

CHAPTER FOUR

REVIEW AND RETHINKING ON HUSSERL, SCHUTZ,
MERLEAU-PONTY AND OTHERS

CHAPTER FOUR

SOME CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS ON HUSSERL'S TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY

Edmund Husserl is an insightful genius beyond recognition. He has revolutionized the realm of philosophical thinking as well as the theoretical pattern of social-scientific considerations. Actually his contribution is unfathomable as regards the findings of phenomenological investigation. But what would be more illuminating for us is to look at the path he has traversed and the milestones he has established. Most instructive is his discovery of the gravitation of the Lebenswelt, which cannot be overcome by anybody and in any way, Lebenswelt or life-world is the most concrete reality in which abstract eidos and discrete de facto sensibilities are intermingled with each other, in such a way that no reduction can bring a fission.

It is Descartes (1596-1650) whom Husserl has credited much for giving philosophy a new inception. His Cartesian Meditation begins with the ego cogito that had been discovered by Descartes methodical doubt. Husserl declared, "The aim of the Meditations is a complete reforming of philosophy into a science grounded on an absolute foundation"¹. But in Crisis, Husserl has been critique of Descartes' mode of thinking and their effect. This may be felt from the following citation : "After Galileo had carried out, slightly earlier, the primary establishment

of the new natural science, it was Descartes who conceived and at the same time set in systematic motion the new idea of universal philosophy in the sense of mathematical or, better expressed, physicalistic, rationalism — philosophy as 'universal mathematics'. And immediately it had a powerful effect" ².

According to Husserl, Descartes had been deluded by an ideal of objectivism — that of the absolutely grounded knowledge. In search of self-evidence, Descartes through epochē obtained the 'ego' disconnected from facticity. Husserl points out that Descartes failed to maintain the radicalism with which he began and it is evident from the latter's identification of ego with 'pure soul'. As a result of this Descartes succumbed to the naturalistic mind-body dualism. So he comments; "The whole gain, the great discovery of this ego, loses its value through an absurd misconstruction : a pure soul has no meaning at all in the epochē, unless it is as 'soul' in 'brackets', i.e., as mere 'phenomenon' no less than living body" ³.

Husserl formulates another criticism against the Cartesian egology. It was a blunder on the part of the founder of modern philosophy to conceive of 'an' ego, existing for itself. "It remained hidden from Descartes that all such distinctions as 'I' and 'you', 'inside' and 'outside', first constitute themselves in the absolute ego" ⁴. But it seems to me that Husserl in course of criticizing Descartes, is in fact carrying on an unconscious self-criticism. The eidetic phenomenology of Husserl in many respect was but a neo-Cartesianism. This may be shown in this way.

In the fifth Cartesian Meditations, Husserl derived the concept of the sphere of 'ownness' which is the sole jurisdiction of ego. The sphere of ownness is obtained as a result of the 'second epoché' of the transcendental experience⁵. It is expected that after the reduction we shall be able to understand, how can 'my ego' within its peculiar ownness can experience someone as other. In his own words : "As Ego in the transcendental attitude I attempt first of all to delimit, within my horizon of transcendental experience, what is peculiarly my own. First I say that it is non-alien. I begin by freeing that horizon abstractively from everything that is at all alien"⁶.

Now the question arises that in the sphere of transcendental attitude, how one can take with himself the notion of alien-ness to form that of ownness. The notion of ownership is an element of the natural attitude in order to make a fence between the ego and the Other. I can say some territory to be my own only when made to feel it by the unencroachable surface of some 'Other'. Without this Otherness the horizon of ownness can not be there. So what Husserl says in criticism against Descartes is not self-sustaining. Husserl, in Cartesian Meditation subscribed to the very view which he is criticizing against Descartes. He failed to give an satisfactory account as to how the distinctions as 'I' and 'you', 'inside' and 'outside' are constituted. Are they really the accomplishment of the absolute ego? Or is there any ego who constitutes 'ownness' quite itself? Does not the 'sphere of ownness' indirectly refer to some sphere which is disowned by the ego?⁷

To seek an answer we may refer to Husserl's characterization of transcendental attitude in which, what is given in straightforward consciousness is a "phenomenon". The experience of the 'sphere of ownness' is also obtained but only within a background of otherness. The 'sphere of ownness' can not be separated from the background, otherwise the "phenomenon" will be mutilated. Even when he spoke of 'freeing the horizon' from what is alien, the sense of alienness could not be done away with. In short ownness and otherness are reciprocal. The integrity of 'I' can stand over a context of 'Other'. Schutz describes this mutuality between these two aspects in the following way. "... our self participates likewise in the vivid simultaneity of the 'We' which belongs, therefore, to our stream of consciousness. To this extent at least the 'We' is always and from the beginning connected with self"⁸. Husserl was wrong in crystalizing the ego-pole to form a transcendental Ego.

Again from the 'sphere of ownness' the path to transcendental subjectivity does not seem so easy. The 'sphere of ownness' obviously presupposes a 'sphere beyond ownness' presided over by 'Other'. Ownness is composed by the centrality of ego but surrounded by non-ego. If we compare it to an intentional phenomenon then the consciousness reveals to possess an implicit directedness to other. Now, is it possible to extract the subject only from the composite piece of experience? It appears that Husserl gathered the ego-pole from the multitude experience of

which 'ownness' is the unique feature and constructed the model of transcendental subjectivity as the source of all meaning accomplishment. Phenomenology is characterized by an overcoming of subject-object dichotomy. Phenomenon is here nothing transcendent but an immanent experience in which subject and object are inseparable. Husserl did not presuppose a transcendental ego but arrived at it by means^{of} abstraction and idealization of the subject-part of any experience. It was the same effort in which naturalists constitute an objective and transcendent realm in-itself by multiplying the object-part of experiences. So the entire experience consisting of owner-ownness - [disowner] should have to be reduced by Husserl for discovering the most rudimental structure. Instead Husserl happened to dissect the experience 'as-is-given-to-us'. The obvious result was transcendental solipsism to get rid of which he had to take recourse to 'apperception and pairing'. But did he succeed in it?

Schutz has discussed in detail the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity of Husserl. He shows that Husserl has made a division of the ego's entire transcendental field of experience into two strata : firstly the sphere of what is "properly" of the ego and secondly, the sphere of what is not of the ego. Husserl has suggested repeatedly that the experience of the second sphere belongs in the first sphere - the sphere "properly" of the ego. At this level, "The negative determination of the sphere that is "properly" of the ego in terms of what is not "properly" of the ego involves at least five major difficulties"⁹.

1. Identification of what is not "properly" of the ego is a precondition for the ego to abstract from the former sphere of disowning.
2. The notion of "that which is not 'properly' of the ego" from which abstraction is required, fluctuates very much.
3. How the exclusion of every reference of sense to a possible Us and We may be compatible with the retention of all actual and possible experiences of Others?
4. Can any distinction be made between our consciousness of what is not "properly" of the ego and our consciousness of the subjectivity of others insofar as it determines and co-determines sense.
5. In phenomenological reduction three types of egos have been confused as the mundane ego, the transcendental ego and the detached observer performing the epochē.

Subsequently as Schutz shows, Husserl gave up the negative determination of the spheres in terms of the other and characterized the sphere "properly" of the ego to be the sphere of actualities and potentialities of the stream of ego's experience.¹⁰

Now Schutz comes to the description made by Husserl, of the constitution of the Other's I within the primordial sphere. His criticism of the idea of "apperceptive transfer" of ego-hood depending on "living body" is as follows: Husserl's assumption

that an analogical apprehension of an Other's living body takes place on the basis of a similarity to my own living body contradicts the phenomenological finding that my living body "stands out" in my primordial perceptual field in a manner which is fundamentally different from the manner in which the allegedly similar body of the Other stands out in this field"¹¹. Again, according to Schutz if we overlook this step there are some more difficulties. One can not count Other's body as a 'body' which is similar to his/her own 'body' only by virtue of mere apresentation. What is required is that the Other's body which is 'there' must behaved in a congruent manner with my own body, which is 'here'. There is a gulf between the 'here' and the 'there'. But at once the question arises as to, "How do I know, when reduced to the primordial sphere of what is 'properly' of my ego, whether - and to what extent - the behaviour of the body experienced as the living body of the Other is indeed congruent?"¹² But once the transcendental experience has been reduced to the sphere of 'ownness' it would be difficult to establish the sense of congruence, which presupposes an already inherent Other.

Moreover the idea of congruence also presupposes some standards of normality, by dint of which typification of the Other's behaviour can be done. But all these standards being put under parenthesis, how can be possibly revived now in this epochē. Normality is again a relative notion varying from culture to cultures posing another problem for a transcendental outlook.

So about the result of Husserl's "second epoche" in which he purported to describe the transcendental experience of Other, Schutz remarks : "This second epoche could never yield the constitution of the Other as a full monad within my monad, but at most it yields appresentation of another psychophysical ego beginning from the substratum of my psychophysical ego" ¹³ .

Husserl's notion and scheme of the constitution of higher level of communities, have also been polemicized by Schutz. The experience of alter-ego by ego, is for Husserl the first level of community as we know from the fifth Cargesian Meditations. Beginning from this, higher levels like the social, culture, nation etc. come into being. These all are instances of transcendental intersubjectivity. Now Schutz's point is that - we may, for the sake of argument, accept the notion of Husserl's transcendental subjectivity or 'I'. This very transcendental ego constitutes an Other but basing on a somatic apresentation. So there is not any transcendental 'Thou' correlating the transcendental 'I'. Consequently there can not evolve any transcendental 'We' only from a transcendental 'I' which has a psychophysical Other on the horizontal distance. Transcendental inter-subjectivity is nothing else than the transcendental 'We'. Then how can Husserl propose for the transcendental constitution of higher level of communities? According to Schutz, Husserl at this level made a two fold interpretation of intersubjectivity — firstly, intersubjectivity as constitution by Ego and secondly, intersubjectivity as communication. While the former one has a transcendental odour though in vain, the latter one can not be explained without a

constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude — which is the field of Schutz's major interest.

Maurice Friedman has also criticized Husserl on his earlier position. "... he (Husserl) saw the unfolding of the universe as an one vast egology, our understanding of the Other selves as by analogy with ourselves..."¹⁴ But the criticism rather stop. So far the bush has been beaten much even after Husserl's adandonment of the problem that haunted our thought so much. Husserl is no more a rigorous eidetic in his standpoint as we find in the Crisis. He is now concentrating on a new field called a perceptual field or field of things with an elaboration of the nature of perception. Perception reveals a two-fold reality. on the one hand the perceived thing is within a field of things and on the other hand. "... in our continuously flowing world-perceiving we are not isolated but rather have, within it, contact with other human beings. ... in living with one another ..." ¹⁵

Now Husserl is talking about a new dimension of communa-lization, in which 'self' finds himself. The world is validated not being my private world. He writes: "Thus in general the world exists not only for isolated men but for the community of men; and this is due to the fact that even what is straightforwardly perceptual is communalized"¹⁶. In this sphere he arrives at the notion of interpenetrability among 'selves'. Husserl now admits that my stream of consciousness can come in contact with that of others "similar to the contact between individual series of experiences within my experiential life". Individual man experiences some aspects of the experienced thing while others

have experiences of other aspects. But in spite of the perspectival difference everyone agrees with other in that they are experiencing 'the same total system of multiplicities'.

Giving up early egological model Husserl assumes this intersubjective model in which 'an openly endless horizon of human beings' comes into being quite prior to the emergence of subjects and co-subjects. He calls this 'we-synthesis', in which ego and alter-ego are inseparable. In his own words; "... the synthesis of intersubjectivity, of course covers every thing else as well : the intersubjectively identical life-world-for-us-all serves as an intentional "index" for the multiplicities of appearance, combined in intersubjective synthethis, through which all ego-subjects (and not merely each through the multiplicities which are peculiar to him individually) as oriented toward a common world and the things in it, the field of all the activities united in general "we", etc"¹⁷. Husserl ultimately characterizes the universal subjectivity to be the mankind as a component part of the world. But he himself at the same time raises a question as to how can a part of the world that is human subjectivity constitute the whole world as its intentional formation. To seek the answer Husserl discovers a paradox of human subjectivity in that it is both a subject as well as an object in the world. Resolution of this paradox lies in the truth that human beings are ultimate functioning-accomplishing subjects. "Concretely, each "I" is not merely an ego-pole but an 'I' with all its accomplishments and accomplished acquisitions, including the

world as existing and being-such" ¹⁸ .

From the foregoing discussion we may note that Husserl has made an to-and-fro journey between a pre-given life-world and accomplishing ego-pole. So far as the presupposition of the pre-giveness of the life-world is concerned, some criticism is unavoidable.

David Carr in his introduction to the Crisis points out that in incorporating a pre-given life-world in the phenomenological programme, Husserl gives rise to two overarching difficulties ¹⁹ . Firstly, in his recurrent insistence on the 'pre-giveness' of the life-world. Husserl's initial idealism is likely to be impaired. The theoretically acknowledgeable world may rest on the accomplishing function of consciousness, but the latter imbibes upon the fluidity of the pre-constituted life-world. Again Husserl on the other side speaks of a transcendental constitution of the world-as-it-appears. So, it is difficult to reconcile the pre-giveness of the life-world with the transcendental ego's constitution. Secondly, Husserl's phenomenological description of the life-world must itself be a theoretical activity — theoriā of the highest order. But every theoretical activity presupposes the structure of the life-world while phenomenological aim is to be presuppositionless. David Carr hence puts: "Husserl must show how it is that phenomenology can fulfil the telos of all theory without being caught up in its archē , its rootedness in the life-world" ²⁰ .

Carr however remarks that Husserl was well aware of these problems and might have tried to dissolve them. But it appears to me that a circularity is involved there, though not vicious necessarily. But this circularity can not be understood within a pure phenomenological framework and hence it invites for some alternative approach like hermeneutics. Without ~~the~~ Husserl's project of revealing the relation between the sciences in general and the life-world remains inadequate.

The foregoing discussion may be able to show Husserl's effort to overcome the Cartesian influence due to which he got preoccupied with eidetic and egological investigation. Now one more direction may be shown where Husserl has tried to neutralize his earlier Cartesianism.

Husserl during his earlier philosophizing, was guided by the ideal of philosophy-science inter^osection and it was due to Descartes' subjugation. He sought to bring about a new beginning for philosophy — philosophy as a rigorous science. Philosophy, for him would be a science of essence-intuition (Wessenschau). In his lecture entitled "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science"²¹ we may catch sight of manifold use of compound terms like 'scientific philosophy' or "philosophical science". Again alleged definitiveness of science and philosophy, in terms of one another can be easily made obvious from the given citation : "Philosophy, however, is essentially a science of true beginnings, or origins, of rizōmata pantōm"²². For him, might be the intellectual process and progress of mankind were at a halt. But surely this is to undermine the history of human achievements. His obsessive

scientism-cum-philosophism blinded him about the historicity of understanding. Only a closed vision to history can assure anyone of a static position. Perhaps this made Husserl think about a true beginning, as a result of which he worked out his earlier phenomenology as an initiating technology. But it took some years to change his outlook and outdo the earlier static and eidetic phenomenology by introducing a genetic phenomenology of life-world alongwith a de facto method.

In Husserl's view the crisis of sciences in general is due to the estrangement from the meaning-fundament of them, which is embedded in the Life-world. But the rehabilitation of this nexus between science and the life-world can be accomplished by means of the humanistic sciences, that are illuminated with what Husserl calls a personalistic attitude. This is a phenomenologically unique discovery in which man is to be viewed as a person living in an unitary surrounding-world or Umwelt. The personalistic attitude can be extended towards the life-world also as far as possible. However its antithesis, that is naturalistic attitude too can be projected to everything including man. Naturalistic attitude, which is theoretical, must not be confused with the natural attitude which is inherent in the life-world.

Schutz, depending upon his empirico-phenomenological method, raises several objections against Husserl's later findings, what may be called a phenomenology of attitude. According to Schutz, Husserl simply mentions that in naturalistic attitude an ego-subject is transplanted or transferred on a similar living body to constitute the sense of alter-ego. But, "How this 'transfer'

of localization [of mental activities] can occur, and how, subsequently, a continuous coordination of the physical and the psychical is to take place — 'legitimately' - is neither explained nor intelligible²³. On this point these attitudes seem similar. Husserl in the very personalistic attitude also, according to Schutz, does not explain why we within our surrounding world understand the other as a personal subject. Moreover in this surrounding world with which the ego-subject is strictly related, the latter [subject] not only confront things but also other subjects related to the same objects. Here Husserl ignores the point that through personalistic attitude 'mind can be inserted' into the body²⁴.

The subject, according to Husserl, dwells in a surrounding world which is so only due to being communicative. Sociality is also constituted by specific communicative acts. Communication among multitude of subjects result in a social totality of higher level. But Schutz remarks that Husserl presents this in an inadequate manner. In the first place, in spite of his admittance that each person has an 'ego-istic' compartmentalized sector, Husserl does not endeavour to explain how the manifold of sectors (physical and relational) may coincide to generate a whole. Again the coincidence must be cognizable to every one of the persons. Without the prior rise of a common surrounding knowledgeable world, reciprocal understanding can not be established.

Then, in the second place, Husserl is not right in considering communication to be most primary. Because reciprocal

understanding and communicative acts of any form already presuppose what Schutz would call a common stock of knowledge. In other words social-relationship is somehow pre-communicative. Schutz's third and final objection is against the sense and meaning of 'person' which Husserl does not clarify. According to Schutz the meaning of 'person' changes significantly when the communication moves from primary 'subject-subject' level to that of higher level, e.g., 'community-nation'. In the words of Schutz, "... the meanings of the concepts of person, communication, surrounding world and subjectivity shift so radically in the transition to higher levels that it can be taken only as an excessive metaphorical usage of inadequate terms. To be sure, in the social world of everyday life there arises the problem, serious for all social sciences : the problem of the so-called "social person"²⁵ . For this, however, what Schutz holds liable is "... only a regrettable ignorance of the concrete sciences of society ..." of Husserl "... whose conscientiousness was otherwise exemplary ..."²⁶

Now let us come to some more significant aspects of transcendental phenomenology of Husserl so far as the methodology of social sciences is concerned. He gives a real thrust in the field of sciences and that of scientists' self-reflection. Following Schutz' remark we may hold that Husserl's contribution does not lie in the area of concrete social sciences. But his total theoria is expected to be a groundwork for all sciences. Especially his insistence on philosophy as Bildung is aimed at

giving any scientist a profound self-awareness about his/her vocation as well as life-situation. Eidos and facticity may merge in philosophical knowledge at the level of highest self-reflection. Jurgen Habermas, the hermeneutic-sociologist, is also right in understanding Husserl's sublime theoretical motive, when he writes: "Husserl identifies transcendental self-reflection, to which he accords the name of phenomenological description, with theory in the traditional sense"²⁷.

But according to Habermas, Husserl's ultimate goal of self-knowledge may remain unattainable due to some reasons. He points out that, though Husserl criticized the objectivist or positivist illusion of a nature idealiter, he did not envisage that the ontological presupposition of his theoria does not lose the connection with positivism. Positivism, according to Habermas, is a principle which conceals to consciousness the role of interest in our knowledge-constitution. Phenomenology contradicts positivism in making everything clear and open to consciousness. Now Husserl thought that his theoria of transcendental phenomenology would bring practical change in human life. But he could not grasp that theoria only in the sense of cosmology can have any practical efficacy and not otherwise. Because only in such regard mundane human interest is served. On the contrary phenomenology, according to naturalistic men, seldom accomplishes any practical intent. So Habermas surmises, "... Husserl cannot expect self-formative processes to originate in a phenomenology that as transcendental philosophy, purifies the classical theory

of its cosmological contents, conserving something like the theoretical attitude only in an abstract manner" ²⁸.

So it may be reasonable to say that the impetus of transcendentalism was so deepseated in Husserl that he could hardly ever anchor on the life-world which is 'for us all'. At this point Merleau-Ponty's warning is relevant that what we need is an intersection of idea and fact. Husserl in fact suffers from building a self-enclosed realm of lofty idealism in spite of his overt affinity to a common life-world.

A CRITIQUE OF SCHUTZ, GARFINKEL AND THE SOCIOLOGISTS OF KNOWLEDGE

The succession of Husserl and Schutz is in an important way reminiscent of the dialectical sequence of Plato and Aristotle. ²⁹ In spite of his being an intimate student of Husserl and an upright heir of phenomenology, Schutz does not refrain from criticizing the former. The foregoing discussion has outlined Schutzean criticism of Husserl's major themes like absolute subjectivity, inter-subjectivity and personalistic attitude. Like Aristotle's replacement of Platonic 'Idea' by means of the notion of 'form', Schutz substitutes Husserl's 'essence-intuition' by introducing the notion of 'typification' through direct experience. Whatever be the position of Schutz regarding his phenomenological insight and meta-sociological reflection, Husserl's phenomenological philosophy would ever remain the theoretical matrix of the former.

Husserl came out of the reef of solipsism as soon as he advanced the notion of communalization of perception in Crisis.³⁰ Although some hints of the notion of 'life-world' is available in the Cartesian Meditations, it is in the Crisis that a detailed exposition of life-world becomes explicit. The inherent intersubjective character of the life-world is the capital doctrinal-content of Schutz. About the mundane intersubjectivity Schutz writes, "As long as man is born of woman, intersubjectivity and the we-relationship will be the foundation of all other categories of human existence. The possibility of reflection on the self, discovery of the ego, capacity for performing any epochē, and the possibility of all communication and of establishing a communicative surrounding world as well, are founded on the primal experience of the we-relationship".³¹

But at this point a question does arise as to why an intersubjective common world is accepted by Schutz without any questioning. This is because for him the experiential modality of the common-sense world is self-veridical and pre-interpretive. Any pattern of scientific thinking presupposes this pre-interpreted substratum. So, the linear description of the social world is derived from Schutz's two basic mutually referential notions like 'face-to-face situation' and 'direct experience'. Direct experience is what brings some part of the world within my reach and gives rise to a face-to-face situation. If the former one is the process then the latter one is the product. Schutz asserts, "... temporal and spatial immediacy are essential characteristics of the face-to-face situation".³² Does not such an emphasis on experience and

a concomitant narrowing down of its meaning lead to a sort of position, which Merleau-Ponty calls 'phenomenological positivism'³³?

The horizon of a concrete social relation or we-relation, according to Schutz can never transgress the limit of sense-perceptions e.g., acoustic, optical, alfactory, tactual etc. He in course of discussing the 'degree of directness' gives examples of social relations like sexual intercourse and causal conversation.³⁴ From this we may infer to the extent to what the notion of experience has been radicalized by Schutz. According to his analysis the solitary ego is incomplete without the awareness of the Other in any of the orientations, either Thou-orientation or They-orientation. "Neither he nor I attend to our respective experiences without awareness of the Other"³⁵. Herbert Spiegelberg also observes that "... to Schutz the we-relation was a basic fact of the social life-world which even Husserl's transcendental or 'egological' phenomenology of intersubjectivity cannot account for"³⁶.

But if we follow a rigorous Schutzian denomination of the face-to-face social relation, then the vast area of our life would turn to be non-social relation as such. He has argued that only those who are within the reach of my direct-experience, may be called fellowmen. But one's being a fellow man to me is very ephemeral in reality. With the change of my spatio-temporal co-ordinates the fellowman or fellowmen of the previous instant may become a mere predecessor or differentiated contemporary(ies) to me. With the temporal progression I am always moving (not only

spatially but relationally too). I am coming in contact with men or women at every moment and at the same time getting separated from them on account of the incessant flux of practical life. The horizon of the face-to-face situation of the We-relation in which I am a partner, may be fluctuating but only with the principle of spatio-temporal immediacy.

Schutz makes a clear distinction between the experience of fellowmen, which is direct and perceptual, and the experience of contemporaries, which is anonymous and derivative. The predecessors and successor can only be grasped in a much indirect way. My own life and my predecessors' conscious lives can not be coordinated in genuine contemporaneity. According to Schutz the impossibility of my co-ordination to the conscious lives of the predecessors is due to the fact that, "The world of my predecessors is by its very essence constant; everything has already come to pass. "Hence instead of orientation to past of men, one can act upon them at the utmost. Thus for Schutz, my predecessors can not be experienced as free. On the other side, on account of absolute freedom and openness the world of genuine successors is beyond the grasp of my understanding. About the men or women of future we can take the aid of predictions and assumptions only. Thus Schutz arrives at a general rule : "The further removed the region from an actual We-relation or They-relation, however, the vaguer the interpretations by which we try to understand it" .³⁷

The emphasis on such a primacy of direct experience definitively based on spatio-temporal immediacy encapsules an ego like me within a very narrow but peripherally altering life-world. Significant is the point that here, Schutz disconnects the 'present of my lived experience' from past and future. Past is fixed while future is uncertain. If only the immanent structure and content of consciousness be so much obvious and upbearing then it seems to be reasonable to maintain such views. Perhaps this is the basic axiom of Schutz's phenomenology, the corollary of which is his another notion of 'biographically determined situation'. This phrase has been devised to describe and rationalize the 'present' situation of any individual. The determination of biography is partly due to the birth and up-bringing which are immutable and rest due to the virtual indeterminateness of the future and hence beyond any comprehension. These two aspects are synthesized by the 'common stock of knowledge' prevalent in any community. Each and every person in society including the social scientist as a disinterested observer, is biographically determined. Thus the notion of transcendence of any man from the given continuum of existence to another is theoretically denied by Schutz. However his position is likely to enjoy as privilege in asserting that whether be delinquency or diplomacy, insanity or intellectualism, all forms of mobility are biographically determined.

Actors in the social scene are biographically determined in their live-engagement and vital-accomplishment. Likewise, the social scientist while building models of human rational actions through the mediation of homunculi, is also under the sway of his

own biographically determined situation. Thus what Schutz discovers is the interlocking of action and cognition with one's biography. At this point some difficulties of Schutz's notion of social science that tries to highlight the biographically determined situation have been pointed out by Fred R. Dallmayer. According to him mere sociology can not cast focus into the underground reality. He writes : "What is unclear at this point is why the life-world, when treated as a topical subject matter and as a 'biographically determined situation', eludes the techniques of empirical psychology and, in particular, why purposive or goal-oriented behavior is not amenable to intentional explanation ... While biography and individual socialization seem to fall within the province of empirical psychology, the reference to the social origin of ideas transforms the life-world into a target of the sociology of knowledge"³⁸ . Thus Schutz remains ever in between empirical psychology and sociology of knowledge. His thematic interest is about the 'being' of man in his biography and not about the 'becoming' of man in wider horizons like religion, politics, etc.

Schutz is much more descriptive in his approach instead of forwarding any normative study. He does not set any ideal either for social actors or social scientists. According to him human beings are practically interested in this world as because they, "... know anxiety as a chief motive of all his deeds"³⁹ . In the naive and non-rational common-sense understanding of social-world man arranges himself at the nucleus of the social

cosmos. Schutz writes, "... the social world with the 'alter egos' in it is arranged around the self as a center in various degrees of intimacy and anonymity".⁴⁰

About the attitude of the social scientists Schutz makes a straightforward assertion that they are cognitively interested in the social world. For this what is necessary is that the social scientist at the very beginning withdraw himself from the nucleus-position of the social-world where he used to dwell as an ordinary actor. The observed person is to be placed at the center of this newly constituted world. The social scientist is to carry out perpetuated observations from various perspectives in such a way that the observed person can not experience the presence of the observer. The social scientist is not engaged in interaction. About the specific situation of the social scientist, Schutz says, "As a scientist (not as a human being dealing with science) the observer is essentially solitary"⁴¹. Schutz narrates these to be the already features of social scientific activities.

But one thing is not apparent from Schutz's exposition — that how a reversal from the practical interest to cognitive interest can occur. He does not deny that some connection must be there between the life of the scientist and his vocation. But the 'specific attitude of the scientist toward his problem' transcends the coercion of the impulse of lived-situation. Schutz considers the ideal of rationality and objective-knowledge, to be operating like a touch-stone on human minds. For him the every-day is much short of even probability. Scientific attitude makes any man to,

"... be in a position to ask, what happens in the mind of an individual actor whose act has led to the phenomenon in question"⁴². But in it the threshold point is not justified.

Schutz makes a water-tight compartmentalization between common-sense and scientific realms so far as rationality is concerned. In order to construct a model of rational actions hypothetically inhered in "puppets", the social scientist creates a self-contained world of typification. Under such condition the social scientific constructs, being a 'second order construct' are likely to have any relevance for the non-rational substratum of the human world. It is remarkable that following phenomenological method, Schutz advocates for the nihilation of the malign subjective determinants on theory. But if it is extended upto the construction of 'personal ideal types' of all observed man in the form of homunculus, then the sense of a social world thriving with vitality and vivacity is sure to be ineffective.

At this point Schutz's sharp discord with Husserl regarding the existing condition of social sciences in particular and sciences in general, may be conjectured. Unlike Husserl, Schutz has no anxiety or even no recognition about the crises of sciences in general. For him, the sciences must have been accomplishing their duties well. However, this position is not inconsistent with Schutz's extra-normative approach in social-scientific understanding. Sciences have no inadequacy either in them or as them. The entire edifice of Schutzian phenomenology rests on such a foundation of self-complacency, that may be understood from this

quotation: "The social scientist, therefore, may continue his work in full confidence. His clarified methods, governed by the postulates mentioned [in the earlier section] give him the assurance that he will never lose contact with the world of daily life. And as long as he uses with success methods which have stood this test and still do so, he is quite right in continuing without worrying about methodological problems"⁴³.

Schutz feels an inclination to modern economics, as a paradigm of social scientific knowledge. But he yields a mild criticism of its statistical method in that it is just an 'intellectual shorthand', for generalization and idealization. Social scientist, here is nevertheless open to comprehend individual human activity. In this way he works out a clear-cut definition of the objective and method for the social sciences. The primary goal of social scientific enquiry is to acquire 'organized knowledge of social reality' depending upon the 'methodological postulate of sensory observation of overt human behavior'⁴⁴. In doing so it is claimed that Schutz has created a meta-sociology. But it appears that his notion of model-construction can be applied on his own position in a reflexive manner. For him a social scientist builds a model of rational action through 'puppet' - actors with fictitious consciousness. If his simplified and homogenous model is further continued it would not be illegitimate to remark that Schutz himself constructs a personal ideal-type of 'puppet' of social scientists also — equipped with ideal motives and reasons. Just like the 'puppet' actors, no such 'puppet'

social scientist can be found in the social world. Schutz succumbs to the same philosophical urge, what Merleau-Ponty calls an unfortunate divorce of idea and fact. A positivist bifurcation between subject and object or noesis and noema may be liable for this irreconcilability of two levels.

Maurice Natanson has discussed these points in his article The Problem of Anonymity in the Thought of Alfred Schutz.⁴⁵ Schutz has made a two-fold emphasis on opposite directions. In his noetic phenomenology emphasis has been laid on the subject-side of consciousness in constitutive actions while in the noematic counterpart what is already substantively structured draws central attention. In the words of Natanson: "It would seem that in terms of our approach to Schutz and also in terms of his writings, there are two different moments in his thought which might appear to be difficult to reconcile. One, the attempt as a noetic phenomenologist to account for the processes of anonymization. The other the effort as a noematic thinker to account for the we-relationship, fellow-men in conjunction and working in correlation with each other, i.e., a full, strong and profoundly rich domain of sociality in which we are actually in touch with each other as fellow human beings"⁴⁶ .

Schutz's disavowed attachment to positivist line has also been pointed out by Dallmayer as he writes: "Once the process of scientific investigation was underway, the methodological rules endorsed by Schutz were on the whole convergent with those invoked by positivist philosophers of science"⁴⁷ .

Joseph Bleicher has shown that Schutz fails "to overcome objectivist elements in Weber's methodology and to recognize fully the hermeneutic dimension binding subject and object"⁴⁸. It is perhaps due to Schutz's implicit bias for the positivist view that cleavage between subject and object is a necessary presupposition of social sciences. At this point a deficiency of Schutz is felt in that he does not consider the historicity of understanding by a man whose horizon is saturated with prejudice and ideology. His direct observational method narrows down the horizon of man. This is why Schutz's phenomenology fails to make an adequate room for a philosophical anthropology from which all social sciences virtually emanate.

The deeper philosophical insufficiencies that inhere the phenomenological orientation of Schutz, have been well transmitted to Garfinkel's ethnomethodological enterprise. Prompted by the same radicalization of direct and individual perception ethnomethodology suffers from the difficulty of over-concision. It may be helpful in eliciting the underlying folk-methods of any social institution or social-scientific investigation. But on account of much insistence on immediacy of givenness, the ethnomethodological technique can not be extended beyond a social context within which the experimenter(s) is situated or outside a limited set of scientists with whom the experimenter(s) is supposed to have interaction. Moreover the possibility of stretching beyond the domain of 'present' is totally closed. In this way ethnomethodology is inapplicable to historical or tradition-bound inquiries. Lack

of repeatability and verifiability has also given rise to a more serious objection. Bleicher puts : "The most serious attack from within sociology on ethnomethodology is directed at its non-scientific character" ⁴⁹

Ethnomethodology is much helpful for an individual so far as it yields a self-awareness about the self-projected human potential of meaning-accomplishment. The noetic aspect of the phenomenon 'social' is much emphasized here while the noematic counterpart has been characterized as an 'X-factor'. But ethnomethodology can not disclose the content and contour of this 'X-factor' for an underrating of the historical and hermeneutic nature of man. Though the experience of the present moment is always primal and originary, reference or some relatedness to the past and future are also most necessary for an adequate understanding of any object. It is only human beings who have a horizon demarcating the regions of perception and apperception. Both Schutz and Garfinkel fail to recognize the principle of Gestaltein psychology where both the perceived thing and the background (which can not be perceived with same vividness) are equally important for the meaningful constitution of the whole. So due to a overlook into the horizontal component, Schutz forwards an oversimplified version of social reality and social science, while Garfinkel produces a more compressed picture of the social world. Such a methodology can not be applicable for the Geisteswissenschaften in general.

IS THERE ANY RELEVANCE OF MERLEAU-PONTY?

At this point some of Merleau-Ponty's ideas seem to be of much relevance. Schutz emphasises the directness of experience in a strict perceptual modality. But this he does from an implicitly positivist position in which the structural aspect is considered at the desertion of the horizational elements. As a result he fails to see that within a lived situation every bit of experience transcends itself and indicates to a wider context. Without this everything would be ambibuous and absurd. Depending only upon absolute immediacy and immanence Schutz misunderstands the past to be completed and closed, while the future is so open that makes no sense at all.

If Schutz could radicalize his position further then the notion of 'my birth' would have the same fate of ambiguity. In that case to talk about the 'biographically determined situation' seems to be vague. So his phenomenological analysis proves to be inadequate for an inherent inability to make sense out of ambiguity.

Merleau-Ponty by means of his synthesis of phenomenology and existential thought, advances an alternative framework in which the dual nature of the life-world objects has been revealed. "Society", "body", "birth", "death" etc. have both transcendent and immanent aspects. The individual ambiguity of these are synthesised by consciousness to create a congruent whole. In this process the role of "body" is unique which ordinary mechanical physiology can not expose. Dallmayer comments; "Reducible neither to matter nor to mind, embodiment in Merleau-Ponty's view

constitutes the cornerstone of a pre-reflective (and thus pre-subjective and pre-objectivist) ontology" ⁵⁰ .

About this unique explication of the incarnation of consciousness Tiryakian has spoken highly. Let me quote a long statement: "This [incarnation of consciousness in the body] has great implications for sociology, particularly for general micro-sociology, albeit Merleau-Ponty has yet to receive the recognition he deserves as a crucial bridge figure between existential phenomenology and the social structures of intersubjectivity, which is the heart of the phenomenon of society. Even more than that, Merleau-Ponty in his synthesizing endeavor was formulating a philosophy of ambiguity (but not an ambiguous philosophy), whose outline is clearly suggested in his unfinished work, The Visible and the Invisible. Once we perceive the fundamental ambiguity of the Lebenswelt, including the ambiguous nature of social interaction and social existence, Merleau-Ponty's meaning for the social sciences, as perhaps the modern philosopher of the social sciences, should become patent" ⁵¹ .

Yet Merleau-Ponty's notion of incarnated consciousness, which is much relevant for micro-sociology, is contradicted by his own declaration, "I am the absolute source". Such a transcendentalist commitment can not be accounted for in terms of body-subjectivity. Bondage of and salvation from historicism, psychologism, sociologism etc., inhere not in the level of corporeality but in the higher strata of knowledge and ideology, that have a social origin. So what we need, ^{mere} is a sociology of knowledge rather than phenomenology of perception.

Berger and Luckmann have worked out a great deal to exhibit the dual aspects of the social reality. Through internalisation and externalisation, society becomes to an individual both subjective as well as objective respectively. They succeed in covering the range from 'ideology' to 'common sense knowledge', through their discipline. But it would be fallacious for them to include within the domain of the reduced varieties of knowledge all other forms of knowledge to have social origin. Janet Wolff raises an objection here as she writes: "... it seems that Berger and Luckmann considers other forms of knowledge to be derivative from it [social life]. If this is indeed their view, I think it is mistaken. Symbolic universes are not just legitimating ideologies, arising from the need to justify the originally arbitrary, and therefore precarious, structure of social life. They are not even merely symbolic legitimations for an opposition to the existing social structure and the defence of an alternative society. A sociology of symbolic systems will need to develop a more subtle line of approach to what are extremely complex problems" ⁵² .

So what we may see in the case of sociology of knowledge is that here the internal realm of man is overlooked to some extent. A balanced ratio of internality and externality is somewhat lacking here. However, ~~some~~ of the valuable instructions of Berger ~~are~~ that a sociologist must have an untiring 'ear' to what the society speaks and must try to peep behind any curtain. These have remarkable bearing in the fields of investigative journalism as well as interpretive sociology. But in all the cases, what is

required more is a deeper understanding of understanding itself. Understanding or interpretation is not possible by a tabula rasa, which is may be susceptible to impressions. Throwing light into the fore-structures of understanding and discovering the broad 'pre-in-built' categories, are the proper task of hermeneutics in general.

The searching of some fore-structures of meaning within one's own interpretative horizon may not be an accomplisable act fully. Any such endeavour is sure to push the horizon further. Nevertheless any person engaged in understanding can comprehend the tentative correlation between the so called object of study and the subject's frame of reference for understanding. One's self-understanding should begin with the very given point of correlation. Sociologists of knowledge are contributive in describing the social origin of knowledge. But for anybody whether a layman or a theorist the knowledge has a third dimension, which conceals the subjective or personal and objective or societal origin. The interlocking of knowledge with 'prejudice' or 'interest' can not be revealed without some special effort which is the chief concern of contemporary hermeneuticians.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. Cartesian Meditations, (CM), p. 1.
2. Crisis, p. 73.
3. Ibid., p. 80.
4. Ibid., p. 82.
5. First epochē is the bracketing of the natural standpoint and existential judgments of any sort.
6. CM, p. 95.
7. In the following section this problem has been discussed with reference to Schutz' objection.
8. Schutz, CP, I, p. 76.
9. CP, III, p. 58.
10. CP, III, p. 61.
11. CP, III, pp. 63-64.
12. CP, III, p. 65.
13. CP, III, p. 67.
14. Maurice Friedman, The Human Way - Dialogic Approach to Religious and Human Experience, Anima Books, USA, 1982, p. 78.
15. Crisis, p. 163.
16. Ibid., p. 163.
17. Ibid., p. 173.
18. Ibid., p. 183.
19. Ibid., p. xId
20. Ibid., p. xLii.
21. Edmund Husserl, 'Philosophy as a Rigorous Science' in Quentin Lauer (tr) and (ed), Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy.
22. Ibid., p. 146.
23. CP, III, p. 70.
24. CP, III, p. 71.
25. CP, III, p. 73.
26. CP, III, p. 73.

48. Joseph Bleicher, Hermeneutic Imagination, p. 120.
49. Ibid, p. 133.
50. Fred R. Dallmayer, op.cit., p. 104.
51. Edward A. Tiryakian, op. cit., p. 21
52. Janet Wolff, Hermeneutic Philosophy and the Sociology of Art, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1975, p. 19.