Preface

My interest in Phenomenology goes back to my M.A.days when I carried out a dissertation work on Husserlian phenomenology under the present supervisor. This was perhaps fortuitous in some way as I felt impelled to read on more phenomenological literature which created a disquiet in my mind for not being able to understand many of the basic issues. One such was connected with values, or more specifically, moral values as I tried to figure out how to grapple with the matter from the phenomenological point of view. The present project is a logical sequence to this quest. This is, however, not to say that I have in any way come to a clear solution. The present work, therefore, lays no claim to finality, though a modest attempt has been made to tie up certain reflections and insights as I gathered them from my readings into the works of Scheler, Hartmann and indeed, Husserl. My initial inspiration came when my teacher and the present supervisor drew my attention to the phenomenological significance of Moore's critique of naturalism. My conviction about it grew when I had occasion to discuss the matter with Professor R.A.Mall (Germany). It was again a stroke of luck which enabled my visit to Germany in connection with my research under the kind auspicious of German Academic Exchange Service, Bonn. The vast body of phenomenological literature to which I desperately needed access could materialise

only for my visit to two of the most ancient Universities of Europe - the University of Tuebengen and the University of Freiburg. To any student of phenomenology, it was nothing short of a pilgrimage. The phenomenological spirit lay hold of me as I looked through the old but hallowed manuscripts and other published writings in the libraries and archives of two Universities. This is, however, not to belittle the significance of my meeting with such august authorities of phenomenology as Professor Klaus Hartmann, Professor R.A. Mall, Dr. Adelgundis - the last mentioned being a direct student of Husserl. I would always cherish memories of my visit to Tuebingen University where Professor Klaus Hartmann and his colleagues were only too keen to see that I would persue my task in an intellectually stimulating atmosphere. I am only sad that by that time the project could be completed the benign presence of Prof. Hartmann was around us, but unfortunately, he died of cancer about three years ago. The present project was taken up with a quest for a phenomenological understanding of moral values. For this purpose, the writings and works that we have referred to mainly are those of Husserl, Scheler and Hartmann, though in keeping with the phenomenological spirit, none of them is treated here as a "historical" thinker. The Chapter on Kant has been attempted more as it helps to understand the viewpoints of Scheler and Hartmann. And the Chapter on Moore is only exploratory in our search for some

useful insights which may have some bearing on our central theme. These Chapters, therefore, are not based on any exegitical exercise. The basic objective is to lay hands on whatever insights one could which would contribute to a phenomenological understanding of values, in general and moral values, in particular. Phenomenology speaks of "pure" experience. So our central question is, can there be a "pure" moral experience ? Connected with this are also issues, such as, how are moral values cognised or intuited ? Are they absolute ? Is our perception or intuition of values relative ? In the phenomenological context, in what sense are values given a priori ? And, finally, how does validity of values depend on the inter-subjective ground ? These questions and other related ones have been considered in the context of phenomenological thinking.

A preface is perhaps the only place in a thesis where one may strike a personal note. So, at the outset, I would like here to express my deep and profound gratitude to my teacher Dr. Ranjan K. Ghosh, Reader, Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal under whom I carried out the present research work. Besides supervising throughout, inspite of his heavy preoccupation during the intervening period for which he was Director, I. C. P. R., he found time to go through my first drafts and discuss specific points. His insightful discussions greatly helped me to delve deep into my chosen field of research.

I feel privileged enough to have been able to work under him without whose critical but affectionate guidance, this dissertation, I am sure, would not have been possible. However, for remaining all the inadequacies I alone am responsible.

I am naturally extremely grateful to Professor Klaus Hartmann, Philosophisches Seminar, Tuebingen University, Germany with whom I have had the opportunity to discuss several issues that I have dealt with in the present work. I consider myself to be singularly fortunate that I had the occasion to read with him several portions from the phenomenological texts of Husserl.

I gratefully acknowledge the help received from Professor E.H.Cadwallader, Westminister College, Wilmington, U.S.A. who was kind enough to send me a copy of her book as also a number of her published articles addressed to the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann. I am also grateful to her for the many valuable suggestions I received through my correspondence with her.

I am grateful to Professor R.A.Mall, Bergische University, Germany with whom I discussed some points relating to my project during my visit there. I am also grateful to Professor S.S.Barlingay, Poona University and Professor Kalyan Bagchi, Viswabharati for their insightful suggestion in

connection with the present work. I would also like to record here my gratefulness to Professor Archie J.Bahm, University of New Mexico, U.S.A. Who was kind enough to help me by sending some of his published books and articles on ethics.

I am thankful to the authorities of North Bengal University for providing me with Junior Research Fellowship and also to German Academic Exchange Service, Bonn for a scholarship grant under the scheme of Indo-German Cultural Exchange Agreement which made it possible for me to visit Germany in connection with my Ph.D. work for 3 months in 1990.

I am indebted to the following institutions : (a) North Bengal University Library, (b) National Library, Calcutta, (c) Indian Council of Philosophical Research Library, Lucknow, (d) Philosophisches Seminar Library and Central Library, Tuebingen University, Germany (e) Husserl Archives, Freiburg University, Germany, (f) Husserl Archive, Köln University, Germany.

I am thankful to the colleagues of Sukanta Mahavidyalaya, Dhupguri, Dist. Jalpaiguri for their active and constructive help and support. My special thanks are due to Prof.N.C.Paul, Principal, Sukanta Mahavidyalaya. I also owe a debt of gratitude to the College authorities which helped me by granting study leave which made my task easier and pleasanter.

I am also thankful to my friends Albert MollenKopf, Dietmer Kock and Klaus Bort of Tübingen University, Germany with whom I had weekly meetings to discuss Husserlian texts. I greatly benefited from the academic correspondence with them.

I would also take this opportunity to express my grateful thanks to all the teachers in the Department of Philosophy, North Bengal University who were always a source of great encouragement and support in carrying out the present project. I also take this opportunity to express my thanks to my old teacher Prof. Ranjit Kr. Acharjee, Reader in Philosophy, Ramkrishna Mahavidyalaya, Kailashahar, Tripura who has been a source of encouragement and support all along. It was he who during my student days inspired me to take on philosophy.

I am also thankful to Dr.(Mrs.) Pratima Ganguli, Reader, Bhagalpur University, Shri Asraf Noor, Husserl Archive, Freiburg University and to Shri S.Bhavanandan, Lecturer in Philosophy, A.M.Jain College, Madras for various reasons.

Finally, I am also deeply grateful to my wife Rekha for her untiring care, moral support and encouragement which made my task a little easier.

Benulal Dhar.
(Benulal Dhar)

N.B.U.Campus,
20th February, 1995.

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

When we look back on the broad conspectus of the ethical ideas and theories that have been studied and pursued by academic philosophers in the English-speaking countries during the present century which now is drawing to a close, we find an overwhelming preoccupation with the views of mainly English-speaking philosophers and thinkers. This has, of course, been duly acknowledged by some thinkers and writers on ethical philosophy sometime even with an apologia, such as for example one finds in the book Twentieth Century Ethics. Hancock in his introduction to this book is clearly conscious of this "limitation" as he remarks, "that, unfortunate as it may be, work in ethical theory in the English-speaking countries in recent times has been done independently of work outside these areas."[1] He hastens to add,

> No suggestion is being made that the work of Nicolai Hartmann or Max Scheler, for example, is less important than the work of, say, G.E.Moore or Charles Stevenson. The suggestion is simply that the recent work of English-speaking philosophers in some important sense autonomous and can therefore be treated in a book such as this by itself.[2]

The above-quoted remarks help us to set the perspective for the present project. That there is a lamentable lack of

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1 Hancock, R.N., Twentieth Century Ethics, pp.1-2, Columbia University Press, 1974.

2 Ibid.

due exposure to the tradition outside of what goes on within the English-speaking world, insofar as ethical philosophy is concerned, would be commonly shared by many a present-day scholars even if sometimes pricked by the prefetorial remarks, such as, one finds in Hancock's book. A serious attempt, in our view, is called for in order to remedy the situation by investigating another dominant philosophical trend that has been carried out mainly outside the English-speaking world in the West, namely, the phenomenological philosophy. The present work promises to move in this direction.

Phenomenological philosophy as a systematic movement came into focus with the writings of Edmund Husserl. It was more a "movement" than a set of doctrines; and as a movement it occupied itself mainly with philosophical methodology. For Husserl, philosophy as a "rigorous science" can succeed if only if the starting-point is ceased to be free from all presuppositions and is carried out in accordance with an perfected methodology which always must remain conscious of itself. That Husserl was deeply interested in ethical philosophy as well has been widely acclaimed by most phenomenological thinkers. In the words of Marvin Faber who himself a student of Husserl

> In the writings published during his life time Husserl showed that he also had in mind the experience and nature of values, and what he stated indicates the direction of his ethical thought. The ethical manuscripts left at his death give a greater indication of his

> conception of the phenomenology of values. . . . . Husserl's serious interest in ethics is shown by the number of times he elected to give lectures and seminars on that subject.[1]

As these manuscripts (both published and unpublished) are not available in India and many of these are yet to be translated into English, we are unable to incorporate Husserl's own views with regard to values in the present project. For that matter, a more daunting task lies ahead of us i.e. to be able to work out and develop a phenomenological framework within which the more concrete issues relating to ethical knowledge may be considered and investigated further. Though the task is difficult, it is not wholly unattendable. For, besides vast store of Husserl's writings (take into consideration only English translation alone) which deal with various aspects of phenomenological philosophy and in which pregnant suggestions and hints with regard to the moral realm are not difficult to come by. There are also at least two important continental thinkers in this tradition, namely, Nicolai Hartmann and Max Scheler. The latter two philosophers have paid exclusive attention to the theory of values, in general, and moral values, in particular, generally within the broad framework of phenomenological thinking. It would therefore be necessary for the present work to sharpen the focus more clearly on the writings of Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann with a view to drawing their insights into the nature of moral values and other related issues.

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1 Farber, M., Phenomenology and Existence, pp. 185-86 Herper & Row Publishers, New York, 1967.

But for undertaking any systematic investigation, it is sometimes helpful to cast the net wide and far. Such a move would be inspired by the hope that importance may be gleaned from the sources that are not accredited as phenomenological. As thinkers, such as, G.E. Moore who is only too readily assimilated into the English-speaking tradition of analytic or linguistic mainstream provides an important clue to our understanding of the phenomenological idea of the critique of naturalism. As Farber points out,

> With no apparent conscious motivation, a writer like G.E. Moore appears to point to an impasse to naturalism in ethics, and to be trying to achieve what idealists in Germany had wanted to accomplish in more elaborate ways.[1]

It may be relevant here to mention that Moore himself found his views as worked out in Principia Ethica "closely resembling" those of Frant Brentano and acknowledges this fact in the preface to his book.[2] This is of some significance because Husserl's own debt to Brentano in developing the notion of intentionality can hardly be lost sight of.

Now, it may be worthwhile to ruminate the idea that values play a central role in practical decision-making in everyday life as well as in all areas of human life, such as,

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1 Ibid., p.166.

2 Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica pp.x-xi, Cambridge University Press, 1965.

in economic theory, there are value-decisions of prices or wage etc.; in political theory, conceptions of public welfare cover a vast valuation structure; in aesthetic studies, the reviews of picture, movies and paintings are nothing but the value-studies; in judicial process, the judgements that passed are value-oriented. Needless to say that in the case of d conduct, values are essential by way of norms or standards of evaluation. Thus all areas of human existence not only deals with values but also embody them.

In the context of such a vital role of values in all areas of human existence, philosophers naturally feel the need to have an organised framework of values or valuational principles. Thus from ancient times[1] down to the present era numerous attempts have been made in order to describe the phenomena of values even though from different perspectives and directions.

It would appear to an observer of western intellectual scene that the two tradition of philosophizing, namely, the analytic and phenomenological grew almost in waterlight compartments alongside each other. Moore, at the beginning

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1 We are quite aware that the term "value" in the current sense has come to be use only in the 18th century. The Greeks used the term "virtue" (which is not synonymous with "value") corresponding to the modern notion of obligation. In 18th century, Richard Price and Hutcheson have been concerned with understanding the nature of values to give ethics a concrete foundation. I owe this point to Professor Klaus Hartmann, Tuebingen University, Germany with whom I had privilege to discuss this project when I visited Germany in 1990.

of the analytic tradition, makes out a strong case for the need to study and clarify the nature of values and other related issue of ethics "in a 'meta-ethical' rather than a straightforwardly ethical perspective."[1] For him and other thinkers in this tradition the complexities arise in the moral matters are due to our vague understanding of the moral concepts and language. Naturally, there is an appeal by these philosophers to dispel such complexities by means of conceptual and logico-linguistic analysis of the value-concepts and value-judgements.

Now, the thinkers in the phenomenological tradition, if this be construed in somewhat flexible terms, attempt to give an account of the value-phenomena as such purely in terms of contents of consciousness. The issues raised here related to the domain of values are different from those that the analytic philosopher deals with. Though the writings of Meinong and Brentano may be taken to be the precurser of such approach, a pure phenomenological foundation is seen to begin with the writings of Husserl.

At this stage, we may address the following two quiries : (a) In what way is it a challenge for a phenomenological thinker in having to deal with values, in general and moral values, in particular and, (b) how does the phenomenological thinker

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1 Findlay, J.N., Axiological Ethics, p.3 Maxmillan & Co.Ltd. 1970.

justifies the legitimacy of applying phenomenological methodology in dealing with matters relating to values. We may first take up (a) as that would facilitate also our task of making clear the issue raised at (b). It may be pointed out that Husserl by his advocacy of the "pure phenomena" or "experience" seems to lay himself open to the charge of following out a methodology which is subjectivistic. In order to bring out the tension that phenomenological thinking suffers we can do no better than to quote Liverziani who brings it out in sharp focus.

> But is it not a contradiction of terms to speak of an a priori experience ? Would it not be better to conclude quite frankly that even a moral, spiritual, metaphysical, religious or mystical experience, each in its own peculiar manner, is something that comes to us a posteriori? We could do this only once we succeed in ridding ourselves of the prejudice (an inveterate one, unfortunately) that one can only have an experience of the physical, natural, mundane realities. If even values, as Scheler defines them, are de facto realities and possible objects of experience, and are so precisely because they are values, why should it not be possible to qualify the Absolute in an analogous manner ? Why should we not speak of an absolute reality, object of an experience, object of an experience of the Absolute?[1]

In other words, the charge of subjectivism against phenomenological methodology hangs over it like proverbial democles' sword and as any wrong move would only hasten its fall. So in dealing with this tangible world and its existence Husserl cautiously carves out the method of bracketing which, according to him, promises

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1 Liverziani, F., "Value Ethics and Experience" A.T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol.XVI, p.275, D.Reidel Publishing Company, 1983.

to result in eidetic essences. Now, the domain of values is far different and less tangible than the domain of worldly objects and events. This throws a greater burden on the phenomenological thinker or else it would be easy target of attack for subjectivism. Any phenomenological approach to values must, therefore, ensure that in the ultimate analysis the values would emerge as objectively real and eternal. If this caution is not heeded, such an attempt would lapse into mere subjectivism and the critics will be too oblige to slap back this charge on phenomenology.

And now for the legitimacy of the phenomenological method in dealing with values and other related issues. Now, what in the foregoing analysis has been shown to be the weakness of phenomenological method may now be termed as its strength also. For, values and not facts are more easily amenable to the kind of experience that has been advocated by Husserl and his followers. In support of this point, Paolo Valori has this to say :

> .... it is in moral philosophy that one perceives better the deficiency in both the positivist thesis already mentioned - the reduction of knowledge to empirical verification - and the logistic position - the reduction of knowledge to tautological judgments. In short, neopositivism's famous "principle of verification" can be clearly recognised as expendable.[1]

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1 Valori, P., "Phenomenology of Personalistic Morality" Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol.VI, op.cit., p.82.

Valori further explicates in support of his arguments that what the phenomenological method does is,

> to derive ethics not from a metaphysical structure systematised in advance and therefore a priori, but from an authentically verified description of the phenomena of conscience. In a word, it is necessary to begin building the moral edifice from solid ground rather than from the roof. In this perspective the phenomenological method proves very useful as an introduction to a morality existentially lived and at the same time removed from a relativistic and historicist situationism.[1]

That Husserl would have wholly supported such a move, Valori maintains, is evidenced from what he has to say in Ideas I and Logical Investigations where Husserl states that "the object (Gegenstand) of phenomenological research can be .... a thing, an event, a mathematic statement, a being, an 'ought to be' (Sein wie ein Sein Sollen)."[2]

Thus instead of deriving ethics from a systematised metaphysically a priori structure, phenomenological founding of morality provides us with a ethics derived from an authentically verified description of the phenomena of values. Indeed Valori goes so far as to maintain that

> if there is an area in the phenomenological method finds greater realisation of its potential, I might even say, finds its vocation, it is the precisely in the field of morality.[3]

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1 Ibid.

2 Quoted in P.Valori, "Phenomenology of Personalistic Morality" op.cit., p.81.

3 Ibid., p.82.

So our objective in the present dissertation is to consider the ethical views of some phenomenological thinkers who have clearly shown the legitimacy of applying phenomenological method in ethics. Thus, for example, "extensive and splendid works of Max Scheler have demonstrated beyond any possibility of doubt the fruitfulness of the phenomenological method when applied in a creative manner to moral research."[1]

So, it may well be justifiably maintained that phenomenological method has a greater relevance in value research. One who has developed the phenomenological insight may be able to understand how this insight is very useful to have the grasp of values. The phenomenological method, if creatively applied, can be a better way to get access to the world of values. For one thing, this method is not concerned with facts but with pure essences. On the other, ethics is not concerned with facts i.e. not with describing the actual conduct of human beings. Rather it is concerned with evaluating the conduct of persons and therefore it is concerned with values themselves. And these values may be pure essences of phenomenological type. Further, the phenomenological method seeks to set aside all metaphysical and naturalistic considerations while describing the experientially pure phenomena. Similarly, the essence of ethics is values which are not the furnitures of the physical world. They are

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1 Ibid., p.81.

non-empirical, pure phenomena. Thus it seems clear that the values can be the pure objects of phenomenological research rather than the objects of empirical knowledge. The moral philosophers belonging to phenomenological tradition use the phenomenological insights to understand the problem of values without always adhering to the original meaning given to them by Husserl. But they share some phenomenological ideas which apply to values.

First, we may begin by pointing out the general phenomenological view with regard to values. All phenomenological ethicists are anti-naturalistic, in the sense that they reject ethics based on inductive experience. According to them, values cannot be explained or understood in terms of natural objects (or, that which are valuable). Even Husserl is said to have maintained the same standpoint as he does in his theoretical philosophy. In the words of Shmueli,

> Against naturalistic theories Husserl stresses the difference of values from physical or psychological qualities. They have their own general essence, and their validity does not depend on their actualisation in reality which is the domain of the time and space dimensions.[1]

Similarly, Hartmann and Scheler, as we shall see, in opposition to naturalism develop their views about values. Further, the

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1 Shmueli, E., "The Universal Message of Husserl's Ethics : An Explication of some Ethical Premises in Transcendental Phenomenology", Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol.XXII, p.554 D.Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1987.

phenomenologists in general, and Scheler, in particular maintain anti-metaphysical attitude towards ethics. But Hartmann, though he incorporates a handful of phenomenological ideas in his value-ethics, avowedly compares values with Platonic Ideas.

Second, all phenomenological ethicists share the view that values are essences in the phenomenological sense, though they differ with regard to the ontological status of them. While Scheler takes values in the sense of Husserlian "essence", Hartmann, who also calls them "essence", takes them on Ratonic lines.

Third, values are a priori as they are not available in the natural world of space-time. They are apriorically given to our feeling; no intervention of senses is required. This has been recognised by both Hartmann and Scheler. Even Husserl is said to have shared this view. In Shmueli's words, "....values themselves are based on an a priori structure."[1] Shmueli further says that "Husserl's problem was finding the a priori concepts and rulings of ethical foundations and evidence for their origin and essentially a priori eidos."[2]

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1 Ibid., p.554.

2 Ibid., p.553.

Fourth, values are ideal objects for all the phenomenological ethicists, though they are not quite unanimous with regard to the meaning of the term "ideal". As Farbar says,

> The phenomenological view of values, which is 'eidetic' in its Husserlian form, is developed to operate abstractively with values as ideal objects. It is important to trace those idealities back to their own sources, to the realities of history and natural experience, if they are not to lose their instrumental function, and if they are to conform to the rules of good behavior of ideal objects. They must touch the earth in order to reach the sky, and do so repeatedly if they are to remain in the sky, where they belong.[1]

Both Husserl and Scheler seem to share this view. Husserl's view on the matter is brought out by Shmueli as follows :

> A value is an ideal construct produced by a theoretical activity which has as its material foundations will and emotions.[2]

Scheler, as we shall see, borrows the Husserlian sense of "ideal" to describe the value-phenomena as ideal entities like the species "red".

Fifth, for the phenomenologists in general, values are indefinable. As values are phenomena, they cannot be defined.

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1 Farbar, M., Phenomenology and Existence, op.cit., p.193.

2 Shmueli, E., "The Universal Message of Husserl's Ethics, An Explication of some Ethical Premises in Transcendental Phenomenology", Tymeineika (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol.XXII, op.cit., p.554.

E.g. "definition of the phenomena, according to Scheler essentially/anyhow...."[1] Thus phenomenologists rejects logico-linguistic analysis of values as they are not concepts. It may, however, be noted that Hartmann also adduces other reasons for the indefinability of values.

Sixth, "the pure phenomenological treatment of values", Farber points out,

> proceeds from feelings, desires, and insights as such, manifested in experience by persons as such, all viewed abstractively and 'essentially'. But the structural study of the modes of experience should not lose sight of the ways in which feelings and desires are conditioned in a given cultural system.[2]

Husserl is said to have subscribe to the same view as Shmueli remarks on his behalf that "no ethics can be conceived without a theory of emotions (Gemiitsreich) and desires."[3] Hartmann and Scheler also have put emotion rather than intellectual grasp at the centre of value experience. Thus they are opposed to adopt rationalism in apprehending values. For them, values are given a priori to emotional intuition.

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1 Spiegelberg, H., Phenomenological Movement, Vol.I. p.243. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1971.

2 Farber, M., Phenomenology and Existence, op.cit., p.194.

3 Shmueli, E., "The Universal Message of Husserl's Ethics : An Explication of some Ethical Premises in Transcendental Phenomenology", op.cit., p.554.

Finally, the phenomenological way of thinking regards values as something "material" or as contentful. They are not "formal" as Kant conceives. Scheler and Hartmann criticise Kant's "formalism" and show how formalism brings disastrous results in the domain of ethics. The values are eternal, immutable and absolute and "material" in nature.

As we have already mentioned, Husserl is said to have dealt with ethical problems though in a marginal way. It was Max Scheler (1874-1928) who develops a full-fledged value-ethics which is based on Husserlian phenomenology. His basic phenomenological ideas follow an unorthodox interpretation of Husserl. By setting forth his critique of Kant, he goes on to found an ethics that will not be a formal one (that which prescribes duty for duty's sake), but rather will be material (that is to say, having a content, namely, value with respect to which a duty is finalised), — a system of ethics that will be both material and a priori. Scheler accepts Husserl's fundamental methodological principle to "approach the 'things' themselves" without assumptions and to describe phenomena as they are "given" to consciousness. He attempts to elaborate a phenomenology of feeling in and through which values are apprehended, though this kind of feeling is quite different from the mere feeling-states which are in the nature of "blind" drives. Thus Scheler's value-theory is essentially based on the phenomenological ground.

On the other hand, Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) founded his value-ethics on platonic structure of thinking but not without borrowing some important phenomenological insights. His book Ethics is as much a work in the general theory of values as it is in ethics. Like Scheler he too builds up a non-formal ethics. He also shares some of the views of Scheler. For example, Hartmann accepts Scheler's contention that values are given a priori to intuition by means of emotion. He subscribes to Scheler's view that values are eternal, immutable and that only the perceptibility of them differs from society to society. However, Hartmann parts company with Scheler in maintaining the opposite theory that higher values (moral values) are dependent on lower values (goods-values).[1]

It is of some significance that both Scheler and Hartmann, more Scheler perhaps than Hartmann, have delued deep into Kant's ethical views as they developed specific and pointed arguments against Kant's formalism. This, in a way, helps them systematize their views in the manner that they do by making out a strong case for an ethics rather, which as opposed to being formalism, seeks to come to grip with the contentful nature of values. For the present project, it is therefore necessary to look at the charges that the two philosophers make

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1 Another little known phenomenological ethicist who is said to have made significant contribution to value-ethics and whose works had drawn the attention of Nicolai Hartmann is Hans Reiner (1896-). Please see, R. Gortzen, "Duty and Inclination : The Phenomenological value-ethics of Hans Reiner". The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol.25, 1991, p.119.

against Kant's ethical views. In Chapter III, an attempt will be made to consider some of these charges. As has often been pointed out by various thinkers, Kant's formalism in ethics marks a watershed in the history of western ethical thinking. The views of Scheler and Hartmann will be of great value insofar as they will help us to understand the phenomenological approach in certain perspective with which most of us are familiar.

Of no less importance is the critique of naturalism that Moore develops in his own writings. It seems to ring a bell when he considers his views in the close proximity with some of the key ideas of phenomenological thinking. As has been earlier pointed out, Moore's own acknowledgement of the similarity of his views with those of Brentano provides sufficient justification for considering his non-naturalism, even though his main objective may have been to give a meta-linguistic turn to the central questions of ethics. In Chapter IV, an attempt is made to look at some aspects of Moore's ethical views.

Hartmann's own substantive views on values in general, and moral values, in particular have two-fold significance. He conceives values as eternal, immutable and ideal along the lines of Platonic tradition. For this, he comes to be dubbed as a

value-platonist.[1] Is he really a Platonist ? And if so, how does he comes to the phenomenological way of understanding ? On the other hand, Hartmann also advocates a kind of value--relativism and so the question arises, how does he reconcile value-relativism with value-absolutism ? This two questions will engage us in Chapter V in which some light will be thrown on how and in what sense does Hartmann contribute to the understanding of phenomenological ethics of values.

Max Scheler will naturally be the centre-stage of our study as a thorough-going phenomenological thinker who sets his face formally against any metaphysical turn in keeping with spirit of Husserlian methodology. Scheler, like Hartmann, stands for value-absolutism without, however, looking to Plato for any inspiration in this regard. Scheler too speaks of relativity in "perceiving" values, though meticulously safe-guarding his standpoint of value-absolutism. In Chapter VI, some of these issues will be considered at some length. Scheler and Hartmann provide two different ways of approaching values, though the conclusions they reach are marked by striking similarities.

In the concluding Chapter VII, some general insights will be drawn from the maze of details that will by then be available to us from the various sources.

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1 Please see Cadwallader, E.H., Searchlight on Values The University Press of America, Lanham, 1984.

Now, in order to bring out all these points as we proceed with the project on hand, it may be useful to deal with at some length the various aspects of phenomenological method on the basis of the writings of Husserl which are easily accessible to us. We shall undertake this in a systematic way in the following Chapter, that is, in Chapter II.

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Chapter II

PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD AND PERSPECTIVE

The word "Phenomenology" is used by Husserl to denote a method as well as a discipline or a system of thought.[1] It is true that no method can wholly be divorced from certain presuppositions in the content of thought. But in the case of phenomenology, the intertwining of method and content is so close that it often appears doubtful whether purely methodological ideas can be distinguished at all from their actual content. The reason perhaps is this that the phenomenological method is not devised by keeping itself free from the actual content at any particular stage of Husserl's philosophical career. Rather, it is a product of gradual development of his philosophical thought. It remains always in the making through a number of intellectual periods of Husserl's thought. Inspite of having this dynamic character of Husserl's philosophical investigation, it has developed a definite philosophical perspective which persists through all the changes. This philosophical perspective

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1 Husserl says : "Phenomenology : this denotes a science, a system of Scientific disciplines. But it also and above all denotes a method and an attitude of mind, the specifically philosophical attitude of mind, the specifically Philosophical method."

Husserl, E., The Idea of Phenomenology, pp.18-19. Translated by W.P. Alston and G.Nakhnikian, Martinus Nishoff, The Hague, 1964.

consists of the following basic ideas : I. The Ideal of Presuppositionless Philosophy, II. The Technique of Phenomenological Reductions, III. Transcendental Consciousness; Its Intentional Character, IV. The Concept of the Ego, V. Transcendental Subjectivity, VI. Phenomenological Constitution. Let us now give a conceptual elaboration of these key issues in the following :

I. The Ideal of Presuppositionless Philosophy

The first and foremost methodological principle of philosophy, according to Husserl, is that it must be free from presuppositions. In paragraph 63 of Ideas I, Husserl says : "it (Phenomenology) demands the completest freedom from all assumptions."[1]

The term "presupposition" harbours some ambiguity. Its literal meaning is that which is "posited as holding or existing in advance".[2] Broadly speaking, it refers to any kind of supposition or assumption. It may be in the sphere of ideal or material, a process of experience, a realm of existence or a formal principle.

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1 Husserl, E., Ideas, p.187.
Translated by W.R. Boyce Gibson, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 5th Impression, 1969.

2 Farber, M., The Aims of Phenomenology, p.20.
Harper Torch books, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1966.

It is to be noted here that phenomenological method is entirely oriented toward one goal, that of founding philosophy as a "rigorous" and first science. By "rigorous" Husserl means that which does not take anything for granted without giving sufficient reasons for it. The de facto sciences which we have today are not "rigorous" in this sense since they are full of unjustified presuppositions which they cannot validate in their own framework. E.G., Newtonian physics cannot justify its laws of motion which are its vital presuppositions. Philosophy, in order to be rigorous science, must satisfy the requirement of freedom from presuppositions - all assumptions which cannot be justified in terms of phenomenological intuition.

According to this ideal, one cannot assume anything or take anything for granted unless there is proper reason for accepting it. Our acts of thought refer to external or even non-existent and ficticious objects. But the assertions concerning these objects cannot be assumed to be true when one is engaged in philosophizing. The "Physical" and "psychical" realities that transcend consciousness, cannot be taken for granted. A true philosophical discipline is not at all concerned with the questions relating to the existence or non-existence of "physical" and "psychical" realities. Rather, it should remain indifferent to them. For Husserl, the metaphysical questions i.e. the questions about the nature and existence of the external world or reality are quite irrelevant to philosophy which would claim itself to be a

rigorous and first science. No assertation can be made of real existence and hence the premises which are drawn from metaphysics, natural science and psychology are totally irrelevant to erect a philosophical edifice which would be a strict and ideal science. Such a scientific philosophy would give strict foundation to all empirical sciences. According to Marvin Farber : "It is this metaphysical, natural-scientific and psychical freedom from presuppositions and no other kind, that Husserl proposed to realise at this time." [1]

Husserl claims that the method of philosophy is to be "radical" in the sense that it does not take for granted any assumptions, beliefs regarding the existence of physical and psychical things. Even the physical existence and psychical faculties of one who is philosophising cannot be presupposed. For, if once anything is presupposed dogmatically while one has to build up a system of scientific philosophy, then there is a possibility of the philosophy to turn out to be a dogmatic one which cannot have a scientific knowledge. The hidden presuppositions may vitiate the whole of philosophy and as a result, the conclusions reached by such philosophy may collapse into nothing. The natural sciences and psychology take things for granted in their pre-given conditions. Inspite of having a critical attitude of their own, natural sciences as well as psychology

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1 Ibid., p.32.

assume the physical and psychical facts beforehand. They never question the natural attitude which harbours the so-called scientific and pre-scientific statements. The spirit of a strict or 'rigorous' science would be to count nothing as really scientific which cannot be fully justified by the evidence. Hence, philosophy must realise this spirit of a strict science in order to be a source of all apodicticity.

In short, Husserl's methodological principle of presuppositionlessness requires that all scientific and prescientific statements of the assertations concerning the existence in space and time, causal connection etc. must never be presupposed. Rather, they must be eliminated in order to satisfy the methodological requirement of a scientific philosophy which is expected to provide a strict foundation for the de facto sciences by making possible a methodological reform of all of them. No unexamined assumptions or hypotheses or prejudgements relating to natural world can be accepted unless there is any reason for clearly positing them. And this would be the basic spirit of a "rigorous" science - the Husserlian designation for "Philosophy".

It must be noted here that by setting down the ideal of presuppositionlessness in his procedure, Husserl does not try to eradicate from his method all kinds of assumptions and thereby to begin philosophising from nothing. In his "Introduction" to the English edition of Ideas I,[1] Husserl has made a distinction between

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1 Husserl, E., Ideas, p.28, op.cit.

"presuppositions of a positive kind" and "the totality of presuppositions that can be taken for granted." The latter kind of presuppositions must always be there from where philosophy begins its journey. It is an absolute basis, a ground of unquestioned being, in which all means of solution must be contained."[1] This is referred to as the subjectivity of consciousness - "a self-evident basic requirement of any rational method."[2] Thus phenomenological method assumes at least one self-evident principle as its point of departure, though it is not explicitly acknowledged to be a presupposition.

The ideal of presuppositionlessness is a basic but important principle of phenomenological method. Husserl wants to establish philosophy on a basis of unimpeachable rationality which claims to be rigorous from its earliest beginnings. And this ambition can be fulfilled, Husserl realises only by the rigid application of phenomenological method having the scientific rigor of being presuppositionless. For Husserl, "to be presuppositionless" and "to be certain" are synonemous expressions. The main spirit of the ideal is that one must proceed towards establishing a source of apodictic knowledge by thoroughly and systematically examining all the naive beliefs and prejudices and

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1 Husserl, E., "Phenomenology". Translated by Richard E. Palmer and published for the first time in Ecyclopeadia Britannica (1927) and included in Husserl : Shorter Works P.McCormik and F.Elliston University of Notre Dame Press, 1981.

2 Ibid.

thus nothing is left which is open to doubt. The unjustified assumptions may contain something which may vitiate one's whole philosophical endeavour or may reduce it into a dogmatism. It is only the procedure of presuppositionlessness which guarantees philosophical thinking as having scientific rigor.

II. The Technique of Phenomenological Reductions

As a matter of historical record, philosophy is said to have originated when man begins to question the world which is "spread out in space endlessly and in time becoming and become without end"[1] and seeks to have a rational foundation for it. To demand a rational foundation for the world is to take a radical attitude to it. Instead of accepting the natural world which the natural attitude demands, one has to take a changed or radical attitude to provide a rational foundation for it. This departure from the naturalist attitude to a truly philosophical attitude is called by Husserl "the phenomenological reduction."

Husserl develops his theory of reduction on the basis of his radical criticism of the "natural attitude". The phenomenological reduction eliminates the "general thesis" of the natural standpoint as such. Husserl proceeds by levelling

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1 Husserl, E., Ideas I, p.

radical criticism against the natural standpoint before he goes on to elaborate his theory of reduction. Husserl's motive behind the criticisms of naturalistic standpoint is to show that the method of reduction involves the questioning of all one's presuppositions about the world. He who philosophizes must have to take a radical attitude which consists in disregarding the presuppositions of a world existing independently of us. He has to suspend the judgements which are consisting of certain commonly held beliefs and prejudices regarding the transcendent world to lay the foundation of a "scientific" philosophy. The phenomenological reduction is an important device by the radical performance of which one can adopt a neutral position with regard to the transcendent reality. To describe this neutral attitude to the natural world, Husserl uses the Greek term 'epoche', which is used by Greek sceptics to refer to a suspension of judgements. Being a mathematician, Husserl also identifies the basic meaning of reduction with the mathematical operation of bracketing.[1] The underlying idea of this metaphor is that a philosopher should detach or disconnect himself from the context of his naive or natural living. A mathematician paranthesizes a mathematical equation, not in order to eliminate it, but to put it out of question for the time being in order to concentrate on the larger context of the equation. Likewise, a philosopher must have to "put out of action" of one's all the presuppositions by placing them in bracket while engaged in philosophical activity.

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1 Husserl seems to have used the three terms - "phenomenological reduction", "epoche", "bracketing" interchangeably and therefore, they may be regarded as synonymous.

The first and most fundamental aspect of the technique of reduction is negative. It seeks to eliminate the "factuality" which is the root of all contingency and hence of doubt from the object of investigation. But this does not in any mean the elimination of existence itself. Reduction simply means the elimination of natural attitude which we generally cherish with regard to transcendent world. The existence/transcendence is simply bracketed in the sense that no position is taken either for or against. By putting the transcendence into bracket, it is pointed out that existence/transcendence does not have any significance for phenomenology. So, it is simply left out of consideration by executing the radical technique of reduction. Husserl says : "I may freely abstain from entertaining any belief about experience - which I did. This simply means that I refuse to assert the reality of the world .... I must similarly abstain from any other of my opinions, judgements, and valuations about the world, since these likewise assume the reality of the world."[1] Further, to put the transcendent reality into bracket does not mean to deny it. It simply means to refrain from making any comment with regard to its existence. Moreover, to suspend "the natural thesis" does not mean to transform it into anti-thesis, or indecision or doubt. Rather it is something unique. It is unique in the sense that by putting it into operation, a philosopher keeps his way of philosophizing free from the influence of "natural thesis". The entire natural world

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1 Husserl, E., The Paris Lectures, pp.7-8, Tr. by Peter Koestenbaum, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 2nd edition, 1975.

which is out there continually for me and of which I am continually conscious, will remain so for ever, even though I decide to put it into bracket. Reduction affects neither the existence of the natural world nor the existence of philosopher himself as a natural being. That is to say, it changes nothing in the world. With the execution of reduction "he loses nothing of their being and their objective truths and likewise nothing at all of the spiritual acquisitions of his world-life or those of the whole historical communal life; he simply forbids himself - as a philosopher, in the uniqueness of his direction of interest - to continue the whole natural performance of his world-life; that is, he forbids himself to ask questions which rest upon the ground of the world at hand, questions of being, questions of value, practical questions, questions about being or not-being, about being valuable, being useful, being beautiful, being good, etc. All natural interests are put out of play. But the world, exactly as it was for me earlier and still is, as my world, our world, humanity's world, having validity in its various subjective ways, has not disappeared."[1]

Now a question may arise : which things are needed to be bracketed ? From his writings it appears that Husserl proposes to bracket out the following at one time or another :

(i) The Phenomenological epoche requires that we would abstain from making any judgement at all regarding the

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1 Husserl, E., The crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, p.152. Trans. by David Carr, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1970.

theoretical content of all previous philosophical theories which may be held in abeyance. We must detach ourselves from such philosophical theories as are constructed on the presupposition that a world exists independently.

(ii) Husserl proposes to suspend all common sense prejudices which are the characteristics of the natural attitude. Our perception of a table, for instance, on which I am writing, involves the belief that a physical table is present out there. This belief of having the existence of the table is not necessarily true and also not necessarily false either. It is contingent or accidental and therefore, has to be kept under suspension. Similarly, all our physical phenomena are also subjected to the same fate. In the words of Husserl, "with the suspending of the natural world, physical and psychological, all individual objectivities which are constituted through the functional activities of consciousness in valuation and in practice are suspended all varieties of cultural expression, works of the technical and of the fine arts, of the sciences also (so far as we accept them as cultural facts and not as validity-systems), aesthetic and practical values of every shape and form. Natural in the same sense are also realities of such kinds as state, moral custom, law, religion."[1]

(iii) The so-called scientific outlook as it is understood in our quotodian experience as well as in scientific perceptions

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1 Husserl, E., Ideas, op.cit., p.171.

is needed to be bracketed. "Therewith all the sciences natural and mental, with the entire knowledge they have accumulated, undergo disconnection as sciences which require for their development the natural standpoint".[1]

(iv) Even the world of mathematical objects as they contain transcendent claims are required to be universally bracketed. The formal logic and all the disciplines of formal Mathesis, e.g. the algebra, theory of numbers, theory of manifolds and so forth. "The theoretical framework of the mathematical disciplines and all the theorems which develop within it cannot be of any service".[2] Further, the eidetic sciences i.e., the sciences which belongs essentially to the physical objectivity of Nature as such have to be disconnected. For examples Geometry, Kinematics, the "pure" physics of matter.

(v) Together with all these, the process of reduction is needed to be extended to another peculiar transcendence "which comes to knowledge in a highly mediated form", namely, God. Though this "intuitable actuality" is called Absolute, yet it is quite different from the Absoluteness of pure consciousness. Hence, it is transcendent in a different sense. Husserl pronounces : "we extend the phenomenological reduction to this "Absolute" and to this"transcendent".[3]

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1 Husserl, E., Ideas, op.cit., p.171.

2 Ibid., p.176.

3 Ibid., p.174.

(vi) (a) The phenomenological reduction is required to be carried out with regard to the historico-empirical ego which is a part of transcendent reality. This reduction is called by Husserl "the reduction to the sphere of ownness".[1] (b) With the self-suspending of the phenomenologist himself, he also carefully suspend all the judgements which are based on or which involves the other.

> The reductive method is transferred from self-experience to the experience of others insofar as there can be applied to the envisaged mental life of the other the corresponding bracketing and description according to the subjective "How" of its appearance and what is appearing".[2]

The operation of reduction involves several steps. As Husserl himself acknowledges, "On grounds of method this operation will split up into different steps of 'disconnexion' or bracketing, and thus our method will assume the character of a graded reduction".[3] Husserl seems to have distinguished at least three stages of reduction. Some interpreters[4] of Husserl have been able to determine some additional steps of the same. For our purposes, we discuss the broadly-distinguished three stages of

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1 Husserl, E., Cartesian Meditations, p.
Trans.by D.Cairns, Martinus Nihoff, The Hague, 1960.

2 Husserl, E., Encyclopaedia Britannica article on "Phenomenology" (1927), op.cit., p.25.

3 Husserl, E., Ideas, op.cit., p.114.

4 Quentin, Laner, Phenomenology, pp.50 onwards.
Harper Torch books, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1965.

reduction, namely, phenomenological reduction, eidetic reduction and transcendental reduction. The first stage, namely, phenomenological reduction seems to be the most important step for Husserlian methodology. The other two stages are the refinements and variations of the first. But it must be noted here that all the three stages of reduction taken together composes "the phenomenological reduction".

(a) Phenomenological reduction : For this reduction, we require to suspend "the general thesis" of belief in an independent reality together with all other transcendences, even our scientific thinking.

Our perception of a table, for example, involves the belief that a table as a physical thing is present in front of me. Such beliefs have to be kept in disconnection. Even a mathematical number e.g. the number 2 should not be thought as having an objective, extramental existence. The number 2 can be thought independently of the things to which it is applied in our practical life.

(b) Eidetic reduction : It is a stage of reduction in which all references to individuals and particulars are dropped and thereby one reaches out to general essences. In this stage, the individual thisness or thatness is eradicated. In other words, it is a reduction from mere particular facts to general essences taking the word "essence" roughly in the sense of

platonic "eidos". In Husserl's own language : "It is only the individual element which phenomenology ignores, whilst it raises the whole essential content in its concrete fullness into eidetic consciousness".[1] In the case of perception of a chair, e.g., I grasp the perception itself as given essentially to my pure intuition.

(c) Having put into bracket literally everything, what we reach is the pure ego. This operation is called by Husserl "the transcendental reduction".[2] Husserl describes the technique of reduction chiefly in negative terms but he also indicates its positive aspect of the operation. Husserl says, "we cannot disconnect transcendents indefinitely, transcendental purification cannot mean the disconnecting of all transcendents.

Since otherwise a pure consciousness might indeed remain over, but no possibility of a science of pure consciousness."[3] Hence, the technique of reduction has far-reaching and profound mission. It points to a original field of experience. As Marvin Farber rightly comments : "Reduction is not merely a moving away from the natural world but a moving toward something. The goal of this movement is none other than transcendental subjectivity".[4]

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1 Husserl, E., Ideas, op.cit., p.209.

2 In fact, it seems that transcendental reduction cannot be sharply distinguished from eidetic reduction. For both the stages of reduction points to the same absolute region of essence or consciousness.

3 Husserl, E., Ideas, op.cit., p.175.

4 Spiegelberg, H., The phenomenological Movement, Vol.I, p.136. Second edition, Martings Nijioft, The Hague, 1971.

A systematic application of phenomenological method of reduction, as Husserl himself recognised, has great importance for phenomenological method as a whole. It is the technique which frees us from our usual preoccupation with natural reality and thereby it points to a most authentic region which he calls transcendental subjectivity where the naive world of things and beings finds its meaning. The process of reduction helps the philosopher to keep himself at distance from the natural reality and thus judge the authenticity of what is essentially given to consciousness.

III. Transcendental Consciousness : Its Intentional Character

The operation of the phenomenological reduction opens up "the region of pure consciousness". The adjective "pure" indicates that the field of consciousness which is discovered by reduction is the consciousness which remains as "a phenomenological residuum" after the operation of phenomenological reduction. The realm of "Absolute" Being in which all other regions of Being have their root and to which they are essentially related.[1] "Consciousness, considered in its "purity" must be reckoned as a self-contained system of Being, as a system of Absolute Being, into which nothing can penetrate and from which nothing can escape".[2] This region of pure

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1 Husserl, E., Ideas, op.cit., p.212.

2 Ibid., p.153.

consciousness is taken by Husserl to be the field of inquiry. It is important to understand the nature of pure consciousness with specific reference to phenomenological method. For, "it is in consciousness - thanks to its intentionality - that the relations between objectivity and subjectivity occur, and it is only through these relations that we can expect to gain insight into the true sense of knowledge".[1]

According to Husserl, consciousness can be understood in terms of acts and these acts of consciousness are intentional or directional in nature. In his earlier writings, intentionality is held by Husserl to be the characteristic reature of consciousness, but in his later writings, he understands intentionality as the very essence of consciousness. In his Paris Lectures, Husserl says : "The essence of consciousness, in which I live as my own self, is the so-called intentionality".[2]

It may be worthwhile to mention how the term "intentionality" is introduced into modern philosophy and what is Husserl's reaction to this traditional conception.

It has been pointed out that Brentano for the first time introduces the term "intentionality" into modern philosophy.

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1 Ströker, E., "Phenomenology as First Philosophy : Reflections on Husserl" in Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological tradition, edited by Robert Sokolowski, p.250. The Catholic University of America Press, 1988.

2 Husserl, E., The Paris Lectures, op.cit., p.12.

His chief concern is to demarcate the boundary of psychological phenomena by distinguishing it from physical ones. Aiming at this attempt, he develops the notion of intentionality as constituent part of psychological phenomena. According to Brentano, the distinction between mental phenomena and physical phenomena lies in the fact that the former unlike the latter are characterised by "intentional relation" or by what he calls "intentional inexistence" of the intended object.

In order to characterise the psychological phenomena, Brentano makes use of two phrases (i) "intentional inexistence of an object" (ii) "reference to a content". These may be explained as follows.

In the first, "object" means factual object. The "intentional inexistence" implies the existence of the intended object inside the intending subject, and not outside. To mean the insideness of the intended object, Brentano uses the term "immanent-object-quality". The intended object may or may not have the existence independent of the intending mind. When, for example, one thinks of a "pen", the object of this thought is the pen which exists outside and independently of the intending mind, but it need not be existent. Or, consider the example of an "unicorn" which has no extra-mental existence. The two objects, namely, "pen" and "unicorn" make no difference to Brentano's conception of intentionality. Thus the object of love, hate and desire may or may not have the independent

existence of their own. Hence Brentano calls these objects like "pen" or "unicorn" immanent object.

The second characterisation of the psychic phenomena, namely, "reference to an object" or the intentional relation, is not a property of verbs to Brentano; it is a psychological relation. Obviously, a mental act or relation presupposes an intending subject who loves, hates etc. Hence, it is clear that intentional relation holds between subject, on the one hand and the object which has "mental inexistence", on the other.

Brentano, while speaking of "intentional relatedness" finds it difficult to call it a relation, because generally a genuine relation holds between two existent objects. But the mental relatedness, of which Brentano talks, does not require this condition. It may refer to something which may or may not have real existence, e.g., uniform, God etc. Hence, Brentano's conception of intentional directedness is psychological one. Further, Brentano points out that the mental phenomena are perceived in "inner consciousness". For example, seeing a colour, or hearing a tone are mental phenomena. Brentano speaks of mental phenomena which are directed towards their object. v Let us now turn to Husserl's reaction to the Brentonian conception intentionality and finally see how he establishes his own theory of intentionality.

Being a strong critic of both psychologism and naturalism, Husserl wants to keep all naturalistic and psychologistic

considerations into brackets. It is possible that Brentano works within the framework of psycho-physical attitude which is not acceptable to Husserl. Having clearly stated his position against naturalistic standpoint and that of psychologism, he seems under an obligation to refute any attempt at establishing the dichotomy between the mental and psychical phenomena. If this distinction is accepted by him, it would be quite inconsistent with his basic standpoint. Viewed in this perspective, it is quite understandable that he is not prepared to indentify intentionality with all mental phenomena. If it be shown that at least some mental phenomena is characterised by intentionality then it would constitute the refutation of Brentano's criterion with regard to mental phenomena. Similarly, if it be shown that besides mental phenomena, some physical actions are also characterised by intentionality, then it will also take away the weight of Brentano's argument. As has been pointed out by Mohanty, Husserl shifts between these two positions at different times, sometimes taking one, at other occasions the other in order to meet the requirement of his own methodology by proving Brentano to be wrong. This is the form of argument which Husserl seems to adopt in general in order to salvage the concept of intentionality from the cesspool of psychologism and thus he remains consistent with the method of phenomenological reduction.

Though he rejects the Brantonian theory of intentionality, Husserl gives full credit to his teacher for reviving the

scholastic term and for having called attention to this excellent phenomena. Having borrowed the term "intentionality" from Brentano, Husserl acknowledges "the existence of a highly important class of mental fact - for which Husserl reserves the title of acts - which have the peculiarity of presenting the subject with an object".[1] Husserl has also marked the point that there are different ways of being intentionally related to an object - in mere presentation, judgement, perception etc.

Having rejected the psychological interpretation of intentionality, Husserl gives a transcendental explanation of intentional character of consciousness which bears a much wider significance in his methodology and in his philosophy in general. Let us now turn to draw out the basic and salient features of Husserl's own intentionality thesis.

In the Volume II of Logical Investigation, Husserl gives what are called static and dynamic analyses of intentionality. But in Ideas I, he gives a more developed and mature interpretation of intentionality. We shall focus on the latter. The State analysis is meant for uncovering the structure of intentional acts of consciousness. However, in the static analysis, a distinction is made between "reelle component" and "intentional correlate" of intentional experience. In the dynamic analysis, there is a dialectics of intention and fulfilment. The dialectics implies that the intentional act

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1 Gurwitsch, A., "On the Intentionality of Consciousness" in Philosophical Essays in memory of Edmund Husserl, p.65. Marvin Farber (ed.), Greenwood Press, Publishers, N.Y. 1968.

possesses the character of "aiming at" which demands to be actualised or fulfilled.

This basic distinction which is made in the static analysis is found in Ideas I where a developed and more deeper analysis of intentionality has been given. Here the "reelle components" are of two-fold ; hyle and noesis. And the intentional correlate is called the noema. The peculiar nature of intentionality has been indicated in the expression : "Consciousness is the consciousness of something". In Husserl's own words : "we understand under Intentionality the unique peculiarity of experience "to be the consciousness of something".[1]

The pure consciousness, which has been stripped of all contingent and accidental characteristics, can be understood only in terms of acts which are referential or intentional or directional in character. The act of consciousness is finally termed in Ideas I as "noetic act" or "noesis". The word "act", in this context, is not to be understood as it is used in ordinary language where it is meant as activity or process.

For "act" in a general sense involves the concept of space and time. Again, it should not be confused with the psychological act which occurs in time, nor is it to be understood in an ontological sense. On the contrary, "act" for Husserl, is a conscious act which cannot be transcendent to

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1 Husserl, E., Ideas I, op.cit., p.242.

consciousness and thus involves no spatio-temporal consideration. Hence "act" in Husserlian sense, means fact-neutral act, that is to say, such act unlike act in general sense, makes no reference to physical or mental object.

However, noesis or noetic act is not bare consciousness but having directedness of its own to something - be it a percept or concept or a value and so on. The functional character of consciousness lies in its being referred to an object.

Another "reelle component" of the intentional experience is "hyle". Husserl is reluctant to confuse it with "noetic act" itself. Because, the latter is characterised as possessed of directedness, whereas the former is not. As Husserl puts it : "it is easily seen that not every real phase of the concrete unity of an intentional experience has itself the basic character of intentionality, the property of being a "consciousness of something". This is the case, for instance, with all sensory data, which play so great a part in the perceptive intentions of things".[1] Husserl gives the following example - in perceiving a piece of white paper, the glance of consciousness is directed towards the paper's quality of "whiteness" where lies the sensory datum "whiteness". As the "whiteness" is the essential component of perception, and hence it is the bearer of an intentionality, but it is itself not a consciousness of something. Husserl

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1 Ibid., p.120.

very cautiously distinguishes his concept of sensory element, namely, hyle from that of empiricists' by saying that his concept of sensation unlike that of the latter's is not formed out of the sensory data, that is to say, consciousness is not the consciousness of the hyletic data. Hyletic data is material component of intentional experience. In the words of A. lingis : "the sensations, the hyletic data are mental material".[1] The intentional flash of consciousness comes into contact with the transcendent things only by virtue of it or rather only through it. But it is to be noted here that consciousness does not actively produce it or receive it passively from outside. Rather, it remains permanently in consciousness as the component having no referential character.

Let us now turn to "intentional correlate" i.e. the element "of something". It is said to be a nuelious concept which makes it possible for us to understand the intricate nature of intentionality. Husserl's technical term for it is "noema" or "noematic content". There is a controversy among the interpreters of Husserl about the nature of noema. We shall mention some of the general characteristics of noema.

Noema is said to be the sense of conscious acts. It belongs to the sphere of transcendental subjectivity as a sinn. It is "irreal" or ideal entity for having its atemporal character. Noema is independent of any concrete act by virtue of which it

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1 Lingis, A., "Intentionality and Corporeity", Tymieniecka (ed.) Analecta Husserliana, Vol. I, D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, 1971.

is actualised. A noema is the immediate object of perceiving, judging etc. The object of perception is object itself and the noema is the appearance of this object from one side or in one aspect. The noema is not itself the object toward which the act of consciousness is directed. Rather noema is "the object as it is intended" as distinct from the object which is intended. It is the noema by virtue of which the intentionality of consciousness is directed towards its object. Noema is said to have two components : (1) One that which is common to all acts having the same object and (2) another that is different in acts with different thetic characters, such as, perceiving, remembering etc. According to Husserl, a simple perception has its noema, that is, "perceived as such". Similarly, in an act of judging, the noema "judged as such". In contrast to noesis, the noema is "irreal", because it remains over and above the notion of temporality and particularity.

Let us now focus our attention on an important aspect of intentionality thesis, namely, "the noetic-noematic correlation". Husserl very precisely presents this correlation in a single sentence in his book Ideas : "No noetic phase without a noematic phase that belongs specifically to it".[1] We shall now explain this significant correlation theory with the help of an illustration.

Suppose that Mr. X is perceiving a book on his table.

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1 Husserl, E., Ideas, op.cit., p.271.

For the first time he perceives the book from one standpoint; there he performs one perceptual act. This particular perceptual act has its noema i.e., the perceived as such. Again, Mr. X performs another perceptual act to perceive the same book from another perspective. His second perception also has its perceptual noema.

In this way, he may perceive the intended object from different perspectives and obviously, there must be different noemata corresponding to each perceptual act. In each perspectival perception, Mr. X may perceive the colour, shape or length etc. Thus it is clear that corresponding to multiple perceptual acts, there may be multiple noemata. But the intended transcendent object remains the same.

Again, when Mr. X perceives the same book from the same perspective, over and again, then he performs different acts. This performance of perceptual act from one level, unlike the former case, has the same noema. Thus different acts performed at different points of time from the same perspective have the same noema.

In short, (1) the acts performed from different perspectives have their corresponding different noema.
(2) Different acts performed from one perspective may have the same noema, (3) Multiple noemata have the same intending referent object, that is to say, noemata has its directedness towards the same transcendent object, it is noematic intentionality,
(4) "Each act-phase has its noematic phase".

Now we shall understand these four-fold relationships more vividly : For Firstly, this correlation between noesis and noema should not be identified with the unity of intended object i.e., noema and the "constituting formation of consciousness". In the words of Husserl : "that the parallelism between the unity of the noematically "intended" object, of the object we have in mind should not be confused with the paralletism between noema and noema".[1]

Secondly, the noetic-noematic correlation at one level is one-to-one but in another level many one. Thirdly, each noema may be said to have multiple perceptual acts which involves temporality and particularity, because the acts, as we have pointed out earlier, are performed in different points of time, and they are countable, but the noema remains over and above the temporality. Fourthly, when different acts are performed from <u>one</u> single perspective, then noema may be said to be an identity of different acts, and again different noemata have their identity in their same intending transcendent object. Thus, noema may be said to function as a <u>mediator</u> between the noetic act, on the one hand and the intentional transcendent object, on the other.

IV. <u>The Concept of Ego</u>.

The pure consciousness survives the phenomenological reduction and finally remains as "the phenomenological residuum".

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1 <u>Ibid</u>., p.290.

Pure consciousness, according to Husserl, consists of the ego, conscious acts and intentional objects. Husserl characterises the structure of consciousness, in other words, by tripartite formula : Ego - Cogito-Cogitatum.

His conception of the Ego undergoes a long development. Husserl's conception of the Ego takes its departure from ego of mundane level i.e. the psycho-physical ego which is a "thing-like object". Then he reaches a second Ego by means of a reduction which is not yet a transcendental reduction. He reaches it by cutting out the "ego-body" from the empirical ego. It is nothing but an empirical ego's stream of experience and thus it is a product of naturalistic attitude. In the second edition of Logical Investigations, Husserl first alludes to the concept of pure Ego. And he develops this notion in his Ideas I and Ideas II. In Ideas I, he introduces it not as the complex of real conscious acts, but as what he calls "ego-subject".

We may note here that Husserl seems to have distinguished pure Ego from what he calls transcendental Ego. He introduces the concept of transcendental Ego in his later writings. However the distinction lies in the fact that transcendental Ego, unlike the pure Ego, does have content and "internal features" of its own.[1] In Cartesian Meditations, Husserl goes forward and characterises transcendental Ego as concrete Ego which he calls in Leibnizian term a "monad".

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1 Husserl, E., Cartesian Meditations, op.cit., pp.73, 101.

Husserl introduces the concept of pure Ego as "Ego-subject" in his Ideas I. Pure Ego is "pure subjectivity" having no spatio-temporal existence. It can be grasped, unlike that of psychological ego, only under the attitude of reduction. It is the subject of all acts and not itself an experience or process. It is "the active and affective subject of consciousness, lives in all processes of consciousness and is related, through them, to all object-poles".[1]

The pure Ego is the originating point of all acts or cogito, which is understood in non-natural sense, since the operation of reduction leaves the pure Ego as "pure". These acts with their proper essences remain permanently and necessary related to the pure Ego as their pure subject and as their source. Each act of the Ego goes out from it and actually lives in it. It has the traits of directedness. It directs itself at something. "The "being directed towards" "the being busied with", "adopting an attitude", "undergoing or suffering from", has this of necessity wrapped in its very essence that it is just something "from the Ego"; and this Ego is the pure Ego, and no reduction can get any grip on it".[2]

The pure consciousness is said to be composed of a series of actual and potential acts. Actual acts are those

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1 Ibid., p.66.

2 Husserl, E., Ideas I, op.cit., p.233.

which receives directedness from the Ego towards the object. The Ego lives in them actually. But the potential acts are also acts of the pure Ego, though they are deprived of Ego's attention. The Ego lives in them potentially or ideally. These potential acts in which the Ego participates ideally constitute the field of Ego's freedom.[1] Hence the pure Ego is absolutely necessary for acts-actual or potential. But the Ego does not require the acts for its own being.

Now it seems that the pure Ego belongs to every experience. The intention ray passes through every actual act and towards the object. The glancing ray changes with the each act of the Ego; it arises and fades away with each act. The ray of directedness is part and parcel of the pure Ego. But the Ego remains the same and identical. Every cagitatio can change and may be subject to doubt, but the pure Ego is necessarily there in principle. It remains self-identical over and against the stream of multiple acts. It cannot, therefore, be counted as the inherent part or phase of the experiences themselves.[2] In this context, Husserl ascribes a kind of transcendence - in his language - "a non-constitutive transcendence - transcendence in immanence by considering the Ego's position in relation to the acts.

All experiences belong to the pure Ego and the pure Ego lives in each experiential process or act. But how the identity

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1 Ibid., p.233.

2 Ibid., p.172.

of the pure Ego can be experienced ? Husserl's reply is this that it can be experienced "through the acts of experiencing as reflected on" and similarly, we know the necessary relationship of the stream of experience to the pure Ego. Husserl also points out that all conscious acts belong to one single stream of experience, namely, to my stream of experience. Husserl expresses this point in Kantian term : "The 'I think' must be able to accompany all my presentations."[1]

According to Husserl, the pure Ego cannot be object of inquiry or study. Because, apart from its "ways of being related", there is nothing to describe. Apart from its "ways of behaving", it is empty of essential content that can be unravelled or described. This seems to imply that the Ego, when living in the experiential acts, can only be open to description.

During the Ego's living actually in a cogitation act, it distinctly and manifestly exhibits a peculiar characteristic of consciousness, namely, intentionality. This means that the consciousness is always consciousness of something. Consciousness is always intentional in character. This is Ego's manner of being-directed-to things. Here Husserl distinguishes the pure Ego living in experiencing process, the proper act and the content of experience. Husserl technically called latter two aspects "noesis" and "noema". The directedness towards something

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1 Ibid., p.173.

is in harmony with the act involved, perceptive in perception, fanciful in fancy and so forth. Thus, the directedness is not the proper act and the "object" towards which the intentionality is directed is not necessarily an apprehended object. It is the object intended by the pure Ego.[1]

Pure Ego is positional or thetic in character. When the Ego lives in the act actually or potentially, it intends "something". To be "busied with" something on the part of the Ego makes it possible to thematise all kinds of "theses". This "something" becomes "objectivated". Here "thesis" includes doxic theses, volitional theses etc.

However, in Ideas II, the Ego is said to have been described as polarised, it is said to be the individual ego-pole of conscious acts having possessed of the form cogito.

In Cartesian Meditation, Husserl states that the being of the pure Ego and its cogitationes is antecedent to the natural being of the world. "It continually presupposes the realm of transcendental being".[2] To say that Ego is transcendental is to say that it is presupposed by the sense and being of the world. The "Objective" world which exists and will exist for me, with all its objects, derives its sense from me as the transcendental Ego. Thus, the transcendental Ego is not an item of the world we live in.

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1 Ibid., p.121.

2 Husserl, E., Cartesian Meditations, op.cit., p.21.

According to Husserl, transcendental ego is what it is solely in relation to intentional objectivities. These objectivities are of two kinds : (i) objects within the ego's own adequately verifiable sphere of immanent time and (ii) world-objects which can be existent only in inadequate and presumptive external experience. Thus, it is the essential property of intentionality which are going on within it.

Further, transcendental ego exists for itself in continuous evidence. The ego is understood to be as the ego's own flowing life — as the universe of actual and possible subjective processes. This flowing life is inseparable from the ego itself. This implies not only that ego constantly constitutes itself as existing, but also that the ego is constituted by its own flowing life. The ego not only grasps itself as a flowing life, but also as "I" who lives through this or that cogito as the same 'I'. The ego polarises the multiplicity of actual and possible consciousness toward identical objects. There is a second polarisation where the ego polarises all the individual multiplicities of the cogitationes collectively as belonging to one and the same identical ego - as the same undergoing subject of consciousness.

Husserl points out here that this active subject of consciousness is not to be taken as an empty pole of identity. But according to the law of transcendental genesis, it exhibits throughout an abiding style or property - "a personal character"

with its acts originating from it and having a new objective sense. Thus the ego manifests itself as the only decision-maker and becomes the substrate of habitualities. "Habitualities" indicates a kind of inclination from being to having, from me to mine. It means a kind of content or internal features and does not mean any real psychological dispositions. The habitualities emerge from the self-constitution of the ego in inner time. The ego can recognise itself while living in the acts as the same identical ego.

Husserl now distinguishes this ego as the identical pole of subjective processes and as the substrate of habitualities from the ego grasped in its full concreteness. "The Ego can be concrete only in the flowing mutiformity of his intentional life, along with the objects meant - and in some cases constituted as existent for him - in that life."[1] This concrete ego is called "monad" in Leikmizian term. This monadic ego embraces everything admitted by phenomenology without exception. Obviously, it includes the whole conscious life - actual or possible. It is said to be the universe of all sense and therefore, includes all essences along with hyletic data and noema. Phenomenological method is meant for uncovering the all-embracing eidos ego or transcendental subjectivity which contains all <u>apriori</u> principles and which constitutes within itself everything that exists for the pure or transcendental ego as sense.

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1 Husserl, E., <u>Cartesian Meditation</u>, <u>op.cit</u>., p.68.

V. Transcendental Subjectivity

The outcome of the operation of phenomenological reduction is two-fold : (i) it leads to the disclosure of a self-contained, absolute and apodictic region which bears its justification within itself. It needs nothing transcendent to have a foundation for itself. Rather, it founds everything. This region is what Husserl calls transcendental subjectivity. (ii) Another aspect of the outcome of the execution of phenomenological reduction is the "giving of sense" to everything which is transcendent to pure subjectivity. It is the pure subjectivity which gives sense to the entire world of things and beings. The giving of sense is what constitutes the central theme of phenomenological "constitution".

Let us elucidate the concept of transcendental subjectivity which may be said to be the basis of phenomenological method and phenomenology in general. For, it is the transcendental subjectivity which carries out the function of "sense-giving" through constitution. According to speigelberg, the discovery of transcendental subjectivity is "the wonder of all wodders" for Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl, like Descartes, seeks to have certainty in philosophy. He is in constant search for a apodictaic field of certainty. And in course of search, Husserl discovers transcendental subjectivity as an apodictic source of certainty. It is the subjective principle of consciousness which is aware of its own being as well as of other beings. In his

Encyclopaedia Britannica article entitled "Phenomenology", Husserl describes transcendental subjectivity as follows :

"The psychic subjectivity, the concretely grasped "I" and "we" of ordinary conversation, is experienced in its pure psychic ownness through the method of phenomenological-psychological reduction. Modified into eidetic form, it provides the ground for pure phenomenological psychology. Transcendental subjectivity, which is inquired into in the transcendental problem, and which subjectivity is presupposed in it as an existing basis, is one other than again "I myself" and "we ourselves"; not, however, as found in the natural attitude of everything or of positive science; i.e., apperceived as components of the objectively present world before us, but rather as subjects of conscious life, in which this world and all that is present - for "us" - "makes" itself through certain perceptions".[1]

In the above passage, Husserl describes how a psychic subjectivity is transformed into transcendental subjectivity. The psychic subjectivity is a concretely grasped human ego having its own psychical sphere and who is the knower and giver of sense of all that is presented to sense-perception. The psychic subjectivity can be modified through the method of reduction where it remains "I" or "we" but not in the natural-psychical sense. After the operation of phenomenological-eidetic reduction,

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1 Husserl, E., "Phenomenology" Encyclopaedia Britannica, article (1927), op.cit., p.

all beliefs about the existence of transcendent world and all references to individuals and particulars are dropped. In order to reach the transcendental subjectivity, we require further reduction, namely, transcendental reduction through the application of which "I" or "we" no longer remains the part of mundane world. The worldly things and beings including phenomenologist's own ego are transformed into pure consciousness. Hence, Husserl by the foregoing discussion seeks to clarify the point that we are not dual beings - psychological and phenomenological/transcendental. Rather, the psychological subjectivity is reduced into transcendental one through the operation of the method of reductions.

The transcendental subjectivity, as it has been discovered after having freed itself from the bondage of experiences based on natural standpoint, is called by Husserl neither real nor unreal, but "irreal". The psychic subjectivity is real, in the sense that it has natural-psychical existence. To avoid the confusion, Husserl uses the term "irreal" to designate the ontological status of transcendental subjectivity. This "irreal" subjectivity constitutes all reality within itself.

Transcendental subjectivity is "absolute". It is absolute in the sense that it is "given" fully, apodictically and adequately. It is a self-sufficient and self-contained region needing nothing for its foundation and justification. As Husserl says : "Transcendental subjectivity alone exists

in itself and for itself".[1] Everything needs transcendental subjectivity for its foundation and justification. "Every existant is relative to transcendental subjectivity"[2] to have its sense within it. It is to be noted here that by saying that transcendental subjectivity is absolute, Husserl does not mean any metaphysical or psychological entity.

According to Husserl, transcendental subjectivity is the basis of all conscious acts which are of intentional character. Every existent is constituted in transcendental subjectivity through intentional acts. Here "act", as we have already pointed out, does not mean the act in ordinary sense where it involves the concept of space and time. These are acts of pure consciousness having no spatio-temporal reference.

For Husserl, transcendental subjectivity is a piece of self-explication which reveals the original self-evident truths. The "Phenomenological self-explication" that does on within the ego, explicate ego's all constitutings and all objectivities as they exist for him. And thus all worldly objectivities including my and other ego finds their place in the universe of pure possibilities.

In this context, Husserl says : "The whole of phenomenology is nothing more than scientific self-examination on the part of

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1 Husserl, E., Formal and Transcendental Logic, p.273. Translated by Dorion Cairns, Martinus Nijihoff, The Hague, 1978.

2 Ibid., p.273.

transcendental subjectivity, an examination that at first proceeds straight-forwardly and therefore, with a certain naivete of its own, but later becomes critically intent on its own logos, it is a self-examination that goes on from the fact to the essential necessities".[1] It is a systematically progressing self-examination, having its starting-point from transcendental reductions, which leads ultimately to original self-evident essences. The existent world of things and beings gets its meaning through such self-examination on the part of transcendental subjectivity. Even my ego and other egos are explicated within the pure field of subjectivity. Husserl has precisely stated the matter in the following words : "First, a self-explication in the pregnant sense showing systematically how the ego constitutes himself, in respect of his own proper essence, as existent in himself and for himself; then secondly, a self-explication in the broadened sense, which goes from there to show how, by virtue of this proper essence, the ego likewise constitutes in himself something "other".[2]

The self-examination on the part of transcendental subjectivity means the essential ability of it <u>to reflect</u> on itself. It is the ability to make itself thematic and thereby to produce judgements relating to itself. The ability of transcendental subjectivity to reflect on itself is a process

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1 <u>Ibid</u>., p.273.

2 Husserl, E., <u>Cartesian Meditation</u>, <u>op.cit</u>., p.85.

of uncovering itself which goes back to the original ego. In other words, this is a process of self-explication through which it finds "objective" truth and being as constituted within itself. Here something "objective" means the synthetic unity of actual and potential intentionality which belongs to the proper essence of transcendental subjectivity.[1]

Now, the capacity to reflect on itself by transcendental subjectivity is quite different from that of psychological reflection which moves within the field of natural-psychological reality and which is performed by psychological subjectivity. The self-reflection of transcendental subjectivity belongs to transcendental level which goes on by putting the mundane level of experience "out of play". The transcendental reflection thematises the world of things and beings through the method of reduction. Transcendental self-reflection lays bare the foundation of our mundane experience.

Transcendental subjectivity, according to Husserl, is "the universe of all sense" - actual or possible. As Husserl says : "Every imaginable sense, every imaginable being, whether the latter is called immanent or transcendent, falls within the domain of transcendental subjectivity, as the subjectivity that constitutes sense and being".[2] In the above passage, Husserl points out that everything gets its sense within the domain of

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1 Husserl, E., Formal and Transcendental Logic, op.cit., p.274.

2 Husserl, E., Cartesian Meditations, op.cit., p.84.

transcendental subjectivity. Transcendental subjectivity constitutes within itself the sense of everything by radical reflection. It is not only the basis of meaning-conferring acts but also that it manifests itself in the acts of constitution and gives meaning to all objects - actual or possible. Outside it lies what is precisely non-sense. But the nonsensicalness has its own mode of sense which lies within the sphere of possible insight. The world of things and beings including the community of egos receives its meaning in the life of transcendental subjectivity.[1]

Negatively, we can characterise transcendental subjectivity as "unnatural" and "unworldly". It is unnatural in the sense that it can be discovered by taking "unnatural" attitude and it is unworldly because it is not the object of the natural world. It is not a logical possibility, nor is it an abstraction. It is concrete in the sense that it is constantly unveiling itself through self-explication to have sense of what is given to it.

Characterising the transcendental subjectivity in this manner, Husserl aims at establishing an "all-embracing science of transcendental subjectivity" within which all particular sciences are members.

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1 Ibid., p.84.

VI. Phenomenological Constitution

Having arrived at a sphere of apodictic, adequate "givenness", namely, transcendental subjectivity, Husserl discovers it as the source of all original formation of sense. It is the transcendental subjectivity which gives sense to all things and beings of the transcendent world when they are essentially "given" to it and this becomes possible through constitution. To mean the way in which transcendental subjectivity carries out its function of "sense-giving", Husserl uses the term "constitution".

After the operation of reduction, "we have literally lost nothing but have won the whole of Absolute Being, which, properly understood, conceals in itself all transcendences, "constituting" them within itself".[1] This means that transcendent objects are retained in subjectivity even after the reduction, but of course not as it is, but as "constituted". Through the operation of reduction, it is possible to reduce reality to a pure phenomenon, to something entire "constituted".

Husserl sets up a relationship between the apodictic sphere, viz. transcendental subjectivity and transcendent sphere which is to be understood in phenomenological terms. The transcendental subjectivity and transcendent reality are entirely

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1 Husserl, E., Ideas, op.cit., pp.154-55.

different types of being. This difference lies in the fact that the transcendental subjectivity is "abyss" of sense but the transcendent reality is not. Husserl also points out that constiousness can be conceived apart from reality and not vice versa. The reality is relative to consciousness which itself is absolute in nature. Transcendental consciousness is independent of the real world; but the real world is not.

The transcendent reality is dependent on consciousness/ subjectivity to have a sense. The transcendent world in itself does not have sense but it can have sense, if there exists a consciousness. Consciousness is the only "absolute existent" to which the natural things and beings are relative in order to have their sense. It is only the consciousness which can give sense to all things and beings. Obviously, the transcendent objects require consciousness which is the source of all senses, not in order to have their existence, but in order to have their sense. To say more specifically and explicitly, transcendental subjectivity has the ability to constitute its own ego's sense as well as the sense of all other objects. But the transcendental subjectivity needs nothing to itself be meaningful and to make other things and beings to be meaningful. In a word, the natural reality requires transcendental subjectivity to be meaningful and not vice-versa.

We have already pointed out that it is the only absolute

existent, because it is self-contained and self-sufficient apodictic region and it needs nothing to have its own "existence". But in respect of constitution, transcendental subjectivity is absolute in a different sense, "Here it is absolute, because it does not need any other reality to have a sense".[1]

In saying that subjectivity gives sense to all that is transcendent, we must not ignore transcendence. If we stress only subjectivity, then it would mean that subjectivity "creates" or "produces" transcendent reality out of itself. On the contrary, if we emphasize on the transcendent reality, then subjectivity can be interpreted as unnecessary. There is a controversy among the interpreters of Husserl centering round the issue whether constitution means "production"/"creation" or not. However, without having involved ourselves into controversy, we would favour the view that constitution does not mean production or creation of sense, but simply the giving of sense to the natural beings and things. This means that the subjectivity "gives the world its sense by making it possible for this sense to come about".[2] Indeed such is the view held by Robert Sokolowski and Prof. R.A.Mall. Prof. Mall is of the opinion[3]

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1 Sokolowski, R., The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution, p.196.
Martinus Nijihoff, The Hague, 1964.

2 Ibid., p.197.

3 Mall, R.A., Experience and Reason, p.50.
Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1973.

that the meaning of constitution is not production or creation, but the elucidation of transcendent reality and other egos have for us. The constitution consists in meaning-giving activity of subjectivity. It is an ultimate method of showing how we come to the sense of things and beings of the world.

It must also be pointed out that for Husserl, no ready-made sense is there in the pure field of transcendental subjectivity. The sense of things and beings of the world comes about in and through the intentional acts. This refers to the noetic-noematic correlation in which lies the centrality of the phenomenological constitution. Here the concept of constitution acquires fuller and deeper meaning. Transcendental subjectivity is the performer of all intentional acts and thereby it constitutes the transcendent reality within itself as sense. Everything is "given" to it in order to have sense as "constituted". "In fact, there is no givenness which, for Husserl, does refer to us back to antecedents figuring in complexes of noetic-noematic constitution".[1]

Having shown how all the regions of human experience is "carified" within the field of transcendental subjectivity as the correlate through description of their constitution, Husserl now turns to show how the other ego is constituted in order to

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1 Hartmann, K., "Self-Evidence" Studies in Foundational Philosophy, p.45. Elementa series, Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1988.

dispel the charge of solipsism against phenomenology. In Cartesian Meditation, Husserl shows how the transcendental ego constitutes other egos as equal partners in an intersubjective community which in turn forms the foundation for the "objective" i.e., intersubjective world. According to Husserl, our knowledge of others is to some extent indirect. The other is given us not in direct presentation, but only by way of appresentation — a process which acquints us with aspects of an object that are not directly presented. The body of the other is really present to me and it belongs to the original sphere of my own experiences of my body. When we perceive a body other than my own as "there", rather than my own as "here" we apperceive it at once as the body of an alter ego by way of an assimilative analogy within my own ego. This, however, is not an inference by analogy. In this process, the analogising ego and the analogised alter ego are "paired". Thus the other ego, while not accessible as directly as its body, can be understood as a modification of my own pure ego by which we put ourselves into his body as if I am in his place. It is the process which makes us conscious of such an identity. Thus Husserl insists that the other egos thus constituted are themselves transcendental and that these egos form a community of "monads".

When Husserl says that the transcendent world is constituted within the field of subjectivity, this does not mean that the latter constitutes the former that exist "for us"

after Husserl's discovery of subjectivity's quality of constitution. The subjectivity possesses the quality of constitution inherently. What Husserl is showing is that the transcendent things and beings receives their sense from no other source than subjectivity.

Another misunderstanding may arise in this connection. Husserl's statement that subjectivity constitutes reality does not mean the constitution of concept or mere appearance. Transcendental subjectivity constitutes reality and not the appearance of reality as Kant conceives. For Husserl, reality is "given" to subjectivity as "phenomenon" which means "absolute showing". It is through intentional constitution that transcendent reality gets access to pure consciousness.

It is quite understandable from the spirit of phenomenology that constitution does not mean the creation of any metaphysical entity by subjectivity nor does it mean the production of any psychological reality. Constitution does not mean any psychological act.

We have already pointed out that the constitution implies a relationship between subjectivity and the world of objects. The former is said to be the self-contained and self-sufficient realm which means that the world of objects requires consciousness in order to be "real". The word "real" does not mean to be

existent, because the transcendent reality is already existent. Here "real" means to be meaningful. In the words of Prof. Mall : "To be is to be meaningful".[1]

According to Husserl, a sense is constituted in two related stages,[2] namely, (i) in the pre-predicative constitution or passive genesis, (ii) in the predicative constitution or active genesis. Passive genesis takes place as part of our conscious life, and active genesis results in ideal objects which "break off" from this life and transcend it and its temporality.

The philosophy of constitution is the culminating stage of transcendental phenomenology when the latter is consistently and systematically carried ahead. It shows how the world before us "comes to be" as meaningful to us. The task of constitution is to elucidate the sense which the things and beings of the world possess. The philosophy of constitution is said to be a process which goes on within the field of pure subjectivity and which has no beginning and end. It is a dynamic process through which we "achieve" gradually the meaning of transcendence. In short, to exist phenomenologically is meant to be real, and to be real is meant to be constituted and have a sense.

At this stage, some reflections on the foregoing account and analysis are called for. The Phenomenological method has

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1 Mall, R.A., Experience and Reason, op.cit., p.52.

2 Husserl, E., Cartesian Meditations, op.cit., p.77.

been introduced and developed by Husserl in order to put forward a programme for radical reform in philosophy. It aims at establishing philosophy as a rigorous and strict science which should rest on absolutely certain principles and as such be universally valid and evident. In order to meet the requirement of philosophy as a rigorous science, Husserl devises a radical method for philosophical investigation which has the scientific rigor of its own. In the following, we shall try to give a brief survey of phenomenological method as a series of steps on the basis of foregoing discussion.

One of the basic but teachable part of phenomenological method is this, that philosophy must be free from presuppositions or preconceptions. The phrase "freedom from presuppositions" stands for the attempt to eliminate those presuppositions that have not been thoroughly examined. But this does not mean the emancipation from all kinds of presuppositions and consequently to start philosophizing from absolutely zero. This principle prescribes us to eliminate only the unclarified, unverified and unverifiable presuppositions that are involved, so that nothing dogmatic can remain hidden which may vitiate the whole philosophical endeavour that is to be undertaken subsequently.

In order to eliminate all our naive beliefs and prejudices in the existence of the natural world and metaphysical entity, Husserl introduces the technique of phenomenological reduction. It is described as an philosophical attitude, the

operation of which makes us free from our usual preoccupation with beliefs and theories of different kinds, such as, metaphysical, natural-scientific and psychological and facilates to concentrate on essential content of "what" of the phenomena. Further, this operation helps a philosopher to return to the "things themselves" -- the original data of experience. It facilates also to consider all kinds of data-- real, unreal or doubtful as having equal rights in philosophical sphere.

Having suspended all kinds of naive beliefs, a philosopher concentrates and starts investigation into particular phenomena within the realm of pure consciousness. First, one had to concentrate on the object intuited. This operation consists in keeping the "eyes open","looking and listening" - to use the metaphorical phrases. One grasps the uniqueness of the specific phenomena by relating it to other phenomena. Then he analyses the phenomena themselves to trace the elements and structures of them. But the phenomenological analysis is different from the analysis of analytic school in that the latters' analysis consists of the analysis of certain linguistic expressions which refer the phenomena and not the analysis of the phenomena themselves.

It must be noted here that "phenomena" in phenomenology does not mean subjective phenomena. For Husserl's concept of subjectivity involves the attempt to discover the essential phenomena i.e., the objective essences and does not involve

subjective phenomena i.e. one's private and personal phenomena. Having explored the phenomena intuitably and analytically, one describes what is "given" to consciousness as pure phenomena - as "the original givenness".

An important phenomenological procedure is eidetic intuition. Husserl calls phenomenology an eidetic science which deals with essences (eidos). But this does not in any way mean that phenomenological method cannot be applied to empirical sphere. By virtue of reduction, real objects of the world is given as essential phenomena. However, eidetic intuition means the intuition of essences or Eide. As the essences are not the natural objects, they do not exist like individual objects. They are neither spatial nor temporal, so that they neither emerge nor disappear. "The general essence or eidos has no reality superior to particular entities. vThe essences are ideal beings. The general essences, as ideal mode of being, is constituted by transcendental subjectivity within itself. As the essences are ideal beings, they can only be known by special kind of intuition. In order to apprehend the essences, we need to look at particulars as instance which stand for the essences. We can take the red of an individual rose and we can see it as an instance of a certain shade of red, in general. Then we can proceed to see it as exemplifying redness. Thus the eidetic intuition is one of the devices of phenomenological method.

Husserl introduces an important phenomenological technique, namely, "free imaginative variation". Let us briefly say something about this technique with the help of an illustration. Remaining in the natural attitude, suppose that I perceive a duster on the table as real. In the phenomenologically reduced sphere, phenomenon "duster" retains the same qualities as an intentional object of my act of perceiving. If I am interested in finding out the qualities that are common to all dusters, I cannot use here the commonly accepted method of induction as it presupposes many things e.g., that there exists similar things. However, now I see before me only a single duster as a transcendent object. Now I can freely very the object "duster" in my fancy in that I transform its colour, shape, size etc. Thus I am free to imagine an infinite number of dusters. In this process of variation, I find common qualities of infinite number of dusters imagined and they remain untouched. The common qualities that we find in infinite number of imagined dusters are called <u>eidos</u> or essences. This eidetic imaginative variation may be used to find out the general essence of anything.

The culminating stage of phenomenological method is the process of constitution. The operation of reduction opens up a self-contained region, an apodictic region which contain its justification within itself. It is transcendental subjectivity. Every transcendent is given to it essentially and adequately.

Now transcendental subjectivity constitutes the sense of given objects within itself. The given objects establish themselves and take shape within transcendental subjectivity. It is described as a process through which the "original givenness" gets constituted within the immanent sphere of transcendental consciousness. Thus the process of constitution is a method for the formation of sense.

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Chapter III

KANT'S ETHICS : A PHENOMENOLOGICAL CRITIQUE

Section-A

Though our aim in the present project is to develop an understanding of values from the phenomenological point of view, it would be quite unthoughtful if we do not take into account the power and pervasive influence that Kant's treatment of ethical values has exercised over the centuries down to the present era. Some of the phenomenological thinkers we shall undertake to study in the following Chapters have sharply responded to Kant's ethical ideas. In point of fact, Max Scheler, the phenomenological thinker, has repeatedly drawn attention to the various aspects of Kant's theory if only more often to criticise some of the points in his own work, Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values. Nicolai Hartmann too has also criticised Kant's ethics. It would be, therefore, necessary to begin with a clear, to the extent possible, understanding of Kant's views on the matter which will serve two-fold purposes as follows : (a) An understanding of Kant's formalism in ethics will provide the springboard for understanding the phenomenological treatment of values which is characterised as "contentful". (b) Insofar as both Scheler and Hartmann make extensive use of Kant's writings on ethics, if only in a critical way, an understanding of the insights of Kant would greatly be helpful.

We might begin by acknowledging that "Kant invented a new way of understanding morality and ourselves as moral agents. The originality and profoundity of his moral philosophy have long been recognised."[1] In this Chapter, we shall but only dwell upon some aspects of his moral philosophy such as would pave the way for a more sympathetic understanding of Hartmann and Scheler. For our limited purposes, the main sub-heads under which we propose to carry on our discussion here are as follows : (i) Kant on Good will and practical reason, (ii) Formalism of Kant, (iii) Formalism and Apriorism, (iv) Intellectualism of Kant. In the later part of this Chapter, we shall look at the criticisms made by Hartmann and Scheler with regard to the earlier points of discussion. This way of following up the matter would, we hope, facilitate our main objective of considering how Hartmann and Scheler viewed Kant's position vis-a-vis their own.

(i) Kant on Good will and practical reason

Ethics, for Kant, means what he calls "pure ethics" i.e. the ethics which is completely cleansed of all empirical elements. In his Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, he feels "the utmost necessity to work out for once a pure moral

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1 Schneewind, J.B., "Autonomy, Obligation and Virtue : An Overview of Kant's Moral Philosophy" in Guyer Paul(ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Kant, p.309, Cambridge University Press, 1992.

philosophy completely cleansed of everything that can only be empirical...."[1] As morality, for Kant, deals with the laws, one must admit that a law has to carry with it absolute necessity to be valid. And such

> grounds of obligation must be looked for, not in the nature of man nor in the circumstances of the world in which he is placed, but solely a priori in the concepts of pure reason.[2]

Kant identifies such pure ethics which deals with a priori rational laws as what he calls metaphysic of morals. In other words, "the pure science of laws in accordance with which everything ought to happen is called (by Kant) 'pure ethics' or 'the metaphysic of morals".[3] Thus Kant seeks to leave aside all considerations of particular moral judgements, all propositions about what ought to be or ought not to be done in particular circumstances. He looks for one absolute and a priori rule of conduct which is the same in contexts or circumstances from which the particular rules for the particular contexts or circumstances may be deduced. Acting on this rule would make an action morally good or right.[4] Thus goodness or rightness

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1 Kant, I., Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, p.57. Translated by H.J.Paton, Harper torchbooks, New York, 1964.

2 Ibid.

3 Gupta, R.K., Towards Purity of Morals, p.4. Pragati Publication, Delhi, 1981.

4 Though it may be noted here that as against the utilitarianist who think in terms of states of affairs as good or bad consequences, for Kant and the deontologists rightness assumes primary over goodness since they do not speak of consequences i.e., good or bad states of affairs but only of the moral worth or rightness of the action.

would be the same in all circumstances. Hence, Kant believes in the purity of morals and rejects all such ethics as are based on inductive experience, that is, the ethics which derives its principles and laws from experience. Thus, "sternly he cast out from the temple of Ethics all commerce in objects of desire; the useful, the expedient, the socially advantageous".[1]

Morality, as a human phenomenon, is necessarily related to good actions and good agents, though it is indirectly connected with other kinds of goodness. From the viewpoint of morality, there are three factors involved in certain action-situation which are morally significant : (i) the will which initiates the action, (ii) the intended result of an action, and (iii) the motive - the subjective reason for acting. Each of these factors is liable to be either good or bad.

What initiates an action is called by Kant "goodwill". Generally, a will is closely bound up with action. The will does not mean mere wish to do something. It means taking a decision and to act or perform. From a psychological point of view, the will is the action. In other words, the will is the same as the action from the viewpoint of what goes on in the mind of a doer during taking a decision. "And Kant, as a matter of fact, uses the terms 'good will' and 'good action' almost discriminately".[2]

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1 Lâring, L.M., Two Kinds of Values, p.68. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1966.

2 Field, G.C., Moral Theory, p.19, Methuen & Co.Ltd., London, University Paperback Series, 1966.

Let us now understand what good will is, keeping in mind our present purpose. Kant defines 'good will' thus :

> It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a goodwill.[1]

We would proceed now by first explaining what is meant by "good without qualification". This phrase, in other words, means "good in all circumstances or contexts". A thing can be called "good without qualification" whose goodness is not dependent on any particular circumstance or context; its goodness consists <u>in itself</u>. Thus goodness of good will consists <u>in itself</u>. That is to say, the goodness of good will lies <u>intrinsically</u> in itself. According to David Ross, Kant has offered two tests of goodness without qualification :

> (1) That which is good without qualification must never unite with anything else to produce bad results;
> (2) it must never unite with anything else to constitute a bad whole.[2]

And good will and not anything else, according to Kant, satisfies the above tests.

Here Kant's point is that good will is the only thing which is absolutely unconditioned and its goodness remains

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1 Kant, I., <u>Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.61.

2 Ross, D., <u>Kant's Moral Theory</u>, p.10, Oxford University Press, 1954.

static without different circumstances, contexts, etc. Thus Paton says,

> It is good in itself and not merely in its relation to something else. Its goodness is not limited to goodness in this or in that relation; it is, in short, good without limitation or qualification or restriction.[1]

Good will is "will which is inwardly good and whose goodness in no way depends on anything outside itself".[2] Thus good will possesses its full worth in itself and that worth cannot be determined or increased and cannot be outweighed or dimmed either by consequence or by varying contexts in which it may be found.

Kant is quite aware that there are plenty of good things which are good in many respects. Among these kinds of things may be included, for example, (i) mental abilities like intelligence, wit, wisdom etc., (ii) emotions - courage, determination etc., (iii) blessing of fortune - power, honour, wealth etc., (iv) essentials of happiness - health, the good life etc.

All these may at most be helpful to good will but they can never be unqualified good like good will. All these are good when they are in conjunction with a good will; otherwise, they can never be good without limitation in themselves. Thus, the

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1 Paton, H.J., The Categorical Imperative, p.34, Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London, 7th Impression, 1970.

2 William, T.C., The Concept of the Categorical Imperative, p.2. Oxford University Press, 1968.

actual goodness of the things we have listed above is contextual, varies with their circumstances and contexts; and therefore, they are not unqualified good.

It would be a fundamental error for Kant to suppose that the goodness of good will is derived from the goodness of ends it aim at. As Kant clarifies,

> A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes - because of its fitness for attaining some proposed end ; it is good through its willing alone - that is, good in itself.[1]

An action which flows from a good will is morally good regardless of whether it produces good or bad results. Given appropriate conditions, an agent who performs an action from the good will will try his best to do good. But it is not all conditioned by the result that an action produces. For,

> It will still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself.[2]

Good will, according to Kant, may be conceived to act under human conditions only. As williams puts it, "the possible experience of a good will which is open to human beings is that of a will which acts from duty in the face of subjective inclinations and desires".[3]

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1 Kant, I., Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, op.cit., p.62.

2 Ibid.

3 Williams, T.C., The Concept of the Categorical Imperative, op.cit., p.3.

Let us now turn to Kant's notion of practical reason and see its relation to the good will. On Kant's view, reason or rationality can be displayed in action as well as in thought. Reason, when it determines action is called by Kant practical reason as opposed to "theoretical reason" which is displayed in thought. The practical reason is "the reason in its practical (moral) use or function".[1] The practical reason is concerned with the production of moral choices or decisions in accordance with the moral law. Reason has the influence on the will as the latter is produced by the former. In Kant's words,

> .... reason has been imparted to us a practical power - that is, as one which is to have influence on the will; its true function must be to produce a <u>will</u> which is <u>good</u>, not as a <u>means</u> to some further end, but <u>in itself</u>...[2]

Thus reason is the guiding force of the will. It is the reason which guides our will to make our choice of something as what we ought to do or ought not to do. Kant sometimes seems to identify the reason with the will. He calls the latter the rational will. Kant attributes the initiation of action to the will and not to the desires as they are not rational as such. It is the rational will which guides our choices in action.

(ii) <u>Formalism of Kant</u>

Kant's theory of ethics has often been characterised by his critics as "formalism" because his concept of duty and

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1 Copleston, F., <u>A History of Philosophy</u>, Vol.VI, Search Press, London, 5th Impression, 1977.

2 Kant, I., <u>Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.64.

its formula i.e. the moral law is formal. That is to say, the concept of duty and its laws are devoid of any "material" or content. According to Kant, in order to have moral worth of an action, it must not be performed from any inclination or desire, nor performed from consideration of what results it produces, but from duty. This is precisely what constitutes Kant's "formalism".

It may be noted that Kant's formalism has a background which can be traced back to ancient philsophy, e.g. the philosophy of Aristotle which favours the pure form and neglects the matter. Matter is conceived as something indeterminate, obscure and of lower value. The form, on the other hand, is regarded as the determining principle; and it is the form which allows something to be valuable. The Aristotolian bias against matter is found to be there in the modern philosophy, particularly, in the philosophy of Descartes and Leibniz. It continues to play a major role in Kant's theory of knowledge as well as in his moral philosophy.

The seeds of Kant's formalism may be found, if has been pointed out, in Kant's first two propositions of duty.

(i) A human action is morally good, not because it is done from immediate inclination - still less because it is done from self-interest but because it is done for the sake of duty.[1]

(ii) An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose to be attained by it, but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon.[2]

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1 Paton, H.J., (Translated and analysed), Immanual Kant : Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, op.cit., p.20.

2 Kant, I., Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, op.cit., pp.67-68.

Let us now turn to Kant's concept of duty which has been characterised by the above two propositions. Kant seems to have taken a hint from Hume when the latter says that an "ought" cannot be derived from "is". That is to say, a factual situation is not sufficient of itself to obligate an agent to perform a certain action. There is nothing, for example, in the fact alone of man being in distress, which obligates one to help him - unless I acknowledge the principle that I ought to help him whenever I can. A ground of obligation which, according to Kant, contains the idea of moral necessity about the action, is needed. This moral obligation is called by Kant "duty". That such moral experience of one's duty may be characterised as phenomenological has been pointed out by F. Liverziani.

> [I]n the ethics of Kant there is (or, at least, one can extract from them) a moment that can be defined as phenomenological, i.e. the moment in which Kant highlights the moral fact with the particular type of imperative that distinguishes it. For Kant, indeed, the moral experience is the experience of a voice inside ourselves that prescribes us something like a duty, like an unconditional and absolute duty to be discharged in a certain action or in refraining from such an action. Kant throws proper light on certain essential characteristics of this duty, of this moral law. And up to this point his reasoning seems to me to be substantially good phenomenology.[1]

Generally, duty refers to one's specific duty, for example, one's duties as a parent, an employee, as a citizen etc. Kant makes an extension of "specific duties" to a "generalised duty" and thereby he "seeks to detach if from any idea of utility"[2].

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1 Liverziani, F., "Value Ethics and Experience", Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana Vol.XVI, p.272. D.Reidel Publishing Company, 1983.

2 Norman, R., The Moral Philosophers, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983. p.95.

For him, moral goodness of an action consists in the performance of this generalised duty for its own sake.

Now, it is clear that the concept of duty cannot be derived from mere inductive experience. It is apriori and independent of experience. It contains a sense of necessity. It is practical reason and not the particular situation which assigns necessity to a particular course of action and not to another. The necessity as such is a priori and so the moral necessity. The moral necessity of action or moral obligation is based on reason and not on experience. Hence, the concept of duty which bears a sense of necessity is a priori concept of practical reason.

Let us now consider Kant's first proposition, which we have quoted above in order to highlight the formalistic character of the notion of duty. Kant in his first as well as in the second proposition of duty seeks to distinguish the moral motive from non-moral motives of action. That is to say, he seeks to have a clear view of the moral motive which makes an act morally good by detaching it from non-moral motives.

In order for an action to be a morally good action, it is essential that it must be done from moral motive, that is, from duty only and in such an action good will is manifested. If an action is performed from immediate inclination or self-interest, then its motive would be non-moral. Thus, for Kant, we can perform an action in one of two ways : either

because it is obligatory or for some other reason. The former i.e. the action done as obligatory is called by Kant "duty" and the latter i.e. the action for some other reason is not from the conception of duty.

Thus actions have moral worth only if they are done for the sake of duty and not from inclinations, desire etc. To act for the sake of duty is to act rationally i.e. such actions are governed by reason. Thus, "actions done from duty must coincide with actions governed by reason".[1]

Kant clearly distinguishes actions which are done for the sake of duty from those that are for other reasons. For example, an action done from inclination to help other with the help of getting some benefit from them would be quite different from the same actions when it is done for the sake of duty. Again, if a person pays his debt out of fear of arrest, his action though accords with duty is not done for the sake of duty. Likewise, benevolence is a duty but it ceases to have moral worth if it merely proceeds from a feeling of sympathy and not solely from duty. But, it would be of moral worth if the person regards it his duty to be benevolent to others. A true example of acting for the sake of duty would be when a man under grief and miserable conditions has no inclination to live and wants to die and yet he preserves life under the notion that it is his duty to preserve his life though he is not inclined to live. This action is done purely

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1 Norman, R., The Moral Philosophers, p.98. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983.

from moral motive, that is, it is done for the sake of duty.

Let us now turn to the second proposition of duty and see how it contributes towards building up a formalistic ethics. As we have already noted, it states that the moral worth of an action does not depend on the results it produces or seeks to produce, but on the basis of the maxim in accordance with which it is done. It is the formal maxim acting in accordance with which an action can have a moral value. An action would be morally good when it is done for the sake of duty on the basis of a formal maxim. A good man's maxim would be, "I will do my duty whatever my duty may be". And it is acting on such a maxim, an action becomes morally good. As Kant clarifies, "it will have to be determined by the formal principle of volition when action is done from duty...."[1]

Kant's point is that the moral value of an action does not depend on the results it produces. For him, the moral value of an intention is independent of the material goodness of what is willed. It makes no difference what is willed, so long as the agent wills it from moral motive. It does not matter what result is produced by an action. But what matters is whether it is done from the moral motive or any other motive. For the moral motive is the determinant of the will which is a priori.

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1. Kant, I., Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, op. cit., p. 68.

At this stage, it would be quite necessary to ask as Liverziani does

> whether one can really speak of duty, or the moral law, as something that is absolute in itself, to be pursued solely for its own sake and for the love of it (or, better and as Kant himself prefers, for respect of it ; for we are here concerned with something that is far easier to respect than to love). One may well ask whether Kant is not running the risk of turning duty, the moral law or, if you prefer, a certain rationality into an idol.[1]

As he himself goes on to say that there is "a tendency of this kind.... present in Kant" (and) "duty and the moral law in fact reveal a certain absoluteness".[2] We shall see how this Kantian absolutization comes under attack from Scheler.

"Kant's notion of duty", MacIntyre rightly holds,

> is so formal that it can be given almost any content, it becomes available to provide a sanction and a motive for the specific duties which any particular social and moral tradition may propose. Because it detaches the notion of duty from the notions of ends, purposes, wants, and needs it suggests that, given a proposed course of action, I may only ask whether, in doing it, I can consistently will that it shall be universally done, and not ask what ends or purpose it serves.[3]

Now, for Kant, the law of duty is a unique kind of imperative which is unconditional, that is, what he calls "the Categorical Imperative". The uniqueness of the Categorical

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1 Liverziani, F., "Value Ethics and Experience", Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol.XVI, op.cit., p.273.

2 Ibid., (our emphasis).

3 MacIntyre, A., A Short History of Ethics, p.198. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1967.

Imperative lie in that they are "not conditional on any purpose at all. They are not of the form, 'Do this in order to achieve that', but simply 'Do this'".[1] As Kant states,

> Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.[2]

Though there are four formulations of the Categorical Imperative but "strictly speaking, there is only one Categorical Imperative".[3] What needs to be stressed in the present context is that the Categorical Imperative is regarded by Kant "as a formal principle of the will and not as a material principle of action depending upon empirical aims and desires".[4] It cannot prescribe any "material" or content, that is, what one ought to do in a certain situation. The formal nature of the Categorical Imperative seems to be its merit insofar as it can be applied to any rational being for not having its any reference to a particular action-situation. This means that any action which, in a certain situation, is right or wrong, would be right or wrong for <u>any</u> rational being whatever in that situation, no matter what his special taste, inclination or desire may be. Schneewind brings out the matter clearly :

> Like the logical law of contradiction, which rules out any proposition of the form 'p and not-p', the moral law must not itself contain any "matter" or content.

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1 Norman, R., <u>The Moral Philosophers</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.102.

2 Kant, I., <u>Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.88.

3 Norman, R., <u>The Moral Philosophers</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.102.

4 Acton, A.B., <u>Kant's Moral Philosophy</u>, p.21. Macmillan & Co., London, 19.

> Nevertheless Kant thinks form without content in morality is as empty as he thinks it would be in our experience of nature. There must be content, Kant holds, but it can only come from outside the will - from desires and needs, shaped by our awareness of the world in which we live into specific urges to act or plans for action.[1]

Thus, in the present section, we have seen that "the moral law, like the idea of 'duty', cannot be defined by its content".[2]

(iii) Formalism and Apriorism

We have stated that the moral law must be a formal law and therefore, cannot have "matter" or content. Now Kant relates the formal nature of the moral law with his concept of apriority. For Kant, that which is formal must be a priori. It follows by implication that for Kant that which is "material" must be a posteriori.

Now, the universality and necessity is the mark of apriority. As the moral law or the Categorical Imperative must be universal and necessary, it follows that it must be a priori in nature. The universality and necessity can never be derived from the sensuous experience. Only that which is non-empirical can claim to have universality and necessity. And, for Kant,

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1 Schneewind, J.B., "Autonomy, obligation, and virtue : An overview of Kant's moral philosophy' in Guyer Paul(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant, op.cit., p.318.

2 Norman, R., The Moral Philosophers, op.cit., p.100.

only that which is formal is non-empirical and therefore, it must be universal and necessary. Further, for Kant, the will (i.e. good will) cannot be materially determined, because if it be so, then it would mean that it is determined by something outside of it, that is, by desire, inclination etc. And thereby, the will would be heteronomous; it can no longer be an autonomous principle.

Thus Kant holds that moral law which is a formal law must be autonomous. Only such a law must be a priori in the sense that the form can in no way be derived from the empirical world. Hence, Kant characterises the moral law as formal as well as a priori. Formalism and apriority are what constitute the peculiar nature of the moral law or the categorical Imperative. Thus it seems that in Kant's ethics formality and apriority are placed in a fixed unity.

(iv) Intellectualism of Kant

Kant has given rationality or reason the supreme place in his philosophy. In his theory of knowledge as well as in ethics, rationalism has a very dominating role. He talks of "thought" or "understanding" in his theory of knowledge, and in ethics, he talks of reason in its practical function or what he calls "practical reason". This is what has been dubbed as "intellectualism" by Hartmann.[1]

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1 Hartmann, N., Ethics, op.cit., p.171.

The dualism of sense-perception and understanding, intuition and thinking, the sensible and the intelligible dominates Kant's whole philosophy. In his theory of knowledge, we see that Kant speaks of two faculties, namely, "sensibility" and "understanding" from which knowledge arises. It is "sensibility" by means of which the representation of objects are given to us and "understanding" is the faculty by which we think or judge. In other words, "matter" of knowledge is supplied by "sensibility" and the "form" is given by "understanding". Kant has given the sensible a negligible position, something that is of lower value. In comparison, "understanding" or the faculty of thought has a superior position. He also identifies this contrast with what is a posterioristic and aprioristic. For him, that which is a posteriori is sensible and that which is a priori is thought or intellect.

In his ethics also the similar trend is quite visible. Here he seeks to eradicate the "sensible" from his theory of ethics as he attempts to build up his theory of ethics on a non-empirical, non-sensible and a priori plane which he calls "pure ethics" or "metaphysic of morals." It is Reason which plays an important role in his theory of ethics. It is reason in its practical (moral) use or function that guides our choices i.e. what ought to be done or ought not to be done. This practical reason produces a will (i.e. good will) which acts in accordance with the moral principle. An action will have moral worth only if it is done in conformity with the law of

reason or the Categorical Imperative without any influence of inclinations or desires. Thus it seems that Kant, having given the reason or rationality a supreme place, does not incorporates in his ethics those human emotions which are rich in moral allusion, such as, love, kindness, sympathy, compassion etc. and thereby he paves the way for "intellectualism".

Section B

Hartmann's Critique of Kant's ethics

The depth and profoundity of Kant's ethical thinking do not escape the notice of the subsequent thinkers. Among others, in recent times, phenomenological thinkers have also duly recognised some vital aspects of Kantian ethics, though they are critical of some other aspects of his ethics. Hartmann, though influenced by the phenomenological way of thinking, puts forward some criticism against Kant's ethics. Hartmann summarises his view with regard to Kant's ethics in the following passage :

> [I]t was Kant who set up the unity of the moral law instead of the concrete variety of the virtues, the formal principle in place of the fulness of content, and subjective legislation in the position held by the objective essence of moral ideas. On account of this contrast, the present-day investigation of values finds very little solid ground under its feet.[1]

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1 Hartmann, N., Ethics I, Vol.I, p.204.

He even finds Kant as exception to the whole historical perspective, that is, the perspective which regards values as concrete a priori essences. Thus,

> almost all philosophical ethics, although standing only half-way towards the solution of its problems, yet deserving the name of ethical research, has been fundamentally a concrete ethics of values. Kant, on the contrary, and his followers are the exception in the historical succession. They constitute a chasm which separates us from the great traditions of antiquity and of the Middle Ages.[1]

Hartmann who finds himself in line with the historical perspective has devoted a section of his Ethics for a critical appraisal of Kant's ethics. Let us now turn to some of his objections in this regard.

First, according to Hartmann, Kant commits a great mistake when he identifies a priori with the subjective. In fact, though Kant has been able to rescue his ethics from naturalistic way of thinking, he "was unable to escape from the subjectivism of his age, and still sought for the determinant of value in a 'reason' divorced from the world of common interests".[2]

As we have pointed out, according to Kant, "good will", under the influence of practical reason, is determined by the

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1 Ibid.

2 Hartmann, N., Ethics, op.cit., in Editor's Introduction (Muirhead, J.H.), p.5.

moral law. But the will is free to act contrary to the moral law. Now, according to Hartmann, receiving of the law by the will from beyond itself is clearly to adopt "heteronomy". To the question, "How is the relation between the will and value to be understood ?" Hartmann has the following to say,

> Value is that which formulates the commandment, the 'moral law', the thing that ought to be. The will is that for which the commandment has validity. The good will therefore is "determined" by the law, it conforms itself to the law. It therefore receives the commandment from beyond itself; the commandment is not its own. For in regard to the law the will is indeed free to act contrary to it.[1]

In order to properly appreciate the charge of heteronomy that Hartmann brings against Kant, we would do well to keep in mind the following point of elucidation made by Copleston.

> It should be added that while Kant sometimes speaks of practical reason as though it were distinct from will and influenced the latter, he also sometimes identifies it with will. The former way of speaking suggests the picture of practical reason moving the will by means of the moral imperative. The latter way of speaking shows that for Kant the will is a rational power, not a blind drive.[2]

In other words, Hartmann's argument is based on the premise that the will cannot be identified with reason and the charge of heteronomy of the will is directed against Kant even though the latter speaks of the autonomy of the will on the grounds that Copleston rightly attends to. Hartmann interprets Kant's view

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1 Hartmann, N., Ethics, op.cit., p.155-56.

2 Copleston, F., A History of Philosophy, Vol.VI, p.310.

as one in which it is the subject which prescribes the law that determines his will; and, thus the will determines the ought and not vice versa. So, "the will determines or creates the values, not the values the will".[1] Thus the "ought" becomes subordinate to the will which makes ethics heteronomous.

Now to proceed with the criticism that Hartmann directs against Kant, the transcendental subjectivism of Kant poses some difficulty in understanding the problem of the will. The will which is supposed to be the originator of the principles of morality have the freedom to follow it or not. But the question is : how can the will transgress that which is itself its product ?

Hartmann's point against Kant may be understood in the following way. Kant claims both autonomy and freedom for the will. If the will is really autonomous, then it claims to be so only on the ground that it is the originator of its own laws. If that be so, how can the will transgress that it makes intrinsically for itself ? For example, the nature cannot violate its own laws, even though it may well claim to be autonomous with regard to its role as originator of laws. On the other hand, if the will claims to be free on the ground that it has the freedom either to conform to its laws or to transgress

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1 Hartmann, N., Ethics, op.cit., p.158.

them, then can it really claims to be the originator of laws. The point that Hartmann is trying to drive home here is that Kant's view that will is both free and autonomous involves contradiction in terms. Thus "for Kant", Hartmann avers,

> the pure will is accepted as free, exactly in so far as it has no other ground of determination than the principle which inheres in its own essence. Consequently Kant's 'free' will has in truth, on the basis of these determinations, self-legislation (in the strict sense, "autonomy"), but has no freedom in the proper sense of the word. It is subject to the autonomous principles of its essence exactly as nature is subject to natural law.[1]

Thus in Kant's ethics, the will can be free only by ceasing to be autonomous. Hartmann, therefore, concludes that

> transcendental subjectivism is not only not required by the doctrine of the freedom of the will, but stands directly <u>in opposition to it</u>.[2]

Further, Hartmann points out that the postulation of the disjunction : either the moral law originates from the external world or it issues from the subject i.e. from reason has vitiated Kant's theory of knowledge as well as his theory of morals. Kant's distinction of the origin of moral law from the natural fact is appreciated by Hartmann. But from this, Hartmann points out, it does not follow that it issues from human reason. Hartmann's own view is that the fact of morality i.e. the values, not the moral law, originates from an ideal sphere of self-subsistent nature which is discovered <u>a priori</u>.

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1 <u>Ibid</u>., p.159.

2 <u>Ibid</u>., p.160 (our emphasis).

Let us turn to Hartmann's second point criticism of Kant's ethics. As we have already stated that the moral law or the Categorical Imperative is only a formal law of action, that is, it cannot prescribe the content - what one ought to do in certain situation. And this formal law is a priori, that is, it is not derived from the empirical experience of human action. Hartmann strongly objects to Kant's identification of the a priori with the formal. According to Hartmann, it is for identifying the a priori with the formal that Kant's moral law fails to prescribe what one ought to do in a particular circumstance. It lacks "material" and cannot give any definite end to the will but only a form and as a result the will cannot function. Hartmann goes so far as to say that

> An imperative which did not command anything as to the content would be empty, therefore in reality not an imperative at all.[1]

Hartmann observes that it is the long-standing prejudice in favour of form which dominates not only Kant's ethics but also the whole of his philosophy. Hartmann recognises that laws, commandments and categories are universal as compared with the instances for which they hold good and in this sense they are formal. But this does not mean that it must be a priori. It is possible to have principles which have content and that they can be a priori as all principles are known a priori.

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1 Ibid., p.167.

To put the matter more clearly, Hartmann's point is that the moral law can have a matter without losing its apriorical character. And therefore, the pairs "formal-material" has nothing to do at all with the pair "a priori - a posteriari". Because, for him, that which is a priori is not necessarily formal, and that which is a posteriori is not necessarily material. Hartmann readily acknowledges his agreement with Scheler on this point.

Inspite of the criticism of Kant's ethics, Hartmann appreciates Kant's rejection of empirical ethics and "of all prescribing of specific ends which can arise only upon the ground of empirically given situations".[1]

To turn now to the third point of criticism. We find here that Hartmann is opposed to what he calls Kant's "intellectualism". Hartmann criticises Kant's advocacy of the dichotomy between the sensible and the intelligible which equally reigns in his theory of knowledge as well as in his ethics. Since, reason is held to be in a superior position, particularly in ethics. For Kant, (i) that which is a priori is rational and (ii) that which is a posteriari is sensuous.

Let us the latter first. For Kant, every empirical determination of the will is a determination by the sensible, that is, by the pleasure or pain. But, in fact, Hartmann points

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1 Ibid., p.166.

out, the will is never determined by the sensible, that is, by pleasure or pain but by the desired objects. We desire not for pleasure but the object which is the bearer of value. It is true that pleasure is derived from the desired object when it is realised, but for this, pleasure itself is not the object of desire.

As for the (ii), i.e. that which is a priori is rational, Hartmann claims that "with Kant the intellectualism of the aprioristic is almost a settled principle"[1] in his philosophy. In ethics, Kant's Categorical Imperative is a law of reason" and it also reveals what Hartmann calls "intellectualism". But, for Kant, the ethical a priori must be rational a priori and can be expressed in judgements. This is the apriority of the Categorical Imperative. Kant cannot conceive of the a priori that is not rational, that is, emotional. Because, what is emotional is inferior to what is rational. For Hartmann, on the other hand,

> Every moral preference is intuitive, is immediately there and is always contained in the grasping of a given circumstance (whether it be a situation or a finished course of conduct). It does not first wait for a judgement of the understanding.[2]

Thus Hartmann argues that acts of preferences are emotional acts and not intellectual. The emotional act is equally cognitive

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1 Ibid., p.174.

2 Ibid., p.176.

like the rational act. For him, valuational *a priori* is not rational but emotional unlike that of Kant's view as to the identification of *a priori* with the rational.

Section C

Scheler's Critique of Kant's Ethics

Max Scheler's writings show a distinct preoccupation with Kant's ethical views even if for the purpose of refuting and criticising several of its points. There is a reawakened interest in this aspect of Scheler's thrust. Reviewing one such recent book[1] Francis Dunlop, the reviewer acknowledges such an intellectual disposition when he remarks,

> Scheler shared far more with Kant than has usually been recognised and a good deal of the book is taken up with a preliminary discussion of Kant's ethical transcendentalism.[2]

Scheler undertakes a thorough examination of Kant's formal apriorism and some specific doctrines of the *Critique of Practical Reason* in his *Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values*. In the following, we shall present some of the main critical points made by Scheler with regard to Kant's formal-aprioristic ethics.

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1 Perrin, R., *Max Scheler's Concept of the Person : An Ethics of Humanism*, Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., London, 1991.

2 *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol.24, No.2, May, 1993, p.193.

To begin, it may be noted that Scheler's criticism of Kant's ethics, as he himself says in his "Introductory Remarks" to his Formalism in Ethics is not "internal criticism" but one of external criticism made from the point of view of phenomenology. Scheler's concern is avowedly not "historical Kant", but the formal ethics as such of which Kant's ethics is only an example.

Scheler sums up the propositions of Kantian ethics which he believes to be erroneous in his "Introductory Remarks" to his book Formalism in Ethics which may be briefly stated here. Every non-formal ethics, we are told, must necessarily be (i) ethics of goods and purposes, (ii) empirical, inductive and aprioristic, (iii) responsive to the consequences, and so (iv) hedonistic in nature.

Now, according to Scheler, Kant is quite right in rejecting all ethics that are based on inductive experience. For Scheler, all experience of good things and bad things presuppose the comprehension of what good and evil are. Thus Scheler recognises the apriority of values. But, according to him, Kant cannot answer the question as to how the ethical a priori can be known. Kant does not put forward any criteria to distinguish between a "fact of pure reason" and a psychological fact. Intuitive sight which exhibits the fact of intuitive content is unknown to Kant. "For this reason", Scheler

concludes, "Kant's procedure in ethics acquires a purely constructivistic character".[1] It is Scheler's view that only non-formal ethics is based on genuine facts or what he calls "value-facts" as opposed to arbitrary construction.

Further, for Scheler, "the identification of the 'a priori' with the 'formal' is fundamental error of Kant's doctrine".[2] According to Scheler, apriority means an ideal unit of meaning which is self-given by way of intuitive insight. It is a kind of content. Values as content are a priori. And so, that which is itself a content cannot be formal. But, for Kant, moral values are formal. In short, Scheler accuses Kant of identifying a priori, which is contentful, with the formal.

This implies, according to Scheler, another closely connected error, namely, Kant's identification of the non-formal with the sensible content and a priori with thought. On Kantian scheme, one asks "what can be given?" instead of "what is given" implying that something beyond the sensory functions cannot be given to our experience. Here, in this question, "What is given?", our attention should be directed to what and not to other sensible contents. Thus Scheler says,

> It is only in the direction of the intentional act, apart /heransgelosten/ from the person, the ego, and totality of the world in which we are seeing, that we observe and see the what and how it appears.[3]

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1 Scheler, M., Formalism in Ethics, op.cit., p.47.

2 Ibid., p.54.

3 Ibid., p.55.

"No less erroneous", Scheler further points out, "is the identification of the 'a priori' with the 'rational' (or 'thought'), which corresponds to the identification of the 'non-formal' with the 'sensible' (as well as the a posteriori".[1] This identification of the a priori with the rational, according to Scheler, is very detrimental to ethics. What leads Kant to identify apriority with the rational is the longstanding prejudice, namely, the division of sensibility and reason. According to this division, what we assign to sensibility is not rational - that is not order, law and the like. Everything "alogical" e.g., intuition, feeling, loving, hating is dependent on man's psychophysical organisations and therefore "sensible". Kant is not an exception to this belief. In ethics, he is firm on the position that all feelings, even love and hate, basically belong to the sensible sphere and thus he excludes them from ethics. Because he cannot assign them to "reason". Kant assumes that man's inclinations are in a state of complete chaos and it is only a will based on reason or what he calls "practical reason" which bestows some significant structure upon this chaotic state. Scheler holds, on the contrary, that there is an eternal and absolute "lawfulness of feeling", loving and hating which are as absolute as that of pure logic. The absoluteness of feeling, loving, hating etc. is not reducible to the absoluteness of pure logic. Thus, for Scheler, it is only with the dismissal of the division of sensibility and reason that the "a priori non-formal" ethics

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1 Ibid., p.70.

emerges. Scheler recognises a non-formal a priori or what he calls "emotional apriorism" as a definite necessity for any ethics which dismisses the Kantian identification of a priori with the rational.

Thus values, for Scheler, are non-formal a priori which are given to value-intuition and not to reason. Scheler accuses Kant of deriving "the a priori from the function of willing instead of from the content of moral cognition, as it occurs in feeling, preferring, loving and hating".[1]

Scheler also maintains that Kant's notion of general validity of moral judgements is not connected with "essentiality" and has nothing to do with a priori. Kant refers to all connections of the "ought to be" to the necessity of ought instead of to a priori insight in the context of the values. "Thus, only what is good can become 'duty' ; or it is because it is good (in the ideal sense) that it necessarily 'ought' to be".[2] For Scheler, it is the insight into the a priori structure of values which gives "necessity" to the ought.

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1 Ibid., p.70.

2 Ibid., p.75.

Chapter IV

MOORE'S CRITIQUE OF NATURALISM : SOME PHENOMENOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS

An attempt will be made in this chapter to delineate some of the important ideas which More's ethical non-naturalism embodies. Our concern here is to bring out clearly as to how Moore's theory of ethical values contains an important insight which would seem to bear well on our understanding of values from a phenomenological standpoint. Our point of interest is to focus on the connectedness of Moore's ideas with the way some of the phenomenological thinker, notably Scheler among them, develops the matrix of phenomenological thinking with regard to values. In immediate support of this we may quote the following relevant lines from Scheler's preface to the second edition of his book, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values :

> In England, G.E.Moore has set forth similar views (such as those developed by Scheler himself) on many points concerning the problem of values.[1]

1. Moore's Non-naturalism

Moore advocates a form of non-naturalism in his theory of moral value by denying the analysability of goodness in any

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1 Scheler, M., Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, p.XXI, Translated by Manfred S. Frings and Roger L.Fund, North-western University Press, Evanston, 1973.

terms - naturalistic or metaphysical. According to him, "good is a property of certain natural objects" but "good itself is not a natural property".[1] Moore is reluctant to assimilate the value-term "good" to the realm of naturalistic properties, such, pleasure, tall, red etc. The nature of natural predicates is such that they are descriptive in character and they describe the spatio-temporal objects. They are not used to judge any natural object or action whether they are valuable or not. They cannot give us direction to our actions. But, on the other hand, moral predicates, such as, good, right etc. are such that they evaluate our action or prescribe what one ought to do. They provide us with the guideline for doing this or that action as principles of action. In being of distinctive nature, natural terms and value terms should not be confused with each other. If the two are not distinguished apart, according to Moore, a factual science will replace the subject called Ethics. That is, the analysis of value-terms by means of factual terms would cause the occurrence of a factual science, because "analysis" is possible only by another term which would be factual term in nature. Thus, Moore takes the standpoint that maintains the non-identity of value and the naturalistic terms which has come to be known as ethical non-naturalism.

Moore proceeds by clarifying that by "nature", what he means is,

> that which is the subject-matter of the natural sciences and also of psychology. It may be said to all that has

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1 Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, p.41, Cambridge University Press, 1965.

> existed, does exist, or will exist in time. If we consider whether any object is of such a nature that it may be said to exist now, to have existed, or to be about to exist, then we may know that that object is a natural object and that nothing, of which this is not true, is a naturalistic object.[1]

With this explanation of what natural object is, Moore goes on to point out that the theory which regards that "good can be defined by reference to natural object"[2] is called ethical naturalism. To Moore, ethical naturalism is "a particular method of approaching ethics",[3] which "consists in substituting for 'good' some natural property or 'defining' good in terms of some natural property, or meaning by 'good' some natural property".[4]

The naturalistic method of approaching ethics reduces the latter to a positive or factual sciences whose "conclusions could be all established by means of empirical observation and induction"[5] and thus it is inconsistent with the possibility of any Ethics whatsoever. Moore's non-naturalism, it may be pointed out, excludes the use of empirical observation and induction from any ethical enquiry. A moral judgement which is formed by reference to "good" does not need any evidence to be true or false. Ethics which is constituted by using naturalistic

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1 Ibid., p.40.

2 Ibid., p.39.

3 Ibid., p.40.

4 Bharadwaja, V.K., Naturalistic Ethical Theory, p.9. Delhi University Press, 1978.

5 Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.39.

method needs evidence, empirical observation and induction. The factual sciences use the method of empirical observation and induction. It follows that ethics which uses these empirical method or principles can no longer be regarded as ethics. Thus, the naturalistic method of approaching ethics, by using the principles of factual sciences, reduces ethics to merely a natural or factual sciences. Moore's more articulate expression of what ethical naturalism is as follows :

> Those theories of Ethics, then, are 'naturalistic' which declare the sole good to consist in some one property of things, which exists in time and which do so because they suppose that 'good' itself can be defined by reference to such a property.[1]

It must be noted here that according to Moore, the same type of argument would apply to what he calls "metaphysical ethics" which attempts to define moral predicates in terms of things existing in a supersensible sphere and the fallacy that occurs in this case is given the same name the "naturalistic fallacy' As, Moore says,

> the fallacy, by reference to which I define 'Metaphysical Ethics' is the same in kind; and I give it but one name, 'the naturalistic fallacy'.[2]

Though Moore gives the same name "naturalistic fallacy" to the fallacy which metaphysical ethics commits, he recognises that the case is different since metaphysical properties are non-natural.

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1 Ibid., p.41.

2 Ibid., p.39.

The foregoing account is in the way of a brief outline of Moore's model of ethical naturalism which he refutes on the ground that it involves commiting what he calls "naturalistic fallacy" by violating Butler's principle, namely, "Everything is what it is, and not another thing" (Bishop Bulter).

Let us now try to bring out what Moore means by the naturalistic fallacy and what does making such a fallacy consist in. The term "naturalistic fallacy" has been coined by Moore and it first appears in the following passage of Principia Ethica :

> It may be true that all things which are good are also something else. .... And it is a fact, that Ethics aims at discovering what are those other properties belonging to all things which are good. But far too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good; that these properties, in fact, were simply not 'other', but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. This view I propose to call the 'naturalistic fallacy'....[1]

Moore's point here is that all things which are good have certain properties and many philosophers identify goodness with those other properties while defining goodness. This mistake which occurs by defining goodness in terms of some natural property is called "naturalistic fallacy".

We hasten to point out here that Moore, in the above passage, has used the term, "definition" in a different sense

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1 Ibid., p.10.

from that of his own. Here to "define" means to "identify" and in his prescribed sense of definition, to "define2 means to "analyse", that is to break something in simpler terms. This is the difference between his own sense of definition and that have been used by some other ethical philosophers.

However, the sense of definition suggested by ethical naturalists is not acceptable to Moore. On the other hand, the naturalists, accepting this sense of definition, commit a mistake which has been termed by Moore as "the naturalistic fallacy". The advocates of this sense of definition as identification, according to Moore, have overlooked or denied an important distinction, namely, between goodness and other notions. They confuse one notion or one class of notion with the other notion or other class of notions. And thus, they identify goodness with other notions. Therefore, the naturalistic fallacy consists primarily in the denial of the distinction between a non-natural property called "good" and any other notion. In other words, the naturalistic fallacy consists in identification of "goodness" with a natural property. As Alan White has rightly commented :

> In essence the fallacy is simply that of identifying or equating any two notions which in fact are distinct, or of supposing two words to be synonymous which are not.[1]

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1 White, A.R., G.E.Moore : A Critical Exposition, p.124, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969.

Accepting Moore's distinction between natural and non-natural, we can have four varieties of the same distinction ; (i) a natural notion with another natural notion, (ii) a natural with a non-natural notion, (iii) a non-natural with another non-natural notion, and (iv) a non-natural notion with natural notion.

Of these, Moore identifies (ii) and (iv) as commiting naturalistic fallacy. He says that to define "good" by naming some "other" property which belongs to things and thus saying that these "other" property is identical with "good" is to commit the naturalistic fallacy. In Moore's own words,

> But if he(someone) confuses 'good' which is not in the same sense a natural object, with any natural object whatever, then there is a reason for calling that a naturalistic fallacy; its being made with regard to 'good' marks it as something quite specific, and this specific mistake deserve a name because it is so common.[1]

For Moore, naturalism is a particular method of approaching ethics which, in a strict sense, is completely inconsistent with the possibility of any ethics. This method, Moore points out,

> "consists in substituting for 'good' some one property of a natural object or of a collection of natural objects; and thus replacing Ethics by some one of the natural sciences.[2]

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1 Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.13.

2 Ibid., p.40.

Moore, however, elaborates that in a sense even (iii) also involves commiting naturalistic fallacy. When a metaphysical definition is given, then "good" is identified with some other non-natural noation e.g. with God etc. And "the fallacy", he says,

> by reference to which I define Metaphysical ethics is the same in kind; and I give it but one name, the naturalistic fallacy.[1]

It is to be noted that though he has given the same name "the naturalistic fallacy" to the fallacy which metaphysical ethics commits, he recognises that the case is different, since here the metaphysical properties are different from naturalistic properties.

Now, to our understanding, it seems that Moore does not think (i) as commiting naturalistic fallacy. He takes the example about self and pleasure. If someone imagines that when he says, "I am pleased", he means by this that he is exactly identical with "pleasure", then he cannot be said to commit the naturalistic fallacy. Here the person, who identifies himself, is a natural object and his identification of himself with another natural object called pleasure is not, according to Moore, to be treated as commiting naturalistic fallacy.[2] "And", he says,

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1 Ibid., p.39.

2 Ibid., p.13.

> if anybody tried to define pleasure for us as being any other natural object; if any body were to say, for instance, that pleasure means the sensation of red, and were to proceed to deduce from that pleasure is a colour, we should be entitled to laugh at him and to distrust his future statements about pleasure. Well, that would be the same fallacy which I have called the naturalistic fallacy.[1]

In other words, if pleasure which is a natural property is defined in terms of another natural property say, red, then it is to commit "naturalistic fallacy". This point is the evidence to regard (i) as a case of naturalistic fallacy.

Now, it seems that ultimately Moore comes to think that the naturalistic fallacy consists in defining 'good' as something else. That is, to identify or define the simple notion denoted by "good" with or in terms of any other notion is to commit the naturalistic fallacy. As pointed out earlier, violation of Butler's statement which Moore has mentioned at the beginning of his book, Principia Ethica, viz. "everything is what it is, and not another thing" leads to this kind of situation. "It follows", Frankena says,

> that views which try to identify it with something else are making a mistake of an elementary sort. For it is a mistake to confuse or identify two properties. If the properties really are two, then they simply are not identical.[2]

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1 Ibid.

2 Frankena, W.K., "The Naturalistic Fallacy" See Phillippa Foot edited Theories of Ethics, p.58 Oxford University Press, 1967.

It may be worthwhile to mention here in the passing what Moore has to say as to what would follow from commiting naturalistic fallacy in ethics. In other words, the naturalistic fallacy "reduces what is used as a fundamental principle of Ethics either to a tautology or to a statement about the meaning of a word".[1]

What we have tried to bring out in the present section is the Moore's view that "Good" which is fundamental to ethics must remain what it is and not to be confused with or to be defined in any other terms - naturalistic or metaphysical. For, any attempt to confuse it or identify it with other terms or define it in any other terms would ultimately lead us to no possibility of ethics. Thus Moore's attempt to keep the moral value "good" out of the naturalistic or metaphysical context has a close resemblance with phenomenological perspective which also disregards the appeal of naturalism or metaphysics.

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1 Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.xiv.

2. Moore's Intuitionism

In the preface to his book, Principia Ethica, Moore makes a point of fundamental importance, namely, that good stands for something simple, indefinable, non-natural and non-metaphysical "object or idea". Having raised the question, "what is good?" he clarifies that he neither means, what particular things are good ? nor what sorts of things are good ? The question he raises is one of the definition of good. He writes,

> My business is solely with that object or idea, which I hold, rightly or wrongly, that the word ("good") is generally used to stand for. What I want to discover is the nature of that object or idea.[1]

The discovery which he claims to have made in the above passage about the "object or idea" good is that it is indefinable. In Moore's words,

> If I am asked 'what is good?' my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked 'How is good to be defined?' my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it.[2]

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1 (a) Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.6.

(b) Moore's concern here is with the ordinary use of the word "good" and what he wants to do is only to characterise it and not to change the meaning of it or to redefine it. But L.M.Loring has pointed out that "the use of 'good' to stand for an object is most unusual, seeing that this word - as Moore himself observes shortly afterwards - is an adjective. Thus it generally stands for an idea, however, may be admitted".
Please see, Loring, L.M., Two kinds of Values, p.130. Routedge & Kegan Paul, London, 1966.

2 Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.6.

We may briefly explicate the sense in which Moore is denying that good is definable. He differentiates three kinds of definition, namely, (i) Stipulative definition or what he calls "the arbitrary verbal definition"; (ii) Lexical definition or what he calls "the verbal definition proper"; and (iii) Definition by analysis "in which a definition states what are the parts which invariably compose a a certain whole".[1] This kind of definition gives the anlysis of the concept defined, and may be called analytical definition. We are told that in this sense, to define means to analyse[2] or to break up a complex whole into its simplest constituent parts which cannot further be analysed or broken as they have no parts. This is the kind of definition which, according to Moore "describe/s/ the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word".[3]

This kind of definition is possible only when a word or notion in question is complex. For example, the concept "horse" is not complex but what it denotes is complex for having many different properties and qualities all of which can be enumerated until one arrives at "horse" reduced to its simplest terms which can no longer be defined. These simple

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1 Ibid., p.9.

2 In A.C.Ewing's words "he(Moore) uses 'definable' as equivalent to analysable". Please see his book, Ethics, p.87. The English Universities Press Ltd., London, 1969.

3 Ibid., p.7.

terms cannot have definition at all in the above explained sense. And it is in this sense of "definition" that Moore denies definability of "good".[1]

Now, it appears that Moore has arrived at the decision that good is indefinable via the concept of simplicity which is possessed by the object "goodness". That is to say, goodness is indefinable[2] because it is a simple notion. A simple notion cannot be defined in the sense of the definition explained above.

However, in arguing that good is a simple notion, Moore presupposes that an object must be either simple or complex but cannot be both from whatever point of view it is looked at. Goodness refers to a property or an entity having no spatio-temporal existence and therefore has no parts. It is simple. Its simplicity lies in its very nature of its substantial character. The simplicity here consists in <u>indivisibility</u> of what it denotes by conceptual means. In the word of Moore "'good' is a simple notion, just as 'yellow' is a simple notion;

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1 Moore says, "the most important sense of 'definition' is that in which a definition states what are the parts which invariably compose a certain whole; and in this sense 'good' has definition because it is simple and has no parts". Moore, G.E., <u>Principia Ethica</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.9.

2 Prof. R.Prasad maintains : "I interpret Moore to be making not a verbal claim, but a substantial claim in asserting the indefinability of goodness". Prasad, R., <u>Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality</u>, p.160, ICPR, New Delhi, 1989.

that, just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to any one who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is".[1]

Thus Moore finds analogy between good and yellow. Goodness, according to him, is like colour "yellow", not in the sense that they have some objective characteristics in common, but in the sense that both are simple, indefinable and immediately apprehensible. As A.C.Ewing puts it.

> Goodness is of course a very different kind of characteristics from a colour, but might still well resemble each other in being immediately apprehended and in being indefinable[2]

We shall later have occasion to appreciate this reflection of Moore when we deal with a similar point made by Scheler. Suffice it to say here that Scheler too finds values quite comparable to colours in point of both being directly and immediately intuitable. Needless to say that any phenomenological understanding of values – moral or any other – requires stressing that they are object of direct intuition.[3]

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1 Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.7.

2 Ewing, A.C., Ethics, p.88.
The English Universities Press Ltd., London, Impression, 1969.

3 The point made here is quite independent of the natural/non-natural dichotomy to which Moore readily resorts.

It seems that when Moore says that goodness, like yellowness, is simple, he means by this that it is conceptually unanalysable, that both goodness and yellowness cannot be broken or analysed in conception or thought.[1] On the contrary, when he says that "horse" is analysable, this does not mean merely that "horse" is physically divisible. It is true that a horse existing in space and time can be physically divided but this is not the point of Moore. He is not at all concerned with physical divisibility of any object. His interest is in conceptual analysis. For Moore, horse is a complex because it can conceptually be analysed. The point is that simplicity and unanalysability are synonemous terms for Moore.

Further, in our daily life one sees different yellow coloured things that have the colour yellow, but cannot explain the nature of the colour if it is not already known. This failure to describe or explain is not due to anyone's lack of verbal ability, but is due to the object's simplicity. Moore argues that this failure to explain or to describe what the yellow is, is the proof that yellow is a simple notion. Similarly, one cannot describe or explain what goodness is.

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1 We may mention here Moore's general standpoint with regard to ethical properties, such as, good, in Frankena's words, "Ethical properties, however, are not for him (Moore), mere indefinable natural properties of a different kind — non-descriptive or non-natural".

Franken, W.K., "The Naturalistic Fallacy" in Philippa Foot (ed.) Theories of Ethics, op.cit.

One can have the knowledge of goodness by intuition, but cannot explain conceptually what is intuited. This failure to conceptualise the nature of goodness implies that goodness is simple. In other words, goodness has the property of simplicity which is known when one tries to communicate its nature.

It follows from the above discussion that the nature of goodness can only be immediately apprehended, but it cannot be made known to others in conceptual terms. For, no concept can grasp its real nature. Each one can have the knowledge of goodness by her personal inspection or experience. In J.N. Findlay's words,

> 'in itself' good remains a character that must be simply apprehended, that it cannot be further analysed, and only when it has been thus apprehended, and clearly put before the mind in thought, can we come to understand and know various further propositions, necessary and emperical, concerning it.1

We must hasten to add here that this is a point that comes very close to any phenomenological way of understanding.

It is worth nothing that good, for Moore, means "intrinsically good"[2] or "good as an end" as distinguished

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1 Findlay, J.N., Axiological Ethics, p.38. Macmillan and Co.Ltd., London, 1970.

2 Alan White points out, "In his earliest ethical work, Principia Ethica, Moore did not explicitly confine his analysis of the meaning of 'good' to 'intrinsically good' even he had intended, as he later said, to do so". Please see his, G.E.Moore : A Critical Exposition, op.cit., p.122.

from "extrinsic good" or "good as an end". As Moore himself says,

> whenever he (any person) thinks of 'intrinsic value', 'intrinsic worth', or says that a thing 'ought to exist', he has before his mind the unique object — the unique property of things - which I mean by 'good'.[1]

Or, in Blanshard's words,

> 'Good' was for him (Moore) the name of a simple 'non-natural' quality present in everything that is good intrinsically. Of course what he is considering is not instrumental goodness, the value of something as a means, but the intrinsic goodness of that which is good in itself or good for its own sake.[2]

The expression, "intrinsic good" means that the goodness of a thing is intrinsic when its worth depends solely on the intrinsic nature of that thing. If the goodness is intrinsic to a thing, then the goodness of that thing remains static and constant in all respects and under all circumstances. If the judgement of intrinsic goodness, which asserts that a thing is good in itself, true of one instance of the thing in question, is necessarily true of all. Thus the worth of goodness lies in itself and not in anything else. This point is of particular interest to us as it seems to strike a basic chord of similarity with a phenomenological understanding of "goodness" as a value.

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1 Moore, G.E. Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.17.

2 Blanshard, B., Reason and Goodness, op.cit., George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1961.

Further, having taken "good" as intrinsic goodness, Moore recognises that

> the goodness of a thing is wholly independent of the thing's relation of anything else; and in particular it is wholly independent of the thing's relation to feeling or desire or will.[1]

Thus Paton takes Principia Ethica's one of the main objects as "to refute relativism and subjectivism in ethics".[2] This point also is appreciatable to phenomenological value-theoriests. For them, also, values themselves are not relative, but absolute and they are also not subjective.

Moreover, the judgement of intrinsic goodness is incapable of proof or disproof and therefore, self-evident. On the other hand, the judgement of extrinsic goodness is not self-evident and therefore, probable. So, for Moore, the judgement of goodness is only intuitable, as we shall see later on.

Goodness, according to Moore, is known by direct "experience" or intuition. We would stress that this single point is of utmost value to Scheler who quite openly acknowledges it. The starting point for any phenomenological understanding must be rooted in experience and the mode in which phenomenological essences are supportedly given to intuition. Now what kind of intuition is it ? Are there different kinds of intuition ? To

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1 Paton, H.J., "The Alleged Independence of goodness". Schilpp, P.A.(ed.), The Philosophy of G.E.Moore, p.113. Cambridge University Press, Third edition, 1968.

2 Ibid.

To be sure, Moore differentiates his intuitionism. He says,

> that I am not an 'intuitionist', in the ordinary sense of the term .... The Intuitionist proper is distinguished by maintaining that propositions of second class - propositions which asserts that a certain action is right or a duty - incapable of proof or disproof by any enquiry into the results of such actions. I, on the contrary, am no less anxious to maintain that propositions of this kind are not 'Intuitions', than to maintain that propositions my first class are Intuitions.[1]

Intuitionism, for Moore, consists in holding that the propositions of first class i.e. the propositions which asserts what things are intrinsically good are incapable of proof or disproof. This means that these propositions cannot be proved or disproved since no relevant evidence can be adduced for them. They are true by themselves alone i.e., self-evident. On the other hand, propositions of what ought to exist and propositions of what ought to be done are not intuitively known, for, the ethical ideas, such as, right, duty etc. are derivable from it (goodness).

In the context of establishing the indefinability of goodness, Moore wants to dispel another possible confusion. He makes a distinction between "good" and "the good". The latter standing for "that which is good" while the former refers to an "object or idea", an adjective which is attached to a substantive which has the quality of goodness. For example, in the statement "This pen is good", the adjective "good" is

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1 Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.x.

predicated of a substantive, viz., the pen. On the other hand, the good stands for that which is good. It is the substantive to which the adjective "good" will apply. Moore says,

> if it (i.e. the good) is that to which the adjective(good) will apply, it must be something different from that adjective itself, and the whole of that something different, whatever it is, will be our definition of the good.[1]

"The good" is a complex notion, because it is constituted of two parts, viz. "good" and "thing". And therefore, it is analysable or definable, but "good" is a simple notion, hence it cannot so be defined. Moore concludes that "the good is (to be) definable; and yet I still say that good itself is indefinable".[2]

To recapitulate, Moore says that "good denotes a simple and indefinable quality".[3] Elsewhere he says,

> if it is not the case that 'good' denotes something simple and indefinable, only two alternatives are possible : either it is a complex, a given whole, about the correct analysis of which there may be disagreement; or else it means nothing at all...."[4]

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1 Ibid., p.9.

2 Ibid., p.9.(our emphasis)

3 Ibid., p.10.

4 Ibid., p.15.

Moore has rejected the first alternative by what is an open question "argument". The second alternative too is rejected by him. According to Moore, good cannot be "nothing" at all. Now, as to how Moore proves that goodness is meaningful, we may turn to Moore's following argument. It seems that if goodness refers to simple property and does not refer to a complex property, then its meaning seems to consist in its reference to something, that is, a simple property. If it does not refer, then it is nothing at all. The meaningfulness of goodness consists in its reference to simple "object". It is also clear from this that Moore supports the referential theory of meaning, at least, in the case of ethical knowledge.

As for the type of property which the word "good" refers to, Moore says that good refers to the same quality in all of its uses, i.e. there is a common quality, the quality of goodness present in all the things about which it is true to say that they are good. It is a quality which is referred to by all good things.

Besides, goodness being a "non-natural" property, Moore holds that it is in the world as irreducible constituent of it. "I do not deny", Moore elaborates,

> that good is a property of a certain natural objects : certain of them, I think, are good; and yet I have said that 'good' itself is not a natural property. Well, my test for these too concerns their existence in time.

> Can we imagine 'good' as existing by itself in time, and not merely as a property of some natural object ? For myself, I cannot so imagine it . . . .[1]

So, in this view, goodness is a property; it is non-natural property; and, it is a non-natural property of natural objects which is not in time.

It is interesting to note here some points of convergence between the views of Moore and Hartmann with regard to values. These points have well been brought out by Professor Cadwallader[2] in the following way.

First, both Moore and Hartmann may be said to have advocated Platonism in their theory of value, though in different senses. Hartmann is avowedly a value-platonist; and so, according to him, values are real entities which exists in a realm of their own which is different from that of the natural world such that the values are not perceived or perceivable by the senses. Now, Moore also advocates a form of value-platonism[3] though quite in a different sense according

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1 Ibid., p.41.

2 Please see, Cadwallader, E.H., Searchlight on Values, Ch. II, University Press of America, New York, 1984.

Also, see her paper with Eisenberg, D. Paul. "Platonism-proper Vs. Property - Platonism". Idealistic Studies, Vol.5, No.1, January, 1975.

3 Professor R. Prasad thinks Moore as a platonist. Please see his article, "Moore's argument for the Indefinability of Goodness", Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality, op.cit., p.157.

to which the value goodness is a "non-natural" property existing in this world as an irreduciable constituent of it. Cadwallander describes Moore's value-platonism as "property--platonism" and that of Hartmann's as "Platonism-proper".[1]

Second, values have been conceived of by both Moore and Hartmann as ontologically unique in their mode of existence. Values share in some aspects of its existence with some other objects. For Moore, goodness is a simple quality like yellow, on the one hand. And, for Hartmann, values are like mathematical objects, on the other. Further, for both of them, values are different from their analogues.

Third, according to both Moore and Hartmann, values are non-natural. Though for the former, value (goodness) exists in this world, but for the latter, values exist in a different realm of its own which is other than the spatio-temporal world. Further, although for Moore, good is really in the world being a non-natural property, it is "outside of time".[2] And for Hartmann, a value being an existent of a non-sensuous realm, is also not in time.

Fourth, value is an independently real entity for both Moore and Hartmann, in the sense that according to the former,

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1 Cadwalleder, E.H. & Eisenberg, D.Paul., "Platonism-proper Vs. property-platonism", op.cit.

2 Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.

value-properties like all other properties are "objective", and according to the latter, a value is a real existent apart from being known or appreciated. Both of them seem to share value-objectivism. "Each in his own way insists that 'goodness' refers to something objective, that this 'real thing' is not 'merely subjective' despite the fact that actual cases (instances) of goodness always (or, according to Moore, usually involve an experiencing subject".[1]

Fifth, a focal point of similarity between the axiological theories of Moore and Hartmann is that according to both these theories, goodness is "indefinable".[2] However, both Moore and Hartmann adduce opposite reasons for this same standpoint. For Moore, "....good has no definition because it is simple and has no parts".[3] On the other hand, Hartmann writes, "good is not definable - neither directly, per genus et differentiam, nor indirectly"[4] and the reason is that ".... Values are many, their realm is a manifoldness; and (2) we know neither

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1 Cadwallader, E.H., Searchlight on values, p.42. University Press of America, New York, 1984.

2 For Moore's view of it, see Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.9 and for Hartmann's view, see Ethics II, p.172. Translated by Stanton Coit, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, Fourth impression, 1967.

3 Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, p.9.

4 Hartmann, N., Ethics II, p.172.

the entire manifoldness nor its unity".[1] Hartmann argues for the indefinability of goodness not because it is too simple but, because it is too complex. Cadwallader further points out,

> Hartmann's own reasons for 'good's indefinability' as lying (in part) in the Nietzschean insight that '....we do not yet know what good and evil are...."- meaning that we do not yet know what are all the things that are good - can be understood only in the light of his highly complex axiological theory as a whole".[2]

Finally, it is important to note that, for Moore, goodness is, first and foremost, a property. For, Moore himself insists that he does "not deny that good is a property of certain natural objects"[3] and all properties are in the actual world. Moore's goodness, being a property of natural objects, is in the natural world. But Hartmann's ideal values, by contrast, are not the resident of the natural world and so belong to a different world. Moore's "goodness" cannot, therefore, be regarded as an ideal value in the sense in which Hartmann uses the term.

By way of conclusion, it may be said that our conviction that Moore's notion of 'good' can be understood in phenomenological terms is mainly based on anti-metaphysical and

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1 Ibid., Vol.I, p.83.

2 Cadwallader, N., Searchlight on Values, op.cit., p.45.

3 Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, op.cit., p.41.

anti-naturalistic attitude of both Moore and Husserl. Moore's reference to "the naturalistic fallacy" seems to have resemblance to Husserl's criticism of naturalistic and metaphysical standpoints. Moore makes an appeal to his reader to move out of the context of the physical world or metaphysical reality which bears a close resemblance to Husserl's view, though they have their two different context of expressing this view. Husserl's criticism of naturalistic or metaphysical standpoint is in the context of how knowledge is possible where he faces a long-standing and unresolved problem of transcendence. On the other hand, Moore expresses his anti-naturalistic and anti-metaphysical attitude in the context of moral value. When he finds that "good" is defined by many philosophers by violating the principle, "Everything is what it is and not another thing" (Butler), that is, confusing the value, "good" with factual or metaphysical terms. However, the context and arguments of expressing expressing the anti-naturalistic and anti-metaphysical attitude may be different, but it seems to us that within broad framework of phenomenological approach to a possible theory of values relevance of some of the aspects of Moore's theory needs to be duly acknowledged.

In saying that good can be defined independently of naturalistic or metaphysical terms, Moore seems to point to the idea that conceptual or linguistic explanation of "good" is not possible. To him, definition means definition by analysis.

Good is a simple notion and so, cannot be defined in this sense of the term "definition". We find ourselves quite in sympathy with Moore who points to the impossibility of conceptual or linguistic means to expose the nature of them. For that matter, we do not find it out of place to contend here that one had to grasp its meaning-essence only through non-sensuous intuition. A tentative suggestion would be to say that in order to grasp its essential meaning, good has to be given to pure consciousness as meaning or essence.

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Chapter V

NICOLAI HARTMANN'S VALUE-ETHICS : A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

In this Chapter, we shall mainly deal with the phenomenological aspect of Hartmann's theory of value.[1] In his "Foreword" to the English edition of his three volume Ethics, Nicolai Hartmann says that his central task in this work is to analyse the contents of values as he believes that "only in this way will it be possible in the future to grapple afresh with the problem of conduct".[2] Moral values, as regard their contents, constitute the foundation of ethics. This way of looking at moral values has at once a bearing on the phenomenological conception of value as contentful. According to Hartmann, all strivings and doings, the commandments and the norms have their basis in values which are unique in kind and in mode of existence. "It is evident", Hartmann writes, "that one not only can never will or nor take up as an end anything which one does not regard as 'valuable', but also can never accept it either as a command or demand, as a commandment, as something that ought to be. One must somehow have conceived that a thing has value; only than and only thereby does it become a determining power in the moral life".[3] For Hartmann,

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1 According to Cadwallader, "Hartmann's theory of value.... involves phenomenological, aretaic, and metaphysical aspects", Cadwallader, E.H., "Value Trichotomizing in Philosophy and Psychology : on Nicolai Hartmann and Karen Horney" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol.XXXIX, No.2, December, 1978, p.219.

2 Hartmann, N., Ethics I, p.15.

3 Ibid., p.81.

values stand "behind" all ends of our action. We can evaluate the conduct of a person, a deed etc. only with reference to a value. Hence, values, according to Hartmann, are fundamental to ethics.

Section A

1. Platonism and Hartmann

Hartmann is regarded as a philosopher who belongs to the platonic tradition,[1] though he combines well with it some basic phenomenological insights. Quite avowedly, he builds up his philosophical theories on platonic structure of thinking. And, his ethical theory is not an exception to this. Hartmann relates his philosophy of value to what may be considered as Platonic foundations. Hartmann harks back to the Platonic notion of Ideas and establishes his theory of moral values on it. Plato conceives a realm of Being which he calls "the realm of Ideas" other than the realm of the phenomenal world. Hartmann finds Platonic conception to be illuminating for his theory of

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1 This has been widely acknowledged.

Please see, (a) J.N.Mohanty, Nicolai Hartman and North Whitehead Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1957.

(b) E.H.Cadwallader, Searchlight on Values University Press of America, Lanham, 1984.

(c) F.Kraenzel, "Nicolai Hartmann's Doctrine of Ideal values : An Examination", Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol.18, No.2, 1984.

value. This is evident from his following statement : "Characteristically among Plato's ideas are found ethical principles, the ideal 'virtue' - those values upon which his ethics was built. This fact is especially illuminating for the theory of value : in their mode of Being, values are Platonic ideas".[1] It should be made quite clear that Hartmann's concern is not the Platonic theory of Ideas in general, but with some aspects of this theory.

Hartmann seems to have inherited the following leading ideas from Plato : (a) values represent a world of their own, like Plato's Ideas, detached from the mundane world. This means that values have a peculiar mode of being, like those of Plato's Ideas and unlike the objects of mundane reality having spatio-temporal existence. Quite in the way that Plato conceives Ideas as having Ideal Being, Hartmann gives values the status of Ideal Being. In his own words, "in their mode of Being, values are Platonic Ideas".[2] Hartmann's focus of interest, therefore, is on Plato's theory of Ideal Being.

(b) A notion of "ground" is attached to Plato's Ideas, as essences, in the sense that Ideas are ideal Form participating in which an object becomes real object. That is to say, Ideas are that "through which" everything that participates in them

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1 Ibid., p.184.

2 Ibid.

gets its foundation as an object. This notion of "ground" has been duly taken note of and emphasized by Hartmann. According to Hartmann, "They (values) are that 'through which' everything which participates in them is exactly as it is - namely, valuable".[1] In other words, "real things have values through partaking in the ideal Form which are values".[2]

(c) Values, like Plato's Ideas, are many, not one, which are independent of all other actual and possible worlds as also of one another. They constitute a world of plural units something that is like Plato's Ideal Forms. Hartmann borrows the Platonic pluralism, namely, (i) the dualism of values as an ideal realm, on one hand and their actual occurrence in this word, on the other, and (ii) the pluralism of values.

(d) Hartmann also borrows the Platonic notion of apriorism. According to Plato, Ideas are a priori to all existing things and beings in the sense that they are intuited independently of all things and beings. For Hartmann, "Platonic philosophy is the historical discovery of the a prioristic element in the whole realm of human knowledge".[3] Further, ethical values cannot be discovered in the conduct of man. "Values are not to be recognised by the fact that they are, or are not, contained in the real".[4] Values are given a priori,

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1 Ibid., p.185.

2 Kraenzel, F., "Nicolai Hartmann's Doctrine of Ideal Values; An Examination". The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol.18, No.2, 1984.

3 Hartmann, N., Ethics I, op.cit., p.62.

4 Ibid., p.98.

and like Plato's Ideas. "They are not even capable of being grasped by thought" but are "immediately discerned only by an inner 'vision'".[1]

(e) The term "a priori" must be understood here in the sense that such "a priority of the knowledge of them is no intellectual or reflective a priority, but is emotional, intuitive".[2] And for Hartmann, "The Platonic notion of 'beholding' well fits that which material ethics designates as the 'sensing of value'".[3]

In the preceding section we have brought out how Hartmann builds up a fine edifice of the philosophy of value on this platonic inheritance. As Cadwallader has rightly pointed out, the Platonism that Hartmann advocates in the realm of values may well be designated as "Value-Platonism".[4] Like Platonism itself, there are a number of theses that are historically associated with value-platonism and it has contributed towards much confusion. Generally, value-platonism is regarded as the view according to which there are entities, called values, which are "real" and form a realm of their own apart from the spatio-temporal world. We may briefly note here the various

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1 Ibid., p.185.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Cadwallader, E.H., Searchlight on Values, University Press of America, Lanham, 1984.

senses in which Hartman's value-platonism can be understood. In this connection Cadwallader has identified the following as incorporated in such a view[1]:

Values may be regarded as entities which are "really real" and exist like tables and chairs apart from the spatio-temporal world; and, without them one cannot make value-judgements. This is an ontological claim.

Second, values exist independently of being known. They are only discovered by human mind. This may be termed as psycho-epistemological claim.

Third, the independent being of values is not relative to anything whatever, including persons, cultures and perspectives. This independence of values lies in their very nature which resist them to be relative to anything whatever. If they are relative, one cannot make sense of the normative discourse. This claim may be termed Valuational Absolutism.

Finally, Value-Platonism also claims to value-objectivism in the sense that the judgements about values are really statements and hence true or false. They are not something about, say, the speaker's attitudes etc.

Let us now briefly turn to the term "value" and the sense in which it is used in Value-Platonism. This will be

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1 Ibid., Chapter I.

clear if we make a distinction between a thing or event which is to be judged valuable (e.g., good, right etc.) and the standard or norm according to which it is judged to be valuable. The distinction here is between the items as evaluated and in virtue of which a thing or event is evaluated. Cadwallader has used the term "actualised-value" for the former and "value-ideal" for the latter. Now, actualised-values are in time and they are part of history. They are actual entities considered in their aspect of having been valued by some subject. But on the other hand, value-ideal are not in space and time, and therefore, they are not the sort of thing that are in or of the natural world at all. For Hartmann, they belong to the ideal order of being. Further, actualised values are dependent on the person, thing or relation to which they are attached. But the value-ideals are totally independent of any person, thing or relation whatsoever. Thus, the term "value" in Hartmann's Platonic theory, means value-ideals as distinguished from the value that is actualised.

2. Values as "independent" mode of being

Before we go on to Hartmann's positive characterisation of values, or moral values, in particular, it may be relevant here to begin by making some charificatory remarks so as to avoid

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1 Cadwallader claims to have coined these terms for the first time. Please see, E.H.Cadwallader and P.D.Eisenberg's article, "platonism-proper Vs. Property-Platonism : On Moore and Hartmann". Idealistic Studies, Vol.5, No.1, January, 1975.

certain possible confusions. In the first place, values do not reside in valuable things. Nor are they discerned in things that are valuable. It must also be noted that values do not emanate from the valuable objects. Further, as they are not natural objects, they cannot be defined or explained in naturalistic terms. They cannot be defined with reference to the subject's specific mental attitudes. Moreover, values arise neither with our desires, nor with our interest in them. This means that values are not product of subjectivism and psychologism.

Earlier, we have seen that Plato's theory about objectively existing and most real entities (i.e. Ideas) has been avowedly inherited by Hartmann. What is distinctive, for Hartmann, about Platonic Ideas is that they are not in the actual world, in space and time. Values are radically different sorts of things, belonging to a different type of "world"; their mode of being is unique and peculiar. Hartmann conceives them as having the <u>same mode</u> like that of Ideas. Values have their place in ideal world of being <u>independent</u> of spatio-temporality. Further, values are "real" like Platonic Ideas and therefore, they are not something fictitious. Their mode of being is very much like the physical objects in the sense that they cannot be imagined away or cannot be wished away by the will of the subject; the only <u>difference</u> being that values <u>lack</u> spatio-temporality. Values are not only "real" but they are <u>independently</u> "real". Their "reality" is subsistent. They do

not depend on anything else other than themselves. Values are not only independent of the things that are valuable (goods) but are actually their prerequisite. This, however, does not mean that they are dependent upon each other. Each value is independent of anything whatsoever as well as independent of each other. According to Hartmann, values belong to an ideal order of being and therefore, they are themselves ideal beings. "Their mode of being is that of an ideal being-in-itself".[1] Now, what is ideal being of value ? For Hartmann, ideal being has its "being-in-itself". He defines the being-in-itself thus :

> Whatever in its mode of being is not relative to a subject, whatever confronts a thinking subject as independent and immovable, whatever sets us before him a self-subsistent regularity and energy of its own which the subject can grasp or miss but cannot get rid of, that has for him the character of self-existence".[2]

This means that values are independent of the subject who passes the moral judgement and independent of the judgement itself. The being of values has its own regularity and order which is quite different from the mundane reality. They are not products of biological or psychological process. They are independent of the person's actual conduct. Their being as a non-spatio-temporal object remains intact for ever. This independence

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1 W.H.Werkmeister's Introduction to E.H.Cadawallader : Searchlight on Values, op.cit., p.xii.

2 Hartmann, N., Ethics, op.cit., p.218.

from the mundane world is what constitutes the meaning of ideal being of value. It is not enough to have persons and their actions which have value. They are merely carriers of value. There must be ideal values "behind" all actions to make them valuable or its opposite.

Hartmann compares the mode of being of values with logico-mathematical objects as he thinks that the values and the logico-mathematical objects stands on a same ontological footing. Hartmann points out,

> As regards the mode of Being, peculiar to values, nothing is so instructive as its close analogy to the theoretical essences, especially to the mathematical and logical structures.[1]

Hartmann thus invokes the analogy of value-theory with mathematics and logic. Elsewhere he says that the sphere of values are connected organically with the sphere of logico-mathematical objects and the former sphere is the "continuation" of the latter.[2] The only difference is this : "Pure logic, pure mathematics and the essences are theoritical idealities while the values are axiological idealities".[3]

Let us now turn to Hartmann's view that values are ideal self-existent being. What he says is this : "The mode of Being

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1 Ibid., p.303.

2 Ibid., p.221.

3 Mohanty, J.N., Nicolai Hartmann and Alfred North Whitehead, A study in Recent Platonism, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1957.

peculiar to values is evidently that of an ideal self-existence".[1] Also, "values have actually an existence in themselves".[2] In order to understand this, it is necessary to explain the distinction he makes between the content and the valuational character. As we have already pointed out, the values are not formal empty structures, but are material structures for having their contents. This content is different from the valuational character though the latter inheres in the former. In other words, it is the content or "material" which has value inherent in itself. Hartmann clarifies, "the content and the valuational character do not coincide".[3] For example, the idea of trust is the content or the material concrete structure of a specific form of relationship between person and person which can quite generally be described. This relation is not identical with the value of trust or the value of such a relationship. Even the idea of trust or the idea of such a relationship is not identical with its valuableness or value-ideal. The idea of trust is merely the structure of the content and not the value of the content. So, the idea of trust or material has only ontological structure and not the axiological. The valuableness or moral worth of trust cannot be derived from the structure of the content, although it inheres in the content itself. It is the essence of another sort which through all differentiations remains different from the material. It makes the material

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1 Ibid., p. 221.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., p. 217.

e.g., the relation of trust, meaningful. The valuableness only has axiological significance.

It may be noted here that although the valuableness is not derived from the material, but the feeling of valuableness necessarily presupposes the material and not vice versa. They are not unrelated to each other. The valuableness varies with its materials. For example, the material essence of trust is different from that of fidelity, so its valuational character. As Hartmann puts,

> And, nevertheless, valuableness is a something which through all differentiations always remains different from the material; a something which builds above it, camps over it, lends to it a glimmer of meaning, a significance of higher order, an import which for ever remains transcendent to the existential reality.[1]

Now, what does Hartmann mean by "self-existence"? For him,

> Whatever in the mode of being is not relative to a subject, whatever confronts a thinking subject as independent and immovable, whatever sets up before him a self-subsistent regularity and energy of its own which the subject can grasp or miss but cannot get rid of, that has for him the character of self-existence.[2]

Three important ideas are contained (i) that whose mode of being is independent of person; (ii) that which stands opposite to person as static; and, (iii) that which has its own

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1 Ibid., p.218.

2 Ibid.

uniformity and energy which a person may or may not grasp but cannot free himself from.

We may elaborate the matter as follows. The mode of being of values (value-ideals) is independent of the subject for their "existence". Valuableness remains static and unchangeable even when they confront a person. They "exist" independently of whether one knows them or not. Awareness or non-awareness of them by a subject does not affect their own reality. The presence or absence of feeling for values or the presence or absence of philosophical attitude towards them do not stand in their way of being self-subsistent. However, the presence of value-feeling indicates that there are values, since our "sensing" of value is infallible. But Hartmann's point is that feeling of value cannot bring out any change in the nature of values. Nor the value-feeling creates them. The variations occur only in the consciousness of values, but not in the values themselves.

The points we have so far discussed with regard to valuableness do not apply to valuational material. A subject can very well produce a material e.g., he can set up a relation of confidence with other person. But once he produces such a material, he cannot prevent the material to be something of value. A material, (here, the relation of confidence) once produced, needs no co-operation from the subject to be something of value, and the vice versa. A subject may produce a "material"

and he may believe that it is devoid of moral worth. But the belief does not affect the value which inheres in the content.

Now, according to Hartmann, values are the objects of possible valuational discernment. Their being is as independent as things existing in spatio-temporal world. But the knowledge of these beings i.e. values are obtained through different means. Hartmann says that "knowledge of values is genuine knowledge of Being".[1] The knowledge of values are primarily emotional which Hartmann calls "sensing of values"[2] or "feeling of value".[3] In valuational vision and feeling, the willing subject remains purely receptive. He cannot get rid of the appeal that values make upon him. He is disposed to have the "primal sensing" of value when he produces a "material". The moral consciousness cannot reject the appeal of values which they make upon his emotional "sensing". The Being of value, the object, determines the consciousness through the "primal sensing" of them. In Hartmann's words;

> In this 'beholding' of them the subject is purely receptive; he surrenders himself to them. He sees himself determined by the object, the self-existent value; but he himself, on his side, determines nothing.[4]

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1 Ibid., p.219.

2 Ibid., p.102.

3 Ibid., p.100.

4 Ibid., p.219.

The point to note here is that values themselves remain unaffected by the beholding of them, just as a natural object remains unaffected while it is known. The feeling of them cannot change or modify them. They remain existent "independent(ly) of all imagination and longing".[1] A moral subject has no right to choose a value as he likes. In a given situation, all must direct their gaze towards only one value (or set of values). This value determines a subject but he does not determine anything.

Our discussion, so far, of self-existence of values centres round the meaning of self-existence <u>for knowledge</u>. But ethics is not concerned with the knowledge of values <u>alone</u> but also with the <u>values themselves</u> i.e. with the <u>mode</u> of values. So, let us now turn to a consideration as to how the values are self-existent from the point of view of ontology.

According to Hartmann, values do <u>not</u> have self-existence like that which belongs to all things and events, to whatever has spatio-temporal existence. "Values have no self-existence that is real".[1] Values, for having their <u>ideal</u> nature, have self-existence that is ideal. As principles of action, values' participation in determining reality in specific ways, does not affect their <u>ideal</u> mode of self-existence. As valuational quality of a specific material, e.g., sincerity remains in ideal

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1 <u>Ibid</u>., p.93.

2 <u>Ibid</u>., p.220.

mode as essence whether it is embodied in someone's conduct or not. In its ideal mode, sincerity is independent and therefore, self-subsistent.

But the "actualised" value e.g., the sincerity embodied in the conduct of someone is indeed a value, but only a derived one. These actualised values are merely "Ideas" whose root lies in the value of the material. Hartmann goes as far as to say that :

> Strictly taken, values themselves are not at all 'actualised', but only the materials, to which, whether ideal or real, the value belongs.[1]

Hartmann recognises the impossibility of giving a metaphysical definition of what an ideal self-existence is "as it is impossible to determine metaphysically what real self-existence is. Each must be taken as fact".[2] The character of ideal self-existence is "postulated" as the realm of real self-existence is postulated. On this point, one may raise an objection that a man who dreams or is in error may believe that the object he beheld has ideal self-existence. Hartmann dispels this objection by pointing out that from a dream, there is awakening, as there is correction in error, but there is no awakening in valuational insight. If once a value is beheld by someone it cannot be erroneous.

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1 Ibid., p.221.

2 Ibid., p.223.

Moral values are expressed in moral judgements, and thereby, the ideal self-existent character of values is not affected. Moral judgements are themselves sensations or their expressions. But what a moral judgement means is something objective, something existing in itself; that is, values which is of ideal nature. Further, moral values which are expressed on the basis of primal moral feeling have also ideal self--existence like that of mathematical law.

The principle that values have an ideal self-existence affirms more than mere apriority and the absoluteness of discerned values, that is, it affirms that there is a realm of values that subsist for itself.

3. Apriority of Values

Values, according to Hartmann, are a priori. A value, for Hartmann, is a "conditioning factor". And, as Hartmann puts it, "indeed, it must be an a priori condition".[1] It would be necessary here to understand what Hartmann means by the term, "a priori". The two ideas that are conjoined here are : (i) that which is "independent of experience"[2] and (ii) that which is "already presupposed".[3] Now, let us take each one at a time. If x is something that exists/subsists independently

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1 Ibid., p.193.
2 Ibid., p.192.
3 Ibid., p.193.

of some experience called y, but y cannot exist without x, then this implies that x has independent ontological status. And now for "already presupposed" : If something x is presupposed by some experience y, then x is the conditioning factor for some experience y. Thus, "Hartmann uses the term 'a priori' to mean 'both epistemologically and ontologically prior' ".[1] But, for Hartmann, to show that y cannot exist or subsist without the existence/subsistence of X is to "know" x a priori.

Thus he expresses the meaning of a priori in Kantian phrase which is referred to as the "conditions of the possibility".[2] What it means to say is that values are presupposed in all the phenomena of value-experience. To the question, what are necessary conditions of the possibility of something to be valuable ? Hartmann's answer would be that "values are a conditioning prius of all phenomena of the moral life".[3] Values are a conditions of the possibility of goods, persons or conduct. To put the matter differently as Hartmann does, "they (values) are that through which things are valuable".[4] Not only that. Hartmann maintains that "values are not only conditions of the possibility of goods, but are also conditions of all ethical phenomena in general".[5]

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1 Cadwallader, E.H., Searchlight on Values, op.cit., p.115.
2 Hartmann, N., Ethics, op.cit., p.186.
3 Ibid., p.217.
4 Ibid., p.186.
5 Ibid., p.192.

To our understanding, it seems that Hartmann generally combines all the following when he states that values are a priori :

(i) In order for something to exist, a value must already pre-exist

(ii) In order for us to know something to be valuable, a value must be believed to have existence beforehand,

(iii) In order for something to be valuable, value is a necessary condition.

Now, we may stress the point here that all of the above senses of a priori uniliterally means that values are a priori with respect to our experience of valuable things. That is, the value-ideals are prior to what we have called actualised value. For example, if something x is a value-ideal, then it exists independently prior to actualised value y. What needs to be noted here is that this priority is not temporal, but logical.

Now to briefly recapitulate the point of our preceeding discussion. In Hartmann's view, in order to know something to be valuable, one must first presuppose the standard through which he feels a thing to be something of value. But one may say, by way of objection, that we find the values in the nature of abstractions from something that is valuable. How would Hartmann

respond to this objection ? It seems, Hartmann would merely say that in order to have experience of something valuable, one must first logically presuppose that there subsists a value-ideal by reference to which he feels something to be valuable.

> He must possess beforehand the standard; for example, the standard of the pleasant and the unpleasant, and from the start things must fall for him under this standard, they must divide themselves according to it into things pleasant and unpleasant.[1]

In other words, one becomes able to make the distinction between good and evil, pleasant and unpleasant only because one is possessed of a standard. The sense of value or standard prepares one to tell a certain thing either as good or bad.

Now, before we turn to the arguments in support of his view it may be well to take note of a more clear articulation of his point in the following;

> A thing can be valuable only through its relation to a value itself. This must be fixed beforehand. It is the condition of the possibility of there being anything of value and of its being recognised as valuable, as a good - so to speak.[2]

A thing, person or deed must have a reference to value in order to be something of value. A value must be immediately discovered in order for something to be called goods. A value

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1 Ibid., pp.186-87.

2 Ibid., p.189 (our emphases).

is always presupposed in the case of a thing or conduct that is of value. This relation of values with the things valuable is irreversible. "It is one-sided dependence".[1] What we have called actualised-value is always dependent upon a value-ideal to be something of value but not vice versa.

We would now turn to the arguments. Let us deal with them systematically in terms of the following points :

(i) Hartmann begins by asking the question, viz., "what is experience of goods?" To this, his answer is, "It is something a priori".[2] To put the matter more pointedly, in our experience of a thing as useful, serviceable etc., the knowledge of value of usefulness or serviceability is assumed beforehand. Here the value, namely, usefulness or serviceability, is felt to be already fixed. This feeling of fixity of value beforehand implies that they (i.e. value-ideals) are a priori.

(ii) The second argument may also be followed in terms of a question : why a certain thing is good ? The answer to this may be that it is good for some other thing, which will be the same question, why that other thing is good ? Evidently, an eternal circle of back-reference will lead us to a vicious epistemological regress. In order to escape from this

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1 Ibid., p.189.

2 Ibid., p.186.

eternal circle of back-reference, one has to answer this question by reference to a value which has first converted a thing into good. So, Hartmann argues, "It does not come to a rest until one no longer answers with a good but with a value".[1] The crux of the matter is that intelligibility of certain value-experience is made possible only by means of a self-subsistent value-ideal existing "behind" actualised values.

(iii) For the next argument, consider the fact that everyone of us is doing this or that work in our life. But to the question, what are we working for ? the answer must be with reference to a value. A life is worth living for having a value attached to it. It is value which gives meaning to our work. Hence, for Hartmann, "appraisement of value precedes experience. For that which is striving for is still unreal, at least not yet 'experienced'".[2]

(iv) Further, according to Hartmann, "values are not only conditions of the possibility of goods, but are also conditions of all ethical phenomena in general".[3] Values also are pre-requisite of all ethical phenomena. The human volition has good which is not found in goods. The object of volition has the form of an end and the end can never be contentless. If there is nothing valuable in the content

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1 Ibid., p.187.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., p.192.

of an end, it would be impossible to adopt anything as an end. But this content or valuational character need not be known clearly. The volitional consciousness must possess a "sense" of its quality as a value. The point of the matter is that value precedes experience. It must be noted that the term "sense" (or "sensing") has been distinguished by Hartmann from mere empirical knowledge or experience. However, a fuller discussion of this point may await until later.

(v) Finally, Hartmann considers the following situation : A subordinate carries out the orders of his boss, even though he does not know the end of his boss's orders. That is to say, he does not know the value or aim which guides his boss to issue the order to him. In this case, the content of the command is the ultimate value to him. The subordinate believes in it, though he cannot "see" it. In this belief inheres the moral value of obedience. The command of the boss which is taken up blindly and "uncritically" by the subordinate and "the independently discerned value which determines the end are both equally a priori".[1]

Thus to summerize the point, the factor which decides, whether a conduct is good or not, does not reside in the conduct itself or in its sphere upon which a moral judgement is passed.

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1 Ibid., p.193. (our emphasis)

This deciding factor is self-dependent and a priori. Thus in all kinds of striving, yearning after, a value is always presupposed Now, it is clear that a value is not dependent upon things that are valuable nor they lie within the sphere of action. Rather, the actions are dependent upon the value-ideals in order to be something of value; hence, the apriority of values.

Before concluding, it must be noted that for Hartmann, values are not formal a priori but are material a priori. They are not empty structures, but are possessed of contents which form the specific quality of goods or persons etc. In Hartmann's words : "They (values) are 'materials', structures which constitute a specific quality of things, relations or persons according as they attach to them or are lacking".[1]

4. Values as Absolute

Values, in Hartmann's view, are absolute. Absoluteness for Hartmann, is "the kind of being peculiar to values".[2] To put it differently, the values that belong to the self-subsistent order of being have their own kind of reality. A value, being a member of ideal world, subsists without depending upon anything other than itself.

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1 Ibid., p.185.

2 Ibid., p.189.

Here, a brief discussion on the relation of goods to the subject will be quite in order. According to Hartmann, the relatedness of goods to a personal subject does not mean the relativity of values. This relatedness cannot affect the objective character of values. It is true that a personal subject has to unconditionally accept what is good for him as good and what is bad for him as bad. It is not within his power to change a thing which is good for him to bad for him. Here, obviously, a kind of relatedness of goods to the person is given. But, this relatedness is not to be confused with relativity of it. In other words, while "relatedness" implies that the values are applicable to persons, from this it does not follow that the values themselves are relative; for the values are always absolute. Here the subject cannot have any active role, that is, to determine the values. Hartmann takes up the example of geometrical laws and psychological laws which hold good unconditionally for spatio-temporal figures and psychic beings. This does not mean that the laws themselves are always absolute. Rather, the spatial figures and psychic beings are unconditionally subjected to the laws of geometry and psychology respectively. "In the same way", Hartmann writes, "also the consciousness of goods and evils - so far as it exists - is subject unconditionally to the laws of values and anti-values".[1]

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1 Ibid., p.208.

For, a person cannot, according to his will, decide what is good or what is bad for him. He is unconditionally subjected to accept what is valuable or what is not valuable for him. Thus Hartmann concludes,

> [T]he relatedness of these values to a human subject is not relativity to the subject's opinion of them or to his appraisement of them, but to the subject's existence, including his entire categorial constitution.[1]

Now, for a consideration of moral values. According to Hartmann, moral values, as determining prius, control our actions. Approving or disapproving of human conduct presupposes a value. It is value which determines/controls the attitude that man takes up towards his life. Values are always fixed beforehand. They are independent of the consciousness of them. That is, "they by no means subsist only for the one who discerns them, but in themselves".[2] Nor can they be "displaced by subject or made dependent upon him".[3] They are also independent of the person who judges, and are not relative to the person who values the goods. They are even independent of the judgement of them. Just as a tree cannot be imagined away or changed by wishful thinking, one cannot change or imagine away the values. In other words, the absolute

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1 Ibid.

2 Ibid., p.207.

3 Ibid., p.

nature of values is not a psychological fact. That is, it is independent of whether one thinks that they are absolute or not. An important point that follows is that the absoluteness of values implies the independence of values from cultures, societies, perspectives, attitudes etc. In short, the absoluteness of values ultimately comes to mean that values are not relative to anything else. If they were so, then our talk of normative discourse could not make any sense at all. The very nature of values are that they cannot be relative.

What needs to be stressed here is that relationality and relativity of values are two different things. Values can be relational without being relative to goods, persons and his acts or opinion, society, culture etc. They can be relational, yet remaining absolute. The relationality of values with whatever else does not affect the absolute nature of them. That is to say, the relationality of values cannot put their independence in question. In fact, values cannot but be relational; or else, valuing would be impossible.

Now it is interesting to note that Hartmann distinguishes three possible kinds of relatedness of value which may apparently be regarded as implying the relativity of moral values. Let us mark them off, clearly.

(i) To begin, Hartmann explains, that a moral value seems to be relative when it turns out to be a goods-value to another. For example, trust is a good thing for him to whom it is shown. Thus the relation of trust may be a goods-value to the person whom it is shown. But Hartmann points out that the moral worth of a person does not lie in being precious thing to another person. The moral value (e.g. trust) inheres in him even if it is not good "for" anyone. It remains exclusively as a quality of his own conduct.

In short, the relatedness to another person does not in any way mean a valuational relativity. Moral judgement is passed not on being goods-value to another person, but on the person who possesses the moral value.

(ii) Second, moral values are values of disposition which are always towards some person. The object of moral value is the person and not things. The relation of the value to other person inheres in the structure of the content of moral value which is quite different from the goods-value that goes with it.

Here we find two kinds of relationality which are dependent on each other. (a) When, for example, fidelity is practised towards other person, the latter feels a sense of security, and is able to entrust himself to the faithful person.

These are goods-value to him. (b) The moral value of trust possessed of by the trusted person consists in spiritual strength, trustworthiness, which is a value in itself.

These two kinds of value do not coincide. Similarly, the two kinds of underlying relationship are also radically different. In the case of fidelity, the conduct of the other person to whom it is practised is conditioned by the act of the trusted person. Hartmann thereby concludes that "the inner, intentional relatedness conditions the outer relationality of goods-value which is dependent upon it."[1] But these two kinds of relationality does not in any way mean valuational relativity.

(iii) A third kind of relationality is as follows. This is between value and the bearer of value. Accordingly, the carrier of moral value is a personal subject. A moral subject is one who can will, set up ends, pursue them and has the ability to feel the value and is capable of moral conduct. Moral value is attached to his whole categorical constitution, to his personality as a whole and not to his particular acts. In all of his acts, moral person stands "behind" all of his actions. Thus a person becomes the carrier of moral values.

To sum up, the relation of moral value to the person is merely a kind of relationality and does not in any way

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1 Ibid., p. 213.

mean the valuational relativity. For the relatedness of moral value to the person is not dependent on the person who thinks that certain moral dispositions exist. It is rather a moral value which has universal character. The relation to the person as a bearer inheres, therefore, in the material and not to moral value itself. The relatedness of moral values to its bearer does not mean valuational relativity.

Section B

1. Values as Principles

In Hartmann's view, "values are also principles".[1] First, they are principles of ideal ethical sphere. This material essence of ideal nature is fulfilled in the real merely accidentally and not necessiated by the ideal content as principle. For "values are primarily and throughout ideal self-existents; in so far as they are principles, they are from beginning to end only principles of the ethical ideal sphere".[2]

According to Hartmann, the being of ideal sphere and the being of principles are different. For, ideal sphere of

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1 Ibid., p.235.

2 Ibid.

values contains, in addition to independent values, what is called derivative values such as, the value of useful, mediating values which are also ideal but they cannot claim to be principles. "Genuine, proper values, however, are principles of the ethical ideal sphere".[1]

Second values are also principles of actual ethical sphere, that is, they are the principles of actional sphere. Value-ideals must have practical significance, otherwise they would not be ethical principles at all, because ethics is concerned with the ethos of man which is of actional character. Values as principles of ethos transcend the realm of ideal self-existence and take possession of the actional sphere and thus they become the principles of actual ethical sphere. Valuational principles penetrates into the whole sphere of acts and determine them. The determination issues from the values as principles. Therefore, this determination of values as principles is the presupposition of the actional sphere. The relation of transcendent ethical acts to the genuine moral values is a conditional relation, since the disposition and will can resist values. The will and disposition can counteract the valuational discernment which is the determinant for every moral judgement. In Hartmann's words : "Here not everything is subordinate to them; the acts of the subject do not accommodate themselves to them unresistingly".[2]

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1 Ibid.

2 Ibid., p.237.

The specific actuality of values differs from the ideality of values in that in the latter, values are supreme determining factors, inviolable and decisive powers. Nothing can resist them to be the principle of ideal sphere, but in the former, values are actualised conditionally. They are subject to the will and disposition which may or may not resist them. In actual ethical sphere, they are no longer inviolable determining factor.

All moral values have a tendency to be actualised or to be the principle of actual ethical sphere which lies in their very essence. But they are not always so since the will and disposition resist them. This distinguishes them from natural process.

Third, values are also principles of real ethical sphere. We have already pointed out that the specific quality of values consists in the possibility of conduct to be contrary to values. Even in this disagreement between transcendent act and moral values, the connection between the two is not broken. Rather, it continues in full force. In other words, there is a tension between ontological and axiological principles which subsists in the same actional sphere. This actional sphere is subordinately called the world of reality. Moral consciousness expresses itself through the actional sphere in transcendent acts. Through the actional sphere, values succeeds in moulding the real.

It is to be noted here that the real ethical sphere does not consist of only moral agents with his acts, it also includes his living creations, permanent communal customs etc.

What has been said about the ethical sphere of action holds true with regard to the realm of real ethical sphere. Like that of actual ethical sphere, values are not decisive determinant power. They are also not fulfilled without resistance in this sphere. Thus values are, in a restricted sense, the principles of the real ethical sphere.

2. Moral Values and the Ought

Let us now turn to a consideration of moral value and its relation to the ought. The concept of ought belongs to the essence of values as principles. As Hartmann points out, "it (ought) adheres to the essence of ethical values and make itself felt where it is not brought into the foreground".[1] Although the valuational materials are ideal essences, they have a tendency towards reality. But this tendency does not at all affect its character as value-ideal. Here a question may arise : how such a tendency is consistent with their ideal nature ? This can be understood from the following modal analysis of the ought.

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1 Ibid., p.247.

The main ideas may be explained here as follows. According to Hartmann, the model character of value is that of an ought. This means that value belongs to a peculiar order of being which is different from the ontological order expressed by either being or non-being. There is no absurdity in saying that a value is a thing that ought to be only if its matter is unreal. Thus, it is not at all insignificant to say that a man ought to be honest even if he is actually so. On the other hand, the judgement "The man is honest just as he ought to be" is clearly a valuational judgement and has the form of an ought. "Hence, it follows that the ought belongs to the essence of the value and must be already contained in its ideal mode of existence".[1] This is what Hartmann calls, the ideal or pure ought-to-Be.

The ideal ought-to-Be is in itself valuable, irrespective of its actuality or possibility. For instance, when one says that there ought to be universal peace, this means that universal peace is an ideal ought-to-Be, irrespective of whether or not its matter i.e., universal peace actually exists in the world. For Hartmann, "Their (values') ideal ought-to-Be subsists independently of the reality or unreality of their matter."[2]

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1 Ibid.

2 Ibid., p.248.

Hartmann points out that ideal ought-to-be transcends its ideality for having its tendency towards reality. It demands instantiation".[1] The ideal ought-to-beness of value has double nature, that is, ideality and a tendency towards reality. The ought has a direction towards something and the value is that "something" to which the direction is drawn. But the direction is conditioned by goal. So, "value and the ideal ought-to-Be stand in strict correlation, in reciprocal conditionality".[2] The proper modality of a value is an ought, but so far as its material content is concerned, an ought is a value. The relation between value and the ought is indissoluble. It is a stable and balanced relation.

The "ideal ought-to-be" gives rise to what Hartmann calls "the positive Ought-to-Be" whenever the ideal sphere confronts reality. In positive "Ought-to-Be", values are non-existents. This kind of ought adheres to the tension between the spheres, to the actuality. It is experienced as a tension by conscious practical beings. The real is indifferent to the ideal as such. But the ideal value as such has tendency towards the real. It has an urge to fulfil itself in the real world but itself always remains unfulfilled.

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1 Findlay, J.N., Axiological Ethics, p. 71. Macmillan & Co.Ltd., London, 1970.

2 Ibid., p.249.

The positive Ought-to-be is distinct from the ideal Ought-to-be in that "it does not adhere to value as such, it is added thereto".[1] The sphere of positive Ought-to-Be stands midway between the ideal Ought-to-be and the Ought-to-do.

The positive Ought-to-be presupposes the non-being of the Ought-to-be. That is to say, it does not exist. Hence,

> /It/ is only possible within a real self-existent world - that is, it presupposes this real self-existent world, together with its real determinations which deviate from the constitution of what Ought-to-be. It has, as condition, the whole ontological system".[2]

It is against this self-existent world that the positive ought-to-be exhibits the tendency towards fulfilment though it remains unfulfilled. The disparateness and resistance which belonging to the real world makes what ought to be itself positive. The ought becomes positive through the resistance of the existent. For, tendency is possible where there is resistance. It is not like the ideal ought-to-be which is totally indifferent to the question of fulfilment.

The positive ought-to-be is different from what Hartmann calls ought-to-do. For, the latter presupposes not only the non-being of what ought-to-be, but also presupposes that it is within the power of a human being to realise it. The latter is a necessary condition of what ought to do. Unless it

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1 Ibid.

2 Ibid., p.250.

is within the capacity of such beings to do an action, the ought-to-do loses its significance. Suppose we put forward universal brotherhood of man as the goal of human endeavour. In order to have its significance, the goal must not be actually existent in the real world, and secondly, it is within the power of human being to realise this goal. Here lies the significance of Kant's statement. "Thou oughtest, therefore, thou canst" which means that the ought, as representing a man's goal, has no meaning unless it is within his power to realise it, in other words, ought implies can.

Here we find that ethics and ontology become separated through their fundamental modalities : Ought-to-be and To-be. The real does not depend for its existence upon the ought, but the ought as positive is dependent upon the presence of a real existent. But this does not take away the qualitative superiority of values as principles. For, Hartmann asserts that "dependence and superiority are not antagonism to each other. In the graded realm of principles, it is precisely the dependent which is always and necessarily at the same time the superior : the higher principle is always the complex, more conditioned and in this sense the weaker".[2] This means the ontological dependence of the axiologically superior.

Hartmann's position here may be succinctly put as follows: Values, for him, are different from categories in that the

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1 Ibid., p.250.

2 Ibid., p.251.

former are not necessarily embodied in the world. They make a claim to be embodied in the real world. If man necessarily realises the values, then values would be categories, part of this universe. Values may or may not be actualised, though they demand to be so.

3. Moral and Non-moral Values : Their Connection

According to Hartmann, not all ethically relevant values, whether in the sense of obligation or of participation, are moral values. It is true that values of each specific type are always essentially attached to a definite order of bearers. But not all of these types are moral. Only those which are attached to personal subjects are moral values. The latter are not attached to things but to persons and their acts. Moral values or disvalues are always affixed to his personality as a whole and not merely to his single acts.

Further, when a person performs an action which is morally bad, this performance of such action is not his mistake or deficiency, but his fault. He is held responsible for the action; he is subject to condemnation and disdain. Person is guilty for this action and consequently for his moral anti-value. Thus all moral imputations are attached to the moral person. All judgements of approval and disapproval made by others apply to him only. He bears guilt and responsibility. But all these

cannot be said with regard to situation and things which are opposed to value.

Moreover, moral values differ fundamentally from non-moral values in that the former can be defined as values which imply freedom. That is, the person is free to choose an action to do, or, not to do an action-opposite to the former. And thus "only a free being is capable of being good or bad"[1] by virtue of his action alone. The connection of moral value with freedom is the specific mark of them and for this reason moral values are superior to the values of goods and situations.

The distinction of moral values from non-moral values does not imply that the former are totally disconnected from the latter. Moral values are connected essentially with other values. This is not an external and negligible connection. As Hartmann points out,

> Their (moral values') connection with the moral is not outward and not nullifiable or even negligible. It is essential, inward, material".[2]

This internal connection of moral values with the non-moral is one of <u>dependence</u>. That is, the moral values are dependent upon the non-moral values, in certain sense. Moral values presuppose the specific quality and worth of other things. It is only in respect of other kinds of values that moral values can exist.

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1 Hartmann, N. <u>Ethics</u>, Vol.II, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.57.

2 <u>Ibid.</u>, p.24.

> Whatever goods we choose, moral values persist; but if there were no goods or no persons who aim at them, there would be no moral values".[1]

A moral value, for example, honesty can exist only in relation to goods which have no moral value. The distinction between an honest man and a thief can only be made if goods have value. For instance, a man who steels something which has no value cannot be called a thief and such an action as wrong.[2] Thus moral values which Hartmann calls higher ones are dependent upon the goods-value, that is, the lower ones and not vice versa. "But the dependence is purely material, not axiological".[3] In no other sense except materially the moral values are dependent on the non-moral values.

Hartmann advocates what he calls an "incurable pluralism"[4] as regard values and thereby at the same time denying the idea of a supreme value. In the history of ethics, we find many theories which advocate the idea of supreme value and all other values as subordinated to it. But, according to Hartmann, it is not at all a value from the valuational point of view. For him, for example, such is the platonic "Idea of the Good". It lacks a definite content. It is merely an

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1 Review of E.H.Cadwallader's book, Searchlight on Values by F.Kraenzel, The Journal of Value Inquiry, p.241, Vol.21, No.3, August, 1987.

2 Please note that this position would be quite unacceptable to Kant and Scheler.

3 Hartmann, N., Ethics, Vol.II, op.cit., p.25.

4 Ibid., p.57.

abstract idea. It cannot tell us where the good is to be sought. It is a postulate without any definite content. We cannot have the sensing of supreme value for not having its definite content. One may have a tendency towards a unity of scale of values. He may seek a logical unity of the multiplicity of values in supreme value for the sake of our practical life. But such a unity is possible to have without supreme value which do not have definite content. What we require for our moral life is not a monism of value in the given multiplicity of morals but "a monism of ethics in the multiplicity of values".[1]

4. Values and their discovery

We may now turn to another important aspect of Hartmann's discussion of values which he deals with at length in the chapter "The Pathway to the Discovery of values" in his book Ethics.[2] According to Hartmann, values are already "there". None can create them or make them. Even the champion of ideas do not invent them. Hartmann recognises that "here exists a field different from that of things fabricated — the field of distinctive values".[3] Values are not something fabricated like the worldly objects. Hartmann believes that a fabricated thing cannot have any affect upon man. It has no power over man. Nor can it give a new orientation to the innermost being

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1 Ibid., p.71.

2 Hartmann, N. Ethics, op.cit., Vol.I, Chapter IV, pp.87-104.

3 Hartmann, N., Ethics, Vol.I, p.86.

of man. As values are not fabricated items, they have their inherent and dormant power which determines consciousness and gives new meaning and orientation to life.

What we can do is to discover the already existing values. In course of discovery, we cannot even change them or modify them. They are discovered as they are. The discovery of values, according to Hartmann, is of two kinds : (i) Primary (ii) Secondary. This is an epistemological distinction, which is often ignored, between "sensing" or feeling of something and the knowledge of it. The former is emotional and the latter is intellectual. These are two stages of knowledge through which values are known. The intellectual discovery presupposes the emotional discovery, but not vice versa.

(i) The discovery which is made at primary level or what Hartmann calls "primal feeling of value" means "a capacity to appreciate the valuable".[1] The primary discovery is an immediate apprehension of values. It is a matter of emotional approval or disapproval, loving or hating for something i.e. of values. Every shock, every conflict, every crisis leads man to the primary discovery of values. The primary discovery of values is going on endlessly throughout the history of mankind. Mankind is unceasingly at work on the primary discovery of values. Every community, every race takes in primal sensing of values.

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1 Hartmann, N., Ethics, Vol.I, p.86.

Every individual for himself also participates in the primary discovery of values. Even the spiritual heroes prophets also merely discover the values at primary level. "The Champion of ideas invents nothing ; he only discovers".[1] But this discovery is not unconditional. These gifted individuals succeed in their work of primary discovery of values only if there already is present the appreciation of values in the valuational sentiment of the crowd of that age. Hartmann writes : "The ideal already lives before it is discovered by self-conscious thought. Its life is only waiting for thought to give it form, like a crystal in solution".[2] The Primary discernment of values is an unending process. It always remains incomplete. As Hartmann says, "Moral consciousness.... is indeed never complete."[3]

(ii) The second stage of discovery is reflective discovery of value. This is called by Hartmann "scientific comprehension" which is more than emotional "sensing" of value. Here, investigation of values consist in nothing else than an investigation of principles. This may be called philosophical discovery of values. The genuine knowledge or reflective discovery of values is derived from what has been discovered by primal sensing of value. It is subordinate to the primary

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1 Ibid., p.90.

2 Ibid., p.91.

3 Ibid., p.101.

"sensing" of value. Philosophical ethics elevates the primary discovery of values by means of reflection and deliberation to a theoretical and systematic level. Philosophical ethics occupies itself with values which others have discovered and strives to present them clearly, to force them into consciousness and to establish them. The principle adopted is : "One knows it already".[1]

In order to establish a system of values, Hartmann thinks that ethics has to take recourse to metaphysics. "Ethical values are not to be discovered in the conduct of man".[2] And, so:

> Values are not to be recognised by the fact that they are, or are not, contained in the real. They subsist even where the given case, indeed where all actual cases, contradict them. The case does not reveal the value. For so long as one does not already know the value from some other source, it always remains questionable whether the case agrees with it or not.[3]

The main idea here is that the mere "sensing" of values gives primary consciousness of them which is then required to be elaborated by reason or reflection so that the systematic or scientific comprehension of values then becomes possible.

Now, how are values apprehended ? Of one thing

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1 Ibid., p.93.

2 Ibid., p.99.

3 Ibid., pp.98-99.

Hartmann is very clear. Values are not directly known intellectually. This is what marks them off from objects of knowledge, which require the intervention of thought. Consider the following :

> They are not even capable of being directly grasped by thought; rather are they immediately discovered only by an 'inner vision', like Plato's 'Ideas'. The Platonic notion of 'beholding' well fits that which material ethics designates as the 'sensing of value', that which is embodied in the acts of preference, of approval, of conviction.[1]

The idea that clearly emerges here is that values are discovered by an 'inner vision' and such discovery is not mediated by any intellectual process. The precise sense in which the term "discovery" is to be understood can be made clear by saying that such "insight into values is and remains aprioristic insight, whether it have the primary form of the sensing of them or the derived form of reflective discrimination".[2]

Hartmann is aware of the fact that ethical convictions of mankind and individuals differ and change from time to time and age to age. But, do values also change with the changing ethical convictions ? Hartmann's clear response to such a query is that values remain static and unchanged. Values are

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1 Ibid., p.185.

2 Ibid., pp.103-04.

independent of such changes. It is not the values that change but the apprehension of them. Thus,

> In the revolution of the ethos, the values themselves do not shift. There nature is super-temporal, super-historical. But the consciousness of them shifts.[1]

Values exist in their ideal plane independent of anything whatever. Whatever be the changes happen in the valuable things or persons, values remain as they are. Due to changes in our apprehension of them "that actions, dispositions, relationships which yesterday passed as good can to-day appear bad. Neither the real nor the values have changed".[2]

It is interesting to note how the shifting of our apprehension around the static value-world has been explained by Professor Cadwallader with the help of an analogy, namely, "Searchlight analogy".[3] In this analogy, our value-consciousness is compared with a searchlight and values are conceived of as something existing in a vast field having three-dimensional space, like stars in the sky. Our consciousness, like a searchlight, directs its focus on the ideal plane of values and thereby only a relatively small portion of vast field of values at a particular point of time or age is "seen". And this

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1 Ibid., p.88.

2 Ibid., p.89.

3 Cadwallader, W.H., Searchlight on Values, op.cit., p.89.

implies that a certain ethos-group have the knowledge of those values which come under the purview of the focus of intuition. Those values, which were under the focus of consciousness may appear bad as with the "wandering about" of the focus of our consciousness, some values are lost, on the one hand and some are gained, on the other. Mark here what Hartmann has to say.

> The process of discovery of ethical revolution is a genuine process of discovery, a genuine unveiling, a disclosing of values; indeed, on the other side, there is always at the same time a loss of values, a forgetting of them, a vanishing.[1]

To put the matter succinctly, some values lose the attention of consciousness at ~~the~~ a particular point of time and some other values come under the focus of valuational consciousness in accordance with the shifting of valuational apprehension.

But the point to note here is that values which get the attention of valuational consciousness are not new values. J.N.Findlay rightly points out :

> /S/uch values are not really new, only hitherto ignored, and they are certainly not the creations of those who suddenly feel them, as Nietzsche thought them to be.[2]

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1 Hartmann, N., Ethics, Vol.I, op.cit., p.89.

2 Findlay, J.N., Axiological Ethics, Macmillan and Co.Ltd., 1970, pp.74-75.

Thus our valuational consciousness is constantly at work to discover a group of values. There is no stopping of such valuational apprehension. Thus, Hartmann maintains that the shifting of value-consciousness does not mean the revaluation of values. If the revaluation of values is possible, then the devaluation of values is also possible which would make values something manufactured and thereby they would be subjective. The shifting of value-apprehension ... brings about the revaluation of life. People or individuals of a certain culture or ethos-group revalue their life by having discovered a set of values, thereby stimulating their life and giving it a new significance and direction.

Moral consciousness, according to Hartmann, consists "of the distinctive sensing of values, which separates the good from the bad in them and constitutes their ethical standard".[1] This is the "factum" of ethics. But this is not at all empirical but a pure or "aprioristic factum".[2] The values can be discovered by their presence in moral consciousness alone. But one might ask, Is this moral consciousness infallible in apprehending the values ? Is there no possibility of valuational error or delusion ? Hartmann answers such questions by maintaining that moral consciousness or primary discernment is "perhaps never free from

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1 Hartmann, N., Ethics, Vol.I, op.cit., p.101.

2 Ibid.

error in its application, that is to say, in the actual valuation which it confers upon actions and dispositions".[1]

According to Hartmann, valuational error consists in failure to appreciate the ideal values when they are outside one's narrow focus of valuational consciousness. It means the "incapacity to discriminate" something as truth or error. This is blindness to value-ideals. This means failure to "see" what is valuable. For Hartmann recognises that, "Failure to appreciate is a special chapter in the life of man".[2]

The objects of primary discernment are as genuine and objective as mathematical objects are. But the former (values) are more "veiled" through the emotional character of the act. What is needed is to raise them above the act in order to be aware of them. The error occurs where there is non-agreement with the value. Values as self-existing object are independent of truth or error of the knowledge of them. The phenomenon of error presupposes the existence of truth because it presupposes a standard whereby error is distinguishable from truth. Hartmann provides a criterion for the recognition of valuational error which is nothing but primal discernment itself of values. In his words : "The criterion of the genuine and spurious is nothing else than the primary consciousness of value itself".[3]

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1 Ibid.

2 Ibid., p.41.

3 Ibid., p.103.

Hartmann maintains that all are not equally capable of having the insight into values, just as all are not equally aware of mathematical objects. In order to have primary discernment of values, there should be sufficient education and training of an individual or group of individuals. To have the capacity to discriminate values, an individual/community should have certain degree of maturity in his/in the community of certain age/time. As per the degree of maturity in an individual/mankind, his/mankind's focus of primary consciousness is thrown upon certain portion of the valuational field. One becomes aware of these values upon which his gaze of mental eye is directed and he remains blind to other sections of values at the same time.

5. Moral Values and the Person

Let us now turn to a consideration of the relation between moral values and person. Moral values are the values of person and his acts. Person is the bearer of moral values. But each and every subject cannot be moral person. Hartmann defines a person thus :

> A moral subject, who of all real entities stands alone en rapport with the ideal world of values and who alone has the metaphysical tendency to communicate them to reality which lacks them - only, such a subject is a 'person'.[1]

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1 Ibid., p.266.

According to Hartmann, there are two distinctively ethical elements which are the decisive marks of a moral person.

(i) In the first place, values do not restrain the subject, when they are discerned by him, but makes a claim upon him while leaving him free. Person is free to take hold on value or not. Moral person is a "free" entity having his own principle and autonomy. This is his moral freedom.

(ii) The second element of personality is found in the valuational marks which are contained in the acts of the moral person. Moral values do not inhere in the ends of the action or volition but in the acts of the person and ultimately in the subject who acts. For example, moral value of a loving person attaches exclusively to his loving conduct but not in the end of his volition i.e., in the person who is loved. "It (moral worth) inheres in the personality of the one who loves".[1] A person, thus, becomes the carrier of moral values.

These two deeply embedded elements of personality - freedom and the carrying of moral values - constitute the unified feature of moral personality. Moral person is free to realise the claim made upon him by values or to reject it. And secondly, moral person bears the moral values in his acts. These two things constitute the relation between values and the person.

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1 Ibid., p.267.

Chapter VI

SCHELER'S NON-FORMAL ETHICS OF VALUES

Introduction

Scheler's Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values[1] is an immensely original and in-depth study of the nature of values, particularly, of moral values. The foundation of his ethical thought lies in Husserl's phenomenological philosophy. He makes use of some phenomenological tools, of course in his own ways, to understand the general logic of value-discourse. Further, another broad feature of Scheler's ethical thought, as is found in his Formalism in Ethics is constant reference to Kant. His objective of taking Kant's ethical views into consideration is mainly to refute Kantian formal apriorism and some specific doctrines of Critique of Practical Reason and thereby to free German ethical thought from Kantian rigorism and imperativism. Moreover, in order to strengthen his position, Scheler also gives a critical look at some traditional ethical doctrines, such as, eudaemonism, utilitarianism and pragmatic-positivistic ethics. For our purposes, we shall present Scheler's theory of values under the following broad headings : (1) Scheler and phenomenology and (2) Scheler's Non-formal theory of Values.

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1 Henceforth to be mentioned as: Formalism in Ethics. Translated by Manfred S.Frings and Roger L.Funk, North-Western University Press, Evanston, 1973.

1. Scheler and Phenomenology

Scheler is said to be a value-theorist belonging to phenomenological tradition. But his interpretation of the nature of phenomenology has its own uniqueness, like other authors belonging to this tradition who are not unanimous as to the nature of phenomenology itself. Scheler is decisively influenced mainly by Husserl's earlier thoughts. He acknowledges the importance of Husserl's Logical Investigations, while he remains indifferent to Husserl's some other works. To Scheler, unlike Husserl, the question of method is secondary. Rather than the phenomenological investigation of transcendental ego or the ontological question of Being, Scheler is concerned with Being of man, here and now, in his different dimensions. In his Formalism, the focus is mainly on the valuational aspect of man. To our understanding, Scheler seems to be guided by the theory of intuitive insight, the eidetic method and the doctrine of ideal objects - without always adhering to the original meaning given to them by Husserl. In Scheler's hands, these features receive an unorthodox interpretation and thereby allowing for the same as an excellent instrument for exploring the realm of values. It needs to be stressed that for Scheler Phenomenology is not a method, but an attitude of inner vision by which the realm of essences is revealed. He also adheres to the goal of phenomenology, namely, to come into immediate contact with the "things" themselves without regard to whether

these things are physical or mental, feeling or value while sticking to the phenomenological ideal of presuppositionlessness. Now, it is worthwhile to analyse the Schelerian brand of phenomenology or what Scheler means by phenomenological experience in order to grasp his theory of values.

In order to understand what is meant by phenomenological experience or phenomenological intuition, one has to begin with his concept of "fact". The "fact", to Scheler, means phenomenological fact as distinguished from natural fact as also from scientific fact.

This has been very clearly brought out by Alfred Schutz.[1] Natural fact refers to the world given in the commonsense experience of the natural attitude. It is the world of concrete things and events which also includes the socio-cultural objects that are taken for granted by certain societal surroundings.

Scientific facts, on the other hand, are artificial, in the sense that they are construct derived from natural things by way of what Scheler calls "Scientific reduction". The bearer of this kind of facts are symbols, signs etc. which are given as particular content by a scientific definition.

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1 Schutz, A., Collected Papers III, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1975, in the Chapter "Max Scheler's Epistemology and Ethics".

Scientific facts are understood, not in terms of tradition, but in terms of generalisation, idealisation etc.

In Scheler's view, phenomenological facts are different from both natural and the scientific facts in that the former are independent of all sensory factors but the latter are not. In the language of Schutz, such facts are,

> /A/s to their unity and content, independent of all factors which are not grounded in the things themselves. Particularly, they are independent of all the sensory functions of the percipient. The pure fact, which can be grasped by eidetic intuition, must remain unchanged even if the sensory functions actually vary or are imagined to vary. The pure fact is, moreover, at the foundation of every possible sensory content, and in this relation the former is the independent, the latter the dependent variable.[1]

Phenomenological facts are <u>independent</u> of all factors which are not grounded in the "things" themselves. They are independent of all sensory or metaphysical factors. They are "pure", in the sense that they are stripped of all transcendences and therefore, having no Spatio-temporal location or any other ontological character. But, on the contrary, the sensory contents, be it natural or scientific, dependent on the "pure" facts for their foundation and not <u>vice versa</u>. The phenomenological facts remain unchanged even if the sensory functions actually vary. Further, the pure facts are also

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1 <u>Ibid</u>., p.148.

independent of all pictures, all possible symbols or signs etc., by which they might be designated. They are independent even of concepts or any other linguistic units.

On Scheler's theory, the phenomenological facts or pure facts are a priori and not a posteriori - the latter being the case of natural and scientific facts. Now the question is : What is meant by a priori here ? Scheler defines a priori thus,

> We designate as "a priori" all those ideal units of meaning and those propositions that are self-given by way of an immediate intuitive content in the absence of any kind of positing (setzung)....[2]

Thus, a priori, for Scheler, means ideal units of meaning or signification which neither posit the existence of a subjectivity which would think them nor the existence of an object to which such units of meaning are applicable. Apriority here means self-givenness and is discovered by the thinking subject in eidetic intuition. Scheler cites the example of a case of deception. Suppose that one takes something to be alive, though it is not so; here, essence or "whatness" of 'life' is intuitively given in case of deception. Obviously, here this "whatness" or "fact" does not have ontological existence and hence it is pure a priori. "The point, therefore, is to leave aside all kinds of positing, including the positing of 'real' or 'non-real', 'illusion' or 'real', etc."[2]

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1 Scheler, Max., Formalism in Ethics, op.cit., p.48.

2 Ibid.

Now this intuitive content can be called "phenomenon" though this is not to be confused with "appearance" supposedly behind which something is assumed to be hidden. The word "phenomenon" here has been taken in the Husserlian sense so as to mean something which wholly shows itself. Nothing lies behind it. That is, essence or phenomenon means absolute showing of what is given to intuitive insight. This is the essence or "whatness" of an object which is known through phenomenological intuition or what may be called "essential intuiting". It is to be noted here that there is no question of degree in such "givenness" of a phenomenon. "Either this 'what' is intuited and, hence "self"-given ...., or this 'what' is not intuited and, hence, not given".[1]

Scheler makes an important distinction between essences or what he calls phenomenological facts, on one hand, and concepts or propositions which are the bearers of all inductive knowledge including all the so-called scientific knowledge, on the other. On this view, concepts are different from essences in that the former are linguistic but the latter are not. Essences cannot be expressed by language, symbol or sign, and hence, cannot be explained. For, explanation is always linguistic. No instruction is a help to get in touch with it. Therefore, phenomenological fact or essence is independent and different from both concept and what it refers to. It follows that the expressions of

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1 Ibid.

positive sciences whatsoever are different from this fact of special kind as this scientific knowledge is expressed through concepts and propositions. So Scheler writes,

> The concept 'thing' and the intuited 'thingness,' the concept equality and the intuited equality, or the being equal (as distinguished from the being-similar), etc., must be clearly distinguished.[1]

Here, Scheler is purported to have accepted Husserl's categorial intuition as found in Husserl's Logical Investigation II.[2]

It is evident from the foregoing account that the phenomenological fact can never be known through concept as it is amenable only to phenomenological intuition. This fact of special kind is contentful though it cannot be known conceptually or through proposition. The object of ordinary experience is not a "fact". To say that it is "fact" is to say something paradoxical. The object of phenomenological experience is a "fact" which is equated to contentful essence. This intuitive content cannot be grasped by any concept or proposition as it is non-linguistic something. On Scheler's theory, knowledge is also different from thought; for thoughts are carried out through linguistic means. In ethics, Scheler rejects the intellectual mode of knowledge. For him, knowledge of value is intuitive given in a special kind of feeling.

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1 Ibid., p.49.

2 Ibid., See, p.49, f.n.7.

The a priori which Scheler talks of is not conceptual a priori as Kant conceives. But Scheler rejects Kant's transcendental sense of a priori which is formal and conceptual. Scheler's "essence" can be grasped not by any formal concept but by "essential intuiting". Secondly, according to the Kantian sense of a priori, real things, goods, and acts are what "conforms" to the a priori content of experience in the sense of observation and induction. The "conforming" which, according to Scheler, obtains between essences and real is not to be confused with the Copernican turn to which Kant draws our attention. Thirdly, Scheler points out that apriority of "facts" has nothing to do with the dichotomy of "innate" and "acquired" ideas of the Cartesian mode which are causal and genetic and are not applicable to the type of insight with which we are concerned here.

All concepts and propositions find their fulfilment in such essences or contents which are a priori in nature. As Scheler says

> /E/ssences and their interconnections are a priori 'given' 'prior' to all sense-experience (of this kind).[1]

As we brought out the point earlier, what Scheler means by a priori cannot be expressed by propositions. Schelerean brand of a priori belongs wholly to the "given" and to the realm of "facts". So

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1 Ibid., p.49.

"A proposition is only a priori true (or false) insofar as it finds its fulfilment in such 'facts'."[1]

One point that merits attention here is that, the a priori facts that are "given" to intuition are not amenable to observation and verification. They can neither be suspended or cancelled by observation and induction nor further be improved. Rather they give the empirical observation the desired direction. It is the essential nature of a "given content" that it cannot be observed but always intuited. It is the criterion of essences having interconnections among them that they are always presupposed. And to recall the point earlier made, all concepts and propositions find their fulfilment in this a priori intuitive content. The only way to make them "seen" is pointing to them. It is the nature of phenomenological intuition that it has the intrinsic ability to disregard the natural fact which exists in contingent location and make the "fact" "seen".

Now, Scheler distinguishes phenomenological experience from sense-experience in terms of the following two criteria : (i) Phenomenological experience alone yields "facts" themselves immediately without recourse to any mediated means i.e., symbols, signs or instructions. One can define, for example, a colour blue in different ways - as the colour of this or that object extensively, as the colour designated by the word "blue", as the

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1 Ibid.

colour I am now seeing, etc. But in all these ways of definition the essence "blue" is common. It is basic something essentially and in itself given. It is the fact of intuition which is given immediately. No presupposition or mediation of anything can block this intuitive insight. No linguistic unit, concept, symbol, sign etc. can block this immediate essential intuition of "facts" themselves". "Phenomenological experience, however, is the experience in which the totality of these signs, symbols etc. are fulfilled".[1] Here, to our understanding, Scheler seems to adhere to Husserlian ideal of presuppositionlessness.

(ii) The second criteria of Scheler for distinguishing phenomenological experience from inductive experience is that the former is "immanent" experience and not transcendent like that of sense-experience. In phenomenological experience, the essence or "phenomenon" is intuitively given and never anything outside of such an act can belong to it. But in the case of ordinary experience, its object is always transcendent to the act of experiencing and thus that which is not given in the act of experiencing is "meant". In the case of our experiencing a chair, for example, the chair does not belong to the act of perceiving yet it becomes a meant object. Phenomenological experience is different, however, where this does not happen.

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1 Ibid., pp. 50-51.

Thus,

> /I/n phenomenological experience nothing is meant that is not given, and nothing is given that is not meant. It is precisely in this coincidence of the "meant" and the "given" that content of phenomenological experience alone becomes manifest (Kundwerdan). In this coincidence, in the very meeting point of fulfilment of what is meant and what is given, the phenomenon appears.[1]

To sum up, the separation between what is meant and what is given cannot constitute the phenomenological experience.

An important aspect of Scheler's theory may be brought out as follows. The immanent experience of the phenomenological kind disregards the thatness of things and looks for whatness of things. It looks for whatness by asking the questions like : What is the world ? What is man in terms of his invariant structure and essential qualities ? In similar way, it asks : What is the experience of love and beauty ? Thus phenomenological facts determine the meaning of concepts and propositions and not vice versa. The facts, as we have seen, are a priori content and no arbitrary understanding is possible. Only pure intuition is able to grasp them in their essentials. All ordinary experience happens according to them or conforms to them in order to have their meaning.

In concluding this section on Scheler's approach to phenomenology, we would do well to point out that the a priori "given" has nothing to do with proof or disproof. "Insofar as

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1 Ibid., p. 51.

their a priori nature is concerned, it is a matter of indifference whether propositions of arithmetic function as axioms or as provable theorems".[1] It is the content of intuition which fulfils these concepts or propositions. The apriority of Schelerean type does not merely refer to the formal a priori, but also refers to each concrete province of knowledge, such as, geometry, mechanics, physics etc. which are founded upon this structure of a concrete aprioristic propositions which find their fulfilment in phenomenological content/"fact". The intuitive insight grasps the content which pertains to the judgements of these fields.

2. Scheler's Non-Formal Theory of Values

Let us now consider in some detail Scheler's theory of values. As an anti-thesis to the ethical system of Kant, Scheler develops his own ethical doctrine borrowing the aforesaid basic ideas from Husserlian phenomenology. As against Kantian formal value-theory, Scheler builds up a non-formal theory of value. Regarding his value-theory, he says : "The spirit behind my ethics is one of rigid ethical absolutism and objectivism".[2] Later, he goes on to descry it variously as "emotional intuitionism" and "non-formal apriorism". He finally interprets his position as "ethical personalism" which he puts

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1 Ibid., p.53.

2 Scheler, Max., "Preface" to the Second Edition of Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, op.cit., p.XXIII.

as the subtitle of his main work[1] as he believes that all values i.e. the values of things and beings are subordinated to values of the person.

Scheler's main ethical work under reference here opens with his attempt to distinguish things, goods and values. Goods are defined as "things of value"[2] i.e. as things in which values are realised. Values are essentially independent of goods for their being and givenness. First, the being of values are independent of things, state-of-affairs, men and relation of all kinds which are their bearer, the so-called goods. Values "exist" and are given clearly and evidentially apart from the givenness of the bearers of values. For example, one considers a poem or a work of art as "beautiful" or "ugly" without knowing in the least which properties of work prompt this. This is equally true of all physical and psychic relations. "Clearly, neither the experience of values nor the degree of adequation and the evidence.... depends in any way on the experience of the bearer of the values".[3] The distinction between values and their bearers is thus clearly brought out. Second, to distinguish a value from its objects/state-of-affairs does not require the pre-given knowledge of its bearer. To distinguish, for example, value of a pen from the pen itself does not require the knowledge

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1 His main work on ethics is : Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values. op.cit.

2 Scheler, Max., Formalism in Ethics, op.cit., p.9.

3 Ibid., p.17.

of what constitutes the pen. "Indeed", Scheler clarifies,

> /I/t is as if the axiological nuance of an object (whether it be remembered, anticipated, represented, or perceived) were the first factor that came upon us, ... A value precedes its object; it is the first "messenger" of its particular nature. An object may be vague and unclear while its value is already distinct and clear.[1]

Third, that values are different from their bearers is also clear from the fact that values themselves do not change with the changes that occur in their bearers. Just as colour"blue" does not become red when a value sphere becomes red, so the value of friendship remains unchanged even if a friend of mine turns out to be a false friend and betrays me.

Fourth, values are also independent of our subjective emotional states, such as, sadness, gladness, desires etc. Fifth, values - qualities are different from what humans value or consider important. For example, a painting by Bikash Bhattacharjee is beautiful, not because what people think according to social validity but because the beauty is found in the painting independently of people's opinion. Values are objective "facts".

Finally, in their mode of givenness also, values are different from their bearers. Values are given in and through

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1 Ibid., p.18.

2 Ibid., p.22.

the immediate means of intentional feeling while their bearers are given through the immediate means of sensuous intuition. Scheler recognises the precedence of value-qualities over their bearers in the matter of their knowledge. "Goods are thoroughly permeated by Values".[1] Thus in order to distinguish between values and goods, Scheler calls the former "things-value" and the latter "value-things."

Now to turn to the question, what is value ? Scheler has the following to say :

> Insofar as the word "is" in this question refers to existence (and not only to a mere copula), a value "is" not at all. The concept of value does not allow any more of a definition than the concept of being does.[2]

Manfred Frings interprets the above quoted words[3] of Scheler to mean that "By itself, a value is neither an existing thing, nor does a value exist by itself in a platonic realm".[4] A discussion on this point would ensue in the following paragraphs.

According to Scheler, values "exist" the way a pure colour of the spectrum exists. Here Scheler seems to be deeply indebted to Husserl's discussion of the being of universals as

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1 Ibid., p.22.

2 Frings, Manfred,S., "The Background of Max Scheler's 1927 Reading of Being and Time, The Critique of a Critique Through Ethics" Philosophy Today, Vol.36, No.2/4, Summar 1992, p.101. This passage is translated and quoted by Frings from Scheler's Gesammelte Werke, Bouvier Verlag, Bonn, 1985 published in the article referred to above.

3 According to Manfred Frings, with this statement, contained in Scheler's 1897 dissertation, his value-theory begins. See the Article referred to in f.n.2 above.

4 Ibid., the article referred to in f.n. 2 above, p.101.

it is found in latter's "Investigation II", namely, "The Ideal unity of Species and Modern theories of Abstraction".[1] It would be worthwhile to consider here Husserl's theory of universal so as to gain an insight into Scheler's treatment of this problem.

Husserl recognises the obvious fact that a particular colour, say, a shade of red on the surface of a thing is an individual shade. Appearance of the colour red in the flag or in the blood are case of individual shades of the species red and these individual shades are directly known by sight though the species red is not a direct object of our sight. Thus there can be two ways of attending to such a situation : (i) It is possible to have a direct awareness of the individual red shade through our senses (here, sight) as also, (ii) it is possible to apprehend species red or red as such through intuition. Husserl puts the matter as follows :

> But the same appearance sustains different acts in two cases. In the first case it provides the presentative basis for an act of individual reference, i.e. for an act in which we apply ourselves to the apparent thing itself, and 'mean' this thing or this feature, this part of the thing. In the latter case it provides the presentative basis for an act of conception and reference directed to the specieses i.e. while the thing appears, or rather the feature in the thing, it is not this objective feature, this feature here and now that we mean. We mean its content, its 'idea'; we mean, not this aspect of red in the house, but Red as such.[2]

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1 Husserl, E., Logical Investigations, Vol.I. Translated by J.N.Findlay, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1970.

2 Ibid. pp.339-40.

The point more clearly is that though our gaze is directed towards the individual red shade, we can also intend or "mean" the red as such in intuition. The distinction between the particular instance of red colour and the species colour is readily acknowledged by Husserl. Hence,

> /T/he act in which we mean the Species, is in fact essentially different from the act in which we mean the individual.[1]

A point that merits attention at this stage is the following. Unlike British empericists, Husserl gives colour species (species red in our example) a status of an "object". Husserl joins issue with the British empericists on this point as the latter regard colour species to be a concept which is formed by abstraction.[2]

Further, on Husserl's theory, species red can be the "object" of an act and is given differently from how the individual red shade is given to our apprehension. While directing our attention towards the individual shade, we "mean" or "intend" the species red and thereby species red acquires the status of an object. That is, the species red is an

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1 Ibid., p.339.

2 As to how the species becomes an "object", attention may be drawn to Husserl's own words : "while the red object and its emphasized aspect of red appears before us, we are 'meaning' the single identical Red and are meaning it in a noble manner, through which precisely the species and not the individual, becomes our object". Ibid., p.337.

object given in intuition. "A new mode of apprehension" Husserl points out,

> has been built on the intuition of the individual house or its red aspect, a mode of apprehension constitutive of the intuitive presence(....) of the Idea of Red.[1]

Now, in the background of the foregoing account of Husserl's views it would be possible to understand Scheler's approach to the problem. Scheler regards values as "objects" quite in the same way as for Husserl colour species is an "object" given through an intuitive act. As Moosa points out, "Just as red is an object of an act, so also values are objects".[2] And so, Scheler clearly states that "values are true objects and are different from all states of feeling".[3]

Now, what does Scheler mean by saying that values are objects. This may be made clear in terms of the following two points : (i) to be an object it must be given to intuition. And such objects are contentful and not be mere contentless concepts. "The value itself", Scheler holds, "always must be intuitively given or must refer back to that kind of givenness".[4] Elsewhere, he clarifies that moral values are,

> facts of non-formal intuition, not of sensible intuition, if by "intuition" we mean immediacy of the givenness of an object....[5]

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1 Ibid., p.339.

2 Moosa, I., "A Critical Examination of Scheler's justification of the existence of Values", The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol.23, 1994, p.25.

3 Scheler M., Formalism in Ethics, op.cit., p.19.

4 Ibid., pp.14-15.

5 Ibid., p.166.

(ii) Second, the view that values are objects implies that they are not abstracted from concrete things, actions or persons. "Values are not" Scheler clarifies,

> Concepts abstracted from empirical, concrete things, men, or deeds; nor are they abstract, "dependent" moments of such things. They are independent phenomena that are comprehended independently of the peculiarity of contents, as well as of the being-real or the being-ideal and the non-being (in this twofold sense) of their bearers.[1]

That is to say that just as the individual shade of, say, red does not exist and the species red is not formed by abstraction, so the values are not derived from our sensible experience of concrete things and men.

The foregoing account of how Scheler has regarded values as objects brings out in focus the influence of Husserl on his views. This influence would seem to be quite pervasive as may be seen from the following consideration. Scheler accepts the Husserlian thesis that there are ideal objects of knowledge which are independent both of knowing subject and real objects. On this view, values are particular class of ideal objects which are objective, eternal and unchangeable. In order to understand this, it would be worthwhile to turn to a consideration of the Husserlian concept of "ideal". For Husserl, there are two types of objects - real and ideal. Real is defined in

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1 Ibid., p.185.

terms of its temporality. It includes both physical as well as mental entities. For example, a pen or a present state of mind exists in certain duration of time. "We define 'reality' in terms of temporality. For the only point of importance is to oppose it to the timeless 'being' of the ideal".[1] In other words, temporality does not belong to what is ideal. In case of colour, the individual shade of, say, red is temporal, existing on the surface of the object, and therefore, is real. But the species red is timeless and therefore ideal.

The ideal object also exists, though its "existence" is not spatio-temporal like that of real objects. This is not to say that what is ideal is ficticious. Ideality is distinguishable from what is fictitious or imaginary insofar as the former is existent, and the latter is not. Husserl says,

> It is naturally not our intention to put the being of what is ideal on a level with being-thought of which characterises the fictitious or the non-sensical. The latter does not exist at all,... Ideal objects, on the other hand, exist genuinely.[2]

Note here that the categories of space and time are not applicable to ideal being. "We do not deny but in fact emphasize", Husserl contends,

> that there is a fundamental split in our unified conception of being....; We take account of this split when we distinguish between ideal being and real being; between being as species and being as what is individual.[3]

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1 Husserl, E., Logical Investigations, op.cit., p.352.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., p.353.

The crux of the matter is that what is ideal for Husserl is neither spatio-temporal nor fictitious or non-sensical but something which exists as "genuine object".

It is interesting to see how Scheler makes use of this insight to uncover the nature of values. Scheler writes, "Value-qualities, however, are 'ideal objects' as are qualities of colours and sounds".[1] According to this view, value are not real objects. Nor are they something fictitious. They are, as Moosa puts, "ideal essences that can be disclosed to us but not posited by us".[2] Scheler compares their nature of being with colour and says that values exist the way species colour exists. Value as ideal has its own being. So,

> /R/ather, all norms, imperatives, demands etc. if they are not to be understood as arbitrary orders — have their foundation in an autonomous being, the being of values.[3]

But what is an "autonomous being"? And what does it mean to say that values have autonomous being ? In one definite sense, we can say that values do not depend on anything else for their "existence". Though the person alone, Scheler says, "is the ultimate bearer of value, but in no respect whatsoever is the person a positor of values".[4] On the other hand, value is

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1 Scheler, M., Formalism in Ethics, op.cit., p.21.

2 Moosa, I., "Are Values Independent Entities? Scheler's discussion of the Relation between values and persons". Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol.24, No.3, October, 1993, p.272.

3 Scheler, M., Formalism in Ethics, op.cit., p.21.

4 Ibid., pp.186-87.

totally independent of the world of goods and its changing form; values are eternal, immutable self-contained being. Further, Scheler pointedly says that "Values cannot be created or destroyed. They exist independently of the organisation of being endowed with spirit".[1]

To say that values are ideal does not mean that they do not have any contact with reality. Scheler explains this point in the following passage :

> It is only in goods that values become 'real'. They are not yet real in valuable things. In a good, however, a value is objective (whatever the value may be) and real at the same time. There are genuine increase of value in the real world with any new good. Value-qualities, however, are ideal objects as are qualities of colours and sounds.[2]

Implicit in this is the idea that values are given in this world. And values are intuited in goods and persons. Species red, to repeat our earlier example, is independent of all red objects; and only in these red objects, one can intuit the species red. Only through the experience of, say, the red objects, one grasps the species red. Imtiaz Moosa who is avowedly critical of platonism looks at the situation from Aristotlean standpoint. And so, he is quick to conclude that "values are independent of man and goods, but yet can only be intuited in them".[3] This

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1 Ibid., p.516.

2 Ibid., p.21.

3 Moosa, I., "A Critical Examination of Scheler's Justification of the existence of Values", The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol.25, 1991, p.27.

way of putting the matter seems quite reconcilable with what Scheler actually says in the Preface to the third edition of Formalism in Ethics[1] which merits our attention here.

> In fact, I reject, in principle and at the very threshold of philosophy, a heavenly realm of ideas and values that is "independent" of the essence and execution of living spiritual acts, independent not only with regard to man and human consciousness but also with regard to the essence and execution of a living spirit in general.[2]

Elsewhere, Scheler elaborates,

> There is an ideal meaning-content of "the good" which I can bring into my consciousness with a good man and a good deed, just as I can do this with the ideal species 'red' in a seen red colour i.e., the 'red' in a certain shade of red.[3]

An interesting point which we have brought out in the above para is that one cannot grasp values without having his experience of the world of goods and of men. Because it is only through directing his gaze to specific goods or men that it is possible to intend or "mean" a value in intuition, even though the realm of values is independent of the world of goods and of men.

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1 op.cit.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., p.165.

At this stage a point of crucial importance may be brought out. We have a little earlier pointed out that for Scheler, values are "ideal essences" which await disclosure to us and that values cannot be created or destroyed. Now, this position of Scheler seems to have undergone a complete change and reversal in his later writings in which, as I.Moosa brings out "he /Scheler/ states that essences or values are invented (Konstruieren) or created (Schaffen). They are not merely discovered or found (Vorfinden). This is his definitive later position."[1]

Let us now turn to Scheler's further phenomenological characterization of values. According to Scheler, values are "facts" or what he calls "value-facts".[2] In ethical sphere, they are "facts" of morality. Here "facts" means, for Scheler, the pure facts or phenomenological facts[3] which were available to us as pure intuitive contents in immediate experience and not in sense-experience like that of natural facts. By saying that values are "pure facts" Scheler seems to mean that values are independent not only of natural factors, but also of all metaphysical factors; in short, values are stripped of all

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1 Moosa, I., "Are Values Independent entities ? Scheler's discussion of the Relation between Values and Persons". Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology. Op.cit., p.273.

2 Ibid., p.166.

3 We have already explained what Scheler is meant by "Phenomenological facts" in the section, Scheler and Phenomenology.

transcendences. Because, for Scheler, "Values are facts that belong to a specific mode of experience".[1] Thus Scheler has used the word "fact" to characterise values not in general sense but in a technical sense where it is meant to be independent of our positing beliefs or disbeliefs.

Further, values as pure facts are in a new and peculiar sense apriori i.e. independent of what can be given by inductive and particularly by causal knowledge. They are also not found in the valuable things. Rather, they are presupposed by our sensuous experience of valuable things and beings. Values, according to Scheler's definition[2] of a priori, are meant to be ideal units of meaning which neither posit the existence of a person who bears them nor does it posit any object to which they are applicable. As Scheler clearly states, "A value precedes its object; it is the first "messenger" of its particular nature".[3] Elsewhere, Scheler recognises that there is

> ...non-formal series of values, with its order, which is totally independent of the world of goods and its changing forms, and which is a priori to such a world of goods.[4]

Moreover, values, according to Scheler, are de-symbolizing phenomena. They can neither be grasped through concepts or proposition nor through symbols or signs. The concepts, for

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1 Scheler, Max., Formalism in Ethics, op.cit., p.187.

2 Please See, Section, "Scheler and Phenomenology" above.

3 Scheler, Max., Formalism in Ethics, op.cit., p.18.

4 Ibid., p.23.

Scheler, are also symbols used for representing values, because they predicate them as properties of certain volitional acts, deeds, or persons e.g. 'good', 'evil', 'noble', 'base'. But according to Scheler,

> Values are not concepts abstracted from empirical, concrete things, men or deeds.... They are independent phenomena that are comprehended independently of the peculiarity of contents....[1]

Similarly, Scheler also rejects any attempt to grasp values by any mediated means, such as, symbols, signs etc. Because, the danger of symbolism lay in the tendency of symbols to displace and to conceal the phenomena.

According to Scheler, "values are given first of all in feeling (Fühlen)".[2] They are given to us as intentional objects of our feeling, as colours are given to us in and through visual perception. Values are completely inaccessible to reason and hence it is beyond the grasp of intellect. Reason is blind to them as the ear and hearing are blind to colours. Here we must keep in my mind Scheler's general standpoint according to which the distinction between the faculties of reason and feeling is a fanciful "prejudice". "This Prejudice",

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1 Ibid., p.185.

2 Ibid., p.35.

Scheler says,

> Consists in upholding the division between 'reason' and 'sensibility', which is completely inadequate in terms of the structure of the spiritual. This division demands that we assign everything that is not rational — that is not order, law, and the like — to sensibility. Thus our whole emotional life — and, for most modern philosophers, our conative life as well, even love and hate — must be assigned to 'sensibility'. According to this division, everything in the mind which is alogical, e.g. intuition, feeling, striving, loving, hating, is dependent on man's psychophysical organisation.[1]

It, is therefore, all-important for Scheler to have a correct theory of the sort of feeling that is concerned in value-experience.[2] Let us now turn to this aspect of Scheler's theory.

The type of feeling in and through which values are revealed is called "intentional feeling" or "feeling-acts". These feeling-acts should not be confused with the sensible feeling-states. The following consideration help us to understand the distinctness of feeling-acts from feeling-states.

Firstly, a feeling-state is a psychological state of mind caused by objects, events or situations. For example, I may be sad because of my failure in the examination. The sadness,

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1 Ibid., pp.253-54.

2 According to Findlay, "Scheler, like Hartmann, is concerned to put emotion, rather than cold intellectual grasp, at the Centre of Value-experience". Please see, J.N.Findlay's Axiological Ethics, op.cit., p.59. Macmillan and Co.Ltd., London, 1970.

I feel, may evoke in me various sentiments. I may be heartbroken or composed, defiant etc. The feeling of sadness remains so long as subjective emotional state does not change. The feeling-states are always towards certain objects, events, or situation, through simple contents of sensing, thinking, representing or perceiving and such a connection is always mediate. On the contrary, feeling-acts are not mere psychological state of mind, but are "opinion" to such a state. They go directly to their objects, namely, values. Schutz holds that "intentional feeling-functions do not need the intermediary of the so-called objectifying acts of representing, judging etc. in order to come into immediate contact with their objects".[1] "For here", Scheler clarifies,

> /W/e do not feel 'about something'; we immediately, feel something, i.e., a specific value-quality. In this case, i.e., in the execution of feeling, we are not objectively conscious of feeling itself. Only a value-quality comes "upon" us from within or without.[2]

Secondly, a feeling-state is only related to what is outside of it or transcendent to consciousness. Such a relatedness, for Scheler, is not "original". On the other hand, the relatedness between feeling-acts and their objects i.e. values, is original. Here, "original" is to be understood as what Husserl means "immanent". In Scheler's words, "feeling (feeling-acts) originally intends its own kind of objects,

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1 Schutz, A., "Max Scheler's Epistemology and Ethics" Collected Papers III, op.cit., p.163.

2 Scheler, Max., Formalism in Ethics, op.cit., p.259.

namely, values".[1] That is, a feeling-acts when related to a mental state is being self-reflective insofar as consciousness is directed upon itself.

Thirdly, feeling-states are dead and factual states of mind. For, "there is no "signifying" in it, nor is there any immanent directedness in it".[2] But on the contrary, feeling-acts have signification that is "capable of fulfilment" and "non-fulfilment".[3] Now, feeling-acts are "intentional" in the sense that in and through these feeling-acts, values are given to us.

Finally, in the case of feeling-states, one is passively affected by a definite cause, the cause being outside of or transcendent to consciousness. But in the case of feeling-acts, one is actively responding to "objects", such as are given to consciousness by the intentional character of feeling-acts.

To put the whole matter more clearly, a feeling-act which "is a goal-determined movement"[4] is a reflective act of consciousness as against a feeling-state which is directed toward something outside of itself. Feeling-states "arise" out of or caused by whatever that is outside of them. The

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1 Ibid., p.258.

2 Ibid., p.257.

3 Ibid., p.258.

4 Ibid., p.257.

connection between mental states and what causes them is not original connection. By the term "original", Scheler means, whatever is "immanent" to consciousness. A feeling-act, as an act of consciousness, which is directed towards itself when it is related to mental states. The connection between feeling-acts and feeling-states is original. The intentionality[1] of feeling-acts secure immanence of feeling with regard to consciousness. In short, a feeling-act is one that is directed upon itself or consciousness as mental states are given to consciousness. On the other hand, feeling-states have their connection with what causes them which is outside of consciousness or what is transcendent to consciousness.

Having made the phenomenological analysis of feeling-acts in terms of having their intentional character towards values which are the objects of these cognitive intentional feeling-acts, Scheler now proceeds to explain the nature of "existence" of values. Firstly, it seems that Scheler seeks to prove the "existence" of values by examining the mode of givenness of values. Values are the intended object of intentional feeling-acts. As pointed out earlier, intentionality of feeling-acts cannot but be directed towards such a being which belongs to its own kind of being and that is, towards

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1 Here, it may be noted that Scheler seems to draw a distinction between what he considers intentionality in a "strict" sense as against the general notion of intentionality. The former stands for "those experiences that can mean an object and whose execution an objective content can appear". Ibid., p.259.

values. The relatedness between feeling-acts and that of then intended objects i.e. values is not artificial like that between feeling-states and its object, but original.

Further, the intended object is given originally and immediately without recourse to the objectifying acts of representing, judging etc. This implies that the object is given with evidence. For Scheler, "The self-givenness and evidence (insight) are prior to truth and falsity. Therefore, what is given with evidence is given with utmost clarity. Scheler says that values are given evidently and immediately in their "essential" intuition of them. No doubt can be cast regarding their original givenness. The givenness of values are not mediated like that of feeling-states and their objects. Nor can anything stand in the way of their givenness in essential intuition. Just as an individual shade of red colour is given to our sensible intuition with immediacy, so are the values given in our essential intuition through cognitive intentional feeling-acts. So, Scheler argues that the immediacy of givenness of values is equated with their being given with absolute evidence.

Secondly, Scheler argues that the feeling-acts, being intentional character, must have an intended object corresponding to such acts. Feeling-acts are cognitive acts and reveal or disclose something to us. A feeling-act is a feeling of comething, cognition of some being. In other words, the feeling-act reveal its own kind of being. This being is, for

Scheler, nothing but values which have unique existence of their own.

Let us concern ourselves with Scheler's view with regard to the relation between moral values and the ought. Scheler criticises Kant for latter's emphasis on laws and imperatives as the fundamental facts of morality. Scheler asserts, on the contrary to Kant, the primacy of value-phenomena as the basic "facts" of morality. Scheler does not, however, deny the phenomenon of oughtness. According to him, "any ought-to be is founded upon a value and not the other way around".[1] A value, for Scheler, is an ideal object upon which an ought-to-be depends.

Scheler distinguishes between ideal ought-to-be and obligatory/normative ought-to-be. The former is founded upon the intuitive insight into a value. But this is not to say that the ideal ought-to-be creates values. It merely presupposes them. According to Scheler, this relation between ideal ought and values is governed by two axioms, namely, "anything of positive value ought to be, and anything of negative value ought not to be".[2] This interconnection between values and the ideal ought-to-be is not reciprocal, but uniliteral. As Scheler says,

> /E/very ought has its foundation in values, but values are not founded in the ideal ought.[3]

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1 Shutz, A., "Max Scheler's Epistemology and Ethics", Collected Paper III, op.cit., p.163.

2 Scheler, M., "Formalism in Ethics", op.cit., p.206.

3 Ibid.

In other words, the ideal ought-to-be presupposes the values, but values do not presuppose the ideal ought-to-be. Thus, ideal ought-to-be depends on values and actually forms the foundation of the normative ought-to-be. The ideal ought-to-be and not the normative ought-to-do is the indispensable foundation of moral actions.

When the ideal ought-to-be generates the imperative of any form, such as, the advice, command, order etc., it becomes normative ought-to-do. Like the ideal ought to be, the normative ought-to-do presuppose the non-being of a positive value, but in addition, the latter presupposes a tendency of the subject which opposes the realisation of the value.

Thus the relation between values, ideal ought and normative ought is irreversible and is as follows :

> The knowledge of values generates the ideal ought-to-be and the latter in turn the normative ought-to-do.[2]

Now we shall turn to an important and peculiar feature of Scheler's value-ethics, namely, the absolutism of values on one hand and the relativity of norms on the other. It is a historical fact of some importance that imperatives and norms seem to change from one social group to another, or one race to another. For that matter, the different social groups practice

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1 Shutz, A., "Max Scheler's Epistemology and Ethics", Collected Paper III, op.cit., p.170.

diverse ethics or the same society upholds some values at the present time which may differ markedly from what they were in earlier times. Thus different social groups, or different generations within the same society, may have different norms for the evaluation of conduct. But the question is, how is the fact of the divergence of norms in different societies or generations compatible with the thesis that the values are eternal and absolute ? Values also change with the changable norms followed by different societies ?

Scheler argues that having different norms in historically existing societies does not imply that the same values are not recognised by these different societies. There may be different norms while the same values are recognised. In Scheler's words,

> /A/ll imperatives and norms can vary historically and with different groups, even when the same values are recognised; and they can continue to vary, even when the same propositions of the ideal ought are affirmed.[1]

Or, elsewhere,

> /T/here may well be quite different laws or any number of laws of exception in the presence of the same moral values and the same order of ranks, but nothing can be said against the objectivity and identity of moral values because of this state of affairs.[2]

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1 Scheler, M., Formalism in Ethics, op.cit., p.215.

2 Ibid., p.217.

Thus, from the fact that different societies have different norms and it does not follow that values themselves differ in the sense of being given as relative to a given society. It is rather the case that each society simply views these absolute values from its own divergent perspectives i.e. as if each was looking through a different window at the same absolute values. Thus the relativity of norms to different ethos groups does not in any way imply the relativity of values themselves.

Scheler observes that the erroneous theories of the sociological and historical changableness of values have come into existence either in a confusion of the value-bearers with the values themselves or by way of false inference about the changes in values from changes in norms; or in equally erroneous inference from the lack of generality to a deficient objectivity of values; or finally, in a confusion of the relativity of value--judgements with absoluteness of values.

The dimensions of the relativity of value-estimations, especially ethical value-estimations have been clearly analysed by Scheler in his Formalism in Ethics. In a study of historically moral facts, it is necessary to distinguish[1] apart (i) the variations in the morals proper, (ii) the stages of intellectual insight into the inner and outer causal connections of things, and (iii) the features of the techniques of actions existing

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1 Please see Scheler's Formalism in Ethics, op.cit., p.296, f.n.

among different social groups. It is possible to analyse the relationship of social groups to values only by a reduction of the social group under comparison to the same level in terms of their intellectual culture, their technique of action, the levels of their value-estimations etc. Now, it is necessary to remove all these disguises in order to disclose some sphere of values which is relative to these different social groups in their "feelability".

Scheler distinguishes five types of so-called relativity[1] which do not affect the objectivity of values themselves :

(i) Variations in feeling values themselves and therewith the structure of preferring values. Scheler calls it the variations in ethos.

(ii) Variations in our opinions about ethical matters. These variations occur in our judgemental sphere. These are called by Scheler the variations in ethics.

(iii) Variations on the types of institutions, goods, and actions which function as factual units. The examples of these types are marriage, murder, theft, etc. These are founded upon moral value-complexes. Theft, for example, presupposes the existence of property. But in societies which have not yet introduced property the action i.e. the theft cannot even occur.

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1 Please see Scheler's Formalism in Ethics, p.299 onwards.

(iv) Variations in the value-estimations of the practical conduct of men based on norms or imperatives recognised by these men and which correspond to their own structures of preferring. The value of such practical compartment is entirely based on ethos prevailing among them. Variations of this type are called variations in practical morality.

(v) Variations belonging to the areas of mores and customs in which ethical beliefs are expressed. It is the variations in forms of action expression which are rooted solely in tradition. This type of variation is the variations of mores.

Scheler's intention in considering the various kinds of variations at different levels is to say that none of these variations implies a relativity of moral values themselves. The abovementioned variations do not alter the fact that "values are irreducible, basic phenomena of emotive intuition".[1] Thus it is not norms but the values, which are static and immutable in nature, are the ultimate fact of morality and they remain so inspite of the changes that occur in societies or races.

Hence, Scheler's point is that values themselves are not relative, but one's knowledge of the values is relative. In Shultz's words,

> Not the existence of values, but their perceptibility is relative.[2]

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1 Ibid., p.265.

2 Shutz, A., "Max Scheler's Epistemology and Ethics", Collected Papers III, op.cit., p.170.

Evidently, there is no value-relativism, but only the value-perspectivism that is involved here. Scheler's position has been very clearly brought out by Shutz in the following words,

> Scheler contends that an absolute ethics of material values alone, if correctly understood, postulates the emotional value-perspectivism of historical and sociological units, as well as the essential incompleteness of the ethos on any level of its formation....[1]

Let us now consider Scheler's discussion of the hierarchical order of values which is said to exist among values themselves. This order of ranks belongs to the very essence of values as the difference between "positive" and "negative" values. This means that one value stands to another one in the relation of "higher" and "lower".

This a priori order of ranks is absolute and self-extent and this order is apprehended by us in particular feeling-acts which are called the acts of preferring. Scheler says : "The height of a value is "given", by virtue of its essence, only in the act of preferring".[2]

Scheler points out that the height of values is not apprehended by us in the same manner as the values themselves are. Because "preferring" is an act of the emotional and intentional

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1 Ibid., p.173.

2 Scheler, M., Formalism in Ethics, op.cit., p.87.

life on a higher level than the emotional functions by which the values are revealed".[1]

To the question What is meant by the act of preferring ? Scheler carefully distinguishes preferring from choosing as the former refers to the felt relations among values whereas the latter is always choosing among goods and is an act of the will. Preferring is different from choosing in that, for example, one prefers orange to apple without thinking of choice. Preferring is an immediate feeling of the relations that are prevalent among values. The act of preferring which takes place between values themselves are independent of goods and therefore, a priori. Further, according to Scheler, "the height of a value is "given" not 'prior to preferring, but in preferring".[2] Moreover, it is not the precondition for the act of preferring that the plurality of values be given in feeling to serve as the foundation of the act of preferring.

Scheler finds two aprioristic order of the rank of values, (1) the first order of rank contains the height of values in accordance with their bearers. This first one is relatively "formal" in comparison with the second which is a purely non-formal a priori order. In this order of rank we find the "values attaching to persons and values attaching to things, values for self and values for another, values of acts, functions and reactions, of dispositions, deeds and consequences, of

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1 Schutz, A., "Max Scheler's Epistemology and Ethics", Collected Papers III, op.cit., p.167.

2 Scheler, M., Formalism in Ethics, op.cit., p.88.

intentional experiences, of foundaments, forms and relations of things for their own sake and of things for something else's sake etc."[1]

The second aprioristic order is more important. Because "the facts of these modalities present the strongest refutation of Kant's formalism".[2] In this order of ranks, the lower value is dependent upon the higher one. According to Scheler, the lower values can exist only insofar as the higher, to which they are related and in which they find their meaning exist. In other words, the lower values are axiologically conditioned by the higher ones. All these are applicable to the same mode as well as to the gradation of the order of rank of modes. Scheler distinguishes four modalities among values which are as follows :

(i) The first order of ranks of value consists of the value series which ranges from the aggreable to the disagreeable. These values belong to the sensible feeling and they are values of things, functions and states. This modality is "relative" to sensible nature in general, but not necessarily to any particular organism. Animals too have these feelings. What is agreeable to one man may be disagreeable to another, but this difference is absolute and evident prior to any knowledge of things.

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1 Findlay, J.N., Axiological Ethics, op.cit., p.63.

2 Scheler, M., Formalism in Ethics, op.cit., p.105.

(ii) The second modality, that of vital feeling, is revealed by the class of vital feeling. The vital encompasses the opposition between the values of the noble and the base or the good and bad. The feeling-states of this modality includes all modes of the feeling of health and sickness, of age and death. According to Scheler, "Vital values form an entirely original modality".[1] That is to say, it can not be reduced to any other modes. The previous theories, such as, hedonesm, Kantian formalism, according to Scheler, have all made a great mistake by ignoring this fact.

(iii) The third level of values is spiritual values which are given independently of the sphere of the bodily and environmental existence. These values are apprehended by the functions of spiritual feelings. This value modality includes the aesthetic values, judicial values, the pure knowledge of truth etc. The feelings correlated with the spiritual values are, for example, liking and disliking, approval and disapproval, contempt and spiritual sympathy etc.

(iv) The fourth and the last modality of values is the values of the holy and the unholy. These are distinguished from the preceeding class by the fact that they refer to "absolute objects". This level is as such independent of things. Power, individuals or institutions which is various times and cultures

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1 Ibid., p.107.

have been considered as "holy". The acts through the value of the holy is originally apprehended are the specific kind of love which is directed towards "persons". "The self-value in the sphere of the values of the 'holy' is therefore, by essential necessity, a "value of the person".[1]

Scheler expresses the order of value ranks as follows :

> /T/he modality of vital values is higher than that of the agreeable and the disagreeable; the modality of spiritual values is higher than that of vital values; the modality of the holy is higher than that of spiritual values".[2]

Let us now put together the various points in Scheler's phenomenology of values. We may begin by pointing out that Scheler has clearly based the formulation of his values upon his understanding of phenomenology. At his first sight, what he sees primarily in phenomenology is not a method, but a peculiar attitude or a way of viewing. Following this attitude, one is able to approach directly the "things" themselves without all kinds of previous assumptions and thus we enter into an immediate relationship with "phenomena" themselves. In his value-ethics these "phenomena" are nothing but values or what he called "value-facts". These "value-facts" are pure, in the sense that they are non-spatio-temporal and non-metaphysical existents. For Scheler, "values are facts that belong to a specific mode of experience".[3]

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1 Ibid., p.109.

2 Ibid., p.110.

3 Ibid., p.187.

Values, For Scheler, have a mode of being independent of valuing men and goods. To the human social valuation of, say, good and evil, there corresponds an objective realm of values. All persons and goods presuppose values. Act of valuation proceeds from these "value-facts". Thus they are a priori "fact" of ideal nature in which all kinds of evaluative judgments, moral judgements in particular, find their signification and fulfilment. "Ideal" nature of values precludes the possibility of their being posited.

The point which merits our attention here is this that apriority of values is not formal like that of logical rules. Values are non-formal a priori and is a kind of content or phenomena. A value as a content is the first factor which is given to our intuition as essence. It proceeds its objects i.e. their bearers in respect of knowledge. Values remain eternal and immutable whatever changes occur in their bearers.

Concepts and propositions are inadequate for having a grasp of values. As they are pure phenomena, they are essentially incapable of definition; only concepts are definable. All kinds of symbols, signs, or instructions are no help to grasp these basic facts of values. They are given as pure "whatness" directly and immediately to essential intuition.

A noteworthy aspect of his value-ethics is that Scheler has put cognitive emotion at the centre of value-apprehension

and thereby, he breaks down the age-old rigid disjunction of reason and emotion. Scheler shows that there are a large number of feelings which have "objective" character and are actually a mean of knowledge. He calls them "feeling-acts" as distinguished from feeling-states. We get admittance into the objective realm of a priori values and attain the knowledge of value-facts in and through these cognitive function of feeling.

Finally, Scheler's ethics is that values are absolute, eternal, immutible and consequently not susceptible to change or variation, and therefore, in no way relative. He is quite aware of the fact that people in different societies practice diverse ethics; but this, according to him, does not diminish or affect the absolute nature of values. Since the different societies perceive the same values from different perspectives and forms their norms accordingly, only the feelability of values differ among different societies while the values remain the same.

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Chapter VII

MORAL VALUES AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY : SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

Our objective in the preceeding consideration of phenomenological theories of value has been to bring out, inter-alia, an important problem, namely, how can moral values be the object of intersubjective knowledge ? How can we claim knowledge of moral values which are eternal, immutable and absolute in nature ? We suggest that a clue to the solution of this problem may be found in the respective value-theories of Hartmann and Scheler, though a conscious attempt to deal with this problem was not made by either of these thinkers. In order to see how this may be possible we shall proceed by recapitulating their basic standpoints on values as such and their resolution of absolutism-relativism antinomy so as to situate the problem in a broader phenomenological perspective on values.

We may begin by turning to the antinomy which is referred to by both Hartmann and Scheler while dealing with absolutism and relativism. It must be admitted that both Hartmann and Scheler believe in the absolutism of values. Because, for them, values have their own kind of "reality" (for Hartmann, the mode of being of values is like that of platonic Ideas, and, for Scheler, values have mode of "experience" i.e., they are pure essences. Values do not depend on anything else for their

existence; they are and remain <u>independent</u> of anything else and are self-subsistent. But this does not mean that they deny all relativism in the field of values and our experience of them. They also, in a certain sense, advocate relativism in their theory of values. Thus the antinomy results from taking seriously two apparently conflicting yet equally weighty insights. In fact, the relativism advocated by these thinkers does not stand in contradiction with the absolutism of values. In other words, for both of them, axiological relativism does not imply the denial of what is called value-absolutism. In order to see how these phenomenological thinkers become able to consistently combine two apparently contradictory positions, it would be worthwhile to explain the sense in which, according to them, values are <u>absolute</u> as also the sense in which values are <u>relative</u>.

Let us first take up Hartmann's view. For Hartmann, values are regarded as <u>real</u> entities existing in a different world of their own apart from spatio-temporal world. They are "ideal beings" belonging to the ideal order, independently of all their bearers. They possess the "independent" and "ideal" mode of being like Plato's Ideas. Thus Values, for Hartmann, have self-existence, though <u>this</u> self-existence is not real but <u>ideal</u>. This ideal realm of values exist in itself independently of whatever else.

We have already seen that values are <u>a priori</u> for

Hartmann. Hartmann takes the term a priori to mean both epistemological a priori and ontological a priori. Values are epistemologically a priori because they are presupposed in all phenomena of value-experience. They are the conditioning factor which make their bearers valuable. Values are a priori with respect to our experience of their bearers. On the other hand, in saying that values are ontologically a priori what is meant is that in order to for something valuable to exist, one must presuppose the "existence" of values. The existence of values conditions the possibility of something valuable to exist.

In their mode of being, values are absolute. The kind of reality they possess are such that they do not depend on anything else for their existence. Their peculiar mode of reality is totally independent and therefore, it cannot be relative to anything else. They must be related to their bearers i.e., persons and his acts; but this does not mean that they are relative to them. The independence and immutable nature is in no way affected by the relationality that they have with their bearers.

Besides the characterisations that values are independent in their mode of being, that they are real (though not spatio-temporally), that they are a priori, that they are absolute, we may bear in mind that they are principles of all

our actions, and that values are eternal and not subject to change or mutation. What needs to be stressed in the present context is how they are known. And this will provide us with the way as to how Hartmann accommodates the apparently conflicting views that, on one hand, values are intersubjectively objective while, on the other, they are also relative.

Hartmann conceives a vast field where values having the abovementioned peculiar characteristics exist independently of whatever else. The world of values, therefore, has its own ontological status quite peculiar to it. Though there are numerous values in this objectively existing field, human beings can have access only to a few of the world of values through their emotion.

It is through emotion that we can have the awareness of values though it should not be taken to mean "blind" drive, but rather a cognitive emotion. We can have, what Hartmann calls, the primary value-consciousness "which is emotional and intuitive awareness of values in situations".[1] Though it is personal, partial and unsystematic, but it is "stubbornly truthful". In order to get beyond the narrowness, partisanship and the unsystematic nature of the primal consciousness of value, it is necessary to turn to intellectual reflection. This is the task of philosophical ethics which lets us survey and

1 Review of E. H. Cadwallader's book, Searchlight on Values, The Journal of Value Inquiry, op. cit., p. 242.

order our whole experience of value — both of our own and those of other people. Thus of these two kinds of awareness, that is, the primary awareness and secondary awareness, the former is most important for us in the present context. For, the former way of being aware of values are, in our view, phenomenological in nature. It is an immediate way of getting access to the world of values. No mediation such as through concepts, symbols, signs, etc. are required in order to become aware of them. It is the first and "original" discovery. It is purely an "emotional contact"[1] with the objects, that is, values. This is "in the first instance a sense of value, a primal, immediate capacity to appreciate the valuable".[2] Thus Hartmann recognises the role and legitimacy of emotion or "feeling" as fundamental to value-experience and thereby he consistently refuses to rationalise it into formal logic. It is, for him, a non-logical and a differentiated kind of feeling, which is "a farm of comprehension, although not transmutable into the language of concepts".[3] Here Hartmann's founding of his entire cognition of value-phenomena on the primacy of an irreducible apprehension of values by feeling paves the way for him to advocate, as we shall see, a kind of relativism in a radical sense.

By way of further elaboration, it may be added that

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1 Hartmann, N., Ethics I, op.cit., p.95.

2 Ibid., p.86.

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Hartmann excludes the linguistic means, that is, the means of concepts, propositions etc. in understanding the realm of values in a purely phenomenological manner, though he uses philosophy for a rational demonstration of previously acquired cognition through "feeling". Because,

> Words are sluggish, concepts are coarse and come hobbling after, but insights into values is inconceivably alert and highly differentiated; thought cannot tell what it will do exist.[1]

Thus the primary stage of cognitive awareness is direct immediate way of understanding values through "feeling", thus underlying the phenomenological way of apprehension of values.

Turning to the question as to how the primary awareness of values takes place, Hartmann suggests that one should look into the deeper levels of moral life to find out the answer to this question. Every new conflict, every new expectation sets a new problem in human life and it is that which leads us to the primary discovery of values. Ethical convictions of mankind change and differ. And this change and differing is constantly going on without any halt. In this process of differing and changing of ethos, every age, every society, every race take part. This differing and change can never be without value-orientation. It is in the context of the differing and change

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1. Hartmann, N. Ethics I, op.cit., p.88.

in ethos that occur among the societies, cultures, the primary discovery of values take place.

Now, to our understanding, the taking place of "primary sensing" is always perspectival in the sense that every person, every society and every race "senses" values from a perspective relative to the cognising consciousness. What needs to be stressed at once that far from rejecting value-absolutism which requires that all values as immutable and eternal beings abound in a Platonic realm of pure existence, Hartmann only grants that discovery of some definite values by a society is relative to its perspective. In other words, for Hartmann, values as eternal, immutable beings belong to an exclusive realm such that all of them are accessible to any one individual or society at a point of time. Values themselves are eternal, immutable and real, though only some of them are accessible by intuitive means. It follows that different sets of values may be discovered by different societies; but this in no way should distract us from upholding value-absolutism. Relativism is only with reference to "discovery" of values even though values themselves are absolute. The searchlight metaphor provides the apt mode of understanding the absolutism of values, on one hand, and relativism with regard to their discovery, on the other. Thus, for Hartmann, "not all values are known, or, what is the same thing that we do not yet know what is good

and evil...."[1] The perspectival focus of feeling by different persons, societies, and races differ from one another. One perspectival feeling of values differs from another and therefore, they may never be the same. Those persons, societies and races who acquire the awareness of values from their respective perspectives form their norms and commandments accordingly. But the objects of primary sensing, i.e., the values remain static, immutable and eternal. Corresponding to every perspectival intuition, there is a value or a set of values which is/are already "there" in the ideal plane.

The metaphor referred to earlier would bear some further reflection and elaboration, even though we have already discussed it in an earlier chapter. Here, our value-consciousness is conceived of as "searchlight" which focuses historically "migrates" across the field of values that are static and immutable. The searchlight of "primary sensing" "moves about" on the ideal plane of values and it exposes only one constellation of values at one time. Or, the focus of searchlight of different persons, societies and races may be thrown at different portions of the ideal value-plane at the same time. Now the focus of searchlight, i.e., of value-consciousness is thrown upon a relatively small portion of the vast field whereby the values are so apprehended. Though the ethical

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1 Ibid., p.94.

convictions of persons, societies and races change and differ, values themselves continues to remain static and immutable. Because, "values are independent of our differing and changing valuations".[1] But this does not, however, mean that we constantly add new values to the present stock of our intuited values. With new "unveiling" of fresh values by the value consciousness, the concurrent "vanishing" or "forgetting" of other values take place; that is, the values which at an earlier point of time have been in the focus of value--consciousness, now shift into the domain of darkness. And so, "we always survey only a limited sections of the realm of values, while we remain blind to the other sections".[2] Thus, in a manner of speaking, we might say that the actions, relationships which are regarded good today may be replaced by another set of values. What, however, is undeniable is that the values which are disclosed by any particular ethos-group appear as "absolute" to that ethos when it "perceives" them.

So far we have argued how Hartmann is able to maintain value-absolutism given his views that societies may opt for different value-schemes. The thrust of this matter is that values themselves do not change in terms of their ideal content.

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1 Spiegelberg, H., The Phenomenological Movement, Vol.I, op.cit., p.385.

2 Hartmann, N., Ethics I, op.cit., p.228.

What really changes is the focus. Out of a infinite value-ideals one may discover only but a few or a small constellation of values. It is interesting to note that Hartmann argues for value-relativism if by that is meant changing societies adopting different values only on the ground and assumption that values themselves are absolute. Relativism of the kind referred to here can be upheld, Hartmann would argue, if only values themselves are taken to be absolute. What then is the nature of such relativism ? Relativism, in a general sense, means that the values are relative to time and place, that is, relative to a particular society at a particular point of time. And any society may claim that its own standards are absolutely right and thereby it condemns the standards of another society. Thus the standard of the particular society valid for that society only and not for others. However, relativism, in the present context, may be understood in terms of the following premises : (a) that different societies/cultures seem to adopt or "discover" different values, and (b) that while the values are discovered they are given as absolute. A point that at once emerges is this that relativism, in this sense, does not destroy the objective validity and the consequent sanctity of the values discovered by the societies/cultures. In other words, given a perspective, any society/culture would find or discover the same values. That it does not happen in point of history, is because the perspective always changes.

Now, such perspectival intuition of values may be termed as "value perspectivism" which involves a kind of relativism in a radical sense. It is now clear that Hartmann rejects the relativism of the ordinary sense by denying the relativity of values themselves. For him, values themselves are not relative but the discovery and the continued discernment is relative, that is, relative to "ethos" of a people at particular point of time and place. Hartmann also thereby rejects the philosophical subjectivism which maintains that values are relative to individual consciousness or human cultures. In fact, values, being a Platonic Ideas, cannot themselves be relative to individuals or human cultures.

Thus, it would seem to make sense to distinguish the kind of relativism that Hartmann advocates from the ordinary sense of the term. By rejecting both relativism in the ordinary sense and the subjectivistic form of that position, Hartmann embraces a relativism in a peculiar and unique sense which may be termed as "perspectival relativism". In point of distinction, the relativism in this sense means that values are relative to a particular "etheic" perspective. That is to say, values are relative to a particular perspective from which a particular individual, society or race establishes an "emotional contact" with certain constellation of values and accordingly they form their norms and commandments. Thus there is a constellation of value corresponding to each perspective

from which a person, society or race intuit the eternal and immutable group of values existing in a "objectivity there" field of values. This goes for Hartmann's position that different persons, societies or races experience values as "objective" that is, existing in an independent ideal realm. Further, the perspectival "vision" corresponding to each constellation of values does not contradict with other perspectival vision of values. It is possible for individuals belonging to one ethos to be aware of a quite different constellation of values from that which individuals of another ethos becomes aware. So, there is no conflicting value--apprehensions as there are only differing value-apprehensions.

For a phenomenological understanding of values in general, and moral values, in particular, Hartmann's advocacy of value-absolutism is of crucial importance. In order to uphold this position, though Hartmann admittedly brings in the Platonic view of reality, the implicit logic of value--absolutism is tied up with objective validification of values themselves. The kind of relativism he reverts to is to be distinguished from ordinary sense of it insofar as the former and not the latter is adduced in support of the objective validity of values. By combining value-absolutism with what we have called perspectival relativism, Hartmann has pulled the realm of values out of the pale of capricious subjectivism.

One or other set of values is choosen or more appropriately "discovered" by a people not because of mere capricious preference, but because the values are "out there" objectively for the consciousness to discover them. Given a certain perspective, consciousness can but only discover that values it does and no other. Implicit in this is the argument that anyone from the same perspective (by virtue of being historically placed so) would always intuit the same values. This clearly goes for objectivity of values which a phenomenological consciousness ensures by delinking itself from the pure subjective drives which are capricious in nature. The logic of the invariance of values is based on their absolutism, that is, the values themselves belong to an ideal domain which is independent of the historical events and flux.

Indeed a hardline phenomenologist would have reservation for subscribing to a view which implicitly or otherwise presupposes any metaphysical or ontological commitments. Needless to mention, Hartmann's value-platonism may be a easy target of criticism from a hardliner. But any phenomenological analysis would be sympathetic to the core idea that values themselves are invariant and provide the basis for the objectivity of moral judgements. Hartmann's value-platonism is to be understood in this larger perspective. In order to invest values with invariance and objectivity, they must be held

as belonging to ideal realm which transcends, and is independent of, whatever exists in space and time. His value-platonism may be said to have an important underlined message, namely, that values "exist"; they do so in an ideal realm; for, if they did in space and time, they would not be invariant.

Of no less consequence is Hartmann's analysis which involves his accounting for and responding to the historical fact that different people/societies adopt different values which may give rise to the false impression that values are mere a matter of subjective preference and, therefore, nothing objective about them. In order to obviate the latter difficulty, Hartmann explains the apparent phenomena of changing values in terms of differing perspectives. Why an individual/society adopts a value is because of the perspectives from which he/it focusses consciousness on the realm of values. Given his peculiar position/perspective, there is no other alternative but to intuit the value that he does. Hartmann's approach in this direction can well be elaborated supportively by invoking the notion of intersubjectivity. To argue that an individual discovers a value relative to his perspective is also to claim that anyone else in his place would also discover the same value. The validity of value, therefore, can be upheld intersubjectively as one can sympathetically imagine different people discovering the same value where they all to view from the same perspective. In a limited context, this is borne out even historically as a particular

society is known to apply generally the same norms of moral standard for judging the conduct of its own members.

That values in general and moral values, in particular, are not based merely on subjective ground but have objective validity is also very clearly argued and brought out by Scheler who lays the foundation of his ethics avowedly on the pattern of Husserlian phenomenology. In the present section, we shall first focus on some of the salient features of Scheler's views on values before undertaking a critique of the same.

To Scheler, phenomenology is primarily an attitude and not a method. He takes up Husserlian methodological principle to "approach the 'things' themselves" without presuppositions, above all, dissecting them from all naturalistic and metaphysical assumptions. He accepts Husserl's idea to approach "phenomena" as they are "given" and to "describe" the way they constitute themselves in the consciousness and intention of the perceiver. As against Kantian formal ethics, he lays the foundation of an ethics which is non-formal i.e. "material". For him, values are not empty, but have specifiable contents. He rejects the subjectivist's claim that values as such, and moral values, in particular, are only subjective phenomena in man's mind which do not have independent significance and existence. He argues that if values are simply the correlates of human acts of valuation, they would be variable and wholly relative.

The latter position which is taken by various naturalistic--positivist thinkers comes in for sharp criticism as Scheler attempts to refute it by demonstrating that values have a mode of being independent of the valuing man. On the other hand, for him, to the human social valuation, there corresponds an objective realm of values. In his onslought against Kantian formalism and the various forms of modern subjectivism, Scheler builds up his theory of moral values.

Now, according to Scheler, values are phenomenological facts or what he calls "moral-facts" or "value-facts". But what are these "moral facts" or "value-facts" ? Scheler explains that these value-facts are entirely independent of things, persons and relations of all kinds, that is, they are independent of all their bearers. For example, a human relationship called "friendship" is itself a value, remains static, though in practical life, a friend turns out to be a false friend. Further, they are also independent of all human considerations, prejudices. As essences, values belong to the mode of "experience" and a priori to what can be given by inductive and particularly, by causal knowledge. Furthermore, in his phenomenological description of the nature of values, Scheler compares the mode of values with colour-species by distinguishing it from individual colour shade. Thus, for him, value-facts "exist" the way colour species exist. Moreover, the "value-facts" are

"objects" as the colour species are the objects for Husserl. But, then, are they like Platonic Ideas ? Spiegelberg clears away the confusion and brings out the matters more clearly as follows :

> Scheler has often been interpreted as saying that values are general essences, ideal entities hovering over the empirical world of ethical experience like so many Platonic Ideas. Actually Scheler assigned to them neither the status of individuals nor that of universals. They are given as the contents of immediate intuition in concrete cases of ethical experience, once we attend to the value characters in their pure 'whatness'(was) regardless of their experience. It would seem, therefore, that such 'whatness' is an unplatonic as any other property that is carried by the objects of our concrete experience.[1]

In other words, "moral facts" are "objects" of non-formal intuition, that is, of the intuition of a phenomenological kind and thus the values are intuitive a priori. Here, a point which would be substantive to our understanding of Scheler's view of a priori intuition is that the traditional dichotomy between rational truths and non-rational truths is unacceptable to him. In Greek thought, the distinction has clearly been made and upheld in conjunction with the view that only rational truths are worth persuing whereas non-rational means, such as, emotion is either incapable of viewing any truth or is of a marginal order. This theme with some variations runs through whole

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1 Spiegelberg, H., The Phenomenological Movement, Vol.I, op.cit., pp.252-53.

western philosophical thinking. And so for Scheler, it was like swimming against the tide when he claims that truths grasped by emotion are necessary and universal in nature. On the other hand, Scheler points out, reason is incapable of providing such methodological requirement. Scheler legitimises emotion rather than reason as source of immediate necessary truths. "Moral facts" are accessible only in this fashion through emotion and are grasped immediately and intuitively. The view that whatever is gained by emotion being wholly subjectivistic can never lay claim to necessity and universality is blown to pieces in the hands of Scheler.

Thus Scheler sets his face strongly against the view that everything in the human mind that is non-rational, namely, feeling, loving, hating, intuition etc. is dependent on man's subjective constitution and therefore, cannot be our guide in our practical life. Scheler shows, on the contrary, that value-ethics can very well be based on emotions. Scheler attempts to elaborate a phenomenology of "feeling". He claims that feeling are far from being "blind" drive, as many Anglo-saxon philosophers maintain, are actually a means of knowledge which reveal through their intentionality the ethical <u>a prioris</u> of a distinct realm of eternal values.

The crux of the matter is that according to Scheler, cognition of values is possible not <u>primarily</u> through intellect

but is gained in and through feeling which is intentional and cognitive. The cognitive nature of feeling would be clear only in the context of an important distinction made between feeling-acts and feeling-states. Scheler carefully distinguishes cognitive feeling from mere feeling-states by saying that the former is not mere psychological state of mind having some referrents outside of it but have the intentional character which is directed towards its own kind of being, that is, value. A feeling-act is a feeling of something and this "something" is value. Further, a feeling-act is an act through which its "object", that is, value is grasped "originally" and "immanently". Thus feeling-act or cognitive feeling is not dead state of mind but "signify" something i.e. values. But, how is cognitive feeling is able to help us grasp or intuit values ? Funk provides the answer on behalf of Scheler :

> The feeling here reveals objects to me; it is neither a question of there being objects associated, either mechanically or through mental act, with what I perceive nor objects of being brought in "from without" the experience, for feeling goes directly to its objects, viz. values.[1]

Thus, on Scheler's view, values are "given immanently through feeling-acts and thereby the latter becomes the acts of valuing.

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1 Funk, R.L., "Thought, Values, and Action", Manfred Frings (ed.) Max Scheler (1874-1974) Contennial Essays, p.50. Martinus Nijhoff (The Hague, 1974)

It would be interesting to note here how Scheler's notion of valuational intuition, as we have explicated above, leads to his unique theory of relativism in the field of values. According to him, value-intuition is always perspectival. A society or a race at a particular point of time intuits values according to the historical circumstances in which it is situated. A quite another society or race may intuit values from another perspective according to its historical situation. For example, in a preponderantly military society where war is a means of acquisition, the values, such as, courage, bravery etc. are considered to be more useful for the general welfare than the values like industry, diligence, honesty etc. which find acceptance in an industrial society. Thus, here, the two societies, say, military society or the industrial society, intuits the eternal, immutable values from their respective perspectives and obviously their own perspectival "perception" would be different from each other. In the same way, numerous societies or races feel certain values and prefer them each from its own standpoint which will make possible imperatives and norms accordingly. Thus the difference and variation in norms and imperatives are due to their perspectival differences. This point bears close proximity to that of Hartmann in this regard. But the differences and variations, as we have explained in details earlier, do not in any way mean that values themselves are relative. Values, as we have stated earlier, are

eternal, unchangeable and static. In fact, all societies or races recognise the same values. The variations and differences are relative to the perspectival intuition of value-phenomena.

The different societies may "look" at the same eternal and immutable values from their divergent perspectives. They would do so as if from different windows at their "objects" of intuition which remain unchanged. As Scheler clearly affirms,

> /T/his most radical relativity of moral value-estimations gives us no reason to assume a relativism of moral values themselves and their order of ranks.

Further,

> It is precisely a correctly understood absolute ethics that strictly requires these differences - this value--perspectivism of values among peoples and their times and this openness in the formative stages of the ethos. Because moral value-estimations and their systems are more manifold and richer in their qualities than the diversity of mere natural dispositions and realities of people would allow one reasonably to expect, one must assume an objective realm of values which our experiencing can enter only gradually and according to definite structures of the selection of values.

Now, the relativism advocated by both Hartmann and Scheler does not stand in contradiction with the absolutistic nature of values or Ethics. The kind of relativity advocated by Hartmann and Scheler may be termed as "perspectival relativism" which does not imply valuational relativity. Because values themselves are not affected by the perspectival intuition of persons or societies. They remain eternal, static and

immutable inspite of changes that occur in the norms and imperatives followed by diverse persons and societies. Thus relativism in this radical sense can go in hand and glove with the absolute values.

At this point of our discussion we may briefly recapitulate some of the central issues around which the phenomenological thinking has developed on the matter of values, in general, and ethical values, in particular. But let us be brief : (i) Hartmann's theory of "sensing" of values and Scheler's theory of "feeling" are basically not different from each other, though they hold divergent views with regard to the ontological status of the "objects" of apprehension i.e. values. (ii) The relativism advocated by Hartmann and Scheler is of a type which far from contradicting the value-absolutism goes really to support and sustain such a view. The argued coherence between value-absolutism and perspectival relativity of values can be realised by invoking the notion of intersubjectivity.

Let us take the <u>first</u>. We may begin by reminding that both Hartmann and Scheler take <u>emotion</u> as a source of cognition in the field of values. Kant's advocacy of "reason" or "rationality" in ethics has been vehemently criticised by both these philosophers. They express their dissatisfaction, as we have seen earlier, over the rigid disjunction of reason and emotion, as also cognitivism and emotivism. And both

of them make attempts to break down this dichotomy and bridge the supposed wedge with the help of phenomenological insights. Hartmann who subscribes to the platonic tradition uses phenomenological insight in the matter of the apprehension of values. The latter is emphasized by Scheler too. For them, feeling far from being a "blind drive" can claim to be a source of cognition. These cognitive feelings are, of course, different from subjective feeling-states, such as, elatedness, depression etc. which are non-cognitive. For Hartmann, "they are acts of feeling - not intellectual but emotional",[1] and on Scheler's view, "it is in and through our feelings that objects and states come before us as endowed with worthwhileness and counterworthwhileness...."[2] Further, both Hartmann's "primary discovery" and Scheler's "intentional feeling" are the immediate way of getting access to the world of values. In order to have the knowledge of values, no mediation, such as, of concepts, judgements, symbols, signs etc. is needed. It is in and through this immediate intuitive knowledge that the "Thing" itself i.e. value is "given" and "mediated experience that never gives things themselves". One thing more. This immediate "givenness" of the "objects" themselves is a distinguishing

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1 Hartmann, N., Ethics I, op.cit., p.177.

2 Frindlay, J.N., Axiological Ethics, op.cit., p.59.

mark of phenomenological experiencing. Hartmann clarifies,

> Every moral preference is intuitive, is <u>immediately</u> there and is always contained in the grasping of a given circumstance (....). It does not first wait for a judgement of the understanding.[1]

Similarly, for Scheler, value-facts are given "<u>immediately</u> i.e. not in any way mediated by symbols, signs, or instructions of any kind".[2] Furthermore, as this kind of apprehension is emotional in nature, one cannot shink away from its "objects" in order <u>not</u> to have the knowledge of its "objects" i.e. <u>values</u>. A valuing subject is not free to have or not to have the apprehension of values. A subject is purely <u>receptive</u> in matters of apprehending values. Such subject cannot avoid and escape the appeal of values made upon the subject's "feeling".

Now, the <u>second</u> point. The relativism which has been advocated by Hartmann and Scheler is quite along the same lines. They both recognise the perspectival intuition of values. That is to say, each society/culture intuits values from its own perspective and this perspectival intuition differs from the perspectival intuition of another society/culture. Or, it may be that perspectival "perception" of one generation may differ from another generation. And thus the values which are "perceived" or "felt" from a particular perspective may be said to be <u>relative</u> to that perspectival "perception". The emphasis here is on the point that relativism in this sense

1. Hartmann, N., Ethics, op. cit., p. 176.
2. Scheler, M., Formalism in Ethics, op. cit., p. 50

does not affect the value-absolutism which is upheld by both Hartmann and Scheler. This type of relativity which does not imply the relativity of values themselves is of a piece with the phenomenological thinking.

A point that may bear repetition here is this. The ordinary kind of relativity asserts that values are relative to time and place i.e. to particular society/culture and the society/culture may claim that its own standards are absolutely right and thereby it may condemn the standard of another society/culture which "honours" different values. Thus this type of relativism clearly implies the relativity of values. Because the societies/cultures fundamentally disagree with regard to the values themselves. It recognises the diversities in values and consider such diversity as fundamental. Here by "'fundamental' is meant that it would not be removed even if there were perfect agreement about the properties of the thing evaluated".[1]

But what we have referred to as "perspectival relativism" differs from the ordinary type of relativity in that in the former no such disagreement arises with regard to the values themselves like it is the case in the latter. It recognises the eternity and immutability of values and it is only the case that different societies differ only in their perspectival "perception". Thus here there is disagreement in perspectives

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1 Edwards, P., (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.3, p.75. Macmillan Publishing Co., New York.

only and not with regard values themselves. It is their particular social circumstances which lead their members to "perceive" a particular value or a set of values and this does not imply that they (the members of that society) would deny or condemn the values advocated by other societies. Thus values intuited perspectivally by each society is relative to that perspectival intuition only, unlike that of ordinary relativism in which values themselves are relative to that society.

As for the third point, it has been maintained that notwithstanding relativity of value intuition, values themselves claim objective validity. And this may be argued on the ground of intersubjectivity. As values are relative to the perspectival intuition of each society/culture, whoever would "visualise" from the same perspective would also "perceive" the same value or set of values. A military society, to take our earlier example, where war is a mean of acquisition may intuit such values as courage, bravery rather than, say, diligence, industry and honesty which are preferred intuitionally in an industrial society. Now, whoever enter the either of these societies is compelled to have the "sensing" of respective set of values i.e. courage, bravery etc. or diligence, industry, honesty etc. Thus values "perceived" by these societies are valid for each of them respectively and there is no question of condemnation

of the values adopted by one society by the other. In other words, whoever would come to "perceive" values from that societal perspective would "perceive" the same values which have been perceived by the military society or industrial society. Thus it seems to us that the perspectival relativism is intersubjective in the sense that whoever would "perceive" the values from a particular perspectival view would "perceive" the same values. Here the sense of intersubjectivity, it seems, is purely phenomenological-epistemological in nature.

Now, it seems to us that both Hartmann and Scheler are under an obligation to explain the objective validity of values so as to steer clear the charge of subjectivism that is generally levelled against phenomenological approach. The task is so much harder for them as they both subscribe to the view of the relativity in "perceiving" values. Admittedly, they both hold that relativity does not apply to values themselves which are eternal, immutable and unchangable but rather to the way they are "perceived" by the cognising consciousness which could do so only from a particular perspective or standpoint. The point of the matter is that though all values themselves are absolute, consciousness can have access but only to a few. The argument with regard to relativity of values can thus be understood in terms of the following premises : (a) values are numerous, though all of them are absolute, (b) consciousness

cannot be aware of, or, have access to all values at the same time, though it can grasp only some values at a time.

It is interesting to note that both Hartmann and Scheler dwell at length on (b) above going into details of the mode of apprehension and the manner in which values - moral or other, are grasped. For one thing, the grasping of values by consciousness is immediate and direct, and quite unlike the rational means in which reason is mediated by concepts, language, symbols etc. The distinctive stress on direct and immediate understanding of any phenomena is the hallmark of phenomenological approach to knowledge. It requires not only that we go back to "things" themselves, but do so by a mode of understanding which is both direct and immediate. Reason cannot function unmediated by concepts, symbols etc.; but emotion can. Both Hartmann and Scheler lay much store by emotion which alone can help the cognising consciousness to grasp meanings and values immediately and directly. Thus it is claimed that values, be the moral or otherwise, are directly and immediately grasped by the phenomenological consciousness. By phenomenological consciousness is meant consciousness constituted by whatever is immanent to it and emotion being immanently given in consciousness (as opposed to states of feeling) can grasp such meanings and values. Indeed, there is a sense of subjectivity here which must, however, be distinguished

from subjectivism. The latter is accidental, though pure subjectivity is out of what phenomenological consciousness is constituted.

Emotional subjectivity ignores anything that is transcendent to it and by virtue of that must grasp meaning-essences or values themselves. Unlike a mere object of mere rational cognition, values themselves are immanently given to grasping consciousness which by its very acts lays also tje foundation for its objective validity. If "grasping", in the phenomenological sense, of values is made by consciousness, it is not merely a subjectivistic phenomenon; any consciousness would grasp the very same essences of values. The idea of intersubjectivity is thus intertwined with the very phenomenological mode in which consciousness grasp meanings and values. What, in effect, is argued by both Hartmann and Scheler is not that objective validity of values must be grounded on the premise that all consciousness as a matter of fact do grasp the same values; for the latter is never the case due to the divergence of perspectival positions. Intersubjective basis for the validity of values is invoked by maintaining that a consciousness from a perspectival position must always grasp the very same values as would be accessible to any consciousness from the same perspectival position. Thus the fact of differing "perceptions" of values does not affect value-absolutism which indeed may be taken as the implicit

ground for holding the relativity of "value-perception".

The foregoing analysis of values brings out another point in clear focus which is that of methodology. In the philosophical tradition of English-speaking world, there has emerged a certain ~~consciousness~~ consensus in favour of the view that rational mode of cognition is superior to any non-rational mode which, even if it is admitted for certain purposes, has only a very marginal role to play. The phenomenological tradition going back to the writings of Husserl, however, it succeeded in evolving and developing a methodology which is mainly oriented to the so-called non-rational mode of cognition. Not only that, The phenomenological thinkers have occasion to study and send out a message loud and clear that it is only emotion and not reason which is vastly superior to achieving the phenomenological attitude of grasping "things" and meanings themselves. From the phenomenological point of view, moral values directly and immediately grasped by a consciousness which acts within the parameters of phenomenological requirement. That such values can claim objective validity is grounded on the very nature of the phenomenological act of grasping. The choosing of values are no matter of mere caprice. Nor are they for that matter based on any rational arguments. A moral value is valid for that is what the cognising consciousness directly grasp or "perceives" in phenomenological sense. The moral worth of an action would depend on whether or not we conform

to this phenomenologically grasped values; no process of ratiocination can help us to wriggle out of such obligation. It may be said by way of a final concluding remark that phenomenological appraisal to understanding moral values encompasses within its folds two important insights, namely, that such values are absolute, eternal and immutable numerous as they may be and they are amenable to direct and immediate grasping by consciousness even though only a few at a time.

That phenomenological approach to values offers an alternative mode of cognition of values in general, and moral values, in particular, is enough clear. What is more important is that such a mode of cognition which is claimed as non-rational, non-formal or intuitive is held to be superior to the rational means of cognition that the western tradition has always tried to glorify. There is a distinct parting of ways with this rational mainstream of tradition which in the west traces itself back to the times of Plato; the phenomenological approach lays greater store by the non-formal or intuitive mode for the direct grasping of values themselves. The rational means of cognition, on the other hand, is neither immediate nor direct; it therefore must always seek its own justification in terms of arguments based on deductive and inductive modes. Phenomenological approach is characterised by a mode of <u>understanding</u> which is both direct and intuitive

and therefore, needs no justification from outside. However, the notion of intersubjectivity that is invoked by phenomenological approach in support of the values being objective and universal is based on sympathetic imagination whereby any person/society would intuit the same values provided the perspective from which it is done remains also the same. Thus the claim is that the objective and universal character of moral values have for them a more secure foundation than can be expected to be provided by the rationalistic tradition.

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