THE PROBLEM OF MEANING: A FREGEAN ACCOUNT

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE
OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PHILOSOPHY)
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

By

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Declaration

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Dedicated to My

Parents Chandan Sarkar

And Purnima Sarkar

Title of the Thesis

The Problem of Meaning: A Fregean Account

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PREFACE

The main contention of this thesis is to explain the problem of meaning in the light of Gottlob Frege. Frege has been recognized as the father of modern analytic philosophy. His account of the problem of meaning is associated with his semantic account where an artificial language has been constructed to solve the problem of meaning. As language Frege invokes in favor of Concept-Notation (*Begriffsschrift*). The central issue of the problem of meaning is deeply associated with his landmark paper 'On Sense and Meaning' (*Siṅṅ* and *Bedeutung*) published in the year 1892. In this paper, Frege has claimed to resolve two philosophical problems, such as *the problem of identity* and *the problem of empty proper names*. The thesis begins with a general introduction and then enters into the nature of proper names concerning Frege, Mill, and Russell. After that, the central issue of the problem of meaning is proposed to explain with the twin concepts of *sense and reference*. The thesis claims that the semantic problems of truth cannot be resolved after Frege without bringing the concept of thought. Therefore, a threshold discussion about Frege's thoughts is proposed to discuss in this thesis. Even though Frege's interpretation of the problem of meaning is revolutionary but still it is not free from question-begging. There we witness a considerable contemporary debate regarding Frege's interpretation of the problem of meaning. Having said that, it may be concluded by saying that Frege's interpretation of the problem of meaning opens up a new vista in the realm of semantics. This thesis is proposed to develop in this direction.

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ABSTRACT

The famous German mathematician and philosopher Gottlob Frege is widely known as the father of modern analytic philosophy. He was the first to offer us a thoroughly systematic approach to meaning. His early work *Begriffsschrift* (Concept-Notation) was characterized by elementary formal logic. Thus the language Frege initially anticipated was logical in nature. Keeping this in view psychologism was completely foreign to Frege's philosophy of language. He launched a strong attack on psychologism through his first principle in the preface of *The Foundations* by pointing out the distinction between the subjective and the objective. Frege was in favour of constructing a well-organized systematic form of language to deal with the problem of meaning because, like other revisionists, he believed that ordinary language is vague and ambiguous. Frege's celebrated article 'On Sense and Meaning' (1892) appeared in the domain of analytic philosophy owing to address two philosophical burdens of which one is associated with the *problem of identity* and the other is associated with the *problem of empty proper name*. By introducing informative identity of the form a=b, Frege shows that how can two expressions having same reference may have different senses or modes of presentation. 'Morning Star' and 'Evening Star' both have the same reference Venus, but their way of referring the referent or modes of presentation are different. Informative identity symbol flanks between two expressions having different senses or mode of presentation but same reference. By bringing this distinction between sense and reference, Frege also solves the age-old philosophical puzzle, the problem of empty proper name. Frege conceives proper name from a broader perspective. A proper name (word, sign, sign combination, expression) expresses its sense, stands for or designates

its reference. Thus for Frege, sense of proper name is important besides having reference. From this perspective, Frege asserted that empty proper names are meaningful because they bear sense or mode of presentation. It is only that nothing ever corresponds to the way in which they are presented and thus they are lacking of reference in the usual sense. However, being a leading campaigner of ideal language philosophy which is obviously a scientific language, Frege later on stipulated an identical reference for all empty proper names.

Besides sense and reference, the role of thought is important to Frege. In his paper 'The Thought', Frege illuminated his conception of thought. Thoughts, for Frege, belong to the *third realm*. Thoughts are true facts. Thoughts are timelessly true, objective and independent. Thoughts are neither physical nor mental. Thoughts are independent of human beings and it is for the humans to grasp the thoughts. A thought is something expressed by sentences. But thoughts are not ideas. The thesis contains a detailed discussion of the distinction between thoughts and ideas. Frege takes thought as *the possessor of truth-value* and sense as the *possessor of reference*. This is how Frege maintained the sanctity of his semantics by keeping intact the position of truth-value while at the same time making his theory comprehensive by bringing the conception of thought and empty proper name. Here lies the gravity of Fregean semantics.

Frege also introduced both Context Principle (CP) and Principle of Compositionality (PC). Apparently, they seem contrary in nature because CP assumes the priority of sentence-meaning and PC assumes the priority of word-meaning. Frege introduces CP to avoid the problem associated with ideas. Frege contended that the sentence is basic in our understanding of the relation between language and what is outside language,

i.e., world. But the word is basic in our understanding of the relation between each sentence and the rest of the language in which it belongs. Apart from various criticisms, I stand with Frege and the research is deeply involved to find out how Frege maintained overall consistency while developing his referential semantics within the horizon of the problem of meaning. Hence, I think, Frege's philosophy of semantics adequately justifies the position of being the father of modern analytic philosophy.

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Gottlob Frege (1845-1925) was a German mathematician and philosopher. He was also the founder of modern mathematical logic. His philosophical work was primarily restricted to logic and the philosophy of mathematics. His introduction of the quantifier-variable notation for expressing generality cause the sharp break between modern logic and the older logical tradition that George Boole and his contemporaries developed. In the first quarter of the 20th century, Frege began to develop mathematical logic which made him a major figure in the history of mathematics and philosophy. His famous publication *Begriffsschrift* (Concept-Notation) published in 1879 brings his inclination towards mathematics and logic. Besides mathematics and logic, Frege was equally interested in the philosophy of mathematics, which greatly influenced philosophers like Edmund Husserl, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. They studied Frege's philosophy of mathematics and were highly influenced by him even though it remained unknown to the then general philosophical circle.

According to Frege, the foundation of a mathematical theory comprises the elucidation and justification of its axioms. We think Frege's ideas on this subject appear as fresh as any contemporary writing and contemporary questions that now seem relevant. As a semantic philosopher, Frege takes the realist position and in turn, revolted against Hegelian idealism. In this regard, he enabled to seize the most sophisticated realist position than Meinong, Moore, or Russell. Some would say that this philosophical position of Frege is somehow misleading. What is vivid and clear is that through his realism Frege launched a strong attack on what he called *psychologism* – a view that asserts that the meaning of words must be given in terms of the mental process. This

psychologistic outlook was deeply embedded in British empiricism as in post-Kantian idealism. Frege perhaps was the first philosopher after Descartes who asserted that logic was the beginning of philosophy. In this regard, Michael Dummett says, "For Frege, if we do not get logic right, we shall get nothing else right."[1] Thus for Frege, Dummett claims, that logic is before philosophy and logic properly guides philosophy. Epistemology is not prior to any branch of philosophy. It was Frege who first claimed that one can deal with the philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science and philosophy of metaphysics without first having undertaken any epistemological inquiry. This position of Frege is exclusively Fregean for which he has been treated as the first modern philosopher. Thus, we have a change of philosophical perspective in Frege which has further been extended by Frege's juniors Russell and Wittgenstein in their philosophical writings.

Fregean Foundations and Development of Philosophy:

It has already been mentioned that Frege started his philosophical career with the publication of *Begriffsschrift* which appeared as the presentation of the modern logical system comprising logical concepts, such as, negation, implication, the universal quantifier and identity as primitive. It is a formulation of classical second-order predicate calculus whose first-order fragment constitutes a complete formalization of first-order logic. The second stage of Frege's career ended with the publication of his masterpiece *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* (published in 1884) where the most fundamental mathematical theories and the theory of numbers were developed. In *Die*

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[1] Dummett, Michael, *Truth and Other Enigmas*, Duckworth, 1978, p. 89.

Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Frege gives a preliminary account of his view of arithmetic. The arithmetical insight of Frege that appeared in this book contradicted the earlier theories on arithmetic. Frege's attack was brilliantly successful and the views Frege criticized in his *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* are totally annihilated.

The third period of Frege's career extended with the publication that appeared in 1903, the second unpublished volume of *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* in which Frege became aware of certain deficiencies in his philosophical logic. In his subsequent writings, Frege gradually developed a highly articulated system of the philosophy of logic that is absent in *Grundlagen.*

Was Frege a Linguistic philosopher?

It thus seems from the above that Frege started his philosophical career with a background in logic and mathematics. He candidly confessed that without logic and mathematics, serious philosophy cannot be practiced. If it would be the case then naturally the question arises: Was Frege a linguistic philosopher? We think that Frege even started with logic and mathematics, his very intention was to develop a kind of distinct and precise language that would adequately reveal the world or reality. Even though he developed number theory but he at the same time seeks questions about: What do number words mean? What is the analysis of statements of number? What is the logical status of the arithmetical theorem? What is the function of the negation sign? Thus by way of doing logic, mathematics and arithmetic, Frege in turn has sought the proper analysis of such concepts very similar to the criterion adopted by a linguistic philosopher. While giving the intended interpretation – the semantics, the whole apparatus of Frege's philosophical logic comprising sense and reference, thoughts,

truth-values, judgments, assertions and objects as opposed to the concept, relations, and functions of one or two arguments, classes, the extension of relations, discusses these notions from his *philosophy of language.*[2] It should be mentioned here that linguistic philosophy is all about the clarification and analysis of linguistic terms. Linguistic philosophy deals with clearing the slums of language by way of clarifying and analysing the logic of language. Thus linguistic philosophy offers us a *philosophical method* through which the relationship between language and reality can be established. In this regard, we need precise and distinct language. This type of language cannot be obtained, Frege opines, without a background in logic and mathematics. Thus, our observation is that even though Frege started his philosophical career in general and semantic approach in particular with his *Begriffsschrift* and *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik*, his very intention was to develop a kind of language under the realm of semantics.

Our main concern in this research work is to explicate and examine the problem of the meaning of Frege. The problem of the meaning of Frege is reflected through his celebrated distinction between sense (*Sinn*) and reference (*Bedeutung*). The distinction between sense and reference for determining the meaning of language is philosophically important because at the very outset it overshadowed the distinction between sense (*Sinn*) and 'coloring' (*Färbung*). According to Frege, *"the sense is that part of the meaning of an expression which is relevant to the determination of the truth-value of a sentence in which the expression may occur"*[3]. On the contrary, the coloring is that part

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[2] Dummett, Michael*, The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy*, Duckworth, 1981, p. 13.

[3] Dummett, Michael, 1978, op. cit., p. 93.

of its meaning which is not relevant to the determination of the truth-value of a sentence in which the expression occurs. Thus for Frege, while determining the meaning of a sentence or solving the problem of meaning proper, one has to distinguish precisely and distinctly between sense and coloring (tone). Frege holds that the truth-value of a sentence is eventually determined just by way of knowing the sense of the sentence but not by way of knowing the tone or the coloring of the sentence. Philosophical ambiguities arise when philosophers fail to distinguish between sense and tone clearly and vividly. If we have a sound logical and mathematical background while dealing with language, we can overcome the distinction between sense and tone. We come to know that the problem of meaning can be sorted out just by way of knowing the sense of the sentence under consideration. This is where, Frege says, the significance of the clarification of language actually hinges on.

Within the sphere of philosophy of mathematics, Frege concentrated more on the analysis of particular mathematical notions, but elsewhere he was more concerned with giving a general account of *the structure of language,[4]* and hence with *a general theory of meaning*. In each of these cases, he gives importance to the senses of particular words or language. We think that his development of the quantifier-variable notation determined his orientation toward the philosophy of language. This philosophical tendency of Frege deviated himself from natural language because Frege found some incongruity in natural language for developing a new philosophical method. The discovery of his new philosophical method is based on a *permanent distrust* of natural language. He conceived natural language as merely incoherent. Distrust of natural

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[4] Ibid, p. 94.

language is not only Fregean taste, in fact, but the whole host of semanticists have also adopted the revisionist position of the proposition of natural language for its ambiguity and vagueness. According to Frege, no coherent account what he called *semantic account* could be given of a language containing well-formed sentences which were neither true nor false. Therefore, in constructing a philosophy of language, Frege opines, we need not be shackled by the inadequate instrument with which we are forced to make in everyday discourse. Accordingly, we have to construct a more perfect and precise effective instrumental language on the foothold of which the proper philosophical journey be started. Elsewhere Frege was also concerned to apply the technical notions of his theory of meaning to sentences of natural language, or demonstrate that his logical formulas were apt for representing the logical structure of the thoughts expressed by such sentences. However, it should be kept in mind that Frege in his *Grundgesetze* was not concerned with the representation of sentences of natural languages or the thoughts expressed by them, rather he was setting up a *formal language* as an integral program of his semantics, the senses of whose formulas were to depend solely on his stipulations of mathematical and philosophical logic.

Indeed, throughout his life, Frege attempted to write a comprehensive treatise setting out his views on that (semantic) branch of philosophy which he called 'logic'. Thus, there is no fundamental distinction between semantics and logic in Frege's philosophy of logic. Frege's logic or semantics is much wider than formal logic or the theory of deductive reasoning that we employ in first-order predicate logic. According to Michael Dummett, Frege's formal logic of *Grundgesetze* is not an ancillary to or extension of

natural language, but as an independent language in its own right or simplistically, *'the beginning of one'[5]*.

Thus it seems to me that Frege's semantics hinges on his very conception of logic. Logic, for Frege, is required for the analysis of deductive reasoning in general. Logic must incorporate all principles of inference that may need to be invoked independently of the *subject matter*. Logic is not concerned merely to state the laws governing correct inference, but with whatever is required for the explanation of the terms in which they are stated and for their formal or informal justification. Since the test for the validity of a form of inference is that it be *truth-preserving*, logic is concerned with how a sentence or thought is expressed. That is why Frege intends to say that logic has to be understood in the broad sense where the word 'true' indicates its *subject matter*. In summing up, Michael Dummett, after Frege, says that 'logic must be a theory applying to any language capable of expressing thought.'[6]

According to Frege, a large part of the work of the philosopher 'consists in a battle with language'. In this regard, language may be thought to be an enemy. Language bewitches us according to Wittgenstein. Even though language is the only medium of communication, considering the bewitchment capacity of language, one must be very careful about the functional aspect of language. For Frege, language is an enemy because language is merely a means of obscuring the true structure (logical structure) of the thoughts expressed. Therefore, human beings must associate thought with a

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[5] Dummett, Michael, 1981, op., cit., p. 15.

[6] Ibid, p. 16.

sentence expressing it. We grasp thoughts as expressed by sentences. Frege does not admit any account of the structure of thoughts. Frege inclines to say that although the analysis of thought must be given in terms of an analysis of some means of expressing it, the relevant means of expression must be a *purified logical notation*. This is indeed the symbolic expression of a thought that displays its true structure. However, its verbal expression distorts it. Thus for Frege, thoughts in the desired sense cannot be comprehended concerning the verbal expression of natural language. In a letter to Husserl in November 1906, Frege says that *'someone who wishes to learn logic from language is like an adult who wishes to learn thinking from a child'*, and that 'the principal task of the logician consists in a liberation from language and a simplification: logic ought to be a judge over language'.

If we try to understand the content of the letter of Frege written to Husserl, we come to know the whole proposal of Fregean semantics. It clearly indicates that Frege emphasizes more on logic than natural language. His constructed language is backed up by logical canons and principles. Thus he tries to grasp thoughts through the construction and analysis of logical or formal language. Of course, we do not deny the fact that thought in a broad sense can be expressed using language. In this sense, the concept of thought may be very closer to the concept of ideas. But when the concept of thought is to be taken with regard to the concept of ideas then such thought cannot ensure the concept of truth under the orbit of semantics in the Fregean line. Frege invokes a kind of semantics as distinguished from the concept of an idea through which the concept of truth as the program of the problem of meaning can be resolved and sorted out. We will discuss this issue in great detail later on. Our point of contention at

this point in time is that Fregean thought is functioning not under the womb of verbal or natural expression but under the womb of logic.

As a semanticist, Frege with the help of logic attempts to give a general account of *the structure of language*. The logical basis of language is in no way related to the language we use in our everyday life. The question then arises: Does Frege comprehend logic as *universal logic*? If it does then it has two consequences. First, the formulas of the logical symbolism must express *thoughts* that we are capable of expressing in natural language or in ordinary mathematical notation as well as the technical notations of sense, reference, object and concept. But if logical symbolism can serve to express the very same thoughts as those we express using natural language, then the structure of a symbolic formula must correspond at least to the *hidden structure* of the appropriate sentence. If it did not, it could not be said to express the same thought. Accordingly, Frege said that the structure of thoughts corresponds not at all to the structure of a sentence of natural language expressing it. Now, if the structure of thought were in no way reduced to the structure of a sentence, then it could not be *that thought* which was expressed by the sentence, that is, which was the sense of that sentence. It then follows that natural language cannot be quite useless for the analysis of thought. Natural language perhaps is useless for the analysis of thought when an attempt has been made to ensure the concept of truth along with the line of semantics with the help of natural language.

The Philosophical Logic of *Grundlagen*:

While dealing with the problem of meaning, we have to spell out the philosophical logic of *Grundlagen*. Frege based his investigation of the theory of numbers on three

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fundamental theses, which are enunciated in *Grundlagen*. The first is the rejection of psychologism; the second is connected with the context of sentences and the third basic principle is the distinction between *concept and object*. Let us explain each of these in turn in brief.

According to Frege, mental images that may arise in the mind of the speaker or hearer are irrelevant to its meaning, which consists in the part played by the word in determining the *truth-condition* of sentences in which it occurs. This is the first clear statement in the history of philosophy of a basic principle that may underlie any *adequate theory of meaning*. This clearly suggests that in Frege's philosophy in general and semantics in particular, mental images as the content of psychologism do not have any significant role in determining truth conditions. The vague conception, common to both the British empiricists and Aristotle, whereby a word represents an 'idea' and a phrase or sentence accordingly represents a complex of ideas, is simply too crude to serve even as a starting point. This again reflects that the concept of idea as developed by the British empiricists and Aristotle does not have any significant role in determining the concept of truth. We know that Frege's problem of meaning can be solved by way of determining the truth-condition of the sentence under consideration. Ideas are associated with a mental image and hence are an integral part of psychology. It virtually forces us to adopt the conception whereby the meaning of a word is embodied in a mental image. In this regard, Frege says, so long we cannot overcome mental images, we cannot overcome ideas. Frege, of course, admits that no progress can be made until we take up the step of seeing a word connected with our actual practice in the employment of language. Thus, Frege's severance of mental images from meaning is

thus the first move in the direction of Wittgenstein's dictum that 'the meaning is the use'. In this regard, Wittgenstein says, 'Don't ask for the meaning, ask for its use'[7]. But Wittgenstein's dictum is suffering from weaknesses as it lies in its extreme generality. Frege is distinct from Wittgenstein as unlike Wittgenstein, Frege's conception of linguistic practice appeared in *Grundlagen* is excessively schematic. For Frege, everything was a matter of the utterance of sentences with determinate truth conditions. Thus our prime objective is to find out the meaning of truth conditions by way of linguistic practice – a sort of linguistic practice which is completely detached from mental image and which is functioning under the paradigm of semantics.

The second thesis of *Grundlagen* has a close connection only in the context of a sentence that a word has meaning. This dictum appeared in *Grundlagen* and was endorsed by Wittgenstein both in the *Tractatus* and in the *Philosophical Investigations*. However, it never occurs in Frege's subsequent works. Frege elsewhere suggested the absurd idea that a language is conceivable in which the thoughts expressed by sentences like 'The Earth is round', '5+17=22'. He then said that the *sense* of a sentence is built up out of the senses of its constituent words. That means, that not only do we attain an understanding of the sentence by our understanding of the words which make it up, but this sense is intrinsically complex. Rather Frege was aiming at what Wittgenstein expressed by saying that only by the utterance of a sentence, and not of any smallest linguistic unit, do we succeed in 'making a move in the language game'. This is how we do perform a linguistic act. Frege's dictum conveys that the 'meaning of a word consists wholly in the contribution it makes to a precise determination of the specific

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[7] Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, tr. by G. E. M. Anscombe, Pearson Publication, 1953.

linguistic act that may be affected by the utterance of each sentence in which the word may occur'[8].

Frege thus said if we do not follow this principle of meaning, we shall commit the fallacy of 'asking after the meaning of a word in isolation[9]. Any attempt to concentrate on the meaning of a word without adverting to the kind of sentence which contains it will lead us to fix on some *mental images* as its meaning. To overcome such immanent fallacy, what we ought to be doing instead is characterizing the truth-condition of the most general form of sentence in which the word occurs. The advantage of such characterization is that it relates to a complete sentence and in such a case there is no reason as such why it needs to proceed via an explicit definition of the word in question. In *Grundlagen,* Frege regarded his principle that words have meaning only in the context of sentences as justifying contextual definition and thereby took this to be one of its most important consequences.

Frege's third basic principle is the distinction between *concept and object* and between concepts of the second and first order. This distinction cannot be appreciated until Frege's definite conception of an object is grasped. This notion is correlative with that of what Frege called a proper name. By a proper name, he meant what is more generally called a *singular term*. However, for Frege, there is no implication that a proper name should be logically simple. More importantly, what Russell distinguished as a definite description, Frege included in the general category of proper names. Russell categorically classified proper names as logical and ordinary and then claimed that only

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[8] Dummett, Michael, 1978, op. cit., p. 95.

[9] Ibid, p. 95.

logical proper names are genuine proper names because in such a case the denotation of a logically proper name is known by acquaintance all without exception. Frege, unlike Russell, was not interested to distinguish between logical proper names and ordinary proper names; instead, he was interested to accept anything like a proper name having adequate sense. We will discuss this issue later on. Our point is that this category of expression assumed peculiar importance for Frege because of the analysis of the structure of sentences which for him underplayed the quantifier-variable notation for expressing generality. As a founder of modern elementary logic, Frege attempts to develop semantic language with the background of mathematics and logic.

Thus in the **First Chapter** of this thesis, I propose to analyse and examine the nature of proper names after Frege and also make an attempt to outline a comparative study of Frege, Mill, and Russell of the same. It is important to be noted here that like all other semanticists Frege advocates linguistic revisionism toward developing semantic language. In this regard, he metaphorically compares logical language with a microscope and ordinary language with an eye. He then said that just like an eye cannot detect the default of language which a microscope can do similarly, there are so many loopholes in ordinary language that cannot be reflected on the surface level or grammatical level but which can be reflected in the logical structure. Therefore, to do or practice philosophy properly one has to emphasize more on the logical structure of language. Interestingly, Frege did not face this phase because knowingly or unknowingly he started his philosophical career with mathematics and logic. It has already been mentioned that Frege began his philosophical career with *Begriffsschrift* (Concept-Notation) which is based on elementary logic and mathematics.

Thus, we can say that Fregean semantic language has adequately been backed up by logic and mathematical precepts. We are talking about the proper name. Proper names are supposed to be the vocabulary of Fregean semantic language. This is not new to Frege because very similarly there is a whole host of semanticists, reductionists, and atomists who developed their semantic language with the help of proper names. Therefore, the problem of the meaning of the Fregean language is associated with the functional aspect of proper names.

It is further noted that based on the proper name there develops various theories which directly or indirectly address the problem of meaning under the realm of semantics. In this regard, there develops two important theories, such as the sense theory and the no-sense theory. This clearly suggests that the sense of a proper name plays an important role in determining the problem of meaning in Fregean semantics. It is further stated that within semantics there develop two important attributes of a proper name. It is said that a proper name either denotes or connotes an object. That means every proper name has its denotational (de re) and connotational (de dicto) implications. These two implications are associated with the referential function of language. Thus, the paradigm of semantics centred around proper names is based on two functional aspects of names of which one is directed to sense and the other is directed to reference. Thus, sense and reference are the two functional aspects of a name based on which the development of semantics is made possible. Therefore, in the **Second Chapter** of this thesis, we propose to analyse and examine sense and reference as the criteria of meaning after Frege.

There is no question of doubt that the whole host of semanticists envisaged and enquired about the problem of meaning with regard to the referential function of language. It has been generally accepted that language does refer but disagreement arises among the semanticists regarding the footholds of reality. Language does refer but where does language refer? What does language refer to? Does language refer to objects? Does language refer to concepts? Does language refer to what lies within the world or does it refer to what lies outside the world? Thus, we can say that as far as the referential aspect is concerned there is no problem among the semanticists but where language refers is a problematic area for the semanticists. It is to be noted here that semantics as a philosophical school works or functions under the womb of referential theory. The important aspect of the referential theory is that it sets up the foundation of *linguistic realism*. The very contention of linguistic realism is that it asserts that without the reference of language, the object of the world as an integral part of reality must be there in the world. That means linguistic realism asserts that language and the referent of language are two independent entities where one is used to locate the other. In this regard, there developed two different types of referential theories, such as *the naïve version of the referential theory* and the *sophisticated version of the referential theory*.

According to the naïve version of the referential theory, the meaning of the sentence is determined by what the sentence refers to. That means the sentence and its reference are two independent and separate entities. However, the naïve version of referential theory immediately faces serious objection because if this theory is taken into account as a paradigm of semantics, then there is a possibility of incorporating metaphysical entities. Because the reference of language may be some metaphysical objects or

pseudo-objects. Because language refers but it is not clear where language refers to, what language refers. Therefore, the foothold of reference must be specified. In order to overcome this apparent default of the naïve version of the referential theory, there developed a sophisticated version of the referential theory. According to this version of the referential theory, a sentence is meaningful if it refers to something other than the sentence itself and there must be a *referential connection* or referential adjunction between the sentence (language) and what it refers to (reality). This is how the problem of meaning can be solved with regard to the referential theory of meaning. If we carefully go through the sophisticated version of the referential theory, it seems to me that the referential connection plays an all-important role to ensure the relationship between language and reality.

It should further be kept in mind that referential theory is a general perception of semantic school. However, various linguistic philosophers under the same school have developed various theories on their own the foundation of which is somehow or other linked with or directly associated with referential theory as stated above. The referential connection, of course, is the hallmark of semantics. There is no question of doubt. It has been reflected in Mill, Russell, early Wittgenstein, Saul Kripke, and many others. While distinguishing between the logically proper name and ordinary proper name, Russell goes on to say that logical proper names are the real proper names based on which genuine language under the womb of semantics can be constructed. A logical proper name, according to Russell, is known by acquaintance where there is no scope for description[10]. We think that Russell's theory of acquaintance is reflected in the naïve

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[10] Russell, Bertrand, *The Problems of Philosophy*, Henry Holt and Company: New York, 1912.

version of referential theory where the emphasis has been laid on *referential connection*. Acquaintance is a sort of fulfilment of referential connection. In modern terms, it is known as denotation or de re. It is said that every proper name has two different types of referential contents, such as denotation (*de re*) and connotation (*de dicto*). Keeping this background in mind, Frege perhaps distinguishes between object and concept. This perception actually influences other semanticists as well. Mill in his book, *A System of Logic[11]* also mentioned the denotational as well as the connotational aspects of proper names. Wittgenstein in his celebrated book *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* developed his picture-theory of meaning with regard to propositions whose constituents are nothing but names. Even though Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* did not mention specifically the distinction between the ordinary proper name and logically proper name but his understanding of name in his *Tractatus,* I do reckon, actually goes in favor of logically proper name. While defining the concept of the name Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus* says, 'A name denotes an object'[12]. The meaning of the name is the meaning of the object. This wave continues further in the philosophical writings of Saul Kripke who developed the concept of a name as a rigid designator. The designator (reference) of a name is rigid according to Kripke in the sense that it (name) designates the same object in every possible world[13]. Thus, it seems to me that reference is an important force of semantics.

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[11] Mill, John Stuart, *A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive*, Cambridge University Press, 1843.
[12] Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, tr. by D. F. Pears and B. McGuinness, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961.
[13] Kripke, Saul, *Naming and Necessity*, Routledge, 1980.

But when we come to Frege, we have a slightly different innovative interpretation in Fregean semantics. This actually makes Frege a great contributor to the modern interpretation of semantics. Frege, like other semanticists, does not rule out the referential aspect of language. But what Frege does, unlike others, is that he gives more importance to the sense of the proper name. He understands sense with regard to the mode of presentation. According to Frege, any linguistic term, such as phrase, clause, or singular name would be treated as a name having sense. A name having sense generally has reference. However, Frege ensures sense rather than ensures reference *in the brute sense of the term*. Frege identifies various degrees of reference, such as direct reference, indirect reference, etc. Thus, Frege's theory is distinctly known as the sense theory of reference where the sense of proper name has been ensured without exception. Contrary to the sense theory of reference, there develops a *no-sense* theory of reference. It states that reference is the hallmark of meaning. Proper names have only references but they do not have sense. The debate between sense theory of reference and no-sense theory of reference is philosophically fascinating as it not only appears as two different paradigms of semantics, but rather it equally dissected all semanticists into two different distinct wings.

Thus, Frege's problem of meaning is deeply associated with the sense of proper names or the mode of presentation of proper names. To solve the problem of meaning after Frege we have to concentrate more on the sense of a proper name, rather than on the reference of a proper name. Frege elsewhere hinted that the mode of presentation of a proper name generally ensures the reference of that proper name. In this sense, I can presume that for Frege sense is primary and reference is secondary. Even though the

problem of meaning cannot be solved after Frege just by forfeiting the concept of reference, Frege puts more emphasis to ensure the sense of a proper name and then try to ensure the reference of a proper name.

The sense of a proper name is nothing but the meaning of a proper name. The sense or the meaning of a sentence cannot be grasped fully without the concept of thought. According to Frege, thought is independent of language and also independent of humans. However, we cannot grasp the meaning of the sentence (sense) under consideration without thought. Thus, in a sense, the complete sense of a sentence actually hinges on thought. Therefore in the **Third Chapter** of my thesis, I propose to analyse and examine the philosophical implication of the concept of thought after Frege and it would be entitled: **Frege's Concept of Thought and its Philosophical Implication.**

Even though Fregean semantics in general and his problem of meaning, in particular, is primarily concerned with his celebrated concept sense and reference (*Sinn* and *Bedeutung*) actually hinges on the very concept of thought. Thus the philosophical implication of Fregean thought plays an important role in solving the *problem of meaning*. However, it would be really challenging how Frege justifies the relevance of thought to solve the problem of meaning. Many would say that thought is nothing but a replica of the traditional concept of Ideas developed by empiricists – Locke, Berkeley, and Hume during the 18th century. The concept of idea has been popularised in philosophy in various ways. Frege gives a lot of emphasis on thoughts. The problematic area is that is thought differs from ideas? I do think *thoughts in general* are not different from ideas. If it would be the case then it would be a herculean task to justify the

relevance of thought towards determining the problem of meaning, because in such a case thought would contain psychological matters as well. We know that Fregean semantics is anti-psychological in nature. Thus when we talk of the relevance of thought in Fregean semantics, we have to set aside the relevance or the content of psychology from the very concept of thought. Thus my understanding of Fregean thought is somehow or other detached from psychology. If his thought is detached from psychology then he has to understand thought in a stipulated manner which eventually detaches thought from ideas when dealing with the problem of meaning within the sphere of Fregean semantics.

Frege actually does it. In this regard, Frege classifies thoughts into various levels. He distinguishes thought into three different levels, such as apprehension, judgment, and the level of assertion. If our understanding of thought incorporates all these levels just cited then certainly thought is not related to ideas. However, when Frege brings the concept of thought towards developing his problem of meaning under the sphere of semantics, he certainly takes care of the level of thought and keeps himself aloof from the concept of ideas as developed by empiricists. For Frege, the thought process begins with apprehension, then moves to the judgemental level, and finally moves to the assertion level. Besides, he also distinguishes presupposition and assertion as the two important concepts of his referential semantics. For Frege, the presupposition is required for asserting the referential content of indirect reference, and the assertion is required for ensuring the referential content of the direct reference. Thus he uses the presupposition and assertion level of thought in his semantics and sets himself aloof from the apprehension level of thought – a level of thought which would represent the

content of psychology. This clearly suggests the importance of thought in Fregean semantics.

The very objective of Fregean semantics is to solve the problem of meaning. The problem of meaning is deeply associated with the semantic concept of truth. Accordingly, he has to maintain and ensure the semantic concept of truth within his semantics. The novelty of Frege is that, unlike the radical semanticists, Frege widens the language of semantics. The language of semantics is, of course, proper names. But Frege incorporates phrases, clauses, and incomplete parts of sentences as proper names having *sense* (*Sinn*). Thus, the language of Fregean semantics is comparatively larger and diversified in comparison to the language of other semanticists. For example, Bertrand Russell thought only logical proper names as the vocabulary of the semantic language and in this regard, he favoured the logical form of the sentence instead of the grammatical form of the sentence. Wittgenstein while developing his *Tractatarian* form of language gives importance to names where each name denotes an object without exception. If we compare Frege with these aforesaid semanticists, we can say that the language of Fregean semantics is comparatively liberal and wider than the others.

This is indeed a challenge to Frege to retain the sanctity of the very concept of truth as the mark of solving the problem of meaning. However, Frege successively retain the concept of truth and thereby enabled to solve the problem of meaning within his *liberal* semantic paradigm. Not only that Fregean semantics *is remembered as remarkable* within the school of semanticists because, unlike many other rigorous semanticists, Frege in fact, brings the concept of *context-principle* and the concept of the *principle of compositionality* in his semantics. It will be seen that Frege brings these concepts to

detach himself from the concept of Ideas. He successfully retained the concept of truth to solve the problem of meaning even by bringing contextual principles as well as the principle of compositionality. Not only that the philosophical influence of context principle and the principle of compositionality is prolific in the later developments of linguistic philosophy or philosophy of language. Thus we can say that, unlike other semanticists, Fregean semantics appears as a new paradigm of semantics based on which subsequent developments of semantics are built. Thus, in the **Fourth Chapter** of my thesis, I propose to analyse and examine the implications of Fregean semantics to contemporary philosophy of language and it would be entitled: **Contemporary Debate regarding Frege's Theory: A Response.**

After developing the aforesaid task of the problem of meaning after Frege, it is my general obligation and responsibility to understand Frege from my own rationale. Frege's theory of semantics associated with sense and reference is common and popular and every philosophical student is aware of it. But when a thesis is proposed on the same issue, then generally the question arises of what something is newly added for which the readers would be interested. Therefore, it is the task of the researcher to explore some insights of the literature available which may be claimed as something new not only to the researcher but also to the readers as well. With this promise, I will end the thesis with **Concluding Remarks** and which would appear in **Chapter Five** of the thesis.

The thesis is finally ended with **Selected Bibliography** which is far more technical and methodological rather than creative.

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Chapter One

Nature of Proper Names: A Comparison among Frege, Mill and Russell

There is no question of doubt that the concept of a proper name is the hallmark of semantics. Linguistic semanticists distrust the grammatical structure of language for its dubious and un-perspicuous nature. Ordinary or natural language by its very nature is ambiguous. Naturally, ordinary language, even though useful in informal or conventional communication, may not be regarded as a sharp tool to tackle formal disciplines. Thus instead of ordinary language semanticists, in general, have pleaded for constructed language to develop linguistic realism as the mark of showing the relationship between language and reality. This is where the relevance of *linguistic revisionism* actually hinges. Thus the whole host of semanticists in some sense or other took initiative in formalizing or constructing a sort of an artificial language or scientific language by collecting legitimate vocabularies from the womb of ordinary language.

Does ideal language differ from ordinary language? Some would say yes and some others would say no. In my sense, even though the nature and function of ordinary language are somehow different from ideal language but ideal language is not completely different from the ordinary language in the sense that the vocabularies of ideal language have been taken from ordinary language. The difference between ordinary and ideal language is not an issue here. Rather our prime concern at this point in time is to illuminate the concept of a proper name after Frege.

Frege introduces the descriptive theory of proper names. His descriptive theory of proper name differs from the *causal theory* or the *chain theory* of proper name as developed by Kripke, Marcus, Putnam, and others. Frege's descriptive theory of the proper name is also known as the sense theory of proper name which may be contrasted with the no-sense theory of proper name as developed by Mill, Russell, and early Wittgenstein.

What then is a proper name according to Frege? Frege says, "A proper name (word, sign, sign combination, expression) expresses its sense, means or designates its meaning. By employing a sign we express its sense and designates its meaning"[14]. Thus Frege pointed out that proper names may apply to imaginary and inexistent entities *without becoming meaningless*. He further showed that sometimes more than one proper name may identify the same entity without having the same sense. That is why, while justifying the relevance of a proper name, Frege brings the distinction between sense and reference. For example, the phrase 'Homer believed the morning star was the evening star' would be meaningful and tautological in spite of the fact that the morning star and the evening star identify the same referent. This example became known as *Frege's puzzle* and is a central issue in the theory of proper names.

Thus it seems to us that Frege's understanding of proper names is far more liberal and comprehensive, unlike other semanticists. According to Frege, the meaning of a proper name is the object itself which we designate by using it. The idea that we have in that case is wholly subjective. Frege's descriptive theory of the proper name is primarily

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[14] Frege, Gottlob, "On Sense and Meaning" in *Translations from the Philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege*, ed. by Peter Geach and Max Black, Blackwell: Oxford, 1952, p. 61.

concerned with the sense of the proper name and he is non-committal about the existence of the proper name. The reference of a proper name may be an existential entity; may not be an existential entity; may be a real entity or may be a fictitious entity. Whatever it may be the dispositional power of reference arising out of sense must be there. Thus words, phrases, clauses, and parts of sentences having sense or mode of presentation should be treated as proper names according to Frege.

Following Michael Dummett, we can say that a proper name in Frege's sense is a *singular term*[15]. But we do not know what constitutes a proper name very similar to we do not know precisely what constitutes in any of the various categories of incomplete expressions appearing as proper names after Frege. However, Dummett thinks that Frege has never troubled to give any precise characterization of the category of proper names. According to Frege, an expression constituting a *substantival phrase* in the singular, governed by the definite article would be treated as a proper name. While illuminating the nature of proper names Frege, unlike other semanticists, remained indifferent to the distinction between singular and plural proper names. He was equally indifferent about other than intuitive recognition of the concept of a proper name.

We think that an expression of the category of a proper name is an inherent feature of its sense. We ought to be able to say with what aspects of its sense this feature is connected. According to Dummett, Frege's use of the expression 'proper name' for all singular terms, including highly complex ones reflect his conviction that the primary use of such terms within a sentence is "to pick out determinate objects for which the

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[15] Dummett, Michael, *Frege: Philosophy of language*, Duckworth (second edition), 1973, p. 57.

term stands in the same way a proper name, in the strict sense of 'proper name', stands for its bearer"[16].

1.1: The Theory of Meaning Concerning Proper Names:

There is no question of doubt that Frege has been regarded as the first 'intellectual giant'[17]. While determining the nature of a proper name, Frege raised the issue of meaning for a part of the language. In this regard, he emphasizes that the meaning of a sentence directly depends on the meaning of its constituent parts. In this regard, he has dissected the internal structure of a sentence provided by *logical syntax* where the *truth-value* of such sentences may be revealed by logical semantics. Thus in a sense, Frege's theory of meaning is deeply associated with the treatment of sentences having both semantically and syntactically relevance. It is primarily concerned with determining the truth values of sentences as an inherent program of semantics. While outlining the primary purpose of semantics in this context, Jeffrey C. King and UC Davis remarked, "A primary purpose of semantics for a natural language is to compositionally assign to sentences semantic values that determine whether the sentences are true or false. Since natural language contains contextually sensitive expressions, semantic values must be assigned to sentences relative to context. *These semantic values are propositions*…. Propositions are the primary bearer of truth and falsity"[18].

The ingenuity of Frege's theory of meaning is that it is *organized*. It is organized in the sense that it has been systematized with regard to context sensitivity. In this regard, we

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[16] Ibid, p. 55.
[17] Jamil, Sikander, "Frege: The Theory of Meaning Concerning Proper Names", *Kritike*, Vol. 4, N. 1 (June 2010), p. 150.
[18] Hawthorne, John & Dean Zimmerman (ed.), *Language and Philosophical Linguistics*, 2003, p. 54.

can say that Frege's theory of meaning is context-sensitive. Frege perhaps is the first philosopher who developed the view that *a considerable part of language* may be treated as true or false and in this regard, he depends on logic. For Frege, logic not only provides the rule of inference, it equally attempts to validate by deriving a true conclusion from true premises. Frege's theory of meaning associated with proper names fundamentally contains two basic ingredients, namely, the *theory of sense and reference* and the *theory of force*. We know about the theory of sense and reference and we will come to discuss sense and reference in detail later on. But what is a theory of force?

While illuminating the theory of force Michael Dummett says, "…to the sense of a sentence belongs only that which is relevant to determining its truth and falsity; any feature of meaning which cannot affect its truth and falsity belongs to its tone. Likewise, to the sense of an expression belongs only that which may be relevant to the truth or falsity of a sentence in which it might occur; any element of its meaning not so relevant is part of its tone"[19]. Following Dummett, we can say that the theory of force differs from the theory of tone or alternatively known as, the theory of coloring. It is a common perception that language has dispositional power that may be classified into the theory of force as well as the theory of color (tone). In the present context here we are primarily concerned with the theory of force which is deeply associated with the mode of presentation or the sense (*Sinn*) of the sentence under consideration and in turn, such kind of force helps us to link the mode of presentation with the reference and eventually enabling us to determine the truth and falsity of the sentence. In this way, it helps us to solve the problem of meaning. Therefore following Dummett, we can say that the

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[19] Dummett, Michael, 1973, op. cit., p. 57.

feature of meaning that we discuss after Frege does not affect the semantic value of a sentence. If two sentences are semantically true and the conjunction or the disjunction of these two sentences would remain semantically true even though the meaning may be distorted in some sense or other. Here Dummett's position, we think is deeply rooted in the reflection of Frege's philosophy of language. A modern commentator, namely, Wang Lu, in this regard inclines to say that Dummett actually took the theory of reference and sense as the principle of the theory of meaning along with the line of Frege's philosophy of language. In fact, Dummett takes Frege's entire formulation of reference to constitute the core of the theory of meaning. Accordingly, we can say that the theory of meaning should inherit Frege's results of reference. The central core of the theory of meaning clearly correlates with reality and truth simply because of Frege's theory of meaning[20]. Our understanding is that Frege's theory of meaning is the notion of truth.

It seems to me that Frege's theory of meaning is fundamentally related to his theory of reference based on proper names. It is conceptually directed towards the concept of truth. Thus to me, Frege's proper name is one of the most striking features of the theory of meaning roughly based on the theory of reference. Thus in a sense, to me, reference is nothing but the meaning of the proper name. According to Mark Platts, a contemporary thinker, "The meaning of a proper name is its bearer"[21]. In Mark's term, the 'bearer' actually means the reference. Frege's theory of meaning actually stands for particular atomic sentences, such as, 'Peter is wise'. The truth value of such an atomic

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[20] See Lu, Wang, "Theories of Meaning" in *Frontiers of Philosophy in China*, 3:1, 2008.
[21] Platts, Mark, *Ways of Meaning: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Language*, Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1979, p. 134.

sentence may be determined with regard to sense and reference and it is the ultimate objective of the theory of meaning suggested by Frege. Here the singular expression 'Peter' used in the sentence 'Peter is wise' actually serves the function of introducing an object. The function to be augmented here is in turn introduced by the "concept expression". Here the "concept expression" will yield an atomic sentence, which is determined by the position of the truth value.

Interestingly, Frege, Dummett claims, admitted a member of the undesignated value class. Frege anticipates that a proper name may fail to correspond to an object and hence be *devoid of meaning* and also fails to present an atomic sentence in which it lies with an argument to the function stipulated with concept-expression. Accordingly, it may be claimed after Frege that any such atomic sentence will be devoid of any truth value. Frege recognizes that such a sentence is neither true nor false. It simply shows that such a sentence falls short of having any truth value at all. Thus, Dummett assumes that Frege perhaps would anticipate the *third value* to accommodate the undesignated objects. What then would be the ontological status of the third value? If Frege would have recognized such a third value, as Dummett anticipates, then we think that his concept would have treated objects as per broader categories of entities. In this sense, again the sentence would have been devoid of any truth value. Moreover, a "concept- expression" may fall short of introducing a function that makes objects truth-value because such expressions cannot be used in general language to make some significant assertions regarding the facts. Naturally, it may be claimed that if such assertions are allowed then some atomic sentences would display the absence of truth-value. Universally quantified sentences are of this kind. While talking about empty singular terms and their meaning,

Frege in his unpublished work 'Seventeen Key Sentences on Logic' says, "A sentence can be true or untrue only if it is an expression for a thought. The sentence 'Leo Sachse is a man' is the expression of thought only if 'Leo Sachse' designates something. And so to the sentence 'this table is round' is the expression of thought only if the words 'this table' are not empty sounds but designate something specific for me"[22].

Even though Frege's sense and reference have been developed with regard to his understanding of proper names in general, in this sequel, we are primarily concerned with his understanding of proper names in particular. We have already outlined that like many other semanticists, Frege developed his own semantic approach with a background in elementary logic and mathematics. In this regard, he started with the number theory of mathematics and predicates, individual variables, and constants from elementary logic as the legitimate vocabulary of his semantic language. However, he subsequently enlarged his theory of semantics by incorporating other linguistic items as the mark of a proper name. In his *Grundlagen,* Frege expresses a point of *singular terms* (proper names) which seems to be closer to his conception of Russell. Here Frege intends to say that the significance of singular terms actually hinges on their possessing a referent. It should be kept in mind that proper names as singular terms would be an uncontroversial vocabulary of a formalized language and nobody within the semantic schools has raised any question regarding singular terms as proper names. It should be kept in mind that Bertrand Russell actually offers us a rigorous interpretation of the proper name by introducing the theory of *knowledge by acquaintance*. Russell sticks to this theory as the legitimate theory of proper name. If we come to Frege, we find that

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[22] Frege, Gottlob, *Posthumous Writings*, tr. by P. Long, R. White and R. Hargraves, Oxford, 1979, p. 174.

Frege does not find any problem incorporating Russell's theory of proper names as singular terms within his (Frege) interpretation of the proper name. But the important point is that Frege goes beyond Russell by incorporating Russell's disguised description as proper names. Here lies the distinction between Russell and Frege as far as their understanding of proper names is concerned. However, considering the direction of this sequel, we cannot enter into the debate between Frege and Russell, rather our main contention first is to explain and examine the concept of a proper name after Frege.

We think that Frege's concept of proper name bears important philosophical significance simply because it is not associated with just a mere identification of reference as singular terms do, but it goes beyond that to identify the referential entities. We will see later on that Frege's interpretation of reference is wide enough in comparison to other semantics and his understanding of reference with regard to a proper name goes beyond the proposal of *direct reference* or de-dicto reference. Many semanticists understand reference with regard to direct reference or de dicto reference or reference based on extensionality, but Frege along with these sorts of reference incorporates the possibility of indirect reference, *de re* reference, or the reference of extensionality. Thus we can say, after Frege, that his understanding of proper names has a great philosophical significance and implication in comparison to other semanticists.

Frege's concept of a proper name is not only associated with his celebrated concept of sense (mode of presentation/meaning), reference, but it is deeply linked with the concept of *thought*. In this sense, Frege's understanding of a name is not a mere name or senseless name which is barrenly and brutally associated with an object. According to Frege, any proper name like 'Leo Sachse' has got significance in any sentence of

thought expression *if and only if* it designates something as a concrete object. Interestingly, there is no guarantee that the concrete object as referred to by the name 'Leo Sachse' would be an existential object or a real object. Even it may perhaps be the case that the object as referred to by the name 'Leo Sachse' and expressed in the sentence 'Leo Sachse is a man' would fail to express a thought. In this regard, Frege inclines to say that the sentence 'Leo Sachse is a man' would be the expression of thought if the name 'Leo Sachse' *designates something[23]*.

It thus reflects that any proper name like 'Leo Sachse' has got significance in any sentence of thought expression, according to Frege, if it designates something as a concrete object. If it fails to designate a concrete object, then it would be treated as an empty proper name. According to Frege, an empty proper name is a proper name *that would fail to express thought*. As he solves the problem of meaning with regard to truth-value he thereby claims that a sentence containing an empty proper name would not express any truth value. In this regard, Frege differs from Michael Dummett and other logical positivists. Frege says that his understanding of the truth-value of a sentence would simply be *beyond the truth*. It would be neither true nor false and it would be simply meaningless in the sense that it is not associated or linked with thought. Dummett differs from Frege because, unlike Frege, Dummett anticipates the third value of the sentence besides the bivalence truth values.

What we reveal from the above is that Frege is very much conscious of the existence and non-existence of proper names. He knows very well the philosophical and semantic

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[23] Ibid, p. 175.

implications of the existence and non-existence of a proper name. We think that Frege does not have any problem incorporating Russellian and Wittgensteinian concepts of proper names. But Frege takes a different interpretation of the proper name. Russell's understanding of proper names is rigorous and in this regard, he was primarily concerned with singular terms. Like Russell, Frege would say that a proper name having sense denotes an object. Russell talks in favor of direct reference of proper name and rules out any other possibility of reference of a proper name. Frege equally asserts that a proper name refers to a concrete object and may not refer to a concrete object. If a proper name refers to a concrete object, it would be a non-empty proper name. On the contrary, if a proper name fails to refer to a concrete object, it would be an empty proper name. However, the beauty of Fregean semantics is that he tries to understand proper names not in terms of denotation, but in terms of connotation even though he does not deny the relevance of denotation. Now for Frege, if a non-empty name is used in a sentence and refers to an object, then it would be identifiable with regard to the concept of truth and falsity. To identify the reference of a sentence and comprehend it with regard to truth and falsity ensures the underlying association of thought. More simplistically, it can be said that thought is the *meaning or sense of the sentence* and the question of thought simply does not arise in the case of an *empty proper name used in the sentence*. This does not however make us say that the sentence, in turn, is disconnected from thought. Only the name which fails to refer to an object but is used in a descriptive sentence is in no way linked with thought. Frege (1892b) acknowledged that a proper name might have a sense and no reference. 'Odysseus', for example, when used in a declarative sentence, such as, 'Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound

asleep' would express thought but lack a truth-value. The truth value of the sentence depends on *the referent of the sentence*. That means if an empty proper name is used in a sentence has a sense but fails to refer to an object, then in such a case the truth-value of the sentence cannot be known; the reference of the sentence *in proper* can be undetected. In such a case, Frege would say that the problem of the meaning of language can be adequately and satisfactorily solved if the language used by means of a sentence associated with a proper name has a truth value. The truth-value of a sentence has played a vital role to solve the problem of meaning and in such a case the proper name as used in the sentence should generally be a non-empty proper name.

The question then immediately arises: Why does Frege admit an empty proper name? In this regard, we can say that to Frege sense is primary and reference is secondary. Normally and in most general cases, a proper name (non-empty) having sense does have a concrete reference. As Frege gives importance to sense more than reference, he incorporates empty proper names within his realm of semantics on the basis that all non-empty proper names do have sense. This is the main reason for admitting empty proper names within the sphere of his semantics.

What Frege insists here is that empty proper names do have sense but may not refer to a concrete object. Many would say that proper names do not have a sense if they fail to refer to concrete objects. For them, the sense of a proper name is determined on the basis of fixed reference. Even P. F. Strawson has claimed that the sense of a proper name does not arise if the proper name under consideration is empty. However, Frege offers us an altogether different interpretation of proper names. According to Frege, an expression belonging to the category of proper names is a feature of its sense. We ought

to be able to say with what aspects of its sense this feature is connected. Frege's use of the expression 'proper name' for all singular terms, Dummett opines, including highly complex ones actually reflects a conviction that the primary use of such terms within a sentence is to pick out the determinate object for which the term stands in the same way as a proper name. Dummett claims that in the strict sense a proper name stands for its bearer. Frege asserts that a proper name stands for an object. By the term object, Frege perhaps does not mean bare objects or brute objects like many other semanticists including Russell and Strawson. Frege's understanding of objects has *ontological* relevance. Dummett claims that "Frege's use of the ontological term 'object' is strictly co-relative to his use of the linguistic term proper name". A proper name stands for an object. Accordingly, to speak of something as an object is to say that there is a proper name that stands for it. Thus for Dummett, Frege actually applies the term 'proper name' to some expressions about which we might feel dubious concerning the correctness of its application.

While illuminating the nature of the proper name of Frege, Peter Geach observes that Frege's use of a proper name is completely straightforward and unproblematic. According to Geach, Frege's interpretation of proper names contains both complexes as well as logically simple ones. Frege begins with numbers as the nominees of a proper name. For Frege, numbers are objects. He classified numerical terms like proper names with the philosophical perception that whatever stands for an object is a proper name. As he defends in favor of objects of ontological nature, his understanding of objects may or may not be a real object with which we are directly acquainted. If an object is strictly understood in terms of a concrete object or real object and on the basis of that a

proper name is recognized then Frege, of course, admits empty proper names. According to Geach, Frege incorporates empty proper names simply because his accounts of the proper name are based on the relation between *linguistic and ontological categories*.

1.2: Empty Proper Name:

We have already stated that there are two important issues related to Fregean semantics, namely, solving the problem of identity and solving the problem of empty proper names. Let us explain in detail what is the nature of empty proper names? Why does Frege incorporate empty proper names in his semantics? We have already mentioned after Frege that empty proper names do have sense and secondly and more importantly, empty proper names like other non-empty proper names stand for an object. Of course, his understanding of an object is ontological in nature. Gareth Evans in his book *The Varieties of Reference* finds some loopholes in Fregean understanding of empty proper names. It is said in the first place that a proper name may fail to have an object as its meaning and also fail to provide any singular sentence in which it occurs with an argument to the function associated with the concept-expression. As a result of that, the sentence in which the proper name is used lacks truth value. In such a case, Frege is saying that the sentence is neither true nor false because the sentence actually fails to have any truth value at all. Interestingly, Evans observes that Frege here anticipates a *third truth value* that is particularly relevant to a member of the class of *undesignated values*. Evans has taken the clue from Dummett. As Frege has recognized a third value as an undesignated value, his concept would have mapped objects onto a larger category of entities. But Evans feels that Frege still would have left the possibility that a sentence

may have no truth value in the appropriate sense. This clearly suggests that Frege goes beyond the appropriate reference of the proper name. The appropriate reference of the proper name ensures that the proper name under consideration must be non-empty and singular and the sentence it contains must be designated as a purely singular sentence that stands for a concrete object as its reference on the basis of which the truth-value of the sentence would be determined and the problem of the meaning of semantics would be solved. But Frege goes beyond that. This is what we think is the philosophical ingenuity of Frege and for which he has to pay response to criticism arising out of his extended and uncharacteristic referential duplicity.

In the second place, a "concept expression" may fail to introduce a function that eventually gives rise to a truth value for each object of the domain. According to Evans, the function of concept-expressions are partial. It is partial in the sense that it is not adequately defined. As a result of that, it does not have meaning that fits them to serve generally in a language used for making serious assertions about the world. According to Evans, if such "concept-expressions" are allowed then some singular sentences will fail to have a truth value very similar to *universally quantified sentences*. It is not at all necessary that the individual words should have a sense and meaning of their own, provided only that the whole proposition has a sense. Frege was conscious about it. In this regard, Frege remarks: "A sentence can be true or untrue only if it is an expression for a thought. The sentence 'Leo Sachse is a man' is the expression of thought only if 'Leo Sachse' designates something. And so to the sentence 'this table is round' is the expression of thought only if the words 'this table' are not empty sounds but designate something specifically for me". These remarks clearly suggest that thought is an integral

part of the sense of the sentence. Frege elsewhere claims that the sense of a sentence is a thought. A sentence containing a proper name has a sense and must designate or refers to something. The reference of the sentence may have a designated value (true and false) as well as a designated value (i.e., the third value; neither true nor false). When the proper name 'Leo Sachse' is expressed in the sentence 'Leo Sachse is a man', it actually designates something very similar to the sentence 'The table is round' is the expression of thought only if the words 'this table' are not empty sounds. Frege continues this position even in his writing and appears in the dialogue with Pünjer on existence. Here Frege wrote: "The rules of logic always presuppose that the words we use are not empty, that our sentences express judgments, that one is not playing a mere game with words. Once 'Sachse is a man' expresses an actual judgment, the word 'Sachse' must designate something, and in that case, I do not need a further premise in order to infer 'there are men' from it".

As a firm believer in elementary logic and mathematics, Frege inclines to say that the rules of logic always ensure that the words we use as proper names are not empty. Otherwise, the sentences in which such proper names are used cannot express judgments. Accordingly, it is our logical presupposition that the words 'Sachse is a man' must designate something and there is no need for assuming that 'there are men' to infer beforehand to utter the words 'Sachse is a man'. This position of Frege certainly reminds us of Russell. Evans notes that here Frege is perfectly clear about singular terms which is commonly regarded as much more Russellian than Fregean, namely, the view that someone who utters a sentence containing an empty singular term would fail to say anything or would fail to express a thought. We think Evans is partially right but he

should not forget that Frege incorporates something beyond Russell as far as their understanding of proper names is concerned. Of course, it is true to say that Frege maintains strictly that to utter a sentence containing a name is not lacking a bearer. For Frege, a name lacking a bearer is to fail even to express a thought. This position of Frege is particularly true only for genuine singular terms. Frege felt able to say much more than it because Frege admits empty names and sentences containing them as well.

Frege's notion of an empty proper name thus reveals that the proper names without any semantic value may still have a sense. Many would contend that this point has got an extremely weak foundation. It would lead us to confusion in understanding both the sense and semantics of proper names. Many would say that empty proper names are nothing but 'mock proper names'. In this regard, Evans asserts that a proper name that fails to fulfill its usual role of it may be called a *mock proper name*, a fictitious name. Evans says, "Names that fail to fulfill the usual role of a proper name, which is to name something, may be called mock proper names. Although the tale of William Tell is a legend and not history, and the name 'William Tell' is a mock proper name we cannot deny it a sense. But the sense of the sentence 'William Tell shot an apple off his son's head'. I do not say that this sense is false either, but I characterize it as fictitious…. Instead of speaking about the fiction, we could speak of 'mock thoughts…' ".

Thus by incorporating the possibility of empty proper names, Frege in fact brings *mock proper names* along with *mock thoughts*. Thus, there are two parallel types of proper names, such as mock proper names and non-mock proper names. Likewise, there are two parallel types of thought, such as mock thoughts and other than mock thoughts. What is other than mock names and other than mock thoughts is acceptable to other

semanticists and in this regard, there is nothing new in Fregean semantics. But what is extremely new to Fregean semantics is its admission of mock proper names and mock thoughts. What are the relevance and philosophical compulsion of Frege to admit mock proper names and mock thoughts is a serious philosophical examination and philosophers over the years have encountered Frege's position about mock proper names and mock thoughts. We think this position of Frege is extremely challenging and a proper and deep philosophical scrutiny is a pre-requisite in this regard.

1.3: Do Proper Names Really Have Sense?

We have seen, after Frege, those proper names have sense. Frege argues that if proper names do not have sense then identity statements would be trivially analytic. We have already stated that Frege's theory of sense and reference may be accounted to solve the problem of identity as well as to solve the problem of empty proper names. Here, Frege claims that to solve the problem of identity, we have to admit beforehand that proper names must have sense. How can a statement of the form a=b differ in cognitive value from the statement a=a? The statement of the form 'a=b' is informative whereas 'a=a' is obvious. Thus the cognitive value of 'a=b' differs from the cognitive value of 'a=a'. In this regard, Frege asserts that in the case of 'a=b', though 'a' and 'b' have different senses, they refer to the same thing. The morning star *is* the evening star; i.e., the morning star=the evening star is very similar to a=b. The sense of the morning star is different from the sense of the evening star but still, they are identical simply for the fact that they refer to the same object, i.e., Venus. Thus, for Frege, to explore the information that the morning star is the evening star (i.e., a=b), we have to know the sense of the proper name a and b and also to know their reference. That means, without

the sense of the proper name we cannot know that identity statements are trivially analytic.

Let us consider the following two sentences:

(a) 'Tully = Tully' is analytic

But

(b) 'Tully = Cicero' is synthetic

According to Searle, if the above statements are taken into account then each name must have a different sense which at first appears implausible. Normally, it has been claimed that proper names in the real sense of the term do not have sense, and based on that, there develops a no-*sense theory of proper names*. Those who advocate this view would like to say that a proper name only denotes an object. Therefore, a proper name is deeply involved in its referent alone. The question of its sense simply does not arise. Russell's theory of the logical proper name is a case in point. According to Russell, logical proper names do not have sense. For Searle, in the normal case, the proper name placed in the subject position of a subject-predicate proposition does not have sense. But only a predicate has sense. Frege, of course, asserts that a proper name can be placed both in the subject as well as in the predicate position of a subject-predicate proposition. According to Searle, unlike (a), here (b) gives us information. The point of contention here is whether (b) is like (a), analytic. "A statement is called analytic if and only if it is true in virtue of linguistic rules alone", Searle remarks.[24] In the case of an analytic

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[24] Searle, John R., "Proper Names" in *The Philosophy of Language*, ed. by A. P. Martinich, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1985, p. 270.

statement, there is scope for empirical investigation. Here the linguistic rules for using the name 'Cicero' and the linguistic rules for using the name 'Tully' are such that both *refer to* the same identical object. This clearly suggests that in this case, *linguistic rules* play an all-important role to identify references. In support of Frege, we do claim that linguistic rules are nothing but to determine the sense of the proper name. Some philosophers may claim that (a) is fundamentally different from (b) because the statement used in the form of (a) will be true for any arbitrary substitution of symbols. Thus, (a) is obvious unlike (b). But in linguistic philosophy, we find different interpretations as well. Many linguistic philosophers including W. V. Quine would consider it a dogma, an unfounded dogma that fails to retain its sanctity within linguistic rules. Even it would be the case that at time X=Y would be trivially analytic and X=X would be senseless. Even Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* finds logical and identity statements senseless and transcendental. For Wittgenstein, propositions of logic are transcendental.

Our inquiry is, of course, not to exemplify the very nature of an identity statement, but to know whether the proper name contained in an identity statement does have sense. We have already pointed out that we have a philosophically available divergence of opinions regarding the same. It has already been stated by citing the name of philosophers that proper names do not have sense, but only have a reference. Frege, however, does not belong to this camp. For Frege, proper names without exception, do have sense. If proper names do not have sense or mode of the presentation then the whole program of Fregean semantics represented through his celebrated article 'On Sense and Reference' (*Über Sinn und Bedeutung*) cannot be substantiated. Frege

affirms that two proper names having different senses may at times refer to the same object. Based on this philosophical background and philosophical perception, Frege introduces informative identity in terms of 'a=b'. We think 'a=b' cannot be substantiated without preconceiving the sense of the proper name 'a' and 'b' used in the identity statement 'a=b'. How do we come to know 'a=b' if we do not know anything about 'a' and 'b'? If we think that proper names do not have sense, but only reference then we are no longer in a position to identify that a=b. Fregean informative sense of identity as used in the form of a=b is made possible with the presupposition proper names do not have senses. Thus we think that Fregean semantics appears to give a way out from the problem of identity he faced while determining the various meaning of different proper names having the same reference. Frege asserts that the identity statement, namely, a=b is synthetic. We think that this statement is synthetic simply for the fact that "proper names do have senses". Here the sense of the proper names, such as, 'a' and 'b' make this statement synthetic. According to Frege, a proper name could not have a reference unless it has a sense. The reference of a proper name is determined based on the sense of the proper name. Thus for Frege, the sense is primary and the reference is secondary for understanding a proper name. One can understand an object as referred to by a proper name just by way of understanding the "general convention governing proper names, we explain that this word is the name of that object".[25] According to Searle, if we do not have the sense of the proper name, i.e., mode of presentation in Fregean sense, beforehand, we are no longer in a position to identify its referent. We think that the no-sense theory of the proper name is not tenable because it

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[25] Ibid, p. 270.

fails to acquaint with an object all without exception even if the object relevant to the context would be a real object. In this sense, we think the Fregean sense theory of the proper name is more acceptable and cogent. The rule of language that we are talking about in the case of analytic and identity statements as cited in (a) and (b) above does not fulfill the requirement of Fregean semantics. Suppose, for example, that we teach the name 'Aristotle' by explaining that it refers to a Greek philosopher born in Stagira and further suppose that our student continues to use the name correctly, that he gathers more information about Aristotle, and so on. Let us further suppose that it is discovered later on that Aristotle was not born in Stagira but in Thebes. We will not now say that the meaning of the name has changed, or that Aristotle did not really exist at all. Searle remarks that explaining the use of a name by citing characteristics of the object is not giving the rules for the name, for the *rules contain no descriptive contents at all.* They simply co-relate the name to the object independently of any description of it.

Having said that, Searle finds some problems with Frege's assertion that proper names do have sense.[26] Searle reveals two conflicting views associated with the question: Do proper names have sense? The first asserts that proper names have essentially a reference but not a sense. On this basis there develops a no-sense theory of proper name. The second asserts proper names have *essentially a sense but only contingently a reference*. Here proper names refer only to the condition that one and only one object satisfies their sense. In this regard, there developed a sense-theory of a proper name. These two views are diametrically opposite in the sense that one ensures the reference

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[26] Ibid, p. 272.

of the proper name and forgoes the sense of the proper name; whereas the other ensures the sense of the proper name and develops a contingent statement about the possibility of reference. According to the former, the twin concept of sense-reference does not bear any significance because the meaning of a proper name is only determined based on the reference of the proper name alone. According to the latter, the twin concept of sense and reference is relevant because to determine the reference of a proper name, the sense of the proper name in terms of mode of presentation plays an all-important role to determine its reference. This is where the philosophical significance of Frege's sense and reference actually hinges.

Whatever may be the case there we do not find an accepted view without begging question do proper names have sense. While reflecting on this issue Searle claims that the first theory leads to the ultimate object of reference; whereas the second leads to the identity of the indiscernible. For Searle, the subject-predicate structure of the language suggests that the first must be right but the way we use and teach the use of a proper name cannot be right. Thus there lies a philosophical problem. Let us start with the second. If it is assumed that every proper name has a sense, as Frege does, then it must be legitimate to demand of any name, "What is its sense?" If it is assumed that a proper name is a kind of short-hand description in Russellian sense and mode of presentation in Fregean sense, then in such a case, Searle opines, "We ought to be aware to present the description in place of the proper name?".[27] If it would be the case then again the question arises: How are we to proceed with this? For Searle, if we try to present a

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[27] Ibid, p. 272.

complete description of the object in the sense of a proper name, then at times odd consequences may appear. In such a case, the complete description of the object may lead to an analytic statement or false statement, or even a self-contradictory statement. As a result of that, the name would have different meanings for different people. Here, we have to have the necessary and sufficient conditions for applying a particular name to a particular object. The problem is how do we determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for applying a particular name to a particular object? Suppose for the sake of argument that we have independent means for locating an object, then in such a case what are the conditions for applying a name to it? What are the conditions for saying, for example, 'This is Aristotle'? Here, Searle reveals three conditions to be simply that the object must be identical, to the object originally characterized by the name. Therefore, the sense of the name would consist of a statement or set of statements asserting the characteristics that would constitute this identity. Accordingly, the sense of 'This is Aristotle' might be: "This object is spatiotemporally continuous with an object originally named 'Aristotle'". 'Aristotle' here refers to a particular object named "Aristotle", but not to say "Named 'Aristotle'". Here the term 'Aristotle' is a proper name. So "This is named 'Aristotle'" is at best a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the truth of 'This is Aristotle'. Searle opines that "This is the name 'Aristotle'" is not the identity of any object named 'Aristotle', rather its identity with Aristotle that constitutes the necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of "This is Aristotle".

Searle then attempts to resolve the conflict between the two views on the nature of proper names by asking what is the unique feature of proper names in our language. As far as reference is concerned, expressions, such as definite description, and

demonstratives do perform this action. What then is the difference between proper names and other singular referring expressions? In this regard, it can be said that, unlike demonstratives, a proper name refers without presupposing any stage or any special contextual conditions surrounding the utterance of the expression. This is again a clear-cut distinction between the no-sense theory of proper name as well as the sense theory of proper name. Unlike definite description, demonstrative pronouns do not in general specify any characteristic at all of the objects to which they refer. For Searle, the name 'Scott' refers to the same object 'the author of *Waverly*'. But 'Scott' specifies none of its characteristics, whereas 'the author of *Waverly*' refers only in virtue of the fact that it does specify a characteristic. Thus, the linguistic expression of 'the author of *Waverly*' appears as definite descriptions, whereas the linguistic expression 'Scott' appears as a singular proper name. Both have the same reference because in some sense or other it is claimed that 'Scott *is* the author of *Waverly*' in which the verb 'is' is used in the sense of identity.

The question then is: if a proper name does not in general specify any characteristic of the object referred to, then how does it bring the reference? How a connection is made possible between name and object? In this regard, it can be said that though the proper name does not assert any characteristics, their referring usage nevertheless presupposes that the object to which they purport to refer has certain characteristics. That means, there underlies uniquely referring descriptive statements. According to Searle, every descriptive statement has some *descriptive force.* The descriptive force of 'This is Aristotle' is to assert that a sufficient but unspecified number of this statement is true of this object. Thus in a sense, referring usage of 'Aristotle' presupposes the existence

of an object of whom a sufficient but unspecified number of this statement is true. In this regard, Searle remarks, "to use a proper name referring is to presuppose the truth of certain uniquely referring descriptive statements, but it is not ordinarily to assert these statements or even to indicate which exactly are presupposed. And herein lies most of the difficulty".[28]

What is observed here is that the concept of the descriptive force of referring expression plays an important role to mark the reference of the descriptive expression. The reference of the descriptive expression is unspecified in the sense that here the reference is detected not in terms of denotation (de re / extension); but in terms of connotation (de dicto / intension). Accordingly, if the characteristics or mode of presentation in the Fregean sense agreed to be true of Aristotle, then the descriptive statement 'This is Aristotle' would ensure its reference in the sense of connotation. Thus one possible response in favor of descriptive referential expression is to find out adequately what characteristics constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for applying a proper name. Of course, there may have various modes of speech, such as material mode and formal mode of speech. Considering this possibility in mind, still, we can say the name itself would become superfluous for it would become logically equivalent to the set of descriptions that are taken together as the necessary and sufficient condition of the descriptive statement. If this would really is the case, then surely we would be in the position of being able to refer to an object by describing it. This is the only way through which the gulf between genuine proper names and descriptive expression appears in the

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[28] Ibid, p. 272.

form of definite description can be overcome and this is where the ingenuity of Fregean naming theory actually hinges. We have already stated that, unlike other semanticists, Frege's vocabulary of proper names contains many different linguistic expressions, namely, singular terms, ordinary proper names, phrases, clauses, etc. Frege incorporates all these linguistic expressions under the purview of proper name on the principle that every proper name has a uniform basic and fundamental characteristic known as *sense*. If the criteria for proper names were in all cases quite rigid and specific, then a proper name would be nothing more than a shorthand for these criteria. In such a case, a proper name would function exactly like an elaborate definite description. Thus in a sense, we sense a *pragmatic convenience* of proper names in our semantic language as enunciated by Frege. This so happens because they enable us to *refer publicly* to objects without being forced to raise issues and eventually come to "*agreement* on what descriptive characteristics exactly constitute the identity of the object". They function not as a complete description but as pegs on which to hang the description. Thus in a sense, we find some basic looseness of this criterion of proper names and it should be treated as a necessary condition for isolating the referring function from the describing function of language. It is important to be noted here that not all describing function of language is relevant to its referring function. But when we try to understand Fregean semantics with regard to the descriptive function of language, it ensures its reference at least in an unspecified manner. In this regard, it can be said that the force of the reference is being expressed through the descriptive function of language (sense or mode of presentation in Fregean sense) entails a sort of reference in a specified or unspecified manner. The question then is: why do we have proper names at all? The answer is obvious. We do

have proper names to refer to individuals. In this regard, descriptions or modes of presentation could do that for us. In this process, we must always stick to the concept of identity.

Let us back to our original question: does a proper name have sense? We have already explained in great detail some paradoxical situations relating to this issue. If it asks whether or not proper names are used to describe or specify characteristics of an object, the answer is no. But if it asks whether or not proper names are *logically connected* with characteristics of the object to which they refer, the answer is yes in a loose sense. In this regard, Searle finds the distinction between *paradigmatic proper names* with *degenerate proper names* like 'The Bank of England'. In the latter case, it seems the sense is given straightforwardly as in a definite description. In this sense, a proper name may acquire a rigid descriptive use without having the verbal form of a description. For example, God is just omnipotent, and omniscient. This definition is true only for the believers of God. Here the verbal form of language misleads us. Based on the background, we refer back to the original statement (a) and (b). Following Searle, here we can say that our original statement 'Tully=Cicero' is analytic, but it might be transformed into synthetic if the same descriptive presupposition associated with 'Tully' and 'Cicero' is different. It might even be advanced as a historical discovery if anybody stuck with the descriptive content of these two linguistic expressions. If it does then we do not find any serious philosophical burden in claiming that proper names do have senses.

What then is the unique function of proper names in our language? In this regard, we can say that most proper names do refer to objects. Thus, referring is the hallmark of a

proper name. In this regard, we can say that to be a proper name is to be a name of an object. A proper name always tags with an object. But whether the object that has been referred to by a proper name exists or does not exist is altogether a different philosophical issue. Now Searle raises the question: what then is the distinction between the proper name and singular referring expression? In this regard, we can say that "unlike demonstratives, a proper name refers without presupposing any stage setting or any special contextual conditions surrounding the utterance of the expression".[29] Even following Russell, we can spell out a subtle distinction between proper names and singular referring expressions. According to Russell, a singular referring expression can be regarded as a logically proper name and in this category, all demonstrative pronouns belong. Unlike definite description, singular referring expressions do not specify in most general cases any characteristic at all of the objects to which they refer. Let us make this point clear. 'Scott' refers to the same object 'the author of Waverly'. Here, 'Scott' does not specify any characteristics of the person referred to by 'Scott'; whereas 'the author of Waverly' refers only in virtue of the fact that it does specify a characteristic. In this regard, P. F. Strawson in his 'On Referring' presupposes a common, underlined assumption between 'Scott' and 'the author of Waverly'. For Strawson, referring usage of both proper names (Scott) and the definite description (the author of Waverly) presupposes the *existence* of one and only one object referred to. However, the problem Searle faced is that if a proper name does not in general specify any characteristic of the object referred to, then how does it bring the reference? In what sense the feasible connection between proper name and object will be set up? In this

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[29] Ibid, p. 272.

regard, we can say that even though proper names do not normally specify any characteristic, but nonetheless their referential usage presupposes that the object to which they purport to refer has certain characteristics.

For example, when we use the name 'Aristotle' to state what they regard as certain essential and established facts about him, we usually mean to say that there is a set of uniquely referring descriptive statements or descriptive force of the statement 'This is Aristotle'. It asserts that a sufficient but unspecified number of these statements are true of 'Aristotle'. Therefore, referring usage of 'Aristotle' presupposes *the existence of an object* of whom a sufficient but an unspecified number of these statements are true. Thus it is resolved that to use a proper name *referring to ipso facto* is to presuppose the truth of certain uniquely referring descriptive statements. Here lies the difficulty. The question is: what constitutes the criterion for 'Aristotle'? If the characteristics are agreed to be true of 'Aristotle' then there may be a case that half should be discovered to be true for one man and the rest half to be true for another. Therefore, the question of the necessary and sufficient condition of a descriptive phrase is to be evaluated. Otherwise, the characteristics of a descriptive phrase would be treated as a mere accident in the context of a proper name.

To overcome this problem Searle applies the name 'Aristotle' with regard to the formal model of what Aristotle is? To represent 'Aristotle' as what Aristotle is is to ask for *a set of identity* criteria for the object 'Aristotle'. In this regard, 'what is Aristotle?' and 'what are the criteria for applying the name Aristotle?' are directed in different ways. The former question is associated with the material mode; whereas the latter is associated with the formal mode of speech. According to Searle, the formal mode of

speech based on identity criteria to know a proper name is based on referring to the use of the name. Here the name may be superfluous because it would become logically equivalent to the set of descriptions. But if this *were* to be the case, Searle opines, then "we would be in a position of only being able to refer to an object by describing it. Whereas in fact, this is just what the institution of a proper name enables us to avoid and what distinguishes proper names from descriptions". If the criteria for proper names are rigid and specific then a proper name would be nothing more than a shorthand for those criteria. In such a case, a proper name then would function exactly like an elaborate definite description. This may be treated as a *pragmatic account* of the proper name used in our language, and it enables us to refer publicly to objects by raising issues with regard to an agreement based on the descriptive characteristics through which one can identify the object attached with the proper name. In such a case, a proper name is not functioning similarly to description even though it seems to be the case rather as 'pegs on which to hang description'. Thus, we cannot still rule out the looseness of the criteria for proper names. In fact, Searle reads such looseness of the criteria of proper names as a necessary condition for isolating the referring function from the descriptive function of language. This makes clear what the unique function of a proper name is and in what sense the unique function of a proper name is associated at length and is dissociated at length from the descriptive function of a proper name.

Let us explain the same point differently. Why do we have proper names? Why philosophers are craving for proper names? One naïve answer is that proper names are required for referring to individuals or objects. The world is the totality of objects or individuals. Every identified object or individual is attached with a proper name used

in language. Therefore, semanticists in particular abstracted proper names from language and in turn attempted to identify objects or individuals of the world. That is how language (in our case proper names) is attached to reality (in our case objects or individuals). The point is whether description can do the same job as proper names. The answer is that descriptions like proper names can identify the objects only at the cost of specifying identity conditions based on which reference is made. Accordingly, instead of using the proper name 'Aristotle', we may use the definite description 'the teacher of Alexander'. It is a necessary truth that the man referred to as Alexander's teacher. But it is a contingent fact that Aristotle ever went into pedagogy.

Based on the above consideration, we can now resolve our inaugural question: does a proper name have a sense? If proper names are used to describe or specify characteristics of objects, the answer is no. But if it asks whether or not proper names are logically connected with characteristics of the object to which they refer, the answer is yes in a loose sense. In this regard, Searle makes the distinction between *paradigmatic proper names* with *degenerate proper names* like 'The Bank of England'. Here the sense is given as straightforwardly as in a definite description. Having said that Frege's theory of proper names has been developed conclusively with the background of the sense theory of proper names and in turn, it has deviated from the no-sense theory of proper names. So far we have outlined and examined after Searle in what conditions and in what context a proper name does have a sense or does not have sense. But when we come to Frege, we do not have any scope of raising the question of whether proper names do or do not have sense. My point is that proper names of Frege always have sense. More importantly, Fregean proper names are not strictly associated with logical

proper names or even ordinary proper names that we normally experience in semantic school. Frege incorporates logical proper names, ordinary proper names, and other linguistic expressions which can function as proper names. Irrespective of different types of proper names Frege's single-line philosophical resolution is that all proper names irrespective of their various nature do have a reference. Frege's proper names thus do not fail to have sense.

1.4: Dummett's Observation of Frege's Proper Name:

According to Michael Dummett, by proper name Frege conceives 'singular term'.[30] By the term 'singular term', Frege actually means various categories of incomplete expressions having sentential operators. Thus in a sense, unlike the other semanticists, Fregean characterization of proper name does not bear any specific direction. Frege includes any linguistic expression, such as singular terms, incomplete symbols, sentential parts, phrases, clauses, etc. as proper names having a mode of presentation. The term 'mode of presentation' is very important in Fregean semantics. Frege understands the mode of presentation at par with the sense (*Siṅṅ*). The question is: mode of presentation of what? Certainly, the mode of presentation of a proper name is deeply associated with singular terms or objects or individuals in the loose sense of the term. According to Dummett, like Russell and others, Frege was non-committal to finding the subtle distinction between singular and plural or those which lack a definite article. He is equally indifferent about logical proper names or rigid designators as used by Russell and Kripke respectively. According to Frege, the whole distinction between proper

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[30] Dummett, M., *Frege: Philosophy of Language,* Duckworth: London, 1973, p. 54.

names and expression of other kinds actually hinges upon *intuitive recognition* of the terms used as a proper name.

According to Dummett, an expression belonging to the category of a proper name is a feature of its sense. Frege's use of the expression 'proper name' for all singular terms, Dummett opines, includes highly complex ones that the primary use of such terms within a sentence or linguistic expression is to pick out determinate objects for which the term stands, in the same way, a proper name in the strict sense of the term stands for its bearer. For Dummett, Frege understands 'objects' from an *ontological* perspective and it is strictly co-relative to his use of the linguistic term 'proper name'. Dummett says, 'Whatever a proper name stands for is an object, and to speak of something as an object is to say that there is, or at least could be, a proper name which stands for it'. Thus for Dummett, Frege applies the term 'object' to the entities for which they stand. In Frege's sense, our intuition compels us to recognize objects. Many would find some dubious nature in Frege's understanding of the proper name. However, Peter Geach thinks the other way round. According to Geach, Frege's use of the proper name is completely straightforward and unproblematic. However, Dummett reveals that Geach's accounts of the matter are false to Frege's whole attitude to the relation between 'linguistic and ontological categories'. Such a picture is remote from Frege's thoughts. For Frege, the different categories of expression which occur in our language, and the division of these expressions into categories depend, in turn, upon the different ways in which they are used in sentences. Thus, Frege needs to maintain that each expression may be recognized as belonging to the logical category in which it is employed in the language. The distinction between proper names and expressions of

other types must be one that can be drawn in wholly linguistic terms. Proper names form a linguistic category of the most general possible kind. Proper name constitutes the only complete expressions that would fall short of being sentences. That's why, Frege in his *Grundlagen,* Dummett opines, recognizes the possibility of subdividing the category of objects. Thus, in Fregean semantics, the assignment of an expression to the category of a proper name must accordingly depend upon the most general feature of its use.

Thus for Dummett, Frege's whole philosophy of language needs to discriminate proper names from the expression of other kinds to have a clear picture of language. In this regard, Frege like many other semanticists involved to construct natural language with the background of formal language which Frege termed a perspicuous form of symbolic language. Thus for Frege, it is possible to provide a criterion applying to the proper names of natural language. If we are unable to be sure about which expression of natural language was to count as a proper name, we ipso facto be unable to carry out the so-called reconstruction that we desire in formal semantics. Interestingly, Frege gives little attention to this problem. He does not think it unnecessary but he thought it unlikely that anyone would seriously challenge the claim that it could be accomplished. While giving such criteria, we must presuppose some knowledge of the language. The classification of an expression, Dummett opines, as a proper name relates to its use in the language. Accordingly, the criteria of classification are to be used by someone familiar with that use. Thus for Dummett, it is a pre-requisite to leave at an intuitive level the recognition of sentences as well-formed or ill-formed. The sentence containing a proper name must eventually be ensured to be well-formed to have a sense as well as

a reference If there is a sentence containing a proper name that eventually appeared as ill-formed, it does not bear any sense, and its reference. But Dummett opines that the concept of well-formed is not sufficient to distinguish proper names from all other expressions. Further tests can only relate to the correctness or incorrectness of certain simple patterns of inference, recognition of which may again be left *at the intuitive level*. Thus besides the construction of language, the level of intuition associated with thought plays important role in Fregean semantics. For Dummett, if Frege's philosophy of language is sound, then surely the category of the proper name has to be recognized within every conceivable language. Within the languages, we normally distinguish proper names by reference to certain very simple and evident features of their use.

Dummett claims that the inference pattern to which appeal has to be made necessarily involves the *expression of generality*. Our language has the feature that the same verbal expression is used for first-order and for higher-order *generalization over objects or over properties or over relations*. Accordingly, we can assume that the word 'something' can be picked out and is understood without making knowledge of the distinction between first-order and second-order generalization. Many natural languages have the feature that there is a difference in expression between generalization *over persons* and *over things*. So the expression we need to consider is not the word 'something' but the phrase 'someone or something'. However, to save prolixity, Dummett prefers to use 'something' or 'someone' and correspondingly 'it' or at times 'he' for 'he or it'. Thus it seems after Dummett that the fundamental form of inference is an *existential generalization.* It is a necessary condition for an expression 'a' to be a proper name that it should be possible to infer from a sentence containing it

that the sentence the expression 'a' by the word 'something'. Since the same word may function in different ways in a different context, the criteria that we are seeking should determine whether or not an expression is a proper name in a particular context that they therefore should apply exactly to every context. From the sentence 'Peter is still alive, we shall be rescued', it is not possible to infer 'someone is still alive, we shall be rescued'. Here, this test does not exclude the word 'something' itself. We need further requirements. From two sentences 'A (a)' and 'B (a)' it is possible to infer 'there is something such that A (it) and B (it)'. Of course, in simple cases, when 'A (a)' and 'B (a)' are both of the form 'a is w', where 'w' is some adjective, the conclusion could be expressed in a simpler form. Here we are concerned with formulations that cover *all possible contexts*. Here, we have to approximate the quantifier-variable notation to have such a formulation. According to Dummett, this formulation is essential for Frege to exclude not only the word 'something' itself but also many occurrences of indefinite substantival phrases, such as the phrase 'a sheep'. This phrase fails to test as applied to the sentence 'Jones owns a sheep' and 'Henry ran over a sheep'. On the other hand, it does not rule out occurrences of such phrases, for instance, the phrase 'a poet' passes this test, as it occurs in the two sentences 'Richard was born a poet' and 'Henry has become a poet'. But from this background, if we say, 'There is something such that Richard was born it and Henry has become it', the word 'something' serves to express higher-order generality.

But what about the criteria of 'everything', i.e., universal generality. According to Dummett, we may lay down it as a third requirement expressed in the form of 'A (a) or B (a)' of two sentences that may be inferred from 'It is true of A that A (it) or B (it)'.

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This criterion, of course, excludes plural noun phrases and it sticks to the singular pronoun 'it' being substitutable for 'a' without destruction of the well-formed character of the sentence. The criteria that we have outlined so far serve to separate proper names (i.e. singular terms) from other substantival phrases, plural or indefinite, involving in one way or another the expression of generality. That is, they distinguish proper names from substantival phrases of other kinds when such phrases stand in the context in which proper names could meaningfully stand. But Dummett finds some difficulties arising at the most basic level. For Dummett, an indefinite noun phrase is ruled out by our criteria when it occurs as a grammatical subject or object. For example, 'A policeman struck him' and 'A policeman charged him with assault'. From these sentences, it is impossible to infer 'Someone both struck him and charged him with assault'. For Dummett, here the term 'a policeman' in this context does not qualify as a proper name. In this context, F. P. Ramsay holds that not all pairs of expressions can be combined to form meaningful sentences. While providing a reason for distinguishing singular terms from predicates, we can pair nothing by an appeal to the intuitive notion of what is being talked about. At the first level, Frege classifies proper names as complete expressions, but predicates as incomplete expressions. But Ramsay claims that there would be no possibility of giving formal criteria for distinguishing proper names from all other expressions. For Ramsay, we should be able to devise criteria for distinguishing two large classes of expressions, one consisting of singular terms and the other of predicates. But there would be no *general characterization* through which we could specify which class stood for which.

According to Dummett, Frege offers us two alternative analyses of an atomic sentence, such as, 'Socrates is wise'. It is composed of the proper name 'Socrates' and the incomplete first-level predicate ' - is wise'. However, we may alternatively regard it as composed of the same first-level predicate of another incomplete expression ' - (Socrates)'. These are two different hierarchies of expression at different levels. Ramsay, however, puts question by saying what exactly counts this to the expression of a different level? Ramsay denies Frege's view that proper names, such as, 'Socrates' can properly be regarded as 'complete' expressions in contrast to predicates, such as, '… is wise'. According to Dummett, Ramsay's position actually hinges on the view that the only complete expression would be a complete sentence but not a proper name like 'Socrates' as Frege thought. The term 'complete' is comprehended here in virtue of its forming a linguistic expression by means of which it is possible to say something, i.e., to perform a *linguistic act* in the language game. For Dummett, proper names and predicates are, in this view, equally incomplete. But they do not have the same kind of incompleteness. Otherwise, two names or two predicates would serve to form a sentence as a name and a predicate. Thus for Dummett, we have to have some conception of logical valency of different categories of expression that will fit together to form a sentence while certain other expressions of certain other categories will not fit together to form a sentence. Accordingly, following Ramsay it can be said, Dummett opines, that we find ourselves having two construe 'Socrates' as being either a complete expression of level zero or an incomplete expression of level two.

However, Dummett thinks that Frege's general notion of incomplete expression actually relates to something much deeper than his conception of logical valency

(power). The notion of an incomplete expression is required for a satisfactory explanation of the way in which the expression of generality functions. An incomplete expression (predicate) is not merely metaphorically but literally incomplete. It is something formed from a sentence by omission rather than something assembled on its own in the course of constructing the sentence form. For Dummett, the general notion of a complex predicate is something that can be defined only in terms of the notion of a proper name. Thus, we have no problem distinguishing between a proper name and a predicate in this general sense. Dummett says that owing to explaining the construction of atomic sentences, we do not need to invoke the notion of expression which are incomplete in this full-blooded sense. It is only for the sake of the economy that Frege needs to assimilate a simple predicate into a complex one. For Frege, simple predicates are not literally incomplete. We must regard the singular statement as put together out of the proper name and the predicate rather than regarding the predicate as being formed from the sentence by the omission of the proper name. In this connection, the ascription of incompleteness to the predicates rather than to the proper names is almost irresistible. Unlike a proper name, a predicate has a hook in one particular place and it must be attached to a sentence. A proper name does not by itself constitutes a sentence. According to Frege, a proper name though preferably used in the subject place may occur at the beginning, at the end, or in the middle of the sentence. For Frege, a proper name is a complete expression whereas a predicate is an incomplete expression. A predicate is an incomplete expression because, for any predicate, there may be another predicate that *is* true of just those objects of which the original predicate is false and false of just those objects of which the original predicate is true.

1.5: Two Different Types of Analyses of Sentences:

In this regard, Dummett recalls Frege's two kinds of analysis of a sentence into its constituents. For Dummett, a sentence is constructed out of component words in which the truth condition of the sentence is determined from the words of which it is composed. This kind of analysis, Dummett opines, relates to the sense of the sentence and also the constituents of the sentence. Thus the tacit understanding of the sentence actually hinges on the process of construction where a speaker of the language can derive from his knowledge of the senses of the words, that is, the truth-condition of the sentence. Thus barring the ambiguity of the sentence, there is only one correct analysis of any sentence which relates to sense. According to Dummett, the other kind of analysis is needed in order to determine the validity of the inference in which the sentence is involved. Thus it is unnecessary, for someone who has the sense of the sentence that be aware of the possibility of an analysis of this kind. This sort of analysis into which the sentence may be analysed may be a complex incomplete expression that we form from the sentence itself just by omitting another expression. In this way, we can build up the sentence in which the first sort of analysis relates. For example, the sentence 'Brutus killed Caesar' is divisible into the name 'Brutus' and the predicate '_ killed Caesar' or again the name 'Caesar' and the predicate 'Brutus killed _'. However, neither of these analyses, Dummett reveals, is relevant to the mechanism by which we grasp the truth conditions of the sentence.

Let us pass on to the second type of analysis. It is indeed true to say that Frege's own principle, is resulting from the first-level predicate '_ is wise' arising out of the sentence 'Socrates is wise'. From the first-level predicate '_ is wise' we have the second-level

predicate '_ (Socrates)'. The second-level predicate is degenerated case but it cannot be set aside or dismissed as spurious. According to Dummett, it relates to inferences in which generality is involved in premises or conclusions. Thus, its relevance actually hinges on the range of generality involved. If 'Socrates is wise' occurs as one premise of inference, the other premise of which is 'Anyone who is wise disregards fashion', then only first-level generality is involved. Thus, the first-level generality is appropriate for the first type of analysis. And this process will continue from the second–level generality to the third-level generality and so on. It would be a process of abstraction where abstract objects would be part of higher generality. We involve in this process of generality in practice in order to resolve ambiguities arising from uncertainty. But to use it in this form for our purposes would obviously involve circularity. Thus, we wish to distinguish first-level from second-level generality in order to help in determining when an expression constitutes a proper name. We may, of course, Dummett opines, avoid circularity just by saying: "The generality was of second-level if a point may be reached where a demand for the specification is still grammatically well-constructed but is nevertheless rejected as illegitimate". Thus seeking something grammatically in order does not help us all without exception dig out proper names. The question, "Which Cambridge?" is grammatically licit and perhaps may be perfectly sensible but this does not impugn the status of 'Cambridge' as a proper name. Here, the name 'Cambridge' is used as a city in the United States, and of one in England is in fact equivocal in just the same way 'bat' is equivocal as used of a mammal and of what a cricketer uses. Thus the question 'Which Cambridge?' has the same sort of force as 'What kind of bat?' or 'Which bat?'

Even it may perhaps be the case that something that may not be detected as a proper name ten years back may be detected as a proper name now in language. For example, 'Ten years ago undetected murderers were very common' and after ten years 'Now undetected murderers are rare'. From this one may legitimately infer 'There is something which ten years ago was very common and now is rare'. In that case, 'undetected murderers' pass the particular test for being a proper name. However for Dummett, by our criteria, the 'something' in the conclusion of this inference expresses a generality of second-level if someone asks, "What is it that ten years ago was very common and now is rare?" The straightforward answer is 'undetected murderers'. Here, the further question, Dummett opines, 'Which undetected murderers?' cannot be acceptable. Here the term 'undetected murderers' is used as a proper name.

It thus seems from the above that the criteria so far laid down would provide a method admitting of no exceptions for distinguishing proper names from the description of other sorts. Indeed, one has to know, Dummett claims, how to apply Frege's categorization of expressions into proper names and others to acquire the means of doing so. Of course, Fregean criteria of identifying proper names would not be a practical one. Therefore, it should not be difficult for someone to read and understand Frege. However, Dummett opines, that a measurable criterion is always a pre-requisite to understanding the Fregean theory of proper name. The genesis of Fregean semantics is significantly embedded in the concept of the ontological category of the term 'object'. In fact, for Frege, the application of the ontological category-term 'object' is based on the application of the linguistic category-term 'proper name'. Thus Frege uses two different linguistic concepts of which one is termed as 'proper name' and another as 'object'.

Both are linguistic category terms. As per as identification of proper name is concerned, Frege gave us *crude criteria* for this, but it would be senseless to search the same while identifying criteria for something being an object. We could not know what a thing was at all unless we know whether it was an object. As part of Frege's doctrine whatever can meaningfully be said of an object cannot be meaningfully said of something that is not an object and conversely. It is not because Frege has decided that classes are objects that he calls class-terms proper names to fulfill his criteria for being proper names that he calls classes to object. For this reason, it is essential that the criteria for the application 'proper name' should relate to the *linguistic behaviour* of the expression rather than to the character of the entities for which they stand. However, the problem is that if linguistic expression plays a pivotal role in identifying proper names then all sorts of expressions will have to be admitted as proper names which seem to be absurd to speak of as standing for an object. For Dummett, while dealing with a linguistic expression we normally use a wide variety of substantival expressions of all kinds, namely, gerundives, infinitives, and abstract nouns, derived from other parts of speech and these often constitute or can be used to form phrases constituting singular terms in respect of their immediate grammatical role. Thus it would seem absurd, Dummett opines, to think of all these as standing for objects. For example, there is such an object as the identity of the murderer. Further asserting that the police do not know the identity of the murderer actually means to say that the police do not know who the murderer is. Unfortunately, the clause 'who the murderer is' a grammatically substantival clause satisfies those of the tests we have so far devised for being a proper name. Thus, if Holmes knows who the murderer is and the police do not, then there is *something* that

Holmes knows and that the police do not know. Dummett claims that the use of the generic term 'something' is not ordinarily regarded as expressing generality of first-level and it would fall short of satisfying our condition for an expression of second-level generality.

However, it would be contrary to Frege's outlook to make indispensability a criterion for an expression's being a proper name. In fact, Frege pays little attention to it. In his **Grundlagen,** he is arguing that numbers are objects. That means, for Frege besides the *adjectival use* of number words, there occurs a substantival one. Mathematical statements, for example, 'The number 5 is prime' is a substantival one and in this substantival use, number words satisfy his criteria for being proper names. 'The number five is prime' where the word '5' occurred only adjectively, what Quine termed as an *opaque context* where the principle of substitutivity of identity fails. This indeed is a very unique feature of language which in any case throws doubt upon the status of proper names. However, Frege had a very special doctrine concerning such context. For Frege, if Rome is the capital of Italy and Italy is the most beautiful country in Europe then Rome is the capital of the most beautiful country in Europe. But from the fact that the murderer is the secretary of the Club, and everybody knows the identity of the secretary of the Club, it does not follow that everybody knows the identity of the murderer. Frege however while developing his concept of proper name did not admit all these as standing for an object.

It seems to us that like proper names Frege considers various objects, such as points, lines, moments, weights, shapes, directions, and the like-to-be objects. Thus his understanding of objects goes beyond brute facts having spatiotemporal location.

Besides, Frege implicitly categorizes colours but not 'the colour red', as standing for an object. Colour words like number words have both an adjectival and a substantival use. For Frege, the substantival usage seems strict whereas adjectival usage is not. The color words when used as a noun, should not be equated with *abstract nouns* formed in the usual manner from the adjectives; it is red, not redness, which is a primary color. Abstract nouns derivatives from adjectives or verbs have a fairly well-defined and uniform set of usages. Frege always maintains transparency regarding various uses of the linguistic term. This does not, however, make sense to say that he by doing so has deviated from his semantic proposal. The gravity of Fregean semantics is that unlike other semanticists he opens up a new dimension of semantics where proper names of various categories are accommodated under the realm of his constructed language. Accordingly, Dummett believes that "there is no firm boundary" in Fregean semantics "whether an expression which satisfies a formal criterion is to be taken as a genuine proper name, albeit of an abstract object, depends, not indeed on the impossibility of extruding it from the language without loss of expressive power...". Thus Frege understands proper names in the sense of a *matter of degree* where within the flexible linguistic practice his understanding of proper names cannot deviate from the *demand of semantics.*

For Frege, if we are to understand an expression as standing for an object, then we must be able to recognize the object. We come to know under what conditions some other terms will stand for the same object. For example, if I am told, "This is the River Windrush", and I have no idea how to determine whether it would be right, at some other place or time or both to say once more, "This is the River Windrush", then I know

nothing about the expression 'the River Windrush'. In such a case I do not know what object is being named or what expression used was being employed as a name of an object. To that extent, if I am uncertain how to 'recognize the object as the name again', I cannot *ipso facto* know the object and also do not know what is true of that object. If I know that a river flooded last winter, but do not know what would establish that it was or was not the same river, I shall not know, either, what would establish that it was true of the River Windrush that it flooded last winter. As a result, the expression cannot in all cases be analysed as meaning. In Fregean semantics, the meaning of a sentence is determined by knowing the truth value of the sentence. Therefore, so long we are no longer in a position to know about the truth value of the sentence under consideration, we are no longer in a position to determine the meaning of the sentence. If the sentence lacks meaning, it equally lacks sense or mode of presentation. Fregean semantics does not tolerate any linguistic expression without fulfilling the criteria of meaning as such.

1.6: Criterion of Application and Criterion of Identity:

According to Frege, sense or mode of presentation varies from context to context. The difference in a sense actually lies in the different ways in which the sense may be used as attached to those words. If it is asked how many books a library contains, it is ambiguous. If I am asked, "Is that the book I saw you reading yesterday?" is again ambiguous. In both cases, the ambiguity arises when we have two different senses for the expression 'book'. According to Dummett, the difference of sense concerns only the *criterion of identity* associated with the word 'book', not the *criterion of application* associated with it. The criterion of application determines when it is correct to say. As per as the criterion of application is concerned, there is nothing wrong with the sentence

mentioned above. But the problem arises to apply the criterion of identity to those sentences which are supposed to be ambiguous. The criterion of identity, unlike the criterion of application, does not bear any sense in the case of ambiguous sentences. In fact, the criterion of identity is not relevant to the truth or falsity of the statement. Rather the criterion of identity is to be taken as part of the sense of the general term; if I say, "It is the same book", meaning, "It is the same work". Here we use the phrase 'the same' in any weaker or less strict sense than if I had meant, "It is the same copy" that it may well be exactly, literally, the same work. It is the word 'book' which I am using in a sense different from other meanings. This makes clear that the criterion of identity is not derivable from the criterion of application. If we go through Fregean semantics, we find along with Dummett that there are some common nouns possessing a sense that associates with them both a criterion of application and a criterion of identity; while others are mostly concerned only with a criterion of application. According to Dummett, all adjectives belong to the criterion of application but do not belong to a particular criterion of identity.

The criterion of identity is mostly associated with nouns, for example, 'man', 'woman', 'tailor', etc. "A is the same man (woman, tailor) as B". It can really be analysed as "A is a man (woman, tailor) and A is the same person as B". Among any such class of nouns, associated with the same criterion of identity, there will always be one that is most general and which applies to all those objects to which any general term in the class applies. That is, to all those objects for which that is the appropriate criterion of identity. Thus the criterion of identity is applied on terms called 'categorical predicates' and the classes of objects to which they apply are called categories. Thus categories are

nothing but large classes of *objects*, in Fregean terms totalities of objects, concept, relations, functions, etc. The criterion of identity could not apply to some objects at one time and not at another. The same man may at one time have been a tailor and may at another time no longer be a tailor. But 'horse' though not a categorical predicate because the same criterion of identity that is used for horses is equally used for cows and for all vertebrates.

Thus it seems to us that a wide variety of common nouns have as part of their sense a *criterion of identity* that involves grasping their sense is knowing to what sort of objects they apply. At the same time, there must always be associated a criterion of identity with every genuine proper name. In order to understand a proper name, we must know what sort of category of objects it is to be used as the name. This leads us to suggest that every proper name must belong to some range of names that are associated with the same criterion of identity. That means they are names of objects belonging to one category. This is where the concept of generality seems to be relevant. Colour words used as nouns have a range to which all genuine proper names are required to belong to. Here we have general nouns, such as colour, substance, and so on applying to all the objects in any one of these categories. However, there is no definite range of objects to which sliminess, shininess, or resemblance belong. They are indeed tactile quality or visual quality or relation. In such a case, we do not find an appropriate answer to the question 'What is this tactile quality?' It does not explicitly involve the use of the associate predicate or some equivalent one where the gap is to be filled either by the adjective 'slimy' or by some longer adjectival phrase with the same content. Accordingly, there could not be a language having a word meaning 'sliminess'. Even

wisdom and brotherhood belong to more definite ranges. Wisdom is a virtue and brotherhood is a relationship. Therefore, one might accordingly admit wisdom and brotherhood as genuine objects. One may even notice the simile between the expressions 'This is slimy' and 'This is Socrates'. While using 'Socrates' we have to know how to recognize Socrates when we come across him again and in order to use 'slimy', we have to know how to recognize sliminess when we come across it again. Thus for Dummett, what determines whether a word is to be classified as a singular term or a predicate is whether or not it occurs in another context with which predicates are attached with. What is pertinent here is that the term under consideration should be recognized as belonging with others to a certain definite range. A predicate can be understood, Dummett opines, only by knowing the conditions under which it applies to an arbitrary object of a given range. However, membership of a definite range as required is only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for non-trivial use of a vocabulary for forming predicates attaching to a term.

Thus it seems to us, after Dummett, that if we introduce into our language proper names of a new range, standing for objects of a new category as determined by the criterion of identity, we shall be unable to use these names for anything unless we simultaneously introduce set of predicates which can be applied to these objects. Thus, to identify a name properly we have to recognize the concept of the predicate with which the object is associated. This is where the significance of the proper name of Frege's actually hinges. That is why, Frege gives much emphasis on the sense theory of proper name instead of the no-sense theory of proper name as expounded by Bertrand Russell, early Wittgenstein, Mill, and others. It is for this reason that the existence of talking about

colours is of importance in recognizing colour words where proper names are used substantively. According to Dummett, the absence of such a vocabulary in the case of a general run of an abstract noun is not a mere matter of degree. There still may be borderline cases in practice we often contend to allow a criterion of identity. A borderline case among abstract objects would be character traits, it is not to be classified as a proper name or thought of as standing for an object unless we can speak of a criterion of identity. Thus for Dummett, a criterion of identity is a prerequisite to determine the sense of the expression applies to the object for which it stands. Having said that every object varies from every other object. For example, the object 'green' is the name, that is, a color. So we can refer to that object in other ways, such, as the color of grass. Likewise, the number 7 may also be referred to as the greatest prime divisor of 105 or as the number of the days of the week. But we cannot say what sort of object sliminess is? Here we cannot supply a sortal predicate applying to it very similar to previous ones. Accordingly, we do not take seriously the use of such abstract nouns as names of objects. The danger or the difficulty Dummett reveals in Fregean theory of names is his notion of an object. Dummett asserts that the Fregean notion of object is so complex and abstruse that it would eventually be reduced to absurdity. This would happen because serious objects were overwhelmed by frivolous and spurious ones is thus averted. Having said that Dummett equally is satisfied with Fregean notion of a proper name in principle capable of being supplied with precise criteria which are formal and linguistic in the sense that he needs to accord with his outlook. Accordingly, Dummett acknowledges that Frege has reconstructed language with the background of his *Begriffsschrift*. The reconstructed language helps Frege a lot to offer a definitive

account that can be used as a sharp tool in the analysis of the semantics of our natural language.

In summing up, we can say that Fregean semantics based on a proper name has multi-dimensional philosophical facets which would enhance and add to the scope of language under the orbit of the term 'proper name'. We think the Fregean notion of the proper name holds the centrality of the overall perception of a proper name. He not only broadens the concept of a proper name by incorporating others' views, he even goes beyond that by adding some new concepts, namely, the concept of adjectival, substantival, different levels of generality, thoughts, and levels of thought to illuminate the concept of a proper name. Thus in a sense, his concept of a proper name is wide enough and comprehensive and he actually puts emphasis on the mode of presentation more and more linguistic terms under the realm of the vocabulary of proper names. This does not make sense to say that he by doing all these things has deviated from his inaugural promise of semantics initiated with the term Concept-Notation and elementary mathematics and logic. We think by doing all these things Frege eventually survived to retain his semantic stance that the problem of meaning is eventually solved just by knowing the truth-value of the sentence under consideration. This is his philosophical strategy and we think that Frege retains it within his comprehensive framework of semantics in general and proper name in particular.

1.7: Comparison among Frege, Mill and Russell:

So far we have outlined and examined the concept of a proper name after Frege. Frege developed the classical theory of proper name along with Mill and Russell. So at the end of this chapter, a passing remark would be philosophically worthy if we engage

ourselves in a comparative study, in brief, between Mill, Russell, and Frege. Simplistically, the classical theory of proper names had been inaugurated by Mill in his book, *A System of Logic*[31] where he classified proper names into various categories. However, in the present context, we can say summarily that Mill has outlined three fundamental characteristics of a proper name in his above-cited book. These are as follows:

a) A proper name must be singular.

b) It is always placed in the subject position of a subject-predicate sentence.

c) It has denotation but no connotation in the sense that it denotes an object without ascribing any property of the object under consideration.

For example, 'Paul', 'the emperor of Rome', 'man', and 'whiteness' are all names according to Mill. By considering 'Paul' as a name, Mill does not ascribe any property to 'Paul', rather he conceives 'Paul' simply as a referring expression having no ascription.

Now, if we pass on to Russell, we find different senses of a proper name. Russell in his tiny article, 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description'[32] finds a subtle distinction, unlike other classical thinkers, between an ordinary proper name and a logically proper name. Russell then claims that a logically proper name is known by

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[31] Mill, J. S., *A system of logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive*, 1843.

[32] Russell, Bertrand, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description" in *The problems of Philosophy,* Henry Holt and Company: New York, 1912.

acquaintance, whereas an ordinary proper name is known by description. Russell then ponders that a logically proper name is a genuine proper name, unlike an ordinary proper name. For him, an ordinary proper name, though looks like a proper name, is a *disguised description*. So, according to Russell, a genuine proper name would not be an ordinary proper name but only a logically proper name. He then subscribes demonstrative pronouns, i.e., 'this', 'that', 'it', etc. as the candidate of logical proper name. He then concludes by saying, "A name in the strict sense of the term can never be a description, and a description in the strict sense of the term can never be a name".

On the basis of that he then characterizes the fundamental features of logically proper names which are as follows:

> a) A proper name is a singular name.

> b) It is the name of a particular.

> c) It can take the position of the subject alone.

> d) It is devoid of all descriptive content.

> e) It is applicable only to what is presently given in acquaintance.

Now, if we compare Russell with Mill, we find that what Mill has said about a proper name is very much present in what Russell has said about a logically proper name. Even though Mill has characterized three attributes of a proper name and Russell has characterized five attributes of a proper name, a careful study would reflect that the other two attributes of a proper name which Russell mentioned, but Mill did not mention, are inherent or embedded in Mill's perception of a proper name. But like

Russell, Mill did not classify proper names as a logical and ordinary proper names. When Russell talks about an ordinary proper name, his apprehension of it is different from Mill's. Russell affirms descriptive content of ordinary proper name which is unlikely in the case of Mill. For example, according to Mill, 'Paul' is a proper name because the name 'Paul', Mill does not ascribe any connotative meaning. But 'Paul', according to Russell, would be an ordinary proper name having descriptive content. Like 'Paul', Russell takes 'Socrates' as an ordinary proper name having descriptive content.

Now coming back to Frege. As we have already seen that Frege's idea of a proper name is comprehensive. Frege's idea of a proper name is based on the sense or the mode of presentation of the term. Frege did not classify proper names like Russell as ordinary and logically proper names. Rather his concept of the proper name includes all linguistic items having a sense or mode of presentation. A proper name, for Frege, is a name of an object. By 'a name of an object', Frege means a name of a single object. So in this context, we claim that like Mill and Russell, Frege takes a proper name to be a singular name and thus accepts the thesis that a proper name is a singular name as expounded by both Mill and Russell. But unlike Russell and Mill, Frege does not explain what he actually means by the object. For Frege, an object is that which is not a concept and for him, a concept is that which corresponds to the predicate in a statement that constitutes the reference of the predicate. A concept, Frege further says, can be converted into an object. The concept 'horse' is easily formed 'the concept horse' which takes the subject position does not occur as a concept, rather it occurs as an object. According to Russell, thesis (a) entails thesis (b). That means, if a name is a singular name, it would be a name

of a particular. Accordingly, to affirm (a) and denies (b) leads to a contradiction. But Frege does not think so. So Frege disagrees with Russell. For Frege, a name may be singular without being a name of a particular. It will be possible only if we allow universals can be the bearer of the name. This possibility was envisaged by Mill when he recognized a class of names that are singular as well as abstract. If the singular abstract names are not called proper names, Frege quips, Mill, which seems to be due to what is more than an arbitrary decision. On the contrary, if Russell defines a proper name as a name of a particular then he does so only in his later *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, and thereby he allows the possibility of there being proper names of universal in his earlier book, *The Problems of Philosophy*, where he clearly subscribes that universals are one of the kinds of entities with which we can be acquainted.

As far as thesis (c), Russell maintains that a proper name can occur only as of the subject in a statement. If we carefully scrutinize this, there we find a complete agreement between Russell and Frege and disagreement between both of them and Mill. We think, Frege believes, as Russell does, that the subject and predicate are strictly *irreversible*. That a proper name that can figure as a subject can never figure as a predicate and vice-versa. Regarding the Russellian thesis (e) concerning acquaintance, we find a subtle discrepancy between Mill and Russell on the one hand and Frege on the other. This can be vividly comprehended if we compare thesis (e) with thesis (d), namely, that a proper name is devoid of all descriptive content. Frege maintains, as we know, that a proper name has both a sense and a reference and what he means by sense, we may claim, comes so close to what is called *connotation* by Mill and what is called *descriptive meaning* by Russell. As we have already stated after Frege that a proper name is the

mode of presentation of the object of which it is a name. Thus for Frege, the mode of presentation is the aspect under which the object is presented to us and what is presented to us is nothing but the reference of a name.

So what we gathered from the above is that Mill completely ignores the connotative meaning of a proper name and he did not ascribe any property whatsoever while outlining the characteristics of a proper name. If we pass on to Russell then we can say that Mill's idea of the proper name has closer proximity to Russell's idea of a logically proper name and a subtle distinction reveals when we compare Mill's idea of a proper name with Russell's idea of an ordinary proper name. Of course, Russell did not consider an ordinary proper name a genuine proper name. So in this regard, we can say that both Mill and Russell offer us the no-sense theory of proper name because their perception of proper name lacks connotative meaning or mode of presentation, or descriptive meaning. But in Frege, we find a different approach altogether to the concept of a proper name. Frege's simplistic characteristic of a proper name is that it has a mode of presentation that he technically calls *sense* (*Sinn*). So unlike Mill and Russell, Frege develops a sense theory of proper names. Having said that, we claim that Mill, Russell, and Frege's view of the proper name altogether has been designated as the classical theory of proper name that has been vehemently challenged by the later development of proper name known as the causal theory of proper name as expounded by Saul Kripke, Hillary Putnam, Marcus, and others. As it is not the content of our discussion, I leave this section with the comparison between Frege, Mill, and Russell.

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Chapter Two

Sense and Reference as the Criterion of Meaning

In the previous sequel, I have outlined, after Frege, the concept of the proper name as well as its philosophical implication and dimensional notation, and impact on post-Fregean tradition. Frege conceives the concept of the proper name as *singular terms*. It should be pointed out here that the concept of singular term alternatively amplified as a proper name in the arena of philosophy of language in general and semantics, in particular, has played a significant role. Frege initially was predisposed by logic and elementary mathematics and on the basis of this background, he developed 'Concept-Notation' (*Begriffsschrift*). The items of his 'Concept-Notation' are singular terms alternatively known as proper names. To me, it is a general perception prevailing among the whole host of semanticists that the vocabulary of formal language is nothing but singular terms containing names and descriptions. However, the very nature of names and descriptions still remains problematic even today. We have seen in the previous sequel that Frege himself was in a turmoil state of mind about the dimension and the philosophical implication of the proper name. However, there is no question of doubt that as a father of modern philosophers, Fregean semantics notes a multi-dimensional impact on post-Fregean thinkers.

In this sequel, our strategy is to explain and outline the Fregean insightful article 'On Sense and Meaning' ('Uber Siṅṅ and Bedeutung', 1892). The terms *sense* and *meaning* have many synonymous notations. It is at par with denotation and connotation, de re and de dicto, extension, and intension (Carnap). Frege himself uses the term *sense* with regard to 'mode of presentation'. The German word 'Bedeutung' stands for reference

and the German word 'Uber Siṅṅ' stands for *sense* or mode of presentation. In the older translation, it was translated as *nominatum* or occasionally translated as denotation. It means 'meaning'. It should be kept in mind that the sense or mode of presentation of a proper name is not at par with the *meaning.* Thus in my sense, 'On Sense and Meaning' is at par with 'On Sense and Denotation'. It is further noted that Frege uses *Bedeutung* with its ordinary meaning of 'meaning' currently uses as *reference*. However, Frege, I do reckon, uses the term *Bedeutung* in a somewhat wider sense from how *reference* is typically used. Fregean understanding of reference is more like *semantic value.*

The main objective of Frege's 'On Sense and Reference' is primarily concerned with the question of how the sense (mode of presentation) of a sign (name) is related to the meaning (reference) which is expressed by the sign. In this regard, Frege deeply engages with the question of how the object which is designated by a sign is related to the meaning which is expressed by the sign. Interestingly, Frege subscribes that changes in the sense or mode of presentation of a sign may change the meaning of the sign. He then describes how changes in the sense of a sign may also change the sense of the presentation in which the sign is contained. Thus the prologue of this sequel is to develop the relation between sense and reference and the relation between significance and meaning after Frege.

There is no question of doubt that Frege's article brings a philosophical message in order to address and overcome two philosophical puzzles, namely, the puzzle concerning the identity and the puzzle concerning empty proper names.

Let me explain each of these puzzles in turn.

2.1: The Puzzle of Identity:

Long back Leibniz had introduced the concept of identity in the name of the *Principle of Indiscernible*. This principle of identity known as the Principle of Indiscernible was in the form of a=a. It means that everything is identical to itself. But this principle of identity appears inadequate later in the tradition of philosophy of language. Within the sphere of language, it appears that two or more sentences having different meanings (senses) may have the same referent. This problem cannot be solved by the Principle of Indiscernible. Frege's 'On Sense and Meaning' appears as a solution to resolve this puzzle. By bringing the concept of informative identity, Frege gives an adequate solution to this puzzle. Before illuminating the puzzle, let me explain Frege's concept of sense and reference by citing examples.

By the term 'sense', Frege means the *mode of presentation* or the meaning of the sentence. Let me clarify it by citing the example, 'the morning star' and 'the evening star'. 'The morning star' is an expression and 'the evening star' is an expression. The meaning or sense or mode of presentation of these expressions are different. The expression 'the morning star' means a star rising in the morning and the expression 'the evening star' means the star rising in the evening. Therefore, the sense or meaning of these expressions is distinctly different. But their reference is the same. Both of these sentences refer to the same object, namely, 'Venus'. Thus, it appears problematic to the semanticists because the concept of identity available to them before the appearance of 'On sense and Meaning' fail to explain this concept. Frege introduced the relation of informative identity expressed in the form of 'a=b'. A sentence of the form 'a=b' is informative in the sense that even though the meaning of 'a' and 'b' are different just

like 'the morning star' and 'the evening star', they refer to the same object just like 'Venus'. It is informative in the sense that if we do not know the fact what 'a' stands for and what 'b' stands for we are no longer in a position to say that a=b. Likewise, if we do not know the reference of the morning star as well as the reference of the evening star, we are no longer in a position to say that each of them refers to the object Venus. Thus Fregean informative identity expressed in the form of 'a=b' differs from the Leibnizian principle of Indiscernible expressed in the form of 'a=a' in the sense that they have different cognitive meanings. The former is informative and the latter is obvious. The former is based on the matter of discovery, the latter is not based on the matter of discovery.

The sense of an expression has been explained as that ingredient of its meaning which is relevant to the determination of the truth or falsity of a sentence in which it occurs. Thus in a strict sense, sense or mode of presentation is not the same as meaning. In our sense, the meaning of the sentence and the sense of the sentence is different in nature. The meaning of the sentence is deeply associated with truth whereas the sense of the sentence is the ingredient of the meaning. Fregean semantics is primarily associated with *the semantic value of the expression.*[33] According to Michael Dummett, many philosophers are often confused by considering the sense of the sentence very similar to the meaning of the sentence. One might say that the meaning of a sentence cannot by itself determine its truth or falsity at least in a general sense. Hence for them, the sense of the words can determine only the conditions for its truth and not its truth-value. The condition of truth leads to the truth which is the essence of semantic value. However,

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[33] Dummett, Michael, *Truth and Other Enigmas*, Duckworth: London, 1978, p. 21.

truth is not at par with the condition of truth-value. According to Dummett, the semantic value of an expression was so explained that the semantic value of words composing a sentence will together determine it as true or false. When it is assumed that the contribution of extra-linguistic reality is being taken into account, the notion of semantic value depends upon the assumption of the fundamental principle of semantics. Thus, it seems to us that the sense or mode of presentation of words or expression plays an important role in Fregean semantics to provide the ingredient of meaning or truth.

Now let us spell out the importance of sense with regard to the puzzle of identity.

At the very outset of sense and reference, identity gives rise to a challenging question. The puzzle raised by the identity sentence is that even though 'the morning star' and 'the evening star' have the same reference – the planet Venus, the sense of the sentence 'The morning star is the morning star' and 'The morning star is the evening star' are quite different. The first sentence is self-referential and very obvious to all without exception. Whereas the second sentence is informative and it may be true to one, may be false to one, and even may be unknown to one. They seem, as Frege says, to differ in cognitive value. The first sentence is trivial and a priori and the second one seems a posteriori and could express a valuable extension of knowledge. According to Frege, the second one expresses an astronomical discovery that took substantial empirical work to make. While outlining the distinction between these two sentences, Frege in his *Begriffsschrift* (Concept-Notation) remarks, "Equality of content differs from conditionality and negation by relating to names, not to contents. Elsewhere, signs are mere proxies for their content, and thus any phrase they occur in just expresses a relation between their various contents; but names at once appear in propria persona so soon as

they are joined by the symbol for equality of content; for this signifies the circumstance of two names' having the same content. Thus, along with the introduction of a symbol for equality of content, all symbols are necessarily given a double meaning – the same symbols stand now for their own content, now for themselves".[34] Frege in his *Begriffsschrift* assumed that the cognitive value of a=a becomes essentially equal to that of a=b provided that a=b is true. Thus, a difference can only arise if the difference between the signs corresponds to a difference in the mode of presentation of that which is designated. Frege understands a sign at par with a name or combination of words or later. The sign refers to what may be called the reference of the sign. For Frege, the reference of 'Evening Star' would be the same as 'Morning Star' but not the sense.[35]

It seems to us that Frege takes the puzzle of identity to pose a problem for the view that *identity is a relation.* For if a=b is true a is b. How can the two sides of the statement of identity differ in a way that is compatible with informativeness? If identity is a relation between objects, it seems that only the objects named by 'a' and 'b' can be relevant to the informativeness of the statement. But then if *a is b* how can it differ in *cognitive value* from a=a? Previously, Frege took this as indicating that a statement of identity which is *not a statement of a relation between objects, but a statement of a relation between names of objects.* Thus it seems as if this might yield a solution to the puzzle of identity, then different signs appear on the two sides of 'a=b'. Whereas the same sign

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[34] See Frege, Gottlob, 'Conceptual Notation. A Formula Language of Pure Thought'*, in Conceptual Notation and Related Articles*, ed. by T. W. Bynum, Oxford, 1972.

[35] Frege, Gottlob, *Nachgelassene Schriften*, ed. by H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, F. Kaulbach, Hamburg, 1969, p. 57.

appears on the two sides of 'a=a'. In the sentence 'a=b', there are two signs, such as, 'a' and 'b' whereas in the identical sentence 'a=a' there is only one sign, namely, 'a'.

Now, Frege says that he no longer intends to take this view, for if 'a=b' were merely a statement about the names 'a' and 'b', it would then express no proper knowledge because nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrarily producible event or object as a sign for something. It is possible to see what Frege is getting it. If 'a=b' is a statement about the names 'a' and 'b', it can only mean that there is something that is named both 'a' and 'b'. But if this is not true, then one can make it true simply by stipulating that henceforth one will use 'b' as a name for 'a'. Then it will be true that there is something named both 'a' and 'b'. But what was originally claimed is that 'a=b' could not be made true by such a stipulation, since this was not merely that the signs 'a' and 'b' designated the same object, but contrary to Frege's earlier view, a claim about the object themselves. So the puzzle of identity as to *how it can be both true and informative.* One may say that Frege's argument that the puzzle of identity could not possibly be explained by differences between the signs flanking the identity symbol considered. Here Frege remarks that it is only as objects, not as signs. Such a difference is neither necessary nor sufficient for a true identity statement to be informative.

It thus seems that the puzzle of identity is generated by the fact that such a statement can be *informative* and that such statements need not be *analytic or a priori*. In this regard, Frege subscribes that it may often contain every valuable *extension of our knowledge.* The problem so far we reveal here is that if identity is a relation between objects, then in such a case it looks as if 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' (a=b) and 'Hesperus is Hesperus' (a=a) assert that exactly the same relation obtains a relation between Venus

and itself. Here, the former is informative, whereas the latter is non-informative. So the problem is: how can the former be informative and the latter a mere instance of the law of identity? How can one have a different *cognitive value* from the other? Frege himself once held in his *Begriffsschrift* that identity was not a relation between objects as it appears to be the case. If identity was taken as a relation between objects then we involve in a puzzle. Frege reveals it very well. Instead of conceiving identity as not a relation between objects, he conceives that identity is a relation between names. Thus we can say, after Frege, that 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' (a=b) was supposed to mean something like the names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' has the same denotation. However, one thing should be kept in mind Frege here understands the relationship between a name and its bearer in an *arbitrary* or conventional sense by bringing his very idea of thought. Still, we are not sure enough what actually prompted Frege to bring the problem of identity in the case of the Principle of Indiscernible expounded long back by Leibniz. It seems clear to me that Frege faces a problem to accommodate two sentences having different senses but the same reference under the realm of the Leibnizian Principle of Indiscernible. But Frege's own interpretation of the theory of identity needs further clarification to illuminate his underlying intention of the same. This issue is particularly relevant here to move further. Indeed Frege's theory of identity appears in his *Begriffsschrift* and has been criticized by many contemporary semanticists. At least three charges have been raised regarding the same. First, it has been alleged that the information contained in an identity statement that appears in the *Begriffsschrift* can only be the trivial information that the linguistic community has adopted. Linsky (1967) and Kneale and Kneale (1962) expressed serious doubt about

the substantial information associated with the informative identity (such as a=a). For them, the substantial information embodied in a genuine discovery about the world is often susceptible. Secondly, it has been alleged that the *Begriffsschrift* theory is circular or that it involves a vicious infinite regress. This charge has been raised by Russell (1903b), Wiggins (1905), Kneale, and Kneale (1962). For them, the very dimension of informative identity may have an indefinite and unidentifiable application that perhaps would vitiate the sanctity of identity as such. Thirdly, it has been alleged that the *Begriffsschrift* is flawed by use-mention confusion. This is a popular charge that has been raised mostly by the pragmatists against the semanticists. In this regard, I do refer to the charge raised by P. F. Strawson against Russell. In a very similar way, Church (1951) criticizes Frege.

2.2: The Notion/Understanding of Conceptual Content (*Begrifflichen Inhalt*):

We think that the above charges cannot be adequately sorted out after Frege so long we do not explicate the conceptual content of the underlying identity statement. In chapter eight of *Begriffsschrift*, Frege defines the *identity of content* as follows: ' ⊦A=B' means that 'the symbol A and the symbol B have the same conceptual content so that A can always be replaced by B and conversely'.[36] Here, the symbol for the identity of content '≡' was part of the object language. It represents a relation that holds between expressions instead of their content. In this regard, Frege says, "Whilst elsewhere symbols simply represent their contents, so that each combination into which they enter merely expresses a relation between their contents, they at once stand for themselves as

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[36] Frege, Gottlob, *Begriffsschrift*, 1879, p. 64.

soon as they are combined by the symbol for the identity of content; for this signifies (*bezeichnet*) the circumstance that two names have the same content".[37] Critics find systematic ambiguity in Fregean names appears in *Begriffsschrift*. Frege elsewhere claims that the identity of content alone among the logical constants relates to expressions but he fails to provide adequate justification in supporting his claim. In fact, this was not his primary concern. His primary concern is to justify the term relation appears in *Begriffsschrift*. In fact, Frege chooses to take the identity of content as a relation between expressions to deal with the *Paradox of identity.* So he must hold a substitution principle to account for the cognitive content of identities. According to Frege, syntactically '$\equiv$' is indistinguishable from '$=$'. Informally, the identity of content appears to be no different from identity. For Frege, '$X \equiv Y$' means that X is the same number as Y. Frege then asserts that singular terms are said to have conceptual content. This is not only the Fregean affirmation. Almost all semanticists and logicians believe that singular terms do not lack conceptual content. We noticed it in elementary predicate logic where we apply Universal Instantiation (UI) and Existential Instantiation (EI) on universal and particular propositions respectively concerning singular terms. Such singular terms are designated either as individual constants (a-w) or as individual variables (x,y,z). They are singular terms either designating a concrete non-ambiguous individual/object or an unidentified individual name or object. But they do not lack conceptual content. Frege uses '$\equiv$' to express the circumstance that two sentences have

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[37] Ibid, p. 64.

the same conceptual content and each of them may be replaced either by singular terms or by sentences.

Frege further contends that if α and β have the same *conceptual content* then Sα and Sα/β have the same conceptual content. Earlier on we stated after Frege that 'A≡B' means 'A can always be replaced by B and conversely'. Here, the replacement always preserves *conceptual content.* As the replacement or substitution preserves conceptual content, it would *ipso-facto* preserve the same truth-value. Accordingly, we can say that if {('A≡B' and 'B≡C') → 'A≡C'}. This reminds us that the principle of identity, whether obvious or informative will always be reflexive, symmetric as well as transitive. Here Frege claims when α and β are both singular terms, α≡β appears to have the same truth-condition as α=ß. Here α and ß stand for the same object. However, we are yet to clarify what the sameness of conceptual content amounts to when α and β are both sentences.

Let me explain the semantic theory Frege held in *Begriffsschrift*. According to this theory, a sentence stands for its content (*Inhalt*). This is understood to be a thought. That means, to know the content of the sentence is to know the sense of the sentence with a thought. This is where the relevance of sense/reference distinction actually hinges. According to Frege, it is more like a state of affairs or a circumstance something could be obtained. The sentence stands for its content. It is a proxy for its content. Accordingly, the parts of the sentence stand for corresponding parts of the content of the sentence. The resulting sentence should have the same content as the original. Only that portion of the content of a sentence that counted for inference is what Frege calls the *conceptual content* (*Begrifflichen Inhalt*) of the sentence. Frege says, "Note that the

contents of two judgments can differ in two ways: either the conclusions that can be drawn from one when combined with certain others also always follow from the second when combined with the same judgments, or else this is not the case. The two propositions 'At Plataea, the Greeks defeated the Persians' and 'At Plataea, the Persians were defeated by the Greeks' differ firstly. Even if a slight difference in the sense can be discerned, the agreement predominates. Now I call that part of the content that is the *same* in both the *conceptual content*. Since *only this* has significance for the *Begriffsschrift*, no distinction is needed between propositions that have the same conceptual content".[38]

It thus seems to me that Frege here attempts to find out the sameness of conceptual content in additional premises. Before Frege, the concept of identity is not associated with additional premise/s. The Leibnizian principle of identity is confined to the name itself or object itself. He discovered the principle of identity of indiscernible in the form of a=a. But in Frege, we are talking of a=b just by adding an additional premise namely 'b' with regard to 'a' based on the sameness of conceptual content. When we say that a=b, after Frege, we can *ipso-facto* claim that one is inferable from the other without vitiating truth-value. Of course, the condition for sameness of conceptual content applies only to a "possible content of judgment (*beurtheilbar Inhalt*)" associated with the declarative sentence. Frege in his *Begriffsschrift* explicitly stipulated the conditions under which two singular terms *were to have* the same conceptual content. According to Frege, two singular terms having the same conceptual content have designated the same object. This clearly suggests that he brings the concept of conceptual content with

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regard to a singular term that designates an identified object. Accordingly, we can subscribe, after Frege, that two singular terms having the same conceptual content may replace one with another in a given sentence having the same conceptual content as the original. This position is stated with the principle as follows:

If Sα is about r (α), then if r (α) = r (β) then Sα has the same conceptual content as

Sα/β.

2.3: Cognitive Value and Conceptual Content:

The question then is in what sense does conceptual content differs from cognitive value? Is there any relationship between conceptual content and cognitive value? In what sense does a=a lack cognitive value? Does a=a have conceptual content as well as cognitive value? In response to these questions, we can say that the Leibnizian principle of identity appeared in the form of a=a lacks conceptual content and cognitive value as well. What is obvious without exception cannot have conceptual content and cognitive value. Here, I can refer to Ludwig Wittgenstein who in his book, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* says that tautologies and self-contradictories say nothing. Similarly, the Leibnizian principle of identity, to my mind, says nothing. It is obvious without seeking any justification and clarification. Its truth value is not the by-product of our mental construction. On the other hand, Fregean informative identity has cognitive value because it is directly associated with *conceptual content*. So I do reckon that Fregean identification of sense and reference associated with informative identity is based on the philosophical background of conceptual content. Frege has been regarded as a conceptualist like so many other semanticists. But conceptualism again is a debatable issue. Somebody says in favor of a unified core of conceptual scheme while somebody

other has asserted just the opposite. Kant, for example, in his *Critique of Pure Reason* talks in favor of categories of understanding based on which a unified core of conceptual scheme has been developed. Following Kant, P. F. Strawson in his book, *Individuals* talks in favor of a unified core conceptual scheme based on which successful communication between the speaker and the hearer is made possible while identifying the particulars of the world. Thus, we have a strong philosophical background of conceptualism adequately documented in Kant's philosophy followed by Strawson, and alternatively and in different senses expounded by Quine, Davidson, and others. Here in Frege, we noticed conceptual content based on which the cognitive value of the informative identity appears in the form of a=b is justified. Besides, it is also important to note here how the conceptual content associated with a singular term, such as, 'a' as well as 'b' can equally be overlapped in their composite form as stated previously (If Sα is about r (α), then if r (α) = r (β), then Sα has the same conceptual content as Sα/β). Conceptual content is a sort of intuitive notion of the content of a sentence eventually extended to a function of argument structure. But critics are very often sceptical about the substantiality of Fregean conceptual content upon which cognitive value depends. For them, it would perhaps be the case that singular terms having the same conceptual content in a sentence did not have the same conceptual content as the original. This divergence is made possible because of various conceptual schemes advocated by various linguistic philosophers.

Thus, for Frege 'a=a' is logically true whereas 'a=b' is contingently true. Even though they could not have the same conceptual content but they may have the same conceptual content. Two names have the same conceptual content if both of them say of the same

object that they stand in the same relation. But still, we can say that 'a=a' and 'a=b' are different because the former is logically true where conceptual content plays no role and the latter is contingently true where conceptual content plays an important role. As a result of that, they could not be mutually inferable. Frege, in fact, subscribes to this problem as purely logical to identity by way of reinterpreting identity as a relation between expressions. However, he does not consider a=b as a relation between expressions. Thus for Frege, the content of the logically true identity differs from that of the contingently true identity. This is how Frege subscribes to his own semantic framework. According to Frege, the identity of relation is not associated with thought whereas the identity of conceptual content is deeply entangled with thought-process. It is 'a formula language of pure thought'.[39] As Frege's semantics is based on his *Concept-Notation* (*Begriffsschrift*), he understands the concept of identity with regard to conceptual content where the language of pure thought has a significant role to play. Thus for Frege, 'a=a' and 'a=b' differ in conceptual content only because of what now appears to be the pure *ad hoc* device of having 'a' and 'b' stand for themselves. The information thus obtained is of very limited applicability. As Frege gives importance to the formula language of pure thought, he does not make any difference between the active and passive voices of the same sentence. According to Frege, the active and passive pair of the same sentence does not make any difference in conceptual content level. That means the conceptual content of a sentence expressed in the active voice would remain the same if the same sentence is expressed in the passive voice. Thus, Frege ignores this grammatical distinction in his *Begriffsschrift* and symbolizes each in

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[39] Mendelsohn, Richard L., *The Philosophy of Gottlob Frege*, Cambridge University Press: USA, 2005, p. 45.

the same way. This philosophical position of Frege actually goes against a well-established philosophical commitment that "names are meaningless marks, arbitrarily chosen labels or tags that simply stand for objects but otherwise carry no meaning".[40] It is just this assumption that Frege rejected in *Begriffsschrift*. Frege urges that different names for the same content are not always just a trivial matter of formulation, but touch the very heart of the matter if they are connected with different modes of determination. Frege illustrated it like the following: Fix a point 'A' lying on the circumference of a given circle and pass a straight line through 'A', extending the line so that it intersects with the circle. This point of intersection, which we call 'B', obviously depends upon the position of the straight line, so that as the line is rotated about A, B varies accordingly. This clearly reflects the insight of the Fregean descriptive semantic based on sense and reference. So far we have seen that the distinction between sense and reference is immanent to solve the problem of identity or to resolve the puzzle of identity. We have observed that the puzzle of identity is that a proposition asserting identity can be both true and informative. This demand for meaning makes the principle of identity contextual and Frege himself claims the credit for it. The Fregean resolution of the puzzle, as we observe, appealing to the sense-reference distinction, is that a proposition asserting identity will be true if the singular terms flanking the sign of identity have the same reference, but will be *informative* if the terms have different senses – different ways of determining the common reference as Frege illuminated in his celebrated article 'On Sense and Meaning'. Of course, Frege while establishing the position of 'sense and reference' looked back to his earlier discussion in *Concept-*

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[40] Ibid, p. 46.

Notation (*Begriffsschrift*). It helps to determine the content of the sense of the term under discussion. Frege in this regard involves a tripartite distinction between (a) a sign, (b) its content, and (c) a way of determining that content. Such tripartite distinction located in *Concept –Notation* profusely helped Frege to design an identity proposition. Further, we have also seen that Frege takes the puzzle of identity to pose a problem for the view that identity is a relation. The advantage of conceiving identity as a relation is that it can help to develop informativeness of the statement consisting of 'a' and 'b' expressed in the form of a=b. Further, Frege previously took this as indicating that a statement of identity was not a statement of a relation between objects, but a statement of a relation between *names of objects.* Now he says that he no longer wishes to take this view, for if 'a=b' were merely a statement of the names 'a' and 'b', it would express no proper knowledge simply because nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrarily producible event as a sign for something. Thus we may conclude, after Frege, by saying that an identity statement can be informative whether or not the sign on the left side i.e., in our case 'a' is the same as the sign on the right side i.e., in our case 'b' when we use 'a=b'. Here, *neither the sign (name) nor the reference (what name denotes) is crucial. What is crucial is the sense, i.e., the mode of presentation of the reference.*

Based on the above observation regarding the puzzle of identity, we can sum up the following -

(a) 'The Evening Star = The Evening Star' and 'The Evening Star = The Morning star' differ in cognitive value (the puzzle of identity).

(b) The sense of 'The Evening Star = The Evening Star' is not the same as the sense of 'The Evening Star = The Morning Star'.

(c) The sense of 'The Evening Star' is not the same as the sense of 'The Morning Star'.

(d) The reference to 'The Evening Star' is the same as the reference to 'The Morning Star'.

(e) The sense of 'The Evening Star' is not the same as the reference of 'The Evening Star' (*mutatis mutandis* for 'The Morning Star').

2.4: The Puzzle of Empty Proper Name:

The concept of an empty proper name is a knotty problem of philosophy in general and within the realm of semantics in particular. It is a general perception particularly to the realists or those who have a firm foothold on real objects that we can talk of only those objects which we can experience through our senses or that we can verify within the spatio-temporal framework. Metaphysicians in the past were deeply involved with such noumenal objects where our sense-experience is ineffable to reach up to that. Metaphysicians were comfortable in doing such a philosophy. This actually created a bundle of philosophical problems in the name of the so-called *traditional philosophical problems* for which linguistic revolution or linguistic turn during the first half of the 19th century appeared. There is nothing exaggeration in claiming that metaphysics in general was the targeting point of the linguistic revolution. Metaphysics has been rejected as a meaningless entity for being incapable of expressing them in the sense of truth and falsity. The theme of linguistic revolution is primarily based on the philosophical assumption that all traditional philosophical problems were endangered due to the misinterpretation of language or failure to understand the logic of language.

This is all about history. We anticipated linguistic revolution and under the womb of linguistic revolution we are enquiring that the semantic proposal of language was proper to name as such in different senses are taken to be the legitimate vocabulary of a constructed language. This was the proposal of semanticists in general. But ironically semanticists in general are not free from the duplicity of the interpretation of proper names. It is a matter of history that under the sphere of semantics there are much interpretation of proper names and interestingly every interpretation of proper name was made based on a conscious effort to overcome the problem of empty proper names.

If we go through the literature on proper names within the sphere of semanticists, we will find that there develop two different senses of proper names of which one is philosophically recognized as the sense theory of proper name and the other is philosophically recognized as the no-sense theory of proper name. Those who advocate the sense-theory of proper names would give importance to the sense or meaning or mode of presentation of the proper name. On the contrary, those who give importance to the no-sense theory of proper names give importance to the reference of the proper name. For them, reference alone is the main concern of a proper name. They boil down the possibility of an empty proper name. What I intend to say here is that even the semanticists in general were or are conscious of the philosophical implications of the concept of proper names and they were involved in a tug of war regarding the concept of proper names. Even some pragmatists, for example, Strawson in particular were highly against saying something in favor of empty proper names. For them, we can talk of only those objects having existential import or which are real. How can we talk of an object bearing a proper name having no existential import at all? How can we talk of an

object, for example, the round square, which is conceptually inconceivable? How can we talk of an object, for example, a unicorn, which is purely imaginary? All these objects just cited have an independent proper name. For example, the unicorn, golden mountain, round square, etc. are taken as proper names even by the semanticists. In the Fregean sense, each of these objects has a sense or mode of presentation.

Our question is that where lies the logical problem of admitting an empty proper name under the realm of semantics? This is the problem we will first deal with and then will enter into the Fregean position of the problem and the solution of an empty proper name.

The problem of an empty proper name is linked with the concept of negative existentials. It is indeed a serious ontological problem. The problem actually hinges on the distinction between object and concept. Realists or empiricists from Locke onwards confined themselves within the object occupying space and time. On the other hand, there is also a forceful theory where the identification of objects is made possible through concepts. This is where the problem of negative existentials is located. The problem of negative existentials arises when an attempt would be made to recognize objects non-existential objects in the realm of philosophical discussion. The question is: how do we talk of an object having no real existence? Can we talk of an object whose existence is a far cry? Many would say we cannot and many others would say that we can. Thus the problem arises. Those who admit that we cannot talk of the non-existential object would like to say that to talk of an empty proper name is to involve conceptually into logical inconsistency or logical contradiction. For them, to say that "The golden mountain does not exist" is to presuppose beforehand that "There is at least one golden mountain". For them, to talk of any object whatsoever, we cannot rule out the *existential*

import of the object under consideration. Simplistically, how can we talk of an object having no existential import in the real sense of the term. According to P. F. Strawson, it would be simply a pointless or bogus issue to talk of the non-existential object. Summarily, it can be said that to talk of a non-existential object is to involve in a contradiction. The contradiction is as follows-

To talk of the golden mountain does not exist, we have to pre-suppose that there is -

'At least one golden mountain'.

This entails the sentence:

There is at least one golden mountain such that it does not exist.

This is a plain logical contradiction. It is in the form of P. ~P. Thus the problem of negative existentials arises.

To overcome this problem of negative existentials, there are some philosophers, such as Meinong and Russell who came forward to address the issue. Their views in some sense or other go in favor of Frege. Let me explain, in brief, Meinong's and Russell's interpretation of Negative existentials.

2.5: Meinong's View of Negative Existentials:

Meinong in his article 'Object' took a radical philosophical interpretation in favor of admitting non-existential objects into our ontology. Meinong was an absolute ontologist. According to Meinong, it is simply philosophers' prejudice that to talk of an object one has to presuppose beforehand that the object under consideration must be a

real object. According to Meinong, we can talk of any object whatsoever, real or unreal, not based on their existence, but based on the 'concept' or 'logical being'. Meinong here distinguishes between real and unreal objects by bringing the concept 'subsistence'. According to Meinong, a real object exists and an unreal object *subsists*. Thus by bringing the concept of subsistence, Meinong thus incorporates non-existential objects into our ontology. According to Meinong, there are three different levels of an object, such as the empirical level, the metaphysical level, and the ontological level. For example, when we talk of an object, such as, 'The table is made up of wood', the name 'table' belongs to the empirical level occupying space; 'the being of the table' belongs to the metaphysical level. It deals with *being-qua being.* It is called an ideal object. The metaphysical level, which deals with *being-qua-being*, is higher than the empirical level according to Meinong. The third level is the ontological level which goes beyond the metaphysical level as it is neither being nor non-being, it deals with the 'table as such'.

Based on that Meinong claims that we can talk of a non-existential object because our talking of a non-existential object is not at all associated with existence, philosophers are talking of rather our talking of non-existential object is based on the concept of logical being actually originated from a pure object located in the ontological level.

2.6: Russell's Interpretation of Negative Existentials:

Initially, Bertrand Russell was the proponent of Meinong regarding the problem of negative existentials. But after the publication of his *theory of definite description*, Russell gives a new interpretation of negative existentials. According to Russell, philosophical analysis is acceptable based on the criterion of meaningfulness. In this regard, Russell stands the philosophical position of logical positivism. However,

Russell through his theory of definite description offers us an innovative interpretation of the problem of negative existentials. According to Russell, every sentence expressed in the form of 'the-so-and-so' must be meaningful whether it is associated with a real or unreal object. Let me explain this by citing an example after Russell. The sentence:

'The golden mountain is beautiful'

is in the form of 'the-so-and-so'. Accordingly, the sentence under consideration, according to Russell, must be meaningful even though the object as expressed by the name 'golden mountain' does not exist. The original sentence is logically analysed as:

(i)   There is at least one golden mountain, such that…

(ii)   There is at most one golden mountain, such that…

(iii)   There is exactly one golden mountain, such that…

According to Russell, the original sentence is the conjunction of (i), (ii), and (iii). (i) is false because there is no golden mountain. Accordingly, the conjunction of (i), (ii), and (iii) is false. Accordingly, the original sentence is false. What is false is meaningful. Accordingly, the original sentence is meaningful. This is how Russell shows that any empty proper name which is expressed in the form of 'the-so-and-so' through a sentence must be meaningful.

2.7: Fregean Interpretation of the Problem of an Empty Proper Name:

Based on the above background, let me explain Fregean interpretation of the problem of empty proper names broadly coming under the purview of negative existentials. Like Russell, Frege also attempts to solve the problem of an empty proper name. I have already outlined the view of Meinong as well as Russell. Meinong has been regarded as

an absolute ontologist and from the ontological perspective, he defends the relevance of non-existential objects. Russell from a semantic perspective subscribes that empty proper names can be comprehended as logically meaningful. In my sense, the position of Russell has close proximity to Frege, because both Frege and Russell offer us a descriptive account of naming theory. However, Frege's attempts, to me, are altogether different from Russell's. Frege takes the mode of presentation of the proper name as the lone criterion to incorporate the reference (loose sense of reference) of empty proper names. At the very outset, Frege sticks to his general principle that the fundamental characteristic of a proper name is to have its sense or mode of presentation. By the term mode of presentation, Frege actually means to say that the mode of presentation of a proper name is nothing but the way of representing it in various sets up of language.

While talking of empty proper names, we have to dig out Fregean senses of reference. Reference is the inevitable content of a proper name. Frege himself uses the twin concept in his article 'On Sense and Meaning (reference)'. He understands reference with regard to meaning. Here meaning is understood with regard to truth. What I intend to say here is that sense is inevitably linked with reference. According to Frege, there are different types of reference, such as direct reference and indirect reference. His understanding of direct reference is not at all problematic to Frege and others. But he brings the concept of *indirect reference* in order to accommodate the concept of empty proper names. Thus to understand the reference of an empty proper name, we have to understand the insight of his idea of indirect reference. Frege takes an indirect reference as the foundation of semantics even though it contains direct reference as well. To my mind, the theory of direct reference can be justified without knowing the sense of a

proper name. It is based on the principle: "To be a name is to be a name of an object".

On the basis of that no-sense theory of reference has been developed by Mill, Russell, Kripke, Zip, Marcus, etc. According to Mill, a name denotes an object and it is the meaning of the name. For Russell, a logically proper name denotes an object with which we are directly acquainted. For Kripke, a name is a rigid designator that designates the same object in every possible world of an actual world. For Marcus, a name invariably *tags* an object. Even though Frege depends on sense as pivotal to identifying reference of the proper name, we can easily accommodate the so-called reference of proper name under the realm of Fregean direct reference. The novelty of Frege is that he attempts to solve the problem of an empty proper names in particular and the problem of meaning (reference) in general just by way of recognizing the mode of presentation of a proper name, empty or non-empty.

2.8: Indirect Reference as the Paradigm of Fregean Semantics:

I have already mentioned that instead of direct reference Frege applies the concept of indirect reference in his semantics in general. With the concept of indirect reference, Frege solves the problem of identity by bringing the concept of informative identity (a=b) where the principle of substitution would play a key role. The theory of indirect reference, according to Frege, gives rise to a solution to the puzzle of empty singular terms. In this regard, Harold Noonan says, "The theory of indirect reference also evidently yields a solution to the puzzle of how empty singular terms can occur within the context of propositional attitude construction…".[41] According to Noonan, Frege's

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[41] Noonan, Harold W., *Frege: A Critical Introduction*, Polity Press: UK, 2001, p. 188.

concept of indirect reference is so effective that it can help us to determine the truth-value of an empty proper name (empty singular terms). The sentence, for example, "The old professor believes that Odysseus was set ashore on Ithaca while sound asleep" or "That poor mathematician believes that series S is the least rapidly convergent series". In such a context, according to Frege, the reference of the singular term is its *customary sense*. In this customary sense, it is not an empty term at all. Thus Frege brings the concept of *customary sense* to know about the *customary reference* in our term (i.e., indirect reference). While resolving the puzzle of the empty proper name, thus Frege brings 'a more general theory of the context-dependent character of reference'.[42] In this regard, Frege gives an illustration that runs as follows:

If words are used in an ordinary way, what one intends to speak of is their reference. It can also happen, however, that one wishes to talk about the words themselves or their sense. This happens, for instance, when the words of another are quoted. One's own words then first designate words of the other speaker, and only the latter have their usual reference. We then have signs of signs. In writing, the words are in this case enclosed in quotation marks. Accordingly, a word standing between quotation marks must not be taken as having its ordinary reference (1969: 58-59).

According to Frege, while identifying the reference of any name whatsoever, first and foremost we identify it through language by way of getting the sense of the object used in the form of a sentence where the context plays an important role. Thus, the sense of the proper name extracting through the mode of presentation or the meaning of the

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[42] Ibid, p. 188.

sentence (meaning ≠ reference) is significant while solving the problem of reference of any proper name whatsoever. Even when Frege attempted to solve the problem of identity, he emphasized more on the customary context of the sentence under consideration. The sentence, 'The morning star' contains three words. 'The evening star' is used, as it is in the sentence: The evening star is the morning star. Here the name of 'The evening star in the former displayed sentence is not "The evening star"', but merely 'The evening star'. According to Frege, here the name 'The evening Star' is used in 'The evening star' contains three words has semantic value (truth-value) in that context. It is the same type of consideration that allows Frege to conclude that in a propositional attitude context the reference of an expression is its ordinary sense.

Thus we have to distinguish two components within Frege's theory of indirect reference: (a) the thesis that the reference of an expression is different in a propositional attitude context from its customary reference, (b) the thesis that the reference of an expression within a propositional attitude context in an ordinary sense. According to Frege, the general view of reference as context-dependent might be accepted even if it is held that thesis (b) is mistaken. Here, Fregean senses are not to be countered. In this regard, Kaplan puts the point in his influential paper. Here Kaplan says, "My own view is that Frege's explanation…of what appears to be the logically deviant behaviour of terms in indeterminate context is so theoretically satisfying that if we have not yet…satisfactorily grasped the peculiar intermediate object in question, then we should simply continue looking".

Now, if we carefully understand Frege in the real sense of the term, we can say that within the context of a single occurrence of a propositional attitude verb, an expression,

under consideration, refers to its customary sense. In our sense, the Fregean concept of customary sense plays important role in accommodating the concept of empty proper name under the realm of his semantics. According to Frege, an expression containing an empty proper name refers to its customary sense and is at par to say that its sense has indirect reference. Frege, unlike other semanticists, acknowledges thus both customary sense and indirect sense of reference to accommodate empty proper names.

Thus to understand the reference of an empty proper name, we have to understand the concept of indirect reference very clearly. To make it clear let us cite the example given by Russell: "Scott was the author of Waverly" and "George IV wanted to know whether the author of Waverly wrote Waverly". Here, context plays an important role to identify the meaning of the sentence that Quine calls 'opaque' and uses it as substantival clauses, governed by 'that' or 'whether'. What Quine calls 'opaque' is what Frege calls indirect speech (Oratio Obliqua). Such clauses, such as, 'that', and 'whether' are used in the sentence constituting *opaque context* where the verb is related to 'what is said' or 'what is thought'. It is also associated with modal expressions, such as, 'It is necessary…', 'It is possible…', 'It is permitted…', etc. According to Frege, there are other opaque contexts, such as those involving *modal verbs* like 'must', and 'may' and those involving verbs like 'want' and 'look for'. According to Frege, at least in some cases, it is possible to render sentences involving such words by means of sentences in which the opaque context occur only in *substantival clauses*. The advantage of such a transformation is that it becomes possible to differentiate between senses in a perspicuous manner by means of placing quantifiers. Thus we can identify the difference between 'You may write on any page' and 'You may write on every page' is

naturally represented by using the universal quantifier (x) narrating it as For every x, if x is a page, then it is permitted that you write on x. Again, in the second sentence, "It is permitted that for every x if x is a page, you write on x". But unlike these sentences, as discussed above we find ambiguity in a sentence like, "I am looking for a man who has been to Ireland". It can be resolved by asking, "Do you mean a particular man?". It cannot be explained just by using the quantifier as we did in the case of the earlier two sentences.

On the basis of that Frege inclines to say that a proper name, occurring in an opaque context, cannot have its ordinary reference. In the sentence quoted above, about George IV and Scott, 'George IV' indeed stands for a well-known king, but 'Scott' cannot stand. Scott thus elsewhere stands for even man Sir Walter Scott. Accordingly, Scott stands in an opaque context. Frege then says that a proper name occurring in an *opaque context* does not have its usual reference (direct reference), what does it stand for. To answer this, we must enquire what replacement does leave the truth-value of the whole sentence unaltered. If I say, 'John said that Scott wrote Waverly', I do not purport to be giving his actual words. He may have said, 'Sir Walter Scott authorized *Waverly*' or 'Scott had *Waverly* geschrieben'. Here, my statement would still be true. Here I am professing only to give the sense of John's words, the thought which he expressed. We find the same in singular terms occurring within the indirect speech that would apply to the whole sentence occupying the 'that' clause. Normally, according to Frege, we have seen, that the referent of a sentence is its truth value. If you replace a part of a complex expression with another part having the same reference as the one place, the sense of the whole expression may be altered, but its reference remains the same. This is the

main reason for which Frege brings the concept of informative identity expressed in the form of 'a=b'. For example, given that we know what function 'the capital of n' stands for, the reference of 'the capital of Denmark' depends only on the reference, not the sense of the name 'Denmark'. Here the value of the given function actually hinges on its argument, but surely not on how the argument is referred to. So if 'Denmark' is replaced by another singular term having the same reference, say, 'The country of which Hamlet's father was king', the referent of the whole, the city of Copenhagen – must remain unaltered. Thus what Frege intends to say here is that when a sentence occurs with its usual reference, the reference of the whole even in the case of a more complex sentence, must remain unaltered when the constituent sentence is replaced by another with the same reference. In such a case, the truth value of a complex sentence will remain invariant under the replacement of its constituent sentences by others with the same truth value. This is obviously the case when the complex sentence is formed out of its constituents just by (truth-functional) sentential operators. The replacement of a sentence in an indirect speech by another with the same truth value will evidently not in general preserve the truth value of the whole sentence. As a result of that, a sentence occurring in such a clause cannot have its ordinary reference. Moreover, if we ask what replacements are possible without a change of truth-value, to discover what its reference *in such a context is*. Accordingly, we can alter the sentence in the *Oratio Obliqua* clause without changing the *truth-value of the whole* just so long as we do not change the sense of the constituent sentence, so long it continues to express the *same thought.* Thus, the clause Oratio Obliqua used in the sense of indirect reference based on context is deeply associated with the concept of the same thought retaining the same truth-value – the

sole demand of Fregean semantic proposal. This point would be made clear in the next sequel when we deal with the concept of thought after Frege. At present, what we intend to say here is that what Frege calls the 'indirect' referent of a sentence – its referent when it occurs in indirect speech very similar to the case we have cited and discussed in the case of 'Scott' and 'the author of Waverly'. It seems entirely natural to Frege that when we use a sentence in another context, we are using it to express a sense (a thought). But we are not talking *about that thought*. When I say, Frege says, "Jones said that Scott wrote *Waverly*", we are talking about the sense of his words, about the thought which he expressed, and we use the sentence, Frege opines, in the subordinate clause to refer to that thought.

2.9: Indirect Speech as the Mark of Accommodating Empty Proper Name:

It thus seems that Frege brings the concept of indirect speech as the mark of accommodating empty proper names under the realm of his semantics. Of course, by bringing the concept of indirect reference Frege negotiates a bit about the strict demand of reference at par with other semanticists, but he does not negotiate at all with the general perception of the sense of the proper name in the strict sense of the term. What he intends to say here is that under his semantic proposal there is no point in saying that the term reference needs to be understood in the general sense. This does not make sense to say Frege ignores the relevance of reference in his semantic proposal. He brings the concept of indirect reference to mitigating the demand of semantics and it is the ingenuity of Frege to offer us a new interpretation of semantics in an accommodating manner by bringing language to a wide length. What we claim here is that Frege consistently sticks to his sense. It thus seems natural to say that the indirect reference

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of a singular term is what is ordinarily its sense. Frege claims, that the same reasoning would equally be applied to all other constituents of an *Oratio Obliqua* clause. It is an incomplete expression occurring in it. But they will stand in this context for what is ordinarily their sense. This can be made possible because here a predicate in indirect speech can be replaced, without a change in the truth-value of the whole sentence. Here, only by a *predicate* that ordinarily has the same sense simply because the whole Oratio Obliqua clause stands for its ordinary sense and its constituent singular term stands for their reference. Here the sense of a sentence is built up out of the sense of its constituent parts and the indirect reference of the whole is determined by the reference of its parts. That is why Frege brings *the principle of compositionality* and the *context principle* introduced under the realm of his semantics. We will discuss these principles later on. What we intend to say here is that the sense of an expression, according to Frege, actually determines its reference adequately, either directly or indirectly. Frege thus argues that since expressions occurring in indirect speech do not have their ordinary reference or usual reference, the sense they have in this context cannot be their ordinary sense. Just unlike the other philosophers what he demands newly is that the sense which they carry in indirect speech is their indirect sense.

This position of Frege has been criticized by Russell in his famous essay, 'On Denoting'.[43] Here Russell criticizes Frege's distinction between sense and reference which is understood in Russellian terms 'meaning' and 'denotation'. We think that what Russell understood by the term 'meaning' is akin to Frege's 'reference'. However,

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[43] Russell, Bertrand, "On Denoting" in *Mind*, Vol. 14, No. 56 (Oct., 1905), pp. 479-493.

commentators would say that its position of Russell is extremely confusing. But many would say that Russell's criticism against Frege can be justified not with regard to his distinction between sense and reference; but rather with the distinction between sense and indirect reference. Russell here points out that on Frege's own principle, 'there is no backward road' from reference to sense actually means that sense adequately determines reference but reference by any means determines sense.

The question then is: what is the indirect sense of an expression? In this regard, Frege goes on to say that what its indirect reference is, namely, its *ordinary sense*. But this is not enough to determine what its indirect sense is. There is no way available to state what the sense of an expression when it occurs in an *opaque context* is to be taken care of. One might say that since 'Socrates', when occurs in an *opaque context* stands for what, in a transparent context, is its sense. Its sense in an opaque context must be the same as the sense in a transparent context. It stands for its ordinary sense, i.e., that the indirect sense of 'Socrates' is the same as the ordinary sense of 'the sense of "Socrates"'. But this is again implausible. It is doubted by saying that expressions in double Oratio Obliqua, for example, 'Scott' in 'Russell said that George IV wonder whether Scott wrote Waverly'. Since 'Scott' occurs within the clause following 'said that…', by Frege's doctrine it must here stand for the sense it would have in that clause taken as a complete sentence. In the sentence, 'George IV wonders whether Scott wrote Waverly', 'Scott' has its indirect sense. In the longer sentence, 'Scott' will have a double indirect reference as well as a double indirect sense. Its double indirect reference will be its *simple indirect sense*. Simple indirect sense stands for simple indirect reference. Simple indirect reference is nothing but the ordinary sense of simple indirect

reference. According to Frege, since we cannot say what the simple indirect sense of an expression is, we cannot even say what its referent is when it occurs in *double Oratio Obliqua*. As an example of double *Oratio Obliqua*, we can take the example: 'Scott' in 'Russell said that George IV wonder whether Scott wrote Waverly'. Thus it seems to follow that we cannot even know how to judge the truth-value of a sentence involving double Oratio Obliqua. This constitutes a *reductio ad absurdum,* according to Michael Dummett of the whole theory.

According to Dummett, the whole dispute regarding indirect reference arises from the principle that the reference of an expression must be determined from its *sense alone*. It is only by means of this principle that it was possible to deduce the indirect reference of an expression from the ordinary sense of the expression. According to Dummett, the reference of an expression actually differs when it occurs in a transparent and when it occurs in an *opaque context*. Those who adhere to direct reference or in other words those who stuck to the perception of direct reference cannot admit opaque context or transparent context like Frege. Frege brings the concept of opaque context or Oratio Obliqua to accommodate the reference of empty proper names and thereby attempts to solve the problems of negative existentials. In the case of *opaque context,* it has different senses in two different contexts as we have seen in the case of informative identity.

The question then naturally arises: what actually is the main reason for holding to this principle? What else is there about an expression, other than its sense, which could be relevant to determine its reference? According to Dummett, obviously, they would not be physical properties, i.e., its length, euphony, or spelling, nor again its *tone,* since these and related features appear to exhaust its properties. Thus, eventually, we are left

only with its sense of what could determine its reference. However, this appearance arises only because we have been asking after its reference in isolation from the context of the sentence in which it occurs, which Frege expressly forbids. According to Frege, a word does not have a reference on its own. It has a reference only in the context of a sentence. This position of Frege is revolutionary in the sphere of semantics because this position alone germinates the sense theory of reference and it alone stands against the no-sense theory of reference advocated by the whole host of semanticists. We think Frege's position is fully harmonious with the view that while a word or expression by itself has its sense. But this does not lead us to assume that a word by itself has a reference at all. Following Frege, Dummett remarks, "Only a particular occurrence of a word or expression in the sentence has a reference, and this reference is determined jointly by the sense of the word and the kind of context in which it occurs".[44] It thus reveals that the sense of a word may just be such as to determine it to stand for one thing in one kind of context, and for a different thing in some other kind of context. Accordingly, we may therefore regard an expression in an *opaque context* as having the same sense as in a transparent context, though a different reference. Thus the sense of a word cannot vary from context to context, but what can vary is the *property* of the word itself, apart from any context. For Dummett, it is by knowing the sense of constituent words that we understand the sentence. In such a case, the occurrences of the sentence do not play any role whatsoever. The point is that if the sense of a word varies from context to context, it would have to be according to some general rules. If we were to understand the sentences in which it occurs, then this general rule could in

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[44] Dummett, Michael, *Frege: Philosophy of Language*, Duckworth: London, 1973, p. 268.

reality constitutes the *one* common sense that the word possessed. Of course, in the case of an ambiguous word the sense can vary from one context to another context. But this is just the case in which we cannot be sure of understanding aright the sense of the sentences in which the word occurs. Dummett remarks, "*The sense of an ambiguous word is not 'determined' by the context; rather the context provides the ground for guessing which sense is intended*".

What is revealed from the above is that there is no such thing as the indirect sense of a word. There is just its sense which determines it to have in transparent contexts a reference distinct from its sense and in opaque contexts a reference that coincides with its sense. Therefore, there is no reason to think that an expression occurring in *double Oratio Obliqua* has a sense or has a reference different from that which it has in a single Oratio Obliqua. Its referent in double oratio obliqua will be the sense that it has in single oratio obliqua, which is the same as the sense it has in ordinary context, which is the same as its referent in single oratio obliqua. Thus it is intuitively clear and reasonable that the replacements of an expression in double oratio obliqua which will leave the truth-value of the whole sentence unaltered are – just as in single oratio obliqua – those which have the same sense. Thus, it seems that double indirect sense and reference must be distinguished from simple indirect sense and reference was a mechanical deduction from a slightly faulty theory, according to Dummett. Thus from the above, we find a philosophical revolution after Frege in what sense just by bringing the concept of indirect reference along with the concept of Oratio Obliqua, Frege solves the problem of an empty proper name. The distinctive aspect underlying the whole program is that

a word may have sense but may not have a reference. The reference of a word can be determined, either directly or indirectly, with the sense of the sentence and nothing else.

On the basis of the above consideration, we are now in a position to spell out the distinction between sense and reference and also the philosophical significance between sense and reference. We have already spelled out the distinction between sense and reference by citing the example of informative identity associated with Fregean examples 'The Morning Star' and 'The Evening Star'. We have also explained in great detail Frege's reliance more on sense rather than on reference. Sense of a proper name, according to Frege, is nothing but the mode of presentation of the same. Thus, the sense of a proper name can be expressed descriptively and also in different modes of presentation. This expression of sense is made possible, we will see later on, with the association of thought. We will see in the next sequel that the concept of thought actually plays an all-important role in determining the sense of the sentence. Frege's ingenuity is that by emphasizing sense or mode of presentation, Frege thus single-handedly brings the sense-theory of a proper name into the realm of semantics. This actually makes Fregean semantics, in particular, and semantics, in general, more comprehensive and acceptable as well to the later philosophers.

What then is the objectivity of sense? Is sense a mere mode of presentation or something else? What is the determining factor of sense or mode of presentation through which one can reveal its referent and thereby solves the problem of meaning? All these questions can adequately be resolved just by way of knowing the objectivity of sense. It has already been said that the concept of thought would play a significant role to get a sense of the proposition or sentence constructed by proper name. In this regard, the

distinction between sense and conventional significance and the possibility of sense varying from speaker to speaker is relevant to the understanding or to assess the objectivity of sense as expounded by Frege. The sense is objective, which means for Frege, the sense that it is not subjective. Here, the objective-subjective distinction is extremely crucial for evaluating the *objectivity of sense*. The objectivity of sense is in no way associated with psychology; whereas the *subjectivity of sense* is deeply associated with psychology. We have already stated very clearly and distinctly that Fregean semantics is in no way associated with psychology; rather it is deeply associated with and governed by *Begriffsschrift,* i.e., Concept-Notation. We have also stated that Fregean Concept-Notation is the by-product of elementary logic and mathematics where there is no role of psychology. Accordingly, here we can relate to this backward-looking background here when we do engage with the inquiry about the objectivity of sense after Frege. Accordingly, we can say that the subjective aspects of sense are in no way related to Fregean semantics because Fregean semantics, even though it is comprehensive in nature, cannot tolerate the presence of any sense of psychologism. Thus when we seek the objectivity of sense after Frege, we are primarily concerned not with the subjective aspect of sense, but rather with the objective aspect of sense. However, it would be a matter of great challenge even to Frege to locate the conceptual demarcation between the subjective aspect of sense as well as the objective aspect of sense. But one thing is very clear to us Frege surely was in no mood of entertaining the psychological aspects in his semantic proposal beginning with sense or mode of presentation. Actually, the subjective-objective aspect of sense is deeply associated with the subtle distinction between ideas and thought. Those who fail to

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distinguish between the subjective-objective distinctions of sense equally fail to distinguish between ideas and thought. This actually creates a new dimension in Fregean semantics which needs special attention in isolation.

In our sense, Frege was very conscious of all these tricky philosophical issues when he engaged with the famous sense-reference distinction. Frege developed his three fundamental principles of which the first is engaged to separate sharply psychology from logic, the subjectivity from objectivity. In this regard, Frege remarks, "The reference and sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the associated idea….The same sense is not always connected, even in the same man, with the same idea. The idea is subjective: one man's idea is not that of another….This constitutes an essential difference between the ideas and the sign's sense, which may be the common property of many and therefore is not a part of a mode of the individual mind. For one can hardly deny that mankind has a common store of thoughts which is transmitted from one generation to another".[45] It seems from the aforesaid remark that Frege consciously distinguished both sense and reference from an idea. This ensures that there cannot be any psychological content in the sphere of sense and reference. We have already claimed that the sense of a sentence is thought. Thus thought is embedded in a sense. The idea is not embedded in a sense. The idea is psychological in nature. Thought differs from an idea in the sense that there cannot be psychological content in thought. We will come up with this issue in great detail in the next sequel. What we intend here is that the objectivity of sense is located in thought, but in no way associated with an idea. If

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[45] Frege, Gottlob, *Nachgelassene Schriften*, ed. by H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, F. Kaulbach, Hamburg, 1969, p. 59.

the objectivity of sense is associated with the idea, then the sense or mode of presentation would be vitiated because of psychological intervention. In such a case, the whole program of Fregean semantics would be *jeopardized.*

But the problem is that even according to Frege the sense of a proper name as alternatively known as the mode of presentation of a proper name is shareable by more than one person. If it would be the case, how the objectivity of sense is primarily concerned only with the objective meaning of sense? Can we then not take it as shareability or inter-subjectivity of thoughts and eventually contrasted thought with ideas? In this regard, we can say, after Frege, that the sense can be grasped by different thinkers, not like an idea, but a mode or part of any one mind associated with thought. According to Frege, it would perhaps be the case that different men may associate different senses with a particular word. But, they are not prevented from grasping the same sense but they cannot have the same idea. Frege says, "It is indeed sometimes possible to establish differences in the ideas, or even in the sensation of different men, but an exact comparison is not possible, because we cannot have both ideas together in the same consciousness".

Frege gives us an analogy to clarify this position further. In this regard, Frege says that even somebody observes the moon through a telescope. Frege compares the moon itself to the reference. For Frege, here the moon, the content of reference, is the object of observation. It is mediated by the real image projected by the object-glass in the interior of the telescope, and by the retinal image of the observer. Here Frege compares the former to the sense, the latter is like the idea or experience. Frege further contends the optical image as considered here in the telescope is indeed one-sided and dependent

upon the standpoint of observation. But still, according to Frege, it is *objective* in nature. It can be used by several observers. However, each would have his own retinal image. Thus in a sense, it has the relevance of intersubjectivity or shareability. It is to be noted here that Frege applies the sense/reference distinction just by way of preconceiving the distinction between sense and conventional significance. In our sense, his idea of sense is associated with thought but no idea in the traditional Lockean sense but his understanding of conventional significance is also a process of thought where the conventional Lockean sense of idea is embedded in.

Thus it appears that to have a better perception of the Fregean concept of sense, we have to have a deeper understanding of the concept of thought. I do think the insight into the concept of sense is deeply rooted in a proper understanding of the concept of reference. Therefore, in the next sequel, we will deal with Frege's concept of thought to illuminate the concept of reference proper.

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Chapter Three

Frege's Concept of Thought and its Philosophical Implication

In the previous sequel, I deeply engaged myself with Frege's view about sense (*Sinn*) and reference (*Bedeutung*). It was revealed that Frege developed a sense as the mode of presentation. But it was equally revealed that sense is deeply embedded with thought. In this sequel, we will fully explicate Frege's concept of thought and its philosophical implication. We come to know that the notion of sense applies to a proper name. When we say that sense is the mode of presentation, the pertinent question at the very outset comes to our mind that mode of presentation of what? It is the mode of presentation of proper names. We have already explicated the concept of proper name after Frege and later developed in what sense a proper name is deeply associated with sense or mode of presentation. Unlike Mill and Russell, Frege emphasizes the sense of a proper name. Thus to Frege, to determine the sense of a proper name is primary and reference is, to me, secondary. When I claim that reference of a proper name to Frege is secondary, I actually intend to say that Frege attempts to conceive reference in various senses. For Frege, the reference of a proper name that would be determined through the sense or mode of presentation of the proper name may be direct, may be indirect, may be acquainted, may not be acquainted, and even may be based on presupposition rather than assertion. So to me, the whole semantic problem of Frege is essentially based on cognizing the sense or mode of presentation of a proper name.

Now the point here is that we cannot get the sense or mode of presentation of a proper name without the concept of thought. That means the sense or mode of presentation can

be comprehended through thought. Thus, to me, the concept of thought is the key issue of Fregean semantics. That is why, Wolfgang Carl at the beginning of his paper, 'The Thought' remarked, "It is only by the discovery of the distinction between sense and reference that the notion of thought gets a more clear-cut form"[46]. Frege uses the term thought more or less in the same way as the term *judgeable content*[47] before the discovery of the notion of thought. What then is thought according to Frege? Frege says that the sense of every sentence is a thought. Thought is neither physical nor mental, it is the *third realm* or third eye to get the sense of the sentence. A sentence is comprehensible to us because of thought. A thought in itself is immaterial. Only a complete sentence expresses a thought. Frege says, "The thought is the sense of the sentence without wishing to say as well that the sense of every sentence is a thought"[48].

The above remark of Frege is significant. Frege here asserts that the thought is the sense of the sentence. That means thought is manifested through the senses of the sentence. But at the same time, Frege clearly denies that the sense of every sentence is a thought. Why does Frege deny that the sense of every sentence is a thought? Does it lead us to assume that Frege has a different perception of the term sense? Does it lead us to assume that Frege understands the concept of sense only from the semantic perspective? Does it lead us to assume that apart from indicative sentences or descriptive sentences or assertive sentences, every other sentences that we use in language have senses but lacks thought? If we think, after Frege, that the sense of every sentence is thought then it

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[46] Carl, Wolfgang, *Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Its Scope and Limits*, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 76.
[47] Ibid, p. 76.
[48] Frege, Gottlob, "The Thought: A Logical Enquiry", *Mind,* Vol. 65, No. 259 (Jul., 1956), p. 292.

would be difficult for us to retain the distinction between thought and idea. Frege was extremely conscious of the distinction between thought and idea. His interpretation of thought is exclusively relevant to his semantics and nothing else. In this regard, it can be said that if we assert that the sense of every sentence is thought then we find the sense of the sentence lacking truth-value, lacking reference, and lacking semantic meaning. So this is the problem for which Frege consciously remarks that the thought is the sense of the sentence but not the sense of every sentence is a thought.

It thus seems to me that thought plays the central role in understanding the sense of a proper name that will eventually help us to determine the reference of the proper name and thereby would help us to solve the problem of meaning. Frege thus distinguishes various kinds of sentences and he certainly would not call the sense of an imperative sentence a thought. According to Frege, sentences expressing desires or requests are ruled out in the same way. For Frege, only those sentences in which we communicate or state something come into question. However, feeling, groaning, shying, and laughing fail to communicate anything, and therefore such sort of communication is no longer associated with thought. Now the question naturally arises: How does a thought can become a part of the language? How does it enter into language? I have already mentioned after Frege that thought is the third realm. As it belongs to the third realm, it cannot be possessed by a man just like an idea is possessed by a man. But at the same time, the sense of a sentence is thought and a sentence is being uttered by a man. Thus it entails that there is a certain point of time when thought being the third realm can enter into language. Otherwise, we cannot say, after Frege, that the sense of a sentence

is thought. This is where the question actually arises: what is the point of introducing thought into language?

3.1: Word-Question or Sentence-Question is the Beginning of Thought:

To reply to this question, Frege unlike others asserts that through word-question or sentence-question thought is being injected into language. Now in our part of speech, word-question or sentence-question belongs to interrogative sentences. So according to Frege, interrogative sentences can be the bearer of thought at the initial stages. This does not make us to say that interrogative sentences as the bearer of thought can be interpreted in the form of 'to be the case' or 'not to be the case'. Even no semanticists would accept the truth-value of interrogative sentences. Does it lead us to say that the sense of an interrogative sentence bears the same thought as the sense of a descriptive sentence that bears the thought? Frege was very much aware of the distinction. Frege here affirms interrogative sentences as the receiver of thought which is then completely manifested through the sense of a descriptive sentence. Otherwise, it would not be possible for Frege to apprehend the injection of thought into language. Frege then says that to give a reply to any interrogative sentence whatsoever, we get a descriptive sentence. What is your name? What it is? Who is he? Any reply to any of these sentences helps us to get a descriptive sentence, such as, my name is Jones; it is a mobile phone; he is Socrates respectively.

Frege further contends that a *word question* is not complete like a descriptive sentence. Frege says, "In a word-question, we utter an incomplete sentence which only obtains a true sense through the completion for which we ask. Word-questions are accordingly

left out of consideration here"[49]. Thus for Frege, sentence questions are a different matter. In the case of sentence-question, we always expect to get a response either in the form of 'yes' or in the form of 'no'. Frege then says that the answer 'yes' means the same as an indicative sentence, for it is the thought that was already completely contained in the interrogative sentence. Thus for Frege, "So a sentence-question can be formed from every indicative sentence"[50]. This is unlikely in the case of an exclamation as it cannot be regarded as a communication since no corresponding sentence question can be formed. However, it can be said after Frege that an interrogative sentence and an indicative sentence contain the same thought. But the indicative sentence contains something else as well, namely, the *assertion*. On the other hand, in the case of an interrogative sentence, it contains a request. Thus, while considering indicative and interrogative sentences, two things need to be taken care of, namely, the sentence question and the assertion. But at this juncture, we intend to say that word-question or sentence-question invites or injects thought content in the sentence composed by proper names to refer to something. Thus Fregean thought is intrinsically linked with sense. Here Frege says about the way in which "we think of ourselves".[51] When we think of ourselves and express it through sense or mode of presentation, we think *self-consciously*. However, neither of these things would be true in a generalized descriptive theory of thought. Frege here undertakes a detailed investigation of different particular ways of thinking of objects to make it clear what kind of sense they have. Here I ponder that every grammatically correct sentence has a definite sense. In this regard, every

[49] Ibid, p. 293.
[50] Ibid, p. 293.
[51] Evans, Gareth, *The Varieties of Reference*, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1982, p. 18.

sentence irrespective of descriptive one has a sense. But when Frege deals with the concept of sense or mode of presentation of a proper name he had a different perception altogether. Here he is primarily concerned only with the semantic interpretation of language where the mode of presentation of a sentence is predominantly concerned with reference. His main concern is not to determine the sense of any sentence whatsoever, rather he is primarily and precisely concerned to determine the sense of only those sentences having reference. His main objective is to solve the problem of meaning by way of determining the reference of the sentence under consideration. The sense of the sentence, which is of course a function of the sense of its parts, *is a thought* in which Frege is mainly interested. The single constraint Frege imposed upon his notion of thought was that he should conform to what we might call, Evans opines, "Intuitive Criterion of Difference"[52].

What then is the "Intuitive Criterion of Difference"? In this regard, Evans goes on to say after Frege that "The thought associated with one sentence S as its sense must be different from the thought associated with another sentence S' as its sense if someone can understand both sentences at a given time while coherently taking different attitudes towards them"[53]. This leads us to assume that it may perhaps be the case that one while rejecting (accepting), or being associated with, the other. This is perfectly clear in the passage from the letter written by Frege to Jourdain. The letter states, "Accordingly the sense of the proposition, 'Ateb is at least 5000 meters high' is also different from the sense of the proposition, 'Alpha is at least 5000 meters high'. Someone who takes the

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[52] Ibid, p. 18.
[53] Ibid, p. 19.

latter to be true need not, therefore, take the former to be true"[54]. Moreover, Frege equally employed this criterion in a letter to Russell in 1902 where Frege wrote: "The thought that *all thoughts belonging to class M are true* is different from the thought that *all thoughts belonging to class N are true*; for someone who did not know that M coincided with N could hold one of these thoughts to be true and other to be false"[55].

The above remarks made by Frege clearly reflect the Intuitive Criterion of Difference. According to Evans, Frege needed this connection between the theoretical notion of sense and ordinary propositional attitude psychology if that theoretical notion was to help him solve the original puzzle about how sentences composed out of expression with the same meaning can have different cognitive values. A sentence S has a different cognitive value from the cognitive value of the sentence S' just in case it is possible to understand S and S' while taking different attitudes towards them. I do subscribe to Evans that if the notion of a way of thinking about something is to be elucidatory of Frege's notion of sense, then in such a case ways of thinking about things must be identified and distinguished in harmony with the Intuitive Criterion of Difference for thought. Here a critic might have a point in saying that the Intuitive Criterion of Difference for thought cannot by itself fully determine the identity and distinctness of thought.

3.2: How does Thought Link with Sense?

We have already mentioned that thought is linked with sense. The question is: how does thought link with sense? In this regard, Frege says the sense of a sentence is determined

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[54] Frege, Gottlob, *Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence*, ed. by B. McGuinness, Oxford, 1980, p. 80.
[55] Ibid, p. 153. See also *Posthumous Writings*, tr. by P. Long, R. White and R. Hargraves, Oxford, 1979, p. 197.

by the senses of its component parts. Again he further asserts that the truth value of a sentence is determined by its sense. At times to determine the sense of the component expression, the context of utterance plays a vital role. The sense of the sentence "I ate plum pudding today" is capable of determining a truth value via the truth value of a sentence based on context. Even some contemporary thinkers intuit Frege's sense as 'input sense' and 'output sense'. These are two different levels of sense expressed with the help of thought. The output sense has been grounded in the following thesis:

a) Output sense is essentially sentential, whereas input sense is not.

b) Output sense is sensitive to failure of reference, whereas input sense is not.

c) The notion of indeterminacy does not apply to input sense in the same way in which it applies to output sense.

d) In a sense, the input sense is not ambiguous, whereas the output sense is equivalent to ambiguity.

e) Input sense is not contextually dependent, whereas output sense is *contextually dependent.*

On the basis of the above specification of input and output sense, it may appear that Frege attempts to assimilate output sense with thought. If it would be the case then the output sense is deeply associated with the truth value. Because in such a case one may claim that mere input sense is incapable of either possessing or determining a truth value. In this regard, David Bell remarked, "In short, there is no univocal sense of 'sense' which will satisfy both Frege's principles"[56]. Frege's thought is also associated

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[56] Bell, David, *Frege's Theory of Judgement*, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1979, p. 119.

with his theory of judgment. For Frege, the objects of thought and the primary bearers of truth-value are *Gedanken* (thought). And *Gedanken* is the sense of indicative sentences. But we have to specify what *the objects of thought* are? The objects of thought are *possible bearers of truth-value*. Otherwise, according to Bell, we could not talk, as we wish to, of 'true-belief', 'false judgment', 'the confirmation of suspicion', etc. Secondly, they are essentially expressible and communicable in language. They do not have input sense as the notion of input sense fails to fulfill the aforesaid requirements. In 'Der Gedanke' ('The Thought'), in fact, Frege denies any special sign making the presence of assertive force necessary in ordinary language. That means one can get the sense or the apprehension of truth in the form of a declarative sentence. Assertive force is present only in a declarative sentence.

3.3: Various Levels of Thought:

Even though Frege has asserted that thought exists independently of humans and it is a third realm that is neither physical nor mental, he acknowledges different levels of thought. Different levels of thought are not different thoughts but different levels of the same thought. These different levels of thought differ the truth-value of the assertion even in the same person making in different times about the same object. Accordingly, Frege distinguishes the following levels of thought, such as,

a) The apprehension of thought – thinking.

b) The recognition of the truth of a thought – judgment.

c) The manifestation of the judgment – is an assertion.

It thus seems that thought is a thinking process, it begins with the process of thinking, leads to a judgemental level, and ends with assertion. For Frege, when we first act, we begin with a sentence question. It is the level when thought is apprehended. The sentence question, such as, 'what it is?' creates a force, of course, an assertive force that forms the act of the thinker to engage with making an apprehension about what is being asserted by the sentence question. After an appropriate investigation, the thought, Frege affirms, is finally recognized to be true. Of course, we declare the recognition of truth in the form of an indicative sentence. However, it remains a matter of philosophical question whether all indicative sentences would be the bearers of truth. In this regard, Frege inclines to say that when we deal with the indicative sentence we do not have to use the word 'true' for this. Even when we use it in the indicative sentence it may lack the assertive force and the force of becoming true. What Frege inclines to say here is that only assertive sentences do have the indicative force and may have the valid claim of becoming true. It may perhaps be the case that in some indicative sentences, the question of truth-value would remain a far cry if "we do not speak seriously".[57] Here I am wondering about the term 'we do not speak seriously' as expounded by Frege. To me, it seems a bit ridiculous. Does it lead us to assume that Frege makes himself casual about the language that we use in doing semantics? Certainly, I do not think so. But Frege does not rule out the possibility of non-serious speaking even in the realm of descriptive or assertive interactions. Frege in this regard, mentions cases that we frequently perceive in drama, cinema, and poetic writings. Frege, for example, quips: Is stage-thunder a real thunder or an apparent thunder? Certainly, according to Frege

[57]Frege, Gottlob, "The Thought: A Logical Enquiry", op. cit., p. 294.

and every other, it is true to say that any stage thunder is only an apparent thunder, and a stage fight is only an apparent fight. So for Frege, stage assertion is the only apparent assertion. This is equally true in the case of poetic writings. When a poet characterizes a character in his poetic writings, the concerned character as characterized by the poet is only an apparent character but not a real character. The king in the dark chamber is a case in point. We very often see serials and cinemas in our life where it is clearly stated by the media proprietor that if any character or any event is luckily assimilated to any person that might have been impacted the lifestyle of that person, is not responsible for that because the characters or the act of playing are all apparent characters or act of playing played by different person. So according to Frege, some descriptive assertions describe or assert only apparent descriptions or apparent assertions for which his theory is not applicable. Frege's theory is applicable only in the case of real assertion, i.e. when an indicative sentence is uttered, it really contains an assertion if we deny the requisite lacking of seriousness.

Frege further contends that even an indicative sentence often contains a thought component over which the assertion does not extend. The act on the feelings, the mood of the hearer or to arouse his imagination through indicative sentences are cases in point. Words like 'alas' and 'thank God' are cases in point. Many of the poetic utterances expressed in indicative sentences are also lacking real assertion. Even what is portrayed by cadence and rhythm, mood, fragrance, illumination in a point, etc. do not belong to the thought. Accordingly, it cannot be ruled out that the contents of a sentence often go beyond the thought expressed by it. According to Frege, time also plays an important role to apprehend the thought correctly. Therefore, the time of utterance is part of the

expression of the thought. For example, if someone wants to say the same today as he expressed yesterday by using the word 'today', he ipso facto must replace this word with 'yesterday'. Here Frege asserts that even though the thought is the same, its verbal expression must be different so that the sense is re-adjusted.

3.4: The Objectivity of Thought:

It thus seems to us that Frege's concept of thought has only semantic relevance. It is in no way associated with individual feelings, emotions, passions, poetic imagination, apparent assertions, and many more. So he takes thought as the sense of only the indicative sentences having real assertive force which eventually helps to determine the referent of the sentence and helps him to solve the problem of meaning. Here we examine the objectivity of thought after Frege. The objectivity of thought, I do presume, plays a significant role in his semantics. While talking about the objectivity of thought, Frege remarks, "I acknowledge a domain of what is objective, which is distinct from that of what is real, whereas the psychological logicians without ado take what is not real to be subjective"[58]. Frege uses the term 'objective' in his various writings without deviating their meaning or sense. There is a close connection between the distinction drawn in *The Foundations* between "what is objective and what is handleable or spatial or real"[59], the claim made in 1893 that there is "a domain of what is objective, but not real" and the assumption of a 'third realm' in the first *Logical Investigations*. Frege then gives an adequate explanation of the term 'objective'. He says, "It is something that is

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[58] Frege, Gottlob, *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, ed. by M. Furth, Berkeley, 1964, p. 15-16.

[59] Frege, Gottlob, *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, ed. by J. L. Austin, Oxford, 1953, p. 26.

exactly the same for all rational beings, for all who are capable of grasping it"[60]. If we carefully go through his landmark article 'On Sense and Meaning', we can get the sense of objectivity as the *content of thinking* as explained by means of 'what is capable of being the common property of several thinkers'. The content of thinking needs to be grasped and something can be grasped by different people by the *use of reason*, i.e. by the use of our faculty of thinking. That is why, Frege aptly claims that "objectivity…can only be based, so far as I can see, on reason"[61]. This definition suggests an explanation of why something can be grasped by different people. However, Frege does not show that our faculty of thinking or reason explain the possibility of being intersubjectively accessible. Commenting on this remark of Frege, Bell says, "Frege's paradigm of objectivity is an independently existing object or thing. It is natural, therefore, that to guarantee the objectivity of thought he should have identified them with autonomous objects"[62]. However, Carl does not agree with Bell. He finds mistakes in Bell's observation of Frege. According to Carl, Bell is wrong for two reasons. First, it is not true that objects are a paradigm case of what is objective, and Frege does not attempt to explain objectivity by reference to the assumption of the independent existence of objects. Secondly, what is objective is explained by reference to intersubjective accessibility based on reason. Frege's notion of objectivity has epistemological, but not ontological presupposition. According to Carl (1995), Frege uses the notion of objectivity in two different ways. First, what is objective must be separated from subjective representation, and secondly, what is objective is subdivided into what is real

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[60] Frege, Gottlob, *Nachgelassene Schriften*, ed. by H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, F. Kaulbach, Hamburg, 1969, p. 7.
[61] Frege, Gottlob, *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, op. cit., p. 27.
[62] Bell, David, 1979, op. cit., p. 122.

and what is non-real. Accordingly, the objectivity of thought involves two distinctions: first, they have to be separated from representations on the one side, and second, they have to be distinguished from whatever is real on the other side. While distinguishing between different kinds of what is objective, Frege is making ontological distinctions. By explaining the distinction between what is real and what is unreal, we shall get an idea of what is peculiar to the objectivity of thoughts. This part of Frege's theory is determined by epistemological, not ontological concerns. We think that the first principle of *The Foundations* requires this sharp separation of the subjective from the objective. In fact, Frege explains this point more extensively about what he means by subjective. The subjectivity of representations may belong to the perception of an external object. For example, the visual impression of green may be a representation. However, representations are not themselves perceived, rather they are something we have when we perceive an object. As a result of that, they belong to us. Thus it is necessary to indicate the relation of a representation to somebody "who has it, to its owner"[63]. Further, it can be said that one has representation in the sense that they belong to the *content of the consciousness* of the person who has them, and whatever belongs to such content cannot itself be perceived. It has its own kind of accessibility. One cannot get acquainted with them except by having them. As representations belong to the content of consciousness and there can be no consciousness without being the consciousness of somebody, therefore, there can be no representation without the existence of somebody whose consciousness contains them. In this regard, Frege opines, "It seems absurd to us that a pain, a mood, a wish should go around the world

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[63] Frege, Gottlob, *Kleine Schriften*, ed. by I. Agnelli, Darmstadt, 1967, p. 124. See also G. Frege's *Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy*, ed. by B. McGuinness, Oxford, 1984, p. 135.

without an owner, independently. A sensation is impossible without a sentient being"[64]. Precisely speaking that any sort of representation needs to be an owner without whom it cannot exist. Frege confronts this dependence with the independent existence of things in the outer world.

Finally, we can say, after Frege, that representations belong essentially to the content of consciousness. It is so much of the essence of any one of my ideas to be content with my consciousness, that any idea someone else has is different from mine. Thus Frege concludes by saying that representations are different if their owners are different. This is justified by saying that in every representation there can be one and only one owner. Every representation has only one owner and no two men have the same representation. As representations belong to the content of consciousness and are accessible only by having them, one can know only those representations one is the owner of. They are private in an epistemic sense of the world. Thus here we sense the force of dependence in the process of representation which Frege called *a kind of causal dependence*.

Based on the aforesaid observation, Frege makes the following assertions:

a) Everybody has his own representations that belong to him and only to him.

b) Representations are epistemologically private and not intersubjectively accessible.

c) Representations depend for their existence on the existence of the person whose representations they are.

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[64] Frege, Gottlob, *Logical Investigations*, ed. by P. T. Geach and R. H. Stoothoff, Oxford, 1977, p. 14.

d) Representations are not accessible by outer sense-perception or by thinking but only by having them.

We think that Frege was not interested in the analysis of the notion of representations for its own sake, rather he was interested to clarify the notion of thought by means of the analysis of representation. As only representations are subjective and they are, like thoughts, not accessible by outer sense-perception, he was in a position to explain what is peculiar to thought by distinguishing them from representation. In this way, the relevance of the objectivity of thought is explained by means of the distinction between representation and thought.

3.5: Thought and Idea:

Many commentators and critics were sceptical about the functional aspect of thoughts within the realm of Fregean semantics. They assumed that Frege indeed suffered from confusion about the distinction between thought and idea. So far I have seen that the concept of thought plays a significant role in Fregean semantics. Because without thought the sense of the sentence cannot be comprehended and without the comprehension of the sense of the sentence, the reference of the sentence cannot be known. Further, if the reference of the sentence cannot be known, then we cannot come to know the truth-value of the sentence and also fail to understand the meaning of the sentence. Thus the problem of meaning remains obscure in Fregean semantics without accepting the concept of thought as the third realm.

Now the question that has been raised by the commentators that Frege was confused about the distinction between thought and idea, needs to be evaluated deeply. I think

that Frege was very much conscious of the thought-idea distinction. Let me go back to the earlier view I mentioned in the beginning that Frege initially developed a kind of artificial language with the help of Concept-Notation to develop his semantics. In this regard, Frege initially takes help from logic and elementary mathematics. It is known to all of us that the language of logic and elementary mathematics cannot be part of an idea. They are thought processes, a certain sort of abstraction that can never be expressed and comprehended through the idea. It thus seems to me that Frege was very conscious of the closeness of thought and idea. His concept of thought in any standard of imagination can be a part of an idea and Frege was aware of that. Thus Frege begins with the question and says, "I now return to the question: Is a thought an idea? If other people can ascend to the thought I expressed in the Pythagorean Theorem just as I do, then it does not belong to the content of my consciousness, I am not its owner, yet I can, nevertheless, acknowledges it as true"[65]. These aforesaid remarks give a clear indication that Frege himself was not when he was thinking, the owner of thought. Instead of non-owner of thought, Frege affirms that he acknowledges about Pythagorean Theorem that what he consciously thought is true.

Frege here brings the concept of intersubjectivity while elucidating the concept of thought. According to Frege, the intersubjectivity of a judgment essentially means that different people can grasp the same judgment or thought. This is quite different from the case of representation, i.e. idea for which claim we hold. According to Frege, intersubjectivity of a judgment entails what is acknowledged as true is *intersubjectively accessible*. Thus thoughts differ from ideas (representations). Moreover, thoughts do

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[65] Ibid, p. 16.

not causally depend on the person, i.e. thought is not owned by the person whereas the idea is owned by the person who thinks them. According to Frege, what we think cannot be understood as a "production of thought"[66]. Therefore, thoughts differ from ideas. Frege further ponders that what is accessible in an intersubjective way cannot depend on the existence of a sentient being who acts as its owner. Many things are accessible to different people. That means, the causal dependence essentially entailed by the owner-relation has to be understood in a peculiar way. For Frege, it is a sort of dependence on something mental, on a private 'inner world' and whatever has this kind of dependence is private as well.

On the basis of the aforesaid observation, I can spell out the distinction between thought and idea after Frege in the following:

a) Ideas cannot be seen or touched, cannot be smelt, tasted, not heard. For example, when I go for a walk with a companion, I may see a green field and I have a visual impression of the green as well. I have it but I do not see it. This is unlikely in the case of thought.

b) Ideas are had. One owns ideas. One has sensations, feelings, moods, inclinations, wishes, etc. An idea that has been owned by a person has belonged to that person and it belongs to the content of his consciousness. But this is unlikely in the case of thought. A thought cannot be owned, it cannot be the content of consciousness, rather it is the third realm having contentless. Frege explains this point by saying that pain, a mood and a wish should rove about the world without

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[66] Frege, Gottlob, 1979, op. cit., p. 137. See also G. Frege's *Nachgelassene Schriften*, ed. by H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, F. Kaulbach, Hamburg, 1969, p. 148.

a bearer independently. However, an experience is impossible without experience. The inner world presupposes the person whose inner world it is. Thus for Frege, unlike thought, in the case of ideas, the owner of it is specified and the locus of it in some inner sense is also specified. As thought is ownerless it cannot be specified in the inner world of the person. It can also be grasped just by way of knowing the sense of the sentence.

c) Ideas need a bearer. Things of the outer world, however, are independent. But things of the inner world need an owner. This is unlikely in the case of thought. But does Frege think that things of the outer world are independent? For Frege, when we see the same green field, each of us has a particular sense-impression of green. It may perhaps be the case that one notices a strawberry among the green strawberry leaves and the other perhaps is colour-blind. The colour impression that the other receives from the strawberry is not noticeably different from the one he receives from the leaf. Now the point is, does my companion see the green leaf or green leaf as red, or does he see the red berry as green, or does he see both as of one colour with which I am not acquainted at all? Thus, we cannot rule out some unanswerable, and indeed really nonsensical questions. For Frege, the word 'red' does not state the property of things rather it characterizes sense-impressions belonging to my consciousness. That means, it is only applicable within the sphere of my consciousness. Thus Frege subscribes that it is impossible to compare my *sense-impressions* with that of someone else's. For "it would be necessary to bring together in one consciousness a sense-impression, belonging to one consciousness, with a sense-impression belonging

to another consciousness"[67]. Even in this regard, Frege brings the concept of divine consciousness and puts questions about it. For Frege, it is so much of the essence of each of my ideas to be the content of my consciousness, that every idea of another person is distinct from mine. However, it is a problem related to the problem of the other mind. Thus it is impossible for us as men to compare another person's ideas with our own. For example, I pick the strawberry and hold it between my fingers. My companion observes the very same strawberry that I am holding between my fingers. But each of us has our own idea. No other person has my idea even though many people can see what I am holding between my fingers at this point in time. The same is equally true in the case of own pain. Someone can have sympathy for me, but still, my pain always belongs to me, and the sympathy other shows to me belong to him.

d) Every idea has only one bearer. No two men have the same idea. Otherwise, the object would exist independently of the person which is not really the case. Objects cannot exist independently. Frege then quips: Is that lime tree my idea? Here the expression 'that lime tree' essentially refers to what I see and to what other people can also look at and touch. If my intention is realized here, then the thought expressed in the sentence 'that lime tree is my idea' must obviously be negative. But instead of that if my intention is not realized in an aforesaid way then the designation of the expression 'that lime tree' is empty. In such a case, it enters into the sphere of fiction. In such a case, neither the content of the sentence

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[67] Frege, Gottlob, "The Thought: A Logical Enquiry", op. cit., p. 300.

'that lime tree is my idea' is not the content of the sentence 'that lime tree is not my idea' because in both cases my statement lacks an object. Therefore, one can only refuse to answer the question for the reason that the content of the sentence 'that lime tree is my idea' is a piece of fiction. Here, we have an idea without referring to this with the words 'that lime tree'.

3.6: Is a Thought an Idea?

After illuminating the distinction between thought and idea or more specifically after expounding the nature of both thought and idea, Frege raises the question: Is a thought an idea? Let me get a sense of the question raised by Frege in the light of Frege. In this regard, Frege quips: Does the Pythagorean Theorem belongs to the content of my consciousness? Am I possessing the content of the Pythagorean Theorem in my consciousness? Frege then says that the thought that I express in the Pythagorean Theorem can be recognized by others very similar to me. This leads us to assume that the Pythagorean thought does not belong to the content of my consciousness. Here, I am not its bearer. However, I can recognize it to be true. Frege further contends that if the Pythagorean Theorem is not the same thought which is taken to be the content of the Pythagorean Theorem by me and by another person, then in such a case we should not really say 'the Pythagorean Theorem', but 'my Pythagorean theorem', 'his Pythagorean Theorem'[68]. Then in such a case, it may be asserted that my thought can be the content of my consciousness and his thought can be the content of his consciousness. The question arises: Could the sense

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[68] Ibid, p. 301.

of my Pythagorean Theorem be true while that of his false? According to Frege, the words 'true' and 'false' could also be applicable only in the sphere of my consciousness, if they were not supposed to be concerned with something of which I was not the bearer. In such a case, the truth would be restricted to the content of my consciousness, and "it would remain doubtful whether anything at all comparably occurred in the consciousness of others"[69].

The feasible problem that Frege anticipates at this juncture is that if every thought requires a bearer then it would be thought of as *this* bearer. If it would be the case then there would be no science, common to many on which many could work. Then Frege asserts that "perhaps I have my science, namely, a whole of thought whose bearer I am and another person has his"[70]. Here each of us occupies the content of his own consciousness without involving contradictions. Therefore, it would really be idle to dispute truths. Frege here takes as an example a note of a hundred rupee. He says that it would be for two people to dispute whether a hundred mark note was genuine or not, where each meant the one he himself thought in his pocket and understood the word 'genuine' in his own particular senses. Now if someone takes thought to be ideas, what he then recognizes to be true is the content of his consciousness. Here he is no longer concerned about other people at all. According to Frege, even if he were to hear me the opinion that thought is not an idea, he could not dispute it. Therefore, Frege concludes by saying, "So the result seems to be: thoughts are neither things of the outer world, nor ideas"[71].

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[69] Ibid, p. 301.
[70] Ibid, p. 301.
[71] Ibid, p. 302.

Now it is justified in what sense Frege has asserted that thought is neither physical nor mental but it is the third realm. If thought is physical, it would be associated with things and if thought is mental, then again it would be associated with ideas. But the thought is neither associated with things nor with ideas. Therefore, *a third realm must be recognized*. Even ideas cannot be perceived by the senses, but they can be perceived with things. Hence, an idea needs a bearer to the content of whose consciousness it belongs. Thoughts are *timelessly true*, but ideas are not. For example, the thought that he expressed in the Pythagorean Theorem is timelessly true. It is true independently of whether anyone takes it to be true. It thus needs no bearer. Thus thought is objective. What is timelessly true is objective. What is independent of the mind is objective. Thought is both timelessly true and independent of the mind. It is not true for the first time when it is discovered. For Frege, it is just like a planet that already exists before anyone has seen it. One sees a thing, one has an idea. But one apprehends or thinks a thought. One has to know the distinction between *seeing and thinking*. When one apprehends or thinks a thought, one does not create it but only comes to stand in a certain relation, which is different from seeing a thing or having an idea, of what already exists beforehand.

Thus according to Frege, we are not the bearer of thoughts, but we are the bearer of our ideas. We do not have thought, as we have a sense-impression. We do not see a thought as we see a star as a thing or object. So it is advisable, Frege opines, to choose a special expression and that is the word 'apprehend'. Frege says, "A

particular mental capacity, the power of thought, must correspond to the apprehension of thought"[72].

3.7: Is Thought Real?

According to Frege, thought is not something to call real. For him, the world of the real is a world in which thought acts. All this is a process in time. However, we hardly recognize what is timeless and unchangeable as real. So the question arises: Is thought changeable? Is thought timeless? Referring Pythagorean Theorem, Frege inclines to say that thought is timeless, eternal, and unchangeable. Frege again raises the question: Are there not thoughts that are true today but false in six months' time? It seems that the thought, for example, that the tree is covered with green leaves, will surely be false in six months' time. Does it make sense to say that the thought remains the same? According to Frege, here we are not asserting the same thought because with the duration of six months it is not the same thought at all. When we say that 'this tree is covered with green leaves', it is not sufficient by itself. Without the time indication, we have no complete thought, i.e., no thought at all. Thus for Frege, thought is timely related. Time indication is integral to thought. Time indication expresses a complete thought. But if this position is taken into account, then it leads us to assume, after Frege, that a thought is true not only today or tomorrow but timelessly. Thus for Frege, the present tense in 'is true' does not refer to the speaker's presence, but is a tense of timelessness. Frege further contends that if we use the mere form of an indicative sentence, just by avoiding the word 'true',

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[72] Ibid, p. 307.

we have to distinguish two things, viz., the expression of the thought and the assertion of the thought. He then goes on to say that time indication may be contained in the sentence belongs to the *expression of the thought*, whereas the truth, whose recognition lies in the form of an indicative sentence, is timeless. However, the same words express another thought that would be concerned only with the linguistic aspect of the matter. However, one has to distinguish between essential and inessential properties and regard something as timeless if the changes it undergoes only its inessential properties. According to Frege, a property of thought will be called inessential that consists in, or follows from the fact that it is apprehended by a thinker.

Frege then raises the question: how does a thought act? This is a process in the inner world of a thinker that can have further consequences and can also make itself noticeable in the outer world. For example, when we grasp the thought that we express by the theorem of Pythagorean, we recognize it to be true. Thus our actions are usually prepared by *thinking and judging*. Accordingly, it can be assumed after Frege that thought can have an indirect influence, and the influence of one person on another is brought about for the most part by thoughts. In this sense, we may think that one communicates a thought. How does this happen? According to Frege, this actually happens when one brings about changes in the common outside world perceived by another person. In this process, one can apprehend a thought and thereby make it true. Frege then raises the further question by saying what could we think of the great events of world history. Could the great events of world history come about without the communication of thoughts? Still, we cannot "regard

thought as unreal because they appear to be without influence on events, while thinking, judging, stating, understanding and the like are facts of human life"[73]. Frege further contends that when a thought is apprehended, it brings about changes in the inner world of the apprehender. But it remains untouched in its true essence because the so-called changes it undergoes involve only inessential properties. Frege then remarks, "Thoughts are by no means unreal but their reality is of a quite different kind from that of things"[74]. The effect of thought is brought about by an act of the thinker. However, the thinker does not create them but must take them as they (thoughts) really are. Thoughts can be true without being apprehended by a thinker and in this sense thoughts are not wholly unreal in the sense that at least they could be apprehended and through apprehension thought can be brought into operation. That is why Frege justifies by saying that thought belongs to the third realm.

However, one may claim that Frege's general notion of objectivity of thought lacks ontological connotations. One might suppose that Frege's sub-division of what is objective into what is real and what is non-real is not devoid of ontological connotations. It might be a *peculiar kind of objectivity* that Frege attributes to thought. One may criticize Frege by saying that "whatever else may belong to the 'third realm' entails that they are some kind of 'Platonic entities'".[75] Frege remarks, "I distinguish what I call objective from what is handleable or spatial or real".[76] It

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[73] Ibid, p. 311.
[74] Ibid, p. 311.
[75] Carl, Wolfgang, 1994, op. cit., p. 85.

[76] Frege, Gottlob, *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, ed. by J. L. Austin, Oxford, 1953, p. 26.

actually means not that what is real is not objective, but the converse may not be true, i.e., it is not true that only what is real is objective. According to Carl, what is real does not coincide with what is objective. What is real is defined as something "capable of acting directly or indirectly on the senses".[77] It seems that by calling what is real 'objective', he sticks to the notion of objectivity.

But the question: What about what is objective, but not real? What about the kind of objectivity thoughts have? In this regard, Frege says that "thoughts are independent of our thinking". He justifies this in 'Logic' in three steps. He starts with the independence of the truth of thought from our acknowledgment of its truth. It may perhaps be the case as we know that something can be true although we may think it false. This sort of independence is constitutive of our notion of judgment and assertion. It excludes a "magical" conception of a judgment which is very close to the insight of the popular metaphor "Brains in a Vat" as mentioned by Hilary Putnam. Now the point is that anyone who rejected this independence would not be able to assert anything in the normal sense of the world. Frege further extends by saying "we can go a step further. In order to be true thoughts, for instance, loss of nature, not only do thoughts need to be recognized by us as true: they do not have to have been thought by us at all". In this second step, the possibility is left open that there could be a truth that not have been thought of yet; truths never thought of can be discovered. Frege compares this kind of discovery with the discovery that there is a desolate island in the Ocean. Of course, he does not compare thoughts with such

[77] Frege, Gottlob, *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, ed. by M. Furth, Berkeley, 1964, p. 16.

an island, rather he compares *the truth of thought with the existence of an island*. As far as the third step is concerned, Frege offers a stronger kind of independence of thought. So far we claim that some thoughts which are really true, we may know them as false. In the third step, Frege extends further. Here he claims that not only are some thoughts true that we think false, but also there may have some thoughts true that we may not have thought of yet, but thoughts "are independent of our thinking as such"[78]. The point that needs to be addressed here is how to understand this kind of independence of thought which remains true irrespective of our thinking.

Elsewhere Frege even sometimes compares the independence of thought from thinking with the independence of physical bodies. In this regard, Frege remarked, "Physical bodies and thoughts resemble one another in being independent of my inner life".[79] However, it would be wrong to conclude that Frege here was committed to a form of Platonism that ascribes to thoughts an ontological status to be compared with that of physical objects. In this regard, Burge has argued that Frege's Platonism shows itself because he compares the objectivity of thoughts with the existence and objectivity of physical objects. Such a comparison is based on what Wolfgang Carl calls the *generic use of objective*. According to Carl, this view does not seem to express a particular ontological view of what Burge claims, rather there is a lack of qualification in the claim of independence.

Frege was well aware that the independence of thought has to be taken carefully. For Frege, what is independent of our mental process, i.e., what is objective does

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[78] Ibid, p. 144.
[79] Ibid, p. 149.

not have to be spatial or material, or real. If it were to disregard this, then in such a case we slip into a *kind of mythology*. Frege quips: how can one give some content to the third kind of independence of thought? Thoughts differ from physical objects in our mode of access to them. We see or hear physical objects depending on the affection of our visual or auditory nerves, i.e., sense-impression. This leads us to assume that our knowledge of what is real essentially requires that there is a causal connection between ourselves and physical objects. That we have certain representations, sense-impression of it. What is real acts upon us in a certain way and it is accessible only by means of representations? Frege then points out, "But do I not then see that this flower has five petals?" We can see this and what is meant by it is bound up with thinking and judging. Newton did not discover the law of gravitation because his senses were especially acquitted. Thus, for Frege, any knowledge of what is real involves *thinking a thought*. But it also requires sense-impression. Even though what is real is quite independent of our inner life but our knowledge of what is real is not independent of our real life. Frege here draws a subtle distinction between thinking and representing and thereby criticizes any attempt to smuggle thinking in through a back door in having representations. Frege's favoured explanation of thinking as 'grasping a thought' remains obscure. Frege realizes it and to that extent, he inclines to say that the expression 'grasping' has to be taken in a metaphorical way. By calling thinking the grasping of thought, it seems to me, that Frege did not want to describe the *process of thinking*, rather his aim was to give a *conceptual explanation* of the relation between thinking and thought from the point of view of the objectivity of thought.

It thus seems that Frege offers two proposals for an analysis of thinking both of which are unsatisfactory. Critics would say that we cannot regard thinking as a process that generates thoughts Frege has anticipated. For them, it would be just as wrong to identify thought with an act of thinking. Therefore, they criticize Frege by saying that to assume that a thought is related to thinking as a leap is leaping. Secondly, how is a leap related to leaping? A leap takes place if and only if somebody leaps, i.e., somebody has leaped. Now if one applies this to the relation of thinking and thought, then it may be contended that referring to thought would be equivalent to referring to the fact that somebody is thinking something. Two different people could not think the same thought just like they could not make the same leap. Instead, perhaps they could think the same kind of thought but not the same numerically identical thought. This certainly goes against the objectivity of thought that one and the same thought can be grasped by different people. There is another objection that can be raised against Frege's view that thought is "an act of thinking". If this view is taken into account then there would be no thoughts that were not thought. But this is contrary to the view of Frege that thoughts are independent of our thinking. Thus the view that a thought is an act of thinking is incompatible with the intersubjectivity and the causal independence of thought.

Frege rejected the view that thinking is generating thoughts and that thoughts come into existence as a result of thinking.[80] This view of Frege again has been criticized by saying that the notion of grasping a thought is directed to the assumption that the existence of thought is causally dependent on the thinking of someone or another.

80 Ibid, p. 149.

In this way, the distinction between thoughts and representation gets lost. Frege remarks, "We are not owners of thoughts as we are owners of our ideas. We do not have thought as we have, say, a sense-impression, but we also do not *see* a thought as we see, say, a star. So it is advisable to choose a special expression: the word 'grasp' suggests itself for the purpose".[81] Thus Frege, at last, brings the word 'grasping' that means only negatively by means of the remark that 'we do not produce thoughts'.[82] Thus it may be concluded by saying that the notion of grasping a thought accounts for the distinction between thinking and having representations. However, he does not give any satisfactory explanation of the kind of access to what is objective but not real.

One may claim by saying that Frege's analysis of grasping a thought does not reveal the nature of our access to what is objective. As a result of that, it remains obscure how thinking a thought differs from perceiving an object. Bell claims that Frege here identifies thinking with some kind of material related to an object. Bell says, "Thinking is grasping or apprehending a thought, and a thought is an object. Although Frege himself nowhere explicitly asserts that thoughts are objects, this follows immediately from his identification of thought as the reference of a singular term of the form: 'the sense of the sentence "S" ' ".

In this regard, I think, Dummett's position is praiseworthy. Dummett has correctly pointed out the distinction between expressing thought and referring to it. For Dummett, we can refer to thought by using a name for it, and in this way, we refer

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[81] Frege, Gottlob, *Logical Investigations*, ed. by P. T. Geach and R. H. Stoothoff, Oxford, 1977, p. 24.

[82] Ibid, p. 25.

to the thought as an object. This does not, however, make sense to say that to express a thought by using a sentence is to refer to that thought. Fregean metaphor 'grasping a thought' was meant to describe what is done by expressing a thought, by using a sentence for asking a question (sentence-question), or by making an assertion. Thus we can regard thoughts as objects by referring to them without implying that grasping a thought is to be considered a way of referring to it. Bell's criticism has to be distinguished from Dummett's apprehension of the same. Bell claims that "Frege was wrong to conceive of thoughts as eternal immutable objects" and thereby the notion of thought is embodied by Frege's "philosophical mythology" of a 'third realm'. It has to be replaced by the view, Bell opines, that 'senses are intrinsical of expressions'. Bell further contends that thoughts are 'immanent objects', like dance steps or the power of a chess piece. Dummett writes, "The step did not exist and could not have existed antecedently to or independently of anyone dancing it: it is this which distinguishes it as an immanent object from a transcendent one like a shoe". Here, Carl agrees with Dummett by saying that the distinction between 'transcendent' and 'immanent' objects is important. Indeed Frege did not draw this distinction, rather he conceived them as transcendental objects, and as inhabitants of a realm altogether independent of us and our activities. We think that Frege apprehended the idea of independence of thought in a very restricted sense. He intends to say that thoughts are independent of our private inner life.

I have mentioned previously that according to Frege, the expression in language for thought is a sentence. Later on, he states, "The proper means of expression for a thought is a sentence". Critics may say why does the linguistic expression of a

thought matters for thinking? Why do we need such an expression? While responding to these questions, Frege goes on to say that "we know we can have various expressions for the same thought. The connection of thought with one particular sentence is not a necessary one, but that a thought of which we are conscious is concerned with some sentence or other is for us men necessary". It is true to say that conscious thoughts are thoughts expressed by sentences. But what are conscious thoughts? Thinking is grasping a thought and with regard to thought grasped by someone or other, Frege brings the rhetorical question: "What would a thought be for me if it were never grasped by me?" It seems after Frege that thought is something for me if it is grasped by me sometimes. Now, if we identify conscious thoughts with thoughts being something for me, it seems reasonable to suppose that the only way of grasping a thought essentially consists in expressing it by a sentence in a language that we apprehend. As a result, we can think only by using a language. Frege then points out that this fact concerns our capacity to grasp a thought, but not the thought itself. There is no contradiction in presupposing that there too exist beings that can grasp the same thought as we do without needing to clad to it. It thus seems that we can only grasp a thought by expressing it by means of a sentence in a language, either spoken language or formal language. Frege's concern for language is a concern for thinking that we as human beings can perform only by using sentences. Frege here develops the semantic theory of language as he explicitly claims that the relevance of thought persists only in the case of the semantic theory of language that accounts for the relation between thinking and judgment, between thought and truth. Here Frege is concerned about only those sentences that express

something for which the question of truth can arise at all, and the use of which can be taken as a linguistic manifestation of thinking. Frege had in mind that the fundamental characteristic of semantic theory is: "To free thinking from the fetters of language".

3.8: Sense and Thought:

It seems from the aforesaid observation that Frege took the sense of an assertive sentence to be a thought. That looks like a claim that Frege starting from the general notion of the sense of a sentence arrives at the notion of thought by considering the class of assertive sentences. Thus we have to understand the notion of thought in terms of the notion of sense. Thus one has to start from the notion of thought in order to understand Frege's thesis that the thought expressed by an assertoric sentence is its sense. In this regard, Frege assumes that "such a sentence contains a thought" and he then further continues by saying, "By a thought, I understand not the subjective performance of thinking but its objective content, which is capable of being the common property of several thinkers". As the thought 'contained' or expressed by a sentence is identified with its sense, the notion of sense as applied to an assertoric sentence is much more restrictive to Frege than others. Frege remarks, "In order to bring out more precisely what I mean by 'a thought', I shall distinguish various kinds of sentences. We should not wish to deny sense to be the command, but this sense is not such that the question of truth could arise for it. Therefore I shall not call the sense of a command a thought. Sentences expressing wishes or requests are ruled out in the same way". Thus it seems to me that Frege does not consider the sense of any sentence that is called 'thought', but only the sense of those sentences

'in which we communicate or assert something'. Thus Frege clearly denies the sense of non-assertoric sentences to be thought. An imperative has no reference, but only a sense; a command, and a request are indeed no thoughts, here they stand on the same level of thoughts. The distinction between sense and reference cannot be applied to all sentences. Thus for Frege, the sense of a sentence that is considered to be thought is a *special case of sense*. It is special in the sense that it concerns only those sentences with regard to which the distinction can be drawn and moreover they are just sentences that would serve to make an assertion. According to Frege, as assertions involve a claim to truth, the delineation of the sentences the sense of which is a thought. More importantly, Frege's preliminary explanation of thought is something for which the question of truth can arise at all. Thus it is not the sense of sentences in general but only the sense of a particular class of sentences that is at issue in the claim that the sense of a sentence is the thought expressed by it. However, this position of Frege again creates some doubt in the mind of contemporary thinkers.

3.9: Church's Apprehension of Frege:

In this regard, Church offers further explanation of his own understanding of Frege. According to Church, Frege's notion of sense: "Briefly the sense of an expression is its linguistic meaning, the meaning which is known to anyone familiar with the language and for which no knowledge of an extra-linguistic fact is required; the sense is what we have grasped when we are said to understand an expression". According to Church, it is impossible to realize that the sense of a sentence identified by Frege with a thought cannot be taken as its *linguistic meaning*, because otherwise,

one could not explain why he attributed a special kind of sense to declarative sentences. To respond to Church we may refer to Dummett. Dummett claimed, "For Frege, the sense is the content of understanding, or, rather, the principle ingredient of that content: it is that which one who knows the language apprehends as objectively associated with the expression". Now as applied to sentences, it is again said by Dummett that "to grasp the thought expressed by a particular sentence is to understand the sentence". Thus for Dummett, just by understanding a sentence one can grasp the thought expressed by it. Thus he identifies the notion of thought with the general notion of a sentence. Dummett asserts that in *Über Siṅṅ und Bedeutung* Frege explicitly repudiates the view that any sentences other than assertoric express thought. Here he makes the difference between assertoric, interrogative, imperative, and optative sentences as a difference in their *sense* rather than in the force attached to them. He then concludes that just as assertoric sentences express thoughts, so interrogative express questions, imperative commands, and optative wishes. However, Carl thinks that this position of Dummett opens up the possibility of further misinterpretation to Frege. Frege distinguishes between sense and force of assertoric sentences which is not reflected in Dummett's reading about Frege. Carl thus claims that it was not Frege but Dummett who was wrong in his interpretation of Frege's doctrine as well as its explanation. Dummett, of course, picks up Wittgenstein's idea of a proposition radical that had been clarified by Searle by making a distinction between 'illocutionary acts' and 'propositional content'. In this regard, an assertion and an imperative do not differ from each other in the sense of linguistic meaning. The sense of a sentence is given by an expression of the form

'that P' and we get an assertion from it by adding the operator 'It is the case', whereas we get a command from the same by adding the operator 'Let it be the case'. Dummett shares these views and thereby asserts that assertoric sentences, imperatives, sentential interrogatives and optative would all express thoughts. However, they would differ only in the *force* attached to them. Following Frege, we can say that "We can do various things with an expression of a thought: assert that it is true, ask whether it is true, command that it is made true, wish it were true". However, we think Frege had good reason to repudiate this view. If an imperative and an assertion share the same content and are identified with a thought, then one has to suppose that with regard to one and the same thought one might either command that it be made true or acknowledge that it is true. We cannot generate or produce the truth of thought; rather we can act and command others to act. *Based on this it is concluded that the notion of truth and also that of thought is intimately related to the descriptive or assertive use of sentences. Thus the sense of an imperative or an optative cannot be thought*. This is confirmed after Frege as he elsewhere remarked that different grammatical categories might have the same sense. Frege asserts, I have already mentioned, that an interrogative sentence and an assertive one contain the same thought. But the level of thought of course is different. The assertoric sentence contains something else as an assertion that is unlikely in the case of an interrogative sentence. The interrogative sentence contains a request. Thus it is judicious for us to claim after Frege that the sense of different kinds of sentences may be taken as a thought and is explained by the fact that they are related to each other. The assertion is "an answer to a question", as a question is

"a request for an assertion". This strict correlation between question and assertion requires that their sense be thought, because both involve the notion of truth, and therefore, that of thought.

Why does Frege insist that a sentence having a sense must be translatable? Is it necessary for Frege? Frege replies by saying that the translatability of a sentence increases in so far as *it is an expression of thought and of nothing else*. We can grasp a thought only by forming a sentence that expresses it. The linguistic expression of thought may not be a pure expression of what we think, rather it reflects the given connection between thinking and having representation. Thought is given by a sentence in a 'clothed way' surrounded by 'psychological trappings'. What varies are the sentences in some natural languages and the psychological trappings of our thought. Frege acknowledges that the same thought can be expressed in many different ways. And that it is not only invariant concerning different signs but concerning different forms of psychological clothing as well. That means, thought is objective and remains objective within psychological trappings. The translation of language does not take away these clothes, but shows that "for all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts". This is how one can grasp the same thought in different languages and in various 'clothing'. Frege says, "The distinction between what is part of the thought expressed in a sentence and what only gets attached to the thought is of the greatest importance for logic". For Frege, what goes beyond thought belongs to the realm of representation. For Frege, the content of a sentence often goes beyond the thought expressed by it. Alternatively, it can be said that the thought is not encompassed in

the content of the sentence; and understanding the sentence is not sufficient to grasp the thought. Of course, Frege here understands sentences containing only demonstratives. The general framework of his discussion of sentences containing demonstratives is given by his quest for the necessary and sufficient condition for grasping a thought. He points out that it is not necessary to take account of the whole 'content' of a sentence for grasping the thought expressed by it. Secondly, grasping the thought may not be sufficient to take account of what a sentence says. Thus we can distinguish between sentences that express thought and sentences that do not express a thought. We can also distinguish between an understanding of a sentence that provides a grasping of thought and an understanding of a sentence that does not. Sentences containing demonstratives are of the second kind. They are incomplete expressions of thought. As they are incomplete, understanding them does not provide a full grasp of the thought they express.

For example, the sentence 'I am cold' is a well-formed and complete sentence that has a definite meaning. Why is it an incomplete expression of thought? Frege mentions that 'the sentence expresses a different thought in the mouth of one person from what it expresses in the mouth of another person'. Because of this lack, a sentence like 'I am cold' is an incomplete expression of a thought.

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Chapter Four

Contemporary Debate Regarding Frege's Theory: A Response

There is no question of doubt that Frege's sense appears as a serious extension of semantics. The survival of Fregean sense under the womb of semantics indeed makes the semantics more fertile and comprehensive as well. But at the same time, it faces serious charges/challenges from the eyes of contemporary thinkers. Here we can particularly refer to Saul Kripke, Bertrand Russell and Hilary Putnam. Russell's attack on Fregean sense is famously presented in 'On Denoting'[83]. There is no question of doubt that Russell's 'On Denoting' appears as a classic of 20th-century analytic philosophy. But it has some obscurity as well. But still, it is worthy to take note of from a philosophical perspective. The main contention of Russell's 'On Denoting' is to provide reasons for rejecting an earlier theory of *denoting* which he has expounded in his book, *The Principle of Mathematics*[84]. This theory is primarily concerned with the distinction between 'meaning' and 'denoting' which Russell takes more or less similar to Frege's distinction between sense and reference. Thus it can be said that Russell regards himself as simultaneously arguing in 'On Denoting' against Frege as well as against his own earlier self.

4.1: Russell's Criticism of Frege:

Russell begins his criticism against Frege with the problem of empty singular terms. We have already discussed that Frege's sense/reference theory actually attempts to

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[83] Russell, Bertrand, "On Denoting", *Mind*, Vol. 14, No. 56 (Oct., 1905), pp. 479 – 493.
[84] Russell, Bertrand, *The Principles of Mathematics*, Cambridge University Press, 1903.

solve the problem of empty proper names. We have also seen that the key to solving the problem of the empty proper name is actually associated with the concept of sense. According to Russell, empty proper names pose a problem for Frege because of his adherence to the name/bearer prototype as an ingredient in his notion of reference. For Russell, it is mainly for this, that Frege identifies the semantic value of a singular term with his designation. He eventually leads to the conclusion that sentences containing empty proper names must be truth-valueless except in cases where the terms under consideration have their *indirect reference*. For Russell, Frege enables to do it because he subscribes to the senses of empty proper terms and regards sentences containing them as expressing thoughts. However, according to Russell, this position of Frege is deeply implausible, particularly in the case of empty definite descriptions. For example, 'the least rapidly convergent series' is in the form of 'the-so-and-so' and it is designated, according to Russell, a definite description, and this definite description, Russell opines, is an empty definite description. It is this implausibility that Russell points out in his first criticism of Frege where he reads Frege's terms 'sense' and 'reference' with regard to his own sense 'meaning' and 'denotation' respectively. In this regard, Russell says, "If we say, 'the king of England is bald', that is, it would seem, not a statement about the complex meaning 'the king of England', but about the actual term denoted by the meaning. But now consider 'the king of France is bald'. By parity of form, this also ought to be about the denotation of the phrase 'the king of France'. But this phrase, though it has a meaning, provided 'the king of England' has a meaning, has certainly no denotation, at least in any obvious sense. Hence one would suppose that 'the king of France is bald', ought to be non-sense; but it is not a non-sense, since it is plainly

false"[85].Here Frege is committed to saying that both subject-predicate sentences like 'the king of France is bald' and truth-functionally complex sentences like 'If u is a class with only one member, then that one member is a member of u', contain empty definite descriptions. For Frege, any definite description containing an empty proper name would be neither true nor false. But according to Russell, this is unacceptable. Here, in the former case, the sentence can be false and in the latter case, the sentence can be true.

Thus, the problem arises for Frege because he groups definite descriptions with proper names and eventually and conventionally regards both types of expression as having objects as their semantic values. He treats quantifying expressions as having their references to *second-level functions* from *first-level concepts* to truth-value. Thus, Frege would say:

<p style="text-align:center">Some king of France is bald</p>

as analysable as saying of the first-level concept which is the reference of the predicate 'is bald'. That means it falls under or strictly within the second-level concept which is the reference to the quantifying expression 'some king of France'. Here, Frege would say that the word 'some' occurs in the sentence, and indicates a relation between the subject class and the predicate class of the sentence under consideration. It is a sort of relation between concepts, i.e., "has as its reference a second-level relation between the first-level concepts which are the reference of the predicates 'is a king of France' and 'is wise'"[86]. But Frege rightly thinks that sentences containing such proper names, like

[85] Russell, Bertrand, *Logic and Knowledge*, ed. by Robert C. Marsh, George Allen & Unwin, p. 46
[86] Russell, Bertrand, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell (1944 – 1969)*, Simon and Schuster, 1969, p. 48.

sentences containing an empty definite description, though truth-valueless, express thought.

4.2: Kripke's Criticism of Frege:

Kripke's criticism of Frege is even more challenging than Russell's criticism of Frege. Saul Kripke in his highly important and influential paper 'Naming and Necessity' (1972) criticizes Frege by owing some philosophical inspiration from Donnellan (1972) and Putnam (1975) who developed externalism in the philosophy of mind and 'causal' and 'direct reference' theories of reference in the philosophy of language. These developments constitute an advance on Frege one of the most important philosophical quests for contemporary philosophy of mind and language in the analytic tradition. However, here we are primarily concerned with Kripkean explicit challenge to Frege.

Kripke's paper 'Naming and Necessity' appears as a revolutionary philosophical manuscript through which he not only criticized the descriptivist account of the naming theory developed by Frege but at the same time, he explored in what sense naming is strictly tagged with necessity even in the transworld mechanism. His concept of the rigid designator is philosophically revolutionary through which he, unlike Frege, abstracted names with the concept of modal necessity. It is thought that his remarkable work of philosophy which has been attributed 'a gold mine of thought-provoking contentions and arguments on issues relating to meaning, necessity, the *a priori* and *a posteriori*, identity, essentialism, natural kinds, the mind-brain identity theory and the necessary non-existence of unicorns'[87] incorporates under the realm of names

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[87] Noonan, Harold W., *Frege: A Critical Introduction*, Polity, 2001, p. 213.

associated with the reference. Here we are primarily concerned with the issue in what sense Kripke's arguments are effective against Frege's theory of sense. When Frege talks of proper names, he takes them as distinct semantic categories from quantifiers, what Russell calls them to be an abbreviation of definite description. Despite the differences between Frege and Russell were agreed on one very important point which Gareth Evans (1982) has called 'Russell's principle' as 'Frege's principle'. According to Evans, the meeting point between Frege and Russell is that both of them have asserted that one cannot speak or even think about a thing unless one knows which thing one is speaking or *thinking about*. That means both of them have agreed that to talk of or to think of something one has to comprehend the very idea of what that something is; what that something means. That means we have the mode of presentation or sense in Fregean sense and some descriptive content in Russellian sense, to refer to anything. That is why both Frege and Russell brings under the cluster of classical or descriptivist account of sense or proper name. In order for an object to be the object of one's reference in speech or thought, one must know of some conditions satisfied uniquely by it and in thought eventually, it would discriminate it from every other possible object of reference. This actually means, according to Noonan, that the link between word (language) and the world (reality) is made possible by the word user's *knowledge and intention*. As a matter of fact, one cannot refer to an object of which one lacks *identifying knowledge*. Thus for Frege, sense or mode of presentation is a pre-requisite for identifying knowledge that is naively known as a reference.

This is where the relevance of Kripke's criticism against Frege actually hinges. Like Russell, Frege employs the notion of non-descriptive knowledge in his discussion of

indexicals. It clearly reflects that Frege does not equate knowledge of sense with knowledge of an abbreviated description. Frege is in no way committed to the absurd view that the sense of proper names can be given by description. Nor does he committed to the view that the sense of any proper name must be equivalent to that of a description at all. To my mind when he gives the sense of a proper name, he does so by giving an equivalent description to hold that in some cases grasp of the sense of a name can consist solely in a capacity to *recognize its bearer*. According to Frege, such a suitable presented recognitional capacity will involve sensitivity to features the object has. However, it may not be the part of the name user's grasp of the sense of a name that he can describe the features in question. Thus, it is entirely open to Frege, Noonan observes, "consistently with his views on sense to hold that a person's grasp of the sense of a name of one of his acquaintances might consist of a combination of *non-individuating* descriptive knowledge and an ability to pick them out in suitable circumstances…"[88]. Frege is committed to holding at least that the sense of a proper name can be that of a description, at least in the case of some ordinary proper names. But Kripke disagrees with Frege on this issue. For Kripke, no proper name has the sense of any description, and no proper name could be equivalent in sense to a description. By saying that Kripke denies both Frege and Russell. Here Kripke employs two main lines of argument against the description theory of names, such as the *rigidity argument* and the argument from *ignorance and error*. The rigidity argument starts from the observation that proper names are *rigid designators*. For Kripke, an expression is a rigid

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[88] Ibid, p. 215.

designator, if it designates the same individual in every possible world in which it designates *at all*.

Let me explain this position by illuminating Kripke's own example of Benjamin Franklin, who was the first Postmaster General of the United States and the inventor of bifocals. Accordingly, the sentence:

(1) The inventor of bifocals might not have been the inventor of bifocals.

And,

(2) Someone other than the inventor of bifocals might have been the inventor of bifocals.

are ambiguous. (1) Can mean either:

(1') Concerning the man who in fact invented bifocals; he might not have been the inventor of bifocals.

(1") The following might have been the case: The inventor of bifocals was not the inventor of bifocals.

Where the problem actually lies? In this regard, we can say that the problem actually lies in a *scope-ambiguity* very similar to what Russell says about George IV like 'George IV wondered whether Scot was the author of *Waverly*'. According to Noonan, (1') is true because the inventor of bifocals, i.e., Benjamin Franklin, might never have got round to inventing bifocals. But (1") is absurd, since it says that the proposition *the inventor of bifocals was not the inventor of bifocals* is a possible truth.

Similarly, (2) is ambiguous between the two

(2') Concerning the inventor of bifocals: some other than he might have been the inventor of bifocals; and the absurd.

(2") The following might have been the case: Someone other than the inventor of bifocals was the inventor of bifocals.

However, if we replace 'the inventor of bifocals' in (1) and (2) with Benjamin Franklin, then all these ambiguities disappear:

(3) Benjamin Franklin might not have been Benjamin Franklin

can only be heard in one way, as saying of the man Benjamin Franklin that he might not have been Benjamin Franklin. According to Noonan, this is absurd. Benjamin Franklin might not have been called 'Benjamin Franklin'. He might have had a wholly different career. Even it may be the case that he had done none of the things, he would still be designated as Benjamin Franklin. Similarly:

(4) Someone other than Benjamin Franklin might have been Benjamin Franklin

can only be heard as saying of the man Benjamin Franklin that someone other than he might have been Benjamin Franklin. This again is absurd. Although someone other than Benjamin Franklin might have been called 'Benjamin Franklin', he might have done the things which make Benjamin Franklin a famous figure in American history. No one other than Benjamin Franklin could have been Benjamin Franklin. According to Noonan, (3) and (4) as mentioned above, unlike (1) and (2), are not ambiguous. Kripke says that the name 'Benjamin Franklin' is a rigid designator whose designation in any possible world is *its actual designation*. Whereas, the 'inventor of bifocals' is a non-rigid or flexible designator, whose designation in any possible world is whoever, in that

world, satisfies the condition of being the inventor of bifocals. Now for Kripke, Noonan observes, that the name and the description behave differently in modal context, the name cannot be equivalent in meaning to the description. Synonymous expressions will behave the same in all linguistic contexts. However, in the most likely scenario, names that behave as 'Benjamin Franklin' are rigid designators and description behaves as 'the inventor of bifocals' are flexible designators. So, name and description from modal context are not synonymous. For Kripke, a name stands for rigid designator whereas description stands for non-rigid designator. But referring to Frege, there is nothing wrong because in each case, i.e., name and description, the relevance of reference is not ruled out. The only notable point is that in one case the reference of a name is rigid and in another case the reference of a name (description) is non-rigid. That is why, Frege emphasizes sense and reference acknowledge reference both in terms of direct as well as indirect reference or reference in the sense of entailment and reference in the sense of pre-supposition.

However, defenders of the description theory have responded to this argument in two different ways. First, they have appealed to the idea of scope convention, and secondly, they have appealed to the possibility of rigidifying description. The notion of *scope convention* was introduced by Michael Dummett (1973) to respond to Kripke's argument. It cannot be denied that ordinary proper names are rigid designators and they display the scope of indifference in a modal context. However, Dummett suggests that names are an abbreviation of descriptions but are used as having maximal scope relative to the modal operators. However, one can introduce an expression that is stipulated to be synonymous with another except that it is to have a wide scope relative to a certain

class of operator. Like arithmetic, scope convention plays important role in proper names as well. 'Benjamin Franklin' does not mean the same as 'the inventor of bifocals' but as a matter of convention, it may have wide scope than modal operators. The second response available to the description theorists is to acknowledge that names are not synonymous with a non-rigid description like 'the inventor of bifocals'. However, any such description can be paired with a rigidified description like 'the actual inventor of bifocals' with which the name can be regarded as synonymous. Here, 'the actual inventor of bifocals' behaves in a modal context like 'Benjamin Franklin'; its reference with respect to every possible world is the man who in the actual world actually invented the bifocals. Accordingly, if we replace 'the inventor of bifocals' in 'The inventor of bifocals might not have been the inventor of bifocals' and 'Someone other than the inventor of bifocals might have been the inventor of bifocals' with 'the actual inventor of bifocals', then the ambiguity is eliminated very similar way if we replace it by 'Benjamin Franklin'. However 'the actual inventor of bifocals' is nonetheless a description.

However, it is observed that Frege never explicitly discusses modal context as Kripke did. The modal context is like propositional attitude context in blocking substitutivity of co-designating singular terms. For example, 'it is a necessary truth that the inventor of bifocals if he existed, invented bifocals' – is true, but 'it is a necessary truth that the first postmaster general of the United States if he existed invented bifocals' – is false. Within a Fregean framework, this failure of substitutivity can be accommodated only by regarding the inventor of bifocals and 'The first Postmaster General of the United States' as having indirect reference in these sentences. According to Noonan, a Fregean

account of modal operators must treat them like propositional attitude verbs, as creating a context in which reference shift occurs. Now the ambiguity we are talking of is as follows:

The inventor of bifocals might not have invented bifocals

are also present in ascriptions of propositional attitudes, such as,

George IV wondered whether the author of *Waverly* was a Scot.

A careful study would reflect that the Russellian account of ambiguity employs the notion of scope. However, from the Fregean perspective, this cannot be the full explanation. The ambiguity in the sentence about George IV has to be explained from a Fregean point of view. One asserts that a relation (of wondering whether) holds between George IV and the thought identified in that clause, the thought that the author of *Waverly* was a Scot. The sentence, 'The author of *Waverly*' has indirect reference after 'George IV wondered whether'. 'The author of *Waverly*' retains its direct reference after 'George IV wondered whether'. The sentence does not assert that the relation of *wondering whether* holds between George IV and identified thought. Instead, it merely asserts of the *author of Waverly* that George IV wondered if he was a Scot.

Here one can bring out the aforesaid ambiguity by using some convenient terminology and notation from a paper by Peter Geach (1976b)[89]. In his paper, Geach uses the term 'aspect' to mean the Fregean sense of actual or possible proper names. He then speaks of an aspect α as an aspect of an object X when in Fregean terminology α is a mode of presentation of X. α is a way of latching into X in thought. However, according to

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[89] Geach, P. T., *Reason and Argument*, Blackwell: Oxford, England, 1976.

Noonan, we can embody 'aspects' in the use of any actual proper name, because there are aspects that are not aspects of anything. After that Geach writes '[α is F]' to stand for the thought composed of the aspect α and the sense of the predicate 'is F'. Geach says that this put together a dodge belonging to Quine's theory of quasi-quotes and his use of *square brackets* to put a ring fence around intentional context. In '[α is F]', the Greek letter does not belong to the intentional context. The thought that [α is F] is the thought you would express in the language just by attaching the predicate 'is F' to a subject-term whose sense is the aspect α. Now the two readings of the sentence about George IV can be brought out as follows. The reading which Russell would describe as giving the description secondary reference is:

George IV wondered whether the author of *Waverly* was a Scot.

This needs no special notation. The reading which Russell would describe as giving the description of primary occurrence is:

(∃x) (α is an aspect of the author of *Waverly* and George IV wondered whether: [α was a Scot]).

Now, by using this notational apparatus, we can express in a parallel way the ambiguity in:

The inventor of bifocals might not have invented bifocals.

This may be read as:

It might have been the case [the inventor of bifocals did not invent bifocals].

Or

It is parallel as:

(∃x) (α is an aspect of the inventor of bifocals and it might have been the case that [α did not invent bifocals])

In the above two interpretations, the former is false, but the latter interpretation is evidently true.

On the basis of the above, we are in a position to give a Fregean account of what the rigidity of proper names comes to consistent with the description theory. It seems to us that, unlike the description theory, there is a convention in force whereby a proper name must not be used in a *modal context* to refer to its indirect reference. We must be careful about the distinction between direct reference and indirect reference. There is no scope of indirect reference in the proper name used in the case of rigid designator and modal context. Even if we take into the account Russellian principle of acquaintance which he introduces while developing a logically proper name, we find it clear that there is no scope for indirect reference. Kripke introduces the semantic as well as the pragmatic uses of the proper name as a rigid designator. In the case of semantic interpretation, Kripke introduces the concept of possible worlds that we use in modal logic. However in the case of pragmatic interpretation, even though he takes *natural kind terms* as the rigid designator, we cannot say and surely we should not say that he takes the indirect reference even in the case of pragmatic interpretation of rigid designator. Did Russell introduce indirect reference in the case of ordinary proper name under the phrase definite description expressed in the form of 'the-so-and-so'? We do not think so because the basic objective of Russell is to give a meaningful interpretation of any ordinary proper name expressed in the form of the phrase 'the-so-and-so'. Russell here,

of course, enables us to incorporate empty proper names under the womb of definite description and interpreted them as meaningful. Thus, Russell's philosophical gravity is to retain the demand of meaningfulness that would be a relishing matter to the philosophers of logical positivism in particular and the whole host of enlightened philosophers in general.

But when we come to Frege, we have a different interpretation altogether. Frege admits both direct and indirect reference in his theory of meaning appears under the title of his celebrated article 'On Sense and Meaning'. Many would say that evidently, this proposal is very similar to the proposal that proper names are an abbreviation of description conventionally. It is also to be noted here that both Russell and Frege are being treated as classical referential theorists. But to me, there underlie distinct philosophical proposals for which they may differ from each other. Of course, it would be true to say that we find Russell, but surely not Kripke, Putnam, Marcus, within Frege's womb. Those who advocate proper name under the womb of rigid designator and modal context, are regarded as a causal theory of reference and they are in contradiction with the neo-classical theory of reference. But as both Frege and Russell belong to the classical theory of reference, there underlies some assimilation between Frege and Russell. We will see later on that Frege interprets various levels of thought which actually helps Frege to appear as a different classical semanticist and also helps to make a mark as distinct from other semanticists in some sense or other.

We have also noted Frege's view that ordinary proper names vary in sense from speaker to speaker. That means the sense of a proper name expressed in the form of mode of presentation may have different presentations of the same proper name. But Frege

claims that different presentations of the same proper name may not hamper the dignity and the sanctity of the proper name under consideration. In our ordinary day-to-day life, we converse with people or speak with people about the same thing (proper name). If we fail to do this, we fail to communicate as well. But the question is: If senses of proper names vary from speaker to speaker, then can we not lack a common subject matter if we use proper names with their indirect references? Does indirect reference ensure that reference is proper? According to Frege, if his proposal of indirect reference is practiced in ordinary language that we use in our day-to-day life, then it would create a problem to identify the reference in the desired sense because ordinary language, according to Frege, is defective. Frege talks of indirect reference under the womb of Concept-Notation where a different mode of presentation of a proper name cannot dislocate at all the reference of proper names, directly or indirectly. This would be the sanctity or assurance of Concept-Notation (*Begriffsschrift*), a logical authenticity that is completely foreign in ordinary language.

Kripke then raises another objection against the descriptive theory of names as developed by Frege and Russell. This objection is known as 'the argument from ignorance and error'. We think that this is a much greater challenge to the Fregean sense than the rigidity argument. If it is correct, then it refutes not merely any version of the description theory, but also Russell's principle and any theory like Frege's which requires that "our capacity to refer is epistemically constrained"[90]. Noonan here observes that the point of the argument and error is the observation that most people use

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[90] Noonan, Harold W., *Frege: A Critical Introduction*, Polity, 2001, p. 222.

names of such famous people as Cicero (the Roman orator) on the basis of the scantiest information about them. However, defenders of description theory offer descriptions of the famous deeds of the individual. Kripke here ponders that it is a tribute to the education of philosophers that this thesis was held for so long in this form. Of course, it may perhaps be the case that most people do not have such a detailed general and historical knowledge of the person in all situations. Because historical knowledge is informative in nature. Here Kripke goes on to argue that even when a user of a name seems to be in a position to give an identifying description of its bearer, then it would often be the case that there is an *unacceptable circularity*. For example, it may happen that any student of philosophy irrespective of his classical education, will give rise to providing an identifying designation of Cicero if he has read Quine (1960), where the man who denounces Catiline. But if such a student only knows from reading Quine that Cicero denounce Catiline all he will know of Catiline probably is that he was denounced by Cicero. Noonan's point is that if his only way of identifying Cicero is as the denouncer of Catiline and his only way of identifying Catiline is as the man denounced by Cicero, then his apparently identifying knowledge simply involves a circularity and leaves both names without reference, as per description theory is concerned. Kripke illustrates the same point by citing another example about Einstein. According to Kripke, everyone knows who Einstein was. Everyone knows the man who discovered the theory of relativity. Almost everyone is ready with an answer to the question of what the theory of relativity is associated with Einstein's theory. Kripke now claims that a person whose knowledge is exhausted by this identification does not have knowledge

proper "which fixes the reference of the name 'Einstein' non-circularity"[91]. These arguments are designed to show that successful reference with proper names is compatible with "ignorance of any identifying information about the bearers of the names"[92]. This clearly suggests that Frege here invokes non-descriptive content of proper name as the mark of its reference. It is at par with the no-sense theory of reference advocated by philosophers like Mill, Russell, and Wittgenstein. However, Kripke at the same time differs from the no-sense theorists of proper names just by adding modal employment with the no-sense interpretation of proper names. If we say p is true, we cannot say with absolute certainty that Lp is true (where 'L' stands for modal necessity). But if we say that ⊢p then we can say that ⊢Lp. When I compare Kripke with Mill, Russell, and Wittgenstein, I understand them with regard not in the sense of 'p' as cited above, but concerning the concept of ⊢p. Mill, Russell and Wittgenstein asserted that a name stands for an object with which we are acquainted either physically (Russell's theory of acquaintance) or conceptually (Mill's theory of proper name) or logically (Wittgenstein's theory of proper names). If a name always stands for an object without any discourse of presentation, then in my sense a name always tags with a reference. In such a case, we have the perception of ⊢p meaning that p stands for an object without failing to refer to it. Then in such a situation, we can extend it to ⊢Lp as Kripke did while illuminating his theory of proper name as a rigid designator. Thus in one sense, I do reckon, that Kripke actually develops a theory of proper name as a rigid designator just like an extension of the no-sense theory of proper name as developed by others. In

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91 Ibid, p. 223.
92 Ibid, p. 223.

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this regard, I think that Kripke's theory of proper name as a rigid designator may not be treated as complementary to all the classical thinkers as suggested by others.

Kripke elsewhere uses another example to show that successful reference is compatible with error. Suppose, someone, says that Gödel proves the incompleteness of arithmetic and is able to specify exactly what this means. In such a case, he is not in the position of the man who can *identify* the theory of relativity as Einstein's theory. In such a case, he may perhaps have the knowledge capable of determining an object as the reference for his use of the name 'Gödel' in accordance with the description theory. A descriptivist theorist, of course, would like to say that if this is only identifying knowledge, he associates with the name he must, when he is using the name 'Gödel' as referring expression. However, Kripke argues that it need not be the case that his reference is determined by this description. For Kripke, if Gödel was not, in fact, the author of the incompleteness theorem, which was, in fact, proved by Schmidt, a friend of Gödel's who disappeared in mysterious circumstances, still it would be the reference of 'Gödel' as used by the person in question will still be the famous public figure and not the long-dead unknown Viennese. Now Kripke's point is that ignorance and error, even if there be any, do not impede successful reference with proper names. They refute not merely any description theory of proper names, but also any sense-theory as developed by Frege.

A plausible first response to this argument raised by Kripke is to say that they do not refute the description theory since if the speaker imagined really did associate just the descriptions Kripke supposes with the name used, then their references would indeed be determined by those descriptions. For example, if someone really did know nothing

about the bearer of the name 'Cicero' save that he was a famous Roman orator then he could not use the name 'Cicero' to refer to Cicero. The point is that if someone really did associate only the description 'the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic' with the name 'Gödel' then in the situation imagined by Kripke he would be referring to the long-dead Viennese and not the famous public figure. Description of a proper name may vary. For example, a classically uneducated philosophy student who learns about Cicero from Quine's associate with the name 'Cicero' not only the description to the denouncer of 'Catiline' but also the description, 'the man Quine refers to by the name "Cicero"'; the man who thinks of Gödel as the discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetic also thinks of him as the man to whom the incompleteness of arithmetic is commonly attributed. P. F. Strawson raises this point which Kripke is very much aware of. Strawson says, "The identifying description, though it must not include a reference to the speaker's own reference to the particular in question, may include a reference to another reference to that particular. If a putatively identifying description is of this kind, then, indeed, the question of whether it is a genuinely identifying description turns on the question, of whether the reference may borrow its reference, as a genuinely identifying reference, from another; and that from another, but this regress is not infinite"[93].

We think that if Strawson's view stands then Kripke's view would be in deep philosophical trouble. But Kripke makes three main points in response to this kind of counter-argument raised against the above view. First, Kripke points out that the use of such a description as 'the man to whom the incompleteness of arithmetic is commonly

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[93] Strawson, P. F., *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*, Routledge: London, England, 1959, p. 181.

attributed' will succeed in securing a reference for a name only if not everyone relies on it. Secondly, he points out that if I refer to Joe, in the sense of associating such a description as 'the man Joe thinks proved the incompleteness of arithmetic' with the name 'Gödel', I cannot be sure that there is no circle involved. I cannot, therefore, use such a relatively identifying description with any confidence. Thirdly, Kripke points out that if we use such a description as 'the man whom Joe called "Gödel"' to determine the reference of a name, we need to remember from whom we got the name. But very often mistakenly we do not do it. This shows that the view Kripke advocates have consequences that can actually diverge from those suggested by Strawson. Further suppose, that the speaker has heard the name 'Cicero' from Smith and others, who use the name to refer to a famous Roman orator. He later thinks that he picked it up from Jones who uses 'Cicero' as the name of the notorious German spy and has never heard of any orator in the ancient world. Now according to Strawson's paradigm, the speaker must determine his reference by the resolution 'I shall use "Cicero" to refer to the man whom Jones calls by the name'. In this view, Kripke advocates that the reference will be the orator in spite of the speaker's false impression about where he picked up the name. Kripke takes this to show that his own view is preferable because 'it conforms to the principle that it is the actual chain of communication and not what the speaker thinks is the chain of communication, which is relevant'.

4.3: Putnam's Criticism of Frege:

Like Saul Kripke, Putnam also developed a direct reference theory of proper name. He claims that all-natural kind terms are rigid designators as opposed to the artefacts, such as tables and chairs. Putnam in his "Is Semantics Possible?" (1970) and in his "Meaning

and Reference" (1973) respectively was propounding the view that natural kind terms are rigid designators. Interestingly, both theories are directed against the Fregean view that every common noun has a sense (*Siṅṅ*) and also in most cases a reference (*Bedeutung*).

According to Frege, as we have observed, the *Siṅṅ* (sense) that the noun (name) expresses is a *concept,* and Frege in this regard finds the distinction between object and concept. For Frege, as we have noted, it is via the concept that one can identify or pick out the referent. Frege's view of describing the relationship between the meaning of a linguistic expression and its referent is to say that *meaning determines reference*. Both Putnam and Kripke reject this view. I have already explained the view of Kripke previously. Here, I am primarily concerned only with Putnam's anti-Fregean view. Against Frege's view that meaning determines reference Putnam puts the matter, "Cut the pie any way you like, 'meanings' just ain't in the head"[94]. While illuminating Putnam's position here Stroll (2000) inclines to say that to use Fregean parlance in describing Putnam's view, Putnam would be insisting in opposition to Frege that the meaning of a natural kind term is its *Bedeutung* rather than its *Siṅṅ*. According to Putnam, the relation between language and the world is the same whether one is speaking about proper names/common nouns. In both cases, those words speak out their referent directly. To be sure, we can distinguish between proper and common nouns – the former are labels and hence meaningless, whereas the latter do have meaning.

The Twin-Earth Argument:

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[94] Putnam, Hilary, "Realism and Reason", *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 50 (6), 1977, pp. 483 – 498.

While substantiating the anti-Fregean argument, Putnam brings the metaphor *Twin-Earth Argument*. In his 'Meaning and Reference', Putnam offers what has become the most famous argument in the Twin-Earth scenario in supporting the direct reference view of natural kinds. Putnam begins by asking us to imagine a twin of Earth, a planet exactly like ours, except in one respect. It will be of the same size and have the same appearance. There will thus be a twin-Earth of Hilary Putnam and a twin-Earth of Stroll and so on. An observer while looking at the two planets from an external standpoint would find them indistinguishable. On twin-Earth, there will also be a substance that Twin-Earthlings call 'water'. In terms of its observable properties and its usage, it will be indistinguishable from water. It will be a transparent liquid that is highly viscous and fluid. However, there will be one difference between these two worlds. When this substance on Twin-Earth is subjected to chemical analysis, it will be found not to be composed of hydrogen and oxygen but of another combination of chemicals, which we shall call XYZ, and that are not identical to H_2O.

According to Putnam, this is a *possible scenario*; we can easily imagine such a twin world. As it is a *possible scenario*, then certain inferences about the theory of reference follow from it:

a) That Earthling and Twin-Earthling can have the same concept in mind. That water is a substance having observable properties, such as liquidity, transparency, fluidity, viscosity, etc.

b) That the reference (extension) of that concept is a liquid, i.e., H_2O on Earth and XYZ on Twin-Earth (where XYZ is different from H_2O).

c) That the liquid referred to by the same term 'water', are therefore different substances.

d) That the Fregean view that two substances having different meanings refer to the same object as he cited in the case of 'Hesperus refers to Venus' and 'Phosphorus refers to Venus', where 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' have different meanings, is mistaken.

e) That because Earthling and Twin-earthling were grasping the same concept (i.e., had the same meaning in mind), and because that concept picks out two different references, H_2O and XYZ, it follows that *meaning does not determine reference* as Frege has claimed.

Putnam further contends that even on a deeper level Frege's view was wrong in holding that 'water' meant the liquid having certain observable properties. What 'water' meant had nothing to do with any such Fregean sense or meaning, but was wholly determined by *what 'water' is*. That means it was determined by the chemical composition of water. Moreover, the nineteenth-century scientific discovery that water is composed of H_2O resolves the question of *what water is*. However, English speakers who lived before the nineteenth-century chemical discovery that water is H_2O were mistaken in thinking that water was the liquid defined by certain *overt properties*. The Twin-Earth narrative indicates that two different liquid substances exhibited those very same properties.

Based on the above observation, Putnam concludes by saying that the *observable properties of any natural kind do not determine its real nature*. By a 'natural kind', he actually means something found in nature as distinct from something created by human beings. Accordingly, after Putnam, we can assert that chairs are not natural kinds, tables

are not natural kinds; whereas gold, water and tigers are natural kinds terms. Some substances, such as iron-pyrite look exactly like gold yet they have a different chemical composition. So they are not gold. Accordingly, we can say, after Putnam, that in the case of water its nature is determined by a chemical analysis, which found it to be composed of H_2O. However, that was not the composition of liquid on Twin-Earth. It thus follows that as used on Twin-Earth, 'water' does not mean 'water' as used on Earth means.

4.4: Stroll's Response against Putnam:

Stroll suspects the authenticity of Putnam's argument against Frege. Putnam in his Twin-Earth argument shows that in dealing with two different questions: *what the word 'water' means* and *what 'water' is*. Stroll thinks that Putnam here, like Kripke, conflates these questions, because he presupposes that the debate about what the word 'water' means will be settled once it is determined adequately *what water is*. Here Putnam categorically states, "Once we have discovered that water (in the actual world) is H_2O, *nothing counts as a possible world in which water is not H_2O*"[95].

Here Stroll inclines to say that perhaps Putnam would agree like Kripke that the expression 'water is H_2O' exactly captures what they intend. Moreover, like Kripke, Putnam equally takes this locution to be an identity sentence. That the word "is" taken as a "to be" verb means "is identical with". That means water is H_2O is symbolically represented as: "Water = H_2O". Here, Stroll finds loopholes in Putnam's view. He, in this regard, offers a counter-example, that is as follows:

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[95] Ibid, p. 490.

i) Water = H_2O

ii) Ice = H_2O

iii) Therefore, Water = Ice.

The above argument looks apparently cogent because it is based on the principle of transitivity and it is logically true that identity relation is transitive. It states that if A=B and B=C, A=C. But Stroll thinks that this argument is false because at least one of its premises must be false. That the conclusion is false is obvious, as water is not identical to ice. For Stroll, if I ask you to put some ice in my glass, I am certainly not asking you to put water in my glass. Water is a liquid; whereas ice is not. Water is transparent, but ice is not. However, water and ice stand in a virtually unique relationship to one another. He further extended the argument by adding one more premise like the following:

Steam is identical to H_2O.

He then claims, that we can infer that ice = steam, which is clearly false. It is also false that steam is identical to water even though the chemical composition of steam is H_2O. Now, if Putnam believes that water is identical to H_2O and steam is identical to H_2O then he would have to subscribe to the belief that ice is identical to steam, since both have the same chemical composition.

4.5: My Observation:

I think Stroll here misinterprets Putnam. Putnam has said that natural kind terms have natural properties. Likewise, water as a natural kind term has the natural property H_2O as its chemical composition and it has been proved scientifically. The chemical composition of water, ice, steam, etc. is H_2O, but their observable characteristics are

different based on which Stroll, like Kripke, has claimed that ice is different from water as well as the water is different from condensation based on observable characteristics they have. Therefore, I conclude by saying that Stroll's counter-example does not stand effective against Putnam's argument raised against Frege. In fact, I do further subscribe that the principle of synonymity and uniform substitution is the genesis of logical abstractions based on which the principle of identity functions. However, the principle of synonymity and the principle of uniform substitution seem inadequate when they can be applied to language based on observable characteristics and nothing else. W.V.O Quine has been proactive to show the inadequacy of the principle of synonymity and uniform substitutions. He raised serious objections against Immanuel Kant and Carnap in his celebrated paper entitled "Two Dogmas of Empiricism"[96]. One simple example he raised is as follows:

i)   BACHELOR = UNMARRIED

ii)   BACHELOR = 8 alphabets

Therefore, UNMARRIED = 8 alphabets.

In the above argument, the first premise is true and the second is also true at least based on observable characteristics that the term 'bachelor' contains 8 alphabets. Whereas the conclusion is absolutely false. Does it then lead us to say Quine is right and Putnam is wrong? Does it then lead us to say that Stroll is right and Putnam is wrong? I do not think so. I think Putnam is right in his interpretation of natural kind terms as rigid designators. However, I do not think, Putnam adequately justifies the merit of his

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[96] Quine, W. V. O., "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", *Philosophical Review*, 60 (1), 1951, pp. 20 – 43.

criticism against Frege. Frege invokes an indirect theory of reference where the rigidity of reference would remain a far cry. So my single-handed conclusion is that both Frege and Putnam's positions have merit in their own way. I stand for Frege rather than Putnam though there are some obscurities in Fregean theory.

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Chapter Five

Concluding Remarks

After elucidating a detailed account of the problem of meaning (sense) of Gottlob Frege, I am now in a position to assess the merits and philosophical implications (positive or negative) of the same. In the proposed synopsis of the thesis, I have mentioned two interpretations of meaning that have been developed by Frege. The first interpretation of meaning appears in his early work, *Begriffsschrift* (Concept-Script or Concept-Notation) where the meanings of words were characterized by elementary formal logic. As a result of that, it was claimed that Frege's whole approach to language was shaped by his work on elementary logic. This essentially has set up the foundation of the concept of validity for Frege that argument is valid if and only if it is impossible for all of its premises to be true and its conclusion is false. It has also set up the Fregean foundation of semantic language where he denied the possibility of natural language and favoured logically perfect language that contains proper names as its legitimate vocabularies. As far as the second interpretation of meaning is concerned, Frege holds that proper names must have a sense (connotation) all without exception but *may not have* the reference. That means Frege here indicates by saying that there may have some proper names lacking reference in the usual sense. Empty proper names are cases in point. Thus, I do claim that Frege introduces the sense theory of reference which draws *serious controversy* in the eyes of contemporary thinkers. Frege here has attempted to know the reference of a proper name, not directly but indirectly via sense. That is why his theory is known as the *indirect theory of reference*.

I think Frege's first interpretation of meaning, which appeared as *Concept-Notation*, does not create any philosophical controversy to determine the meaning of proper names. As a semanticist, there is nothing unusual to call in favor of *Concept-Notation*. At least I have no problem with it. However, his sense theory of reference has essentially created some serious problems on which I mainly focus on. Of course, Frege makes it clear that he brings the concept of sense and reference and also distinguishes between them as a solution to the puzzles about *identity statements and empty* names. It has generally been acknowledged that the principle of identity has a huge role to play in mathematics, physics, logic, and semantics. Nobody can deny it. With the two key linguistic concepts, namely, the concept of *synonymity* and the concept of *substitution*, the principle of identity functions. In semantics, logic, physics, and even mathematics and geometry it is generally acknowledged that if two terms are synonymous, then one can be substituted in favour of the other. The principle of uniform substitutions has been regarded as one of the Transformation Rules (TRs) in Modal Propositional Logic. However, Frege finds some problems in the principle of identity that has been developed by Leibniz in the eighteenth century in the name of the *Principle of Indiscernibles*, symbolically represented as a=a, meaning that everything is identical with itself. It is cognitively true. This principle functioned adequately over the centuries till the appearance of Frege's celebrated article, 'On Sense and Meaning' (*Uber Siṅṅ and Bedeutung*).

Frege in his paper finds a serious problem with the Leibnizian identity principle to overcome the problem that two proper names having different senses can have the same reference. He cites the example 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'. Here the proper name

'Hesperus' stands for the morning star and the proper name 'Phosphorus' stands for the evening star. Thus they have *different meanings but they refer to the same object* 'Venus'. Frege then raises the question: How can we say that two proper names have different senses (mode of presentation) but the same reference be expressed by a=a? To overcome this problem, Frege introduces a new meaning of identity known as *informative identity*, expressed in the form a=b. This actually dignifies the philosophical implication of Gottlob Frege's paper 'Sense and Reference'. Secondly, he equally attempts to solve the problem of the empty proper names which again has been regarded as a tricky philosophical problem within the realm of semantics. The problem of 'Negative Existentials' is a case in point. Frege acknowledges the sense of empty proper names but denies their reference. This view is highly problematic to some philosophers of language. How does a proper name have sense even if it is empty, fictitious, and imaginary? Is it not an indication of a kind of psychological involvement? I think Frege's attempts of conceiving the sense of proper names in the case of empty proper names remain problematic because it is associated with so many other philosophical issues, namely, ontological, metaphysical, and transcendental – which cannot be ruled out. Frege has to give a clear and straightforward reply to this issue. However, I do not find any cogent reply after going through Fregean works of literature to the best of my knowledge. Of course, the only advantage of Frege's theory of the empty proper name, I do reckon, is that he somehow or other acknowledges the sense or mode of presentation of empty proper names. However, I do not think that other than empty proper names there remain any serious problems with acknowledging the sense of

proper names. Having said that, the concept of sense again needs sufficient clarification and contemporary thinkers at large have deeply been engaged in this issue.

The Impact of Locke on Frege:

Even though Locke's contribution to the philosophy of language remained unnoticed by many, I do reckon that Frege's basic philosophical concepts are deeply entangled with Locke. I think that Frege's philosophy of language presents a way of accepting what seems most natural and intuitive about the kind of approach to language found in Locke, while decisively rejecting what seems most questions about it. Secondly, his work offers the prospect of a thoroughly systematic approach to meaning. I do subscribe that there are at least three key issues that Frege shares with Locke. These are (i) the nature of language is defined by its function; (ii) the function of language is to communicate; and (iii) what language is meant to communicate is *thought*. At the same time, I have also foreseen some distinct discrepancies between Frege and Locke. There are at least two points on which Frege would disagree with Locke. These are (i) words that signify or mean the components of what language is meant to communicate; and (ii) the components of thought are ideas. A careful examination would reflect that Frege accepts some version of (i), though in a non-Lockean manner. According to me, Locke had the conception of how words are components of sentences. Individual words at least stand for self-standing ideas in the mind of the speaker, and more importantly, these are combined into something sentential by an action of the speaker's mind. But I think that Frege does not accept it. Frege would like to claim that sentences are basic in some sense and individual words only make sense in the context of sentences. Thus, to me, Frege denies the Lockean conception of the relation between words and sentences has

to be rejected if we are to avoid accepting that words mean Ideas. Frege here remained obstinate by denying that words mean Ideas. Thus, Frege disagrees with Locke and denies his view that the components of thoughts are Ideas.

The other important insight that I have revealed in Frege's theory is his use of the materials of formal logic to characterize the meaning of words. I think many contemporary thinkers when they take on Frege and criticize Frege, failed to cognize it. I do claim that Frege indeed was noticeably well-placed to make such an innovation. I think his first great work was the modernization of a new system of formal logic. He has been regarded as the father of modern elementary formal logic and subsequently has equally been recognized as the father of modern analytic philosophy. Such recognition is rare in other philosophers of logic and language. His new system of formal logic essentially forms the basis of what is studied as elementary logic. It has completely superseded the Aristotelian logic which was overriding before Frege. It has been taken for granted in all analytic philosophy. I think almost all analytic philosophies of language in some sense or other work with some variant of Frege's new system of formal logic. I, therefore, claim that there remained sufficient ground in which sense Frege differs from Locke.

Frankly speaking that I experienced some serious doubts while writing the thesis about the fundamental distinction between *thought and Ideas*. In the initial stages, it seems to me that it would indeed be hard to make compartmentalization between thought and Ideas because both are associated with the *act of thinking*. Thus in the initial stage of my thesis, I found considerable difficulty regarding this issue. At that stage, I face a philosophical riddle that stimulates me a lot. On one hand, if thoughts and ideas would

remain the same, then it would not possible to defend Frege's semantics. As a result, his whole semantical program would be vitiated. Again, if both thoughts and ideas are the act of thinking then there would be a meeting point between them. So the initial challenge is to cognize how Frege maintained compartmentalization between thought and ideas. Many contemporary thinkers misunderstood Frege and severely criticized Frege as well. And surprisingly, this web still continues. Frankly speaking, I do not agree with them. Of course, I think and still, I do believe that the functional aspect of the thought of Frege's semantics is problematic. However, if we do justice to Frege, then it would reveal, at least I do presume, that Frege was very conscious of the distinction between thought and ideas. Frege was an anti-psychologist and importantly Husserl was influenced by Frege in this regard. According to Frege, psychology is irrelevant to philosophy, and moreover, ideas are irrelevant to the meaning as even though people understand a given word in the same meaning, they associate different ideas with the word. Frege claims that if we want to continue to assume that the function of language is to communicate, we will have to distinguish between the meaning of a word and its associated ideas. I think Frege intends to say here that mathematics and logic have nothing to do with ideas. In arithmetic, we are concerned with numbers, not Ideas of any kind – whether they be Ideas of numbers or anything else. The aeronautic engineer is concerned with airplanes, not with Ideas of airplanes, and the gardener with plants, not with the Ideas of plants. As words belong to fields of human concern, the character of the relevant human concern determines the meaning of a word. So the number words, then, be thought to belong to mathematics, the plant words to gardening.

Moreover, the basic objects of human concern are not, in general, Ideas, only kinds of psychological will be concerned with Ideas.

One should not forget that Frege begins his semantical journey with a kind of language predominantly concerned with *concept-notation.* Being a semanticist he was against the functional aspect of the so-called natural language (ordinary language). So he has initiated to formulate a form of artificial language containing the language of elementary logic and mathematics. Accordingly, his form of language is purely an abstract form of language, a sort of private language and the content of such language cannot be part of humans. Thus Frege at the initial stage rules out the relevance of psychology and ideas of any sort where there is a role of the bearers of language. Therefore, I think that at the initial stage, Frege was very careful and alert about the program of his semantics. However, the controversy is centred around the view that "thought is neither physical nor mental, it is the *third realm*". I think that the concept of "third-realm" creates some philosophical debate. Many contemporary philosophers have claimed this concept as "Frege's philosophical myth". Again I stand with Frege and would justify why I am thinking so.

Is Frege's Thought Myth?

The first basic question that may be raised against Frege is if his thought is supposed to be a "third-realm", then how does he use it in the case of a sentence? Frege denies Locke by saying that the components of thought are not ideas. Now the question is: If the components of thought are not ideas and if thought is neither physical nor mental, then how does thought is relevant to determine the sense of a sentence after Frege? All sorts of doubt are essentially created with this question. Frege in his paper "Thought" asserts

that thought is the sense of the sense. That means thought helps to determine the sense of the sentence. However, Frege does not claim that the sense of the sentence may not be thought. Thus, to me even though he claims that thought is the sense of the sentence, he makes a distinction between sense and thought. All correct grammatical sentences of any type do have sense. But this does not make sense to say after Frege that they have thought. If Frege would say that the sense of all types of the sentence is thought, then thought can be equated with ideas. But we does not think so. Frege specifically and categorically has asserted that the sense of only those sentences which can be expressed in the form of to be the case or not to be the case can have thought. Frege was a semanticist and he was doing semantics. The language of semantics is descriptive. Thus being semantics, Frege deals with descriptive language alone. This is not only true in Frege's case, it is equally true in every other semantics. Indeed all semanticists are committed to descriptive language. Thus, the sense of any other sentences except descriptive one cannot have thought. Thus I can say after Frege that the sense of every descriptive language is thought. The sense of a descriptive sentence that can be determined by thought must-have reference. It would, however, be a mistake if we assume that there is a hierarchical order between sense and reference. Many would make a mistake by saying that the sense of a sentence leads to reference. In Frege's sense, this is wrong. I do claim that Frege was an internalist and gives the importance of modes of presentation. He does not intend to say that the sense of a sentence leads to reference very similar way external semanticists would like to say. Rather it would be right to assume after Frege that sense itself determines reference. Reference is not something different from sense. It is wombed with sense.

Frege's Myth of the Third Realm:

Many contemporary thinkers conceive Fregean conception of thought as a third realm as a *philosophical myth*. Some would say that Frege's mistake is to assume that all objects are self-subsistent. It would be insane to treat chess moves as not dependent in this sense on chess pieces; but it is perfectly possible to conceive of what Frege calls thoughts – what is expressed by utterances of sentences, and what is judged to be true or false, what are believed, known, doubted – as independent of language and thinking beings. This is in a nutshell what Frege did by conceiving thought as *a third realm*. In doing so, he became guilty of '*philosophical mythologizing*' (Dummett: 1991). According to Dummett, Frege's conception of thoughts and their constituent senses are *mythological*. These eternal, changeless entities inhabited a 'third realm', distinct from the physical universe and equally distinct from the inner world of any experiencing subject. Despite their (thoughts) separation from the physical world, many of these thoughts are about the world and are true or false. Thus somehow we grasp these thoughts and sometimes judge them to be true or false. Somehow we associate senses with words and so communicate thoughts and judgments to one another.

So thought is mysterious because there is no way of explaining how thoughts, being the third realm, relate to things in other realms of reality. That is, what makes them about anything. There is no way of explaining how we grasp them. No wonder, Frege himself wrote, "This process is perhaps the most mysterious of all" (Logik: 1897). Indeed, there is no way of explaining how we attach senses or expressions or what makes them a sense of those words and expressions. All these are obscured because the explanation available to us cannot be reconciled with the mythological picture. In this regard,

Dummett remarks, "When we have Frege's theory of meaning in view, our perspective has wholly altered: the third realm has receded to infinity" (Dummett: 1991).

Regarding this point, John Searle has written, "It is at least misleading, if not simply a mistake, to say that a belief, for example, is a two-term relation between a believer and a proposition. An analogous mistake would be to say that a statement is a two-term relation between a speaker and a proposition. One should rather say that a proposition is not the object of a statement or belief but rather its content" (Searle: 1983). According to Searle, Frege was mainly concerned with thoughts as objects of mental acts, but he did not operate with any distinction between the object and the content of mental acts. Dummett acknowledges the merit of Searle's argument against Frege. Dummett says that Searle is nevertheless quite right. It is in taking thoughts as the objects of mental acts that Frege goes astray. The first false step is an apparently innocent one, namely, to hold that truth and falsity are primarily attached to thoughts and only derivatively to sentences. The truth-value of a sentence stands for the thought expressed as reference (*Bedeutung*) to sense. The thesis is that it is the sense of the sentence to which the reference is primarily to be ascribed and only derivatively the sentence itself. By parity we can generalize it by saying after Dummett: "It is the sense, not the expression, which primarily refers" (Dummett: 1991). According to Dummett, this consequence is seldom explicitly drawn by Frege as it is expressed in the celebrated remark, "The regular connection between the sign, its sense and its reference are such that to the sign there corresponds a determinate sense and to this, in turn, a determinate reference" (Frege: 1892). The same concept is also illustrated by the diagram in Frege's letter of 1891 to Husserl. The point is that if a sense is intrinsically the sense of an expression then a

reference may be associated with it as being the reference of any expression with the sense; and this would remain so even if it were only the sense of some expression never in fact uttered. Thus Dummett reveals that when Frege expounds on his distinction between sense and reference, he never treats sense as prior to reference. He never introduces first the notion of sense and subsequently explains that of reference as a feature of sense. On the contrary, he speaks of the expression as having both sense and reference arguing that it has both and explaining the relation between them. In brief, to understand them, we indeed thereby come to grasp the senses of the expression concerned to grasp how the reference of an expression, whatever simple or complex, is to be determined just is to grasp its sense. However, to grasp this we must take the referent to be the referent of the expression. We would not take it as the referent of the sense in advance either of grasping the particular sense or even the general concept of sense. According to Dummett, if the sense is the route to the reference or the way the reference is given, the general notion of sense cannot be explained except by appeal to that of reference. In such a case, we must have the latter notion first. Here we have the notion of reference in advance of that of sense. We cannot be conceiving of the possession of a reference as a property of the sense, but only of the expression. *Thus it is to the expression that reference is therefore primarily to be ascribed*, even though it has the specific reference that it has in virtue of sense. Based on this, it is concluded by saying that it is an expression that is primarily as a reference, in particular, utterances of sentences are the primary bearer of truth and falsity. Dummett further subscribes that since a sense is a way of referring to something and it is the expression which refers, senses are intrinsically the senses of expressions. In this regard, Dummett claims,

"Frege says that he is concerned with thoughts rather than with sentences, but his detailed theory of sense does not show what explanation could be given of thought without alluding to a means of expressing them".

How can Frege's Thought be Part of the Language?

So far so good and we have a better exposition of Frege's notion of thought. But still, a vital question needs to be illuminated after Frege. We come to know that the sense of only declarative sentences is thought. Now to assume that the sense of the declarative sentence is thought is to assume that thought is being injected into the mind of the speaker as an act of thinking who engages himself to determine the sense of the declarative sentence. If it would really be the case then how does Frege justify it? Again I do claim that Frege was very specific in this regard. In this regard, he inclines to say that it is *sentence questions* through which thought is injected into language and becomes part of an *act of thinking.* Here Frege asserts that the response to an interrogative sentence leads to a descriptive or assertive sentence and the sense of an assertive sentence is thought. For example, the response to the sentence question, such as what it is would be 'it is a pen', or 'it is Tajmahal' or 'it is a book' etc. and the sense of any of such sentence is thought according to Frege. What is important to be noted here is that all logicians and semanticists except Frege do not admit the truth value of an interrogative sentence. However, Frege here clearly suggests that the sense of an interrogative sentence leads us to the thought that would eventually be transformed into an indicative sentence. Having said this, Frege would say that the thought of an interrogative sentence and the thought of a declarative sentence does not enjoy equal philosophical and logical status. The thought or sense of an interrogative sentence

cannot be expressed in the form of to be the case or not to be the case like as the thought of a declarative sentence can do. So as far as the level of thought is concerned, they would enjoy different semantic privileges.

So sense questions are a prerequisite. Frege agrees with Locke on this point that what language is meant to communicate is thought. But he disagrees with him over the nature of thought. The core of Frege's account of communication is that what is communicated are Thoughts, i.e., the sense of the sentence. Some would claim how does Frege claim that thoughts in this sense are anything like what is ordinarily meant by "thought"? The crucial point here is that a Thought, in Frege's sense, is what is thought when someone thinks, *rather than the thinking of it.* Accordingly, he can claim that what is thought is the sense of the sentence. Thus, I think that Frege here offers us a fundamentally different account of communication and hence Frege's Thoughts are fundamentally different from Lockean Ideas.

Now my point is that if what I have said so far in the above holds good then wherein lies the scope of criticisms of Frege's semantics?

I do not claim that modern and contemporary thinkers did not realize it. However, still they think that there remained some grey areas in Frege's theory that cannot be accepted without begging questions. Frege of course makes it clear in what sense he has developed his theory of sense and reference. But to claim something does not make sense at least in philosophy that it would be accepted without begging questions. So even though Frege's theory has been applauded at large, contemporary thinkers find some defects in Frege's theory. I think Frege though manages to accommodate empty proper names within the realm of semantics, but his concept of reference for such names

remained obscure and problematic. Frege holds that every proper name must have sense and in this regard, he makes no distinction between names and descriptions. He takes proper names at par with descriptions. Now the basic object of semantics is to solve the problem of meaning by way of knowing the reference of descriptions. It seems that Frege treats a wide variety of expressions as singular terms. Even Frege treats the complex expression 'the least rapidly convergent series' and the simple proper names 'Odysseus' in the same way. This clearly suggests that proper names, ordinary proper names, definite descriptions, etc. are singular terms. Thus, to Frege, ordinary proper names and definite descriptions are singular terms. They all have the sense as well, *perhaps,* as reference. Here the term "perhaps" gives us a different semantics message as perhaps Frege was evasive about the semantic status of reference.

Let me make this point clear. What does Frege mean by a singular term? A singular term, according to Frege, is to refer to an object. Now, if all types of proper names are singular terms, then surely each of them refers to an object. Thus, we cannot ignore the intended reference of every singular term after Frege. We must say that this is at least true to Frege. Accordingly, following Frege, we can say that a sentence containing a singular term has no truth value if there is no object corresponding to that singular term. Frege then gives the example:

> *Whoever discovered the elliptic form the planetary orbits died in misery.*

Frege then says that the above assertion presupposes the truth of the following:

> *There was someone who discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits.*

Frege does not think that someone who asserts the former is also asserting the latter is true. I can say after Frege that this would be the characteristic feature of sentences that contains singular terms. The criterion Frege has adopted here is that the assertions of singular terms will presuppose but not assert the existence of an object corresponding to the singular term. I think that this position of Frege creates some doubts in the mind of contemporary thinkers. Here one has to take note of the distinction between *assertion and presupposition*. According to Frege, *the assertion of singular terms at times presupposes the existence and at other times it fails to presuppose the existence of the object corresponding to the singular term.* What I gather here after Frege is that every singular term asserts something in the form of presupposition. Accordingly, an empty proper name being a singular term asserts something in the form of presupposition but here the presupposition does not assert the existence of the object corresponding to the singular term. So an empty proper name does not refer to anything in the form of existence. *Here Frege offers an indirect account of reference*. To me, it may be an intended reference. Like Russell and unlike many other semanticists, Frege inclines to say that a natural thought is the sense of an ordinary proper name given by a definite description. Here he subscribes that the sense of the name "Aristotle" might be the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. Here proper names refer to their objects in just the same way as definite descriptions. Thus, it will seem natural to think that a proper name could continue to have the sense, even if it has no referent. Frege thus asserts that *the condition for being the referent of proper names continues to exist, even if nothing meets it.* Some would say how does Frege assert that descriptions are singular

terms? Names can be singular terms but how descriptions are? For them, it leads to some gracelessness when we take proper names and descriptions as singular terms.

However, a careful study of Frege will help us to find a suitable response after Frege. Consider the example: *Earth's second moon is made of cheese.* As the earth has only one moon, the phrase under consideration refers to no object. So it has no truth value. However, it has sense because someone who utters it still intends to say something, though the question of its truth and falsity simply does not arise. According to Frege, someone who uses them *presupposes,* but it does not assert the existence of an object referred to by the description. When presupposition is false, the speaker does not succeed in saying anything at all. However, Frege, I ponder, is obliged to say that the speaker still holds that an expression can have sense without reference, and seems forced to say that he does say something. However, it is something that cannot be true or false. I think this position and interpretation of Frege is hard to take in. To me, in Frege's semantics, there may have real and fictional senses and real and fictional referents. Fictional names have fictional senses and fictional referents. Thus, it seems quandary that we end up with some uncertainty about what we should think about the notion of Sense. I think one model makes Frege's Sense independent of reference; the other model makes it impossible to have Sense without reference. I do claim that this sort of ***uncertainty can be traced to indeterminacy.***

Frege has claimed that the concept of sense is necessary to introduce a=b beyond a=a. They are semantically different. Thus Frege solves the problem of identity. However, contemporary thinker J.J. Katz claims that ***Fregean senses are not necessary for a solution to the puzzle of identity***. For him, it can be handled with any notion of sense

that permits us to assign different senses to the symbols 'a' and 'b'. He thus claims that the puzzle of identity can be solved with his own Fregean notion of sense. I do not think that Katz's observation about Frege's sense decreases the merit of his theory. However, Katz further contends that the Fregean definition of sense can accomplish two things each of which is desirable and is not otherwise jointly accomplishable. One is the *reduction theory of sense* to the theory of reference and the other is the preservation of the *sense-reference distinction*. According to Katz, the reduction is desirable because it replaces what has seen the barren and vague notion of sense with what is seen as a fruitful and precise one. Equally, the preservation of sense-reference distinction is desirable because it keeps philosophers from facing the situation of having to cope with Frege's puzzle without the possibility of appealing to the senses in a solution to it. Intentionalists thus see a Fregean definition as "letting them having their cake and eat it". The point, however, is that if sense is reducible to reference within the theory of reference, it is not immediately clear why the distinction between ***sense and reference should survive***. If the theoretical vocabulary of the system provides the definition, then how can there be a place for a concept of sense over and above the concept of reference? Does not acceptance of the Fregean reduction theory of the theory of sense to the theory of reference turn intentionalism into extentionalism? These are some serious questions raised with regard to Frege's notion of sense. I think Frege's reduction of the theory of sense to the theory of reference is not an eliminative reduction. Rather the Fregean characterization of sense affects a conservative reduction which states that a notion of sense and a sense-reference distinction is available in the reducing theory. Sense and reference are distinguished by their different but correlative rules in the structure. In

Katz's words, Fregean definition of sense is like a definition *of an employer as one who hires someone*. Here employing and being employed are related with respect to their hiring relation. On the Fregean definition, having a sense and having a referent are related with respect to the referring relation. Sense and reference are therefore determiners and determined with respect to the referring relation. I think Katz's metaphysics of employer is good enough to have a different sense of Frege's problem of meaning.

Further, intentionalists who adopt a Fregean notion of sense are like the characters in Jacob's story "The Monkey's Paw". Their wish for 'fruitful' notions of sense and analyticity is granted in a way that results in calamity. They include inter-alia Wittgenstein's wide-ranging criticism of their views of meaning and language, Quine's criticism of their analytic-synthetic distinction, Putnam's criticism of their conception of natural kind terms, and Kripke's criticism of their descriptivism concerning proper names.

Opponents of non-referential semantics assure that such an option is not odd preserving. In fact, neither extensionists nor intentionalists are likely to show much interest in such an option. For the extensionists, Fregean intentionalism is fundamentally wrong. However, the intentionalists think that Frege is right. However, there are non-Fregean forms of intentionalism who think that to be a Fregean intentionalism one has to argue that Fregean intentionalism is preferable to other forms of the position. For them, the Fregean reductive definition of sense is better than any other reductive definition of sense and the Fregean reductive definition of sense is also better than any other non-reductive definition of sense. Frege conceives sense in terms of thought and as a result

of that his intentional meaning of sense containing thought links only with statements expressing propositions and determining truth-value as to be the case or not to be the case. This helps us to understand what we mean here by the reductive definition of sense. Frege intended to make his theory of sense more fruitful than a mere explication of sense structure that one can reveal in the Kantian notion of analyticity. The Kantian notion of analyticity is based on sense structure. Kant remarked that in the case of an analytic statement, the sense of the predicate is ***overtly or covertly*** contained in the sense of the subject term. In such a statement, the sense of the subject and predicate, for example, 'Bachelors are unmarried' is structurally identical and in the statement 'All roses are red', the predicate term is contained in the subject term but the subject and predicate terms are not identical. Thus, Frege's theory of sense goes against the Kantian notion of analyticity.

Like Frege, Michael Dummett has a philosophical agenda that requires a theory of sense to be more fruitful than a mere explication of sense structure that we observe in the Kantian notion of analyticity. It is well-known to all of us that Michael Dummett has been regarded as a proponent of Frege. He takes initiative on every occasion when somebody appears as a critique of Frege. Like Frege, Dummett subscribes that a theory of sense derives from concerns in the philosophy of mathematics. In Dummett's case, nothing less than a full theory of understanding will do because nothing less can provide an adequate linguistic basis for his intentionalist philosophy of mathematics. Hence, to me, the question for Dummett, and also for Frege, is this: What argument is there to show that a theory of understanding is better than an autonomous theory of sense to explicate meaning in natural language? Dummett's argument that "there could be no

route from (an autonomous theory of sense) to an account of understanding". It assumes that a theory of meaning should be a theory of understanding. For Dummett, and also for Frege, in Kant's notion of analyticity, the sense is autonomous. It has been fixed. Therefore, the Kantian notion of analyticity is dictated by *an autonomous theory of sense* which is not acceptable to Frege and Dummett.

Of course, if I carefully scrutinize Frege's sense, I will find the non-reductive aspect of sense even in Frege's semantics. I have already explained the reductive notion of sense. The reductive notion of sense implies *de-facto reference*, but in my sense, the non-reductive notion of sense is possible in Fregean semantics. In the case of an empty proper name, the Fregean sense is *non-reductive* in the sense that the sense of the sentence cannot be reduced into reference. Lacking referential concepts in the case of empty proper names, the theory of sense can state no principle concerning the relation between language and the world. Thus in the case of an empty proper name the relation is not fixed antecedently in the theory of sense. As a result of that, as per Fregean semantics is concerned, the account of the relation can take the form of a principle weaker than the principle that sense determines reference. I think by admitting the sense of the proper name, Frege offers us a weaker version of the theory of proper name.

I think that there remain some problems with the Fregean definition of sense. I have already claimed that Fregean definition of sense is inadequate and weaker while determining its reference all without exception. It is desirable to assume that sense determines reference, but I think Frege's theory finally states that there are references without referents. This makes, I presume, Frege's theory of sense awkward. Further in his recent writing, Katz (2004) reveals that there are some problems with Fregean sense

if we clearly try to understand his reductive definition of sense. According to Katz, Frege's reductive definition of sense is as follows:

D: "Sense is the aspect of the grammatical structure of sentences that are responsible for their sense properties and relations (e.g., meaningfulness, ambiguity, synonymy, redundancy, and antonymy)".

Here on (D), senses are still determiners, and what they determine are sense properties and relations, not referential properties and relations. Here Katz makes the distinction between *sense properties* and *referential properties*. Sense properties are directed towards reference but not referents; whereas referential properties are directed towards referents.

Many would say that Frege is a realist. But I do not think Frege is a realist in the brute sense of the term. In my sense, Frege would at best be regarded as *a moderate realist.* In my sense, a strong realist would be one within the realm of semantics who ensures the concept of truth is based on *assertions* but not based on a presupposition. In Frege's case, I observe that while retaining the concept of truth under the orbit of semantics, Frege has classified his concept of thought into three different levels, such as presupposition, judgment, and assertion. He then employed the level of the presupposition of thought to admit empty proper names in his semantics. According to Frege, empty proper names can be accepted in semantics. Thus it seems to me that Frege while admitting the presupposition level of thought actually deviates himself from the standpoint of strong realism.

I think that Fregean semantics is based on the foundation of logic. One should not be confused by taking the term 'logic' as used by Frege in a more general sense. By the term 'logic', Frege, I think, actually wants to mean the *foundation of semantic language* with the proviso that there is something unclarity in verbal expressions. So long the verbal expressions cannot overcome their own unclarity and ambiguity, semantic language does not bear any sense. In my view, Frege's semantics actually hinges on retaining the concept of truth. Therefore, preservation of truth would be the hallmark of Fregean semantics. By sensing the default of verbal expressions, Frege has inaugurated his semantic journey with the background of logic and mathematics. To me, Frege designed semantic language under the womb of logic. Therefore, his understanding of logic should be comprehended as the foundation of the paradigm of his semantics.

The other question I should highlight: Is thought an act of thinking? Many would say that thought is an act of thinking. But Frege did not accept it. For Frege, thought is not an act of thinking. Because if it is an act of thinking, it would be subjective. But Frege does not anticipate thought is subjective. For Frege, thought is objective in the sense that thought is independent of human beings. The other important dimension of Frege's theory of proper name, we reveal, is that Frege admits both empty and non-empty proper names with regard to assimilating non-empty proper names with thought. In this regard, Frege subscribes that a non-empty proper name would be directly associated with thought and unwarrantedly related to a concrete object. However, in the case of an empty proper name, Frege denies the possibility of referring to a concrete object and makes it clear that in such a case the empty proper name is no way associated with

thought. Thus it seems to me that in Frege's semantics, the role of thought is very important in solving the problem of meaning.

According to Frege, whatever is being expressed having designation would be a part of thought and what it designates would not be empty sounds. Then what would be the status of an empty proper name? Frege admits empty proper names on the basis that they have sense. Accordingly, they designate. But what they designate, they designate *vacuously.* Their designation is empty. Accordingly, they are neither true nor false. My question is: Are empty proper names having sense or mode of presentation designate something without the assistance of thought content?

However, one should keep in mind the subtle distinction between 'the sense of a proper name' and 'the sense of the sentence containing a proper name'. The sense of the proper name is objects. According to Frege, both the proper name and the sentence containing the proper name may have a reference. But the reference to a proper name is different from the reference to 'the sentence containing the proper name'. ***The reference of the proper name is an object and the reference of the sentence is its truth value.***

The question then is: Do proper names have senses? We think Frege's admission of conceiving a proper name having sense is a demand arising out of his semantic program. It has generally been accepted that Frege's sense and reference appear in philosophy to address and solve two important philosophical problems, namely, the problem of identity and the problem of empty proper name. We think to overcome these two problems admission of a sense of the proper name is a pre-requisite to Frege. In our sense, Frege cannot overcome these problems without preconceiving the sense of the proper name. Let us explain, in brief, in what sense the sense of the proper names

appears as a determining factor to overcome the aforesaid problems. In this regard, we can say that Frege cannot ascertain a=b as synthetic without knowing the sense of the proper name 'a' and 'b' in isolation. Frege elsewhere claims that 'a=b' is *synthetic* in the sense that to know 'a=b' one has to explore the sense of 'a' and 'b' in isolation before knowing that 'a=b'. Moreover, one cannot know that the reference of 'a' and 'b' is the same without knowing the sense of 'a' and 'b' in isolation. Moreover, we think we cannot determine, after Frege, that 'a=b' even if both 'a' and 'b' are empty proper names. We think that the principle of informative identity would equally be applicable in the case of two empty proper names.

Thus in a sense, we do find pragmatic convenience in Fregean semantics. If we try to understand and make clear Fregean semantics with regard to descriptive content/mode of the presentation then it seems to move towards the standpoint of pragmatics. Does it then lead us to assume that Fregean semantics has been defaulted or vitiated by pragmatic convenience? We do not think so. The gravity of Fregean semantics, I do reckon, appears as a comprehensive theory of semantics where various linguistic expressions were considered and included as the vocabulary of a constructed language. In this regard, the Fregean concept of sense plays an important role. It may perhaps be the case that Fregean semantics actually paves the way to make a bridge between the two extremist theories appear in the name of semantics and pragmatics. This does not however make sense to say that Frege has been regarded as a pragmatist or nearer to a pragmatist. He has been treated as a semanticist.

Whether Fregean semantics could be treated similarly to Husserl's presuppositions philosophy? It seems to us that for Husserl, the sense of a sentence is a proposition and

for Frege, the sense of a sentence is thought. We have already noted that the Fregean concept of thought is at par with the Husserlian concept of the proposition. Besides, there are other issues, namely, the standpoint of *anti-psychologism*, where both Husserl and Frege come closer. Thus, it can be said that though Husserl and Frege involve in different philosophical inquiries, Husserl developed the phenomenological method whereas Frege developed semantics, but still, there we find considerable similarities between Husserl and Frege regarding their standpoint about sense, reference, thought, proposition, etc. Keeping this philosophical background in mind, can we assert that Frege will accept the foundation of presuppositionless philosophy very similar to Husserl? There is no question of doubt that Frege has voiced in favor of presuppositionless philosophy. Frege has tackled the problem of meaning concerning semantics. In my sense, semanticism at large is convinced by presupposition in some sense or other. Tarski's theory of satisfiability, Carnap's reductionism, Wittgenstein's proposition-picture model, Kripke's concept of rigid designator, and Marcus' theory of 'tag' – all belong to semantics and are guided by presuppositions. What then do we think about Frege? Frege is a semanticist, but his semantic approach, unlike other semanticists as cited above, is moderate, transparent, comprehensive, and liberal. The question then is: Is Fregean liberal semantic approach presuppositionless? Like Husserl, we think Frege cannot say that his outlook on semantics is presuppositionless. However, keeping the philosophical background of his semantic approach we can say that Fregean semantics does not work under the straight jacket of presupposition or stringent dogmas. Husserl's phenomenology in the end is known as rigorous science. Fregean semantics,

though in some sense or other, is liberal (in my sense) in contrast to other semanticists as cited above, is rigorous and systematic as well.

Husserl talks in favor of intentionality of consciousness. In this regard, Husserl was indebted to Brentano. For Husserl, consciousness (the sense of sentence = (proposition)) is intentional. It means that our consciousness is intentionally directed toward an object (reference in the Fregean sense). Very similar to Husserl, Frege asserts that the sense of a sentence is thought. A sentence having a thought is directed towards an object from an intentional perspective.

The acceptance of empty proper names is really something innovative that haunts me, after Frege, that he accommodates the concept of empty proper names under the realm of semantics. This actually deviates Fregean semantics from other semantics at large. While accommodating empty proper names under the realm of semantics, Frege, to my mind, took a great challenge coming from counterparts. The problem of empty proper names, as we have claimed is directly related to a very big philosophical issue alternatively termed Negative Existentials. This is an issue for which philosophers were deeply engaged with serious philosophical debate – indeed an unending debate. It is for this issue that metaphysics as such had been highly condemned and philosophers like P.F Strawson in his book, *Individuals* make a distinction between traditional metaphysics and revisionary metaphysics and thereby talked in favor of revisionary metaphysics instead of traditional metaphysics. Even great philosopher Immanuel Kant was very much concerned about metaphysics entangled with imaginary objects or concepts. Kant rules out speculative metaphysics and in this regard, he was deeply indebted to David Hume. In this regard, Kant candidly confessed that Hume roused him

from 'dogmatic slumber'. According to Kant, only those metaphysics is possible having a natural disposition. Thus metaphysics had been the cup of tea of the philosophers' scrutiny over time. The linguistic turn in the 20th century appeared along with this line of thinking. But when Frege under the womb of semantics brings back the concept of an empty proper name that is in some sense or other imaginary or spurious, actually creates a serious problem for the semanticists in general. Frege incorporates empty proper names within a scheme of semantics and took it as a challenge to revisit the dignity of empty objects under the scheme of 'mode of presentation' of language. We have explained the views of Meinong and Russell from different perspectives and thereby attempted to show in what sense they accommodated non-existential entities under the forum of human discussion. Meinong, according to me was a crude ontologist. He shows the gut of ontological relevance against the tide of the river. When Meinong wrote his article 'Object', that time was the heyday of the semantic revolution. As a result of that, his view actually appeared at a wrong time when metaphysics was struggling to retain its rein. But Meinong through his philosophical ingenuity showed the ontological relevance of non-existential objects through his explanation of real objects, ideal objects, and pure objects.

Russell initially was under the womb of Meinong. But after the publication of his theory of Definite Description, Russell actually took a different interpretation of Negative Existentials containing empty proper names. We have seen that, unlike Meinong, Russell actually gives us a typical logical and semantic interpretation of the concept of empty proper names. In this regard, he sets up a logical paradigm expressed in the form of the-so-and-so and thereby generalizing that any expression whatsoever containing

the phrase 'the-so-and-so' can eventually be expressed meaning fully – the lubricated term that would be haunted by all semanticists including logical positivists. In Frege, we have slightly a different interpretation of Russell, but very close to Russell. It is Russell in the sense that Frege actually attempts to accommodate empty proper names or so to speak try to solve the problem of empty proper names under the womb of language that every semanticist should attempt to do. This is where the genesis of Frege as well as Russell actually hinges. Frege in this regard brings the concept of thought to understand the sense of the sentence. He also incorporates the concept of customary reference as well as an indirect reference which was not the wanted philosophical concept of those semanticists who adhere to the view of the no-sense theory of proper names. Having said this, there is no point in markdown the relevance of Frege's theory of sense and reference. His theory, I think, brings a semantic revolution in the sense that he attempts to break the compartmentalization of the theory of proper names. He attempts to show how the domain of proper names can be expanded beyond the direct theory or non-sense theory of proper names. The only grey area of his theory, I must confess, is the admission of fictional sense and fictional reference of empty proper names or fictional proper names. Moreover, the objections that have been raised by the direct reference theorists, particularly Kripke, Putnam, and Donnellan against Frege, do not find their foothold. Frege did not claim referential to have referential rigidity in the sense of modal necessity. So to raise objections against Frege about referential rigidity does not bear any sense. Rather what is more important is to explicate how Frege accommodates thought, the third realm as the sense of the sentence. Frege is an internal

semanticist, so there remained scope to criticize Frege by the externalist semanticists.

Such criticisms cannot take to piece Frege's theory at all.

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REFLECTION ON FREGE'S ANTI -PSYCHOLOGISM

RESHMEE SARKAR

Gottlob Frege (1894) published his review of Husserl's *Philosophie Der Arithmetik* where he criticises psychologism. In his *Begriffcshrift* (1879), *Grundlagen* (1884) and *The Grundgesetze* (1893) as well as in his paper 'Sinn und Bedeutung' (1892), Frege vehemently rejected psychologism.[1] While developing anti-psychologism, Frege occasionally refers Husserl's idea of anti-psychologism. It is to be noted here that both Husserl and Frege appeared almost at the same period and their philosophical writings influenced each other. Husserl has been regarded as a phenomenologist and his phenomenalism is based on anti-psychologism. Frege is a semanticist and logician, and his semanticism has been the outcome of anti-psychologism. Thus, both Husserl and Frege are anti-psychologists, even though they belong to different philosophical camps and developed different philosophical theories. Although this paper is primarily concerned with Frege's anti-psychologism, I occasionally mention Husserl's position of anti-psychologism to understand Frege in proper.

I will now elaborate on the meaning of psychologism Psychologism is the tendency to reduce an issue to *psychological categories*. In logic, psychologism as such signifies a tendency to reduce the rules of logic to *human psychology*. Psychologism entails that the laws of logic are in principle, a psychological phenomenon and in this sense the

foundations of logic are psychological. Alternatively, it can be said that logic is best studied the way humans retort to certain situations. In this sense, logic could be treated as a topic of *behaviouristic psychology.* Frege is anti-psychologist. He argues that psychologism in logic would be treated as *debauched psychology* because psychologism in logic actually destroys the *objectivity of* logic. If the objectivity of logic is undermined, then all knowledge claims in turn would be undermined. In such a case, reason itself loses its legitimacy. This is the main reason for which Frege favours anti-psychologism instead of psychologism. Frege's semantic theory cannot undermine the dignity of reason because reason plays an important role to uphold his semantic theory of meaning.

For Frege, the laws of logic exist independently of *how we think.* We do not determine the laws of logic. Rather the laws of logic determine how we are to think towards achieving truth. In this regard, he distinguishes the thought from the *going-on* in our brain when we are thinking. Further, the laws of logic are *eternal,* distinct from physical events in the brain. Thoughts are things outside of the physical world that we grasp while thinking. Here, the action that goes on in our brain is distinguished from the thought that is grasped by these *goings-on.* For Frege, thoughts are non-physical, non-empirical entities. Thoughts are neither-things in the external world, nor ideas, rather thoughts are treated as belonging to the *third realm.* Frege writes, "A third realm must be recognised. Anything belonging to this realm has it in common with ideas that it cannot be perceived by the senses, but has it in common with things that it does not need an owner so as to belong to the content of consciousness."[2]

For psychologism, *everything becomes presentation.* Especially, for logic, presentation and the object of which it is the presentation, for example, 'moon' and 'the presentation of

the moon', are not distinguished. Psychologism asserts that like objects, concepts also are confused with presentation. According to J. N. Mohanty, "to apply a concept to an object, on this theory, is to abstract from, i.e., not to attend to the objects' irrelevant features. But by this process, the object becomes more and more insubstantial. Even after that, we still need to reflect on the mental acts involved in the entire psychological process".[3] In psychologism, presentations are essentially *subjective and private*. No two persons may have the same presentation. Moreover, psychological logicians do not make any substantive distinction between *sense* and *presentation*. As a result,, unlike mathematicians and semanticists including Frege, they are not satisfied with an extensional definition (denotational definition), but rather look for the *content* of the concept to be defined. The content could not be the sense. For them, an extensional definition is considered to be inadequate if the *definiendum* and the *definiens* have different contents, that is, different presentations.

Moreover, the psychological logicians can have no account of identity. But without the concept of identity, Fregean semantics does not bear any sense. According to psychologism, if word designated presentations, one can never say 'A is the same as B'. Further, psychologism does not distinguish between 'being true' and 'being taken for true'. It thus contradicts with logic because the fundamental task of logic is to find out the laws of being-true. Many psychologists during the late 19th century were of the opinion that the logical principles, such as, the principle of non-contradiction derive their necessity from the essence of our presentation and thinking which is an integral part of psychology. This clearly suggests that logical principles developed in the *womb of psychology*. Psychologism may be classified into *weak logical psychologism* and *strong logical*

psychologism. Weak logical psychologism holds the view that the essential theoretical foundation of logic actually lies submerged in psychology. Strong logical psychologism considers logic to be a branch of psychology. This clearly suggests that the foundation of logical rules and principles are deeply rooted in psychology. In this regard, J. N. Mohanty says, "… psychological inquiry into actual human thought processes constitutes both necessary and sufficient conditions for inquiry into the foundations of logic"[4]. In this context, Mohanty has claimed that Husserl's philosophy of arithmetic, but not surely Frege's logicism, was at most guilty of 'weak logical psychologism'[5].

The anti-psychological stance of Frege

While developing his semantic position, Frege denies psychologism. His semantic language is the outcome of mathematical logic and elementary logic. He began with *Begriffschrift* (Concept-Notation) as the foundation of his semantics. Frege initiated with predicates, individual constants, propositional signs, numbers, etc. as the constituents of his semantic language. As his semantics is based on logic and mathematics, he has no other alternative but to deny the relevance of psychologism based on presentations as cited above. Psychologism deals with logical truths which would be contingently necessary and it has no bad merit in semantics. It denies extensionalism and it has been deeply rooted with human minds. The laws of logic are true by virtue of the nature of human minds, i.e., "they describe consequences of the way the mind works rather than the way the mind works"[6]. This position of psychologism cannot be accommodated in Fregean semantics. Frege developed arguments against psychologism and rejected it as absurd. In an 1897 text, 'Logic', Frege writes: "If anyone tried to contradict the statement that what is true is

true independently of our recognizing it as such, he would by his very assertion contradict what he had asserted, he would be in a similar position to the Cretan who said that all Cretans are liars"[7].

For Frege, if something were true only for him who took it to be true, there would be no contradiction between the opinions of different persons. The person holding such a psychologistic theory would not then be in a position to contradict the opposite view. There would be no science, no error, and no correction of error in psychology. Thus, in psychology, Frege wants to draw absurd consequences from the psychologistic theory. Psychologism, we think, in no way fitting with Fregean semantics which inherently functions under *the tune of logical and mathematical canons and principles where the concepts of identity, extensionality, intensionality play key role.*

Although both Frege and Husserl agreed in their opposition to psychologism as a theory of logic, they held different views about the nature of psychology as well as about the concept of subjectivity. Their attitudes towards psychology decisively influenced their theories of knowledge. Unlike Husserl, Frege thought of it as a descriptive science of actual mental process which he contrasts with logic. For Frege, the laws of psychology are like laws of nature. They are universal in the mental realm.[8] The laws of psychology are guiding principles of thought in the sense that "they give an average, like statements about 'how it is that good digestion occurs in man', or 'how one speaks grammatically', or 'how dresses fashionably'."[9] In this regard, Mohanty claims that there is no reason to believe that Frege wanted to belittle psychology as a science. On the contrary, what is fact, Mohanty opines, is that Frege wanted to reject outright any intrusion of psychological

explanation into the domain of logical mathematics. If we compare Husserl with Frege about psychology, one can sense that Husserl's view about psychology is far more explicit and well worked out than Frege. Unlike Fregean semantics, the phenomenological account of Husserl perhaps has a close proximity with psychology. In this regard, Husserl's account of anti-psychologism is more systematic than Frege. Husserl conceives phenomenology in the sense of a descriptive psychology based on the clarification of the fundamental concept of logical knowledge. In this regard, Husserl says, "The necessity of this sort of psychological foundation of pure logic, i.e., a strictly descriptive one, cannot lead us into error regarding the mutual independence of the two sciences, logic and psychology. For pure description is merely a preparatory step towards theory, not theory itself.... It is *not the full science of psychology that serves as a foundation for pure logic*, but certain classes of descriptions...."[10] While Husserl is Kantian, Frege is neo-Kantian. Husserl is Kantian in the sense that, he has acknowledged quite a different order of subjectivity not opposed to objectivity, rather regarded as the foundation of objectivity. Thus, Husserl shared with Kant the conception of *transcendental subjectivity*. Frege did not accept transcendental subjectivity. Frege's understanding of objectivity is independent of sensation, intuition and imagination, but not independent of reason. However, by the term 'reason', Frege understands something very close to what Kant and Husserl understand by *transcendental subjectivity*. Frege never brings this concept to bear on his ontology.

Did Frege have a concept of intentionality?

Linke thinks in the light of Frege's "Der Gedanke", that Frege had a view like Brentano did of the mental. He further claims that Bergmann regards Frege as "the first who clearly

saw the logical problem of intentionality. Our point is that if for a mental act to be intentional means that it has an object then every mental act has an object in that commonly acceptable sense". Frege's theory of sense had all the potentialities of providing such an account so long as his concept of sense contained the mode of givenness of the referent. Since Fregean senses attach to expressions, words and sentences, or rather to names, they at most provide an account of *how a name refers to whatever it is a name of.*

According to Mohanty, mental acts are intentional only by proxy and it has been acknowledged by Bergmann as well. Mohanty has agreed with Bergmann regarding Frege's position. For them, Frege perhaps was the first to see the *logical problems of intentionality.* But he did not appropriate this into a *theory of intentionality.* His sophisticated logical theory and semantics have a sharp contrast with a naïve philosophy of mind. While illuminating the concept of sophisticated logical theory, Frege goes on to say that even though the grasping of the law of gravitation is a mental process which takes place on the very limitation of the mental realm it still cannot be completely understood from a 'purely psychological standpoint'. For in grasping the law, "something comes into the view whose nature is no longer mental in the proper sense, namely, the thought; and this process is perhaps a most mysterious of all."[1] Frege further contends that this question of grasping thoughts and recognizing them to be true is still far from being grasped in all its difficulty.

Frege's anti-psychological stance has been motivated by the demand of the background of his semantics. In fact, Frege's position of anti-psychologism is found to be relevant in the context of his semantics. It can be said that semantics has its own specific philosophical implication where philosophical issues associated with psychological mental acts do not bear any

sense. Frege is focused on anti-psychologism because his celebrated Sense-Reference Theory is deeply associated with the concept of thought understood as the meaning of the sentence. If Frege has not been careful enough to specify his position about psychologism, then his central idea of the problem of meaning would be in great trouble. This is the reason for which Frege made clear his position of anti-psychologism.

Frege's anti-psychologism may be compared and contrasted, at length, with Husserl's position of anti-psychologism. Without delving into the comparison between their philosophical stance of anti-psychologism, we can say that their own philosophical directions are dimensionally different in nature. Frege takes his anti-psychological position to defend his semantic approach; whereas Husserl takes an anti-psychological position to establish phenomenology as a science of *pure consciousness*. Moreover, Frege deliberately classifies various levels of thought in order to make himself detached from the influence of psychology within the thought process. In this regard, he classifies thought into three different levels: the level of apprehension, the level of judgement and the level of assertion. On the basis of this classification, Frege takes the assertion level of thought to defend his semantic program. He holds that the assertion level of thought is an anti-psychological stance required to determine truth and thereby solve the problem of meaning.

Moreover, there is an ongoing debate among the contemporary thinkers of Fregean and non-Fregean schools of thought, about the distinctiveness of thought and idea. Many non-Fregean thinkers argue that Fregean thought is differently conceived as idea propounded by Locke in the 18th century. Locke says that every word is a sensible mark of idea. Frege says that thought is the complete sense of the sentence and a sentence is nothing but association of words. Thus, it seems that

Locke's position about word and Frege's position about sentence associated with ideas and thoughts respectively are very close. However, my position is different from the anti-Fregean stance. I do reckon that even though Locke has been regarded as a philosopher of language, but surely, he has not been regarded as a semanticist. Frege's position is semantic. The demand of semantics is strictly different from the demand of non-semantics as far as the development of philosophy of language is concerned. Frege was very much concerned about the criticism of the philosophical affinity between thoughts and ideas. As a result, he makes distinctions among various levels of thought and thereby focusing on anti-psychologism towards solving the problem of meaning under the realm of semantics.

Concluding Remarks:

I think Frege's anti-psychological position has been developed with a specific philosophical background. First, Frege puts into opposition logic/mathematics and psychology in the *Grundlagen der Arithmetik* where he clearly declares that the proper feature of mathematics is "the refusal of all assistance from the direction of psychology". In this regard, he further continues that to separate psychology from logic is at par with the separation of the *subjective* from the *objective*. Frege's main contention of anti-psychologism, I reckon, is based on to set aside arithmetic from the womb of psychology. In this regard, Frege takes a cautious account of representation. He argues that if number *were* a representation, then arithmetic would be psychology because representation in the subjective sense is what psychological laws of association are related. The subjective representation is demonstratively different in human beings. If two persons imagine the same, each still has his own representation, the representation which they have is completely

subjective. Moreover, representations cannot be perceived; representations need an owner and only one owner and hence private. Representations are the subject-matter of investigation by psychology. Frege means psychology in terms of *physiological psychology-* a discipline that requires a modification of the subject-matter of investigation. Thus, representation is attached with psychology and it makes arithmetic or logic subjective. But arithmetic and logic as the foundation of semantics cannot be accounted subjective. Thus representation is an inner mental picture and it "may be reserved for psychology"[12]

I think that Frege's main objective of anti-psychologism was to provide a foundation of arithmetic by means of logic. In order to create an adequate logic prior to the realisation of the foundation of arithmetic, Frege attempts to establish the conceptual autonomy of logic and arithmetic from other sciences, particularly from psychology. Thus, I argue that what corresponds to Frege's anti-psychologism is the separation of logic and arithmetic from scientific psychology as developed by Muller and H. von Helmholtz. Accordingly, we can say that any charges of psychologism raised against logic, philosophy of science, philosophy of social science, etc. have to be always accompanied by the delineation of the type of psychology that the person has in mind.

Frege elsewhere has argued that the value of reason is severely undermined when truth is consigned to a psychological phenomenon. We think that the value of reason has a special dignity within the realm of semanticism. His anti-psychological position eventually enables him to *save the value of reason* in order to solve the problem of meaning by way of determining truths of the sentence. The inclination to say that empiricism is deeply associated with psychologism, and as a result of that it manipulates *the behaviour of the individual.* Accordingly, the

credibility of reason associated with empiricism would be violated. We think that so long as the modern philosophy of language is rooted in empiricist principles as we observe in Locke's philosophy of language, the issue of psychologism inevitably needs to be taken care of. Frege has this background in mind and as a result of, took anti-psychological position. This is with a view to extract the concept of thought content to solve the problem of meaning by way of determining truths under the realm of semantics.

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