

Chapter IV

MOORE'S CRITIQUE OF NATURALISM : SOME PHENOMENOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS

An attempt will be made in this chapter to delineate some of the important ideas which Moore's ethical non-naturalism embodies. Our concern here is to bring out clearly as to how Moore's theory of ethical values contains an important insight which would seem to bear well on our understanding of values from a phenomenological standpoint. Our point of interest is to focus on the connectedness of Moore's ideas with the way some of the phenomenological thinker, notably Scheler among them, develops the matrix of phenomenological thinking with regard to values. In immediate support of this we may quote the following relevant lines from Scheler's preface to the second edition of his book, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values :

In England, G.E. Moore has set forth similar views (such as those developed by Scheler himself) on many points concerning the problem of values.¹

1. Moore's Non-naturalism

Moore advocates a form of non-naturalism in his theory of moral value by denying the analysability of goodness in any

1 Scheler, M., Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, p.XXI, Translated by Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Fund, North-western University Press, Evanston, 1973.

terms - naturalistic or metaphysical. According to him, "good is a property of certain natural objects" but "good itself is not a natural property".¹ Moore is reluctant to assimilate the value-term "good" to the realm of naturalistic properties, such, pleasure, tall, red etc. The nature of natural predicates is such that they are descriptive in character and they describe the spatio-temporal objects. They are not used to judge any natural object or action whether they are valuable or not. They cannot give us direction to our actions. But, on the other hand, moral predicates, such as, good, right etc. are such that they evaluate our action or prescribe what one ought to do. They provide us with the guideline for doing this or that action as principles of action. In being of distinctive nature, natural terms and value terms should not be confused with each other. If the two are not distinguished apart, according to Moore, a factual science will replace the subject called Ethics. That is, the analysis of value-terms by means of factual terms would cause the occurrence of a factual science, because "analysis" is possible only by another term which would be factual term in nature. Thus, Moore takes the standpoint that maintains the non-identity of value and the naturalistic terms which has come to be known as ethical non-naturalism.

Moore proceeds by clarifying that by "nature", what he means is,

that which is the subject-matter of the natural sciences and also of psychology. It may be said to all that has

1 Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, p.41, Cambridge University Press, 1965.

existed, does exist, or will exist in time. If we consider whether any object is of such a nature that it may be said to exist now, to have existed, or to be about to exist, then we may know that that object is a natural object and that nothing, of which this is not true, is a naturalistic object.¹

With this explanation of what natural object is, Moore goes on to point out that the theory which regards that "good can be defined by reference to natural object"² is called ethical naturalism. To Moore, ethical naturalism is "a particular method of approaching ethics",³ which "consists in substituting for 'good' some natural property or 'defining' good in terms of some natural property, or meaning by 'good' some natural property".⁴

The naturalistic method of approaching ethics reduces the latter to a positive or factual sciences whose "conclusions could be all established by means of empirical observation and induction"⁵ and thus it is inconsistent with the possibility of any Ethics whatsoever. Moore's non-naturalism, it may be pointed out, excludes the use of empirical observation and induction from any ethical enquiry. A moral judgement which is formed by reference to "good" does not need any evidence to be true or false. Ethics which is constituted by using naturalistic

1 Ibid., p.40.

2 Ibid., p.39.

3 Ibid., p.40.

4 Bharadwaja, V.K., Naturalistic Ethical Theory, p.9.
Delhi University Press, 1978.

5 Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.39.

method needs evidence, empirical observation and induction. The factual sciences use the method of empirical observation and induction. It follows that ethics which uses these empirical method or principles can no longer be regarded as ethics. Thus, the naturalistic method of approaching ethics, by using the principles of factual sciences, reduces ethics to merely a natural or factual sciences. Moore's more articulate expression of what ethical naturalism is as follows :

Those theories of Ethics, then, are 'naturalistic' which declare the sole good to consist in some one property of things, which exists in time and which do so because they suppose that 'good' itself can be defined by reference to such a property.¹

It must be noted here that according to Moore, the same type of argument would apply to what he calls "metaphysical ethics" which attempts to define moral predicates in terms of things existing in a supersensible sphere and the fallacy that occurs in this case is given the same name the "naturalistic fallacy". As, Moore says,

the fallacy, by reference to which I define 'Metaphysical Ethics' is the same in kind, and I give it but one name, 'the naturalistic fallacy'.²

Though Moore gives the same name "naturalistic fallacy" to the fallacy which metaphysical ethics commits, he recognises that the case is different since metaphysical properties are non-natural.

1 Ibid., p.41.

2 Ibid., p.39.

The foregoing account is in the way of a brief outline of Moore's model of ethical naturalism which he refutes on the ground that it involves committing what he calls "naturalistic fallacy" by violating Butler's principle, namely, "Everything is what it is, and not another thing" (Bishop Butler).

Let us now try to bring out what Moore means by the naturalistic fallacy and what does making such a fallacy consist in. The term "naturalistic fallacy" has been coined by Moore and it first appears in the following passage of Principia Ethica :

It may be true that all things which are good are also something else. And it is a fact, that Ethics aims at discovering what are those other properties belonging to all things which are good. But far too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good; that these properties, in fact, were simply not 'other', but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. This view I propose to call the 'naturalistic fallacy'....¹

Moore's point here is that all things which are good have certain properties and many philosophers identify goodness with those other properties while defining goodness. This mistake which occurs by defining goodness in terms of some natural property is called "naturalistic fallacy".

We hasten to point out here that Moore, in the above passage, has used the term, "definition" in a different sense

1 Ibid., p.10.

from that of his own. Here to "define" means to "identify" and in his prescribed sense of definition, to "define" means to "analyse", that is to break something in simpler terms. This is the difference between his own sense of definition and that have been used by some other ethical philosophers.

However, the sense of definition suggested by ethical naturalists is not acceptable to Moore. On the other hand, the naturalists, accepting this sense of definition, commit a mistake which has been termed by Moore as "the naturalistic fallacy". The advocates of this sense of definition as identification, according to Moore, have overlooked or denied an important distinction, namely, between goodness and other notions. They confuse one notion or one class of notion with the other notion or other class of notions. And thus, they identify goodness with other notions. Therefore, the naturalistic fallacy consists primarily in the denial of the distinction between a non-natural property called "good" and any other notion. In other words, the naturalistic fallacy consists in identification of "goodness" with a natural property. As Alan White has rightly commented :

In essence the fallacy is simply that of identifying or equating any two notions which in fact are distinct, or of supposing two words to be synonymous which are not.¹

1 White, A.R., G.E. Moore : A Critical Exposition, p.124, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969.

Accepting Moore's distinction between natural and non-natural, we can have four varieties of the same distinction : (i) a natural notion with another natural notion, (ii) a natural with a non-natural notion, (iii) a non-natural with another non-natural notion, and (iv) a non-natural notion with natural notion.

Of these, Moore identifies (ii) and (iv) as committing naturalistic fallacy. He says that to define "good" by naming some "other" property which belongs to things and thus saying that these "other" property is identical with "good" is to commit the naturalistic fallacy. In Moore's own words,

But if he (someone) confuses 'good' which is not in the same sense a natural object, with any natural object whatever, then there is a reason for calling that a naturalistic fallacy; its being made with regard to 'good' marks it as something quite specific, and this specific mistake deserve a name because it is so common.¹

For Moore, naturalism is a particular method of approaching ethics which, in a strict sense, is completely inconsistent with the possibility of any ethics. This method, Moore points out,

consists in substituting for 'good' some one property of a natural object or of a collection of natural objects; and thus replacing Ethics by some one of the natural sciences.²

1 Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.13.

2 Ibid., p.40.

Moore, however, elaborates that in a sense even (iii) also involves committing naturalistic fallacy. When a metaphysical definition is given, then "good" is identified with some other non-natural notion e.g. with God etc. And "the fallacy", he says,

by reference to which I define Metaphysical ethics is the same in kind; and I give it but one name, the naturalistic fallacy.¹

It is to be noted that though he has given the same name "the naturalistic fallacy" to the fallacy which metaphysical ethics commits, he recognises that the case is different, since here the metaphysical properties are different from naturalistic properties.

Now, to our understanding, it seems that Moore does not think (i) as committing naturalistic fallacy. He takes the example about self and pleasure. If someone imagines that when he says, "I am pleased", he means by this that he is exactly identical with "pleasure", then he cannot be said to commit the naturalistic fallacy. Here the person, who identifies himself, is a natural object and his identification of himself with another natural object called pleasure is not, according to Moore, to be treated as committing naturalistic fallacy.² "And", he says,

1 Ibid., p.39.

2 Ibid., p.13.

if anybody tried to define pleasure for us as being any other natural object; if any body were to say, for instance, that pleasure means the sensation of red, and were to proceed to deduce from that pleasure is a colour, we should be entitled to laugh at him and to distrust his future statements about pleasure. Well, that would be the same fallacy which I have called the naturalistic fallacy.¹

In other words, if pleasure which is a natural property is defined in terms of another natural property say, red, then it is to commit "naturalistic fallacy". This point is the evidence to regard (i) as a case of naturalistic fallacy.

Now, it seems that ultimately Moore comes to think that the naturalistic fallacy consists in defining 'good' as something else. That is, to identify or define the simple notion denoted by "good" with or in terms of any other notion is to commit the naturalistic fallacy. As pointed out earlier, violation of Butler's statement which Moore has mentioned at the beginning of his book, Principia Ethica, viz. "everything is what it is, and not another thing" leads to this kind of situation. "It follows", Frankena says,

that views which try to identify it with something else are making a mistake of an elementary sort. For it is a mistake to confuse or identify two properties. If the properties really are two, then they simply are not identical.²

1 Ibid.

2 Frankena, W.K., "The Naturalistic Fallacy"
See Phillippa Foot edited Theories of Ethics, p.58
Oxford University Press, 1967.

It may be worthwhile to mention here in the passing what Moore has to say as to what would follow from committing naturalistic fallacy in ethics. In other words, the naturalistic fallacy "reduces what is used as a fundamental principle of Ethics either to a tautology or to a statement about the meaning of a word".¹

What we have tried to bring out in the present section is the Moore's view that "Good" which is fundamental to ethics must remain what it is and not to be confused with or to be defined in any other terms - naturalistic or metaphysical. For, any attempt to confuse it or identify it with other terms or define it in any other terms would ultimately lead us to no possibility of ethics. Thus Moore's attempt to keep the moral value "good" out of the naturalistic or metaphysical context has a close resemblance with phenomenological perspective which also disregards the appeal of naturalism or metaphysics.

1 Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.xiv.

2. Moore's Intuitionism

In the preface to his book, Principia Ethica, Moore makes a point of fundamental importance, namely, that good stands for something simple, indefinable, non-natural and non-metaphysical "object or idea". Having raised the question, "what is good?" he clarifies that he neither means, what particular things are good? nor what sorts of things are good? The question he raises is one of the definition of good. He writes,

My business is solely with that object or idea, which I hold, rightly or wrongly, that the word ("good") is generally used to stand for. What I want to discover is the nature of that object or idea.¹

The discovery which he claims to have made in the above passage about the "object or idea" good is that it is indefinable.

In Moore's words,

If I am asked 'what is good?' my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked 'How is good to be defined?' my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it.²

1 (a) Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.6.

(b) Moore's concern here is with the ordinary use of the word "good" and what he wants to do is only to characterise it and not to change the meaning of it or to redefine it. But L.M.Loring has pointed out that "the use of 'good' to stand for an object is most unusual, seeing that this word - as Moore himself observes shortly afterwards - is an adjective. Thus it generally stands for an idea, however, may be admitted".

Please see, Loring, L.M., Two kinds of Values, p.130. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1966.

2 Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.6.

We may briefly explicate the sense in which Moore is denying that good is definable. He differentiates three kinds of definition, namely, (i) Stipulative definition or what he calls "the arbitrary verbal definition"; (ii) Lexical definition or what he calls "the verbal definition proper"; and (iii) Definition by analysis "in which a definition states what are the parts which invariably compose a certain whole".¹ This kind of definition gives the analysis of the concept defined, and may be called analytical definition. We are told that in this sense, to define means to analyse² or to break up a complex whole into its simplest constituent parts which cannot further be analysed or broken as they have no parts. This is the kind of definition which, according to Moore "describe[s] the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word".³

This kind of definition is possible only when a word or notion in question is complex. For example, the concept "horse" is not complex but what it denotes is complex for having many different properties and qualities all of which can be enumerated until one arrives at "horse" reduced to its simplest terms which can no longer be defined. These simple

1 Ibid., p.9.

2 In A.C.Ewing's words "he(Moore) uses 'definable' as equivalent to analysable". Please see his book, Ethics, p.87. The English Universities Press Ltd., London, 1969.

3 Ibid., p.7.

terms cannot have definition at all in the above explained sense. And it is in this sense of "definition" that Moore denies definability of "good".¹

Now, it appears that Moore has arrived at the decision that good is indefinable via the concept of simplicity which is possessed by the object "goodness". That is to say, goodness is indefinable² because it is a simple notion. A simple notion cannot be defined in the sense of the definition explained above.

However, in arguing that good is a simple notion, Moore presupposes that an object must be either simple or complex but cannot be both from whatever point of view it is looked at. Goodness refers to a property or an entity having no spatio-temporal existence and therefore has no parts. It is simple. Its simplicity lies in its very nature of its substantial character. The simplicity here consists in indivisibility of what it denotes by conceptual means. In the word of Moore "'good' is a simple notion, just as 'yellow' is a simple notion;

1 Moore says, "the most important sense of 'definition' is that in which a definition states what are the parts which invariably compose a certain whole; and in this sense 'good' has definition because it is simple and has no parts". Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.9.

2 Prof. R.Prasad maintains : "I interpret Moore to be making not a verbal claim, but a substantial claim in asserting the indefinability of goodness". Prasad, R., Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality, p.160, ICPR, New Delhi, 1989.

that, just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to any one who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is".¹

Thus Moore finds analogy between good and yellow.

Goodness, according to him, is like colour "yellow", not in the sense that they have some objective characteristics in common, but in the sense that both are simple, indefinable and immediately apprehensible. As A.C.Ewing puts it.

Goodness is of course a very different kind of characteristics from a colour, but might still well resemble each other in being immediately apprehended and in being indefinable²

We shall later have occasion to appreciate this reflection of Moore when we deal with a similar point made by Scheler.

Suffice it to say here that Scheler too finds values quite comparable to colours in point of both being directly and immediately intuitable. Needless to say that any phenomenological understanding of values — moral or any other — requires stressing that they are object of direct intuition.³

1 Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.7.

2 Ewing, A.C., Ethics, p.88.

The English Universities Press Ltd., London, Impression, 1969

3 The point made here is quite independent of the natural/non-natural dichotomy to which Moore readily resorts.

It seems that when Moore says that goodness, like yellowness, is simple, he means by this that it is conceptually unanalysable, that both goodness and yellowness cannot be broken or analysed in conception or thought.¹ On the contrary, when he says that "horse" is analysable, this does not mean merely that "horse" is physically divisible. It is true that a horse existing in space and time can be physically divided but this is not the point of Moore. He is not at all concerned with physical divisibility of any object. His interest is in conceptual analysis. For Moore, horse is a complex because it can conceptually be analysed. The point is that simplicity and unanalysability are synonymous terms for Moore.

Further, in our daily life one sees different yellow coloured things that have the colour yellow, but cannot explain the nature of the colour if it is not already known. This failure to describe or explain is not due to anyone's lack of verbal ability, but is due to the object's simplicity. Moore argues that this failure to explain or to describe what the yellow is, is the proof that yellow is a simple notion. Similarly, one cannot describe or explain what goodness is.

1 We may mention here Moore's general standpoint with regard to ethical properties, such as, good, in Frankena's words, "Ethical properties, however, are not for him (Moore), mere indefinable natural properties of a different kind - non-descriptive or non-natural".

Franken, W.K., "The Naturalistic Fallacy" in Philippa Foot (ed.) Theories of Ethics, op.cit.

One can have the knowledge of goodness by intuition, but cannot explain conceptually what is intuited. This failure to conceptualise the nature of goodness implies that goodness is simple. In other words, goodness has the property of simplicity which is known when one tries to communicate its nature.

It follows from the above discussion that the nature of goodness can only be immediately apprehended, but it cannot be made known to others in conceptual terms. For, no concept can grasp its real nature. Each one can have the knowledge of goodness by her personal inspection or experience. In J.N. Frindlay's words,

'in itself' good remains a character that must be simply apprehended, that it cannot be further analysed, and only when it has been thus apprehended, and clearly put before the mind in thought, can we come to understand and know various further propositions, necessary and empirical, concerning it.¹

We must hasten to add here that this is a point that comes very close to any phenomenological way of understanding.

It is worth noting that good, for Moore, means "intrinsically good"² or "good as an end" as distinguished

1 Findlay, J.N., Axiological Ethics, p.38. Macmillan and Co.Ltd., London, 1970.

2 Alan White points out, "In his earliest ethical work, Principia Ethica, Moore did not explicitly confine his analysis of the meaning of 'good' to 'intrinsically good' even he had intended, as he later said, to do so". Please see his, G.E. Moore : A Critical Exposition, op.cit., p.122.

from "extrinsic good" or "good as an end". As Moore himself says,

whenever he (any person) thinks of 'intrinsic value', 'intrinsic worth', or says that a thing 'ought to exist', he has before his mind the unique object — the unique property of things — which I mean by 'good'.¹

Or, in Blanshard's words,

'Good' was for him (Moore) the name of a simple 'non-natural' quality present in everything that is good intrinsically. Of course what he is considering is not instrumental goodness, the value of something as a means, but the intrinsic goodness of that which is good in itself or good for its own sake.²

The expression, "intrinsic good" means that the goodness of a thing is intrinsic when its worth depends solely on the intrinsic nature of that thing. If the goodness is intrinsic to a thing, then the goodness of that thing remains static and constant in all respects and under all circumstances. If the judgement of intrinsic goodness, which asserts that a thing is good in itself, true of one instance of the thing in question, is necessarily true of all. Thus the worth of goodness lies in itself and not in anything else. This point is of particular interest to us as it seems to strike a basic chord of similarity with a phenomenological understanding of "goodness" as a value.

1 Moore, G.E. Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.17.

2 Blanshard, B., Reason and Goodness, op.cit.,
George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,
London, 1961.

Further, having taken "good" as intrinsic goodness, Moore recognises that

the goodness of a thing is wholly independent of the thing's relation of anything else; and in particular it is wholly independent of the thing's relation to feeling or desire or will.¹

Thus Paton takes Principia Ethica's one of the main objects as "to refute relativism and subjectivism in ethics".² This point also is appreciable to phenomenological value-theorists. For them, also, values themselves are not relative, but absolute and they are also not subjective.

Moreover, the judgement of intrinsic goodness is incapable of proof or disproof and therefore, self-evident. On the other hand, the judgement of extrinsic goodness is not self-evident and therefore, probable. So, for Moore, the judgement of goodness is only intuitable, as we shall see later on.

Goodness, according to Moore, is known by direct "experience" or intuition. We would stress that this single point is of utmost value to Scheler who quite openly acknowledges it. The starting point for any phenomenological understanding, must be rooted in experience and the mode in which phenomenological essences are supposedly given to intuition. Now what kind of intuition is it? Are there different kinds of intuition? To

1 Paton, H.J., "The Alleged Independence of goodness". Schilpp, P.A. (ed.), The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, p.113. Cambridge University Press, Third edition, 1968.

2 Ibid.

To be sure, Moore differentiates his intuitionism. He says,

that I am not an 'intuitionist', in the ordinary sense of the term The Intuitionist proper is distinguished by maintaining that propositions of second class - propositions which asserts that a certain action is right or a duty - incapable of proof or disproof by any enquiry into the results of such actions. I, on the contrary, am no less anxious to maintain that propositions of this kind are not 'Intuitions', than to maintain that propositions my first class are Intuitions.¹

Intuitionism, for Moore, consists in holding that the propositions of first class i.e. the propositions which asserts what things are intrinsically good are incapable of proof or disproof.

This means that these propositions cannot be proved or disproved since no relevant evidence can be adduced for them. They are true by themselves alone i.e., self-evident. On the other hand, propositions of what ought to exist and propositions of what ought to be done are not intuitively known, for, the ethical ideas, such as, right, duty etc. are derivable from it (goodness).

In the context of establishing the indefinability of goodness, Moore wants to dispel another possible confusion. He makes a distinction between "good" and "the good". The latter standing for "that which is good" while the former refers to an "object or idea", an adjective which is attached to a substantive which has the quality of goodness. For example, in the statement "This pen is good", the adjective "good" is

¹ Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.x.

predicted^{ed} of a substantive, viz., the pen. On the other hand, the good stands for that which is good. It is the substantive to which the adjective "good" will apply. Moore says,

if it (i.e. the good) is that to which the adjective (good) will apply, it must be something different from that adjective itself, and the whole of that something different, whatever it is, will be our definition of the good.¹

"The good" is a complex notion, because it is constituted of two parts, viz. "good" and "thing". And therefore, it is analysable or definable, but "good" is a simple notion, hence it cannot so be defined. Moore concludes that "the good is (to be) definable; and yet I still say that good itself is indefinable".²

To recapitulate, Moore says that "good denotes a simple and indefinable quality".³ Elsewhere he says,

if it is not the case that 'good' denotes something simple and indefinable, only two alternatives are possible: either it is a complex, a given whole, about the correct analysis of which there may be disagreement; or else it means nothing at all...."⁴

1 Ibid., p.9.

2 Ibid., p.9. (our emphasis)

3 Ibid., p.10.

4 Ibid., p.15.

Moore has rejected the first alternative by what is an open question "argument". The second alternative too is rejected by him. According to Moore, good cannot be "nothing" at all. Now, as to how Moore proves that goodness is meaningful, we may turn to Moore's following argument. It seems that if goodness refers to simple property and does not refer to a complex property, then its meaning seems to consist in its reference to something, that is, a simple property. If it does not refer, then it is nothing at all. The meaningfulness of goodness consists in its reference to simple "object". It is also clear from this that Moore supports the referential theory of meaning, at least, in the case of ethical knowledge.

As for the type of property which the word "good" refers to, Moore says that good refers to the same quality in all of its uses, i.e. there is a common quality, the quality of goodness present in all the things about which it is true to say that they are good. It is a quality which is referred to by all good things.

Besides, goodness being a "non-natural" property, Moore holds that it is in the world as irreducible constituent of it. "I do not deny", Moore elaborates,

that good is a property of a certain natural objects : certain of them, I think, are good; and yet I have said that 'good' itself is not a natural property. Well, my test for these too concerns their existence in time.

Can we imagine 'good' as existing by itself in time, and not merely as a property of some natural object? For myself, I cannot so imagine it¹

So, in this view, goodness is a property; it is non-natural property; and, it is a non-natural property of natural objects which is not in time.

It is interesting to note here some points of convergence between the views of Moore and Hartmann with regard to values. These points have well been brought out by Professor Cadwallader² in the following way.

First, both Moore and Hartmann may be said to have advocated Platonism in their theory of value, though in different senses. Hartmann is avowedly a value-platonist; and so, according to him, values are real entities which exists in a realm of their own which is different from that of the natural world such that the values are not perceived or perceivable by the senses. Now, Moore also advocates a form of value-platonism³ though quite in a different sense according

1 Ibid., p.41.

2 Please see, Cadwallader, E.H., Searchlight on Values, Ch. II, University Press of America, New York, 1984.

Also, see her paper with Eisenberg, D. Paul. "Platonism-proper Vs. Property - Platonism". Idealistic Studies, Vol.5, No.1, January, 1975.

3 Professor R. Prasad thinks Moore as a platonist. Please see his article, "Moore's argument for the Indefinability of Goodness", Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality, op.cit., p.157.

to which the value goodness is a "non-natural" property existing in this world as an irreducible constituent of it. Cadwallander describes Moore's value-platonism as "property-platonism" and that of Hartmann's as "Platonism-proper".¹

Second, values have been conceived of by both Moore and Hartmann as ontologically unique in their mode of existence. Values share in some aspects of its existence with some other objects. For Moore, goodness is a simple quality like yellow, on the one hand. And, for Hartmann, values are like mathematical objects, on the other. Further, for both of them, values are different from their analogues.

Third, according to both Moore and Hartmann, values are non-natural. Though for the former, value (goodness) exists in this world, but for the latter, values exist in a different realm of its own which is other than the spatio-temporal world. Further, although for Moore, good is really in the world being a non-natural property, it is "outside of time".² And for Hartmann, a value being an existent of a non-sensuous realm, is also not in time.

Fourth, value is an independently real entity for both Moore and Hartmann, in the sense that according to the former,

1 Cadwallander, E.H. & Eisenberg, D.Paul., "Platonism-proper Vs. property-platonism", op.cit.

2 Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.

value-properties like all other properties are "objective"; and according to the latter, a value is a real existent apart from being known or appreciated. Both of them seem to share value-objectivism. "Each in his own way insists that 'goodness' refers to something objective, that this 'real thing' is not 'merely subjective' despite the fact that actual cases (instances) of goodness always (or, according to Moore, usually involve an experiencing subject".¹

Fifth, a focal point of similarity between the axiological theories of Moore and Hartmann is that according to both these theories, goodness is "indefinable".² However, both Moore and Hartmann adduce opposite reasons for this same standpoint. For Moore, "...good has no definition because it is simple and has no parts".³ On the other hand, Hartmann writes, "good is not definable - neither directly, per genus et differentiam, nor indirectly"⁴ and the reason is that "... Values are many, their realm is a manifoldness; and (2) we know neither

1 Cadwallader, E.H., Searchlight on values, p.42.
University Press of America,
New York, 1984.

2 For Moore's view of it, see Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.9
and for Hartmann's view, see Ethics II, p.172.
Translated by Stanton Coit, George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,
London, Fourth impression, 1967.

3 Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, p.9.

4 Hartmann, N., Ethics II, p.172.

the entire manifoldness nor its unity".¹ Hartmann argues for the indefinability of goodness not because it is too simple but, because it is too complex. Cadwallader further points out,

Hartmann's own reasons for 'good's indefinability' as lying (in part) in the Nietzschean insight that '....we do not yet know what good and evil are....'- meaning that we do not yet know what are all the things that are good - can be understood only in the light of his highly complex axiological theory as a whole".²

Finally, it is important to note that, for Moore, goodness is, first and foremost, a property. For, Moore himself insists that he does "not deny that good is a property of certain natural objects"³ and all properties are in the actual world. Moore's goodness, being a property of natural objects, is in the natural world. But Hartmann's ideal values, by contrast, are not the resident of the natural world and so belong to a different world. Moore's "goodness" cannot, therefore, be regarded as an ideal value in the sense in which Hartmann uses the term.

By way of conclusion, it may be said that our conviction that Moore's notion of 'good' can be understood in phenomenological terms is mainly based on anti-metaphysical and

1 Ibid., Vol.I, p.83.

2 Cadwallader, N., Searchlight on Values, op.cit., p.45.

3 Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.41.

anti-naturalistic attitude of both Moore and Husserl. Moore's reference to "the naturalistic fallacy" seems to have resemblance to Husserl's criticism of naturalistic and metaphysical standpoints. Moore makes an appeal to his reader to move out of the context of the physical world or metaphysical reality which bears a close resemblance to Husserl's view, though they have their two different context of expressing this view.

Husserl's criticism of naturalistic or metaphysical standpoint is in the context of how knowledge is possible where he faces a long-standing and unresolved problem of transcendence. On the other hand, Moore expresses his anti-naturalistic and anti-metaphysical attitude in the context of moral value. When he finds that "good" is defined by many philosophers by violating the principle, "Everything is what it is and not another thing" (Butler), that is, confusing the value, "good" with factual or metaphysical terms. However, the context and arguments of expressing the anti-naturalistic and anti-metaphysical attitude may be different, but it seems to us that within broad framework of phenomenological approach to a possible theory of values relevance of some of the aspects of Moore's theory needs to be duly acknowledged.

In saying that good can be defined independently of naturalistic or metaphysical terms, Moore seems to point to the idea that conceptual or linguistic explanation of "good" is not possible. To him, definition means definition by analysis.

Good is a simple notion and so, cannot be defined in this sense of the term "definition". We find ourselves quite in sympathy with Moore who points to the impossibility of conceptual or linguistic means to expose the nature of them. For that matter, we do not find it out of place to contend here that one had to grasp its meaning-essence only through non-sensuous intuition. A tentative suggestion would be to say that in order to grasp its essential meaning, good has to be given to pure consciousness as meaning or essence.

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