as an end and never as a means.

Marx saw in Kant a revolutionary as representing the French Revolution in respect of ideas. But, later on, he found in Hegel the solution of the problem of the gap between the ideal and the real and he wrote :

"I left behind the idealism which, by the way, I had nourished with that of Kant and Fichte, and come to seek the idea in the real itself"¹⁶ (K.M.S.W. - P9).

This position he arrived at because he attached himself more closely with his radical young Hegelian friends who considered religion as essentially irrational. Marx echoed this sentiment as he wrote :

*"Philosophy makes no secret of it. Prometheus' confession, 'in a word, I detest all the gods', is its own confession, its own slogan against all gods in heaven and earth who do not recognise man's self-consciousness as the highest divinity,"*¹⁷

(K.M.S.W. - P 12).

"Like Prometheus", he wrote, "who stole fire from heaven and began to

build houses and settle on the earth so philosophy which has evolved so as to impinge on the world, turns itself against the world that it finds, so now with the Hegelian Philosophy."¹⁸

And he explains that the philosopher has to go beyond Hegel by employing Hegel's essential principles. In a further note he attacks the proofs of the existence of God as empty tautologies. In reality, Marx goes on to say, these proofs are nothing but the proofs for the existence of an essentially human self-consciousness and logical explications of it."¹⁹ (Karl Marx, Early text, ed. D. McLellan, P 18).

Marx adumbrates the theory of alienation which occupies a central position in the evaluation of Marxian Ethics. Alienation occurs when man falls into servitude to and dependence upon his own powers the institutions and good he has himself created. Alienation is not metaphysical, nor religious but is social and economic. Under the Capitalist system labour is something external and alien to the labourer; he does not work for himself but for the capitalist who owns the product as private property. It may be overcome when man makes all his activities free, gives vent to his inner nature free expression and attains full satisfaction of his needs. Man is alienated from his species life, from other men through the competitive character of the economic system based on private property which forces everyman to live at some one else's expense and which divides man into classes with irreconcilable interestes. Man's creative power, products of his labour, his creations should serve to enrich his personality but with the increase of private property in a capitalist society they are separated, split off from man. They become independent of him and by acquiring an independent status and power they turn back upon man to dominate him

as his master. As the process goes on the man becomes alienated from himself-he becomes isolated, morally neutral, lonely and melancholic. Man is a species being and because of this he is a conscious being but alienated labour reverses this relationship, because man is a conscious being that he makes his life-activity, his essential being, a mere means to his existence. "In tearing away from man the object of his production, estranged labour tears from him his species-life, his real objectivity as a member of the species and transforms his advantage over animals into the dis-advantage that his inorganic body, nature, is taken away from him."²⁰ (Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 P 69). Consequently, man feels his freedom or at home only in his animal functions but in his human functions he is not free; he no longer feels himself to be anything but an animal. And, therefore, "What is animal becomes human and what is human becomes animal"²¹.

(Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, P 66).

Rabindranāth Tagore, the poet and dramatist, in his symbolic drama, 'Raktakarabi', adumbrates the phenomenon of alienation in a very subtle and suggestive way when Viśu tells Phāgulāl, another character of the drāmā, that he was a man when he was in his village, but now he becomes a number, simply a number, 69E. Viśu realises : "We are not treated as man here but only as number," He asks Phāgulāl : "What number are you?" Phāgulāl answers in the affirmative; he is also a number now, viz., 47 F and that number is imprinted in the back of his garment he wears. In this Yakṣhapuri (Puri or city of Yakṣha) man are not treated as man, they are treated simply as numbers. No free discussion or Criticism is allowed here everyone doubts everyone, everyone looks at others with

a doubtful glance; utter disbelief prevails everywhere. The king's trusted men known as 'Sardārs', chiefs of men, are always watchful and are very competent enough to run the system. Even the king, the yakṣha, does not come out in open though his power is enormous. He separates himself from others and lives a very secluded life behind the Curtain. He is like a giant machine having unbelievable power and energy. But he fears what is open, the free expression of the genial current of the soul. Music he did not love. He loves money, the gold which makes black appear white and foul fair. He wants wealth, capital—his wants are never satisfied and in it he derives immense pleasure. He is a class by himself. He finds in his self-alienation the confirmation of his own enormous power, his own good. On the contrary, the working class, represented by visu and Phāgulāl, feels humiliated — it sees in it its powerlessness to do anything creative and feels the reality of an inhuman existence. In the midst of these Nandini is the ray of the light. She is the symbol of love, real happiness (Sahaja sukha) and sublime beauty. Her love for Ranjan is not trivial, worldly, sensual and transitory; but it is sublime and divine — it is of the nature of the scent of the lotus. It is the spirit calling to spirit. Her love for the beloved Ranjan is like sun-shine — it is full of vitality or pṛāṇa. She knows no fear as she believes that even death in love is the most covetable death. Nandini's on-the-earth simplicity, her open-mindedness emphasises her unchallenged authority over others. Her power is nil but her authority is enormous and it comes of love. Her love is expressed in her every act and word — it is her very nature, her very being.

'Fetishism' is manifested in the worship of money, gold, in attributing to capital the power to increase of itself in a fanatical reverence towards

symbols of power and wealth. Its roots lie in alienation, in reducing man to the level of a thing or performer of the functions of things. Here in 'Raktakarabī', worship of 'Dhvajā' has been given a great importance by the king and his men who attributed to it a magical power to influence their life.

The king, like his workers, represents the same human self-alienation and in it he feels comfortable, proud and sees in it his might in accumulating wealth or treasures hidden in the womb of the mother earth. But Nandini's love has melted his heart; it has broken the long silence of his soul. He ultimately joins with Nandini in love and breaks his own system by himself. It is a war he fought against himself, against his self-alienation — it is a struggle of his own inner world and in this struggle what is triumphant is love, the love for the humanity. He is now free and emancipated in the company of all. Viśu and Phāgulāl are not alien to him. He is in himself once more. He now recognises himself as a universal, social being in whom the community of workers speaks and acts.

As Rādhākṛishnan puts it : "Mankind is meant to be a unit. Men are not separate like so many grains of sand. We are organically bound into a living unity, which only the spirit of love can energise If the perception of the unity of the human race is dulled, if the awareness of oneness of the moral law is weakened, our nature itself is degraded."²²

(S. Rādhākṛishnan-Religion and Society, P 81).

Marx's notion of alienation came most directly from Hegel. If bourgeois capitalism produces its own and specific antagonism, the antagonism has to be understood by Hegel's dialectical concept of self-

alienation in a new form. Marx's central criticism of Hegel was that alienation would not cease with the supposed abolition of the external world which, according to Marx, was a part of man's nature and what was vital was to establish the right relationship between man and his environment. In his early writings Marx discusses several types of alienation — from religious alienation to philosophical, political and finally economic alienation. Economic alienation Marx considers to be more vital and fundamental in as much as work was man's fundamental activity. "In Hegel", says Marx, "the appropriation of man's objectified and alienated faculties is thus firstly only an appropriation that occurs in the mind, in pure thought, i.e., in abstraction."²³ K.M.S.W., P -100) Marx applies the same analysis to political alienation - the state contains a description of human nature but at the same time deprives man of the opportunity of attaining it.

In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Marx applies the notion of alienation to Economics. In the section on 'alienated labour' he speaks of its four aspects :

(i) The worker is related to the product of his labour as to an alien object; the object he produces does not belong to him, rather it dominates him and in the long run increases his poverty. It stands over and above him, opposed to him with a power independent of the producer.

(ii) Secondly, the worker becomes alienated from himself in the very act of production as the worker does not regard his work as a part of his real life and he does not feel at home in it. It is an

activity directed against himself, that is independent of him and does not belong to him.

(iii) Thirdly, man's social essence is taken away from him in his work; alienated labour succeeds in alienating man from his species. Species - life turns into a mere means of sustaining the worker's individual existence and man is alienated from his fellow men.

(iv) Fourthly, man is alienated from nature which does not confront him as a field for the creative exercise of his powers, but as a source of difficulty and drudgery, as a limitation of his creative powers. Man is alienated from his own humane, creative nature.

These four types of alienation, as portrayed by Marx in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 are to be found in Rabindranath's drama, 'Rakta Karabi':

(i) The worker feels in his work outside himself; he does not feel content and happy-his labour is not voluntary but forced labour; it is external to his nature and consequently does not belong to his intrinsic nature.

(ii) The worker is alienated from himself-his work is turned against him, independent of him and does not belong to him.

(iii) Alienated labour makes man's species-life a means to his physical existence. It alienates from man his individual existence, as well as external nature and his spiritual aspect, his human aspect.

(iv) "What applies to a man's relation to his work, to the product of his labour and to himself, also holds of a man's relation to the other man..."

Here Marx has given a new dimension to the meaning of the central concept of alienation. The workers are no doubt alienated part of capitalist society, but Marx extends the phenomenon of alienation to be common to all the members of the society, Marx wrote :

"The propertied class and the class of the Proletariat represent the same human self - alienation. But the former feels comfortable and confirmed in this self-alienation, knowing that this alienation is its own power and possessing in it the semblance of a human existence. The latter feels itself ruined in this alienation and sees in it its impotence and the actuality of an inhuman existence".²⁴ (K.M.S.W., P134 - The Holy Family).

The same notion re-occurs in Capital, vol I, under the heading 'The Fetishism of commodities and the secret thereof'. Marx wrote :

"A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men's labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum-total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour. This is the reason why the products of labour become commodities, social things whose qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses ... This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities

This Fetishism of Commodities has its origin in the peculiar social character of the labour that produces them."²⁵ (Karl Marx, Capital, Vol I, P 77).

In the chapter on "*Machinery and Modern Industry*" Marx makes contrast between the effects of alienated and unalienated modes of production on the development of human potentiality. Marx wrote :

"Modern industry, indeed, compels society, under penalty of death, to replace the detail-worker of to-day, crippled by lifelong repetition of one and the same trivial operation, and thus reduced to the mere fragment of a man, by the fully developed individual, fit for a variety of labours, ready to face any change of production, and to whom the different social functions he performs, are but so many modes of giving free scope to this own natural and acquired powers."²⁶ (Capital, Vol., P 458).

The alienation of the Divine Mind 'is now transformed into the alienation of man from himself. Alienation is the Key-concept of Marx's critique of civilization. The Capitalist system represents the apogee of thingification of man. In reality, man has become a commodity. Fetishism of commodities and man as a commodity - these are forms of alienation in the sphere of theoretical and practical reason. In the course of history man has lost his totality through division of labour. And ultimately the division of labour has transformed man into a cog of the wheel. The tools which man created himself, threaten man. In the chapter on 'The working Day' Marx describes in detail and depicts a picture of the physical and mental degradation forced on men, women and children by working long hours in unhealthy conditions. Marx's burning protest against these crimes,

especially the exploitation of women and children leading to incredible suffering, a life of desolation and misery which we can hardly imagine even in our day will secure for him a place among the liberators of mankind.

In proportion as capital accumulates the lot of the labourer must grow worse. The matter becomes more worse with the rise of money as a universal medium of exchange. Everything may be converted into money and money makes everything saleable. It enables man to separate himself not only his goods, the products of his work but even his capacity to work itself which he can now sell to another.

Marx wrote :

“Money lowers all the goods of mankind and transforms them into a commodity. Money is the universal, self-constituted value of all things. It has, therefore, robbed the whole world both the human world and nature, of its own peculiar value. Money is the essence of man’s work and existence, alienated from man, and this alien essence dominates him and he prays to it”.²⁷

(K.Marx, Early writings, trans and edited by T.B. Bottomore, P. 37).

In *Capital*, Vol I. Marx wrote :

“Just as every qualitative difference between commodities is extinguished in money, so money, on its side, like the radical leveller that it is, does away with all distinctions. But money itself is a commodity, an external object capable of becoming the private power of private property of any individual. Thus social power becomes the private power of private persons. The ancients therefore denounced money as subversive of the

economic and moral order of things."²⁸ (Capital, Vol., P. 132).

Shakespeare, in *'Timon of Athens'* depicts a picture how money does away with all distinctions.

"Gold ? yellow, glittering, precious gold ?

.....

.....

*Thus much of this will make black white,
foul fair,*

*Wrong right, base noble, old young, coward
valiant.*

.....

.....

This yellow slave

*will knit and break religions, bless th'
accus'd,*

Make the hoar leprosy ador'd, place thieves

And give them title, knee, and approbation,

with senators on the bench. This is it

That makes the wappen'd widow wed

again —

..... *come, damn'd*

earth

The common whore of mankind.....

.....^{'29}

(W. Shakespeare - *'Timon of Athens'*, Act IV, Scene III, Complete works, P 958).

As the division of labour, the use of money and the growth of private property increase, man's alienation becomes more acute and reaches its zenith in the modern capitalist society. Engels in '*Anti-Duhring*', discusses the question of the antithesis of town and country-side.

Feudalism enslaves the whole man but capitalism splits man's functions off from man and uses them to enslave him. In his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Marx portrays vividly the notion of alienation which consists in the abstract study of economic man, legal man, ethical man etc. :

"The more the workers produces, the less he has to consume; the more values he creates, the more valueless, the more unworthy he becomes, the better formed his product, the more deformed becomes the worker; the more civilised his object, the more barbarous becomes the worker : the more powerful labour becomes, the more powerless becomes the worker; the more ingenious labour becomes, the less ingenious becomes the worker and the more he becomes nature's servant."³⁰ (K. Marx-Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, P 65).

Is there any solution to the problem of alienation ? Marx says, 'yes', it is in communism. But this is not 'crude communism', as Marx calls it, in which the domination of material property is so great that it wishes to destroy everything that cannot be possessed by everybody as private property. It wants to disregard talent in an arbitrary manner. It is the negation of all culture and civilization. The category of worker is not done away with, but extended to all men. This system advocates the idea of community of wives - in which a woman becomes a common property of all. Just as a woman, by marriage, enters into the life of a common prostitute, so the

entire world of wealth passes to a state of universal prostitution with the whole community; the labourers, like prostitutes, sell their labour in exchange of money. This approach to woman, to labour, to wealth, is the denial of the essence of man (i.e., the human essence), the natural relation between a man and a woman. The second type of communism either still wishes to conserve the state or at least is still obsessed by the notion of private property. And at the end of his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Marx painted a picture of the communist society, the society of true and ultimate human freedom.

“Communism (is) the real appropriation of the essentially human by and for man; the complete and conscious return of man conserving all the riches of previous development for man himself as a social, i.e., human being. This communism..... is the genuine solution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man - the true resolution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddl of history and knows itself to be this solution”³¹ (Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, P 80).

Communism is, therefore, the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being embracing the entire wealth of previous development.

In such a society, Marx believed, there would be no state, no criminals, no conflicts, no need for co-ercive rules.

Truly free man rising above the very conception of property will thus need no rules imposed from above, no moral exhortations to do

their duty, no authorities laying down what is to be done. If there be any duty, it is self-imposed fulfilling himself in social and Co-operative creation. It is the total cessation of all forms of alienation. Man becomes unalienated when society is truly human. In such a society each man will recognise himself as a universal, social being and it is through him the whole community speaks and acts.

In the pre-history of mankind moralities are sectional, classbound, conflicting, dependent on economic interests, not truly ethical or human because man is still class-bound, dependent on economic conditions, not truly human and free. But with the establishment of truly human society man leaves behind the so-called moralities and enters upon a domain of morality truly human in tone, temper and spirit. He now becomes the ethical subject who judges himself by the self-imposed standards of his own emerging from his nature as a social being instead of being a moral object judged by external standard imposed upon him.

In capitalism money is the measure of all things and the adage goes: "money talks". If money constitutes the basic values of life, if 'making money' becomes the sole purpose of man's activity, if accumulation of wealth is regarded as the end of everything even by resorting to questionable means, then morality turns into narrow selfishness and assumes an epidemic of immorality. And the consequence is that alienation penetrates all layers of society and inflicts incredible suffering. Man becomes frustrated and moral relations among people are dehumanised. Men become as morally neutral and barren as relations of objects. As any object man is easily available for use in

exchange of money. His worth is measured most by the amount of services he can render by his usefulness. Moral relation produces and heightens the perception of human life as essentially lonely and isolated.

Moral alienation has different facets :

(i) It is the alienation of man from his ability to create moral values, and he ceases to be the subject of morality. The individual feels utterly helpless and therefore he is unable to realise what is to be done in actual life situations when moral conflict arises.

(ii) Morality does not stem from within, from man's self-awareences and from the sense of duty. It appears as purely external co-ercion.

(iii) The third is the alienation from the moral substance of the individual — a split into real and unreal. The socially significant values appear to be unreal while senseless wilfulness, sensuous cravings are perceived as real.

(iv) Fourthly, man becomes alienated from his fellow-beings; he is hopelessly unable to appreciate and understand other people's psychological and moral states and as a result an unbridgeable gap is created between a man and his fellow-beings. This alienation of man from man destroys neighbourly feeling and man is plunged into an abyss of loneliness. Alienation of individuals, man from man, assumes such a grotesque proportion and becomes so unbearably painful that the individual emerges as a 'morally deaf' individual insensible to genuine humane moral feelings.

Another manifestation of this phenomenon is the rapid growth of inhuman customs and morals. The social and moral climate is such that people wear a variety of masks displaying standards completely alien to their nature. Fetishism of commodity breeds in insatiable hunger for acquiring and using things. The individual with his conformist consciousness faces a grave crisis of moral ideals and values. He pursues wealth, power, success without regard for the means to attain them. What is valued most is the accumulation of wealth and not education and learning.

"But although '*Capital*', Karl Popper observes, "is, in fact, largely a treatise on social ethics, ethical ideas are never represented as such. They are expressed only by implication..."³² (Karl Popper, *Open Society and Its Enemies*, Ch.22, P 199).

Because the principles of humanity and decency are for Marx matters to be taken for granted, he attacks the moralists of his time. He attacks them because they are sycophants of Capitalism which Marx hated to be inhuman and immoral. He attacks the adherents of liberalism because they eulogise formal liberty which destroys freedom. Marx's love for freedom is not a mere faith but a fundamental conviction in the dignity of man as a free individual. His proclamation of man as the subject of morality obviously indicates the moral primacy of man. Man is not a commodity, he is a dignified, bonafide individual. In the sixth thesis on Feuerbach Marx says :

"They human essence is not an abstraction inhabiting the separate individual. In its actuality it is the ensemble of social relations."

"Man is born a member", says Radhakrishnan, "of some society. His life is a net-work of intimate relations, of attractions and repulsions, from which it is neither possible nor desirable that he should cut himself free. Aristotle says : 'He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a God or a beast'. He has no place in society. Social relationships increase the individual's power and opportunities, and widen his freedom."³³ (Religion and Society, p 72).

It is Marx's vision of the fully social man who has developed all his potentialities makes himself the aim and measure of all things — he adumbrates a theory of freedom, of man as the master of himself, of nature and of history. It is his tremendous concern with the dignity of man which makes his theory truly humanistic. Marx places man at the central point of the circle and his concept of the free man is the basis of his ethics, his philosophy and ultimately the whole of social science. "The presupposition", says E. Kamenka, "and the true end of ethics, of philosophy, of all human activities, is the free, truly human man. Man is potentially the only subject in a world of objects, and anything that turns him into an object, subordinates him to powers outside himself, is inhuman."³⁴ (E. Kamenka, Marxism and Ethics, P 11).

Marx's chief concern is with the whole man, the universal and social man, not with the abstract, self-alienated individual man. Man is de-humanised, self-degraded, enslaved when he is self-alienated from other men.

"Ethics, for Marx, then, was concerned with freedom, and freedom meant human self-determination; it meant that man was

governed by his own nature and its requirements, and by that alone. Man's nature consisted of a set of potentialities; freedom allowed him to go about the task of realising them to the full. It enabled him to subordinate nature and his environment to his will, to realise himself in work and in his intercourse with others instead of subordinating himself to demands confronting him as alien requirements, as limitations on his being and not as fulfilments of it."³⁵ (E. Kamanka, Marxism and Ethics P 12.)

It is unquestionably a fact that Marx's ethical concept is intimately connected with the problem of free will or the freedom of will. There are many aspects of environment we do not judge morally. We do not pass any moral judgement on the instinctive acts of tiny little creatures like ants and bees, on the movement of the stars and planets, clouds and rocks, avalanches and earthquakes. We regard earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods as tragic calamities of nature but we do not say that they are bad in the moral sense of the term as we say good or bad, right or wrong of a person doing an action. But even here there are certain exceptions. The man whose action has been absolutely determined by the external circumstances, the man who has been compelled to do an action on the point of a knife or revolver, the child who has not reached at the age of maturity or mentally handicapped, the insane person, the person who is drunk or carried out by his intense emotional excitements - these persons are not regarded as moral agents and we do not pass any moral judgments on the actions done by them. Thus there are some things we judge morally and others we do not judge. Why? Here we are concerned directly with the moral responsibility and which, in turn, implies freedom of will. It is a general assumption that without free will there can be no goodness whatsoever.

But what is an assumption to us is, to Kant, a necessary moral postulate. Kant advanced, supporting his view, the classic argument in his *Metaphysics of Morals* and *Critique of Practical Reason*.

The problem of free-will has gained immense importance as it has been associated with the problem of evil. To the Christian faith men, having been created by God, must have been originally good. He is innocent, honest, veracious, untouched by sins. But in exercising his free will Adam, the first man, disobeyed the commands of the God and fell from heaven to the troubled ocean of samsara (World). Adam committed the sin by transgressing God's will and evil came into the world through the gate-way of man's free will. God is veracious and perfect; He cannot deceive us. Evil is, therefore, man's own creation — the total responsibility lies with the man.

But the question crops up : Is there any freedom in the proper sense of the term ? or is man really free?

The fatalists' answer to this question is an outright denial of it. There is no freedom anywhere within and outside the world. Everything is determined by the forces of the universe. Our destiny is written in the stars and sealed; everywhere there is only an unbending necessity; we are utterly helpless and powerless to bring about any change in it; nor all our tears wash out a word of it. On this view, moral choice becomes an illusion. Thus fate is supposed to be all-powerful, the ultimate arbiter of everything including our own life in this mundane existence. Hence, no freedom, no moral choice, no responsibility.

The contrary view, in quite opposition to the above view, insists upon freedom. But the adherents of this view are not unanimous as to the

meaning that is to be attached to freedom. One group holds the view that man's will is free in the sense that it is uncaused, while the other group maintains that man's will is always determined not wholly by external forces or the forces of the universe as the fatalists claim it to be but by the man's character, by the forces that are inherent in his character. The individual here is in a sense free as he expresses in conduct such tendencies that are his own, that they follow from the bent of his nature as a rational being. Thus we have two main views (i) Indeterminism and (ii) Determinism.

The first view holds that freedom lies in a spontaneous and uncaused power to choose among given possibilities. But the determinists maintain that the freedom the individual enjoys in his own power to appreciate the innermost demands of his own nature. Freedom is not something as the indeterminists believe it to be, but it is self-determination, self-development, self-expression of our character.

In support of his thesis the indeterminist may argue that the individual, at the moment of choosing among given possibilities, feels that the act of choice is undetermined, that he could have acted differently from what had actually done, that the result of his choice might have been very easily different and he could have easily accepted the opposite alternative. This direct consciousness of freedom in the act of choosing, in the moment of taking decision is a fundamental basic fact upon which the indeterminists base their account of un-caused will or freedom of will. Attribution of praise or blame would have no meaning, would have no sense or justified unless we would assume free-will and consequently, attribution of responsibility would be wholly meaningless.

The determinists, however, hold that every act of choice is

conditioned or necessitated by our motives. A man's conduct is determined by the inner conditions of his character rather than by the outside circumstances and the neglect of this fact is the fundamental error of fatalism. Morality demands that our actions should issue or emerge from an integrated character or a permanent self. The indeterminists' account makes moral choice arbitrary, a product of arbitrary will or a choice of the particular moment. When a man is answerable for the choice he has made arbitrarily at a particular moment, he may say that he is hardly responsible for the results, because it is the product of the arbitrary will or choice of the moment. Thus the attribution of moral responsibility the determinists do not deny and what they deny is that the indeterminists make the attribution of moral responsibility a basal point in support of their thesis.

The fundamental assumption of science is that events are causally related. Every event has a cause. Nothing happens really by Chance and accident; Chance and accidents are aliases of ignorance. This assumption is true no doubt, but there is a long-drawn controversy as to the very nature of causality. Without entering into the debate we may say that it is a basal postulate of our reason and we may take it as a reasonable hypothesis. Is our human will free or does it escape the chains of cause and effect which prevail throughout nature? Human actions, including our will, obey this law-this is the familiar position almost with all determinists. The indeterminist flatly denies this.

The controversy between indeterminism and determinism has taken a new turn as to the problem of freedom of will by the discovery of the principle of uncertainty or the '*Heisenberg principle*' of indeterminacy

in the science of physics. This principle seems to contradict the law of causality according to which every event in nature is fully determined by the preceding events. But according to this principle the law of causation does not hold good in the world of micro-physics. The physicist can measure the electron's position and its velocity and there is no reason why he should not determine its path and its position at any desired moment. But this is not always the case. After repeated experiments he finds that the position of the particle cannot be determined in advance by any measurements. This is an added plus point in favour of indeterminism.

The significant point in favour of determinism lies in its insistence upon the role played by an individual's character and the element of truth that lies in indeterminism is that it insists that man is the master of his own destiny and he is not merely the helpless play-thing of his environment. If, with Kant, we could believe that "the exercise of the will brings with it a capacity for free activity, in virtue of which we can use our sensuous and intellectual knowledge as we please; it brings also a sense of emancipation both from the law of cause and effect which dominates the world of phenomena and from the necessity by which the operations of reason are constrained."³⁶ (C.E.M. Joad', Great Philosophers of the world; P 52) the argument against freedom of will would seem to have lost its force.

We are, therefore, driven to conclude with V.F. Lenzen³⁷ that the final interpretation of the principle of uncertainty depends upon one's own philosophical attitude, (V.F. Lenzen-Indeterminism and the concept of physical Reality, Journal-Phil., May, 25, 1933.)

In his doctoral thesis (1838-41) Marx compared the theories of Democritus and Epicurus on the movement of the atoms and he criticised Democritus' strict determinism and came out in favour of Epicurus' position of freedom of man's consciousness to change his surroundings.

In the Pre-Marxian Ethics the controversy on the problem of freedom of will assumes the form of a dilemma :

Either man's behaviour is conditioned by circumstances in which case the possibility of moral choice is an illusion or the individual is totally independent of objective circumstances and for this reason he is quite free.

These two extremes — moral fatalism and moral voluntarism — are a consequence of a metaphysical distinction between freedom and necessity in man's activity. Fatalistic view ignores the fact that the destiny of each individual is, to a great measure, dependent upon what the particular individual is and does in the face of changing situations in which new events are constantly happening. Fatalism provides us with an unsatisfactory view of man and his place in the world. Its deep-seated error lies in its unconditional denial to recognise the freedom of moral choice - the world and he as a cog within it are rigidly bound up by the iron laws of an unyielding necessity. On the contrary, moral voluntariness reduces the freedom of moral choice to subjectivist arbitrariness and on this view one can hardly be held responsible for the results.

Examining the different situations of moral choice, Marxist Ethics recognises that they stem from man's way of life and his place in the

system of social relations as well as from the system of moral values established through historically developed cultures. Throughout his life every individual is bound to arrive at a Cross-road between good and evil necessitating a moral decision. His objective circumstances, offer him a good number of alternative choices and he must decide on one over the others. The subject who does the moral choice may be either an individual, or a group or a collective or a class seeking to change a social or political system settling the question of its development on humanitarian lines. only a just social system, having no class antagonisms, is able to offer its responsible individual members fairly equal choice resting on the common good to be achieved. According to Marx man "is free not through the negative power to avoid this or that, but through the positive power to assert his true individuality."³⁸ (Karl Marx and F.Engels - The Holy Family, Collected works, vol. 4, 1975 P 131).

"Freedom of will", for Engels, "... means nothing but the capacity to make decisions with knowledge of the subject."³⁹ And Lenin's settlement of the problem is this :

"The idea of determinism, which postulates that human acts are necessitated and rejects the absurd tale about free will, in no way destroys man's reason or conscience, or appraisal of his actions. Quite the contrary, only the determinist view makes a strict and correct appraisal possible instead of attributing everything you please to free will",⁴⁰

From the above we may say that a good knowledge of the matter, though not always the scientific knowledge of the circumstances, is essential in making a moral choice. Secondly individual's freedom of choice means that he should display his ability to make a decision keeping

in view the moral substance of necessity, i.e., the individual, in making a decision, should guide himself by the standards and moral values recognised by the society as the goal to be attained through his action. That the individual has to make decision in conformity with the moral necessity does not at all mean that he should submit to the circumstances, as the apologists of the capitalist way of life argue, but, on the contrary, Marxist Ethics considers goal formation and the individual's responsibility for changing the situation itself a vitally important and fundamental aspect of the freedom of choice. When the revolutionary change is under the way in the world and the need for the individual to be active is urgently called for, the neutral stand failing to make a choice from fear of blundering and compromising a morally worthy goal proves reactionary. Refusal to make a choice, to wish to wash out one's own hands may prove crime against morality; for refusal to make a choice becomes itself a choice. Neutral behaviour can never be an ideal in a society where there is no social antagonism and sources of alienation are removed. Lenin's remarks to those who have failed to combat evils throw light on this problem :

“... where is the evidence that you fought correctly, skilfully ? Bureaucrats are smart fellows, many scoundrels among them are extremely cunning. You won't catch them with your bare hands. Did you fight correctly ? Did you encircle the 'enemy' according to all the rules of the art of war ?”⁴¹

“You gave up in despair, you did not fight, you did not exhaust all the means of fighting.”⁴²

Communist morality is the sum-total of all principles and standards

of conduct based on the ideals of the communist society. The objective criterion of communist morality is what contributes to the establishment of communist society and the realisation of the communist ideal. The following are the main principles of communist morality.

A. COLLECTIVISM

It is a principle of living and working together as a group or collective. It assumes a number of historical forms. The fundamental characteristic of the primitive group-life is that of collective responsibility. The feeling of solidarity is best shown in their joint struggle for existence and survival. Man is, by nature, a gregarious animal and the group-life is the following of his social nature. Apart from the group the individual is of little or no significance. But in the course of historical development the individual becomes more and more important. In the feudal society as well as in the capitalist society the individual assumes greater responsibilities in his own right as an individual and the solidarity to the group is loosened. Individualism becomes the keynote of the capitalist society. But with the coming of socialism it becomes a general principle of people's relations an essential feature of socialist way of life. It has its social basis in social ownership of the means of production and the absence of all exploitation of man by man and its political basis in the equality of all citizens. It presupposes such relations between society and the individual in which the development of society as a whole creates favourable conditions for the development of the individual and the latter, in its turn, is a condition for the progress of the whole of society.

Here we come across one of the key-tenets of the age-old ethical tradition, viz., the opposition of collectivism and individualism. It is

generally believed that they are irreconcilable as good and evil. According to some it has been maintained that society is a mere name given to a group of individuals who are alone are of real significance and whose interests are of great importance in a social order. According to this view, the individual is free, the absolute lord of his own person and possession and society is a collective of the people who make up its membership; society is there only to safe-guard the interest of the individual members. The contrary view holds that the collective or the society is such an entity existing independently of its individual members and thus it has a superior worth in the real sense of the term.

The two above views are diametrically opposed to each other and do not give us a true and just view of the relation between society and the individual. The sober and rational view is that society as something apart from the individuals is an abstract society, a pure fiction only. But it is no less a pure fiction to assume that the individual is absolutely free and subjected to no-body. The truth lies in between the two extremes; the society is for the individual and individual for society.

But how is the individual related to the society? Does the individual enjoy his freedom of thought in the society to which he belongs as one of its individual members?

By the freedom of thought we mean generally that the individual has the right to express his own views including his conviction regardless of the views of others. This problem does not pose so serious in the primitive societies as the group enjoyed undisputed authority over every individual within the group. Every group has its own customs and traditions, its beliefs and convictions, its institutions and rituals, religious

practices and professions. The group has its way of thinking, and acting like that of an individual — and these ways of thinking and acting constitute what is called 'group-mind'. The group behaves in such a way as if one individual is behaving. The group thinks alike, feels alike, wills alike and acts alike. But by this 'group-mind' or the 'Collective mind' we do not mean any separate entity or any 'group-soul' over and above the individual minds constituting society but only the aspect of the individual mind that is common to them all and that consists in their common likes and dislikes, hopes and fears, beliefs and aspirations and the like. The 'group-mind' is only a collective name for individual minds so influenced, as distinct from the minds working in comparative freedom and isolation. William Mc-Dougall's famous book, *'A Introduction To Social Psychology'*, investigates our social behaviour in all its phases — it is particularly devoted to the study of the group-mind or the mind working in society.

With the advancement of civilization and culture the individual is emancipated from the unconditional subservience to the group mind and the consequence of such an emancipation gives rise to the conflict between the individual's way of thinking and the group-thinking. The Sophists in Greece, e.g., not only called in question most of the customs and traditions of their own day but also subjected them to severe and destructive criticism. The Renaissance and Reformation movements are also glaring examples of the same critical attitude towards the past. On the one hand, there is a tendency to maintain status quo, i.e., conservation of old traditions and on the other hand, a tendency to change the society, to modify its customs with a view to making a social advance towards higher goals. It is not the fact that only the individual tends to become critical against the existing

social order. A group or a class may be critical against the status quo or the existing state of things and an illustration of this may be found in the successful Bolshevich Revolution in Russia. It may be either an individual thinker, or a group or a minority against the majority and vice-versa.

There is a considerable amount of truth when the conservative urges that his beliefs have stood the test of time and traditions cannot be discarded simply on the ground that they are old traditions, for they constitute the very foundation of society.

The radicals, in opposition to the above view, may say that the test of time does not prove the traditions to be absolute and what is demanded that the traditions must meet the demands of new advancement of knowledge — they must be subjected to constant verification by the acquisition of new knowledge if social progress sought for. The compromise of this situation lies in it — the conservative must allow revision, if necessary, in the light of new thinking and scientific knowledge and the radical, on his side, must admit value of traditions unless and until new scientific knowledge forces its revision or rejection. The free and honest thinkers must be prepared to accept anything that stands the acid test of truth. He must be rational in his outlook, he must honour not only his own point of view but of others — a sanely critical attitude must be his guide instead of his individual caprice and prejudice. Then and then only we can build up an ideal society providing ample scope for such ideal members within it. In such a situation the statement 'society in the individual, individual in society' becomes meaningful. The individual and society are integrally related—they are two sides of the same social order and hence they cannot be treated as separate, distinct entities.

“There can be no conflict between the individual and the social. For both of these terms refer to pure abstractions. What do exist are conflicts between some individuals and some arrangements in social life; between groups and classes of individuals; between nation and races; between old traditions imbedded in institutions and new ways of thinking and acting which spring from those few individuals who depart from and who attack what is socially accepted.”⁴³

Now the question arises : should we seek simply our own individual ends or the good of other individuals with no regard for the good of the individual?

To this question the answer is not unanimous. One group of thinkers hold that it is the duty of the individual to seek his own good. On the other side and in opposition to this view it has been held that moral duty of an individual is to seek the good of other individuals with no regard for his own. When we seek simply our own individual good or ends, this attitude is called 'Egoism', while 'Altruism' has been used to denote devotion to the ends of others — egoism stands for self-realisation and altruism for self sacrifice. Egoism points out the importance of the individual in the moral life, for it is a man that is an end in himself and not a community. But since an individual is a member of a society, his supreme end will be not simply the perfection of his own life or self-realisation or the realisation of what appeals to him as the most fundamental values, but also the perfection of the society to which he belongs.

The theory which identifies goodness with individual interests exclusively is open to question, because it fails to take into account of the society of selves of which each individual is a part; it forgets that the

interests and welfare of the individual are intrinsically bound up with the interests and welfare of the society. As A. D. Lindsay wrote :

“No one can really be an absolute individualist, any more than any one can be an absolute socialist. For the individual and society interact on one another and depend on one another”^{43A}

In his '*Data of Ethics*', Herbert Spencer has endeavoured to bring about a conciliation between these two views — he pointed out that either of these two attitudes, if carried to an extreme, is self-destructive. So what we should aim at is neither pure Egoism nor pure Altruism, but a harmonious blending of the two. We can realise our true self only by realising social ends-it is self-realisation for the sake of the whole.

A real individual always represents a definite community. We cannot think of any one who lives in society and yet he is absolutely independent of it. Egoism is not always narrow - it carries with it a social essence and in this it transcends the boundaries of the individual. History is marked by a kind of collective egoism. Marxists maintain that egoism should be conceived as having a multitude of forms (e.g. group egoism, class egoism, collective egoism, patriotic egoism etc.) and a historically determined substance. To understand the concrete historical nature of collectivism as a moral principle of socialism one should note three things :

- (i) That it is objectively determined;
- (ii) That it is a necessary form of advancement for the working class and its allies,

- (iii) That it determines the progress of morality in which hundreds of millions of wills constitute a single will.

Marxist collectivism is associated with communistic convictions and a communist society, says Lenin, is a society in which all things — the land, the factories—are owned in common and the people work in common. Communist morality endeavours for building an association in which the free development of each person is the condition of the free development of all. It is incompatible with greed, selfishness - it blends together the collectivist and the private interests in a harmonious whole, its fundamental principle being : 'one for all and all for one'. The main requirements resulting from the collectivism are :

- (i) Comradely mutual assistance ; (ii) social awareness and fulfilment of duties to society; (iii) combination of personal and social interests; (iv) equality in the collective; and (v) respect for the collective.

The principle of the collective does not involve the abolition of personalities of men; on the contrary, it is only in the collective that man finds ample scope for displaying his abilities to the fullest extent. It is to this kind of collectivism that Marx and Engels referred when they said.

“Only within the community has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; hence personal freedom becomes possible only within the community”.⁴⁴

In this collective the development of individuality and personality is of paramount importance as it helps to promote a socialist collectivist spirit and outlook. An ideal society only profits by the ideal members, by the presence of the greatest possible number of unique individuals.

Collectivism, not inspired by noble ideas, may assume a form of group-egoism, may result in fanaticism but it, when personal and social ideals are harmoniously blended together, provides a source of moral progress of both the individual and society directing them towards the perfect humaneness of mature communism.

B. INTERNATIONALISM :

In the historical development of society there have always been numerous groups, more or less sharply sundered from each other — each group being the supreme and sovereign authority in matters relating to its own affairs. At the primitive level the groups were small and very numerous and they were in constant clash with each other and as a result of this conflict the smaller groups were unable to maintain their separate existence and ultimately merged into larger groups. The larger groups gradually have grown into national states which assume the right to determine its internal organization, foreign policies and enjoy the right of the self-determination. The division of mankind into several isolated and sovereign groups gives rise to certain fundamental questions relating to the relation each group bears to others. The nationalist regards his group as having complete and final authority over its own matters and beyond it it owes no allegiance.

But the internationalist, on the contrary, holds that over and beyond the individual groups or nations, there always stands an ideal group of humanity of which all subordinate groups should owe their allegiance and contribute to the development of humanistic ideals. Our civilization has reached to such a crucial stage that the mutual understanding of the individual groups becomes a necessary condition

for further advancement. But if the ideal of internationalism is not put to practice, it is assumed that it would involve the destruction of individual groups and consequently it would jeopardise the feeling of patriotism and other related virtues that emerge from it. Is there any justification for such an assumption? The point is that internationalism does not necessarily involve the annihilation of national states, nor the destruction of virtues that spring from it. At present we can not shut our eyes to the fortunes or misfortunes, good or ill of other groups as we are vitally affected by these happenings. It has an important bearing - it makes us believe that only international understanding can save us from impending dangers caused by war between nations. It may be said that internationalist's ideal towards one general and all-inclusive society is the only way to dissolve all conflicts, mis-understandings, national egoism. But there are insurmountable difficulties in our way to goal. Difficulties are there no doubt, but that does not mean that these difficulties can not be overcome.

The communist morality demands that the workers, all toiling people of the world, irrespective of their caste and creed, beliefs and convictions, should come closer together. And internationalism is one of the basic principles of the ideology and policy of the working class. The workers should go beyond the boundaries of nations and express the international solidarity of the working people of different nations in their struggle against capitalism for their emancipation from all kinds of exploitation, for building socialism or communism. *The Manifesto of the communist party* illustrates the objective necessity of the unity of the workers of different countries in their struggle against capitalism and formulates the main idea of internationalism and proclaims its famous slogan; "*Workers of all countries Unite.*"

The principle of 'internationalism' means mutual support and co-operation of the working people of different countries in their struggle against international bourgeoisie, recognition of all nations and irreconcilability to any oppression of one nation by another. When conflict arises between national and inter-national point of views the communist morality advocates international point of view and national sacrifices. Lenin wrote :

"To be an inter-nationalist Social Democrat, one must not think only of one's own nation, but place above it the interests of all nations, their common liberty and equality.⁴⁵

Communist morality advocates that genuine friendship among nations should be realised practically. It sets definite moral standards for the emotional integration, character-traits and self-awareness of the individual to live up to international practices of the communist movement all over the world. Internationalism is an attitude to the world - it lays emphasis that people should be guided by the interests of the future international community and communist fraternity of the whole of mankind. It rejects the fake bourgeois and petty bourgeois patriotism but not patriotism in principle. Communist morality asserts socialist patriotism - it is inherently linked with internationalism. The struggle for the victory of socialism conducted in one or two individual countries forms a part of an international process that helps unite and emancipate the rest of the working people of the world.

C. HUMANISM :

The progress of human culture and civilization is associated, in a very significant way, with the humanistic system of views, humanistic ideals

and humanistic laws of behaviour. Our moral progress depends on the recognition and acceptance of humanism as a practical standard of social behaviour.

It is evident from the history of morals that one of the basic features of a tribe as a form of social organisation was the collective obligation to hold itself responsible for the avenging of any injury done to one of its members, to seek revenge or retribution — the principle being : 'A life for a life, an eye for an eye'. The members looked upon themselves as one living whole, a single animated mass of blood, flesh and bones. When the transition from the blood kinship (as the group of persons think of themselves as having descended from a common ancestor) to the territorial principle as the basis of social ties occurred, the narrow horizon of group mentality was broadened and the idea of humaneness and the equality of all people was developed. The Mahabharata says : "Do not deprive others of anything, do not wound others' feelings'; 'the vast universe is the holy temple of God,' a pure heart is the sacred place of pilgrimage, and truth eternal is the immortal scripture." The way to cross the troubled water of samsara is the observance of the humanitarian ideals.

The humanistic trend of morality reaches a state of acute crisis in a capitalist society because it is a society where relations among people become particularly inhuman and are based on class antagonisms and the oppression of man by man. The historical findings of bourgeois relations show that while declaring humanistic ideals, the bourgeoisie has not gone beyond mere philanthropy. In the capitalist society, humanism has degenerated into an appeal to help the poor and needy. The humanism of petty bourgeoisie is exhibited in offering crumbs to the man it has robbed. But philanthropy is not, in itself, bad — it has its own value. But it is bad

when it is used in a bad way. The bourgeoisie does not aim at a goal of substantially changing the situation of the un-privileged, they seek to alleviate suffering; they make philanthropy a means to confuse people morally and ideologically with a view to distracting them from the class struggle. What is more, they reduce it into a kind of business. In the capitalist world, the bourgeois exploiters, amidst the drumbeat of charitable projects gave back to the 'plundered victims the hundredth part of what belong to them' In this system millions of people are appropriated.

But socialism signifies a sharp break, a radical change in the relations among people. It breaks up with all class antagonisms and opens up a truly new, human epoch. By abolishing private ownership of the means of production, by demolishing all means of exploitation of man by man and mutual alienation of the people of society it introduces a new measure of humaneness into social relations. As Marx wrote:

"Communism is humanism mediated with itself through the supersession of private property."⁴⁶

Humanism is closely connected with socialism. Humanism is an empty drumbeat until it becomes a practical and objectively determined goal of social development. Communist morality lays stress upon human relations among people-relations based on brotherly feeling, co-operation, friendliness and honest performance of socially valuable duties and in it socialism reaches the highest humanitarian standards; here, in socialism all man are friends, comrades and brothers.

Let us enumerate some of the specific features of communist humanism :

(i) It is universal. It holds that all people are equal - they should be treated equally with respect and love and be given the necessary assistance as and when called for. It conveys deep respect for the working man and does not tolerate assaults on the dignity of the working man.

(ii) It is not only universal but also effectual. It is inherent in the ardent desire of an humanist to fight for man for his emancipation from all kinds of slavery and inhuman conditions. It encourages man for his free and harmonious development. It is against everything that warps man's life and it is for everything that promotes man's survival towards a socialist society.

(iii) Marxist humanist ethics has nothing to do with the advocacy of violence-force is justified only when it is unavoidable - it is not an end in itself-it is an 'instant' in the process against the exploiter system leading towards humanistic goals.

(iv) The Marxist humanist ethics has been gaining significance more and more when the world is on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe and the explosion of population has taken place in such a measure that it threatens our ecological system. Any nuclear war, in any part of the world, would cause great disaster to the humanity and in the face of such a possible danger, it becomes a categorical imperative to preserve our civilization. We feel the need to preserve our richest human values of life; the preservation of human values is more important than ever before.

(v) The communist humanism is realistic. It is based on the objective conditions of life and society. Its development has taken

place step by step — at first it emerges as a class morality of the proletariat having its own ethical standards such as class solidarity, unity of purpose, Collective awareness etc. and subsequently becomes the morality of the whole people in a socialist society and in the final form, the general human morality in communist society. Socialism represents only a milestone in the lengthy historical journey that will end in the complete triumph of humanism. In the communist formation of the society the humanistic essence is deepened and our humanism turns into a living, creative humanism.

Marx's humanism has strong and deep roots in the culture created by 'Renaissance', 'Reformation,' 'Reason' and 'Revolution' at the time of which humanism grew into a distinct ideological movement — a system of views based on the respect for the dignity and rights of man, his value as a personality, concern for his welfare, his all-round development and the creation of favourable conditions for social life. Some of the most prominent humanists of the Renaissance such as Petrarch, Dante, Leonardo da Vinci, Copernicus, Shakespeare, Francis Bacon and others helped to mould mundane views. Humanism reached its zenith in the works of the 18th century Enlighteners who put forward the slogans of 'equality', liberty and fraternity' and proclaimed men's right freely to develop their 'natural essence'. But the ideologists of humanism failed to grasp the actual vices of capitalism and its inhuman essence and were unable to discover effective ways and means for achieving a truly human society. The socialist humanism of Marx is fundamentally different from the previous ideologies or humanistic ideas as it postulated liberation of the poor and oppressed, especially the liberation of the working class from social injustice and

dehumanisation and the building of communism as an essential condition for the all-round and harmonious development of personality of all men in a just society. Marx was very critical of the official christianity which gave a hypocritical defence of Capitalist exploitation. Here Marx may be compared with Martin Luther whose challenge to Roman Church brought about a counter-reformation in his enemy's camp which led to the revaluation of ethical standards. Marx's concern that began with Luther gained strength with French Revolution helped to form the basis of most progressive ethical humanist agitation and reform since the revolutions of 1848. Marx's attempt to elevate man to a dignified position with its ethical rigour, with its emphasis on deeds has a tremendous influence upon the intelligentsia. The industrial revolution has clearly affected economic relations so completely that it calls for a world society with a world economy. Marx's call for communism to the world challenges existing evils prevalent in the society, offers a clear and definite programme for action and professes to provide us with an ethical, moral reformation accompanied with a social message with which all idealists are in agreement.

To understand Marxian ethical theory we must determine its place in the debate between two major philosophical schools - materialism and idealism. These two trends of thought are sharply divided as to the questions : (i) What is the source of morality ? (ii) Is moral ideal attainable?

The materialist philosophers in their very zeal to make ethics an empirical science developed empirical doctrines. Their very attempt was to remove the veil of mysticism from ethics and make ethics emancipated from the shackles of metaphysics and consequently they refused to grant morality a divine status over and above this empirical existence depending on the will or commands of the God. Moral standards and ideals, they

assert, are rooted in the everyday facts of man's life and their ways of living in a society. The idealist theories, on the other hand, perceived the source of morality in subjective or objective spirit and most of these theories associated it with the idea of God. Lenin wrote :

“..... instead of basing ethics on the commandments of morality, on the Commandments of God, they based it on idealist or semi-idealist phrases, which always amounted to something very similar to God's Commandments”^{46A}. And every time, morality appeared to occupy a place outside and prior to the individual's empirical existence.

Another battleground where the two trends of thought clash concerns their attitude towards the moral ideal. The materialists have generally adopted an optimistic stand hoping that man can attain the moral end in his existence in this world and it is something practically attainable. The idealists take a contrary view that it is beyond an ordinary person's reach — it is beautiful and attractive but man can never attain such moral heights in his existence in this life.

The empirical ethics is the ethics of benefits and goals and its fundamental goal is to change the position of man in this world; while, on the contrary, the idealistic ethics is concerned mainly with motive or inner orientations of the individual man and aims at changing his attitude towards the life of the world. As the right action is defined as one which is in consonance with the attitude or motive of the doer —it is an attitude theory; and when an action is defined in terms of its pleasant consequences, it is a consequence theory. The empirical ethics is Epicurean and Eudaemonistic while idealist ethics is stoical and moralistic. The empirical ethics is consequential, for here in it moral values are judged only on the

results and practical consequences having any regard to motives or attitudes of the individual man. On the contrary, the idealistic ethics lays emphasis on motives, inner orientations of the individual.

Further, materialism considers the universe as grounded on matter and idealists in mind. Materialism holds that matter is real and mind is an epi-phenomenon of matter. In opposition to the above view, the idealists put emphasis on mind and hold that mind is prior to matter-mind is real and matter is just an appearance.

The above two views seem to be radically and diametrically opposed to each other. If either one is true, the other must be false and people are generally inclined to believe that one of the alternatives is true. Recent studies in physics, especially the discovery of Heisenberg principle of indeterminacy in the science of physics, and recent studies in psychology have changed our notions of matter and mind and the opposition has become much softened.

Karl Marx, in his Ph. D. Thesis on "*Difference Between Democritean and Epicurean philosophy of Nature*" drew radical conclusions as against Hegel's philosophy, because of his conciliatory tendencies, conservative political conclusions, his emphasis on speculative principles rather than actual social relations. Hegel explains the real facts of life by the 'Idea' but Marx explains the formation of ideas from the objective materialistic view of society and history. His knowledge of the real economic developments and the philosophy of Feuerbach plays an important role in the process of his switching on to the materialistic position. Further, his study of political economy, socialism and history has changed his world outlook and revolutionised his ideas. He is well-aware

of the historic role of the proletariat and the bourgeois and consequently of the social revolution and need of uniting the working class movement with scientific world-outlook. His 'Theses on Feuerbach' are, as Engels puts it. "invaluable as the first document in which is deposited the brilliant germ of the new world outlook."⁴⁷

Marx and Engels drew up the famous '*The Manifesto of the communist Party*' in 1848 in which, on the basis of the results of their scientific research, outlines "a new world conception, consistent materialism which also embraces the realism of social life; dialectics, as the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development; the theory of the class struggle and the world-historic revolutionary role of the Proletariat — the creator of a new, communist society."⁴⁸

By substantiating a materialistic view of society and history Marxism has blasted the bastions of idealism and subjectivism in ethics. It bridges the antithesis between theory and practice by explaining their social and historical nature and proves scientifically that each type of morality is socially and historically conditioned. Marx and Engels provide us with a scientific exposition of the dialectics of the social conditioning of morality. They are against any attempt to describe morality from the anti-historical point of view. A materialist view of history "does not explain practice from the idea but explain the formation of ideas from material practice."⁴⁹

From the early ages of society's formation morality has undergone a long development under the impact of economic and social relations. In addition to human elements morality incorporates historically transient and class norms, principles and ideals. In a society split into classes morality is found to bear a class nature, reflecting as it does the class

struggle. Each class performs the function of a relatively independent norm-giving group-the common interests of the people constituting a class determine their common moral stand. "Every social stratum has its own way of life, its own habits and inclinations,"⁵⁰ wrote Lenin. Each class antagonistic socio-economic formation has its own structure, its principal classes-slaves and slave-holders, serfs and feudal lords, proletarians and bourgeois. The class struggle is the prime mover of social development in antagonistic societies. The interests, either progressive or conservative, are included in the morality of a class and determine its role in the social and historical process of mankind. The morality of the ruling class prevails in society-each ruling class seeks to present its interests as common to all classes to represent the morality it preaches as the sound one, to force it on other classes via all its ideological means at its disposal to attain the goal, their cherished end. The positions of the ruling exploiting class and the exploited class are poles apart-the exploited class develops its own morality as against the morality of the ruling class and consequently it emerges as a class morality of the proletariat which rises to the struggle for changing the society with the necessary and inevitable consequences of class struggle. The ruling class may try to camouflage its self-seeking interests but the working class has no need for moral hypocrisy, because it has a number of points common with the morality of all toiling classes and the conditions of its emancipation as a class are also the conditions of the entire society's, emancipation from exploitation and oppression of man by man. Thus with the assistance of morality, they establish genuinely human relations among people.

Marxist ethics recognises that morality has a universally human content which enters into a complicated dialectical interaction with its class

content. The components of universally human morality are :

(i) The components form the basic rules of any human community and these rules are adhered to by all classes and without which no social development takes place. Moral qualities like love, sympathy, friendliness, truthfulness etc. have always been appreciated in any social environment but, on the contrary, hypocrisy, lying (e.g., white lies, dramatic lies), rudeness, unfriendliness, indifference to others are always commonly censured. Because these are humanity's basic and fundamental needs which are essential to the very existence and well-being of the society.

(ii) Another universally human content of morality is what comprises some of the general psychological forms of moral sentiments. Members of different classes may differ in their likes and dislikes, in their feeling in any given circumstance but in their love for children, love for the country and pangs of conscience they are at heart one-their psychological form of inner emotions is similar.

(iii) The third is the positive contribution to the moral experience of mankind as a whole by the classes in the course of their struggle for existence. As a river is made up of innumerable streams so in a really human morality all individual accomplishments of morality of the progressive classes merge and become one with human morality in the course of historical development. It is above class-antagonisms, above all class distinctions and it has three vital goals to achieve :

- (a) to protect and preserve the precious heritage of mankind's moral culture;
- (b) to develop man's moral and psychological capacity for compassion, mutual understanding, to maintain humane relationships in society which allow a man to realise his dignity irrespective of social origin and social position;
- (c) to realise the really human standards and ideals of man's creative and harmonious development in the midst of the society of selves with a view to creating a new world outlook which is communist in nature.

The anti-Marxian ethical theories make us believe that the revolutionary movements of the working people are the source of moral chaos and degradation but in adhering to this view they fail to understand the part played by revolutionary morality in social development. It is not the manifestation of malicious vengeance, as it is supposed to be, but it encourages the people to better themselves with a new human understanding in their relations with other fellow beings. No social revolution can be successful without moral revolution in their inner worlds — it paves the way for man's moral and spiritual advancement. As Lenin puts it:

“Only struggle educates the exploited class, only struggle discloses to it the magnitude of its own power, widens its horizon, enhances its abilities, clarifies its mind, forges its will.”⁵¹

Revolution makes a man aware of his involvement in the great and grand cause of social progress. It is an event possessing a profound moral meaning.

Belief in the ideal and the just cause of the revolution gives rise to such moral qualities as courage, selflessness, initiative and endeavour in pursuing a goal. As the goal is one and the interests are also one, and as the working people are fighting for a common cause, revolution works as a cementing force to maintain the solidarity and integrity of character of the working people. The working people, as the revolution proceeds on, feel the necessity for mutual assistance, comradely feeling, unity of purpose and the moral upsurge becomes so powerful that it brings about a radical change in the self-consciousness of the working people. Revolutionary Marxist Ethics resolves all contradictions between the individual and the group, between the class and the society. The ethics of socialism seeks the ideal individual through the ideal society. The good of the whole must not be distinct or opposed to the good of its individual members. The ultimate good and supreme value the society aims at is the good of the individual members constituting the society — it lies in the harmonious development of personality of the individual. Marxist ethics enhances new and better relations among people—man is to man a friend, a brother. It is not only against all kinds of alienation of man from man but also against asceticism, cynicism, and helps to develop the principles of disinterestedness and readiness to help others. With the establishment of communism the realisation of social ideals in human behaviour becomes a mode of man's moral self-assertion. Thus Marxist Ethics overcomes all oppositions between absolutism and relativism, egoism and altruism, asceticism and Epicureanism, reason and passion, the contradictions that remained unsolved in the past. To build a communist society it is necessary for each and every member of the society to enhance personal moral responsibility, to combat all that is hostile to its ideals of truly humane

relations, to display revolutionary vigilance, to help accelerate economic and scientific progress and to seek moral improvement in interpersonal relations; the creative role of communist morality consists in the transformation of both society and man himself.

Marxist ethics is not pessimistic but optimistic in assessing man's moral and creative development. It genuinely believes that man can rise to new heights, find new inspiring values. Its assessments are realistic, based on objective facts. It is aware of that man may fall very low, may be degraded. Responsibility for moral improvement does not lie only with the society but also with the individual himself, for no such moral improvement will take place if he does not like pains to grow, if he does not self-criticize, if he alienates himself from society and maintains aloofness from everything.

Marxist ethics is dialectical in nature. Like morality each of its manifestations, each standard and virtue, is in perpetual motion passing from one qualitative state to another. It is emerging and developing and involves an actual historical process-this Marxian historical approach is not tantamount to relativism. There is a continuity in the evolution of morality. In spite of the qualitative diversity of its types its development emerges as an integral process. Thus the different types of morality are links of one chain, stages in the overall processes of historical development-its past, present and future.

Since morality is determined by the Character of qualitatively differing social relations at different levels of human existence, we have four main types of morality.

1. The first type embraces the natural relations within a clan or tribe or group found in the primitive social systems. The members belonging to the group, integrally bound together, thought only in terms of the good of the group. It is communistic in nature, owns property commonly. There is no class or classes and hence no class antagonisms. The group itself is a class and all interests of the individual members are merged into one Common interest, viz., the group-interest. Responsibility does not lie with the individual but with the group-it is collective responsibility which forms one of the fundamental characteristics of the group. The morality of the primitive group is classless, collective and communistic in nature.

2. The emergence of the private property has abruptly changed the whole situation. Division of man into privileged and non-privileged, antagonism between the 'have' and 'have nots' is deepened-classes are shaped and moral code representing the class interest emerges. With the advent of poverty a new cruel form of personal bondage, i.e. slavery of man becomes a reality-the prime mover of the social progress is now between the masters and their slaves. The master class is united by virtue of their social position and class interest and the slave class has been turned into a class of docile and dumb creatures whose sole concern being food and sleep only. It leads to humiliating submission of slaves to their masters. The morality of the master class is imperative upon the slaves and it is the duty of the slaves to obey unconditionally the order of their masters. This qualitatively different

social situation determines the essence of morality in a Slave-holding society.

3. In the third type, the feudal form of social bondage has been replaced by the material dependence between people. In place of feudal lords and serfs we have now bourgeoisie and proletariat whose conflicting interests have shaped the course of history. Individualism becomes the most general characteristic and essence of morality. The very principle of private enterprise establishes the individual as the focal point of social and economic activity. Bourgeois morality speaks of man's emancipation, broader scope for the development of individuality, respect for man and his dignity, equality of all individuals; but in actual practice, it does not concern with all these. Moral equality between the capitalist and the worker is an illusion, a hypocrisy — the former having the capital and exploiting the latter; the latter possessing no capital and exploited by the former; the former is flourishing and the latter is doomed to misfortune and deprivation. What is more, the bourgeois justice is a nick-name for injustice — what is pretended to be justice is no justice in the real sense of the term; it is a means which promotes exploiters' interest. Thus bourgeois morality assumes duality between theory and practice, word and deed and creates an ugly ditch, and unbridgeable gap between the Capitalist and the worker. The concepts of duty and honesty, employed by the bourgeois morality, are made to fit the bourgeois mode of production and way of life. Wealth becomes the universal social and moral value; money becomes the measure of all things - it gives dignity to man, determines man's social position and what

not. So money becomes the basic value of life and the sole end of a man's life lies in making money. And as a consequence, men are not regarded as ends in themselves but mere means for attaining the mainpulatd goals.

Man's worth is measured by his usefulness; as any object man is now available for use in exchange of money, Utter moral degradation penetrates all layers of society. Socially significant values appear to be unreal while individual whims and caprices are perceived as real. Man becomes alienated, isolated from other fellow-men and a feeling of cold-indifference prevails everywhere and man is plunged into an abyss of loneliness. Thus morality of the bourgeoisie makes man selfish, egoistic and morally indifferent hedonist. With the accumulation of money moral vices appear and enter into the scene — people indulge in gross sensual pleasures and wallow in filth like pigs.

4. The transition from Capitalism to Communism indicates a moral turning point in the relations among people. The communist morality signifies a break with the morality of class inequality and oppression of man by man and encourages humane incentives for the moral advancement of the individual as well as for the society. In the communist society, free development of the individuals is no longer a mere phrase, but is really existent. This new morality declares man the supreme value and makes man emancipated from all exploitation and inhuman conditions. No private property, no private enterprise — the individuals collectively own the means

of production and execute planned control over the progress of society. The communist morality is the indicator of moral progress in the society. But moral progress is not a progress in a straight line-it is an inherently contradictory process, occasionally ending in blind alleys. But the communists are convinced that if the development of morality is approached dialectically, the very dynamics of its contradictions reveal steady progress. As the contradiction and the struggle of opposites grow more and more, morality exerts an increasing impact on man's revolutionary ideals.

Another indication of the progress of morality is that morality is not confined to a limited sphere, it is involved in the life of the society as a whole. It reaches all corners, all spheres of life and activity-economic, political and social relations. Observation of socially valuable moral standards becomes necessary in all spheres-in the life of the individual as well as in the life of the society.

Another sign of moral progress is the richer informative aspect of morality. With the growing knowledge in all its branches, man is now capable of expressing his thoughts in consonance with his inner imperatives. He now realises that religious dogmas, prejudices, fanaticism are based on sheer ignorance. He now endeavours utmost to make morality free from all such pre-conceived notions and dogmas and bases morality on genuine objective informations from his life situations. Morality is not alien to him or imposed upon him from outside, it now becomes an integral part of his life. His inner world grows emotionally richer — conscious adherence to moral norms and an awareness of their application in each specific situation become a general condition of man's

moral behaviour. He is not only a conscious individual but also a conscious member of the society and this awareness enhances his moral responsibility. Moral problems are now solved with humanistic outlook, a more humane type of consciousness. Thus a qualitatively new stage of moral progress has begun with the emergence of a new type of man, a harmoniously developed socialist type of the individual. It indicates a major milestone on the road of humanity's moral advancement.

The transition from socialism to communism indicates more harmonious development of personality. The main objective of human activity is not the material wealth or personal gains but to promote social good — a life aimed at most fully developing the creative potential, original talents and abilities of each member of the society constituting the society of selves. It is at this stage of humanity's moral evolution that man becomes the supreme value, the goal of social and historical development.

Moral relations form a part of social relations. They are not the results or consequences of the individual's subjective choice and arbitrary decision-making; but they actually represent the objective social interest of the society consolidating stable behaviour models. Generally in a class society moral relations have a class character. In a society having different classes, moral codes differ as each class justifies its own interests and way of life. But in a classless society, Morality is not sectional, class-oriented but it is all-pervasive. It regulates moral relations among people in all layers and spheres of man's life and activity. An action, whether physical or mental, is moral when it conveys man's attitude to the system of values accepted by the society. E.g., a physical action, viz, jumping into the water, in itself,

is neither moral nor immoral, good or bad-but jumping into water with a view to saving a man's life is certainly a moral action as it conveys the attitude of the jumper to the value of human life accepted universally by the society and reflects his moral character of self-lessness, courage etc. Thus morality is for man a necessary compass which helps him to shape his behaviour and to find its bearings in the life of the society, the world of social values. It allows each man to make a right decision, to act in conformity with the humane ideals of life and the universally accepted system of values. The Marxist ethics encourages man not only to fight for emancipation and betterment of social conditions but also, side by side, for the betterment of his own inner world. His conscience demands that man should do good and resist evils and the sense of duty commands him to be honest and to become a responsible member of the society.

Moral relations may be both subjective and objective-subjective when they emerge from the dictates of duty and conscience; objective when they assume the form of material actions affecting the interests of other people. They do not lie outside the subject as properties of objects or actions as such nor they exist only in the subjective world of man. An action is moral or a behaviour has a moral quality only when it recognises the worth of another individual or a group or a social community. Thus moral relations are always socially significant relations among people. One of the fundamental functions of morality is communicative which incorporates a value attitude to the social environment. It is only through moral communications a man can enrich his life experiences by learning about moral searchings or other person's inner world-his motives, his goals, what he wants to do and what motivates him. A person who is unable to perceive the world around him in value-imperative light will lose

his social bearings. A work-injury and an injury inflicted by a bandit is identical from the medical point of view. But from the point of view of morality the wound inflicted by the bandit, i.e. the action done by the bandit is bad, not moral as it is done with a bad intention and, therefore, this action should be morally censured.

Moral relations change as social, material, economic conditions change, the old system of values gives place to a new system of values — old values crumble down and new values make their appearance in the scene affecting moral consciousness. When moral values clash making the individual undecided as to how to act, his preference must conform to the objectively established values in moral relations. Marxist ethics does not believe in coercion but on persuasion, self-education and mutual understanding. It advocates that the all-round development of the individual is a social need and collective foundations of moral relations pave the way for making life more humane.

Conscience, together with a sense of duty, makes man aware of his moral responsibility towards himself as well as towards others and the society at large. It is the vehicle of social morality in the inner life of the individual. The individual views his conscience as an inner voice of his own moral nature and he judges his behaviour as his own when he makes a moral choice. This is the view of the idealists who regard the phenomenon of conscience as purely an individual's own affair having no connection with the society. Marxist ethics, on the other hand, regards conscience as an attribute of man's social nature, a subjective expression of a certain social and historical imperative that it becomes the regulator of self-judgment. As Marx wrote :

“The conscience of a republican is different from that of a royalist, that of a property-owner is different from that of one who owns no property, that of a thinking person is different from that of one incapable of thought. The conscience of the privileged is precisely the privileged conscience”⁵²

Conscience acts as an integral mechanism organically fusing different and diverse elements of man's mental life—the sensual, the rational and the volitional. Marxist ethics takes a dialectical approach to the sensual and the rational elements in morality—it does not isolate the sensual from the rational and gives us a synoptic view. Lenin emphasises the significance of conscience as a regulator of behaviour guarding the principles of communist morality. A person who has dedicated himself to the ideals of communism cannot violate the dictates of conscience either by word or deed. He always remains truthful and honest with himself and with his comrades. However, it is not only the yardstick by which to measure the moral value of an action. It may be that a man may pursue an unsound line of behaviour, he may err in making a moral choice, here his conscience must be regulated by the moral standards set by society.

Awareness of duty is also a major moral and psychological mechanism of self-control. It implies preferring a certain set of values consciously choosing a system of standards and norms set by the society. Marxist ethics cannot take for granted Kant's rigoristic solution in which 'the duty must be done for duty's sake,' that it is a categorical imperative, unconditional obedience to the moral law—a right action is right and be same for every individual no matter what the tastes or inclinations or circumstances of the particular individual are. Marxist ethics holds that the duty pinpoints man's moral obligations not only to society but to the individual also; it advocates priority of public duty over and above narrowly

understood private interests.

Duty assumes a variety of forms, e.g., duty to the family, duty to the collective, duty to oneself, duty to society and so there arises a need to co-ordinate them. If the conflict of duties arises or is inevitable, moral consciousness has to find out some solution to the complicated question that arises in this connection. The solution may be either egoistic or altruistic, individualistic or socialistic, hedonistic or ascetic. Egoism advocates that the duty of the individual is to seek his own good. But this view ignores the fact that man, by nature, is social. There may be exceptional cases-the ascetic or saint may find his station and its duties away from the society but for a common man morality is a social business, our moral ideas develop only in association with other people and are being constantly modified by 'public climate of opinion'. On the contrary, in opposition to the above view, altruism holds that it is the moral duty of the individual to seek the good of others with no regard for his own. But, like absolute egoism, absolute altruism will lessen the general good. If a man neglects his own health in his eagerness to serve others, he may one day find himself unable to do things for other people. The natural life of a man is a social life-the man who always seeks his own good in utter disregard to the good of others is not really human. Socialist moral consciousness makes possible a harmonious co-existence of different forms of duties. It stresses, however higher types of duties lying in humaneness, collectivism and internationalness as well as duty to one's own station.

The concept of humanism has become the core of anti-communist attacks against Marxist ethics. Socialism as a social system makes the life of the individual more human. Socialist humanism represents only the

beginning of the lengthy historical journey towards the actualisation of humanistic ideals. It steers the colossal ship of the society against the natural currents and storms of history to the shore of living creative humanism. It is a long and arduous process - it is revealed gradually step by step as the society moves forward. The transition or turning of the society from inequality to equality, injustice to justice, hatred to love of fellow-beings cannot be possible in a moment or twinkling of an eye with the help of Allauddin's magic lamp but by conscientious display of duties. It is no denying the fact that moral attractiveness of the socialistic way of life has been increasing day by day. Humanist system of moral norms has acquired a greater social significance in the process of its development. The demand for humanism is the cry of the day. Socialist society is an important step towards realising the communist ideal and attaining real humanism. A communist society will provide objective social conditions for the all-round and harmonious development of man and create scope for each and everyman to develop his inner abilities in the best possible way. No one feels lonely, rather he feels that his work is necessary and most valuable to society and that he is a welcome member of the human community.

There have been a great number of attempts to depict communist morality as inhuman. In their polemic against Marxist ethics, the opponents of communism argue that the moral principle of collectivism undermines personal dignity of man as a man and deprives man of the right to freedom in making a moral choice. The fundamental error of Collectivism is to neglect the fact that men and women are individuals, that society exists for the all-round development of personality of the individual living in a society and this is not attained when the individual is sunk in a 'marching

crowd' in an indistinct group which takes no account of his freedom as an individual, placing the society above everything and as a result the progress of the society will be hampered to a great extent. Paul Tillich maintains that personal development is hampered by collectivism since it is supported by the power of the state and is substantiated rationally. Morality, Tillich holds, is the primitive tribal collectivism under which man loses his independence and regards himself as a subordinate part of something more general and loses the courage of to be himself. Tillich and his followers assert that the principle of collectivism can only be used to stimulate industrial growth but it fails to provide opportunities for each man's free development. The critics of Marxism accuse it of neglecting the role of the individual as the subject of morality. Marxian ethics, by its exclusive concentration on social sources of morality, makes man feel that he is 'an obedient tool in the hands of social will' which is entirely alien to his own wishes and initiative. The opponents of Marxism urge man to put up moral opposition to the external demands set by society or the state, to follow only the spontaneous urges of self-expression and the dictates of the inner moral voice.

The vital question with the Marxist is : can moral standards be derived from the individual's absolute subjective freedom of choice alone by passing or ignoring their social source?

"Not only is man a being who only attains his real nature in society, he is a being who has always lived in some form or other in society even if his earliest society was only that of the family group"⁵³

Man is dependent on society for a multitude of definite services which society provides him with. "It is not natural for a man to be alone,

and that some form of social unity is implied in his essential structure."⁵⁴

Even the existentialist thinkers could not deny the reality of the society. "No one can really be an absolute individualist, any more than any one can be an absolute socialist. For the individual and society interact on one another and depend on one another."⁵⁵

In antagonistic societies, Marx and Engels wrote, genuine collectivism had no place. Under the communist formation collectivism consists "in the necessary solidarity of the free development of all, and, finally, in the universal character of the activity of the individuals on the basis of the existing productive forces."⁵⁶

The principle of communist collectivism calls for profoundly humane inter-group and inter-personal relations and here lies the distinction between communist collectivism and historically earlier forms of collective existence. Communist collectivism regards comradeship and solidarity as the basis of the personality's free, all-round development and the attainment of moral ideal of communism. The dialectics of what actually exists and what should be innate in the communist movement demonstrates the humane foundation of its moral practices. Communist morality reflects society's interest in the individual's free and harmonious development. Collectivism is not only a standard for communist morality but also an objective property, a feature of the social relations of socialism. The individual builds up his own inner world not in isolation from other people but through real contacts with them. A job based on common values produces a feeling of moral and psychological unity and friendliness and enhances mutual understanding and creates a healthy moral atmosphere. However, the process may not always be smooth and free

from difficulties. The fanatics wearing the mask of collectivism may be totally indifferent and blind to individual distinctions and may level out their tastes and needs but all of which is alien to real socialism. This collectivism is called mock-collectivism-the distortions are due to human frailties, backwardness, want of cultural progress and absence of genuine moral education.

The loyalty to communist ideals is, the anti-communists believe, incompatible with humaneness. The opponents of Marxism describe the communist world-outlook as a soulless and dry sociological doctrine, pure and unadulterated political design that destroys man's moral potential and dignity. They maintain that according to Marxism. Leninism it is not the idea that serves man but man serves the idea and this leads to anti-humanism. And when the individual's conscience and thinking serve an idea, it may lead to mass cruelty, violence and persecution of the dissidents.

But this anti-communist thesis can hardly be estimated as sound
For :

- (i) Dedication to an advanced and humane ideal does not contradict individual kindness, compassion and responsiveness but promotes them. Loyalty to communist ideals in conjunction with the most advanced and humane ideals helps people evolve such traits as generosity, readiness to make sacrifices and even act heroically for the sake of others.
- (ii) Adherence to an idea (including moral convictions) is the basis on which man chooses goodness in its concreteness. The ideals of individual's moral life divorced from advanced social

values lose a great deal of their motivating force. Convictions and moral solidarity help man remain humane and kind even in the most tragic situations. Marxism does not preach fanaticism or moral automatism.

The opponents of communism assert that by subjugating the overall social evolution to the attainment of the ultimate end, i.e., the communist ideal Marxism-Leninism sacrifices the present to the distant, vague phantom of the future. They describe the communist world-outlook as a sacrificial ideal of the future social order, an ideal that is the cunning enemy of the people's present happiness.

Against these accusations the Marxists assert that :

It is illegitimate to state that Marxism - Leninism views all the efforts and striving of generations of the past and present as a mere means to an end, a rung on the historical ladder. Marxism does not believe in Jesuitism when it holds that the end justifies the means in all cases, nor it believes in abstract humanism which holds that the means and the end are mutually independent but Marxist ethics holds that the thesis : 'the end determines the means' and the thesis 'the means determines the end' are mutually dependent and correlative, i.e., in a changed situation the goal may become the means and means may turn into the goal-a means is moral and expedient if it is sufficient and necessary for attaining a moral positive goal. Humanism, as a goal embodying man's freedom and happiness, determines the most humane means of attaining it.

In the development of morality, each stage is historically significant in its own right, each stage is a movement in which the values of the past, present and future enter into a dialectical interaction. Social progress is

the historical chain that links the past and the present and the present and future generations-a process during which moral values become more and more perfect. Each new stage of social progress to which mankind rises is very costly, often even costlier than was believed to be in the very beginning. To build a new society, to realise lofty ideals of humanism we have to combat insurmountable difficulties and this task can never be fulfilled without persistent endeavour and selflessness. In our way to goal the positive achievement is that in doing the job people rise to new heights of moral maturity, overcome their backwardness of which human frailties are capable of and become gradually the makers of their own future destiny. Genuine, real humanism arises in the course of this struggle and movement. The people must learn the lesson of perseverance and do utmost for the realisation of the new social order and by avoiding blind alleys in their way to goal they must find out the right road that leads to the path of exit and finally to the land of human values in a new social order.

Through this movement each generation of mankind develops and thus preserves for the future its ideals and values. Whenever a person is self-aware of the moral values he is after, the intensity and strenuousness of his effort will give him immense pleasure, profound satisfaction, a feeling a job well-done, of having overcome all difficulties.

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Chapter - III

CHAPTER - III

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

Marxian ethics is consistently materialistic and dialectical. When we speak of dialectical materialism the two terms appearing in this conception need precise explanation. Now what does 'dialectical' mean ?

The scientific conception of the term was preceded by a long history of development and it emerged through revising, even overcoming, the original meaning of the term. Originally the term denoted the art of debate by means of questions and answers - the word 'dialectics' was derived from the Greek 'dialego', meaning to discuss or debate. It is a discussion of a question from all sides, from all angles, allowing one-sided points of view to oppose and contradict each other during the debate or discussion with a view to arriving at the truth. Socrates used this dialectical method. But Marxian dialectical method is far richer in content, far wider in its scope. It becomes something qualitatively new - a new revolutionary method. It is combined with materialism and it ceases to be a mere method of argument, becoming a method of investigation of both nature and society, a method of materialistic understanding of the world and becomes a sharpened weapon in the activity of the toiling masses.

In his quest for truth Socrates applied this dialectical method which came to be known as the Socratic method. But Socratic method was not used for communicating any definite view of his own. It was the method of

finding out truth through discussion with others. Pretending and even believing to be less wise than the other participants in the debate Socrates elicited from them their views on important subjects like justice, temperance and gradually exposed their mistakes and even made them contradict themselves. He then became the master of the situation and the pride of his adversaries was humbled until some one among them closed the conversation with a remark like this : "Well, Socrates, I no longer have any confidence in my answers; for the whole theme has turned out to be exactly the contrary of what I previously imagined." Without this negative part of the Socratic method it is possible that he might have been remained unknown like many of his fellow-citizens. It was upon this activity that he established his reputation, arrayed his enemies against him and at the last inspired the charges of the indictment upon which he was tried with the resulting verdict of death.

The Socratic method does not end here. So far we have got only the negative side of his method. Had this been all, the total output of the Socratic method would be to know that we do not know.

He, however, wanted to show that we could know and so applied his dialectical skill to elicit the truth from amongst all conflicting opinions. This is the positive or the constructive side of his method. It was the method of arriving at definite concepts or universal notions which alone stand for truth. To know the truth therefore we have to form the concepts constituting the essence of things. What then is the concept of justice in general ? In arriving at this concept he adopted at first the inductive procedure starting from particular instances of justice and then tried to find out the quality those had in common and by virtue of which all these are classed together.

In this way, the notions or definitions were at first formed. Thus inductive reasoning was applied for arriving at the concepts. Deductive reasoning is again applied in their application to new cases.

When we talk of the dialectical method the name of the philosopher Hegel comes up to our mind but by no means was Hegel or Karl Marx the inventor of this type of thinking. It has had a long history which began with Heraclitus who developed this method or way of thinking. For him everything in the universe has in it its opposite - all things contain their own opposites within them; for him "War is the father of all, the king of all." He thought that strife was natural and the life was a struggle. In the struggle and antagonism between hostile principles consists their life, their being, their very existence. By the term 'war' he did never mean war as a military phenomenon nor did he glorify it in any way. Here he speaks of the struggle of metaphysico — ontological opposites which he considers to be the core of the universe. To Heraclitus all things are composed of 'fire' - the fire is, the fire was and ever shall be, an eternally living fire. Fire is identified with life and reason. The more fire there is, the more life, the more movement. The more dark there is, the more death, cold and not-being. Heraclitus takes fire as his fundamental physical principle and has regarded this as incessantly struggling with the dark and moist-principle which is opposed to bright and dry, i.e., fire. He thinks that even in the life of man this struggle can be found going on. The great aim in moral life is to secure the victory for the bright and dry. "Keep your soul dry" - is with him the fundamental moral law.

In a very different way Zeno of Elea of the anti-Heraclitean Eleatic school developed dialectics. Aristotle believed that dialectical thinking had been invented by Zeno of Elea who analysed the conflicting aspects

in the concepts of motion and plurality. Zeno's contribution to Eleaticism is entirely negative. He supports Parmenides in the doctrine of Being. The essential characteristics of the world of sense are multiplicity and motion. Against multiplicity and motion Zeno, the faithful and brilliant disciple of Parmenides, directed his arguments showing that motion and multiplicity are impossible. The type of argument Zeno puts forward, is called 'antinomy' in modern times. Since two contradictory propositions equally follow from a given assumption, that assumption must be false. The term dialectics as a technical term in philosophy was not as yet used. Zeno is credited for using the term in its technical sense in philosophy for he uses this type of reasoning which seeks to develop the truth by making the false refute and contradict itself. Two propositions which contradict each other cannot both be true. Therefore, the assumptions from which both the propositions follow must be false.

To demonstrate the absurdity of motion Zeno tells us a story. A tortoise challenges Achilles, the track star of antiquity, to run a race, on condition that he (the tortoise) be given a head start. Let us suppose that they are off at the sound of the pistol. When Achilles reaches the point from where the tortoise started, the tortoise is no longer there. Again when Achilles reaches the point at which point the tortoise was, the tortoise is no longer there. The tortoise has gone to a point further on. Achilles must then run to that point and finds that the tortoise has reached the third point. Everytime Achilles arrives at the point at which point the tortoise was, but the tortoise is no longer there. This will go on for ever and at no time does Achilles overtake his rival, tortoise.

Zeno tells us another story. This is the story of the flying arrow which will show that motion is inconceivable. An object cannot be in two places

at the same time. At any particular moment in its flight the arrow is in one place and not in two places. But to be in one place is to be at rest. Therefore, at every instant of its flight, it is at rest. Motion is inconceivable. According to Zeno, he who tries to leave the circle of the static concepts of the Eleatic School must run into contradictions. He clearly points out the contradictions which lie in our ideas of space and time. Zeno's arguments which are based upon the antinomy of infinite divisibility are not propounded for its own sake, but to support the fundamental Eleatic position that Being is one; there is no multiplicity, no motion, no becoming.

These contradictions, according to Kant, are immanent in our conceptions of Space and Time. Since they involve such contradictions they are not real beings but mere appearances, mere phenomena only. Space and time do not belong to things as they are in themselves, but rather to our way of looking at things. Space and time are not objects of perception as ordinarily supposed but they are forms of perception. They have empirical reality as being real only for objects of experience. They have further transcendental ideality, for they are a priori forms of our sensibility. But they have no transcendental reality as they do not exist independently by themselves. It is our minds which impose space and time upon objects and not objects which impose space and time upon our minds. But the subjectivity of space and time is different from the subjectivity of sensations. Sensations are individually different, contingent but space and time are a priori and necessary. Kant attempted to show that whenever we try to think the infinite, we fall into irreconcilable contradictions. Therefore, human faculties are incapable of apprehending the reality.

A true solution is possible only by rising above the level of two antagonistic principles and taking them both up to the level of a higher conception in which both the opposites are reconciled and synthesised. Hegel follows this procedure in his solution of the problem. Hegel did not, however, try to solve the antinomies. They appear as mere incidents in the development of his thought. they are not isolated cases of contradiction, but, on the contrary, he regarded them the essential character of reason. All thought, all reason for Hegel contains immanent contradictions. First we affirm some idea or conception of thing, i.e., a thesis and then finding its imperfection we are led to affirm the opposite idea or conception of it, i.e., its antithesis. But the opposite idea, i.e., antithesis, in its turn, is found to be one-sided as the first. This leads us to affirm a higher or more comprehensive idea which reconciles the two opposites - thesis and antithesis into a higher unity called synthesis. For example, we first think a heap of wheat as one, i.e., it is one whole and secondly we think of it as many having been composed of many parts. But both 'one' and 'many' being one-sided and imperfect, we are finally led to the idea or notion of quantity which contains these two — the one and the many. It is a many in one or a one in many. So the one and the many are reconciled in a higher unity, in the higher notion of quantity. Quantity is the synthesis of the one and the many. The thought of the one involves the thought of the many and the thought of the many involves the thought of the one. If we persist in saying it is simply many and not one, then it is divisible ad-infinitum. The truth is that it is neither simply many nor simply one — it is many in one, it is a quantity.

For Plato dialectics is a necessary method of grasping the ideas through the Socratic method of discussion. To the Eleatics Being is the

absolute, one utterly exclusive of the many. Being, according to Plato, contains contradictions - It is single and plural, eternal and transient, immutable and mutable, at rest and in motion. Being is not excludent of not-Being — Being and not-Being are correlatives which mutually involve each other. A 'one' which is not also a 'many' is unthinkable; the idea of the 'many' is also inconceivable without the idea of the 'one'. The one and the many, the Being and not-Being cannot be separated in the Eleatic manner. When we turn our attention to Plato's theory of Ideas, we find that there are many ideas but ideas are not isolated units but members of a single organized system and in this particular sense Ideas are one. Again each Idea is a unity. It is the unity of the one and the many. The Idea of man is one, but individual men are many. Every Idea is a being which contains not-Being, e.g., the Idea of rest is Being in regard to itself, not-Being in regard to the Idea of motion.

In this way there arises a science of Ideas which is called 'dialectic'. The 'Theaetetus', the 'Sophist', and the 'Parmenides' are dialectical.

These different forms of dialectics have something in common — they are characterized by the central role of the opposites and contradictions for both human thinking as well as for reality. Whether dialectics is understood as something positive (Heraclitus) or negative (Zeno), whether it is considered to be the method of human thinking or not, in any case the confrontation of the opposites is the indispensable vehicle of dialectics. In the 18th Century in France, a wealth of dialectical ideas was produced by Rousseau and Diderot. Rousseau examined contradiction as a condition of historical development and Diderot went a step further and investigated contradictions in the contemporary social consciousness.

The conception of dialectics is especially important in Kant and Hegel. In his Epistemology Kant developed dialectical ideas in his teaching of antinomies. He described dialectics of reason as an illusion which evaporates as soon as thought recedes within itself, bounded by the cognition of phenomena proper. Kant asserted that pure reason, whenever it ventures into a field in which it cannot possibly be checked by experience, is liable to get involved in contradictions or antinomies. Kant used antinomy in an attempt to justify the basic thesis of his philosophy according to which the intellect cannot go beyond the bounds of experience and cannot cognise the thing-in-itself. As we have no direct sense experience of things-in-themselves, we have no knowledge of them. Kant repeatedly tells us that no positive knowledge of the noumenal object is possible for us. We can undoubtedly think or speculate about them but that will never amount to a knowledge about them. Kant says that through the speculative ideas of reason, reason attempts to apply categories to something lying beyond the possible objects of knowledge and as a result reason gets entangled in unavoidable show and deception or gets involved in contradictions. Contradictions take the form of antinomies, i.e., pairs of contradictory propositions equally well-founded, each of which seems to us just as necessary as the other, both the members of which, i.e., contradictory pairs of propositions can be proved or disproved with equal force of logic. Kant says that it is possible to prove both the contradictory propositions - both the assertion (thesis) and its negation (antithesis) in each of the following antinomies of Pure reason :

1. (a) The universe is finite (thesis).
(b) The universe is infinite (antithesis).

2. (b) Every complex substance consists of simple parts (Thesis).
(b) There is nothing simple in existence (Antithesis).
3. (a) Freedom exists in the world (Thesis).
(b) There is no freedom in the world, only causality (Antithesis).
4. (a) The primary cause of the universe (God) exists. (Thesis).
(b) There is no primary cause of the universe (Antithesis).

The most important Pre-Marxian stage in the development of dialectics was classical German Idealism which, in contrast with metaphysical materialism, considered reality not merely as an object of cognition but also as an object of activity. The founders of classical German Idealism were pre-eminently Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, and George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Their individual systems, in spite of important differences, exhibited a fundamentally similar philosophical attitude. Kant's critical method leads to agnosticism because it proceeds on the idea that the forms and categories of knowledge have their origin in our mind and are, therefore, subjective. They do not apply to the real or noumenal world lying beyond our mind and experiences. German idealists (Fichte, Schelling and Hegel) though disowned this Kantian position they commonly accepted his contention that the primary concern for philosophy is the nature of human knowledge - e.g., Fichte, in his work *'The Science of Knowledge'*, defined philosophy as the 'science of knowledge'; Schelling maintained that to know things as they are is to know them as they are in and for reason; Hegel declared : 'Being is thought', 'the real is the rational', 'the rational is the real'. They challenged Kant's doctrine of the limitations of human knowledge, his theory of the impossibility of obtaining metaphysical knowledge that reality is unknown

and unknowable. To them the reality is a complete systematic unity, a 'whole' - it is spiritual, it is intelligible in and for reason. The critical philosophy of Kant fails to provide with this ultimate unity. The idea of philosophy as the knowledge of the reality has led Hegel to employ the method of dialectic as the proper method of philosophy. The systematic whole of thought is identified with the reality as we have in Hegelian phrase : "The real is the rational, the rational is the real". The 'whole' is the Absolute and Hegel says that Absolute is the Idea which knows itself, the reason which knows itself.

Schelling developed a dialectical apprehension of the processes of nature - "God affirms himself in Nature". The Absolute is the unity of the real and the ideal, of the subjective and the objective, of the Spirit and the Nature. Fichte's fundamental concern is with the nature of morality. In the formulation of the 'Categorical Imperative' Kant gives us a formula which may be universalized - "So act that the Maxim of thy will may always hold good as a principle of legislation". Fichte maintains that it is in the 'practical reason' of moral experience that one is acquainted with the ultimate nature of reality. This has led him to the concept of universal moral order on the one hand and the acknowledgement of will as striving for perfect freedom on the other hand. Each stage of morality is the realization of the wider whole than that of the particular individual's own ego. From this point of view morality is essentially and fundamentally an abandonment of selfishness, a transcendence of individuality. To Hegel, however, the welfare of each individual goes together with the welfare of all individuals. He regards the development of personality, the attainment and expression of rational freedom as fundamental. The ethics, for the German Idealists,

is nothing but the realization of spiritual personality, rational freedom in and through the social relationships.

The idealistic dialectic of Hegel was the summit in the development of Pre-Marxian dialectical materialism. "For the first time the whole world, natural, historical, intellectual, is represented as a process, i.e., as in constant motion, change, transormation, development; and the attempt is made to trace out the internal connection that makes a continuous whole of all this movement and development"¹ (F. Engels, AntiDuhring, P. 31-32). Hegel's dialectic contains an element of dynamism and evolutionism. But his point of view is fundamentally idealistic. He regarded the universe as a process of development or evolution - but it is not a biological evolution determined and governed by mechanistic laws, but a spiritual evolution taking place according to dialectical process and the end at which man aims is the fullest realization of his spiritual and rational nature. Our human history has also been interpreted as a gradual process of development upwards towards the realization of the truest and most perfect form of self-consciousness.

Hegel recognizes the presence of his dialectic in the ancient modes of argument : the arguments of Eleatic philosopher Zeno against motion and multiplicity, the Socratic 'irony', the Platonic development of the science of Ideas in the dialogues like in the "Parmenides". In all these Hegel sees the true uncovering of and positive expression of 'Divine Life'. It is, however, in Kantian antinomies that Hegel sees the most explicit modern expression of dialectic. Kant not only shows that our notions of time and space can be developed in contradictory ways but also shows further that such contradictions are essential and necessary. It is Hegel's conviction

that the forms of sensibility and categories of understanding through which our thought develops and seeks to know the nature of the experienced world are not confined to our mind but are realized in the nature and constitution of reality itself. "Dialectic", says Hegel, "is the principle of all movement and of all the activity we find in reality". The dialectic form moves through a triadic form - thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The Principle of development which Fichte had discovered and which Schelling had occasionally employed - the three-fold rhythm of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, Hegel carried out with logical consecutiveness. It is the three-fold movement-a thesis being confronted by a contradictory antithesis and both being combined in a synthesis, which in its turn becomes the starting point for a new triadic movement. It is this dialectic process that governs the development of thought from the lowest or most in-adequate category to the highest or more perfect. Thus we pass from the idea of reality as mere 'Being' to the speculative conception of it as the Absolute Idea or Self-Conscious Spirit. The same dialectical process governs the development of the real, objective world existing in relation to our mind. In his philosophy Hegel tries to show how the facts of Physics, History, Ethics and Religion illustrate the dialectical process. Hence for Hegel the forms and categories of knowledge are also the forms and modes of Being or Reality.

Ethics, according to Hegel, is a process of development too. In moral evolution there is a process of development from a goodness which is simply an outward obedience to externally imposed rules to a goodness that consists in the inward submission of to the internal faculty of conscience and the two again find their synthesis in social morality, a life that is gradually shared by the developing consciousness of the community in its efforts to

attain the highest perfection of which human nature is capable of. The 'good will' of Kant is with Hegel no longer the will of the individual imposing rules on himself but the universal will which becomes self-conscious in the course of evolution.

According to Hegel Kant was quite right in pointing out the antinomies or contradictions and it was one of the main merits of Kant to have discovered the triplicity and to have used it in drawing up his list of categories. Kant deduced twelve such categories which our understanding employs to constitute the objects of experience and without these categories no knowledge is possible. In his *'Metaphysical Deduction'* of categories Kant shows us that there are twelve such categories. E.g.,

- I) Quantity - Unity, plurality, totality;
- II) Quality - Reality, Negative, Limitation;
- III) Relation - Substantiality, Causality, Reciprocity;
- IV) Modality - Possibility, Actuality, Necessity.

It is to be observed that of the three categories under each head, the third is the combination of the first two. Totality is plurality regarded as Unity; Limitation is Reality combined with Negation; Necessity is the Actuality given by the possibility itself. What is possible becomes actual through necessity. Hegel differs from Kant when Kant advocates that we know the real as it appears, never as it is. Thus knowledge is limited to the realm of appearances only - reality is, therefore unknown and unknowable. But to Hegel reality is fully knowable - reality is thought, reason. The world is a great thought-process. It is God-thinking. It is not weakness of our intellect but it is the very essence of all rationality that it

must work with antinomies. Contradictions. Hegel asserts, exist in all objects, in all conceptions, concepts and ideas. Our reason is not static like Eleatic Being but dynamic. Reason is equal to the Real. The famous catch-word of Absolute Idealism of Hegel was the statement : "the rational is real and real is rational". Everything that is reasonable must be real and everything that is real must be reasonable. The reason here is not human reason and reality is not experiential reality. The ideal of reason must inevitably be a complete system, each and every constituent of which fits rationally with every other. Reason cannot halt at the partial or incomplete, which points beyond itself. The systematic whole of thought is, therefore, identified with reality and the 'whole' is the Absolute or the Absolute Idea, the Absolute Spirit, God. Hegel talks of the Absolute as the Idea which knows itself, the thought which conceives itself, the reason which knows itself. Hegel chose the identity of being and thinking, i.e., the conception of the real world as a manifestation of Idea, concept or Spirit. This identity he regarded as the historically developing process of Absolute Idea's Cognizing Itself. All phenomena in nature and society are based on the Absolute-the spiritual and rational principle, the 'Absolute Idea', the 'World-reason' or 'World-Spirit'. This principle is active, and its activity consists in thinking or more precisely in self-cognition. The Absolute Idea passes three stages : (1) development of the Idea in its own bosom, in the 'element of pure thinking' - Logic, wherein the Idea reveals its content in a system of logical categories which are related and grow out of one another; (2) development of the Idea in the form of the 'Other-Being', i.e., in the form of Nature - Philosophy of Nature; (3) development of the Idea in thought and history (in the spirit), i.e., philosophy of Mind. At this stage the Absolute Idea withdraws within itself and conceives its content in the

different forms of human consciousness and activity. Every real development is a real process and as a real process it must be a rational and reasonable process if we follow his philosophy of identity. As the history is the development of something real it must be rational. In Hegel's dialectic we find fusion of the three forms of dialectical thinking. Following Heraclitus and Plato, Hegel combines dialectics of things with the dialectics of thinking. Since mind is the very essence of reality dialectics must be both a real metaphysical happening and a method of knowledge. He also combines the positive dialectic of Heraclitus with the negative of Zeno arising from analytical and polemic tendencies. Hegel also developed most fully the idealistic interpretation of alienation. The objective world appears as the 'alienated spirit'. The entire finite sphere, composed of both nature and human mind, is considered a self-alienation of God from Himself. Positive dialectics consists in self-reconciliation of the Divine Mind with Himself. The purpose of development according to Hegel is to overcome this alienation in the process of cognition. At the same time Hegel's understanding of alienation contained rational surmises about some distinctive features of labour in an antagonistic society. Analysing the category of alienation Hegel grasped idealistically the essence of labour, i.e., important aspects of man's objective activity and conceived man and his history as the result of his own work.

The Hegelian system is absolute idealism as well as rational pantheism as the 'whole of thought' is called the 'Absolute' or the 'Absolute Idea' and the emphasis on the unity of the whole gives it the general impression of Pantheism (God is all and all is God) and as such there is a fusion of philosophy and theology. As the Absolute is rather of the character of intuitive immediacy — moral for Fichte, aesthetic for Schelling

and rational for Hegel the classical German Idealism culminates in a form of mysticism.

The dialectic method of Hegel stands or falls with its fundamental assumption that thought and reality are identical. If thought were identical with reality, we could say that the forms and categories of thought were also the forms and categories of reality. For to think of anything is not to bring it into existence but to have an idea or concept of it. The progress made by the special sciences shows us how arbitrary and untrustworthy Hegel's enumeration of the categories of reality is. With the advance of the sciences other new concepts and categories may be found necessary for the interpretation of the experienced world. But in the list of categories formulated by Hegel they have no place. The dialectic method can give us at best a consistent, comprehensive conception of reality but not any direct knowledge of reality.

When Hegel declares that 'Reason' is the sovereign of the world, Arthur Schopenhauer differs from Hegel. For him reason has only a formal function. Reason, according to Schopenhauer, is 'feminine in nature' - it can only give after it has received. Of itself it has nothing but the empty forms of its own operation. In opposition to the Hegelian view of history as a progressive dialectical process, Schopenhauer described it as 'a heavy and confused dream', a continuous reiteration of the same experiences, only the names of the places and persons being different.

The idealism of Hegelian philosophy is no doubt a great and grand theory - magnificent and divine. There is no doubt that Hegel's dialectics was a valuable contribution to philosophy. In it he analysed the major laws and categories of dialectics, substantiated the thesis on the unity of the

dialectics, logic, the theory of knowledge and elaborated for the first time in the history of thought a system of dialectical logic. He left a profound imprint of all the branches of philosophy in which he applied dialectics. But the idealism of his philosophy seemed to have gone wild and he injected mysticism into dialectics. He applied the principle of development in the realm of ideas, made a number of categories of logic stereotyped and artificial and presented their system as a closed one. He was unable and reluctant to draw any consistent social conclusions from dialectics and reconciled himself to the status quo, which he justified proclaiming the Prussian Monarchy the crowning of social development. However, Hegel's philosophy played a great and fundamental role in the development of Marxian philosophy or Marxism which preserved its most valuable element dialectics, moulding it into a scientifically strict teaching on the development of nature, society and thought.

Classical German idealism especially Hegelianism, has had a wide spread influence as a general philosophy of life throughout Germany for half a century. But by the middle of the 19th Century its influence begins to wane. Some of the foremost thinkers - Feuerbach, Bauer, Ruge, D. Strauss, Marx, Engels explicitly rejected it. During the material time Hegelianism assumes different forms. His followers are grouped under the description of 'Right-wing' and 'Left-wing'. The latter group stresses the empirical and regards his doctrine of the absolute as logical formalism. But this distinction is not exact. There are some who retain some aspects of Hegel's dialectical method and reject his spiritual metaphysics. They may be said to have broken entirely from Hegelian Idealism either in developing forms of naturalism or dialectical materialism in contrast with Hegelian dialectical idealism or new Kantianism which sprang up in

Germany in the second half of the 19th Century under the slogan : "Back to Kant".

The passage from Hegelian dialectical idealism to the Marxian dialectical materialism, from Hegelian concepts or notions to the Marxian ideas as class struggle consists in the transformation of philosophical mysticism into a new profoundly scientific outlook. The so-called young Hegelians or the Hegelians of the leftwing, a radical wing of Hegel's philosophical school, thinkers, viz., D. Strauss, B. Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach represented the link between Hegel and the fully developed doctrine of Marxism, especially dialectical materialism which became 'the world outlook of the Marxist - Leninist party', as Stalin called it.

These thinkers did not give up totally absolutism and monism. But they saw the essence of man as the one and only universal and supreme subject-matter of philosophy - for them man became the absolute centre of the universe and all standards above him were to be reduced to that of human needs and human existence. They favoured humanism and uttered good-bye to theology. D. Strauss' book, 'Das Leben-Jesu', which critically analysed the Gospel dogmas, promoted the formation of the Hegelian left-wing. Strauss considered Jesus as an ordinary historical personality. B. Bauer also regarded the Gospel dogmas as deliberate inventions and the person of Jesus as fiction. Their attention was centred on the question of how false concepts of society appear and acquire the force of compulsion. Feuerbach belonged to the left-wing of young Hegelians. His defence of materialism influenced his contemporaries. He criticized Hegel's dialectic understanding of man's essence and his reducing it to self-consciousness. He also sharply criticized the idealistic nature of Hegelian dialectics. He saw the essence of man as one and only universal

and supreme subject-matter of philosophy and in this respect he facilitated the establishment of Marxism. But he did not pursue a consistently materialistic line on this question because he took man as an abstract individual. He did not overcome the contemplative nature of pre-Marxian materialism because in his understanding of history he remained entirely on idealist positions. Not understanding the real world in which man lives, he deduced the principles of morality from man's intrinsic striving for happiness. The morality on Feuerbach's view is abstract, eternal and the same for all times and peoples.

The bankruptcy of the young Hegelian movement lies in the fact that the role of masses in the history, the ideas of class struggle, of the objective laws of social development, of the role of economic relations in the life of the society are alien to them. The task was fulfilled by Marx and Engels who joined this movement at the beginning of 1840s. But they arrived at a radically new understanding of social development - the theory of dialectical and historical materialism. They proved that materialism can be scientific and consistent if it is dialectical and that dialectics can be genuinely scientific only and only if it is materialistic. The development of scientific outlook on social development and its laws was a most essential element in the formation of dialectical materialism.

The emergence of dialectical materialism was a revolution in the history of human thought. But this revolution included continuity and critical acceptance of all progressive elements already attained by the human thought. The two main streams of philosophical development merged in dialectical materialism — materialistic philosophy on the one hand and dialectics of the idealists on the other hand. The development of

philosophical thought in close relation or association with science led inevitably to the triumph of the empirical and materialistic world-outlook. But the doctrines of old materialists were either metaphysical or mechanistic and combined materialism in their view of nature with idealism in their explanation of social phenomena. The philosophers who developed the dialectical outlook were essentially idealists as is shown by Hegel's system. And it is necessary that Hegel's theological dialectics must be eliminated. Marx and Engels synthesised the two, avoiding the defects of either and combining the advantages of both.

The term materialism here has a polemic meaning — it is directed against the Absolute Idealism of Hegel — in short, it is anti-idealism : its slogans being 'nature against mind', 'experience against speculation', 'science against dream', 'history against theology', 'man against gods'. This materialism teaches us that the world by its very nature is material and that everything arises and develops in accordance with the laws of motion in nature; that matter is objective reality existing outside and independent of the mind; that the world and its laws are fully knowable. It is a way of interpreting events, of conceiving of things and their inter-connections, of explaining every question without any bias and prejudice. In a complete reversal of Hegelianism, the interpretation of history and of all forms of human life moves from below to above, from feet to head, and not from above to below. from head to feet.

Though materialism is as old as philosophy, its 19th Century advocates restored it in the language of contemporary science. Most of them were not philosophers in the truest sense of the term — they were scientists, usually physiologists or biologists and their materialism was a direct deduction from the discoveries of the natural sciences. This is

particularly true of L. Buchner whose *"Force and Matter "* established itself as the 'Bible of the materialists'. According to him matter is not inert; there is no matter without force and vice versa; every agent is material — 'no force without matter, no matter without force'. The most influential of all the varieties of 19th Century materialism is the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels. Buchner probably seems to do something to prepare the intellectual atmosphere for the development of Marxian materialism and some critics identify Marxian materialism with '*medical materialism*' of Buchner and his associates. But Engels, in his '*Ludwig Feuerbach*' and the '*Outcome of classical German Philosophy*', dismisses this charge and calls the medical materialists as 'vulgarising peddlars' and 'hedge preachers'. Neither Marx nor Engels had any sympathy for these medical materialists but they owe their allegiance only to two masters - Hegel and Feuerbach. The Feuerbach who aroused the enthusiasm of Marx and Engels was not the Feuerbach who did not pursue consistently materialistic line as he took man as a purely biological being but was the Feuerbach who argued, in his '*Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy*', that Hegelian metaphysics is simply an explication of his theology in disguise — 'the last refuge, the last rational support of theology'. And in his '*The Essence of Christianity*' Feuerbach argued that 'theology' itself is a confused, fantastic way of depicting social relationships. He wrote : "The divine being is nothing else than the human being, or rather, the human nature purified, freed from the limits of the individual man, made objective, i.e., contemplated and revered as another, a distinct being"² (Feuerbach — *The Essence of Christianity*, tr. by Marian Evans, London, 1854, (2nd Ed.) 1881, P. 14). In his philosophy man occupies a unique position. Religion has sacrificed man to God and now what we need is to invert the

religious relation, to regard that as an end which religion supposes to be 'means' and this, in turn, leads straight to the recognition that philosophy to fulfil its task must promote the emancipation of all mankind from all obstacles which stand in the way of free development of human faculties. The question whether God exists or not is for him nothing but the existence and non-existence of man is vital. In religion man alienates himself from himself and renders himself uselessly miserable and true philosophy brings back man to himself.

Feuerbach repudiated Hegel's identification of the real and the rational and held that philosophy must take its start not from Hegel's abstract 'Idea' but from concrete nature and historical reality, that philosophy must trace the natural conditions of human freedom and understand man as a being whose relationship to nature is mediated by the senses. Feuerbach's affirmation of man, nature, the life of the senses reminds us of the name of Rousseau with whom he shares a certain sentimentality which is humanistic in character, based on respect for the dignity and rights of man, his value as a personality, concern for his welfare, his all-round development.

In his first thesis on Feuerbach Marx subjected Feuerbach's materialism to a critical examination. The chief defect of all previous materialism including that of Feuerbach is that the object, the reality, the sensibility is only apprehended under the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as human sensible activity or practice, not subjectively. Marx looked upon knowledge as an activity exercised on things. In the third thesis on Feuerbach Marx pointed out the drawbacks of French materialists when he said that the materialist doctrine concerning the change of circumstances and education forgets that

circumstances are changed by men and the educator must himself be educated.

Since his materialism contains in it an essential principle of progressive change, Marx calls his materialism dialectical. It is called materialistic not because it denies mind or regards it as a by-product of matter or as a derivative quality of matter but urges that ideas influence history by acting on things, by changing their shape and power. The material things which are declared to be the main determinants of social change are not the raw materials of nature - they are not merely coal or electricity but our knowledge of the ways in which materials of nature like water or electricity can be used to serve human ends. But the productive forces which determine the social change include not merely the forces of nature like solar heat, electricity but also the power of the human mind. The productive forces of nature have been there on the mother earth from its very beginning. The discovery and use of productive forces is possible only when human mind takes an active, positive role or actively participates in adapting them for the purpose of economic production.

Feuerbach, according to Marxists, has destroyed metaphysics of Hegel and religion in a single blow. Marx asserts against Hegel that mind and nature are positive entities, not unsubstantial reflection of the Absolute Idea. For Hegel change is an illusion of appearance whereas for Marx change is not illusion, it is real, it is the very stuff of reality. The things we see are real and they are changing perpetually and these changes are intrinsic to the nature of things and not imposed from outside. To the question; what is matter? Marx's answer is that it is the stuff of cosmic reality. Dialectical development is its essential and necessary expression. By materialism Marxists usually mean some kind of representationalism

— the view that the 'Concepts in our heads' are 'images of real things'. In his *"Materialism and Empirio-Criticism"* Lenin defines matter as 'that which, acting upon our sense organs produces sensation; matter is the objective reality given us in sensation'. But here, at this point, Berkeley's Criticism has to be answered, that if matter is not itself a sensation but only that which gives rise to sensation, we can have no evidence that there is such a thing, Engels admits that it is difficult to beat Berkeley by mere argumentation. But, Engels goes on, before there was argumentation, there was action. In the beginning was the deed. To Marx : the question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. The test of truth is practical. Since we change the object when we act upon it there is nothing static about the truth. Marx thus adopts the pragmatic criterion of truth.

In reacting against Hegel, Marx argued, Feuerbach had failed to appreciate Hegel's great contribution to philosophy-his dialectic method. In spite of it, Feuerbach left an indelible impression on Marx, because for Feuerbach man was the true subject and God the predicate. According to Marx, man makes religion; man is no abstract being squatting outside the world; man is the world of man, the state, the society. It is categorical imperative to overthrow all circumstances in which man is humiliated, enslaved, abandoned and despised. In the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach Marx contends that hitherto philosophers have variously interpreted the world, the real task is to change it. Marx is fully aware that Christianity, like other religions, utilises the hope of the poor and the oppressed for a better life. Has life any meaning if it is full of injustice and incredible suffering ? The exploitation of poorer classes, labourers, especially the exploitation of women and children labourers is limitless even in 1863. Marx portrays

a vivid picture in his *Capital*, vol. I, under the head 'The Working Day' of the inhuman conditions of the toiling classes. — "William Wood, 9 years old, when 7 years and 10 months when he began to work...He came to work every day in the week at 6 a.m. and left off about 9 p.m." "Fifteen hours of labour for a child 7 years old!" exclaims an official report of the children's Employment Commission of 1863³. Such inhuman conditions were then tolerated and sometimes even defended by churchmen who formulated the conception of the kingdom of God which the poor and the oppressed will enter after their death more easily than the exploiters who are rich and comfortable. So Marx remarks : "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the feeling of a heartless world and the soul of soulless circumstances. It is the opium of the people"⁴ (K.M.S.W. - P. 63f). Engels observes that the first word of religion is a lie. Religion, wrote Lenin, is one of the aspects of spiritual oppression. Religion comforts the helpless, the oppressed with a better life beyond the grave and rouses hope in them of heavenly reward. Why should poorer classes look beyond this mundane existence for a life of material happiness and comfort and why not in this world ? Marx is right, he is absolutely right when he condemns religion which utilises men, the poor men with the hope of a better life beyond this existence. Why should the exploited people not revolt against it ? Certainly they will revolt against the exploiters who are so in sensible and irresponsible for the well-being of their fellow-men whom they use at the minimum cost and lead them to disease and decay and throw them on the scrapheap when done away with. It is difficult to find language strong enough to criticize these exploiters.

Dialectical materialism is the revolutionary weapon of the working people — it is a method for understanding the world so as to change it - it

is the philosophy of practice. It is a determined irreconcilable enemy of all conceptions of supernatural essences shrouded in mystery, no matter what garb they are clothed in by religion or idealist philosophy. It is the philosophical basis of the programme, strategy and tactics and all activities of the communist party.

Marx stated that Hegel was the first thinker on the dialectic to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. Hegel certainly understood history as a process of dialectical development, but whereas labour in Hegel was always intellectual, in Marx it was material—designed to satisfy the material needs of men. Marx wrote, "My dialectical method is not only different from the Hegelian but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of "the Idea", he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea". With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.

The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion. But just as I was working at the first volume of "*Das Kapital*", it was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre epigoni who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in same way as the brave Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing's time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a "dead dog". I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form

of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.

....In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.

The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society impress themselves upon the practical bourgeois most strikingly in the changes of the periodic cycle, through which modern industry runs, and whose crowning point is the universal crisis. That crisis is once again approaching, although as yet but in its preliminary stage; and by the universality of its theatre and the intensity of its action it will drum dialectics even into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new, holy Prusso-German empire¹⁵. (Marx-Capital vol. I - Afterword To the Second German Edition - P. 29)

Engels summarises three main laws of this dialectic in his '*Dialectics of Nature*'. These are :

- i) the law of the transformation of quantity into quality;*
- ii) the law of the interpenetration of opposites;*
- iii) the law of the negation of negation.*

The first law can be illustrated by the fact that when we lower the temperature of water, there is a change in quantity; but when it turns into ice, it changes in quality. The second law is illustrated by the presence of contradictions in nature and the third law by the way these contradictions are resolved into a higher unity.

E. Duhring in his *'Course of Philosophy'* subjected the second law to a severe criticism. According to him, there are no contradictions in things. To this Engels replies in his *'Anti Duhring'* that this is true only when we consider things as static. Motion itself, he goes on arguing, is a contradiction — even simple material change can come about only being in one place and also not in it. The third law, Duhring argued, the law of the negation of negation, is nothing but jugglery of words. To this Engels replies that negations of negations are very familiar both in science and in everyday life. "Consider the algebraic magnitude 'a' : Negated, this becomes '-a'; negate that negation, and the result is 'a²', the original positive magnitude 'a' raised to a higher power. Again, he argues, a barley-plant negates the seed from which it arises; this negation produces, a crop of seed, which is thus the negation of a negation — seed at a higher level.

It will be sufficiently obvious that 'negation', like 'contradiction', has to be understood in a peculiar and undefined sense, in which to multiply by '-1', to multiply by '-a', and to develop from seed into plant are all 'negations'⁶. (John Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy* - Ch. Materialism, Naturalism and Agnosticism, P. 44).

Hegel called the antithesis of a thesis sometimes its negation and the synthesis the negation of the negation. There seems little doubt that

Marx also supposed there to be a dialectic of nature. And at the end of the first volume of *Capital* (P. 715) Marx stated that "the Capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This in the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation"⁷.

Now what do we mean by 'negation' ? Does it mean simply the end to something ? Does it mean simply 'no' ? Does it mean loss or retreat? To the liberals 'negation' is merely the end to something — far from meaning 'advance' it means 'retreat', far from meaning 'gain', it means 'loss'. But dialectics teaches us to understand how it becomes a condition of progress, a means of positive advance. "Negation", says Engels, "in dialectics does not mean simply saying 'no' ". Negation is the necessary condition of positive advance in which the old dies giving birth to the new. It produces conditions for the transition to the new, from quantitative to the qualitative changes in which all the positive efforts and achievements of humanity belonging to the old are carried forward into the new. The old is negated no doubt, but the progress which takes place in it is not negated but carried forward into the new stage of development. E.g., when capitalism is replaced by socialism, socialism negates capitalism. But the conditions for the emergence of socialism are inherent in capitalism; capitalism does no longer exist and in its place socialism emerges along with all the achievements of the previous stage. Thus negation is not a loss or retreat but a positive advance towards the cherished goal.

Again the question crops up : what do we mean by negation of

negation ? To the liberals, if the negation is negated then we come to the original position, i.e., original position is restored once more without any change whatsoever. It takes us back to the original starting point. It is a return to the old, to the original position from where it takes its start. According to the principle of formal logic, negation of negation is a fruitless proceeding - this is exemplified in the formula : " 'Not not-A' equals 'A' ". Negation of negation does not take us back to the former original position, rather it takes us forward to a new starting point which is the original one raised to a higher level.

Society has been developed from primitive communism of group life to the slave-holding society, from slave-holding system to feudalism and from feudalism to capitalism. Each stage of development is a negation of the former or previous one constituting a higher stage of development. After capitalism what ? Communism. Here there is a return to the beginning - but it is no longer the primitive communism of the group-life, it is a development on the foundations of all the achievements of the whole previous development. Hence the higher stage is reached only as a result of the double negation, i.e., negation of negation. As Hegel puts it, the higher end of development is reached only through 'the suffering, the patience and the labour of the negative'.

In dialectical materialism, wrote Engels, "the materialist world outlook was taken really seriously for the first time and was carried through consistently.... For, "it was resolved to comprehend the real world - nature and history-just as it presents itself to everyone who approaches it free from preconceived idealist fancies. It was decided relentlessly to sacrifice every idealist fancy which could not be brought into harmony with the facts conceived in their own and not in a fantastic connection. And materialism

means nothing more than this"⁸. (Engels -Ludwig Feuerbach, Chapter- IV).

Before the emergence of dialectical materialism, materialism was predominantly mechanistic. The materialists, before Marx, looked for, behind all the changing appearances, something which never changes and they found it in the ultimate material particle - the eternal and indestructible atom. All changes were produced by the movement and interaction of unchanging atoms. The theory of mechanistic materialism regards the whole world as nothing but a complex piece of machinery, a mechanism. So it cannot account for development for the emergence of new qualities, new types of processes in nature. It can not account for the laws of social development and leads to an abstract conception of human nature. Marx wrote : "The materialist doctrine that men are the products of circumstances and education and that changed men are therefore the products of other circumstances and a changed education forgets that circumstances are changed by men, and that the educator must himself be educated."⁹ (Eleven Theses on Feuerbach, 3rd thesis, Marx).

Though this doctrine was progressive and revolutionary in its time, it cannot serve to guide the struggle of the working class in striving to change society.

Dialectical materialism overcomes the weaknesses, narrow and dogmatic assumptions of mechanistic materialism. It understands the whole world as a complex process in which all things go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away. The matter is always in motion and motion is the mode of existence in matter. To dialectical materialism the universe is not static, motionless, idle, 'as idle as a painted ship upon a painted ocean' as portrayed in Coleridge's

'*Ancient Mariner*', but it is in continual process of development. This development is not smooth, an unbroken process—there may be abrupt breaks in continuity, the leap from one stage to another. By taking up the revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy and at the same time freeing it from the idealistic trammels Marx and Engels developed the dialectic materialist conception of development. The key to understanding development in nature and society lies in the recognition of the inner contradictions and opposite conflicting tendencies which are inherent in all processes of development. This discovery by Marx and Engels has revolutionised philosophy as it signals the triumph of materialism over idealism and becomes a revolutionary weapon for the working community, a method for understanding the world so as to change it.

In his "*Philosophical Notebooks*" Lenin wrote, the essential idea of dialectical materialism is "the recognition of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature This alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything in existence. It alone furnishes the key to the leaps, to the break in continuity, to the transformation into the opposite, to the destruction of the old and emergence of the new....."

"In its proper meaning, dialectics is the study of the contradiction within the very essence of things.

"Development is the struggle of opposites."¹⁰

To deny contradiction is to deny development - 'no contradiction, no development' — when contradiction is at work, there is the force of development. This profound conception was first put forward by Hegel. According to him, the Absolute Idea develops through a series of

contradictions and it is this ideal development which manifests itself in the material world. In his "*Ludwig Feuerbach*" Engels is critical of the dialectic development as propounded by Hegel and he wrote : "According to Hegel.... the dialectical development.....is only a miserable copy of the self movement of the concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but at all events independently of any thinking human brain"¹¹ (Engels - L. Feuerbach, chapter IV). But in the materialistic understanding of dialectics "thereby the dialectic of the concept itself became merely the conscious reflection of the dialectical notion of the real world and the dialectic of Hegel was placed upon its head; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing before, and placed on its feet again....."¹² (Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, chapter IV).

The forces of development are now within the material world itself and not outside of it. Dialectic development consists in "the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature, including mind and society."¹³ (Lenin - Philosophical Notebooks - 'On Dialectics'.)

Marx also wrote that "dialectic.....in its rational form is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary."¹⁴ (Marx, Capital vol. I, preface to 2nd edn.) P. 29.

In his "*Dialectical and Historical Materialism*" Stalin enumerated four principal features of the Marxist dialectical method.

- i) Dialectics considers things as 'connected with, dependent on and determined by each other', and not in isolation, but in their interconnection with other things in relation to the actual conditions and circumstances of each case.
- ii) It considers everything as in "a state of continuous movement and change, of renewal and development, where something is always arising and developing and something always disintegrating and dying away'. It considers things in their movement, their change, their coming into being and going out of being.
- iii) The dialectic development must be understood not as a simple process of growth but as a process of development which passes from quantitative changes to fundamental qualitative changes which may occur abruptly, taking the form of a leap from one state to another.
- iv) Dialectic holds that the process of development from the old to the new, from the lower to the higher takes place as a disclosure of the contradictions inherent in things.

Dialectical materialism holds the view that within every process there is a unity and struggle of opposed tendencies. The struggle is not accidental or external to things but internal and necessary - it is inherent in things themselves, in the process as a whole. It is an universal phenomenon and follows from the very nature of the process as a whole. When a qualitative change takes place it is brought about by dint of the labour of the opposites. In each case when the opposite tendencies are

at work, their work, their labour, their struggle eventuates in some fundamental transformation bringing about a qualitative change in the existing state of things.

For example, the class contradiction between the capitalists and the workers, the exploiters and the exploited in a capitalist society is a unity of opposites, because in such a society neither the capitalists (the exploiters) can exist without the workers (the exploited) nor the workers can exist without the capitalists. The capitalists exploit the workers and workers are exploited by the capitalists. Though contradiction is an universal feature of every process, each particular process has its peculiar contradictions. This point was brought to our attention by Mao Tse-tung in his essay *'On Contradiction'*; where he made a thorough analysis of this concept and called it the distinction between 'the universality' and 'the particularity' of contradiction. Each kind of process has its own dialectic. Physical, social and ethical processes are similar because each of these processes contains contradiction but dissimilar in the contradiction each contains.

What would be the future development of society after the coming of socialism or communism ? Are we to suppose that the same dialectical laws will continue to operate ?

Our answer is : Development will not cease. It will, through contradictions, continue to be the rule in the future development of communist society. With the ending of all exploitation of man by man the development will no longer take place through violent conflicts and social upheavals but through the rational method of criticism and self-criticism. This is a new form of development, a new type of movement, a new dialectical law. As Stalin said : "There is dogmatic Marxism and creative

Marxism. I stand by the latter.¹⁵ (History of the C.P.S.U.(B) Ch. VII, Sec.4). Stalin also admitted : "He (Lenin) developed the doctrines of Marx and Engels still further in application to the new condition of development."¹⁶ (Stalin-Interview with the First American Labour Delegation).

In such a long arduous journey mistakes or errors are inevitable. But by checking up and recognising mistakes in time, by examining critically the ground of such mistakes, by learning from such mistakes the communist society will advance to new successes. It is by drawing lessons from mistakes done or inadvertently committed, by making honest and revolutionary self criticism social development will take a new turn towards progress. And without it there is not progress, there is no development. And Marx also wrote: "Every opinion based on scientific criticism I welcome."¹⁷ (Marx, Capital, vol. I. P. 21-Preface to the first German edition).

Dialectical materialism is a truly scientific world-outlook-it does not seek to establish any philosophy above science, but bases its world-conception on the discoveries of the sciences. "Modern materialism... no longer needs any philosophy standing above the sciences", wrote Engels.¹⁸ (Engels-Anti-Duhring, Introduction,I).

The philosophy of Marxism, viz. Dialectical Materialism, when applied to the study of society is called "Historical Materialism." It is a philosophical science about society which solves the fundamental question of philosophy in a materialist way, historically, and studies on this basis the general sociological laws of historical development and the forms of their application in the activity of people. It is the methodological basis of sociology and other social sciences. The driving force of historical change

is not spiritual but material in character. All the pre-Marxist philosophers were idealists in their understanding of social life as they miserably overlooked the fact that whereas in nature blind forces are in operation, in society people's actions are guided by ideal motives. The development of historical materialism caused a fundamental revolution in social thought. The first guiding principle of historical materialism is that change and development in society, as in nature, take place in accordance with objective laws. The materialist conception of history was arrived at by applying the materialist world outlook to the solution of social problems. It is closely related to the task of the revolutionary class-struggle of the proletariat, to the requirements of socialist and communist construction and the development of social science. It helped to formulate a consistently materialistic view of the society in general and revealed the material basis of social life and the laws governing its development. In elaborating his main idea of the natural historical process of social development Marx singled out the economic sphere from the different spheres of social life and the relations of production from all social relations as the main ones which determine all the others. The discovery of historical materialism removes two fundamental short-comings of all pre-Marxist sociological theories - (i) these sociological theories are idealistic in nature, because their main concern is limited to the examination of ideological motives of the human activity and they ignore material causes engendering these motives. (ii) Secondly, these theories study the role of outstanding personalities in history and do not consider the importance of the role or activity of the masses, the real makers of history.

Historical materialism shows the great role of the subjective factor — the actions of people, classes, the consciousness and organization of

the masses. It is the staunch enemy of all kinds of fatalism and voluntarism. According to it, people, masses are the makers of their history but they cannot do it of their own will or voluntarily as each new generation acts in definite objective conditions which had been formed before it. "Men make their own history", wrote Marx, "but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past."¹⁹ (Marx - 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, ch. I). Historical materialism tells the working people that by their own endeavours and by their own efforts alone they can attain power and find their way to happiness. "The emancipation", Marx wrote, "of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves"²⁰ (Marx-Rules of the International Working Men's Association). The real course of history depends on the people, on their activity and initiative, on the organisation and unity of the progressive forces. The main features of historical materialism are worked out at greatest length in the first part of the German Ideology and the best summary of the theory is to be found in the preface to the *'Critique of Political Economy'*. For Hegel, history is the development and conflict of abstract principles — cultures, religions and philosophies. In this development he speaks of the power of the negative : every state of affairs contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction and transformation to a higher stage. This process Hegel calls dialectic. But according to Marx, instead of abstract principles, the changing economic basis of society and the social classes it gives rise is the key to grasping the unfolding of human history. The ultimately determining element in history, Marx stated, is the sum-total of the relations of production which "constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which

risers a legal and political super-structure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness."²¹ (K.M.S.W.P. 389). The determining factor is often narrowed down to the actual instruments of production as Marx stated that "the handmill will give you a society with the feudal lord, the steam Mill a society with the industrial capitalist."²² (K.M.S.W. P. 202). Marx sometimes includes the workers themselves among the instruments of production and even calls the revolutionary class 'the greatest productive power of all the instruments of production'. Marx emphatically says that the instruments of production can never be isolated from their social context. The core of the Marxian dialectic is the unity of the subjective and objective factors. Marx wrote : "History does nothing; it does not possess immense riches, it does not fight battles. It is men, real, living men, who do all this, who possess things and fight battles. It is not 'history' which uses men as a means of achieving - as if it were an individual person-its own ends. History is nothing but the activity of men in pursuit of their ends."²³ (The Holy Family, P. 25).

It is, therefore, understandable, why this philosophy is called materialism. The principal lessons of historical materialism may be summed up in the words of Marx : - "No credit is due to me for discovering the existence of classes in modern society, nor yet the struggle between them. Long before the bourgeois historians had described the historical development of this struggle of the classes. What I did new was to prove:

- (1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production;
- (2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat;

- (3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society.²⁴ (Marx, Letter to J. Weydemeyer, March 5, 1852).

The opening words in *'The Communist Manifesto'* also characterise the approach of Marx and Engels to history : "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles."

When the Marxists say that their ethics is consistently materialistic this means that it de-mystifies morality — the ideals, standards and virtues prevailing in the society are interpreted as a reflection of actually existing interpersonal relations, an expression of interests and requirements of social groups and classes. Morality is not simply an ethical ideology that has isolated itself from the world and lays claim to absolute value but, on the contrary, it is a property of man's behaviour conditioned by his social and historical existence, Marx and Engels wrote :

"The communists do not preach morality at all ... They do not put to people the moral demand : love one another, do not be egoists, etc.; on the contrary, they are very well aware that egoism, just as much as selflessness, is in definite circumstances a necessary form of the self-assertion of individuals."²⁵ (Karl Marx and F. Engels, *The German Ideology*, *Collected Works*, vol. 5, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, P. 247).

Marxist ethics is also dialectical as it maintains that, like morality as a whole, each of its manifestations, each standard and virtue, is in perpetual motion, emerging, developing, dis-appearing, passing from one qualitative stage to another. There is a continuity in the process of the evolution of morality. Thus the different types of morality — whether it is morality of the slave holding society or feudal morality or capitalist

morality or Communist morality — are nothing but the links of one chain, different stages of one integral process of historical development of the past, present and future. Moral development or the evolution of morality can be viewed as a moral progress, each successive stage being historically higher than the previous one reveals a greater degree of maturity in dealing with problems of man-kind in general. Dialectical and materialist ethics maintains that ethics is a discipline which deals not only with 'what ought to be', but, and not in any less detail, 'what actually is'.

Morality, Marxists hold, is not an expression of some eternal moral law decreed by God, nor is it absolute and unchangeable, nor is it an expression of the will of the God, nor is it deduced from natural principle, nor is it, as Kant imagined, the expression of a 'categorical imperative' inherent in the human will; but it is socially conditioned - it is conditioned by man's social and historical existence. This assumes that morality is a regulator of social intercourse, it is the social regulator of conduct. As the whole of social intercourse is conditioned and governed fundamentally by the production relations of the society, morality as a regulator of social intercourse, is the product of definite production relations in every society — each class evolves its moral ideas corresponding to its peculiar class position. In a class society morality is always a class-morality. As Engels puts it :

“Men consciously or unconsciously derive their moral ideas in the last resort from the practical relations on which their class position is based”, wrote Engels, “from the economic relations in which they carry on production and exchange All former moral theories are the product, in the last analysis, of the economic stage which society had reached at the particular epoch.”²⁶ (Engels, *Anti-Duhring*, part I, ch.9).

In a class-divided society morality is always and necessarily a class morality. When the class does not exist, its morality goes down with it, giving way to a different morality. That morality is higher which serves to advance society a step further towards the goal of free and active life and this constitutes the objective criterion for judging what morality is higher.

"Our morality", wrote Lenin, "is entirely subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat. Our morality is derived from the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat Morality is what serves to destroy the old, exploiting society and to unite all the toilers around the proletariat, which is building up a new, communist society."²⁷ (Lenin - The tasks of the Youth Leagues.)

But when with the coming of socialism or communism class antagonisms will be abolished, then morality will become human and not class morality.

"A really human morality", Engels wrote, "which transcends class antagonisms and their legacies in thought becomes possible only at a stage of society which has not only overcome class contradictions but has even forgotten them in practical life"²⁸ (Engels, loc. cit.)

The Marxian ethics, in its efforts to realise the humanistic ideals and to rid itself of all kinds of exploitation, is communist in nature. It generalises and systematizes the principles of communist morality formulated by the working people in the process of building a new society and puts them on a scientific foundation. It serves a scientific basis for the moral education of the working class and helps them to adhere to a firm stand on key problems of the society keeping in mind the norms of

communist morality. Communist morality deals with the principles and standards of conduct based on the ideals of the communist society — viz., devotion to the cause of communism, a high sense of public duty, collectivism, humanism, internationalism. Its objective criterion is what contributes to the establishment of communist society and the realisation of the communist ideals. At the initial stage of its historical development, it is the revolutionary morality of the working people formed within the capitalist society. It is opposed to the prevalent morality of the exploiters, but it has its own ethical standards such as class solidarity, internationalism and collectivism. With the victory of socialism it transforms itself from the proletarian class morality into the morality of the society as a whole. The standards of communist morality are not only confined to people's behaviour but they play an active role in transforming society into a classless society. Thus at first morality emerges as a class morality of the proletariat and subsequently becomes the morality of the whole people in a socialist society and in the final analysis, the general human morality in a classless communist society.

Two extreme tendencies — normative and positivist-scientific-exist as far as understanding the purposes of ethics is concerned. This is particularly typical of contemporary western theories of morality. Their chief flaw is that each attaches absolute significance to one of the aspects of ethical knowledge. Normative ethics gives a theoretical substantiation of moral principles, ideals and norms. It considers theoretically the problems which spontaneously arise and are solved in the moral consciousness of this or that society or class. It is the theoretical study as it is concerned with an end or ideal or standard of rightness and wrongness

involved in conduct of man's life living in a society and this study is called normative as it deals with the norm or ideal.

The neo-positivists, in their attempt to make ethics scientific, eliminate from it the normative questions. They regard 'meta-ethics' to be a specific philosophical discipline which, in contradiction to normative ethics, studies only the ethical language and which claims to be neutral to different moral views. The neo-positivists may deal with problems concerning epistemological and logical nature of ethical language and we see nothing wrong in it but what they do is to reduce meta-ethics to be a purely formal study of ethical judgments regardless of their content. According to them philosophy is possible only as an analysis of language and philosophical analysis does not extend to objective reality — it must be limited only to direct experience or language. The early neo-positivists of vienna circle, by limiting the sphere of philosophy to individual emotions, arrived directly at solipsism. Logical positivists, one of the most influential varieties of neo-positivism, offer a subjectivistic theory in ethics which consistently applies the method of logical positivism. The main exponents are Ayer, Carnap, Reichenbach and C.Stevenson. According to them moral judgments and terms cannot be verified by experience. Moral judgments do not give any information, have no sense and, therefore, are neither true nor false. They advocate 'emotivism' and declare that ethical utterances are purely emotive in nature — they are only used to express speaker's moral emotions with a view to stirring similar emotions in listeners inducing them to act accordingly. The moralist may believe that his experiences are cognitive experiences but unless he can formulate his knowledge in propositions that are empirically verifiable he is deceiving himself. The emotivists draw the conclusion that everybody is free to choose

any point of view in morality, that contrary moral views do not logically contradict each other. Therefore, any view cannot be proved or refuted rationally but only psychologically.

The two approaches consider themselves to be mutually exclusive. Marxist ethics has overcome the one-sidedness of both normatism and scienticism. It is normative but it promotes objective scientific analysis. It is scientific but it allows to define the most sublime moral ideal of communist humanism. Marxism believes that it is possible to give a scientific theoretical substantiation of moral ideas only through the cognition of the laws of human history and these ideas reflect the objective logic of the development of society. The communist morality is the basis for the formation of general human morality in a classless society. Marxist ethics is a qualitatively new ethical theory not only by virtue of new scientific philosophical groundwork but also due to its social class orientation. It represents consistently the interests of the suffering humanity, i.e., the proletariat and opens up for men unprecedentedly broad and drastically new opportunities of moral advancement and activity.

The transition from capitalism to Communism is marked by a moral turning point in the relations among people. Inheriting the invaluable experience of mankind in general, it fosters human incentives for man's and society's moral improvement—there being no class inequality and no oppression of man by man. Free development of the individuals ceases to be a mere phrase or word for word's sake, rather it becomes a reality. Thus a new morality emerges which declares man the supreme value, promotes the development of each person and the enrichment of human relations within the collective community.

Communist morality asserts truly humane relations among people — it rests on comradely mutual assistance, brotherly feeling, active co-operation, friendliness and honesty—all men are brothers, friends and comrades. The communist humanism demands equal justice, equal right, equal freedom, equal opportunities for all so that all people be treated with respect and love and be given necessary assistance whenever called for, keeping in mind that each and every member of the society has an equal right to happiness. Its high and lofty ideal is to maintain the dignity of man as a free individual and to fight for men for his free and harmonious development of personality.

Marxism believes not in violence but in love, sympathy for fellow beings. Not violence, but love, is the keynote of a communist society. Violence is justified only when it is unavoidable — it is not an end itself.

In "Young India" (29.5.1924) Gandhiji wrote: "My non-violence does not admit of running away from danger, and leaving dear ones unprotected. Between violence and cowardly fight, I can only prefer violence to cowardice Non-violence is the summit of bravery"²⁹. "This faith in force", says Dr. Radhakrishnan, "is a disease that has twisted and tortured the world. It deprives us of our manhood."³⁰

All class rule, according to Marx, is necessarily a dictatorship, i.e. tyranny. A real democracy can therefore be attained only by the establishment of a classless society by over-throwing, if necessary, violently, the capitalist dictatorship. The main point is that if the ruling class did not submit, violence would be unavoidable. The revolutionary change is inevitable because of the laws of historical development. What the individual should do is to join the revolutionary party, and actively help

shorten the birth pangs of the new age. Marxism gives a scientific explanation of the class struggle as the driving force of the development of society into antagonistic classes and shows that the class struggle of the working class inevitably leads to social revolution and the rule of the Proletariat, the purpose of which is to abolish all classes and create a classless communist society. A classless structure of society will take shape mainly within the historical framework of mature socialism. In a classless society the state power would lose its function and the state would wither away. When socialism has abolished the exploitation of one class by another there remains no more need for coercion and therefore no need for any social repressive force, i.e. a state. The victory of socialism radically changes the character of the working class—they can no longer be called proletariat. No exploitation of man by man is there in a socialistic frame of society. Distinctions and divisions do not exist in such a society. The process of socialism to communism is based on the gradual obliteration of essential distinctions among workers, peasants and intelligentsia, between mental and physical labour, between town and country. The socio-political and ideological unity of the society achieved under communism is consolidated and the social homogeneity is extended to all spheres of life. It is free of exploitations of all kinds and together with the entire people owns the means of production and does not sell its labour powers. Private ownership is abolished and is replaced by public ownership. 'It is the ascent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom'³¹ (Engels 'Socialism-Utopian and Scientific'.)

Communist morality advocates labour for the common benefit, work that is done not just for oneself or one's family and friends but for others too, i.e., for society as a whole. Marxist ethics is the general scientific, dialectical-materialist methodology of research into the moral process in

social evolution. Lenin repeatedly insisted that neither socialism nor communism is possible without conscious labour discipline. In this effort it is vital to encourage a conscientious attitude towards work and a genuine sense of duty. Awareness of the moral value of labour, its role in uniting the working people and its ennobling effect on the individual are evolved for the first time in communist morality. E.g.,

- (1) Socialism introduces the obligation of all members of the society to engage in socially useful labour. Socialistic way of life unites people and make them equal, thereby performing a tremendous important moral function.
- (2) Socialism asserts the value and social significance of all kinds of labour, above all, productive labour.
- (3) Socialism views labour as the principal criterion by which society judges a person.
- (4) Before Marx in all socio-economic formations the essence of each human individual preceded his existence. Social and family status at birth predetermines a man's way of life. The bourgeois society which grants personal freedom to its members, the opportunities available to many are very often determined by the wealth, a factor which lies outside the individual. Money is the determining factor almost of everything. In this respect socialism has brought about a revolution by determining a man's social worth and status not on money or wealth but on individual's own activity — the yardstick by which society judges him. Under socialism there is no socially dangerous and morally corruptive instances of nepotism, bribing etc. Conscientious labour is the true ruler of the new system. Communist morality regards free voluntary labour as a major moral principle.

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Chapter - IV

CHAPTER - IV

EXISTENTIALISM

As one of the main trends in the 20th Century Ethics, and its relation to Marxism

We propose to devote this chapter to a consideration of Existentialism because the Marxian concept of alienation is shared in common by existentialist thinkers, even though there are divergences. It is also significant that Sartre himself declared himself as a Marxist in his *Critique of Reason*, where he talks about the reality of the group, as distinguished from the individual. Marx's and the existentialists' concept of alienation has its roots in Hegel's '*Phenomenology*' of Mind. Marx developed the concept both in the *pre-Capital* writings and the *Capital*. The economic interpretation of the concept has been uppermost in Marx's mind. The existentialists of course have been avowedly metaphysical on this point.

"Existentialism" is a distinct philosophical trend in the 20th century. It is derived from Latin 'existencia' meaning existence. It originates after the first world war of 1914-1918 and gains a widespread popularity after the second world war. It continues its tradition of 19th century philosophy represented by *Nietzsche* (1844-1900) and *Schopenhauer* (1788-1860) and later *Kierkegaard* (1813-1855), the renowned Danish philosopher. It conveys the ideas of irrationalism in Western social thought. It is still in progress and the most prominent representatives of this movement are

Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), *Martin Heidegger* (1889-1976), *Gabriel Marcel* (1889-1973), *Jean-Paul Sartre* (1905-1980) and *Albert Camus* (1913-1960).

According to Arthur Schopenhauer philosophy is nothing but the correct and universal understanding of experience itself, the true exposition of its meaning and content. His main Work, *'Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung'* (The World as Will and Idea) appeared in 1819. The title suggests that his philosophy is in a sense a form of idealism. According to him reason has merely a formal function and in adhering to this view he differs fundamentally from the classical German idealists. To him: 'Reason is feminine in nature: it can only give after it has received. Of itself it has nothing but the empty forms of its own operation'. Along with Kant he takes the world as idea, as only appearance but he rejects Kant's uncognizable 'thing-in-itself' and maintains that blind and irrational will is the essence of the world. His voluntaristic idealism is a form of irrationalism. The will which rules the world excludes any natural and social laws and any scientific cognition. The world in all the multiplicity of its parts and forms is the manifestation, the objectivity of one 'will to live'. Schopenhauer attaches such significance to 'will' that it exceeds the boundaries of human existence and assumes a cosmic meaning as the 'Universal Will' is objectified in the world. His world-outlook is thoroughly pessimistic. Happiness is always negative and positive morality arises from sympathy for others, i.e., from our sharing of their sufferings. The good man recognises that the distinction between himself and others belongs to a 'fleeting and illusive phenomenon'. Religion is the denial of the 'will to live', the peace of the complete renunciation of all conscious desire. Denial of history as a progressive dialectic process is another peculiarity of his voluntarism — he described it as a 'heavy and confused dream', a

continuous reiteration of the same experiences, only the names of the places and persons being different.

Existentialism follows the lead of another school of thought which can be considered the immediate predecessor of this movement, i.e., the Philosophy of Life or Vitalism as represented by *Friedrich Nietzsche* (1844-1900), *Henry Bergson* (1859-1941) and *Wilhelm Dilthey* (1833-1912). These three thinkers rank first among the influences which have shaped existentialism.

Vitalism is a group of ideas which brings to the whole of philosophy of life. It is anti-rationalistic and pragmatic. It regards time and change as fundamental and it is in favour of historical and evolutionary outlook. In ethics it rejects eternal norms and external imperatives. It is non-theistic in its outlook.

Nietzsche and Bergson differ from each other in the points of emphasis inspite of their common participation in the body of ideas defining vitalism. They agree in their attack on intellect. Our intellect, says Bergson, cannot grasp the true nature of reality. When we conceive of reality as the intellect presents to us, we fall into error. The way to grasp reality in its true nature is only through intuition. It is through intuition that we may become conscious of our oneness with reality as a whole. Intuition enables us to grasp the nature of constant change which is the stuff of reality. Intuition is instinct conscious of itself, i.e., of its real nature as perpetual change. There is no self which changes; there is nothing which changes; there is simply change. Bergson, not Nietzsche, is alone in the formulation of a positive theory of knowledge, embracing the activity of the intuition. Bergson's ethics approaches creativity in terms of love rather than what Nietzsche calls 'power'. The classical philosophical categories

of mind and matter are reduced by him by the category of life understood as the 'Will-to-power'. Power, according to him, serves as a criterion for evaluation of the significance of phenomena. In opposition to a realistic interpretation of experience and reason, Nietzsche holds that our knowledge is subjective and instrumental. In its empirical foundations our knowledge involves sense organs, whose operation is relatively crude. Cognition is alleged to be effective only as an instrument of power. His epistemological relativism leads to re-assessment of all values in ethics - thus his ethics is the ethics of relativism of values which culminates in the opposition of 'slave morality' to 'master morality' related to his vision of superman who will reject our present meek religiously based values by more real ones based on the human 'will-to-power'. He emphatically denies the socialist ideal for he views it as an 'uprising of slaves in morality'. He is out and out an atheist — he rejects christianity or christian religion as it proclaims man's equity before God, as it has affected self-humiliation of man, killing in him the 'will-to-power'. He substitutes for religious myths the myths of 'God's death' (God is dead) and 'eternal return'. And since God is dead, we will have to re-think the whole foundation of our lives and find their meaning and purpose only in human terms and in this he puts emphasis on our freedom to change the basis of our values. In his main work, *The Will to Power* (1889) he adumbrates the thesis that value and power are the same; our conduct, moral codes are valuable only so far as they promote power. Values lie in the increase of power, not in the pleasure. Pain signifies resistnce, not decrease of power. An ethics which advocates pleasure-principle wishing to avoid pain always will fall into 'pessimism of sensibility' because suffering or pain is universal in our life. The illusion of moral freedom and responsibility emerges from the introversion among subject peoples of their thwarted impulse for external power. The sickness of spirit in the individuals should be the concern of the moralist — its

essence is fear and apathy. A remedy, according to his prescription, is to be found in art. In a godless world there is much occasion for disgust and terror, which art can deal with by transformation into the comic and sublime.

Amidst the diversity of points of view we notice a unity of basic conviction and attitude. Here we may quote Leslie Stevenson to make this assertion more clearer and distinct.

"In so far as a common core can be discerned there would seem to be three main concerns which are central to existentialism. The first is with the individual human being, rather than with general theories about him. Such theories, it is thought, leave out what is most important about each individual - his uniqueness. Secondly, there is a concern with the meaning or purpose of human lives, rather than with scientific or metaphysical truths about the universe. So inner or subjective experience is somehow regarded as more important than 'objective' truth. Thirdly, the concern is with the freedom of individuals as their most important and distinctively human property These three concerns, then, are really aspects of one basic theme".¹ (Leslie Stevenson, *Seven Theories of Human Nature*, chapter VII, page 78).

The existentialists affirm the uniqueness of the concrete and real as over against the abstract and possible. They are unanimous in rejecting idealist rationalism of the Cartesian origin and level their criticism against mind-body dualism.

In Descartes' proposition which is the foundation of his metaphysics, 'Cogito ergo sum' — I think, therefore I am, 'existence' of a personal, continuing ego underlying consciousness is inferred from the fact of consciousness. Because there is consciousness there must be the 'I' to be conscious, Thus essence precedes existence — a distinction

is made between essence and existence. By 'essence' we denote 'what a thing is', by existence 'that it is'. What is definable in a thing we call its essence. We define a man as a rational animal — here animality and rationality are the essences of man, they constitute the very essence of man. When we say : 'Man is a rational animal' — animality and rationality are contained in the very nature of man and our judgment is analytic, explicative, because it analyses or explicates what is contained in man.

On the other hand, existence is not analyzable. Existence implies non-existence—a thing may exist or may not exist; either it is existent or non-existent and there is nothing in between existence and non-existence, Being or not-Being. Can we deduce existence from essence ? To use Kant's illustration, as it is found in his discussion of the ontological proof for the existence of God : God is the most perfect Being and as God is the most perfect He must be actually existent and it follows from the definition of God as perfect Being. But Kant contends that the idea of the most perfect Being includes, no doubt, existence, but it is not real or actual existence. What we can infer is the ideal existence of God, and not His real existence. From the idea that I have three hundred rupees in my purse, I can not infer that I have actually three hundred rupees in my purse. Existential propositions are synthetic. In order to exist, a thing must be more than a mere idea - there must be actual sensation of it, it must be presented in experience.

System of thought which allows a superior status to essence, perhaps even to the point of letting existence be absorbed into essence is expressed in Hegel's philosophy of essentialism. By construing 'Becoming' as a passage from non-existence (not-Being) to existence (Being) Hegel completes the absorption of existence into essence. Its counter-position is existentialism which gives priority to existence over

and above essence. But existentialism assumes a variety of forms, the most radical division consists in between the theistic (religious) and the atheistic (non-religious). Kierkegaard, whom we consider as one of the prominent representatives of the movement, is generally regarded as the first modern existentialist. His existentialism stands in quite opposition to Hegel's essentialism. "Like Marx, he reacted against the Hegelian system of philosophy, but in a quite different direction. He rejected the abstract theoretical system as like a vast mansion in which one does not actually live, and maintained instead the supreme importance of the individual and his choices."² (Leslie Stevenson, *Seven Theories of Human Nature*, p. 79).

Kierkegaard considered Hegel as the head of the school of speculative philosophers who reasoned from the viewpoint of the universal — mankind, people, the state and excluded the ontological significance of the personal principle. If we ignore the significance of the individual and put undue emphasis on the social aspect then we lose what is most essential, what constitutes the very basis of personality, its existence. In the *'Unscientific Postscript'* Kierkegaard expatiates on the idea of subjective truth, an important corollary to his conception of existence and in his *'Philosophical Fragments'* some applications to the general theory of being are suggested. Genuine philosophy, according to Kierkegaard, can only be existential, i.e., can have a profoundly personal character. He regarded man as an existence and introduced such concepts as 'fear', 'despondency', and 'resolution' which were subsequently developed by the later existentialists. He recognised three modes of existence of the individual or three main ways of life, viz., the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious and each individual is required to choose between them. But he personally considered that the religious type of existence or the religious

way of life, especially the christian way of life, to be the highest.

The basic category of his religious doctrine is paradoxical — the divine world and the human world are in principle incommensurable. Faith implies rejection of logical thinking and introduces one into the sphere of paradoxes which are absurd from the point of view of human logic and ethics. Kierkegaard subjected to scathing criticism any attempt at combining these two spheres or an attempt at compromising between them. He exposed the official christian morality of his day anti-christian embracing hypocrisy at its core. This caused his conflict with the official church in the last years of his life. But it was not without effect - this challenge of Kierkegaard led to a revision and reevaluation of the ethical standards of his day. In his *'Book of the Judge'* he described his own activity as follows :

"He whose task it is to produce a correct idea, has only to study, precisely and deeply, the rotten parts of the existing order - and then, in the most partial way possible, to stress the opposite of it"³ (Kierkegaard, *Book of The Judge*, p.172.)

Thus Kierkegaard's ideas not only served as a source of existentialism and his religious doctrine had had a profound influence on the teachings of other protestant and Catholic philosophers.

But though the movement started with this Danish christian philosopher it has gained a overwhelming popularity in the mainland of Europe after the second world war, especially in Germany and France. The movement comprises a bewildering variety of thought particularly in regard to its theological implications. It has been a major force in theology in both camps, protestant and Catholic, — it ranges from determined

atheism to Protestant Biblicism and Catholic theism as well as in Philosophy. The prominent representatives of existentialism are :

(i) *Karl Jaspers* (1883-1969), a leading exponent of German existentialism;

(ii) *Martin Heidegger* (1889-1976), one of the founders of German existentialism;

(iii) *Gabriel Marcel* (1889-1973), French Philosopher, writer and the chief exponent of Catholic existentialism;

(iv) *Jean-Paul Sartre* (1905-1980), a French Philosopher, writer and the chief proponent of French atheistic existentialism;

(v) *Albert Camus* (1913-1960), a French Writer, Philosopher and a remarkable representative of atheistic Existentialism.

The influence of the movement is not, in any way, confined within the domain of philosophy or theology alone but has spread over to literature, paintings and other fine arts. The sources for 20th Century existentialism may be traced to Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, and also to the phenomenology of Husserl (1859-1938). These philosophers make their starting point 'existence' - their main concern being man's existence in this world and its related problems without making any assumption as it really is and thus they give philosophy a subjective, quasi-psychological twist, making it the study of human consciousness.

E.g., Heidegger, whose major work, '*Being and Time*' appeared in 1927, combined the irrationalist tendencies of Kierkegaard, Philosophy of life, and Husserl's Phenomenology — his central concern being with human 'existence'. The basic category of Heidegger's philosophy was

'temporality' understood by him as man's inner experience. 'Mood', a form of spontaneous, undeveloped consciousness, was considered to be primary by him. The apriori forms of human personality are 'care', 'dread' etc. which constitute man's subjective being. In order to comprehend the 'essence of existence' man must deny himself any considerations of aim or practicality, realise his mortality, frailty. It is only through a permanent realization of 'being faced with death' that man can visualise the validity and substantiality of each moment of life and get rid of aims and scientific abstractions.

The diversity of points of view may be due to the category of 'existence', for the term existence is undefinable. In our way to define it we have to take into consideration its essence and what it amounts to is the absorption of existence into essence, systematization which is nothing but to sacrifice the unique singularity of the individual. The word 'existence' in itself carries with it a definite intelligible meaning and it cannot be ignored by any genuine philosophy. Now how do we grasp the true meaning of 'existence'? Is it through crisis or through communication? In answer to these two questions we come across two major theses: (i) 'Existence is met with through crisis' and (ii) 'Existence is met with through communion'.

The advocates of the first thesis in their very attempt to make 'existence' totally independent of 'essence' take an uncompromising view and consequently they are anti-rationalist and violently anti-traditionalist than the advocates of the second thesis. The former group is more radical, more uncompromising in subordinating existence to essence than those who discover it through communion. For Kierkegaard, e.g., the word 'existence' denotes chiefly the mode of being which is characteristic of man - this passionately intensified form of human life makes the mind

susceptible to experiencing a crisis and through crisis, his individual existence.

However, the existentialist thinkers commonly and unanimously have voiced against all kinds of systematization. To bring together the different items of existence under a closed system is to ignore or overlook the very uniqueness of particulars. An individual is individual because he differs from others and this difference or distinctness constitutes the singularity, the uniqueness, the concrete particularity of that individual. Similarly, a particular is particular, because it differs from others and this difference constitutes the very 'thisness' of a particular thing. To bring or any attempt to bring all the individuals under a system is to sacrifice the distinctness of the individual as individual. Such an ideal systematization is found in Hegel's Absolute Idealism. All finite things, according to Hegel, are a necessary unfolding of the Absolute Idea. Finite individual selves are logically bound up with Absolute and, therefore, the individual cannot have freedom — freedom being another name for rational necessity. Hegel constructs the essential structure of the universe along with its historical development. Is this great and grand edifice erected on the solid ground or in touch with the real universe as it really exists? By raising such questions like this Kierkegaard has raised violent protest against all kinds of essentialism, either Platonic or rationalist essentialist tradition of which Hegel is a prominent representative, a president-member on the essentialist committee.

Kierkegaard's vital concern is with the individual, the concrete individual and his real existence. Our intellect, he holds, is unable to transcend the realm of essences. The very experience of this inability induces a crisis of despair and when this crisis reaches at a climax, the

individual is paralysed by the 'dread' — a fear not of any concrete or real danger but rather a dread of nothing. This theory of Crisis expressed in his "*Either/or*" and '*the Concept of Dread*' is the key-point of the later representatives of the movement.

Kierkegaard's ideas influenced Karl Barth and in 1919 Karl Barth published his '*Dialectical Theology*'. The conclusion drawn by Barth from the theory of crisis is itself no philosophical theory but a Biblicism which denounces philosophy as an absurd guide towards faith.

To Karl Jaspers goes the honour of first advocating Existentialism in modern times. He started his career as a psychiatrist and this determined his philosophical views to a great extent. He saw in psychopathological phenomena not the expression of personality disintegration of the individual but man's ardent search for his distinct individuality and he came to the conclusion that any rational depiction of the world can be regarded as a 'rationalisation' (one of the mechanisms for resolving mental conflicts) of emotional desires which can never be realized completely. According to him the main task of philosophy is to show that all conscious manifestations of man in the spheres of science, art and religion are based on the unconscious activity of the existence. Thus the irrational world dominates the rational world. According to him the real meaning of existence becomes evident to man only during periods of deep shock, e.g., acute illness, death, unattonable guilt. Only at this particular moment man becomes free from the burden of everyday cares and anxieties as well as his interests and scientific views of reality. He faces a profoundly intimate existence and his true experience of God. Thus in passing through a crisis he may establish a contact with that unknown something that lies beyond the perspective limitations of his knowledge. This is the rise into transcendence. According to Jaspers in man's search for truth there is a

limit and it generates a crisis of intellectual despair — this limit is set by the perspective character of his knowledge, he knows only a segment of reality and the 'Encompassing' eludes his grasp. Jasper's distinction of limited perspective of knowledge with the 'Encompassing' which is unlimited and unknowable reminds us of Kant's dualism between phenomena and noumena, between thing-in-itself and thing-as-it-appears and his agnosticism.

Both Dialectical Theology of Karl Barth and Existentialism of Karl Jaspers turn away from the philosophical core of the question, the former by a leap into divine revelation and the latter by substituting for the whole problem the dualism of the part and whole relationship.

Martin Heidegger attacks the ontological centre of the problem. What is meant by Being ? However, he offers no clear and consistent answer. The concept of Being, according to him, originates with the Platonic conception of the Idea. Long before Socrates among the Ionians, he finds a more authentic vision of Being. He points out that the traditional philosophy has attempted to explain Being with the help of essence. In Hegelian philosophy essence is supposed to be prior to existence. Heidegger makes a sharp distinction between essence and existence and shows that essence cannot exhaust existence.

With Sartre the principle : 'Existence precedes essence' is truly fundamental. Essence presupposes existence. First man is then comes the essence of it. Jean-Paul Sartre was born in 1905 and had a brilliant educational career. His views were moulded by the thought of great European philosophers, especially that of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger. His famous work "*Being and Nothingness*" (1943) expounds his philosophy of existence. On the subject, '*Existentialism and Humanism*'

he delivered a lecture in Paris in 1945 in which he gave an exposition of 'atheistic existentialism' but on the whole it was superficial not depicting his real understanding on the subject. In later years of his life he had amended His individualistic existentialism. While emphasising the progressive nature of the Marxist philosophy he sought to complement Marxism by basing it on existentialist anthropology and psychology.

Proceeding from the main thesis of existentialism-existence precedes essence - he built his phenomenological ontology on a radical antithesis of being and consciousness. In ethics he adhered to the position of pure subjectivism with freedom the main category. Regarded from the point of view of individual consciousness, freedom appeared as the essence of man's behaviour, the source of activity and the only possible mode of his existence. He vehemently denied the objective moral principles and its criteria and the objective determinants of human behaviour. Each person has to choose his morality. In his '*Critique of Dialectical Reason*' vol. I (*Critique de la raison dialectiques*) in 1960 he changed his view seeking to overcoming the subjective limitations of his conception.

Sartre denies God and like Neitzsche he holds the absence of God to be of utmost importance for us all. There are no transcendent values, neither the laws of God nor anything else. There is no meaning or purpose either in the universe or in human life. We are permitted to do anything we like — we are left out in the world to look after our own fate and destiny. Each person has to design himself not in accordance with laws imposed from outside but according to his own choices. We are free, absolutely free - human freedom being the main category or the foundation of values.

This position Sartre arrived at from his existentialist view of man.

The simple and undeniable fact is that we exist and we have to decide what to make of ourselves. Sartre's assertion of human freedom is associated with his typical existential outlook, as, in his view, we are condemned to be free and there is no limit to it. We are doomed in it, he says. This notion of freedom occupies a fundamental position in his existential philosophy. From the notion of consciousness he arrives at the conclusion that freedom is the essence of man's behaviour. How does he arrive at this conclusion ?

The dualism between being and consciousness is shown by the fact that consciousness must necessarily assume an object, it must be always conscious of something other than itself and because of it we are able to make judgments of objects, Again, a judgement may be either positive or negative. Looking at the sky at night I feel as much sure of the non-existence of the sun there, as of the existing of the moon and the stars. So conscious beings can conceive what is non-existent, what is truly not the case. Thus Sartre sees the connection between 'Consciousness' and 'nothingness'. In Indian Philosophy Vaisesikas consider the negative category of Abhava or non-existence as the seventh category.

'Nothingness' appears in Sartre's title of the book, "*Being and Nothingness*" and inspite of its conglomeration of verbiage it plays a crucial role in making a conceptual connection between consciousness and freedom. "For the ability to conceive of what is not the case is the freedom to imagine other possibilities, the freedom to suspend judgement. We can never reach a state in which there are no possibilities unfulfilled, for whatever state we are in, we can always conceive of things being otherwise. (Sartre thinks that we are always trying to reach such a state, to become objects rather than conscious beings; hence his description

of human life as 'an unhappy consciousness with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state', 'a useless passion').....The power of negation is, then, the same thing as freedom - both freedom of mind (to imagine possibilities) and freedom of action (to try to actualize them). It follows that to be conscious is to be free."⁴ (L. Stevenson, *Seven Theories of Human Nature*, p. 82-83).

Following Kierkegaard Sartre uses the term 'anguish' to describe this consciousness of one's own freedom - it is not fear of an external object but the awareness of the ultimate unpredictability of one's own behaviour. 'Anguish' is painful and we generally try to avoid it, but there is no way out or path of exit from it, for it is a necessary truth that we are free. It is 'bad faith' to attempt to escape anguish or consciousness of our freedom by imagining that we are not free, by trying to convince ourselves that our actions are determined by our character, our role in life, our social conditions. Sartre illustrates 'bad faith' with the help of an example.

"He pictures a girl sitting with a man who she knows very well would like to seduce her. But when he takes her hand, she tries to avoid the painful necessity of a decision to accept or reject him, by pretending not to notice, leaving her hand in his as if she were not aware of it. She pretends to herself that she is a passive object, a thing, rather than what she really is, a conscious being who is free."⁵ (L. Stevenson, *Seven Theories of Human Nature*, p. 84).

From the point of view of Freudian Psychology one may try to give an explanation of 'bad faith' in terms of unconscious mental states. According to a follower of Freud, in the case of the above example, the girl under reference is repressing the knowledge that the man, her close companion, has made a sexual advance to her. To this explanation Sartre

agrees to differ; he points out that there might be a repressing agency, the Censor, within the mind which would determine what is to be repressed and what not, i.e., what is to be allowed to consciousness. So the censor is conscious of the repressed idea and if 'Censor', allows its repression, it is surely in 'bad faith'.

However, Sartre is of opinion that it is possible to avoid 'bad faith' and achieve 'authenticity'. He says that in making our individual choices we should be fully aware not to allow anything that determines our choices. We are absolutely responsible for everything we do and we must accept this responsibility for everything about ourselves. There is no escape from it, to flee from responsibility is itself a choice.

Sartre illustrates this point in *'Existentialism and Humanism'* — it is impossible to prescribe anything in matters of individual choices. Here he cites the case of a young Frenchman, at the time of second world war, who is confronted with a situation in which he has to make a choice in between two alternatives : 'To be with mother who lived only for him or to leave his dear mother for an encounter with suffering and death'. Throughout his life every individual, like this young Frenchman, is bound to arrive at a crossroad necessitating a moral decision. "Turn right, and you will lose our head; turn left, and you will find happiness" - in the situation like this a person must take his own decision, he is free to choose any of the alternatives. Sartre holds that no ethical doctrine, christian or Kantian, can prescribe the young French man the one alternative totally neglecting the other one. It is difficult to say anything positive or negative to the young man. Sartre, when his advice is sought for, said merely : 'You are free, therefore choose'. "If you want to end up in hell, just stay in bed : The world is unfair : if you accept it, you are an accomplice; should you wish to change it, you'll become a rascal" — this idea, uttered by one of Jean-

Paul Sartre's characters, highlights an aspect of the situation of choice against the background of social and moral alienation.

According to Sartre *authentic choice* has an intrinsic value of its own. In the example of 'bad faith' Sartre condemns any self-deception, any pretension, any refusal to face reality. Instead of self-deception, he admits of free choice and thus he puts emphasis on self-knowledge and in admitting self-knowledge he differs from Freud in crucial ways. He rejects the idea of unconscious causes of mental events or unconscious motivation — the job of the existential psycho-analysis is not the uncovering of hidden, repressed mental causes of a man's behaviour but to look for the meaning of it. So to understand a person the prime concern is to look for his choices.

But can self-knowledge or authenticity be the only basis for how to live ? Should Sartre commend the man who chooses to kill a man with full awareness of what he is doing ? If the man fails to provide us with reasons for such a choice, is not his choice wrong ? If no reason can be given for choosing the one way of life rather than another, the choice is arbitrary. But we must admit the merit of his analysis because of the fact that the more we become self-aware or self-conscious, the more we are capable of becoming something else. Sartre urges us to become more truly self-aware and to exercise our ability or power of changing ourselves.

According to existentialist thinkers the individual is unique by itself — their general trend is to safe guard the individuality against collectivism. Any form of collectivism, either group collectivism of the primitive societies or collectivism prevalent in a socialist society, brings the individual's existence at peril. Existentialism wages its war against totalitarianism in the modern era. They grant full freedom to individuals. Sartre points out

that each individual capable of making a choice is always creating values. The individual himself makes decision and selects one from many and in this act of choice he, as a conscious individual, completely feels his freedom. All responsibility lies with the individual in his act of choice. And in this choice, in this act of decision-making, the uniqueness of the individual is to be sought, is to be looked for. In a society or in a group or in a closed system the individual may not get his ideal freedom. That does not mean that existentialists deny, by implication, society or its necessity — their main contention being if individual freedom is lost, everything is lost. Though they accept society's existence they find an unending contradiction between the individual and society. The freedom that is ideal for the self is never realized in society. The social environment, its 'climate of opinion' limits his freedom. Therefore, the individual always lives the life of despair, agony. He feels that he is a failure in the struggle for existence and thereby he invites pessimism. Life becomes almost meaningless to him. But of one thing he is absolutely certain — he is certain that death must eventually come to him either at this moment or in some remote future; it is inevitable, is the only truth and he cannot escape it. He is bound to accept it as no other alternative remains for him, for his free choice.

The central theme of Albert Camus' 'Philosophy' is concerning the meaning of human existence. He concluded that man's existence in this world is absurd and made the category of the 'absurd' the basic principle of his philosophy. According to him the senselessness of human life is personified by the mythological image of 'Sisyphus' who for his perfidy, is doomed for ever to roll uphill a heavy stone which always rolls down again. Unable to bear this senselessness man revolts and in this he spontaneously strives to find a way out of his '*Sisyphean plight*'. His frame

of mind is that of a hopelessly lonely man in the absurd world. According to him death is the only revolution in human life - all other revolutions are not revolutions proper. To an individual, at a particular moment, death becomes the only reality.

Camus' existentialism seems to be a rebel philosophy, a philosophy of crisis, despair and death. The world is absurd, the human life is meaningless. Death is the only reality. But with Gabriel Marcel, the chief exponent of the so-called catholic existentialism, it was precisely through existential experience that one could apprehend God and for this reason it was necessary to renounce rational proofs of God's existence. His approach to the Being is through 'I-thou' relationship. By introducing the idea of the absolute person, his existentialism rejoins the tradition of christian metaphysics and theology. Thus with Thomistic theo-ontology Gabriel Marcel, the Prodigal son of God, returned to his real abode, the abode of God; but Albert Camus, a 'stranger' to this world, lost his path in the labyrinth of the 'absurd world' and by his rebellious attitude he at last discovered his path in death.

It is generally believed that the discussion of alienation occupies a central position in existential philosophy. But, in fact, such a discussion may be found in the writings of Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre and Paul Tillich. Here also we come across a radical division between the religious and the atheistic existentialism. Heidegger's central concern is with human existence and his existential philosophy ends in the inevitability of one's death. Like the German Philosopher Nietzsche Sartre is a radical atheist while Paul tillich is a leading existential theologian.

Heidegger's discussion on alienation occurs in his famous book, '*Being and Time*'. He distinguishes two fundamental ways of living — (i)

authentic way of life and (ii) inauthentic way of life. Authentic existence, according to him, is purely self-determined existence. It is shaped and governed by decisions and choices which are truly one's own and the decision the individual makes is with full freedom and full awareness of the fundamental conditions of human life. The latter, viz., the 'inauthentic' existence is determined by impersonal social expectations and conventions and in this existence the individual always exhibits a systematic refusal to face with such conditions. Heidegger commends the authentic existence and he sees that there is an inherent human tendency to fall into the mode of inauthentic existence and he uses the term 'falling' as antonym of authentic existence. However, each type of existence is a potential way of being for man which each of us may not actualize in spite of our efforts to do so. Man's alienation takes place when he is alienated from his authentic existence and authentic way of living.

He speaks of alienation in connection with three interrelated phenomena associated with 'falling'. The first is thinking about death which is one of the individual's 'possibilities-of-being' — a possibility which may be realized eventually all on a sudden at any given moment of existence. The significance of this stark fact is fundamental to Heidegger as it is a necessary condition of authentic existence.

Heidegger observes that people are reluctant to admit this fact that death is inevitable and no one knows when it will come. The cultivation of such an indifference to death alienates man from his authentic or real existence, his non-relational 'potentiality-for-being'. Authenticity is not only conceived simply in terms of 'being-towards-death' but also in terms of self-directedness of one's own life in accordance with projects one resolves upon. Thus these two existences, authentic and inauthentic, involve a relation to the future. He also observes that man has a tendency

to be so absorbed in novelties and distractions of the present that he totally forgets the truth of his 'having-to-die' which is essential to his authenticity or authentic existence. It thus contributes to man's alienation from his ownmost 'potentiality-for-being'. Man is alienated again when he achieves superficial understanding of himself which does not lay the foundation of his authentic existence.

Heidegger's conception of alienation is to some extent similar to the Hegelian and Marxian conception of 'self-alienation' which is conditioned in terms of disparity between a person's essential nature and his actual condition. But Heidegger differs radically from Hegel as well as from Marx, because they try to explain 'being' with the help of essence and place undue emphasis on 'man's essence'. Here man's alienation is his loss of himself and his transformation into a thing from essence. To Heidegger the status of man's essence is not fundamental. What is more fundamental is his 'being', his 'existence' — that man has no fixed essence over and above the basic and inescapable conditions of his existence. Hegel and Marx talk of alienation in essentialist terms which Heidegger himself requires us to reject and to see alienation from the view point of man's existence.

According to Marx, man is alienated from what he does, from things, i.e., products of his labour, from his fellow men and finally from his essence, his true nature and what concerns him most is the dehumanization of man. Man's alienation from his essence is the central thought depicted by Marx in his 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844' which he wrote in Paris. Whether man has an essence or not is a debatable question. Jean-Paul Sartre, the French existentialist philosopher, vehemently opposes essentialism and he emphatically urges that man has no essence. According to him, man lacks the 'solidity of

things' and he is condemned to be free. He works out this principle in detail not only in his philosophical writings but also in stories, novels and plays and shows how men constantly succumb to 'bad faith' hiding from themselves their freedom pretending to be as if they were things rather than what they actually are, i.e., conscious beings who are free. What constitutes the main difference between Marx and Sartre may be summed up in the following.

Sartre concentrates on the psychological processes that lead men to see themselves as objects, as things, as unfree while Marx concerns himself with the economic processes or conditions that lead to man's estrangement, alienation from his essence in a capitalist society in which man is not free, man is not in himself, man is dehumanized. Marx sees the unfree as victims caused by the social system while Sartre insists that we are our own victims - we are really free but we pretend to be unfree.

In "*Being and Nothingness*" Sartre uses the term 'alienation' from the existentialist point of view. It is used in connection with the phenomenon of one's experience of oneself as one is viewed by another subject, viz., as an object. But in his "Critique of Dialectical Reason" Sartre has modified his position in the Marxian line after long seventeen years from his publication of the book, 'Being and Nothingness' in 1943. 'The real nature of man is the totality of social relations,' Marx said in his theses on Feuerbach in 1845. Each is a product of the human society he lives in. Sartre denied that we are determined by society or by anything else, and asserted that every human individual is completely free to decide for himself what he chooses to be in his 'Being and Nothingness'. But they commonly denied the existence of God.

Here we confine our attention only to the conception of alienation

as depicted in his *'Being and Nothingness'*, and, in his view, he certainly differs from Marx.

In both cases, it is through the mediation of another person that the phenomena in question occur; but here the similarity ends. And this similarity is merely formal; for the way in which the person affects the individual is quite different in the two cases. "For Marx, it is when I surrender my labour to the control and direction of another man in return for wages that my labour and my product become 'alien' to me; and it is this, in turn, which results in my 'self-alienation', or failure to realize my essential nature. For Sartre, on the other hand, the Other simply Looks at me; our relation has nothing to do with that which obtains between worker and employer. And the 'self' which I thereby experience as 'alienated' is to be conceived neither in terms of my labour, nor my product, nor my Marxian essential nature (which is realizable only when my labour and my product are truly mine). It does not matter which Sartrean 'self' one considers - that which I experience subjectively or that which I experience as 'Known by the Other'; neither corresponds at all closely to the foci of alienation which Marx discusses."⁶ (Richard Schacht, *Alienation* pp. 225-226).

Paul Tillich conceives of estrangement in essentialist terms. And it constitutes a significant departure from the position held by most existential philosophers, especially Heidegger and Sartre who emphatically reject the view that that man as such has any essential nature which defines how one ought to be and which may or may not actualize.

According to Tillich man, as he exists, is not what he essentially is and ought to be. He is estranged from his true being. Tillich considers it to be the 'question' associated with human situation and it is the task of

theology to find out answers to such questions. Secondly, he regards Jesus as 'the bearer of the 'New Being' or as the one in whomman's existential estrangement is overcome'. To the notorious problem of existential estrangement Jesus is the real solution for he has the power of conquering the existential estrangement.

More recent writers associated with existentialism, after Heidegger and Sartre, are Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel and Albert Camus. Jaspers makes frequent use of the terms '*alien*' and '*alienness*' and does not develop any consistent view of it. In '*Being and Having*' Marcel speaks of alienation while discussing the contrast between 'the thinker' and 'the ideologist' - the thinker never makes an unconditional commitment to any particular idea while the ideologist, in his devotion to one of his ideas, is unconsciously enslaved to a part of himself. His ideas are not novel as they are derived from Marxian ideas. The name of Albert Camus is commonly mentioned in the discussion of alienation. In '*The Stranger*' Camus' character Meursault is an excellent example of a man extremely alienated from the people and the society around him. Camus depicts his character simply as an stranger or alien. He does not extensively use the term, nor does he develop any systematic theory of alienation.

Coming over to Ethics the existentialists place special emphasis on the problems of morality. According to them, social morality is unreal, the real morality lies outside the social. In the debate between the individual and the society they advocate extreme form of individualism - the moral positions of the individual and of society are mutually exclusive and incompatible. According to their subjective-idealist moral outlook man becomes the philosophical centre of the universe as they hold that existence precedes essence. First man is; man exists. First man is

existent, then comes his essence and hence they advocate existentialism and their ethics is known as 'existential ethics'. They oppose essentialism of all kinds and try to adhere consistently the viewpoint of subjectivity. Though their main concern is existence, i.e., man's existence in this world but their analysis is not confined to this realm alone but reaches beyond the boundaries of man himself-often it has been given a metaphysical twist and even some of the existential thinkers of theological brand try to derive relief of their crisis faced in this world from their existential estrangement from man's essential unity with the God. Tillich goes a step further in holding his faith in Jesus in whom the conflict between the essential unity of God and man and man's existential estrangement is overcome.

The real man, as viewed from his natural essence and social dimensions, forms a sphere of unreal existence. What is then men's real existence ? Man exists and he exists independently of any social definitiveness; he is fully free and he falls into crises of existence by pretending to be not free. What is more, the real quality of existence is not a fact but a problem, an idea, a choice, a project, an imperative of sorts. Thus the moral imperative has been given here an ontological status. Social morality makes a man act in conformity with certain prescribed moral ideals totally alien to his existence and, therefore, they are hostile, alien and directed against the individual's hopes and wishes. So social morality is unreal and what is real is existential morality. This militant moral relativism rejects morality as a normative science rejecting vehemently universally significant elements. Although man's social existence is not 'genuine' he is nevertheless compelled to remain in the absurd world as one of its members and must find his bearings in it while all the time rebelling against it and in this rebellious attitude he becomes conscious of his own unique

existence. *"I rebel, consequently, I exist"*. — wrote Albert Camus. But if the moral reality lies beyond the society, the criticism of the prevailing social relations along with the implied wish to change them lose all meaning.

The fact that individual is an end in himself ultimately results in man's loneliness, isolation and makes him a passive spectator, an stranger, outsider, alien even in his existence. Lonely and pitiful, he faces alien 'nothingness' and he cannot but to bear the burden of his fate and the reality of his existence is realized at every moment through fear, crises, worries and fundamentally the awareness of death which may or may not be realized in the immediate future, but which must be realized eventually at any moment. One thing is certain and inevitable and that is death - thus the fear of death is the main feature of existence and ultimately it leads to pessimistic outlook of life and the world.

Existentialism associates its understanding of morality with the question of freedom. The most detailed exposition of it we have in Jean-Paul Sartre, the French Philosopher and one of the leading advocates of atheistic existentialism. For Sartre there is no God, no rules of God, no absolute values, no essence. Man is left alone with himself. As there is no God, nor his commands, man is free, absolutely free — but this freedom is a curse to him; he is doomed to be free. In freedom man is absolutely free to choose anything he likes but due to 'bad faith' he pretends to be determined by outside influence.

Sartre holds that an individual has an absolute right to life, a right that cannot be taken away by any necessity or any kind of violence. What Sartre means to say is that the individual is free to dispose of his life as he thinks fit, i.e., even he has the right to death. Now, if man's supreme

freedom lies in death, can a living person be possibly free ?

Asserting that the individual is the maker of his destiny, that everything depends on the strategy, the design, the project he has outlined for himself, existentialism seems to elevate man to a higher status and assert his absolute sovereignty in his own affairs, but in reality the result is very different — it is followed with despair, hopelessness and pessimism. It considers man's freedom of will with utter disregard to environment or society and makes the two - man's freedom of will and the environment — as two alien separated realities. To them the environment is not really important and hence it does not matter what social system man lives under. It gives absolute status to man's independence and thus separates the individual from the environment making an unbridgable gap between the two. And the consequence is : Without society man's independence becomes an absurdity, a meaningless abstract concept.

The existentialists' conception of total responsibility of the individual does not imply that an individual should be aware of himself as a member of the human race and proceed from the objective needs of social development, that he should be able to assume responsibility for his own decisions. To take for granted each man's absolute responsibility for everything tantamounts to individual caprices. If it were admitted, Sartre would have to commend the man who might choose to devote his life to exterminating Jews — it is to give free access to everyone, the individual or the group or the class, to do anything even it is done with full awareness of what he or the group is doing. Thus existentialist ethics is individualistic, abstract and has no bearing on the social man.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

01. Leslie Stevenson *Seven Theories of Human Nature*, Chapter 7, p. 78.
02. Leslie Stevenson *Seven Theories of Human Nature*, Chapter 7, p.79.
03. Kierkegaard *Book of the Judge*, p. 172.
04. Leslie Stevnson *Seven Theories of Human Nature*, Chapter 7, p.82-83.
05. Leslie Stevenson *Seven theories of Human Nature*, Chapter 7, p.84.
06. Richard Schacht *Alienation*, p. 225-226.

Chapter - V

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

AN EVALUATION OF MARXIST ETHICS

Karl Marx was perhaps the most passionate humanist of the world. He proclaimed his faith in the creativeness of man's power to remake the world in which he lives. Even his critics honour him for his passionate search for truth and intellectual honesty and integrity. He hated capitalism because it de-humanizes man; he hated the system because it resembles slavery. His main work, *Capital ('Das Kapital')*, is largely a treatise on social ethics as he raised a fundamental protest against the servitude, suffering of the working people. He was a moralist, a liberator of mankind and was one of the fighters against hypocrisy. He vehemently attacked the moralists of his day who usually preached principles which they did not follow in their lives, because he saw them as the 'sycophantic apologists' which he felt to be immoral and he tried his utmost to bring about a moral reformation, a social change. Without an intense moral fervour he could not undertake the lone fight to improve the lot of vast majority of men, especially the proletarians, who were subjected to inhuman conditions. The humanism of young Marx along with its strongest moral appeal has left an indelible impression, a very wide appeal to us. Marx's moral philosophy represents a vehement protest against man's alienation, his loss of himself, his transformation into a thing; it is a movement against dehumanization of man. But our praise of his genuine insistence on equality and freedom for the poor and the lowly does not commit us to accept in toto when Marx assumes that all forms of alienation

issue from one root, viz., Capitalism and after the establishment of communism the alienated persons will be liberated from all kinds of alienation and none will suffer from alienation any more. The man will become un-alienated, free and will be of himself.

One question naturally crops up here : Does the evolution of the society stop with the establishment of communism ? Dialectic movement contains in its very bosom the seed of development and change. The creative man, the out-standing individual is generally a non-conformist who doubts, questions and deviates from the tradition of society and plays a fundamental role in transforming the society. These men are very powerful because in them reflection, the dynamo of social change, grows incarnate. The more profoundly original and creative he is, the more profoundly is he bound to become alienated from his society.

It is generally assumed that in the primitive society or in pre-industrial society men were much less alienated, perhaps not at all, and that they were not only happier, more intimate with nature but also more humane in thier interpersonal relations. But there are ample evidences to the contrary. Alienation is to be found in all ages, in all climes, but its forms are different. In Indian villages, far away from the din and bustle of the city, we witness a shattering picture of peasant community; they are alienated and live a very poor and miserable life — they are born in poverty, live in porverty and die in it — their condition is simply deplorable. The oppression of the peasant classes and the sub-human conditions in which they live in and have their being is indescribable. With the growing of industries in the cities the wealth is accumulated in a few hands; the working classes are now getting more facilities due to their collective movements through organised trade unions than before. But the villagers, the poorer classes, especially the peasants of villages are becoming increasingly poorer day

by day. They cultivate lands, grow food for us but their economic condition is miserable as anything.

Let us consider Marx's famous words from '*German Ideology*'.

"As soon as the division of labour sets in, everybody has a determinate and exclusive sphere of activity that is imposed on him and from which he cannot escapewhile the communist society, where everybody does not have an exclusive sphere of activity but can train himself in any branch whatever, society regulates general production and thus makes it possible for men to do this to-day and that to-morrow, to hunt in the morning, to fish in the after-noon, to rear cattle in the evening, and to criticise after dinner.....without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic".

Marx's dream has not come true because such a society has not yet been evolved in a process of historical development. It is not at all impossible or uncommon for men to do all kinds of jobs to find time to hunt or fish occasionally. Division of labour is not in itself bad, most of our social advances in science and technology are due to specialization or division of labour. However, with the introduction of computerised machines workers have little to do but to watch such machines and see that it does the work properly and consequently the number of workers will be decreased to a great extent constituting one pressing social problem of un-employment for the present generation, because the machinery has placed the necessity upon the shoulders of a few specialized men with a view to meeting the situation. As a remedial measure we can introduce pension plans of various kinds and make other beneficiary privileges available to the toiling class. What is needed in such a circumstance is social security, economic security. If all these measures are employed with all sincerity, if society is so formed to provide people with ample

opportunities to go for hunting and fishing or rearing cattle, can the phenomenon of alienation be extinguished altogether? The division of labour need not be accompanied by the imposition of rigid rules that inhumanize men. However, it may be presumed that alienation implicit in the division of labour can be diminished significantly with the imposition of humanitarian rules providing people with high standard of living and ample scope for work for each according to his ability. The outstanding man, the creative man, the non-conformist, is obviously alienated from his society but the conformists who do not possess any courage to rebel against the status quo but to conform the tradition along with its institutions and beliefs are alienated from themselves.

Tagore says :

"We suffer from the sense of sin, which is the sense of discord, when any disruptive passion tears gaps in our vision of the One in man, creating isolation in our self from the universal humanity."¹

(Rabindranath Tagore - The 'Religion of Man' - p. 77).

Men must never lose in his material quests — they must always be music makers and the dreamers of dreams revealing his aspiration for rising in dignity of being.

Alienation is the central feature of human existence. So far no society, capitalist or socialist, has finally solved this problem. It exists in society in some form or other even from the ancient times — it is to be found in all ages, though it does not assume the same form and many of its forms are due to economic depression, political corruption, social injustice, excessive nationalism, intense patriotism, international rivalry and individual and social insecurity. An idealist cum theist may say that alienation is due to our insistence on material conditions of life and men

must rise above all this and realise his unity with God. On the contrary, the atheist may hold that all is not right in this God-less world, while even some may say that when God creates a master-piece like man with freedom to go on his own way, there is always a danger to go in a wrong way. "Evil, O Glaucon", says Socrates in Plato's Dialogue, "will not vanish from the earth". Have we gone astray in our manner of living? Is the present industrial system boon or curse for us? Should we reduce the hours of labour so that all men can find a real joy of life in their creative activities? Are scientific developments, growth of population, more and more amenities of life responsible? Should we let death and destruction go on? Do we allow our blind impulses to have taken possession of us and of the whole mankind? What can we do in such a situation? So far as we can cultivate the virtues of humanity — good will, fellow-feeling, love for others. We can minimise the tension to a larger extent if we work commonly for the cause of humanity as a whole.

We observe that estrangement from nature, from society, from one's fellow men and from oneself is in the increase. One has to detach oneself from the womb of one's environment in order to become a person, an individual conscious being. With the self-awareness man becomes conscious of his own individual existence — he looks upon the others and the world as strange to him and very much perplexing. With his education he becomes more sensitive and thoughtful. The more he is thoughtful and honest, the more is he haunted with fear of falling from his moral standards.

The phenomenon of alienation is also to be found in the creative works of arts, literature and philosophy, even in legends.

Sophocles' "*Oedipus Tyrannus*" depicts a gloomy picture of alienation. Oedipus, the hero of the drama, is alienation incarnate like Karna, a character depicted in the Mahabharata. Both Oedipus and Karna came into this world unwanted and they were cast out in the hostile nature to perish inevitably but somehow they were saved. It was ordained by fate that Oedipus would kill his father and marry his own mother without knowing who they were. The decree was fulfilled and Oedipus ultimately came to know of his terrible fate. He blinded himself out of repentance and went into voluntary exile. Karna, the tragic character of the Mahābhārata, succumbed to death at the hand of his own younger brother, Arjuna, after a fierce battle fought between them. Psycho-analysis has found that every one of us is like Oedipus ordained by fate to direct our first love to our parents or parent-substitutes. Dante's '*Vita Nuova*' is a case study of self-alienation, of viewing one-self as an stranger.

Depending on the conception of man's true nature, Marx used the term alienation to designate brutalisation, loss of creativity, mindless conformity or anything of this kind as one may be tempted to call dehumanization. The christian doctrine of man sees man primarily in relation to God and it ends in a promise of eternal life, a life after the grave. Christianity puts emphasis not only on virtuous living but also on the foundations of character from which such life proceeds. The attainment of true purpose in human life - love of God and life according to the will of the God — is open to all. This love is divine and it follows from the very nature of God. Marx is a materialist in his view of the universe. In religion he takes an atheistic stand and his materialist view dominates his theory of man. He holds that every human individual is free to decide for himself what he wants to be and the individual is the product of the human society he lives in. Sartre denies not only the existence of God but also the view

that men are determined by the society or by anything else. Sartre gives us existential conception of man while Marx emphasises the social significance of man. Marxism denies God, the immortality of the soul-our moral life is not to be governed by the will of the God but by the society we live in. According to christianity God has given us freedom and we fall into sin or error when we misuse the gift of God and thus we become alienated from Him. For Marx man is alienated from his true nature, his essence when the conditions of the capitalist society do not allow his potentialities to develop. But according to Sartre man's existence precedes his essence and man has unlimited freedom. Man falls into 'inauthentic' condition when he pretends that he is not free. Marx's solution lies in the establishment of true communist society where all men are free, humane and un-alienated, while Messianic hopes are deferred to the another world. It is imperative to realize that alienation need not always be destructive. Often it may turn into good if it is re-directed - it is to be regarded as an essential means to the attainment of higher conditions of self-realization, e.g., when the sexual urge is directed towards valuable ends, it does not remain sexual but turns into something socially more valuable. The Mahābhārata says : For the sake of the soul, you may give the whole world - 'atmāṁthe Prithivīm Tyājet'. Socrates stood for the freedom of the spirit and counted it more precious than money or gold. The sages of the Upanishads told us that one, if necessary, must detach oneself from the whole world with a view to realizing his true self, i.e., ātman which transcends all the categories of the world. To realize the soul is to realize that the world is the manifestation of this 'One', the imperishable. He who knows ātman knows everything, nothing remains un-attained to him. Buddha, the Enlightened, sought men to be free from all desires or tṛṣṇa of the ephemeral world, from all attachment and this is the only way to be free from all bondages of life or to be emancipated from ignorance which is the root cause of our bondage and for which we are moving in the world of death and despair, in the

cycle of birth and rebirth. His words are : Life is full of misery and therefore work out for salvation from misery with diligence. The Mahāyāna, a form of Buddhism, regards the desire of one's salvation as selfish at bottom. In place of personal liberation, Mahāyāna emphasises the liberation of all sentient beings as the ultimate goal.

The modern alienated youth may turn to the wisdom of India. Here is a balm for alienated souls and a promise of salvation by practising universal brother-hood and love for all. This insight does not entail other-worldliness or any form of escape at all. Sartre's 'Orestes' says to Zeus : Man's life begins with the other side of despair, Goethe's 'Prometheus' defies Zeus well over a century and a half. Neither Sartre's 'Orestes' nor Goethe's 'Prometheus' withdraw into solitary defiance — both choose to suffer for others. Karl Marx saw himself as another Prometheus trying to bring into being a race of free men. Marxism assumes the need to change the world. Marx placed his faith in a new economic structure and according to him salvation lies in the establishment of a new human society, i.e., communism.

Alienation is the central feature of our human existence. The final interpretation depends upon the particular philosophy one holds. To some life without alienation is scarcely worth living. What matters to us most is to increase our capacity to cope with alienation.

We are living in a world in which tragedy is universal. Men are destined to sail in the troubled wates of the ocean of Saṃsāra. But we should not lose our hope, our belief in our capacity to overcome all that comes to our way to goal. As Tagore prays in his poem : *Atmatran* :

"Vipade more rakṣhā Kara, enahe more Prārthanā

vipade āmi nā yena kari bhoy"².

(It is not my prayer that you protect me from dangers or evils of life but to make me free from fear in the midst of dangers or evils of life).

Our alienness, our suffering, is not sin but the very conditions for the manifestation of spirit. The limited and the unlimited, the imperfect and the perfect are not perpetual opposites, Advaita Vedānta asserts not only that there is opposition between truth and illusion but also that the divine is here in everything. The world is the seat of spiritual liberation. Māyā does not simply mean that the world is a vain illusion, mere smoke without fire-it has fire within. We can transcend our woes only through this earthly existence. Why should there be suffering or ignorance ? It has a meaning, a purpose of its own. All great achievements are born of suffering and sacrifice. Oscar Wilde Comments : "out of sorrow has the world been built; and at the birth of a child or a star there is pain". Only through suffering there may be a rise of being to the higher being of self-consciousness. The divine is not beyond the world, it is behind it as fire exists behind the smoke.

For Marx alienation sums up what is wrong with Capitalism. He gives us a detailed description of certain features of the capitalist society and a value judgment that they are fundamentally wrong. Alienation involves in a relation, it must be from somebody or something. We may ask who is supposed to be alienated from whom and from what ? If one or both the terms of the relationship cannot be specified, alienation is the wrong word. Marx speaks of alienation from himself and from nature. But it is not clear how one can be alienated from himself. The material things, the main determinants of social change, are not merely natural objects of which we get information with the power of human mind. They are not merely natural

objects like coal, water or electricity but our knowledge of the ways in which these material forces can be used to serve human ends. Thus for Marx nature is the man-created world. What follows from this is that men are not what they should be, because they are alienated from objects and social relations they create. Marx says that the private property is the cause of alienation and the abolition of private property is the abolition of alienation. For Marx alienation of labour consists in the fact that the work is not the part of the worker's nature because the worker feels in it physically exhausted and mentally debased. At work he does not belong to himself and even the objects he produces are alien to him. Sometimes he blames money to be the common whore of mankind and the institution of money causes alienation. Again the division of labour makes man's work into an alien power opposed to him.

It may be noted here that the abolition of money as a means of exchange is not possible, for we cannot return to a system of 'barter'. In capitalist society the private ownership, money as the medium of exchange are taken for granted. Does the abolition of private property cure the alienation of labour ? And if the state is the basis of social evils, nationalisation of lands, factories and banks would make things worse by increasing the powers of the state. Everybody's business is nobody's business. It is to be remembered that it is always to treat anyone as a means to an end, viz., the economic end. This has happened in capitalist societies of the early 19th century. Marx himself depicted a faithful picture of it in '*Capital*', vol. I when children and women workers worked for long hours in unhealthy conditions and died immature death after living a miserable life. Industry, technology, scientific achievements - all these are for men and not men for all these. Marx's genuine feeling for the working community must be appreciated. Marx rejected the idea of gradual reform

or reform step by step in the Capitalist system, rather he feels the imperative to change the situation, to transform capitalist society into a socialist society through a revolution of the toiling masses.

For Marx communism is the solution of the riddle of history, with the coming of communism there will be abolition of all kinds of alienation, oppression of man by man and the society will be regenerated as such that there will be no need of the state to impose rules and consequently there will emerge a classless society - the guiding principle being : 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs'. Some critics may say that his ideals will not be realized in practice; because they are impracticable. His ideals may not be realized in practice, but his vision, his dream of the classless society still inspires us for such a social change. As Tagore says :

"We have seen the records of man's dream of the millennium, the ideal reality cherished by forgotten races in their admiration, hope and love manifested in the dignity of their being through some majesty in ideals and beauty in performance. While these races pass away one after another they leave great accomplishments behind them carrying their claim to recognition as dreamers - not so much as conquerors of earthly kingdoms, but as the designers of paradise. The poet gives us the best definition of man when he says :

'We are the music makers,
we are the dreamers of dreams'³
(Tagore - The Religion of Man, p. 77)

II

The basic fact of christianity is that it claims that God exists. It is not pantheism or deism but theism viewing God as transcendent as well

as immanent in the world. He creates the world and is the supreme arbiter of man's destiny and the controller of everything that exists. For Marx there is no God or the Almighty as the designer and supreme arbiter of our life; 'religion is the sob of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, the spirit of conditions utterly unspiritual, the opium of the people', The idea of the God is the key-stone of perverted civilization. It provides us with illusory happiness. To negate or suppress it is to establish the claims of real happiness. The universe is fundamentally material in nature — it exists without anybody beyond or behind it - everything is governed in it by the scientific laws of matter.

The followers of christian faith hold that God has made man out of His own image and has given man freedom and consequently men are at liberty to accept or reject the will of the God. When man misuses the freedom bestowed on him he is deviated from the kingdom of God and in doing this he commits sin and consequently suffering is inevitable. Man's attempt to realise his oneness with the Divine will never end in utter disappointment and in this endeavour nothing is lost; he will be rewarded, if not in this world then in the other world. Thus christianity believes in the immortality of the soul, the life beyond the grave. To Kant, however, the immortality is a moral Postulate and without this pastulate justice is defeated and moral struggle towards the ideal is meaningless. The moral life is a struggle to attain the ideal which can never in this life be attained, viz., the ideal of perfect goodness.

Marxism rejects any such survival after death and holds that moral ideas are conditioned by the society. Marx observes that religion gives illusory hopes to the poor and oppressed by formulating a conception of kingdom of God which the poor and the oppressed enter more easily than the exploiters. Can this belief make any sense of our life's suffering

in this earthly existence ? The helplessness of the toiling masses may give rise to such a belief for the better life in the life after death. Religion turns our eyes towards the heaven than to the real world with its innumerable problems. It is full of lie and hypocrisy and makes man subservient to the purposes of the rich and comfortable. If God creates the world, manages and supervises it and if God is perfectly good, how shall we explain sufferings of the poor and lowly, pain and evil which are the brute facts of life and are evident everywhere ? If God is unable to prevent them to occur, He is not God; if He could and does not, He is not perfectly good. For christianity evil or sin is man's own fault - he misuses the freedom, rejects the will of God and consequently he suffers. Marx replaced the notion of sin by that of alienation; man falls into alienation because in a capitalist society the conditions are as such that they do not allow man's potentialities to develop.

For christianity the ills of human life can be overcome by the Divine grace and to have this divine sympathy we must make our lives tuned with the 'Divine Will'. But Marx says that there can be no real change in the lives of men living in society unless and until the socio-economic conditions of the capitalist system are replaced by the ideals of radical humanism, by the establishment of a new society, i.e., communism in which men will become truly free, humane and unalienated. Men will become real selves no longer alienated by the economic conditions. If there is no God and we are made what we really are by the society and if our life is full of sorrows and sufferings in the society we live in, then it is an imperative on us all to change the society.

Both christianity and Marxism are not just theories but ideologies - they become the fundamental ways of life. Each has its human organization which claims the allegiance of its believers and urges upon the followers

that they are to be practised. For christianity there is the church, for Marxism the Marxist Party. For christianity Jesus is the saviour or redeemer of all mankind from sins, for Marxism Marx is the saviour or the liberator of all mankind from dehumanization of human beings. For christianity there are many churches (Catholic, Protestant etc.), for Marxism there are many Marxist Parties claiming that they are the true followers of the doctrine of their founder. In the 'History of Western Philosophy', Bertrand Russell observes :

"The Jewish pattern of history, past and future, is such as to make a powerful appeal to the oppressed and unfortunate at all times. St. Augustine adapted this pattern to christianity, Marx to socialism. To understand Marx psychologically, one should use the following dictionary:

Yahweh = Dialectical Materialism

The Messiah = Marx

The Elect = Proletariat

The Church = The Communist Party

The Second Coming = The Revolution

Hell = The Punishment of the Capitalists

The Millennium = The Communist Commonwealth

The terms on the left give the emotional content of the terms on the right, and it is this emotional content, familiar to those who have had a Christian or a Jewish upbringing that makes Marx's eschatology credible"⁴. (p. 361)

Marx's view of religion and his comments are not without the spirit of understanding and compassion for the exploited classes. Why should the poor and the oppressed look beyond this world for a better life of material happiness ? Why not here in this earthly existence ? Why should these poor workers allow themselves to be used as means to the evil purposes of the rich and comfortable who are so mad after accumulation of wealth and utterly irresponsible for the good of their fellowmen ? Certainly not. They should not allow themselves to be used as labourers at the minimum wages, to work under unhealthy conditions and to recover their health only in death. True religion can not make them to be victims of illusions, to be the prey of capitalist exploitation which was in his day characteristic of official christianity and the prevailing social system. With a tremendous hatred for priestly sycophants of his day and genuine love for humanity Marx tries to bring about a moral reformation and sees and feels that human society is a single, organic whole and strives to oppose the other-worldly religion which tends to destroy the harmony and beauty of the world and man's effort to create a new social order in its realisation of human brotherhood. It is his lone endeavour and he shoulders the burden of such a great and noble task with a view to emancipating the whole human race from bondage and slavery. It becomes an imperative on him to change the society for betterment of the conditions of it. Bertrand Russell, in his *'History of Wesern Philosophy'* portrays the image of Karl Marx who devoted his whole life for this noble cause. "He took part in both the French and the German revolutions of 1848, but the reaction compelled him to seek refuge in England in 1849. He spent the rest of his life, with a few brief intervals, in London, troubled by poverty, illness, and the deaths of children, but nevertheless indefatigably writing and amassing knowledge. The stimulus to his work was always the hope of the social

revolution, if not in his life time, then in some not very distant future"⁵ (p. 748 - 749).

Then Russell comments :

"Marx, like Bentham and James Mill, will have nothing to do with romanticism; it is always his intention to be scientific.....Marx set to work to represent the interest of the wage - earner. He had in youth - as appears in the *Communist Manifesto of 1848* - the fire and passion appropriate to a new revolutionary movement, as liberalism had had in the time of Milton. But he was always anxious to appeal to evidence, and never relied upon any extra-scientific intuition."⁶ (History of Western Philosophy, p. 749).

III

To the question : what is materialism ? Marx's answer is : it is the stuff of cosmic reality and dialectical development is its essential and necessary expression. Marx calls himself a materialist, but not of the 18th Century sort. He accepts from Hegel the dialectical method and calls his doctrine dialectical materialism which differs in an important way from traditional materialism. His metaphysics is materialistic and his method dialectical. The older materialism, he says, mistakenly regards sensation as passive by which the mind receives impressions from the outer world and attributes activity primarily to the object. But Marx holds that all sensation or perception is an interaction between the subject and the object. Matter, apart from the activity of the percipient, is a mere raw material. To know an object is not to receive an impression from it but to be able to act on it. Knowledge is an activity exercised on things. The question whether objective truth belongs to human thinking is not a question

of theory but a practical question and thus the test of truth is practical. He criticizes the notion of truth from the activist point of view.

Marx calls his materialism dialectical as it contains in it an essential principle of progressive change and it is called materialistic as it urges that ideas influence history by acting on things. He also speaks of historical materialism or materialistic conception of history and holds that economic facts determine social phenomena and regards them as consequences of his metaphysical materialism. Bertrand Russell observes that these two are unrelated.

"The whole of his theory of economic development may perfectly well be true if his metaphysics is false and false if his metaphysics is true, and, but for the influence of Hegel, it would never have occurred to him that a matter so purely empirical could depend upon abstract metaphysics"⁷
(B. Russell, *Freedom and Organisation*, p. 220, 1934).

Marx calls his doctrine materialism in contrast with Hegelian idealism. The things we see and feel are real and they are perpetually changing and these changes belong to the intrinsic nature of things and are not imposed from outside. The ultimate reality is not solid matter. For Marx mind is a derivative quality of matter and he asserts the supremacy of matter over mind. But if matter contains in its very bosom an inner impulse to produce life and mind, the ultimate principle then is not mere matter.

Dialectic development is a process of development from lower to the higher and it takes place as a disclosure of contradiction in things. For Hegel contradiction is the primary principle which is at the basis of all development. Croce, in his book *"What is living and what is dead of the*

philosophy of Hegel", has pointed out that Hegel makes a confusion of opposites and distincts. The opposites, light and darkness, negate each other; they are mutually incompatible; but the distincts, viz., truth and beauty do not negate each other. Poet Keats even goes further to identify the two distincts, truth and beauty : "Beauty is truth, truth beauty". To say that economic facts condition historic evolution is not to assume that they are exclusively determinants of history and other forces have nothing to do in it. Both Hegel and Marx believe in dialectical development of history. But Hegel concluded his dialectical account of history with the establishment of the Prussian State which for him the perfect embodiment of the Absolute Idea. But Marx agrees to differ-his end is different from that of Hegel - it is the establishment of a new social system, viz., communism. A question crops up naturally : Does the process of historical development end with the establishment of communism ? If dialectical process is essentially revolutionary why should it stop with the establishment of communist society or the classless society ? The dialectical principle is not compatible with itself if we answer the above questions in the affirmative. Marx himself admits that there is scope for social evolution after the communist society is established.

Marx adopts the dialectical method not to the realm of ideas and their self-development but to the material development of society. He asserts that the process of historical development is also a dialectic movement through a series of contradictions. An existing state of society takes us into its opposite state and their contradiction leads to a higher state in which the contradictions are overcome. Hegel calls the anti-thesis of a thesis sometimes its negation and the synthesis the negation of negation.

"The capitalist mode of appropriation", "Marx writes, "the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property.

This is the first negation of individual private property based upon individual labour. But with the enexorability of a law of nature, capitalist production begets its own negation. It is the negation of negation. This second negationestablishes.....the common ownership of the land and of the means of production"⁸ (Capital, vol. I, p. 715).

"According to Hegel", Timasheff explains, "each statement of truth, or thesis, has its opposite statement, or antithesis, which is also true. The thesis and antithesis may be reconciled on a higher level of synthesis, but this is not the end for the dialectical process then continues as the synthesis becomes a new thesis with its antithesis, and so on".⁹ (Nicholas Timasheff and George Theodorson, Sociological Theory, p. 57-58)

Hegel advocates dialectical idealism and Marx dialectical materialism - Hegelian idealism perceives truth in ideas, for Marx ideas are not the realm of truth but rather matter is. For Hegel 'history is the growth of Reason to consciousness of itself, and the constitutional, legislative state is the culmination of history'. Marx too is interested in the analysis of the nature and meaning as well as the truth of history but he, unlike Hegel, believes that a materialistic analysis to history will render the truth. He contends that historical ideas are primary and our ideas of them are secondary. For Hegel the real is only outward manifestation of the Idea, for Marx the idea is nothing other than the material when it has been transposed and translated in the human brain. The philosophy of Hegel descends from heaven to earth and the philosophy of Marx ascends from earth to a utopian social order. In Hegel's writings dialectic stands on its head while in Marx it turns 'upside down' with a view to discovering a rational Kernel that is hidden away within the trappings of mystification. In a letter to Kugelmann Marx says : "Hegel's dialectic is the fundamental

principle of all dialectic only after its mystical form has been sloughed off. And that is precisely what distinguishes my method."¹⁰ Marx has no quarrel with Hegel's dialectical logic - the development of history is logical for both Hegel and Marx. But for Hegel 'Mind is the ultimate reality and for Marx 'Matter'. What Marx rejects is the idealistic 'trammel' of Hegel's philosophy. But though Marx emphasises the importance of material conditions, he does not deny the reality of subjective consciousness or its significance in social change.

Marxists assume that the society is moving inevitably and necessarily towards a goal - the goal is communism which is an historical necessity. Engels writes : With the same certainty with which from a given mathematical proposition a new one is deduced, with that same certainty can we deduce the social revolution from the existing social conditions and the principles of political economy. Such a view in which facts and ideals are adapted to each other cannot be called scientific. Why should we assume that the forces of the world will back our ideal towards its actualisation ?

Just as Comte distinguishes three phases of evolution on the basis of ways of thinking, Marx identifies four stages of human history on the basis of modes of production — primitive communism, slave production, feudalism and capitalism. "The first historical act", wrote Marx, "is the production of material life itself. This is indeed a historical act, a fundamental condition of all history".¹¹ (Karl Marx - Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, p. 60 ed. McGraw-Hill, London).

With the variation of the mode of production the relationship which men have with one another varies. But not only Marx gives us an analysis of this scenario but also believes that through dialectical process

capitalism will be finally overthrown and socialism will be installed and it will take its final culmination in the formation of a classless society with no class antagonisms and abolition of private property.

"Therein", Timasheff comments, "may be seen the inherent notion of historical progress and utopianism in Marx's thought, for human history is treated as an inevitable succession of stages culminating in the best possible social order".¹² (Nicholas Timasheff and George Theodorson, *Sociological theory*, 1976 p. 57-58).

"When he (Marx) says that society moves", Radhakrishnan comments, "from feudalism to Capitalism, and from Capitalism to socialism, he is using words which cover immense multitudes of facts. An historical period may be represented by a proper selection of events to be indicative of this or that tendency"¹³ (*Religion and Society*, p. 32).

And Radhakrishnan goes on to say that "history does not proceed according to any strict law. Historical evolution does not invariably proceed through a series of contradictions. The development proceeds at different paces and in varying fashions, now in a transition from one state to its opposite, now in an unbroken line"¹⁴; (p. 32). and he gives us an illustration of it that "Russia was in the feudal, and not the capitalist, state of society when socialism was established"¹⁵. History is not mathematics. From $2+2$ we cannot deduce anything we like - it is a rational necessity to deduce that $2+2$ is equal to 4. Though Marx emphasizes the importance of historical facts that determine the social change, his theory is not the result of his inductive survey - it is of a deductive character that given the premises and we can deduce conclusion from them. Being a materialist, as he calls him, it is difficult for him as well as for a materialist to hold that historical events take place according to the rigid rules of formal logic.

The economic interpretation of history states that economic phenomena, especially economic production, are fundamental. Marx considers economy to be the foundation of the whole socio-cultural system. Marx emphasises the primacy of economics in human relationship and holds that it occupies a central position in political structure. The economic system of production and distribution constitutes the basic structure of society on which are built man's all-round relations, social institutions. Our culture, religion, politics, social and intellectual life are based on economic system of production and distribution, the means and relations of production - these are therefore secondary products determined by the mode of production. According to Engels ".....the production of immediate material means of subsistence, and consequently the degree of economic development attained by a given people, or during a given epoch, form the foundation upon which the state institutions, the legal conceptions, the ideas on art, and even on religion, of the people concerned have been evolved"¹⁶. (Calvin J. Larson, Major Themes in Sociological Theory, p. 43).

"The mode of production in material life", Marx wrote, "determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness"¹⁷ (Karl Marx, Preface to a contribution to the Critique of Political Economy — in Raymond Aron's Main Currents in Sociological Thought, p.154).

This theory, by its very simplicity, appeals to us, but a careful examination of it clearly reveals that it is a part of the truth and not the whole truth. It is no denying the fact that economic conditions are

fundamental in our life but from this it does not follow that they are exclusively determinant factors of history.

Marx would argue that human thought, human consciousness, were not self-originating but mere derivatives of the economic principle. It is true that in order to survive we must eat but this does not amount to saying that 'man shall live only by bread alone'. The indispensable condition is not effective cause, for cause is the sum-total of all conditions-positive and negative taken together. To emphasise one condition to be the sole cause is to commit a fallacy, as it ignores other necessary conditions which are equally important to bring about a result. Our religion, politics, art, culture etc. - all these phenomena of life cannot exist independently of economy as there can be no plant without soil. Soil is certainly necessary but it is not enough - the plants to grow must require soil but it is also fundamentally necessary that the seed must be sown and other conditions should be provided for its growth.

As sex dominates in Freud's analysis of all forms of mental illness, so Marx's account is dominated by the economic metaphor in his attempt to understand and control all forms of human activity in competition, co-operation and revolution. Like Freud Marx is unwilling to allow any other variable in the arena of thought and action. Sex for Freud and economics for Marx are of paramount importance. If Freud's theory of sex be called 'pan - sexualism', Marx's theory may be called 'pan-economism'. Freud sees sex not only in adult behaviour but also even in infantile behaviour, while Marx sees the dominant and fundamental role of economic principle almost everywhere, even in human thought, human awareness and human consciousness. According to Freud sex occupies the central position in the circle of life from which emanate art, culture, literature, even our civilization; Marx, on the other hand, places economic conditions at the

centre of the circle of life from which everything emerges. Freud argues that our civilization can not have arisen without the motive power derived from the sexual energy that has been dammed up and then re-directed. To quote Freud :

"We believe that civilization has been built up..... by sacrifices in gratification of primitive impulses, and that it is to a large extent for ever being recreated as each individual..... repeats the sacrifice of his instinctive pleasures for the common good. The sexual are among the most important of the instinctive forces thus utilised : they are in this way sublimated, that is to say, their energy is turned aside from its sexual goal and diverted towards other ends, no longer sexual and socially more valuable".¹⁸ (Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Pschoanalysis, p. 17, 1922).

And all that we call culture, religion, politics, social relations in human experience are sub-servient and dependent upon the economic factors in the Marxian theory of social relations. Marx wrote : "The political, legal, philosophical, literary and artistic development rests on the economic. But they all react upon one another and upon the economic base".¹⁹ (Karl Marx, Selected Works II, p. 51).

According to Marx, it is not the unfolding of ideas that explains the historical development of society as Hegel thinks it to be so, but the development of the social structure in response to changing material conditions that explains the emergene of new ideas. Marx asserts that historical changes are brought about by class conflicts. He wrote :

"The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Free men and slave, patrician and Plebian, lord and serf.....in

a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another".²⁰ (Karl Marx and F. Engels - The Communist Manifesto of 1848). Marx points out that the ideas of ruling class are in every age the ruling ideas and the ruling class or the class in power clings stubbornly to their privileges and does not allow or yield to any change without a struggle. The changing economical needs demand changes in the system. But the ruling class opposes it vehemently with all their might and struggles issue inevitably.

But history is not merely a record of class struggles. Certainly there are class struggles but the phenomenon is not universal as it primarily seems to be; for there are wars of religions such as the thirty years' war for and against the 'Reformation' between the Catholics and Protestants was a glaring example of it. Sometimes men of all classes fight against the enemy being inspired by the feeling of nationalism, the sentiment of which is more stronger than class consciousness. The conflicts between the Hindus and Muslims in India, between one muslim community with another group belonging to the same class in Middle East or in Afganisthan are not class struggles — we may look upon these conflicts not as class struggles but as the fanatic zeal for the lust for power or for the creed they believe in. Prof. Radhakrishnan observes :

"Communist Russia engages in war to defend itself against foreign aggression, and to destroy capitalism in other states. Even if communism were established in all countries of the world, differences would arise in regard to the true nature of communism and the way to operate it".²¹ (Religion and Society, p. 38-39).

Marx calls himself a materialist and his materialist version of dialectical materialism, though claimed to be the real version of the

universe, is not free from short-comings. The view that mind is simply a function of matter cannot be taken for granted. To say that evolution is determined by the natural conditions of the physical organism, the social and economic structure of each generation, is to hold a one-sided view of evolution. Larson outlines the basic postulates of Marxian dialectical method :

- "(1) All the phenomena of nature are part of an integrated whole;
- (2) nature is in a continuous state of movement and change;
- (3) the developmental process is a product of quantitative advances which culminate in abrupt qualitative changes; and
- (4) contradictions are inherent in all realms of nature-but particularly human society".²² (Calvin Larson - Major Themes in Sociological Theory, p.40).

The Marxian view is that evolution is an ascent from one state to another state, till the highest state is reached. Sri Aurobindo holds, however, that the evolution of matter is possible only because there has been an involution of the spirit into matter. Had there not been a deposit of the spirit in the latter, the latter could not have evolved. For this reason it is necessary to look upon the matter also as spiritual. Thus the one-sided material view which totally ignores spirit and the one-sided spiritual view which ignores matter are fundamentally wrong. In fact, without the descent of the spirit into the world, there cannot be any ascent of the world into the spirit. The evolution of the world has so far reached four stages - matter, life, psche and mind. But the evolution is not going to stop with mind — it must ultimately result in some other greater emergence and greater power of consciousness, viz., 'super-mind'. Sri Aurobindo holds

that evolution means also the development of inner life. Within each of us dwells a spark of divinity which we call the soul. Evolution requires that the light from the soul should illumine our inner being and through it our outer being. No development of our being is possible without awakening of our inner being.

Marxists believe that our soul is wholly a product of circumstances — social and economic. Man thinks, feels and wills - all these acts of cognition, affection and volition are the expression of or by-products of the social environment. Marx wrote : "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness." Psycho-analysis also takes a deterministic view of events within the realm of the mental. Nothing which a person does or says is really happened accidentally, everything can be traced to causes which are in the human mind. If our behaviour, what we say or act, is totally determined by mental causes or unconscious mental causes this may lead us to the conclusion that in choosing an action to be right or wrong men are not free, that it involves the denial of human freedom or free will.

Both Marx and Freud agree that human consciousness, far from being free, is determined by causes and thus they adopt the deterministic view of human consciousness. But for Freud these causes are individual and mental whereas for Marx these causes are social and economic in nature. Freud holds that an individual's mental health depends on harmonious relationship between the various parts of mind - Id, Ego and Super-Ego and between the person and the real world in which he lives. If the world does not provide him with opportunities, suffering, in the forms of mental agony, anxiety, mental conflicts, is inevitable. If it is taken for

granted that the environment is favourable, yet there will be mental disturbances due to the constant inner conflicts between Id and Super-Ego. The Id is infantile, amoral, non-rational and wholly unconscious; on the contrary, super-ego represents the moral principle — it is the moral overseer of our mind. Like the Id, the super-ego is unconscious, but, unlike the Id, it is the un-compromising moralist. Thus mental conflict is inevitable and it is very disturbing to us. And when the conflicts are not dissolved at the rational level, our mind makes use of various methods, technically called mental mechanisms, e.g., repression, rationalisation, sublimation etc. for resolving such conflicts, failing which mental suffering is inevitable.

The Behaviourists look upon the mind of the human infant as like a white sheet of paper on which we can ascribe anything we like. John Locke, the British empiricist, also holds that no ideas are innate and our mind is like a blank sheet of paper at the time of birth and everything is imprinted on it only through the medium of experience. His theory that there are no innate ideas is based on two assumptions : (i) 'Whatever is innate must be universal'; (ii) 'to be in the mind means to be conscious'. If these two assumptions are shown to be false, then his theory stands false.

Human wickedness, according to Behaviourists, is traced to the unwise conditioning. They place too much emphasis on the environment neglecting the role of hereditary factors in shaping our personality. They deny mind, consciousness and are against the use of mentalistic terms. Their main aim is to emancipate psychology from the shackles of metaphysics and to make it a science in the proper sense of the term, i.e., to make it a science of human behaviour. But the Behaviourists offer us a very simple formula, i.e., S-R formula by which we cannot explain satisfactorily the human behaviour which is more complex and complicated than animal behaviour. Recent studies have shown that our personality is

not totally dependent on environment, it is rather a product of both heredity and environment.

Marx agrees with the Behaviourists in holding the view that our soul is wholly the product of circumstances and in committing such a view the Marxists commit the same mistake that our all-round development of personality depends only on the social circumstances we live in. In his *Social Psychology* (1908) William McDougall holds that instincts are innate tendencies common to species, viz., sex, gregariousness, parental instinct etc. McDougall's theory of instinct, though subjected to severe criticisms, is not altogether worthless. The essential facts are hardly in dispute — there exist innate tendencies common to the whole human race to experience certain fundamental emotions and pursue certain ends. An instinct may be transmuted as when I transform my love for a lady into the love of the country; the sex-impulse may be re-directed into an artistic creation; the pugnacious impulse may be redirected into fighting for a noble cause — thus an instinct is the basic dynamic force of human behaviour. Long ago Aristotle told us that men are gregarious animals. Because of this instinct we love the company of others, we love the society of human beings. This side of human nature can not be ignored.

The Marxian view that each individual human being is the product of society in which he lives in is an undeniable fact, but exaggeration of any kind, either in favour of the individual or of the society, is to be carefully avoided. The individual can never be treated as a means to social good. What we mean by the good of the society is the good of all individuals forming the society and not the good of the collective in the abstract. The good of the society can never be obtained overlooking the good of the individuals forming the society.

Marx rejects the thesis that ideas govern the course of history. He stresses the primacy of the economic principle in the evolution of ideologies, philosophical systems, politics, ethics and religion. The thoughts or ideas which move the world rarely come from common masses but from the outstanding individuals who conceive these ideas in solitude and in deep meditation far far away from the society free from storm and stress of life. The sublime ideals of Upanishads are conceived in the solitude of Tapovana far away from the congested human locality which we can rarely hope to attain in the midst of din and bustle of the city. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle contributed materially to the structure of Greek civilization. The French Revolution was the outcome of the philosophy of Voltaire, Rousseau and other great thinkers. Marx himself inspired the great Socialist Revolution of 1917 in Russia. The real task of our philosophy is to illumine and guide our life and exalt our character. Chesterton remarks:

".....the most practical and important thing about a man is still his view of the universe. We think that for a landlady considering a lodger it is important to know his income, but still more important to know his philosophy. We think that for a general to fight an enemy it is important to know the enemy's numbers, but still more important to know the enemy's philosophy".²³ (Quoted from Religion and Society-S. Radhakrishnan, p. 70).

We cannot accept the mechanistic view of life. Our behaviour is not mechanical out and out. We cannot allow ourselves to be used as means to the purposes of others; we cannot allow ourselves to be parrot-like rehearsers of what our political leaders say and ask us to do on the fundamental problems of life. Family affection, love of home, sacrifice for the near and dear ones, reverence for elders are all looked upon as foolish, absurd sentiments. Allegiance to the ideologies of the political parties is now regarded as the supreme value of life. Men are not known as men but they are known by the political parties they belong to. Party domination is universal — it determines everything. We enjoy the dignity of a man as a party member, not as an individual human being. We have forgotten the fundamental principles of humanity — to love our neighbours, 'to live and let live', to honour the dignity of man as man. We do things which we do not will. We are so made that we apply brutal methods of violence even to our revered parents and teachers. The so-called leaders are now following Jesuitic dictum — 'the end justifies the means'. They use modern means to throw us into subjection. Nepotism, corruption etc. are now universal. We lost our moral courage to challenge the evils of life rather we shut our eyes in the face of such situations or maintain extreme neutrality. To the C.P.I.(M) the B.J.P. is a damnable heretic, to the B.J.P. the communist is the ally of satan. We are all saints or sadhus and our opponents are devils. To doubt or to question the party ideology is a vicious crime to be punished by the party activists — party ideology or the party morality is the supreme arbiter of everything. In our way to find out the truth we succumb to the mischiefs of party spirit for no fault of our own. People get hypnotised and their souls anaesthetised. The old wine of fatalism appears in a new bottle under a new label. Our life becomes meaningless.

To cope with this degradation what is needed is intellectual freedom, real democracy, social security. Without intellectual freedom which we have in Socrates, there would have been no Shakespeare, no Milton, no Dante or Goethe, no Newton, no Rabindranath. In Karl Marx we have the spirit of a man tolerant to the ills of life, affectionate to his near and dear ones. He is the man, the outstanding individual who fought a lone fight against everything that enslaves man. His three children died owing to mal-nutrition and impoverishment during the time he was completing his first volume of 'Das Capital'. "Except for the one pound sterling he received for each article he wrote for the '*New York Daily Tribune*', he had nothing".²⁴ (Francis Abraham, John Henry Morgan - Sociological Thought - p. 23). In the midst of such an abject poverty Marx did not give up his writing, rather he was very hopeful of the coming of socialism and this hope acted as an impetus in his untiring effort to complete the 'Das Capital'. So Marx's ideas play a fundamental role in shaping the history.

The transition from Capitalism to socialism, Marx says, is a historical necessity — an inevitable process of history. If it is inevitable, there is no point in asking to work for it. Though in the class struggle the victory of the proletariats is assumed, we can, by our activity, bring it nearer and make the transition less painful by our creative urge to make it a reality.

In due course Engel's Philosophy as set out in '*Dialectics of Nature*' became the corner-stone of the Soviet Marxist edifice — the lines of descent runs from Engels, via Plekhanov and Kautsky, to Lenin and Bukharin. They all share the common faith in dialectical materialism as a universal science of the laws of nature and history. Dialectical materialism is an attempt to amulgate speculative philosophy with positive science.

But there is a fatal flaw in Engels' attempted synthesis of speculative philosophy and positive science. As George Lichtheim observes :

"If nature is conceived in materialist terms it does not lend itself to the dialectical method, and if the dialectic is read back into nature, materialism goes by the board. Because he knew this, or sensed it, Marx wisely left nature (other than human nature) alone. Engels ventured where Marx had feared to tread, and the outcome was dialectical materialism : an incubus which has not ceased to weigh heavily upon his followers, though in fairness to Engels it should be said that he can not be held responsible for the subsequent transformation of his speculative essays into a state religion imposed upon captive audiences by doctrinaire schoolmasters scarcely more literate than their pupils".²⁵ (G. Lichtheim, *Marxism*, p. 247).

According to Marx, dialectic includes "in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it and is in its essence critical and revolutionary".²⁶ (Karl Marx, *Capital* Vol. I).

Dialectical contradiction is universal - it exists in nature, in society and in thinking and consciousness. Contradiction is a category expressing the inner source of all motion and development. By negating one another the opposite aspects pass into one another, become identical and this is a culminating stage of contradiction. When an object reaches the highest stage of contradiction, the prerequisites for its disappearance becomes

ripe, for this stage of contradiction signifies the object's negation of itself within itself through its own development. If the contradiction principle is true then we cannot accept communism as a final stage of development and thus it contains in itself the seeds of its own destruction. It is very difficult to predict to the nature of social evolution after the establishment of communism.

Marxism explains the process of entire social development from capitalism to socialism and from matured socialism to the development of a classless society by the economic laws. But the social development does not take place in a straight line following certain rigid principles, it is so complex and heterogeneous that it is impossible to explain it by strictly adhering to a single concept. If we analyse the history of different revolutions, it is evident that it often depends upon trivial and fortuitous events or causes other than economic factors. Bertrand Russell observes:

"Admitting that the great forces are generated by economic causes, it often depends upon quite trivial and fortuitous events which of the great forces gets the victory. In reading Trotsky's account of the Russian Revolution, it is difficult to believe that Lenin made no difference, but it was touch and go whether the German Government allowed him to get to Russia. If the minister concerned had happened to be suffering from dyspepsia on a certain morning, he might have said 'No' when in fact he said 'yes', and I do not think it can be maintained that without Lenin Russian Revolution would have achieved what it did".²⁷ (Quoted by Joad, Introduction to Modern Political Theory - p. 715-716).

It is asserted that there is an inevitable progress in human history through different stages of economic development. This assertion implies that human free will has nothing to do with such a change. Are men then

mere tools in the hand of historical forces governing the social change and development ? It is as if these changes do not require any thought-out plans and purposes by men. It must not be forgotten that the historical forces which make the progress inevitable are not blind and mechanical as the so-called forces of physical nature, nor it be forgotten that within the order and integral to its structure there appear occasionally outstanding individuals who like, Karl Marx, himself, envisage what they take to be better order and proceed to utilise such forces to change the status quo. To overlook such considerations is to overlook the unique feature of social change. The communist revolutions have not taken place in the industrial countries, e.g., in England while in Soviet Russia it has taken place.

According to Marx, there is no teleology or purpose in nature — everything is determined mechanically. Whatever happens in nature, the falling of a stone or the erosion of soil, happens mechanically. Similarly, in dialectical development what happens happens mechanically, there is no purpose or 'telos' behind and beyond it. Plato, like Socrates, believes that the world is purposive. Following Plato, Aristotle holds a world-view thoroughly teleological - everything in the world has what Aristotle calls a final cause or purpose. Another great Greek thinker, Democritus utterly denies plan, purpose or goal or ideals. During the Middle Ages, the world view of Plato and Aristotle finds general acceptance. This view finds its crowning exposition in Dante's *'Divine Comedy'* where the whole universe has been depicted as a grand and mighty drama existing for man and his redemption. That there is a purpose in nature is also supported by Bruno, Newton, Leibnitz, Voltaire, Goethe and J.S. Mill, and many others. But this teleological view has been opposed by Francis Bacon, Descartes and others. Spinoza and Hobbes exclude all teleological notions from their philosophy. The theory of teleology has been rendered a fatal blow by

Darwin's theory of natural selection — it is unnecessary to call in any designing God or even any mystic vital force. But the concept is very useful in the study of life and mind. Even the simplest organism selects certain things and avoids others because they do or do not serve its purpose. No doubt such concepts as purpose, end etc. do not tell the whole story but they are quite as necessary as the concepts of mechanics in coming to an understanding of the facts of life. It is true that the parts of the motor car act not purposively but mechanically, but it is still true that every wheel, bolt, spring, ball has a function to perform and this function may be regarded as purposive as when we think of the whole machine planned by its inventor. Science tells us that every phenomenon in Nature is fully accounted for by the sum-total of physical conditions preceding it. But why must we always think that a thing is to be explained by what goes before ? Why may it not be explained by the end for which it is indispensable ? Kant in his 'Critique of Judgment' tells us that an organism is something in which whole and part are reciprocally determined. A watch is a whole that may be put together out of preexisting wheels etc. But the organism must itself produce the parts of which it is to consist. It is evident that human actions are directed towards ends, they are not wholly blind and mechanical. Whatever we do, we do for a purpose.

The world is a process of realization, an achievement. From the viewpoint of creative evolution there is creative synthesis issuing in novelties and new and higher values. Even the dialectical development is striving towards certain goals — it is not descent but ascent towards self-consciousness, new social order, new humane morality, true freedom — all of which are higher values or ends of life; we may say that it is all a struggle for existence, since these values are the realities of life, the real existences. If we adopt such a view, our view is teleological. Mechanism

and teleology are not necessarily incompatible when we view things within the restricted limits of time and space it may seem to us that the world is mechanically governed, but when we rise above the spatio-temporal conditions and take a fuller view of the world and our life we see it under the aspect of intelligent plan or purpose.

According to Marx and Engels, "law, morality, religion are so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just so many bourgeois interests".²⁸ (The Communist Manifesto of 1848).

This Marxian attitude is vehemently criticised by D.E. Trueblood. In his *Philosophy of Religion* he observes :

"It has neither the belief in the inherent dignity of a man as a child of God, nor the belief in man's chronic sin, which is an antidote to self-righteousness. In short, it misses both sides of Pascal's famous paradox; it sees neither the essential greatness nor the essential misery of man".²⁹

Dr. Radhakrishnan also comments :

"Religion is a dynamic process, a renewed effort of the creative impulse working through exceptional individuals, and seeking to uplift mankind to a new level. If social quietism, which is said to be result of mysticism, is bad, economic fatalism is equally bad. Marx's main intention is to make us dedicate ourselves to the spiritualisation of the collective. By liberating the human spirit we make the world better in the only way in which it can be made, the interior way".³⁰ (Religion and Society, p. 78).

IV

The result of the revolution culminates with the capture of state power by the Proletariat Party in Russia. Faced with the problem of economic construction Lenin quickly realised that Marx had written nothing about it. In his '*New Economic Policy*' he confessed that he knew no book dealing with the more constructive problems of social engineering.

Marxism along with its philosophy of 'dialectical materialism' has become a pervasive ideology of the Soviet state. It is taught in schools, colleges and universities as only truly scientific world outlook. To be deviated from this or to ask question or to raise any doubt as to its genuineness and validity is a worst counter-revolutionary act. The most non-communists, especially social democratic Marxists, would like to say that the Russian Bolsheviks after 1917 had transformed Marxism into a dogmatic theology with a view to justifying one party rule and to establish control over a backward peasant society. They based their theology on the sacred texts, viz., the works of Marx and Engels and placed the faith on the ecclesiastical authority, viz., the communist party of the Soviet union which cannot be challenged. It also recognised official teachers, viz., the party ideologists for propagation of the ideologies of the party. Not only did they hold the un-Marxian notion of a dictatorship over the proletariat but also made Marxian thought subservient to their practical requirements. And the real and critical Marxian Philosophy had been replaced by pseudo-Marxian Philosophy.

The one party rule, the conditions of pervasive censorship, the use of political terror — all these destroy the independence and integrity of Soviet philosophers as a body. To doubt or to question is a crime to be punished by the tortures of a concentration camp. The propounders of

dialectical materialism, viz., F. Engels, G.V. Plekhanov, Lenin, A.M. Deborin, Stalin not only differ from each other in various respects but they, in their attitudes, are very far removed from Marx himself.

Soviet Marxism-Leninism takes two elements for consideration from classical Marxism -(1) Marx's vision of the future communist society which is the ultimate justification of the whole struggle; (II) and the Marxist analysis of class society showing that the 'old world' is both doomed and unworthy of preservation. On the ethical side, the utopian vision takes up the ethics of the free, unalienated, truly humane man while the Critique of Bourgeois civilization places special emphasis on materialist critique of morality - moral codes serving class interests. The third element they take into consideration is the philosophy justifying party's seizure of power on the ethical side, the good is that which promotes the power of the party, and this is tantamount to hold that the 'end justifies the means'. "Our morality", Lenin declared in 1920, "is wholly subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the Proletariat". Trotsky, Zalkind and other party men who devoted attention to ethics echoed these words of Lenin. However certain aspects of truly human morality as envisaged by Marx become part of the official Marxist-Leninist ideology. The abolition of private property, non-exploitation of man by man would produce a society in which individual and social interests will coincide - the worker, through his participation in the revolutionary struggle, has already learnt the principles of new morality of co-operation, mutual help, dedication to a common cause. When all men become workers, when all class distinctions become annihilated, the state, Police force, the bourgeois interest in self-seeking will wither away along with the external moral laws and sanctions. Disputes will be settled on the spot among the comrades, says Lenin.

In the transitional period all the emphasis is to be given on the party and then on the Collective. The party propaganda, the Communist party cells, educational theories - all lay stress on the subordination of the individual to the demands of the collective - the individual's duty is to submit to the criticism of the collective and to identify himself with its will. In practice the group becomes the vehicle for the transmission of party requirements and its demands. In the socialist society Makarenko wrote :

"There should be no isolated individual....., but a member of a socialist collective.....The individual personality assumes a new position in the educational process — it is not the object of educational influence, but its carrier. It becomes its subject, but it becomes its subject only by expressing the interests of the entire Collective".³¹ (Quoted from : Marxism and Ethics, E. Kamenka, P. 58).

Thus the truly human ethics of freedom and the utilitarian ethics of the individual happiness are relegated to the utopian future and Leninist Jesuitism or Machiavellianism and the priority of the collective over the individual form the contents of socialist morality. Now morality becomes the morality of dedicated obedience to the collective. It becomes the end-directed ethics of Leninist Party.

From 1946 onward an emphasis on Marxist ethics and communist morality has been given. In 1951 in a conference the Soviet and Czech philosophers agree that the special courses should be created for the teaching of Marxian ethics. During the time a great deal of emphasis is placed on normative ethical concepts of bourgeois morality such as conscience, duty, etc. The 22nd Congress of the communist party of the Soviet Union in 1961 adopts 'the moral code of the builder of Communism' - its contents, as listed in the programme, are : devotion to communist

cause, love of the socialist motherland, conscientious labour for the good of the society, a high sense of public duty and intolerance of actions detrimental to public interest, comradely mutual co-operation and assistance, humane relations and mutual respect for individuals, honesty, moral purity, uncompromising attitude towards injustice, dishonesty etc.

The new Soviet 'History of Philosophy' now says that Stalin's inhuman and amoral series of actions and his collaborators' participation in it have inflicted serious harm on the communist education of the working men and their needs are utterly neglected. The terrible purges of the Stalin's regime and the second world war also limited the impact of the development of ethical education for a period. Thus in reaction against Stalin's inhuman activities, the emphasis is now given on certain moral values having intrinsic worth of their own such as honesty, sincerity, family love, truthfulness etc. It helps to grow an interest in the philosophy of values and to make morality independent of politics. Though the social interests are not reduced to a summation of individual interests, yet the good or well-being of man is constantly presented as the fundamental norm of Communist morality. S. Utkin, the Soviet Philosopher, depicts it in the following :

"It is part of every man's character to have an internal striving to be better, morally purer, spiritually richer. And this is the command of his conscience, which represents the dictates, first of all, of his closest social surroundings, of the feeling of responsibility before the collective in which he lives and works, before those nearest and dearest to him whose authority and opinion are the highest un-written law for him".³² (S. Utkin : Notes on Marxist-Leninist Ethics, P. 300).

At this time N.S. Khrushchev made certain political pronouncements and as a result the universal human moral values have

been emphasised. These values are distorted in the earlier ages for exploitation but these values are now recognised as having moral significance. L.A. Arkhangel'ski, in his book *'The Categories of Marxist Ethics'* (Moscow, 1963), attempted to build up a system of Categories of morality. Thus there is an attempt to work out a coherent Marxist position in ethics, but the endeavour has not yet been successful. Let us see and note E. Kamenka's evaluation :

"In forty years of philosophical activity, Mitin and his colleagues failed completely to work out a respectable coherent Marxist position in Ethics, or even to address themselves to the real problems of the subject. In so far as Soviet philosophers are beginning to do genuine moral philosophy to-day (and they have yet to make any real or independent contribution to it), they are taking 'the path of eclecticism'".³³ (E. Kamenka, *Marxism and Ethics*, p. 64).

V

Marx's theory of morality, his moral ideas of justice and injustice are by-products of the social and historical development. Karl Popper, in his book "Open Society And Its Enemies", vol. II, has characterised this moral theory of Karl Marx as the historicist moral theory as it holds that all moral Categories are dependent on the particular historical situation and on this view, he holds, we have, instead of one, different forms of morality, viz., feudal morality, capitalist morality and proletarian morality of the future. This Marxist moral philosophy is a kind of relativism in the field of ethics. From this point of view when we ask : Is it right to act in this way ? Our question remains incomplete until we ask the question in its complete form : Is it right to act in this way according to Capitalist morality ?

It is clear enough that this theory depends largely on the possibility of correct historical prophecy. If this is questioned then the theory loses most of its force. Whether we should accept the morality of the future, this is in itself a moral problem. The fundamental decision cannot be derived from any knowledge of the future.

The historicist moral theory, Popper goes on to say, is nothing but another form of moral positivism, for it holds that 'Coming might' is right. The future is here substituted for the present. The difference between the present and the future is only a matter of degree. Had Marx considered these implications he would have repudiated the historicist moral theory. Numerous remarks and actions prove that it was not a scientific judgment but a moral impulse, the wish to help the oppressed, the wish to free the shamelessly exploited workers which led him to socialism. There are others who do not possess this passionate love for humanity of Karl Marx and are moral futurists just because of these implications. Moral futurists forget that we are not going to live to witness the ultimate outcome of present events.

According to Marx's theory all our opinions including the opinions regarding our moral standards depend upon society and its historical state — they are the products of society or of a certain class situation. Such a theory, Popper holds, of this kind which emphasises the sociological dependence of our opinions is sometimes called sociologism. That man and his aims are, in a certain sense, a product of society is true enough. But it is still true that the society is a product of man and of his aims and it may become increasingly so. It cannot be denied that we can examine our thoughts - we can criticize them and improve them and we can change and improve our physical environment according to our improved thoughts. And the same is true of our social

environment. Karl Popper concludes (Moral Historicism - chapter 22) :

"Scientific' Marxism is dead. Its feeling of social responsibility and its love for freedom must survive."³⁴

Hegel advocates moral positivism in the field of ethics. His positivist ethical doctrine asserts that there is no moral standard but the one which exists, that is, what exists is rational and therefore good. In order to establish the dictum : 'might is right', Hegel even goes further, as M.N. Roy says, to rationalise immorality. His ethical doctrine is the other name of moral nihilism. The practical bearing of the theory, on the ethical side, consists in the idea that a moral criticism of the existing state of affairs is impossible since this state itself determines the moral standard of things. Marx's moral theory, he goes on to say, is nothing but another form of moral positivism — practically there is no difference between Hegel's positivist doctrine of morality and Marxist historical relativism. According to Hegel, the 'present might is right' and for Marx 'coming might is right'. Marx projects the Hegelian doctrine into the future and declares that 'coming might is also right'. Hegel says : 'What is is rational' and therefore good; Marx adds that the future will result inevitably from the present; therefore, it will be rational and good. What follows from it is that if at present might is right, it must be in the future as well. As M.N.Roy remarks:

"The Hegelian essence of Marxism as regards ethical problems has been laid bare by the experience of communists capturing power in one country. There; whatever is, is good; everything done for the defence of the new order is moral; might is right. This Hegelian positivist attitude is not confined to Russia, where the communists rule; it is shared by the communists all over the world".³⁵ (M.N. Roy : New Humanism, p. 21).

M.N. Roy also says that the Hegelian influence induces Marx to reject the liberating doctrine of individualism, the individualist approach to moral problem. Unable to be free from Hegelian influence and owing to his fascination for Hegelian dialectics, he has broken away from his original moral radicalism which consists in the desire to help the oppressed, the wish to free the shamelessly exploited and miserable workers accompanied by the strongest moral appeal to change the existing conditions by taking recourse to revolution. This humanistic essence of Marxism is completely forgotten by its orthodox exponents who make a political Jesuitism out of their faith. What does it mean? It means that there is neither good nor bad means; the end sanctifies the means. Lies, treachery, assassination, amoral actions — anything is permissible that leads to the good by the shortest possible route.

Marx envisaged a total regeneration of man in communism which is the solution to the riddle of history. But he is not very clear as to how this stage is to be attained. He says that there will be an intermediary period during which the transition will take place and that will require the dictatorship of the proletariat for its coming into being. But in the higher stage of communist society the state will wither away and men will be truly free and humane in their relations—the guiding principle being : "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs". But how the post-revolutionary society would be politically organised and administered — this question remains unanswered. Marx, however, advocates that at the higher phase of the communist society, the society will be as such that it will require no rule to be imposed from outside and consequently the state will wither away. Lenin characterised this principle — 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs' as a useless slogan and it has been revised in Stalin's constitution — 'from each according to his

ability, to each according to his work'. If the Marxian principle be a useless slogan and Stalin's revision be a tautology, the consequence is that the judgment is left to those who are in power to decide how the distribution of wealth will take place in the new social order. There is no good reason to believe that those who are in power may not indulge in corruption as they have ample opportunities to abuse the power, as the adage goes - 'power corrupts a man', as the history of Russia since the Revolution obviously suggests this. There is also no good reason for expecting that with the economic changes all conflicts of interests will be sub-sided. The state far from withering away has become more powerful in Communist countries.

There are certain elements in Marxism or Marxian philosophy which we cannot but agree. The freedom of man to work for the common good of all, the application of scientific knowledge to produce enough for all, the shortening of the working day along with the facilities of leisure in the free development of their creative potentials, the ideal society in which all individuals will grow as responsible personalities, the conscientious display of duties, the fair method of evaluating work and equal distribution of wealth in the new social order-all these are ideals which almost everyone of us will share; even though it was not clear that they are compatible. Still a vast majority of people share his view and hope for such an ideal society. In spite of the short-comings in the existing Communist countries many people even to-day believe in communist ideologies and feel the need for social transformation or regeneration of the existing conditions of life and look for ideals of Marx for inspiration for such a social change.

Marx's ideas on revolution follow from his general materialistic

views on historical development. It has become customary to treat '*The Communist Manifesto of 1848*' as the theoretical expression of proletarian revolution. During these days Marx has in mind the French Revolution and his thinking centres round the question : why has French Revolution that seems so progressive failed to cure the social evil ? Marx, however, discovers its positive sides, viz., destruction of feudalism, proclamation of equal rights etc. but all of these, he finds, have no influence on the real life which is anti-social in the extreme. Because of the contradiction between the principles of the state and the real life of the citizens Marx characterises it as a mere political revolution. The next revolution, Marx asserts, will be social and not political - it will penetrate to the real life of man, his socio-economic life, it will involve the whole of society. As it is impossible to reform capitalism, violence is inevitable. Marx, in his '*Address to the Communist League*' says that it is the task of the workers to make the revolution permanent until state power has been taken over by the proletariat. And the address ends with the words : the battle cry of the proletarian party must be "Permanent Revolution !"

The radical wing of Marxism holds that according to Marx all class rule is necessarily a dictatorship. A real democracy can, therefore, be achieved only by the establishment of a classless society, by over-throwing, if necessary, violently the capitalist dictatorship. If for attaining the end, viz., communism violence becomes necessary, then workers must use violence in order to achieve their ends.

Here goal determines the means and the moral value of the means is conditioned by the goal itself and hence moral good and means are not only mutually inter-dependent but also correlative.

Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Lev Tolstoy stand opposed

to all kind of Jesuitism which believes in the dictum : 'the end justifies the means' in all cases and violent resistance against evils. They believe in the theory of non-violent resistance to evil. They refuse to recognise that the end can justify the means. Evils must be resisted but not through force or violence, for evil cannot abolish evil just as fire can not extinguish fire. Thomas Aquinas also says that even for good ends we must pursue the right paths and not wrong ones. If any man is ready to use violence, if necessary or when it is called for, we may say that he adopts a violent attitude, whether or not, violence is actually used in a particular case. Stalin's message to Russia : 'It is impossible to defeat the enemy without learning to hate him with all our soul'; and Bismarck's remark : 'The French must be left only their eyes to weep with' - these two remarks make us believe that we must fight evil with evil and believing such a principle and having adopted identical means we degrade or lower our position at the enemy's level. In our fight for justice, the injustice cannot be taken as means and if we take or make use of such a means our real purpose will be defeated. It has a soul-killing virus; it will result in an insanity of the soul for which there is no cure. Our Hindu scriptures look upon non-violence or ahimsā as the highest virtue. If we go to war for a righteous cause after having exhausted all means to preserve peace we are not then worthy for blame. The Bhagavadgīta adopts a similar view, so also the Mahābhārata. We see the Lord Krishna tried all peaceful means of getting justice done even on minimum terms but Duryodhana remained unamenable. Having failed Lord Krishna asked Arjuna, the Warrior, to fight for justice being motivated from a sense of duty against social injustice and selfishness. Gandhiji also advocates the principle of non-violence. According to him it is not weakness or cowardice, but the expression of strength - it is a sharpened weapon not of the weak and feeble-minded but of the brave,

the dauntless. He applies this method to the cause of India's freedom. His non-co-operative movement, the non-co-operation in every spheres of life, teaches us that if co-operation is withheld, the rule collapses. No government can function without active co-operation of its people. The will of the people, not force, is the basis of the state. Gandhiji appealed to the best in us. He insists that we must develop the inner sense of right, we must learn to restrain ourselves. He says : "My non-violence does not admit of running away from danger, and leaving dear ones unprotected. Between violence and cowardly fight, I can only prefer violence to cowardice I began to prize non-violence only when I began to shed cowardice".³⁶ (M.K. Gandhi, *Young India*, 29.5.1924).

"My creed of non-violence is an extremely active force. It has no room for cowardice or even weakness".³⁷ (*Young India* dt. 16.9.1927).

"Every murder or other injury, no matter for what cause, committed or inflicted on another is a crime against humanity".³⁸ (*Harijan*, 30th July, 1935)

"The doctrine of non-violence is not for the weak and cowardly; it is meant for the brave and strong. The bravest man allows himself to be killed without killing. And he desists from killing or injuring, because he knows that it is wrong to injure"³⁹ (*Harijan*, 20th July, 1937).

According to Gandhiji non-violence or 'ahimsā' is the key-note of his philosophy of life - it is a way of life, its precept - 'return good for evil', 'for a bowl of water give a goodly meal', 'the truly noble know all men as one and return with gladness good for evil done'. Gandhiji has a firm faith that we can build a world without poverty, unemployment, without wars and bloodshed following the path of non-violence. It may seem to be a distant elusive goal to be attained, an unpractical utopian end; but,

according to him, we can make a beginning from now on, adopt it as a way of life. And 'now' is the best time to begin with. With strong determination and will-power man can clear away all obstacles in achieving that end. When 'Ahimsā' becomes all-embracing it transforms everything it touches. There is no limit to its power.

Gandhiji's life is a perpetual and continuous struggle against the un-spiritual. He does not indulge in mere formal talks or gossiping and argumentation, he has a fundamental inclination to put everything to empirical test — he puts emphasis on the practical side of every-thing. When he was a mere school boy he read a play about Shravana's devotion to his parents with intense interest— it left an indelible impression on his mind. The agonized lament of the parents over Shravana's death moved him deeply and he used to play it on a concertina which his father had brought for him. Another play, '*Harischandra*', captured his heart. Why should not all be truthful like *Harischandra*? — he asked this question to himself times without number. Throughout his whole life he makes experiments with truth. In the search for truth individual freedom is fundamental - if it is lost, everything is lost. Love of freedom is perhaps the strongest passion of his soul. In 1904 when he was travelling by train, he read Ruskin's '*Unto This Last*' in his way to Durban. He could not get any sleep that night. It brought about an instantaneous and practical transformation in his life. It had worked such a revolutionary change in his life that he determined to change his life in accordance with the teachings of this book. One of the teachings is :

1. 'That the good of the individual is contained in the good of all'.

Gandhiji wrote : "I arose with the dawn, ready to reduce these principles into practice".⁴⁰ (*M.K. Gandhi - My Early Life*, p. 64).

He says in the Harijan Patrika times without number that 'if the individual ceases to count, what is left of society ? Individual freedom alone can make a man voluntarily surrender himself completely to the service of society.....No society can possibly be built on a denial of individual freedom".⁴¹

Gandhiji, like Rabindranath, believes in the supreme power of love. He says in the 'Hind Swarāj' :

"The fact that there are so many men still alive in the world shows that it is based not on the force of arms but on the force of truth or love. Therefore, the greatest and most unimpeachable evidence of the success of this force is to be found in the fact that, inspite of the wars of the world, it still lives on.....Little quarrels of millions of families in their daily lives disappear before the exercise of this force.....History does not and cannot take note of this fact".⁴²

Side by side let us note what Tagore told in the year 1924 in Argentina :

"The perpetual process that is going on in the world around us is a struggle for the victory of love.....if victory were not always being achieved by goodness and beauty, then long before this, everything would have been devastated. We are then faced with this great fact of the existence of the universe. This one fact, that there is still life, proves that life can be and is victorious over death.....This great idea of love, always fighting the sin we have in the heart of our humanity, is the reason why we should not despair over sin".⁴³

In the wake of evil company, Gandhiji did something wrong in the early years of his life. He decided to confess it and ask his father's

forgiveness for wrong-doing for there could not be a cleansing without a clean confession. His father was then lying on a sick-bed. He handed the note of confession to his father. His father read it through and tears trickled down through his cheeks and his tears moved him so much that he wept with his father. Those pearl-drops of love cleansed his heart and washed away his sins. Gandhiji wrote :

"Only he who has experienced such love can know what it is. As the hymn says :

'only he

who is smitten with the arrows of love

knows its power'.

Looking back upon it, the scene was an object-lesson in

Ahimsā, although then I could read in it nothing more than a father's love".⁴⁴ (My Early Life - p. 19)

Modern civilization provides us with ample amenities of life. A variety of commodities are now at our disposal. But they cannot satisfy man for long; his wants are many and know no bounds. Lust, not love, has been increasingly manifested in our society; impulses have been gaining the upperhand in every spheres of life. According to Gandhiji, it is a disease of our soul and its real remedy lies in self-restraint. If the gross sensual enjoyment be the supreme end of human life, it will shorten our lives and transform man into beasts who always wallow in filth like pigs. Man must rise above these ephemeral impulses and above all these things. His appeal to mankind depends on the love of humanity.

The activity of Gandhiji and Tagore centres round the village. Gandhiji established his *Sabarmati Ashram* in the village, not in the city

of Bombay; Rabindranath established his Ashram at *Santiniketan in Bolepur* and his practical activity began in a village of *Surul*. The main purpose of these two Ashrams is not confined in yogic practices or discussion of shastras (scriptures) but for illumining people with the spread of education and bringing about vitality in the villages. Both Gandhiji and Rabindranth are fully aware of ignorance, illiteracy, poverty of the village societies, yet they realise that villagers, the poor peasants have souls but state is a soulless machine. The city dwellers are far inferior in point of character to the villagers - on the one side there is power, authority, accumulation of wealth, but, on the other, the villagers are poor, their pecuniary condition is simply deplorable; yet villages are the centres of prana and vitality. If we want to see the real India we must go to villages. What is needed most is the all-round development of the villages. Gandhiji emphasises on the development of self-sufficient rural economy and the decentralisation of power. However, Gandhiji says that 'in my picture of the rural economy the cities would take their natural place'. Gandhiji's dream of the development of rural economy, de-centralisation of power has not been fully realised. The villages now have become the centres of power politics. The struggle for power in the name of ideal has taken its entry in the villages. What is more important is the party-interest, not the ideal or ethical standards. The situation is worsened more than before.

What constitutes the difference between Gandhiji and Rabindranath? - one of the beloved lady disciples of Gandhiji asked this question to Rabindranath. Rabindranath wrote in a letter to her :

"According to Upanishad the reconciliation of the contradiction between 'tapasyā' and 'ānanda' is at the root of creation — and

Mahatmāji is the prophet of tapasyā and I am the poet of ānanda'.

When Gandhiji says that 'there is nothing wrong in everyone following truth according to his lights and indeed it is his duty to do so', he is practically recognising the diversity in man's approach towards the realization of the One, the Supreme Reality. His life is a perpetual search for and devotion to truth - truth not only meaning veracity, but truth which is synonymous with God. His conception of God is intimately connected with love or non-injury — this love is not sensual, but it is pure and ideal. It transcends all the categories of the world — it is spirit calling to spirit. And God is pure love. This love is eternal. We have it in the depth of our soul — it burns throughout our life with a steady unflickering, inviolable flame. His experiments with truth, his sleepless devotion to truth, is rooted in love. Gandhiji has dedicated his whole life in search for truth—he is free to speak the truth, not free to lie. For the sake of truth he is ready to forsake all, even his life. All short-cuts to achieve the ideal or by force through actions intrinsically evil, according to him, are doomed to frustration. Our struggle against evils, ills of life should be through non-violence and in this struggle our means must be intrinsically good. We are free to sacrifice our lives but not free to kill or injure others. His courage in the fight against evils comes of love. Gandhiji has no direct intuition of God like Sri Rāmkrishna of Daksineswar, yet through his life and personality divine purpose has been reflected.

Dr. Radhakrishnan comments on him : "The world will look back to him some day, and salute him as one born out of his time, one who had seen the light in a dark and savage world".⁴⁵ (Religion and Society - p. 238). His ideals may seem impossible of attainment but his humnism, nobility of motives, love for truth, moral searchings are essential for the

progress of the whole mankind. He has won humanity's profound gratitude for arousing man's conscience from long slumber and channelling his efforts into fighting cruelty, amoralism, oppression and despotism and all kinds of opportunism following the path of non-violence.

"Perhaps he will not succeed", Tagore wrote of Gandhi, "Perhaps he will fail as the Buddha failed and as a Christ failed to wean men from their iniquities, but he will always be remembered as one who 'made his life a lesson for all ages to come'.⁴⁶ (Louis Fischer - "My Week With Gandhi".)

There are fundamental differences between the two thinkers - Marx and Mahatmāji - relating to their views of the universe. Marx is an atheist and adumbrates a philosophy of materialism, Gandhiji is a spiritualist and advocates a theistic view of the universe. In spite of their radical differences, there is a fundamental striking similarity among them and it lies in their ardent love of humanity. An ethical impulse guides Marx all through his life in adumbrating a theory of human freedom, of man as the master of himself, of nature and of history. It is the vision of a fully social man who makes himself the aim and measure of all things. His humanism, his Promethean ethics, contains an element of rebellion which consists in the teaching that 'man is the highest being for man' and it ends with the categorical imperative to overthrow all conditions in which man is enslaved, forced into servitude — it is a tremendous protest against all kinds of dehumanisation. Both Gandhi and Marx are dreamers of dreams — they dream of a society which is free from all exploitation - a world without poverty, without wars and bloodshed. To Marx it is communism which is the real appropriation of the essentially human by and for man, the complete and conscious return of man to himself as a social, i.e., human, man.

It is our rare opportunity that these liberators of mankind came into this earthly existence almost at a same period of time. Though their paths are different, they lead to the same destination. There are bound to be many paths up the steep hill but all the paths meet at the top of the hill. Their views may be either similar or dis-similar but in and through the midst of the two we see a fuller view of life, the whole truth.

Their fundamental concern is man - their immortal faith lies in man, in the very dignity of man.

"Man is the root of mankind". (Marx)

Gandhiji says : *"There are chords in every human heart.*

If we only know how to strike the right

Chord, we bring out the music".

Rabindranath says : *"It is sin to lose faith in man".*

VI

M.N. Roy tells us that it is very doubtful that a moral object can ever be attained by immoral means. When practices contrary to ethical principles and traditional human values are stabilised as the permanent features of the revolutionary regime, the means defeat the end. He observes that the "communist political practice has not taken the world, not even the working class, anywhere near a new order of freedom and social justice. On the contrary, it has plunged the army of revolution — proletarian as well as non-proletarian — in an intellectual confusion, spiritual chaos, emotional frustration and a general demoralisation".⁴⁷ (M.N. Roy - *New Humanism*, P. 34-35).

Now to overcome this crisis M.N. Roy advised us to turn to the traditions of humanism and moral radicalism. For a new philosophy of Revolution we must look back towards 19th Century radicals who, guided by the humanist principle of individualism, realised the possibility of a secular rationalism and rationalist ethics. It is his firm belief that a moral order will result from a rationally organised society. Man is essentially rational and morality emanates from the rational desire for harmonious and mutually beneficial social relations. The reason of man is an echo of the harmony of the universe. Morality must be related to man's innate rationality and because of this man can be moral spontaneously and voluntarily. Reason is the only sanction for morality. As the innate rationality of man is the sole guarantee of a harmonious social order, the purpose of all social endeavour should be to make man conscious of his innate rationality.

The main concern of radicalism is not nation or class but man, the individual man - it conceives freedom as freedom of the individual. As its main concern is man and his freedom, it can be called 'new humanism'. Humanism is called new because it is enriched, re-inforced and elaborated by scientific knowledge and social experience gained during the centuries of modern civilization. According to M.N. Roy this humanism should be cosmopolitan — a cosmopolitan commonwealth of free men and women, a spiritual community not limited by the boundaries of national states. In it all distinctions, class antagonisms will gradually disappear and, according to M.N. Roy, this is the radical perspective of the future of mankind. In his 22nd thesis M.N. Roy says :

"Radicalism starts from the dictum that 'man is the measure of everything' (Protagoras) or 'man is the root of mankind' (Marx), and advocates reconstruction of the world as a commonwealth and fraternity

of free men, by the collective endeavour of spiritually emancipated moral men".⁴⁸

To this we may add what Radhakrishnan speaks of democracy. "Democracy is the political expression of the ethical principle that the true end of man is responsible freedom. Kant's celebrated moral principle, 'So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, always as an end, never merely as a means', is a formulation of democratic faith. In principle, democracy is ethical and therefore universal".⁴⁹

VII

By laying stress on moral aspect of social institutions and society in general Karl Marx shows that a social system can be as such unjust and that if the system is bad and our actions help to prolong the life of socially unjust institutions, then our actions can never be called moral — they are other names of hypocrisy. Our responsibility is to make men free, conscious and co-operative by removing those social conditions which stand in the way of its realisation. This moral radicalism is still alive and it is our fundamental task to keep it alive even in the face of insurmountable difficulties. His followers maintained the habit of confusing problems of moral philosophy with problems of social reforms. They all devoted their attention to the material conditions of life, being guided from their materialistic outlook and they believed that these conditions would bring happiness to all instead of asking the question : what happiness actually means or really is ? They utterly neglected the questions like : what is the true meaning of life ? What is a worthy existence ? How is real happiness attained ? They made ready-made answers covering all situations instead

of helping people to find the right way in their moral searchings and in education and self-education.

To Marx goes the full credit that it was he who pointed out the way to a sociology of morals, to the recognition of moral codes and moral principles. Marxist ethics is the general scientific, dialectical-materialistic methodology of research into the moral process in social evolution. Marx has thus enabled us to see ethical problems from a new angle of vision.

But ethics must take into consideration the spiritual values whose absence makes man's existence purposeless and meaningless. Ethics, through its philosophical tenets and its normative prescriptions, makes its way into the world of moral values. It is not enough to familiarise oneself with the fundamental tenets of ethics. What we need is to live a moral life of fuller self-awareness, a life of the inner spirit. We must cultivate the ideals of sacredness with veracity and sincerity, we must value the supremacy of the spiritual life, the sense of universal brotherhood and love of peace.

The primacy of spiritual values must be recognised. To gain the ends which Marx and his adherents have in view, to achieve a truly humane society, we need a revival of spiritual values - truth, goodness and beauty, '**Satyam, Sivam and Sundaram**'. All other values, political or economic, must have their appropriate places in the totality of values but these values are relative and subsidiary in relation to the higher values of life. Truth is above individual interests as well as group or collective interests. When this ideal of truth and justice is thwarted in a society it leads to utter chaos, egoism and anarchism.

In 'The Logic of Liberty' Michael Polanyi remarks :

"The totalitarianism of the state arises logically from the denial of

reality of this realm of transcendent ideas. When the spiritual foundation of all freely dedicated human activities - of the cultivation of science and scholarship, of the vindication of justice, of the profession of religion, of the pursuit of free art and free political discussion — when the transcendent grounds of all these free activities are summarily denied, then the state becomes, of necessity, inheritor to all ultimate devotion of men. For if truth is not real and absolute, then it may seem proper that the public authorities should decide what should be called the truth".⁵⁰

We should always remember that the state is a means and not an end itself. It is the primary function of the intellectuals to serve the society with intellectual integrity but unfortunately totalitarian regimes subordinate intellectual activities to their own ends.

Marx is no more in the world, but his 'Promethean' ethics, his moral ideals, his love of freedom and justice, his indomitable spirit to bring about a change in the social system, his sympathy for the poor and the lowly are still alive. An intrepid spirit, an almost impregnable will-power and super-human passion for love of freedom and justice are his main characteristics. His sympathy for the working community of the world, the burning sense of wrong, the impulse for great deeds, uncompromising attitude, his moral fervour, his tolerance to the ills of his life, his desire to emancipate the whole mankind — all these make him the true liberator of the whole human race. His vision of a truly free society has not yet been realised and we hope that it will be realised in a near future. Still he has won humanity's profound gratitude as he woke us from our dogmatic slumber in channelling our efforts into fighting against all kinds of opportunism, oppression and servitude. We should not have gone to sleep again - if we do, it is our own fault and for which Marx is, in no way, responsible.

Considering all these points and originality and genuineness of his outlook and his scientific zeal to put everything seriously to empirical test, a willingness to be ruled by observable evidence, an act of faith in man's strong common sense let us end our discourse on Marxist Ethics. May his effort to emancipate men from the bondage of slavery, may his passionate love for the poor and the needy, may his vision of a truly humane society - may all these come to success, may it bring happiness to the unhappy mankind, to the war-worried world.

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