HUME'S THEORY OF THE PASSIONS

A Study of Book II (*Of the Passions*) of

A Treatise of Human Nature

by David Hume

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

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For Hume the human characteristics relevant to moral worth are always empirical, hence his moral psychology is an investigation into human nature. There is, he says, an original fabric of human nature consisting of propensities and dispositions.

Hume's moral psychology is thus affiliated to his philosophical anthropology. Much of his account of the passions, their relationship to reason, etc. presuppose his image of man, his view of human nature as something given. Hume's rejection of reason as a creative force is characteristic of his way of looking at human nature. Reason, for him, is attested information; it has nothing to do with the choice of ends. The passions, on the other hand, are the most personal part of us, the best as well as the worst.

The problem of admitting moral value to emotionally motivated conduct arises in this context. On Hume's lines it should be possible to show that moral worth could be admitted to emotions, as in Patanjali and Buddhist ethics, the special value of Hume's moral psychology lies in calling us to revise the naive and unsophisticated concept of emotion given by the rationalists.

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INTRODUCTION

A critical exposition of David Hume's moral psychology will be attempted in the following pages. The details of his moral psychology consists mainly of an elaborate and highly complex theory of the passions stated in Book II of his Treatise of Human Nature.

In the present context I should like to make a few remarks of general nature and then would proceed to introduce my line of approach.

Hume's task in Book II of his Treatise is to rehabilitate the passions from the rationalists' distrust; to demolish sophisticated theories, deriving from Hobbes, in which all passions were regarded as forms of self-love; to make way for his rival hypothesis of innate benevolence and sympathy. Besides a reversal of the roles hitherto ascribed to reason and feeling, he offers also a methodologically deterministic thesis about human action, in terms of which 'freely chosen' and 'caused' do not rule one another out. The idea of the self plays an important role in Hume's intricate account of the passions, especially in the case of the passions as pride and humility, when the 'object' is ourselves, and not the least for those as love and hate, when the 'object' is other people. Sympathy plays a role in Hume's theory of passions somewhat similar to imagination in his theory of knowledge. He regarded imagination and perhaps sympathy as cohesive forces, and the associative principles as important scientific principles governing the working of the mind,

both in the domains of knowledge and belief, and in social intercourse. Hume regarded himself as the Newton of the sciences of man and this fact is borne out by his pursuit of the experimental method as also by his adherence to Newton's methodological canons of economy and simplicity of explanation, testability of hypotheses, and refusal to postulate occult causes. But above all, Hume stresses facets of human nature that had largely been neglected since Aristotle. He postulates an original fabric of human nature consisting of various propensities or dispositions.

Hume's theory of knowledge, set out in Book I of the *Treatise*, has been studied in detail by many scholars. Moreover several people have considered parts of Book III, which gives his theory of ethics. Book II of the *Treatise*, however, has been relatively neglected, though one or two scholars (notably Dr. P. Ardal) have turned their attention to it in the last few years. I have therefore ventured to choose for my study a field in which there is still plenty of scope for philosophical interpretation. Hume's thought in the *Treatise* is highly subtle and complex, not least in Book II, and in my enterprise I have endeavoured to work out Hume's position and its viability.

Moral psychology is a part of moral philosophy; and the psychological side of ethical inquiry has always occupied an important place with the British moralists. They have held that without an adequate conceptual map of the psychological areas of human inclinations, actions and choices, a theory of ethics would become futile,

if not impossible. Considerations such as these have led to an interest in description of phenomena, rather than the framing of abstract theories of human behaviour. The description, with the British moralists, Hume included, is at times a description of the way to talk about the subject. They believed that by showing how language is really used can the conceptual confusions which it has generated be cleared up. Hume's refusal to use the word 'reasonable' to 'actions' is significant. He has been able to show, I believe, that describing how to talk about a subject is not very different from describing the complexities of the subject itself. The two cannot properly be distinguished, since in the absence of a great deal of penetrating observation and accurate description of morally significant psychological phenomena like actions and feelings, descriptions of our ways of talking about them could be futile.

The British moralists', or for that matter Hume's as well, understanding of the nature and scope of moral psychology was not exactly similar to that of the contemporary thinkers, since the latter do not share the concern of the former. For the present day philosophers, despite their interest in description of relevant phenomena, the description is primarily a description of the way to talk about the subject. The problems of moral psychology today are not empirical problems only, and under Wittgenstein's influence we have come to believe that they are solved by looking into the workings of our language. Since the problems are conceived as 'philosophical', the moral philosophers' task, even in the domain

of moral psychology, has to be of waging "a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language".

It is far from my intention not to recognize that the language which we use about things may affect our attitude to these things, and, therefore, even our actions. Hume and Berkeley did not deny this. On the contrary, I would like to suggest that there are other paths open that could be trodden not without rewarding illumination. Why not hold to the belief that no human characteristic which is relevant to moral esteem can escape being an empirical characteristic, and, then proceed to investigate human nature? This is what Hume in fact does in Books II and III of the Treatise. Since I do not propose to deal with Hume's theory of ethics, I shall confine my remarks to his moral psychology. Investigation of human nature not only leads to the consideration of a more interesting set of concepts than the right and the good, as well as feelings, desires, intentions and other psychological phenomena. Such a programme reopens the issue of philosophical anthropology, as it came to be called by Max Scheler. Even if total explanations are no longer possible, there could be no reason why we should not look at human beings in general in their context in the world. The social basis of man and the moral basis of society are thoughts that are important for Hume's image of man. No statement of the sociality of man could be more explicit than that of Butler (Sermons, 1), yet I should say that Hume's (Treatise, II, ii, 5) is no less satisfactory.

I shall briefly mention one implication of Hume's image of man before I turn to a more important topic.

Human nature, for Hume, is something given and the task is not to change it, rather to change human situations, and thus to modify and improve human behaviour. Man becomes human in society -- this is one of Hume's central ethical teachings. His rejection of reason as a creative force has proved scandalous in philosophy, but that must be taken as a characteristic way of his looking at human nature. Hutcheson's question, "What is Reason but that sagacity we have in prosecuting any end?" has also been Hume's. Aristotle, on one interpretation of course, does not give reason that atropheid look, rationalists loved and adored. For him, it has been held, the rational element in man is not something altogether separate and distinct from the feeling element, nor is its development something different from or opposed to the development of the feeling element. In this light what does Hume's reversal of the roles of reason and emotion mean? Human nature, for Hume, comprises of reason and the passions, and the picture of slavery of the former to the latter is only a metaphor overstated. The picture should leave no room for uneasiness if understood aright. It should be remembered that Hume would not have approved Dürer's etching entitled 'Reason, a slave of passions', which shows a nude middle aged woman riding on the back of an undressed aged and bearded male crawling. Nor was he a Keats to have intended to say, 'O, for a life of sensations rather than of thought'. The metaphor of the slave is, I suppose, intended to tease the philosophic respectability, a matter, as we know, in which Hume delighted. Could it not be said that the fulfilment of human nature, as Hume envisaged, lies in a spontaneous life, which

it is for reason to cultivate and develop and make productive, not take over. The passions are the most personal part of us, the best and also the worst that is in us. The person who chooses and decides, in doing so, chooses and decides himself.[1] Again, he identifies himself with some of his own passions and their corresponding aspirations and ideals. Reason is not in competition with the passions and there is no struggle for mastery at all. The part of reason is simply to organise and to inform choice whether of means (in the case of purposive, intentional or end-oriented actions) or of ends (such as some general desire for security or human happiness). Hume would have been happy to give any number of examples of good moral principles. The question of destroying the autonomy of ethics did not bother him at all. He writes much in the vein of a rule-utilitarian. But that is another story). Reason as attested information has to do with the choice of ends, and for that matter, of values. A choice is not an impersonal calculation. Should this manner of understanding Hume's intentions be found acceptable, it could also be said that Hume has been able to show the relevance of rational procedures to the choice of values.

The point last-mentioned is significant in another way as well. It is a fragment of a wider issue, and Hume's contribution to that by itself makes his moral psychology worth studying. If as we

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1. It is impossible not to be reminded of Hume's discussions of shame and pride when reading Sartre's discussions of the same subject, i.e., the sense that it is possible to say that the existence of the passions is actually dependent on the existence of another person.

have mentioned earlier, for Hume, no human characteristic worth moral esteem can be non-empirical, then a problem arises concerning defending the part played by emotion in morality against the uncompromising and apparently strong arguments admitting any moral value to emotionally motivated conduct. It is to this issue that I now propose to turn.

Kant's attitude towards the emotions is focused in the Ground-Work of the Metaphysic of Morals where he contrasts the man who acts out of respect for his duty with the man who acts out of sympathetic feeling. I take Kant's objection to acting out of sympathetic feeling as against the emotions as a whole. I do not wish to say anything about Kant's thoughts on ethics, nor hazard any interpretation of his views on the subject. I simply take him as a convenient point of departure. In fact I have in mind a set of views that may summarily be called Kantian, or even rationalistic.

I take the so-called Kantian views to run as follows: The moral value of an act is in no way constituted by the presence or absence of natural inclination. The inclinations or emotions are products of the passionate side of our nature and are 'pathological'. This view of the passions is the outcome of the belief that morality must be necessarily binding. We are rational creatures, and therefore what is moral is what is binding upon us as rational creatures. A point of digression: Could not Kant be said to investigate human nature? A rightful question indeed. But there is a difference none the less. The position and function assigned to reason is different in Kant's case. He looks upon reason as something distinct from

human nature. He says that the ground of obligation is to be sought, not in the nature of man, nor in the circumstances in the world in which one is placed but simply *a priori* in the notions of pure reason. A principle of conduct is right only if it could be accepted by any rational creature whatsoever, irrespective of any contingent attributes it may possess. It is the *rational* constitution of man that is uppermost in Kant's mind. A Humean reply could be that by rejecting the inclinations in favour of the rational, a greater part of man's ethical self, is left out. The rational man is not the whole man.

Could it not be argued that the Kantian does have a room for our feeling of respect? One version of the categorical imperative appeals to it. But respect alone does not go far enough. There are many feelings which have to be overcome, or disciplined or awakened if morality is to become dominant. Respect, closely connected as it is with an intellectual approach, cannot produce on its own the full involvement which devotion to a moral cause requires. Kant distrusts feelings too much; he fears that they are, with the exception of respect, of unreliable and misleading nature and should, therefore, be excluded altogether. As remarked earlier, the ethical self of man is not necessarily rational, and hence the rejection of any reference to man's nature excludes the ethical self. Kant's disregarding the ethical self of man needs postulating a different basis for ethics outside man, lest consideration of man's nature blur the boundaries between morality and psychology. For the Kantians in general existence and obligation fall apart.

Hume did of course know the possible objections against incorporating emotions to morality. At least he appears to have anticipated the Kantian type of argument. In a passage on page 413 of the Treatise he refers to the "suppos'd pre-eminence of reason above passion" and says, "The eternity, invariableness, and divine origin of the former have been display'd to the best advantage: The blindness, unconstancy and deceitfulness of the latter have been as strongly insisted on". That our emotions are capricious, that they are not subject to our deliberation and choice and that individuals differ in their emotional capacities — these are a few representative weighty objections against admitting moral worth to the passionate side of human nature.

It is possible to show that moral worth could be admitted to emotions and should that turn out to be the case, moral psychology, as Hume understands it, would become a worthwhile field of inquiry.

If Hume is taken to hold that any human characteristic which is relevant to moral worth is an empirical characteristic, it also implies that the characteristics concerned are subject to empirical conditions such as psychological history and individual variation. The suggestion is borrowed from Professor Bernard Williams's Inaugural Lecture at the Bedford College (published as Morality and the Emotions) and that it is outspokenly Humean is evident from the fact that any such suggestion would at once be rejected by the Kantian.

What lies behind the Kantian's rejection? Refusal to admit moral worth to emotionally motivated conduct is based on a restricted

or even unsophisticated model of the emotions. There is a good sense in which the emotions are capricious, emotive behaviour does not usually commit the agent to similar behaviour when in the future circumstances are appropriate. It is also not incorrect to say that emotionally motivated actions cannot be backed by justifying reasons. But none of the considerations warrant us to say that we cannot talk significantly of emotionally motivated behaviour as either rational or justified. Take for instance, panic at the sight of a mouse, which is different from panic at the sight of a snake. The latter sort of panic is determined by the beliefs involved in the situation. Beliefs may be justified or unjustified according as they are held by persons who apply it consistently in appropriate situations. It is this point that emerges from Hume's relating the passions to beliefs. Beliefs can be relevant about the significance of situations encountered by persons experiencing passions. This fact is also reinforced by Hume's causal explanation of the phenomenon of the passion: "That cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to sensation of the passion: From this double relation of ideas and impressions, the passion is deriv'd". (Treatise, p.286.) If a phenomenon is susceptible to causal explanation, it also implies that the phenomenon is repeatable, otherwise the talk of cause makes no sense at all. This point of course does not entitle us to deny the charge of capriciousness to emotions, nor does Hume do it. He does admit the changeableness and inconstancy of the passions.

But we must not forget the influence that general rules and the imagination exert on the passions, and those two principles are responsible for universalizability of our emotional reactions. Without going into the detail it will suffice to say, then, that so far as emotions are susceptible to beliefs and capable of consistent repetition it cannot be the case that <u>all</u> emotionally motivated conducts are necessarily capricious.

It must have been evident from the quotation above that Hume does not assimilate the emotion to sensation. His distinction between passion and the sensation of passion is worth nothing. Thus statements about emotions are not thought of as reports that one is experiencing certain sensations. And if it be so, it is also correct then to assert that statements about emotional experiences are not just reports of involuntary sensations. Emotions do not just 'happen' to us. Again emotions differ in their degrees of conative or dispositional properties. Hume's analysis of the passions of pride and love are instances at hand. The passion of love is such that one in love can reasonably be expected to go out of one's way by way of showing care and concern for the other self. The logic of the emotion word 'love' thus analysed entitles us to speak of choosing to act up to an emotion. Bodily expressions of emotions can be decided to be expressed or suppressed. An angry person might consider that he should not shout or any one who is afraid may decide that he must not flee as a part of his strategy. Most educational programme comprises of what may be called training of emotions, and in our everyday life we do temper the expression of our emotions in accordance

with the circumstances. In our persuasive discourse we deliberately set out to influence the emotional behaviour of other people. The border line between persuasion and propaganda is often difficult to draw, and it is a fact that the political agitator more often than not succeeds. Similar direction should then be possible to be given to ourselves. Educating emotional dispositions is as old as pedagogy itself. From Plato to Pestalozzi in the West, and from the *Āraṇyakas* to Tagore in India the topic has come up again and again. Vyasa the celebrated commentator on Patanjali's *Yoga Sutras* (I.12), has said that the emotional dispositions flow into both directions, towards virtues and towards vices -- *chittanadī nāma ubhayato vāhinī, vahati kalyāṇāya vahati pāpāya ca.* Moral life could be said to consist in training the dispositions that flow towards vices, and thereby change its course or direction of flowing. There appears no reason to distrust the moral worth of the emotional dispositions that already flow towards virtues. On the basis of an awareness or insight into one's own and other people's feelings there remains a possibility that some emotionally motivated behaviour can be as free as any other.

The variability of emotional capacity among people is an empirical characteristic and in view of that state of affairs one might not seek to found morality on such a contingent basis. Reason in the Kantian's scheme is unique in escaping being empirical. But what would happen if we choose to follow Hume in holding a close connexion between emotions and morality? Granted that some emotions could be deliberately cultivated, it would then remain an open ques-

tion whether the variability of emotional capacity of people is innately determined. Could it not be a prejudice that we are powerless to guide our emotional development? The moral discourse need not be necessarily non-emotive, on the contrary, emotions have an important role to play in it. Hume's examples of benevolent or sympathetic conduct furnish us with cases of emotional experiences that are not only free, but consistent and principled. And should this contention be viable, there appears no need to suppose that people would be seriously handicapped by their pathological, i.e., natural emotional make-ups.

The considerations submitted above call for revising the concept of emotion. The arguments against emotions having moral import are then convincing only initially. Since the Kantians do not take account the entire phenomena of the emotions they present us with a distorted picture of the case. Herein lies the special value of Hume's moral psychology. It does help us connect the perspective and remove the misgivings. Of course I do not mean to suggest that emotionally motivated conduct is unconditionally valuable nor does Hume; though to admit that at least some of our emotionally motivated conduct is _prima facie_ right and desirable action is to go a longer way as Hume does than could have at all been possible in the Kantian formalism.

Now a word about 'naturalism'. If we care to remember that naturalism is a doctrine of man, Hume's naturalism could then be described as human naturalism, not only because he makes an application of a kind of scientific method to the study of human nature (his

own description of the *Treatise* on the title-page: "an attempt to introduce the experimental method into moral subjects" and also his reference to "an unskilful naturalist" on page 282) but also for his view that phenomena are to be explained by reference to human nature alone. Hume shared that opinion with other eighteenth century thinkers. It is a positivistic doctrine inasmuch as it refuses to appeal to any thing except that which is empirically conceivable. I have used the term 'naturalism' in the specific sense of a meta-ethical notion, in order to refer any ethical position which implies that value-words are definable in terms of the factual ones or evaluative statements can be justified by an appeal to relevant facts. Nowhere I have entered into any discussion whether Hume is engaged in deducing moral conclusions from factual premisses about human nature. That has not been a part of my programme, though I believe that Hume's view that "the end of all moral speculations is to teach us our duty" cannot be easily disposed of in favour of a non-naturalist point of view. At least Hume obliges us to open the issue whether one could draw from a scientific account of human nature practical conclusions as to how men ought to act.

To come back to the passions. In Hume the empiricist view of emotions finds an able exponent. The significance of the Book II of the *Treatise* lies in making a systematic examination of the concepts involved in the description and explanation of those human actions which it is the function of morals to approve or disapprove. The domain of the passions comprise such concepts.

A decision concerning Hume's use of the word 'passion' needs

to be taken. Hume uses 'feeling' interchangeably with 'sentiment' as much as with 'impression'. Passions are said to be secondary impressions, or impressions of reflexion. Hume's phrase "sentiment of the human mind" points to, what may be called in his own words, the 'sensitive' rather than "the cogitative part of our nature". It appears from the manner of Hume's talking about the passions that he takes the word 'passion' as coextensive with the whole class of affective phenomena. One thing is certain that a passion is not a sensation, since a passion is said to be an impression of <u>reflexion</u>. Impressions of <u>sensation</u> are original, and those that are secondary and reflective, i.e., the passions, arise either "from the original impressions (of sensation), or from their ideas". Are passions feelings or emotions, or both? Ordinarily we would say that joy is a feeling while love is an emotion. Both joy and love are, for Hume, passions, though, the former is a 'direct' and the latter is an 'indirect' passion. On the score of the distinction between direct and indirect passions, Hume could be said to have made a distinction between feelings on the one hand and emotions on the other. But it is hardly sustained throughout. Under the class of 'violent' passions (properly so-called) he puts joy and love together. This consideration leads one to believe that, for Hume, the passions are not a subclass of the class of affective phenomena, rather the class of passions and the class of affective phenomena, irrespective of feelings and emotions, map an identical domain. On page 203 of the <u>Treatise</u> occurs the phrase "affections or emotions". Elsewhere Hume disquietingly speaks of even 'sensation' alternatively with 'impre-

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ssion' in the secondary and reflective sense, e.g., "pride is a pleasant sensation" (Ibid., p.285) and "by pride I understand that agreeable impression....etc.", (Ibid., p.297) Such terminological ambiguities demand a decision and in this context I should like to maintain that Hume's use of the word 'passion' is umbrella like, it covers a whole range of affective phenomena, feelings, emotions, attitudes, even evaluations. The last two could be illustrated by such passions as benevolence and pride. The care and concern exhibited by the benevolent person bespeaks of his attitude towards the other. Pride is self-esteem, love is an esteem for the person loved. Hume's inventory of passions includes the names of virtues and vices as well. This is significant. Hume seeks to explain human action in terms of motives and intentions. A reason for action refers to the agent's psychological history, his emotional make-up and the passionate experiences, or in other words his habits and passions. On the other hand, the intentionality of action constituted by the agent's desires and aversions. It could then be said that an explanation of action in terms of motives and intentions is ascriptive, and as such connected with praise and blame. Hume's list of motives is composed of the names of virtues and vices as much as that of Ryle. Of course, Hume was not anxious to combat a particular view of the relationship between feelings and motives as Ryle has been. Anyway, Hume's theory of the passions is a prolegomena to his 'emotionistic' (the phrase is Ardal's) view of ethics. Passions or emotion words form part of the vocabulary of approbation and disapproval, and a number of them, Hume shows in the Book

III of the *Treatise*, belongs to the language of moral evaluation.

Hume could of course have distinguished between *feelings* and *emotions* in the following manner. Since he understands by passion "a violent and sensible emotion of mind" (*ibid.*, p.437) and the notion of calm passion is not generic but specific, Hume's distinction between calm and violent passions is based upon the degrees of intensity. He admits the possibility that a given violent passion could, with a change in the causal set of factors giving rise to it, become, just as well a calm passion, on acquiring a greater degree of intensity, could be transformed into a violent one. The causal factors would include, besides "the peculiar temper and disposition" of the individuals, "the circumstances and situations of the object....the borrowing of force from any attendant passion... custom or...exciting the imagination" (see *ibid.*, pp.437-8). Psychologists usually endorse Hume's contention that a feeling differs very little from passion (or for that matter emotion) except that its phenomena are less intense. I would cite one such endorsement. F. Paulhan writes, "passion may spring from the development of a feeling, or, on the other hand, it may itself give rise to a feeling by a decrease in the intensity of causes that produce it" (*The Laws of Feeling*, p. 67. Translated by C.K.Ogden, Kegan Paul, London, 1930). To generalize the point, emotion is a feeling, or at least an experience which involves a feeling. Hume uses the phrase "weak passion", and we might say that a feeling is an idea or copy of an impression.

Concerning the point that a violent passion can, by losing

intensity, become calm Hume has made the observation that: "Impressions, properly called passions, may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become, in a manner, imperceptible" (op.cit., p. 276). Is he entitled to make this remark after having said that an impression is a perception of the mind? How could there be an unperceived impression, and passions being a subclass of impressions, how is it that there could be an "imperceptible" passion, or in other words, an unfelt feeling? Does the argument esse est percipi apply to Hume's notion of passion? And if it does, then the assertion that a passion can become "imperceptible" should be quite disturbing. Anthony Kenny, (Action Emotion and Will) who has drawn attention to this point, finds it uncomfortable enough. I do not propose to consider Kenny's view that passions, for Hume, are perceived by some sort of an inner sense -- a thesis which, despite Hume's numerous ambivalent faculty-expressions, I believe, is hard to establish. But Kenny does overlook quite a few important points and takes a too literal a view of Hume's words. Hume does not claim exactness for his division of passions, and calls it "vulgar and specious". The question of "imperceptibility" of a violent passion concerns the person who is experiencing the passion. The relation between a passion and the person is such that a passionless state of mind is inconceivable. Apart from it, the change from perceptibility to imperceptibility of a passion is a qualitative one, or else cannot be in accord with Hume's intentions. The word 'imperceptible' is a metaphor, and the contention of the passage quoted above seems to be that a violent passion may so less intense that it may no longer be identifiable as

a passion with the former degree of intensity, but this does not imply that it will cease to be _recognizable_, only it comes to be experienced as a "soft" one. An impression is recognized as a passion only if it influences the will. And Hume has said more than once that both violent and calm passions direct the will. On this point the following remark of Hume is relevant: "passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the disorder they occasion in the temper; but on the contrary, that when a passion has once become a settled principle of action" (_op.cit._, pp.418-19). It is true that violent passions have a more powerful influence on the will, yet the calm ones "when corroborated by reflection, and seconded by resolution" can control the "furious movements" of the former. The calm passions are dispositional, while the violent ones tends to be episodic. The dispositional nature of the calm passions is brought out by Hume's remark that the calm passions "produce" so "little emotion in the mind" that "they are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation" (_ibid._, p. 417). Hume's notion of calm passions is often misunderstood. Kenny is one instance, another is Rachael Kydd's view that Hume had a special theory of calm passions, which I would be considering later.

As regards Kenny's point it would suffice to say that intensity of motivation is not the most characteristic aspect of emotion. Psychologists speak of an almost imperceptible gradient between emotions. The geography of emotions is not only episodic but also dispositional, just as the geography of a terrain is not only mountaneous but has downs and dales as well. It is a commonplace expe-

rience that we may go for days, or even weeks, without any overt expressions of emotion, yet never be free from emotional under-currents which influence our perceptions, our interests, our attitudes, our prejudices, our thoughts, and all our action. There are ways of behaving emotionally.

It must have by now been evident that for Hume passions have motivational significance. And it is no wonder since the terms _emotion_ and _motivation_ have a common derivation. The Latin word _emovere_ means to stir up, excite or move. To be _moved_ in an emotional sense means to be stirred up. In a motivational sense it means to 'bestir one self'. Emotion not only stirs up but also causes us to bestir ourselves. Precisely, it is this view of Hume's theory of passions that has been denied by recent philosophers — a move which I consider to be a serious philosophical howler. In consequence I have tried to work out a dispositional view of Hume's theory of passions. Philosophers have sought to find or institute an affinity between Hume's theory of passions and that of Descartes. I postpone my detailed argument against any such attempt to a later place, and in the present context I should like to content myself with making a few explanatory remarks.

A dispositional view of passions, as I said above, is essentially motivational, and a motivational account of emotions is chiefly available for interpreting human behaviour. Statements about emotions, besides interpreting behaviour, describe it as well. This is an important point. Hume's account of the emotions is sophisticated enough to make room for the two functions of inter-

pretation and description. The classical theory of the emotions does not distinguish between *identifying* and *recognizing* an emotion. The conditions of existence of an emotion, as Hume has shown, are unsatisfiable in a solipsistic universe, related as emotions are to an object and the conative tendency of emotions make expressions part and parcel of the emotive experience. Besides, Hume's social image of man leaves no doubt that emotions place the agent in a social context. Without a given system of social relationships and institutions and concepts belonging to that system human actions would hardly become intelligible. It is quite mistaken to take Hume as implying that he proposes to explain behaviour by specifying its cause only i.e., a certain feeling or inner experience. It must be admitted that Hume suffers from a tension between a two sub-contrary views of the emotions. On the one hand, he uses such an apparatus of analysis that suggests a Cartesian point of view, i.e., the first-person statements of emotion are incorrigible, an emotion is a purely private mental event, and it is contingently connected with its manifestation in behaviour. And on the other, Hume advocates induction and shareability of emotions by sympathy, maintaining a difference of category between feelings such as joy and emotions such as love, speaks of "the bent and tendency" of emotions, and holds the intensionality of the emotion by specifying the passions by their objects.

The tension in the climate of Hume's thought may be due partly to his analytical commitments and partly to his inherited vocabulary. Nevertheless it is certainly possible to show that the main

current of Hume's theory of the passions is dispositional or motivational, and this is no better illustrated than by his view that in the direction of the will the passions are volitional sovereigns. A non-dispositional theory of the emotions such as that of Descartes would never come to espouse such a position. One of the primary aims of Descartes' _Les Passions de l'Ame_ is to show that the will is free in its nature to such an extent that it can never be constrained. And above all, for Descartes, the passions of the soul are to a large extent dependent upon the body, and Hume is in no manner a dualist and advocates no double-aspect doctrine concerning man. It is very rightly that Albert G.A. Balz has remarked that in the case of Descartes the bodily mode might be regarded "as an active catalytic agent with respect to the occurrence of the passion" (_Descartes and the Modern Mind_, p. 400, Yale University Press, 1952). Could such a remark be made about Hume's theory of the passions?

Kenny has admitted that Hume allows the case that it is possible for the mind to make a mistake in its perception of the passion. And this is quite significant, since admission of the possibility helps us distinguish between identifying a passion and recognising it. How do we come to learn the meaning of passion or emotion words like _pride_ or _love_? Much would depend on the type of concept of emotion one has. The emotionally aroused person will tell you not only that he is slightly or strongly excited but also that he has such and such emotion. He will say that he is angry, jealous or in love. But it may not be possible that one can find experiential and behavioural differences to verify every emotional term in the language, just as

such there are emotions that are easily recognised in ourselves, most easily expressed in one's language, and most easily identified when we see them represented in pictures or on the stage. The latter are also most readily predicted in terms of the situations which arouse them. Again, there should be no denying the fact that to the emotionally aroused individual the most obvious aspect of emotion is feeling. The subjective nature of feelings poses some problem. A first-person statement 'I am angry' may be taken as a case. What does 'anger' mean? Is it a conscious observable mental process verifiable by the speaker? And can he not be mistaken? Hume allows that introspection discloses particular features of experience, which are designated by passion or emotion words like 'anger', etc. On page 286 of the *Treatise* he says that "our very feeling convinces us" of the emotions we are experiencing, so much so that the feeling of an emotion is its "very being and essence". In these passages Hume is stating the necessary condition of having a passion in the case of first-person statements. Passions, for Hume, are *simple* impressions and hence indefinable. The very indefinability of passions on account of their simplicity makes emotion statements, at least in the first-person uses, ascertainable by some sort of inspection. A similar case in the history of thought is provided by Moore. The word 'beautiful' can be meaningful or significant only if the speaker experiences "appropriate emotion" (*Principia Ethica*, p. 190, Cambridge, 1929). Moore insists, in the case of aesthetic emotions, that one should "feel and see" it. But the emotional element, i.e., the feeling introspected, is not the whole story of a passion for

Hume, there are other elements like objects, causes, tendencies etc., which taken together make the story complete. Hume would say that it is quite difficult to imagine what the feeling alone, unaccompanied by any expression would be like. At least such an abstraction would have no value in a science of human nature.

The possibility of being mistaken about emotions is endorsed by Hume. For him the reasons for mistake lie in the resemblance in causal factors responsible for the production of passions. Joy and pride could be ordinarily mistaken, and this has been shown by Hume in the following passage: "Men sometimes boast of a great entertainment" though, " 'tis only the master of the feast, who beside the same joy, has the additional passion of self-applause and vanity" (op.cit., p.290). In another passage on page 293, Hume makes it abundantly clear that the required feeling of joy is not sufficient, though necessary, to produce the passion of pride. General rules and custom also have so long an influence upon passions such that "if a person full-grown and of the same nature with ourselves, were on a sudden transported into our world, he wou'd be very much embarrass'd with every object and wou'd not readily find what degree of love and hatred, pride and humility, or any other passion he ought to attribute to it" (ibid., pp. 293-4). More significant is Hume's remark that one's initial experience of pride, for example, may wane when one discovers that neither of the two so-called objects of the passions "have any singularity". "Upon comparing ourselves with others, as we are every moment apt to do, we find we are not in the least distinguish'd; and upon comparing the object we

passes, we discover still the same unlucky circumstance" (*ibid.*, p. 292). So it should with a little caution be said that Hume thinks the only way to learn the meaning of an emotion-word is by experiencing what it stands for. Psychologists often speak of maturation and learning in emotional development, and in this both the processes of incorporation and correction are operative. One may come to learn to use the expression 'I am angry' of himself by having experience of the passion and also by being told by others. There is no reason why the man will not sometimes accept corrections from outsiders about his own emotions or about the correct description of them. Since emotions have a social dimension, both the spectator and the agent will have to and in fact do cooperate in mapping the geography of the emotions.

Hume could be taken to hold that the criterion for identifying a passion is not necessarily the recognition of the special qualities of an experience. For we learn about our own emotion in the same way as other people learn about them. And if it were the case otherwise, inter-personal communication on the emotional level or 'sympathy' as Hume calls it, would have been altogether impossible. If introspection were the sole criterion of our knowledge or understanding of our emotions many emotions could not be distinguished. Shame and embarrassment are two emotions that cannot be distinguished by their feelings, unless we refer to the specific situations that give use to them. Hume's discussion on the passions of malice and envy illustrate the point. So does the distinction between pity and malice, in which case the feelings vary concomitantly with the ob-

jects of the passions. Malice and envy differ not so much in feeling as by the superiority and inferiority of the other person. "Connected ideas are readily taken for each other" says Hume, and this explains the notorious case that we can be mistaken about our own emotions. Again, for all the subtle linguistic differentiation of emotion-words there does not always exist distinct emotions. At least there is no obvious reason to suppose so. This is evidenced by Hume's discussion of the mixture of benevolence and anger with compassion and malice. With the affections of pity and malice other passions are "confounded" such that there "is always a mixture of love or tenderness with pity, and of hatred or anger with malice" (op.cit., p. 381). All these go to show that Hume's theory of the passions is sophisticated and does not allow being given naive and unqualified description as has become fashionable among philosophers.

Many of the problems raised by Hume's theory of the passions have a recency to our times. I should like to make a brief mention of a few of them.

Hume does not appear to make a very clear distinction between motive and intention. "By the intention we judge of the actions", says Hume on page 348 of the Treatise, and again on page 404 we find him speaking about "the union betwixt motives and actions" having a constancy amounting to causal (in his sense of constant conjunction of course) necessity. Obviously Hume has raised these issues in connexion with ascription of responsibility for voluntary actions. Ascription of responsibility can be made only if there is "moral evidence" for an action. By "moral evidence" Hume means "a conclusion

concerning the actions of men, deriv'd from the consideration of their motives, temper and situation" (*ibid.*). Elsewhere Hume couples 'motive' with 'character' and these two conjucts are said to have constant connexion with actions. Similar assertions are made in respect of intention as well. By "intention" Hume means "that quality" in the agent, "which pleases or displeases" and is "constant and inherent in his person and character" (*ibid.*, p. 348). If we remind ourselves that for Hume moral judgments are expressions of approval or disapproval of the spectators, or properly speaking "to feel" those emotions, then intention of the agent is the necessary condition for the arousal of the aforesaid feelings in the spectator. Intention, says Hume, connects the actions with the agent in the sense that the actions are index to something "durable" in him. What Hume has called "moral evidence" is as much dispositional as his account of intention. Personal history of the agent, his temper and character are motives to actions and connect him with his actions as it could be said to constitute his intentions. Hume's position seems to be somewhat as follows: Whatever connects the actions with the agent sufficiently so as to make ascription of responsibility possible are either motives or intentions of the agent.

Now speaking of *motives* and *intentions* interchangeably is not peculiar to Hume. Anscombe in her *Intention* has divided motives into three classes, one of which is comprised by motives that are equivalent to intentions, the others being backward-looking motives and interpretative motives. Attempts at distinguishing and defining the notions of motives and intentions are not altogether free from confu-

sion, and the reason for this may partly be assigned to the ambiguity of the notions. Anscombe herself mentions that at the popular level of discourse motive and intention are not treated as distinct in meaning. I do not mean to suggest that Anscombe takes a Humean stand, rather I should like to say that even if we accept Anscombe's view that motives put actions "in a certain light", for Hume, it is not the agent's putting, on the contrary, the spectator's putting the agent's action into certain light that is important. If it is said that motives explain actions, Hume would say that the explanation consisted in ascribing responsibility to the agent for his action only if his motives determined it in the causal sense. Hume's methodological deterministic view of human actions instantiates the general thesis that it depends on the way an action is described, how much there is left to be explained by reference to either motive or intention. Descriptions of human actions, for Hume, have built-in reference of motives, it is an inference on the basis of "moral evidence". I am far from suggesting that the distinction between motive and intention is philosophically redundant. A description of human action is recognised only if it makes reference to intentions. It is also possible to engage into the kind of above-mentioned talk without reference to motives. To act from a motive does not necessarily imply that the agent possesses a concept of motive, and the asymmetry between motive and intention is such that one may have a motive for an intention, though it is not conceivable that one can have an intention for a motive. Considerations such as these serve only to suggest that the distinction between motive and intention is not that perspi-

suous as it might appear to the unsophisticate.

Granted that there are motives for doing or performing actions for which responsibility could be ascribed to the agent, or for that matter, since motivated actions are voluntary, one can ask: what is the relation between motivational emotions and actions? An action, for Hume, stretches from the agent's personal history, including his "situation", emotions and traits of character, to particular state of affairs which he desires to realise. If the latter could be designated by *intention*, the state of affairs to be brought out by an action, in this sense Hume seems to have distinguished intention from motive. Impulsive actions apart, ascription of praise or blame is possible if the action could "be deriv'd from a particular fore-thought and design" (*op.cit.*, p. 349). Causal authorship of an action is not sufficient for the truth of an ascriptive judgment, there needs be an intention, which, says Hume, "shows certain qualities, ...remaining after the action is perform'd, connect it with the person..." (*ibid.*). Should this reading be found unobjectionable, it could be said that "motive in general" (the phrase is Anscombe's) or motive and intention as distinguished above would together constitute the sufficient and necessary conditions for a voluntary action being performed.

Should assignation of voluntariness of an action be justified by reference of the agent's emotive life, i.e., emotions are motivational in character, in that case Hume could be held advocating a relationship between emotions and motives on the one hand, and motivational emotions and actions on the other. It would be unfair to Hume

to take his saying that emotions as such are connected with motives, since what he calls "weak passions" (as distinguished from the calm ones, see op.cit., p.419) are feelings that have nothing to do with directing actions and conduct. In this regard Hume would not have any quarrel with Ryle, who has proposed a distinction between inclinations and feelings. By 'inclination' Hume would mean "a settled principle of action" which can direct "the actions and conduct without that opposition and emotion, which so naturally attend every momentary gust of passion" (ibid.). But Ryle could still insist on a difference. He might suggest that Hume's explanation of actions by motives is causal. If to offer X as a causal explanation of Y is to say that whenever X then Y, Ryle's own law-like generalisation view of motives is no less causal. For to say 'he boasted from vanity' is to assert 'whenever an opportunity for boasting arrives, he takes it' -- and this assertion construes the original statement as a causal one. Nor it could also be said that Hume's view offers private impulses and Ryle's public circumstances. We have already drawn attention to the fact that Hume has laid emphasis on the 'situation' of the agent, together with the fact of admitting the possibility of one's being mistaken about one's own feelings.

Closely connected with Hume's view of motivational character of the passions is his account of desires, which should be appreciated against the background of the traditional analysis of human action characterising it in terms of an alleged antecedent. The presence of such an antecedent has been made in the tradition a necessary condition of something's being an action, and this antecedent has been

called 'the will'. The idea that a human act (or action) is a bodily movement following from or caused by the will, a volition or an act of will, occurs earlier in Hobbes and Locke, and later in Mill, and has remained dominant in nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century philosophy. Austin expressed the tradition thus: "Certain movements of our bodies follow invariably and immediately our wishes and desires for the same movements....The antecedent wishes and those consequent movements are human volitions and acts ... Our desires of those bodily movements which immediately follow our desires for them are the only volitions; or the only acts of the will" (see his Lectures on Jurisprudence, 11, Lect.XVIII). This view has also been accepted by most analytic jurisprudents after Austin.

Desires, for Hume, are direct passions, i.e., the impressions that arise from good and evil, or in other words, pleasure and pain "most naturally, and with the least preparation" (op.cit., p. 439). Hume has drawn our attention to the instinctive genesis of desires, and the question -- why desires so arise -- is held "perfectly unaccountable". Benevolence, the love of life, punishment to our enemies, hunger and lust are instances of this class of desires, which, for all practical purposes, are instincts. There is another class of desires of more general nature: "the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as such". The distinction between the two classes of desires lies in the fact that the latter are generated by the hedonic quality of impressions, while the former generate such hedonic qualities. The hedonic quality of the impressions is the necessary condition of the passions properly

so called, i.e., the indirect passions together with the direct passions or desires described as "the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil."

Hume speaks of "calm desires and tendencies", now it can be asked whether he intends to assimilate calm desires to the class of reason-like calm passions. It does so appear since Hume, on page 417 of the *Treatise*, mentions the aforesaid two kinds of desires, instinctive ones such as the love of life or benevolence, and the general ones like appetite to good or aversion to evil, in the context of passions owing to this "calmness and tranquillity" being mistaken for reason. He says, "When any of these passions (the desires) are calm, and cause no disorder in the soul, they are very readily taken for the determinations of reason..." The point of interest then is that the division of the passions into direct and indirect, and again into calm and violent cuts across one another. The division of passions into direct and indirect is made according to the origin, while that of calm and violent is concerned with intensity. One is naturally led to the conclusion that, for Hume, the passions are motivational or dispositional in nature. Supposing now that it be allowed that so far I have been right, a few considerations can be made.

The notion of 'passion' becomes interchangeable with desire, since the love of life, benevolence and the general appetite to good are referred to by Hume as both 'desires' and passions, and it would be so irrespective of the division of the passions into direct and indirect ones. The position is not perhaps without its difficulties.

Assimilation of desires to emotions cannot be complete, for desire in the sense of wanting is hardly an emotion, just as much as there are uses of 'desire' in unemotional context, e.g., a letter might open with the following words: "The Prime Minister desires....etc." This is not to suggest that an account of desires is not essential to a treatment of emotions, since the connexion between emotion and behaviour is made by desire. My emotions do not make me want to do the same sort of things, rather my emotions differ from one another according to the different sort of things it makes me want to do.

The role of desires, for Hume, lies in "the government of the will and actions". There are two points in the contention: (a) production of volition and (b) volition effecting action. The production of volition has been dealt with by Hume with greater explicitness. Voluntary behaviour is motivated by passion, and such behaviour is accompanied by an indefinable internal impression called 'a volition', which in turn is caused by one or other passion. To take Hume's own example. A suit of fine clothes produces pleasure from their beauty, and this pleasure produces the impression of volition. Thus the production of volition by passion is just a particular case of the production of one passion by another in accordance with the principle of association of impressions. As regards the case of volition effecting action the following are worth noticing. An act of will, as Hume gives us to understand, is comprehended under what he calls "the actions of the mind" as are the desired effects. I venture to suggest this interpretation on the basis of what Hume says on pages 400-1 of the Treatise. He enunciates his determinism

by seeking to prove "a constant union in the actions of the mind". The view, to put it in his terminology, that the actions of the mind are necessary can be proved by examining the 'particulars' apart. He does not distinguish between the mind and the body, so much so that on page 276 he used the expressions 'the soul' and 'the body' interchangeably, and again on page 303 he makes the self include "the qualities of our mind and body". These assertions are particular instances of Hume's more general view concerning the epistemic status of the concept of body. In Book I of the <u>Treatise</u>, there occurs an unmistakable phenomenalist declaration that the notion of external existence when taken for something specifically different from our perceptions is absurd (see p. 188). Hume makes a reference to this view again on page 298, where his notion of the body appears to be "a part of ourselves" or "near enough connected with us". And what else could Hume mean by the first person pronouns other than a system of perceptions? In the Appendix, again, we find him criticising the view that the will has a discoverable connexion with its effects. An act of volition cannot explain a motion of the body, since the causal relation between them is so construed that one is distinguishable and separable from the other. The motion of the body cannot "be foreseen without the experience of [its] constant conjunction" with the act of the will. I shall examine this contention in another context and therefore postpone criticism of it to a later place. What Hume says in the Appendix is that we perceive constant conjunction of the actions of the mind, and hence we cannot reason beyond it. Volition can effect action only in the sense of hoping

a probable occurrence of the latter. Kenny has remarked that Hume "does not and cannot well explain" how volition effects action. This remark is, in a sense, true, though at the same time stands in need of qualification in another important sense. Hume's own view with regard to the question how volition effects action is given on page 439 in the sentence that follows his statement about the way desire arises: "The WILL exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attain'd by any action of mind or body." Willing then is a special case of desiring, when the object of desire is a likelihood, or a possible state of affairs such that its idea is lively enough to generate a movement towards the object. The philosophical elucidation of the conceptual relation between desire and action depends crucially on the probability of the desired end. For desiring is trying to get what one desires. To desire or producing a volition is not to have an idle wish, a mere feeling. Hume would say that X desires Y is to say, that X does something to get Y. This point has been overlooked in Hume's case and I should think that Anscombe's criticism of Hume (Intentions, p.76) illustrates such an oversight.

Hume's account of desire is essentially empiricist. He describes desire as a feeling or impression, and the content of desire is said to be an idea. The object of desire, the good is conceived "merely in idea, and ... consider'd as to exist in any future period of time" (Treatise, p.438). It could be a present object as well, or even in some cases past. But it is undeniable that the notion of as yet unattainedness, if it could be so said, is built into the notion of

an object of desire. Again, it is possible that I may be mistaken about the desirability characterisation of my object of desire. It is a common experience that we often falsely believe that we desire one thing only to discover that we really desired another. Much of the drama of our emotive life consists in this. Hence the necessary and sufficient condition of something's being an object of desire is that the object would satisfy the desire and nothing else will do that. An object of desire may be desired either as an end or as a means. Hume speaks of "the greatest possible good". Hence a consideration of choosing the right means leading to desired end has an influence on our action. 'What counts as getting an object of desire?' — is a question that demands an answer. In fact these considerations are hinted at by Hume in connexion with his discussion on the notion of reasonableness of actions: "in exerting any passion in action" he says, we may "choose insufficient means for the design'd end, and deceive ourselves in our judgments of causes and effects" (ibid., p. 416). He may not have been explicit in the manner of many of our contemporary philosophers, but it would be untrue to say that he was not aware of the complexity of the issues involved or was insensitive to their subtleties.

Hume's notion of the will is then a kind of desire with a force. Such a conception of desire, as if desire were a force — is found in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics (1147a 34). I do not wish to suggest an identity of intentions of Aristotle and Hume. A passage in Aristotle (1139a 36) says that it is not reason as such that acts in action, but reason which is with a view to something

and is practical. If this statement is taken on its face value, then Aristotle's 'will' could be said to be a 'calm passion' in Hume's terminology. They seem to agree about the applicability of the description 'not in accordance with reason' to actions and desires, while disagreeing about the case of rational desire, i.e., a desire with a rational end. The problem of thought <u>and</u> action is a problem for Aristotle, and not for Hume.

Desire mediates the object of desire with conduct, and conduct or action, for Hume, is the realisation of desire which is instinctive appetite. I shall try to show later the fact that desire is an instinctive appetite does not rule out the case for the deliberation of real means. If desire relates to the end, will does to the possible means, that are in Hume's word 'sufficient' only if the object of desire conceived as existent. On page 440 of the <u>Treatise</u> Hume puts it very clearly that what we desire is the 'existence' of the object of desire. As regards voluntarity it may be said that it is the property of an act originated in one's own desire, it is the activity of desire as will. Voluntarity consists in the fact whereby the power of circumstances translates itself into action through desire. Hume would hold that it is nonsense to say a desire itself is involuntary: it would be to commit a <u>contradicto in adjecto</u>, i.e., to assume a desire without desiring. It is possible to do something without desiring it, but impossible to desire without desiring. The will is the development and augmentation of voluntarity. Between desire and the will there is no qualitative difference, for Hume, but one of intensity such that the will can be said to dominate desire.

Kant's use of the word 'inclination' presents an interesting case. Hume's desires are motives, and if motives are a particular class of reasons, then it could be asked whether desires play the role of principles of volition or maxims as Kant would put it. It is one thing for Kant to deny intrinsic worth to conduct or actions done from inclination, and it is another thing to say that such conduct do not deserve praise or encouragement. Should one can afford to agree with Nowell-Smith's suggestion (<u>Ethics</u>, Ch.10) that Kant puts actions done from inclination in a category logically co-ordinate with 'from duty', then, since some sorts of actions (though of different sorts of course) are done from a maxim, it would be possible to say that actions willed through desire can be given a reason for its having been performed. This is one of Hume's contentions, namely, that our desires are part of our character. To speak of a person's desires is to speak of the pattern, course and direction of his thoughts, feelings and actions. This argument would be valid only if it could be shown that Kant does paraphrase 'inclination' by 'desire'. And if it be the case then it should also be admitted that, for Hume, reason-explanations of actions map into the same domain as do the causal ones.

As I have sought to indicate and argue earlier that Kantian's distrust of emotions renders much of our moral life incomprehensible. I would like to add now that Kant's distrust of desires leads him to believe that all actions springing from desire, unaccompanied by the sense of duty, is devoid of moral worth. An action done from love, if it is not done from duty, is worth no more than the most selfish

action. In fact, a consequence of such a line of argument would put all motives on the same level. And to seek to do so is to present a distorted view of moral life. Hume, I think, is right when he says that conflict of the passions for the government of the will is what describes moral life in a richer manner than does Kant, who, to my understanding, simplifies the moral life so much that, for him, it is a contest between one element which alone has worth and a multitude of others which have none. It appears satisfactory to view the moral life as a struggle between a multiplicity of desires having various degrees of worth.

It is possible to argue, on Hume's lines, that since the calm passions or desires are reason-like in their functions and influence on the will, it would be natural to expect that there should arise the desire to do one's duty. It may be that the desire to do one's duty is different in kind from all other motives. The closest Hume comes to such a notion of motive is when he says that non-performance of an action displeases us after a certain manner and we feel to lie under an obligation to perform it. Promising entails obligation and the obligation is willed in the sense that we bind ourselves by "our own consent". But it would be wrong to say that the desire to do one's duty alone has moral value, and none else has. If this argument is valid, then it may be further argued that because of the nature of affinity between desire to do one's duty and other desire or motives, the later as well can have moral value. Nor it would be the case that addition of any motive to one's sense of duty makes the motivation of an act less good; on the contrary it might improve

the motivation. Let us illustrate the case by examining an instance of a deliberate action.[1]

I was struck to find an anticipated account of Hume's notion of 'desire' in a treatise of ancient Indian psychology, namely the Yoga-Sutras of Patanjali. The work is assigned to the second century B.C., and the famous commentary on it by Vyasa to the fourth century A.D. Patanjali defines 'desire' (sukhānuśāyī rāgaḥ II.2) as that which dwells on pleasure. The pleasure may be either recollected or experienced, and desire ensues upon it. The will-to-live (abhiniveśa) is the paradigm of desire, and on this point there is an agreement between Patanjali and Hume, Kant and Schopenhauer. On the score of this philosophical consensus we can better understand why Spinoza defined desire as 'the very essence of man'. Vāchaspati Misra, another philosopher belonging to the school of Patanjali has made desire a necessary condition of pleasure, since he says there are certain pleasures, e.g., of satisfaction, which cannot be enjoyed in the absence of desire (See his Tattva Vaiśāradi on Patanjali's II.15.) Vāchaspati has argued also that pleasure is permeated by desire, for one cannot possibly say that one finds no satisfaction or happiness in a thing

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1. I have not mentioned the word 'want' in connexion with Hume's account of desire, because I believe 'desire' should be distinguished from 'want', though 'want' is a member of the family of desire-concepts together with 'inclination'. Much of the recent discussions on 'desire' glides into discussions on 'want'. Anscombe, Kenny and a host of others have written in a vein as if the logic of the behaviour of the word 'want' were identical with that of the word 'desire'. It may have been so owing to the pervading influence of Wittgenstein's concentration on the analysis of 'wanting'. However this is an issue which I do not wish to enter into in the present context.

and at the same time take pleasure in it. Further, it is held that pleasure leads to action, because desire generates volition so that one wills, 'let me do it', which is the verbal form of the volition, and this is also comprehended within desire. A volition with desire reaches upto the intended objects which can be expressed by words.

I have no intention of suggesting that Hume and Patanjali agree in every respect. There are very basic differences between them since they belong to two different philosophical traditions. They hold radically different concepts of freedom, of action and above all, of man. Action in the philosophical tradition of the West signifies some kind of intervention on the part of the agent, whereas in that of the East actions presuppose a hinterland of predispositions or *samskaras*, as they are technically called, which in their turn accrue new predispositions. I sought to mention Patanjali's instance in respect of Hume's account of desire, or for that matter, of the passions, only in order to drive home an important philosophical conviction, namely, that the image of man and the notion of his freedom play a crucial role in determining as well as shaping the nature and scope of such inquiries as moral psychology and moral philosophy, if not of philosophy at large. The proper study of mankind is Man.

"Human Nature is the only science of man" said Hume, and recalling the difficulties that beset such a science he remarked that "few can form exact systems of the passions" (*Treatise*, pp.273 and 332). To an examination of his theory of the passions I shall now proceed.

Hume's Theory of the Passions

Hume's Theory of the Passions

"Human Nature is the only science of man," said Hume. He described the *Treatise of Human Nature* as an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects, and hoped to lay the foundation of moral science. Towards the close of the first book he alludes to "those immense depths of philosophy which lie before me" (*Treatise*, p. 263). Hume has used the term 'moral philosophy' to mean the science of human nature and intended the study of man as an active being. He wished to discover the fundamental or elementary principles which operate in man's ethical life. He emphasized the role of the emotional aspect of human nature in man's moral life, and that is why he devoted the second book of the *Treatise* to a discussion of the passions. Hume's task in the second book of the *Treatise* was concerned with analysing the emotional aspect of human nature, considered as a source of action. The word 'passion' is used by Hume to include emotions and affects in general, without confining it to unregulated bursts of emotion. Let us now turn to Hume's theory of the passions.

The passions are "secondary perceptions" or we may say, they form a class of their own consisting of impressions of reflexion. Hume divides the contents of the mind into impressions and ideas, the two being mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. He distinguishes the impressions from the ideas in terms of the degree of vivacity or liveliness. The "ideas are less vivacious or less lively copies

of difference. In the first book of the *Treatise* Hume sought to show that the impressions of reflexion are "derived in a great measure from our ideas" (*ibid.*, p.7). But when Hume proceeds to show the manner in which impressions of reflexion arise "in a great measure" from ideas, he makes such statements which perhaps cannot be reconciled with the immediacy thesis I quote two such statements below :

(a) [The] "idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it." Another similar remark reads: "the impressions of reflexion are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation".

(b) "the impressions of reflexion, viz., passions, desires, and emotion,...*arise mostly from ideas*". This statement is committed to the mediated arousal of the impressions of reflexion (*ibid.*, p.8. Italics not in the text).

The ambiguity of the word 'immediately' prevails throughout the second book. After having called the passions 'secondary impressions', Hume goes on to say, "A passion is an original existence" in the sense that it "contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence". (*ibid.*, p. 415) But at another time Hume finds it convenient to compare the reflective impressions (passions, for that matter) with such secondary qualities like "colours, tastes, smells" etc.,(*ibid.*, p. 366). He tells us in the second book of the *Treatise*

that "all bodily pain and pleasures" are impressions of sensation, while "the passions and other emotions resembling them" are impressions of reflexions. If we take this categorization as authoritative, then we might say that impressions of reflexion can be said to proceed 'immediately' from impressions of sensation, in the sense that they have a necessary reference to, of course, through the idea of, the original sensory data. Or, to put the matter in other words, passions are the basic data of moral psychology. We may start with saying that on the one hand we have sensorily felt pains and pleasures, and on the other, the corresponding reflectively had passions. But the ideated character of the secondary impressions cannot, perhaps, be explained away, because Hume's fork of impressions and idea is so devised that nothing can occur as a mental event unless it is a psychic atom or has either an ideal or impressionistic character.

Another remark can be made before we pass on to Hume's classification of the passions. Hume uses the words 'passion' 'emotion' and 'affection' in such a way as to suggest an equivocation. If the word 'passion' is taken in the sense a feeling, then it cannot be an emotion. He does seem to take 'passion' as 'feeling'. For example, approval is a special kind of passion for Hume, and we find him saying "To approve of a character is to <u>feel</u> an original delight upon its appearance"(<u>ibid</u>.,p.296). Now psychologists would like to distinguish between a feeling and an emotion. They regard emotion as the feeling-tone of a 'motor-set' or a tendency towards

towards activity. If 'passion' be called an emotion, then all of Hume's passions are conative, but not merely affective. We shall see it later. The non-synonymity of 'feeling' and 'emotion' is often brought about by saying that feeling is the affective state considered in abstraction from cognition and conation. We need not go into the question whether feeling can ever exist without any tendency to action. But so far there can be mere feeling, there can be a state of mind which does not issue in external action of any kind. Emotion is said to be the 'moved' or 'stirred up' feeling associated with a tendency to act in a particular direction. The emotion of fear would illustrate the case. It remains somewhat uncertain throughout Hume's writing whether he regards 'passions' to signify the whole conative-affective state, or merely the stirred up feeling characteristics of a motor-act. A decision on this point is likely to affect Hume's theory of moral judgments, since if he is, as some do think, an emotionist, then attribution of goodness or badness to an experience of passions will be to commend or condemn either a passive affective state of mind or a tendency towards changing or maintaining a state of affairs. Or, this decision is related also with the view that Hume's moral valuations are 'promptive and not directive' (Reason and Conduct in Hume's Treatise, by R. Kydd, p. 170).

We may now come to Hume's classification of the passions. Hume makes two classifications of the passions, one in respect of their intensity or feeling-tone, the other in terms of their mode of origination. Of the first kind is the division called 'calm' and the

'violent' passions. Obviously, Hume is using the words 'calm' and 'violent' in a descriptive sense, without evaluating the passions in any way. As instances of calm passions he mentions "the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects" (op. cit., p. 276). Of the second kind, he mentions three pairs of passions, e.g., love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. The pairing is intentional and it will become evident from our later discussion. But Hume does not seem to be satisfied with this division, and he says that the "division is far from being exact". One reason of the inexactness of the division is clear. It is often the case that the so-called calm passions may acquire great emotional intensity. The cathartic function of aesthetic experience may be cited as a case. Listening to great music or witnessing a Greek tragedy being enacted is not a pacifying nor a passive encounter in the ordinary sense. Hume is well aware of this point, since he himself says, "The raptures of poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest height". But a few lines further, he seems to restrict the word 'passion' for violent reflective impressions as it were. Of impressions other than beauty etc., i.e., the violent ones, he says "properly called passions", and then declares that "in general the passions are more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity ..." (ibid., p. 276). In this passage, besides the restrictive use of the word 'passion' to violent reflective impressions, there is also the use of the word 'violent' as a differentia between passions and emotions in general. Our difficulty becomes no less when Hume uses the word 'emotion' for

a less active state of mind such as the contemplation of the aesthetic forms of objects. Shall we say, then, that 'calm' reflective impressions are passions improperly so-called because only the 'violent' ones are 'properly called passions'?

Hume looks back to the division of passions into calm and violent more than once in the second and the third books, and it must be admitted that the subsequent references to the division has only added to the ambiguity of the notion of calm passions. Sometimes it has been used to suggest reason or at least a reason-like disposition, at another time the notion has been so used as if to suggest an evaluating state of mind, disinterested and unbiased. We may give two examples of the varied use of the notion as put into by Hume:

> (a) "that reason which is able to oppose passion [is]...nothing but a general calm determination of our passions, founded on some distant view or reflexion". (ibid., p. 583)

> (b) "The uneasiness and satisfaction are not only inseparable from vice and virtue, but constitute their very nature and essence. To approve of a character is to feel an original delight upon its appearance". (ibid., p. 296)

Passages like these abound in the last two books of the Treatise, and have given rise to various interpretations. Hume himself writes that 'passion' be reserved for violent secondary impressions, while the term 'reason' for affections which operate calmly: "What we commonly understand by passion is a violent and sensible emotion of mind, when any good or evil is presented, or any object, which, by the original formation of our faculties, is fitted to excite an appetite. By reason we mean affections of the very same kind with the

former; but such as operate more calmly, and cause no disorder in the temper: Which tranquillity leads us into a mistake concerning them." (ibid., p.437) What is significant in this passage is that Hume calls the affections which 'cause no disorder in the temper' by the name reason, and that the distinguishing mark of the calm passions is intended to be their low emotional intensity or 'tranquillity'. Though in other contexts Hume would like to reserve the term 'reason' for demonstrative operations of the mind alone, yet here, in this case, we find him using the term 'reason' in a generalised sense of reflexion, though not admitting its identity with 'intellectual faculties'. Besides the varying degrees of emotional intensity that characterise the calm and violent passions, Hume has another way of differentiating them, i.e., in terms of their effects. He says that "the violent passions have a more powerful influence on the will" than the calm ones, which may, of course, control "the most furious movements" of the violent passions only if they are "corroborated by reflection, and seconded by resolution" (ibid., pp.437-8)

Hume never feels secure with his account of the dichotomy of passions. "What makes this whole affair more uncertain" he remarks, "is that a calm passion may easily be changed into a violent one", and vice versa, not only because of "the circumstances and situation of the object" of the passions and custom and imagination, but also due to the fact of their dependence on "principles too fine and minute". Considerations of like nature have led the commentators of

Hume to confess that the calm passions' doctrine is exceedingly difficult to understand and does not allow of any simple interpretation. It may be safely said that Hume says so many different things about the calm passions that one is likely to conclude either that he attributes several meanings to this term or that he thinks passions can be 'calm' in more ways than one. And yet more than one interpretations have been offered. We may note a few of them.

(i) R.Kydd in her book Reason and Conduct in Hume's Treatise holds that the term 'calm passion' is introduced by Hume in order to explain which we really mean by 'reasonable conduct'. The doctrine, she says, is an alternative to rationalism, and she interprets that a passion can be calm if it is "founded on a distant view or reflection".

(ii) Closely allied to Kydd's view is that of Mary Warnock. She puts forth her interpretation in one of her papers to the Aristotelian Society (PAS, 1957, 44). She thinks that a calm passion is a feeling inspired by the rational and detached consideration of some object, and in support of her interpretation she alludes to Hume's example of a calm passion, i.e., 'the sense of beauty and deformity in action'.

(iii) Kemp Smith characterises the calm passions as modes of approval and disapproval.

All the three views about Hume's notion of the calm passions are related. If we take Kemp Smith's view as the leading one, then

we might find it to be source of the two other views as well. Mary Warnock's view seems to be a variant of Kemp Smith's view; since to a certain extent aesthetic evaluations for Hume, are on a par with moral judgments. Both the kinds of approvals, moral and aesthetic, are disinterested and unbiased and are said to arise from reflexion. Only Kydd's view makes a further claim in characterizing calm passions as cognitive. P. S. Ardal has considered the calm passion doctrine extensively in his book Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise and criticized all the views mentioned above. We may now turn to Ardal's criticisms.

He has argued that Kydd makes two mistakes: in thinking (a) that a calm passion is always preferable to a violent one, and (b) that Hume's calm passion doctrine is "designed to replace the rationalist doctrine" and is "essentially based upon rationalist premises". As regards her first mistake Ardal points out that on occasions Hume has suggested that the mind should preserve its ardour, because security diminishes the passions. It is true that violent passions often lead to rash behaviour, yet if passions become "too calm" there might be no incentive to act left. So it is not true that a calm passions is always preferable to a violent one. Kydd thinks of the preference because a calm passion is dependent upon correct judgments, and to this Ardal points out that people may be misled even if they are not in the possession of a violent passion, e.g., by being given wrong information. Kydd has worked out her reasons for preferring a calm passion to a violent one as follows: passions are

calm in the sense that they are either conducive to or directed towards our greatest possible good. Ardal rightly thinks that this is a stipulation, because the word 'calm' in Hume's phrase 'calm passion' is not used evaluatively but descriptively.

Ardal is certainly right in pointing out, in connexion with Kydd's second mistake, that Hume, in fact, uses his distinction between calm and violent passions to explain the rationalists' mistake. The rationalists claimed that reason could be a motive to the will, whereas Hume tried to show that even a calm passion associated with a firm disposition might be a stronger motive. Objective reflexion on a situation arouses in us a passion involving little emotional disturbance directed toward the object of desire or interest. Whether a calm or a violent passion will determine our conduct depends entirely upon our situation and the habits we have developed. We have already noticed Hume's remark in this respect. When Hume says that in distinguishing the calm and the violent passions he was using a "vulgar and specious" methodological device, he makes it quite clear that he had the rationalists in his mind, and his premises could not be rationalist either. The rationalists are the philosophic respectability.

But one feels that Ardal's criticism of Kydd's first mistake, i.e., that a calm passion is preferable to a violent one, is a little uncharitable. The possibility of one's being given wrong information while experiencing a calm passion is quite justified as Ardal has pointed out, yet Kydd's view is not altogether baseless though mis-

conceived. Hume does not speak to the effect that to be determined by a calm passion is to be determined according to the greatest possible good as Hydd thinks it is, but Hume does distinguish between good and the greatest possible good. The view of the greatest possible good may give rise to calm passion, but not necessarily. According to Hume, whether one will come to have a calm or a violent passion in view of his greatest possible good will ultimately depend on "the general character or present disposition of the person". (ibid., p. 418) Hydd overlooks this point. Hume says further that "strength of mind, implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent" (ibid.) but the implication is not mutual, because "there is no man so constantly possessed of this virtue". Hydd may perhaps also have overlooked Hume's note that "The same good, when near will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one". (ibid., p. 419) Here we find no mention of any specific good which will be near or distant. There is no reason to suppose that the greatest possible good must always be at a distance in order that one may have a calm passion directed towards it. Hydd's preference thesis is an uncautious formulation in rationalistic terms. We do find Hume speaking of choosing between calm and violent passions but not as Hydd thought. We are told : " 'tis certain, that when we would govern a man, & push him to any action, 'twill commonly be better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passion, and rather take him by his inclination that what is vulgarly called his reason". (ibid., p. 419) Hume is virtually looking back to Locke, who held that, the greater good does not determine the will in the

absence of uneasiness. Kydd appears to take Hume say what Thomas Reid would have said that what is good for us, upon the whole is an end of which we can only form a conception by the use of reason.

Ardal demurs to Kemp Smith's mistake in thinking that Hume was referring exclusively to approval and disapproval. Though Ardal does not minimise the importance of calm passions in evaluation yet he emphasises that calmness is not the defining characteristic of approval or disapproval. It is true that for Hume to evaluate is to experience a certain calmness of passions, yet the converse is not true. For instance, when the object of passion is distant and unrelated to us, we may have a calm passion towards it, but it does not imply that we are evaluating the object, we may be morally indifferent to it as well. Evaluative passions, Ardal points out, are distinguished by their qualitative character, i.e., disinterestedness and a general reflective perspective. Though Hume classifies approval and disapproval as calm passions, it does not follow that if there is a calm passion, it is either a feeling of approval or of disapproval. It is also true though that we cannot perhaps think of moral evaluation except as experiencing a calm passion.

Ardal seems to have altogether missed Kemp Smith's view that Hume's theory of the passions is more concerned with supporting the thesis that the laws of association play a similar role in the mental world like that of gravity in the physical world. He proposes to highlight "the closeness of the connexion between Hume's theory

of the passions and his ethical teaching". Hence he pays more attention to "those particular passions which call for special consideration under the title of 'sentiments' — the moral and aesthetic sentiments, which determine our judgments of approval and disapproval, and to which there are no proper parallels in the animal sphere". (Philosophy of David Hume, pp. 159-160) If we keep in view the task Kemp Smith sets himself to do, then it would appear not to be mistaken to look upon the calm passions as those which are evaluative. On page 167 Kemp Smith draws our attention to the fact why is it that the calm passions as Hume says, are confounded with reason, "traced, like judgments and inference regarding matters of fact, to understanding or reason instead of to feeling"? Kemp Smith identifies the calm passions as those "which we experience on the mere contemplation of beauty and deformity in action and external forms", and describes as "modes of approval and disapproval" (ibid., p. 167). The identification is made with a view to showing the ethical relevance of a class of passions.

Ardal's own observations about Hume's distinction between calm and violent passions are worth considering. One important comment that Ardal makes is that the distinction is "analogous to the concept of 'force and vivacity' in impressions and certain ideas". The analogy is partly true because, besides differing in 'force and vivacity' ideas and impressions can be said to differ in another

way. It is not only a difference in degree but may also be one of kind as well. Ideas are mostly available for recollection, though we may not have impressions in this way. In a sense, impressions are given, and ideas are not, they are not self-sufficient, but owe their existence to the occurence of impressions. Again, while explaining the word 'idea' Hume speaks as though he would have 'thought' for an equivalent expression. He writes, "By ideas I mean the faint images of these (impressions) in thinking and reasoning;such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse..etc." (op.cit.,p.1) Can such a basic difference be discovered for the passions varying in the degree of emotional intensity alone? Hume's ideas and impressions are mutually exclusive, and this is not true about the passions, since a calm passion can become violent, and a violent one become calm. Such a possibility of transformation does not work for impressions and ideas. Ardal has been led to think that it does because he took the varying degree of emotional intensity as the decisive factor for the distinction between the calm and the violent passions. Impressions and ideas are related not only by their degrees of varying 'force and vivacity' but also by being original and its copy. Could we say that a calm passion is a copy of a violent one? And further, a calm passion can become violent, but an idea can never become an impression, at best we may have an impression of reflexion, and never one that of sensation.

The division between calm and violent passions, Ardal himself

admits, is not exact, but that between impressions and ideas is exact. He explains the sense in which the division is not exact: "Although, upon occasion, a calm passion can be violent, this does not entail that it belongs to the class of violent passions. A calm passion is thus a passion which on most occasions involves a low emotional intensity."(Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise, p.94). That a passion can be altered or acquire a greater or a lower emotional intensity without changing its identity. Now the statement is only apparently plausible. We may ask, is it true for all passions as such or for only a subclass of the passions? Can we think of the passion of approval altering into a violent passion? If it does, then it will certainly change its identity, because an evaluative passion is by definition calm, though any calm passion need not be necessarily evaluative.

Ardal suggests that 'calm passions' could be taken as a calm name, and the class would include more than the passions of approval and disapproval. But the consequences are not worked out by Ardal, and some of which might be contrary to his criticisms of both Kemp Smith and Hydd. For instance, if 'calm passions' is a class name, then it must be a class of such passions that "on most occasions involves low emotional intensity". Let us ignore the phrase "on most occasions". The class of passions involving low emotional intensity will have the class 'violent passions' as its complement. In that case no member of the class of calm passions can be a member of the class of violent passions, 'without changing its identity'.

We can think of a common membership between two classes only if they are non-identical classes. The passion of approval is a member of the class of calm passions, and as such it is not a member of the class of violent passions. Now the class of calm passions has other members besides evaluative passions. Ardal says that the non-evaluative members of the class of calm passions can 'on occasions' be members *ad hoc* of the class of violent passions without changing their identity. The notion of *ad hoc* membership is not enough clear. The class of chairs is a sub-class of the class of furniture, and it is not so 'on occasion', rather always. In formation dance, some members of one class can become *ad hoc* members of another class, but does not the new membership affect their identity? Can I think some of the trees of my garden as *ad hoc* members of the class of wild trees, even though I might have collected them from wilderness. The 'calm passions' as a class name is difficult to be worked out or formulated, yet what Ardal says about calm passions is that a passion which is usually calm, may on occasions be violent seems true only if we can afford to overlook his phrase 'without changing its identity'. *Ad hoc* membership and common membership are not identical notions. In the latter case the product class of the classes, say A and B, is a subclass of both the classes. Can we say that *ad hoc* membership presents a similar case? The product class formed by *ad hoc* membership can not be a subclass of both classes of calm passions and violent passions.

Hume says that the "mind has always a propensity to pass from

one passion to any other related to it; and this propensity is forwarded when the object of the one passion is related to that of the other". (op. cit., p. 399) If this be so, then in order that a calm passion can alter itself into a violent one only if the object of a calm passion be related to that of the violent passions. Ardal obviously overlooks this condition.

Hume has made another division of passions into direct and indirect. "By direct passions I understand such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure. By indirect such as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities' (ibid., p. 276) Some of the examples that Hume gives of direct and indirect passions are common to the examples of calm and violent passions. For example, the violent passions like love and hatred, pride and humility are classed under the indirect passions. But the violent passions such as joy and grief are said to be direct passions, together with desire, aversion, fear, despair and security. If the former distinction between calm and violent passions was based upon the degree of emotional intensity with which they 'strike upon the soul' or enter into consciousness, then the latter division of direct and indirect passions is made according to their mode of originating. So we can say that pride is a violent indirect passion or joy is a direct violent passion. It may be noted that Hume in the first section of the Book II of the Treatise does not give any example of any calm direct or calm indirect passion, though he treats the calm passion of beauty as an indirect passion in the later part of the book. Kemp Smith consi-

ders the evaluative passions, moral or aesthetic, as calm direct passions, while Ardal puts them under calm and indirect passion. It seems fair to treat the evaluative sentiments as a border-line case. An argument for their inclusion under the calm indirect passion may be formulated as follows: Hume's analysis of human nature is intended as the foundation of a study of the various kinds of judgments that we make and the various acts based on judgments. It is not concerned with original feelings, but with our reactions, i.e., the passions. In this sense, the passions are *secondary* impressions. The sensations are not indifferent, and are found either as painful or pleasant. This basic datum is the source of all our judgments, and acts. We approve of the pleasant sensations and disapprove of those that are painful. Secondary impressions or passions arise from these approvals or disapprovals. They constitute the basic human reaction to their situations. Some passions are aroused in us immediately by the original impressions, i.e., the direct passions, while others arise involving certain kinds of relations between the cause of the original impressions and our reactions. These are the indirect passions. When we evaluate ourselves or other persons, we have feelings, which imply a conscious mental state on our part and the person or persons or things having a certain set of attributes, and the owner of the feeling. This explanation shows what Hume could mean by his description of indirect feelings as proceeding from the same principles as the direct ones, 'but by conjunction of other qualities'. Passmore has observed that with the direct passions Hume did not much concern himself, but with constructing "the more compli-

cated indirect passions of the direct passions, with the aid of the associative principles" (Hume's Intentions, p. 124) Ardal takes exception to Passmore's use of the word 'construct', since it might suggest that Hume's indirect passions were complex physical entities. Hume himself remarks that no passion can be defined: " 'tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them (indirect passions like pride and humility), or indeed of any of the passions" (op. cit. p.277). In his words, the passions, whether direct or indirect, are 'simple impressions'. Kemp Smith comments that the indirect passions, "qua impressions, they are sui generis and unanalysable" (op. cit., p. 166). Ardal is then right in pointing out that Passmore's word conveys wrong suggestion. But Hume's discussion of the indirect passions is more elaborate than the direct ones, and we may presume that Passmore was led to use the word 'construct' keeping in view the fact that Hume found in his notion of the indirect passions an opportunity for testing the resources of the experimental method which he professes to follow. In particular, the indirect passion, we shall see later on, are specially susceptible to what Hume calls the 'double association of the impressions and ideas'.

Another issue may be considered for a while, i.e., the classification of the evaluative passions as direct or indirect passions. We have earlier noted that Kemp Smith puts them under calm direct passions, while Ardal classifies them as calm but indirect passions.

Now which of these classifications could be justified. Let us remember that Hume holds that direct passions "arise immediately from good and evil, from pain or pleasure" (op.cit., p. 276). And Kemp Smith explicitly remarks that the evaluative passions are experienced "on the mere contemplation of beauty and deformity in action etc.," (op. cit.,p.167). Now arising immediately from pain and pleasure and from mere contemplation of beauty and deformity in actions and forms can hardly be said to have similar import. Kemp Smith while arguing for the calmness of evaluative passions insisted on their contemplative nature: "as arising when [some abiding quality]... is viewed disinterestedly". On these terms approval or disapproval of the 'moral type' can not be direct, but indirect. Ardal's view that the evaluative passions are calm and indirect seems to fair better than Kemp Smiths'. But there remains another difficulty. An indirect passion is distinguished from a direct one by its necessary relation to the self. Neither pride nor humility could be explained without reference to the self of the proud or the humble person. And when evaluative passions are characteristically disinterested, how could they be said to be 'indirect' in the sense defined? Disinterestedness seems to be the crucial point involved. If a calm passion is disinterested, i.e., bears no reference to self of the person experiencing the passion, then it is direct. On the other hand, a passion can arise immediately from experienced pain or pleasure, or from a contemplation of things. If it does arise in the former manner it will be a direct passion; and if it arises in the latter way, then it is indirect. If conten-

plativeness or disinterestedness is compatible with the necessary reference to the self, then the evaluative passions are calm and indirect as Ardal has argued. If not, then Kemp Smith's view seems to be cogent. But Hume himself is not very helpful on this point, and one will have to offer interpretative explanations. Recent writers on Hume think that the calm/violent division and the direct/indirect division of passions are such that the former 'cuts straight across' the latter. This seems to be a plausible view, and is held in unison by both Ardal (p. 97) and Philip Mercer (in his Sympathy and Ethics, p.22). Though Ardal calls the calm/violent division "the fundamentum divisionis', Kemp Smith, on the other hand, favours another basic classification of passions, i.e., into the primary and the secondary ones. He says that the natural appetites which are 'sheerly instinctive' are primary passions. In their being instinctive they differ from all passions whatsoever. Then there are the secondary passions comprising the affections, emotions and sentiments. "The differentia distinguishing them from a [primary] passion like hunger is that the immediate occasion of their being experienced is some antecedent perception of pleasure of pain." (op. cit., p. 165). Under the secondary passions comes the direct/indirect division, with a calm and a violent variety each kind. But no classification fully works because of Hume's ambivalent attitude in testing the passions and not following his own divisions strictly. A passion like benovelence for example is classed with love of life, which is certainly instinctive. Mercer has remarked that Kemp Smith has lumped together passions of diverse nature, though Hume

himself is responsible for that sort of stipulations, and this fact has been taken note of by Ardal (p.10).

We may now turn to consider the nature of the indirect passions. Since the passions are simple and unalysable, only a description of them is possible to be given. By 'description' of the passions, Hume means "an enumeration of such circumstances, as attend them". He distinguishes between an object and a cause of the indirect passions. Both of these are 'conditioning' circumstances of indirect passions. Kemp Smith takes 'object' to signify "the relation in which the passions stand to the self", and Ardal thinks that the object of a passion is the "direction of thought or attention". Kemp Smith uses the phrase 'the view of the mind'.

In the case of the indirect passions like pride and humility. Hume says that the "object is self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness" (op.cit., p.277). Whether Hume here abdicates his controversial 'bundle of perceptions' or is incorporating some form of Cartesian notion of mental substance, we need not go into that question. Mercer has dealt with this issue. We may instead sample out a few ways in which Hume does speak about the object of the indirect passions. In experiencing an indirect passion the mind comprehends everthing "with a view to ourselves" (ibid.) and what "we call self" is a "connected succession of perceptions" (ibid.). The self is spoken of as an "individual person" (ibid., p.286), which is said to comprehend "the qualities of our mind and body" (ibid.p.303).

The "impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us, and ... our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that anything can in this particular go beyond it" (ibid., p.317). Again, "we are at all times intimately conscious of ourselves, our sentiments and passions" (ibid.,p.339). And the "idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us, and conveys a sensible degree of vivacity to the idea of any other object, to which we are related"(ibid.,p.354).

The domain of the indirect passions is interwoven with a system of emotional associations, of which the self is the most important factor. The self as the object of indirect passions has a specific role to play. It is evident from Hume's manner of speaking about the self that it is an important condition of all our self-regarding passions like pride and humility. Pride, for Hume is a self-regarding passion, which is characterised by "self-esteem or self-approval or self-value" as John Laird has put it (Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature, p. 194). Kemp Smith has explained Hume's notion of the 'object' of the indirect passions like pride and humility in the following way: "Either passion, on being aroused, at once turns our view to the idea of the self. Though neither pride nor humility, qua impression, contains the idea of the self, each none the less fixes the view of the mind upon it." (op.cit.,p. 179). It means the self cannot be regarded as a necessary condition of having the passions of pride or humility. Since neither pride nor humility, qua passion contain the idea of the self, it

is not analytic to say that to experience a passion like pride or humility is to entertain an idea of the self. This point has been elaborated by Ardal in the context of his view that Hume "misrepresents the relation between the indirect passions and their objects" (op. cit., p. 18). The contingent relation between pride and its object is such that one might be proud and yet not think of oneself (ibid.,p.23). But is this true? If, as Hume has more than once put it, the 'impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us', could we say, as Ardal argues, X is proud and the 'object' of his pride is not X himself, but Y? If Hume would allow the logical connexion between X's feeling proud and thinking of himself be overlooked, then even though we might grant that X,while feeling proud, is thinking of another person, Y (think of the statement "I am proud of you"), as the object of his pride, it will run counter to Hume's own statement in this context: " 'tis always self, which is the object of pride and humility; and whenever the passions look beyond, 'tis still with a view to ourselves, nor can any person or object otherwise have any influence upon us." (op.cit.,p.280) Both Kemp Smith and Ardal quote this passage in order to bring out the contingent relation between the self as object of passion and the passion itself. It is true that Hume speaks of the relation as 'natural', but both of them have overlooked Hume's use of the words 'always' and 'original' in the passage they quote. Later on in the paragraph following the passage Hume distinguishes 'original' from 'natural' and speaks of inseparability of the self as the object of the passions as their "distinguishing characteristic". This confusion

could not have arisen if it could be recalled that an indirect passion was marked off as arising when previously experienced pleasure and pain were accompanied by certain ideas involving some kind of reference to a self (see Kemp Smith, p.165). And pride is an indirect passion. Hence it would follow that pride has the self as its object. It has been held that the relation between the passion of pride and the self as its object is contingent. This view is an instantiation of the more general opinion that, for Hume, the relation between the passions and their objects is contingent. The view is widely held and has almost passed into a dogma, and is related to a logical thesis which entertains no other dimensions of language than that of entailment and contradiction, and no use of language than the statement-making one. Without entering into the logical debate, we can ask whether deductive relationships are the only ones that we should consider. Again, should we not consider the nature of the world or the circumstances we care to name. Could we not significantly suggest that by virtue of the nature of the passions one's feeling pride necessarily implies one's having one's self as the object of the passion. Pride is a self-sentiment, and one can not be said to be *proud* unless one's direction of thought is addressed to one's self. Pride may also be a character trait, and in that case the proud man need not be conscious of his self all the time, but from this fact it does not perhaps follow that the proud man has no self-esteem. It appears difficult to conceive a situation such that there is a man who is proud and who does not have his self as the object of his passion. Such locutions as

"I am proud of you" are possible and legitimate. The possibility of such expressions depends on the fact that the speaker shares some of pride worthy qualities of the other person. That is to say, the qualities of the other person and the person himself stand in a unique relationship to the speaker. A father may be proud of his son or a teacher of his pupil and not without reasons. If there are proud mothers who pride in their babies, it is because the babies make it possible for such mothers to enjoy the state of motherhood, which is valued for various reasons, and hence desired. In short, in the domain of the passions Hume intends his propositions to have the contents of factual truths, and to be guranteed in the context of human nature, since he wants to be able to use his propositions as truths about man or human nature with a factual content.

Two points may briefly be noted in connexion with Ardal's interpretation of Hume's view of pride as an indirect passion. (a) He takes pride as 'a form of self-valuing', and points out that in this sense it has an object. But, he remarks that "the object is not something separate from the pride". This point is not explicit in Hume. Ardal further distinguishes between the object of a passion and the object of a desire. "Desires are aimed at bringing something about, a change in, or the continuation of, a certain state of affairs" (op. cit.,p.19). On the other hand, the object of pride or love is always some person, either oneself or another, it is something real, "not something to be realized" or brought about. (b) He makes another important distinction between being

proud and feeling proud. Ardal thinks that Hume's causal account of the indirect passion of pride is concerned with the latter. One may be proud by having pride as his character trait, and in that case he may not experience a certain sort of feeling. It is not unreasonable to suggest, Ardal says, that "a proud man's pride is in general more conspicuous to others than it is to the person himself" (op. cit., p.20). According to him being proud is not equivalent to feeling proud or feeling an impression of pride.

Now this distinction has or may have its own merits, but what is not clear about it whether the judgment 'X is proud' is to be taken an introspective assertion or as a perceptual statement. It seems to me that, so far Hume is concerned, the judgment 'X is proud' can never have any self-validating force, at best an inductive inference at a par with such locutions like 'the peacock is proud' which is based upon noticing a set of conventional 'marks' of pride. Our chief source of knowing judgments like 'X is proud' is only through the mechanism of sympathy, since we do not enjoy any privileged access to anybody's feelings. Granted the privacy of experience as a basic empiricist premise, it remains only to say that the degree of corrigibility of one's own feeling-reports is certainly lesser, because, to have Hume's words once again, "our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person". In that case, Ardal's doubt that a "man is not at all the best judge himself as to whether he is a proud man" (op. cit., p.22) seems to be much beside the point. Ardal himself admits that there may be an element

of self-valuing even in the case of pride as a character trait. Though on the basis of Hume's account of pride it is certainly possible to distinguish, as Ardal does, between being proud and feeling proud, yet, so far Hume's preoccupation is concerned, they are equivalent. At best, we can say that when we experience an emotion through an imaginative or sympathetic assumption of the expression and situation of another person we need not and commonly do not experience it as we would if the situation were unequivocally our own. In the Lysis Plato distinguishes between the ignorance which is both present in and predicable of a man and that which though it is present in him is not predicable of him. Emotion is subject to a similar distinction: the emotion or passion that I feel as another person's may be present in me without being predicable of me. It is present in me, when I say 'X is proud', because I do not merely recognise that X is displaying certain signs or expressing pride, but actually feel the passion; yet the passion I feel is not predicable of me, i.e., it would be false to say that I am proud or even, unqualifiedly, that I feel proud. In the case of the statement 'X is proud', the passion is there for me in X.

We have thus far followed Hume saying that the 'object' of indirect passions like pride and humility is the self. But the self in itself does not generate these passions. The passion of pride or humility in ourselves is excited only when something not ourselves "turns our view" to ourselves. The stimulus to pride or humility must lie in some distinctive 'quality' of the 'cause' that excites these passions. Let us see why the self, the 'object' of the

passions of pride and humility cannot be their 'cause' as well. We have already pointed out that Hume makes a logical point in saying that the thought of self and the passions of pride and humility are 'naturally' connected. Hume's word 'natural' must be taken in a stronger sense than contingent since it is inconceivable in the context of human nature to feel proud <u>and</u> not have a thought of one's self. The word 'natural' in Hume's writings means "an ultimate characteristic of our human nature" (Kemp Smith, <u>op.cit.</u>,p.183). Hence, for Hume's purposes, to say that the thought of self and the feeling of pride are 'naturally' connected would be equivalent to asserting a unique implication between the passion and its 'object'. Or, we might say that the self as the object of the passions of pride and humility is the necessary condition of the passions. Now, the necessary condition is not also the sufficient condition. Hume says, "But tho' that connected succession of perceptions, which we call <u>self</u>, be always the object of these two (pride and humility) passions, 'tis impossible it can be their cause, or be sufficient alone to excite them. For as these passions are directly contrary, and have the same object in common; were their object also their cause, it cou'd never produce any degree of the one, but at the same time it must excite an equal degree of the other; which opposition and contrariety must destroy both." (<u>op.cit.</u>, p.277-8). Hume argues that if the self were the cause of both pride and humility, then we could not distinguish between the passions. Since the passions in question are not similar in nature, the self cannot be the cause of either. This consideration leads him to make a valid point: "We

must, therefore, make a distinction betwixt the cause and the object of these passions; betwixt that idea, which excites them, and that to which they direct their view, when excited...The first idea, that is presented to the mind, is that of the cause or productive principle. This excites the passion, connected with it; and that passion, when excited, turns our view to another idea, which is that of self. Here then is a passion plac'd betwixt two ideas, of which the one produces it, and the other is produced by it. The first idea, therefore, represents the cause, and the second the object of the passions." (Ibid., p.278) In short, the passions of pride and humility have an identity of 'object', i.e., the self, but a diversity of their causes, for nothing can excite both the passions of pride and humility, nor can they have their 'sufficient cause' what is common to both. Hence a distinction between the cause and the object of the indirect passions of pride and humility is legitimately called for.

Now granted the distinction between the 'cause' and the 'object' of the passions of pride and humility, Hume further subdivides the cause into the 'quality' and the 'subject' of passions. The 'subject' is the locus of the 'quality' which operates in generating the passion. When, for example, we say that X is proud of **y**, here **y** constitutes the subject part of the 'cause' of X's feeling of pride. The domain of **y** is constituted by a "vast variety" of things, the qualities of mind and body and "whatever objects are in the least ally'd or related to" X. We might further say, P. In this case a fuller expression of 'X is proud' would be equivalent to

asserting 'X is proud of Py'. For Hume, whenever X is proud of y, there is always an y such that it is P. Hume's own example would make the point clearer. "A man, for instance, is vain of a buitiful house, which belongs to him, or which he has himself built and contriv'd. Here the object of the passion is himself, and the cause is the beautiful house; which cause again is sub-divided into two parts, viz. the quality, which operates upon the passion, and the subject, in which the quality inheres. The quality is the beauty, and the subject is the house, consider'd as his property or contrivance. Both these parts are essential ..." (ibid., p.279) Kemp Smith has rightly said that the 'subject' of an indirect passion is 'complexly conceived'.

The quality 'P' exists in a something y, the subject, which stands related to the self. The relation between Py and X may be two fold. Kemp Smith says "either as in some manner constituting it or as causally related to it as a possession or dependent" (op. cit., p. 181). If Py is constitutive of X's, pride then y would stand for X's dispositions or bodily endowments; and if y is causally related to X, the y would stand for "whatever is in the least allied or related" to X. But the overall picture seems to be of the second sort, i.e., casual explanation of the phenomenon of pride and humility. Kemp Smith has distinguished two ways in which the self enters into the passions of pride and humility: "(1) as integral to the 'subject' which excites, i.e., produces, the passion; and (2) as being the 'object' to which the passion, when excited, at once leads the mind." (ibid.) In the first case the self in a factor

in the complex 'subject'. The second case is easy to understand, and we can dispose of it without any comment. As regards the first case, i.e., wherein the self is 'integral' 'factor' in the 'subject' of passion, one may doubt whether the relation between Py and the self-reference[1] of pride would be identical with that of in the second case. Where the self is a factor in the 'subject' of passion, the relation between the 'subject' and the 'object' would be closer than that in which it is not, and consequently the nature of the causal relation in the two cases will have to be diverse. Hume seems to overlook this point and assort all sorts of instances under one heading.

Ardal has raised the point of justifying one's pride. For example, if X is challenged as to whether he had anything to be proud of in a X could justify his pride with more congency only if he were personally responsible for the quality P in y, i.e., if Py were constituted by X's self. A man could be proud of his academic attainments. But if Py were a beautiful house which X had inherited, it may be doubted whether X could be as proud of it as he could be if it were of his own making. Hume mentions the case of one's return to health as a cause of one's pride. We can think of a person so addicated to drugs that he became ill, and could return to health

1. The self is the 'object' of pride. When X says 'I am proud', X is self-conscious and self-consciousness is a reflexive relation, just as much self-love is, such that for both pride and self-love a formula like '(x)Rxx' is true. I do not suggest that for Hume self-love is reflexive, but, for Hobbes, it could be so. That of course, is another issue. '(x)Rxx' is especially true in the case of pride as self-exteem. In the cases of such locutions as 'I am proud of you', the formulation of the relation between the object and the subject of the passion may be rendered by distinguishing between total reflexivity and reflexivity.

only by dint of his will power in overcoming his addiction. In this case the example is alright. But with an ordinary patient when he comes to health as a result of good medical treatment, it is the doctor who could be proud rather than the patient, who could of course be joyful. Ardal makes two comments which confuses the issue which he very rightly raises. He remarks, on the one hand, that "the challenge 'You have nothing to be proud of' cannot be met unless there is something special in the relation between the cause of pride and its object", and on the other, he says that such a special relation "should be <u>thought</u> to exist" (op. cit., pp. 29-30, emphasis added). Now 'thought' by whom? The man who puts up the challenge or the person who is proud? If it is the thought of the person who feels proud, then the demand for a 'justification' makes no sense, because his mere thinking of there being a special relation would suffice. If it is the other person who challenges the proud man, then of course the question becomes relevant. Whether a man is justified in feeling proud could be ascertained by invoking the principle of sympathy. And if pride is said to be a kind of self-valuation, then the evaluation could also be tested by assuming a general point of view. My mere <u>thinking</u> that there is a special relation between myself and the 'cause' of my pride would scarce justify my feelings. I can say whether I could have been in some sense responsible for the realization of what is taken by me to be the 'cause' for my pride. A plagiarist might show off 'marks' of pride, yet he cannot be proud, because he can take no credit for the cause of his pride.

It must not be assumed that the cause '<u>Py</u>' of itself alone would give rise to passion. The 'cause' would arouse a passion in X only if it is either agreeable or disagreeable to him. This point follows from Hume's description of indirect passions. X could experience a passion only if the quality P is capable of producing pain or pleasure, and y is related to x. "I observe, that by <u>pride</u> I understand that agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or poorer makes us satisfy'd with ourselves: And by <u>humility</u> I mean the opposite impression." (<u>op.cit.</u>, p. 297) Another more terse statement runs as follows: "Any thing, that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride, which is also agreeable, and has self for its object." (<u>ibid.</u>, p.283) In the case of humility "the relation to self continues the same" only "the sensation, arising from the causes" is reversed, i.e., the causes of humility produce disagreeable sensations. The passions of pride and humility, thus explained go to yield a "general system" to which Hume provides as many as five 'limitations'. Some of the limitations we have already taken note of, viz. the cause of a passion must be an independent source of pleasure or pain and it must stand in a special relation to the self. We might now turn to a consideration of what Hume calls the "double association of impressions and ideas."

Hume's 'general system' of indirect passions depends on the associative mechanism of man's emotional life. The passions of pride and humility are "determined to have self for their <u>object</u>,

not only by a natural but also by an original property." (ibid., p. 280) The words 'natural' and 'original' are significant notions so far as Hume's theory of passions is concerned. By 'natural' he seems to mean the constancy and steadiness of the determination of the passions, and by 'original' that it is primary in the sense that it cannot be further resolved into other elements. This explanation stands in need of being modified when we come to the causes of passions. The causes of pride and humility are natural in the sense that the same sorts of objects tend to give rise to the passions. The earlier explanation fits in here. But when we turn to the other property, i.e., 'natural', a modification seems necessary. Material possessions and physical qualities tend to give rise to pride and vanity, though these cannot be said to be 'original' in the same sense as indicated in the case of the 'object' of passions. Firstly, there is a vast number of causes, from psycho-physical dispositions to the effects of art and industry. Hume says that " 'tis absurd, therefore, to imagine, that each of these was foreseen and provided for by nature" to become causes of pride and humility. Again, "we find upon examination, that they are not original, and that 'tis utterly impossible they shou'd each of them be adapted to these passions by a particular provision, and primary constitution of nature." (ibid., p. 281) Although, it might be said, it is from natural principles that a great variety of causes excites pride and humility, it is not true that each different cause is adapted to its passion by a different principle. Only an "unskilful naturalist" (the phrase is Hume's) would say that. Hence, the problem

is to discover among the various causes a common element on which their influence depends. Instead of admitting "a monstrous heap of principles" in moral philosophy Hume seeks to reduce the number of the principles. He compares this task to a Copernican revolution in morals.

Any statement of Hume's theory of the association of ideas is beset with difficultues. The materials of experience, i.e., impressions and ideas, are 'clear and distinct' (at least in the Enquiry, section 48) and fall within the domain of matters of fact. Any relation between them cannot be analytically true, since their atomic status precludes any such possibility. According to Hume only mathematical ideas can be analytically related in the technical sense of the word 'relation'. Hume himself has distinguished two kinds of relations: philosophical and natural. The philosophical relations are usually said to be relations holding between mathematical ideas. And this is the kind of relation that I propose to say is a relation in the technical sense, e.g., any true statement of the form Rab . To say that a is like or unlike b is to assert a philosophical relation between a and b. Obviously this conception of relation does not concern us here. The second sort of relation is of the kind which Hume calls 'natural' relations, and causal relation is a paradigm case of such relations. A natural relation between x and y would mean that x and y are 'related', 'connected' or even 'associated'. Hume's equivocation of 'relation' and 'association' is worthnoting in this context. In fact he speaks of the "double relation of ideas and impressions"(ibid.,p. 286; and

he also uses the word 'connected' in the *Treatise* p.285 in the same context). Natural relations are based on the three properties of resemblance, continguity and cause and effect. One might legitimately expect that Hume's theory of association of impressions and ideas would be a casual one, or at least Hume gives us an account of man's passionate life in casual terms.

The fact that impressions (both primary and secondary ones) and ideas get associated is a characteristic of human nature, and this has "a mighty influence on every operation both of the understanding and passions" (*ibid.*, p.283). Now having granted that "there is an attraction or association among impressions, as well as among ideas," Hume notes a "remarkable difference" in the manner in which impressions are associated from that of the ideas: "ideas are associated by resemblance, continguity, and causation; and impressions only by resemblance" (*ibid.*, p.283). By 'impressions' here would be meant impressions of reflexion or indirect passions. Let us now see how does Hume account for the genesis of pride and humility by making an appeal to the association of impressions and ideas. He would extend the applicability of the mechanism of association to two other indirect passions, viz., love and hatred as well.[1]

Given an indirect passion, say pride, we have two sets of properties, i.e., I(a) properties of the passion, namely, the self or the person having or experiencing the passion, its 'object', and (b) the sensation of passion, which is either painful or pleasant. In

1. "What I discover to be true in some instances, I *suppose* to be so in all." (*Treatise*, p. 285).

the other hand, "the two supposed properties of the causes": II (a) "their relation to self, (b) their tendency to produce a pain or pleasure, independent of the passion" (ibid., p. 286). Hume goes on to explain the mechanism thus: "That cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of passion: From this double relation of ideas and impressions, the passion is deriv'd. The one idea is easily converted into its correlative; and the one impression into that, which resembles and corresponds to it." (ibid., pp.286-7)

The relation is said to be 'double' in the sense that we have two sets of ideas and two sets of impressions. The two sets of impressions are the impression of sensation, i.e., the pleasant or painful sensation and "the sensation of passion" which is an impression of reflexion. The two impressions resemble each other, and are therefore related. On the other hand, we have the 'idea of ourselves' and the idea of the causal subject with its qualities, which is related to the self. Thus we have two associations, one that of the ideas, and the other, that of the impressions. This 'double impulse', as Hume calls it, gives rise to an indirect passion. Neither of these associations is sufficient to give rise to passions, and hence the necessity of the 'double relation'.

In short, Hume's intention has been that of explaining the

complex emotional life of mankind with the aid of as few principles as possible. In treating of the indirect passions and of the transition from one passion to another he makes use of the double relation of impressions and ideas. In fact, he does two things: one, he speaks of indirect passions as arising from the 'double impulse', and secondly, he explains the transition from one such passion to another as the effect of the concurrent operation of associated ideas and impressions. But it may be doubted whether he consistently adheres to the principle of association. For instance, he says, "Grief and disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again, till the whole circle be completed. In like manner our temper, when elevated with joy, naturally throws itself into love, generosity, pity, courage, pride, and the other resembling affections." (ibid., p.283) Doesn't this explanation make a single association of resembling passions do the work of transition, which on Hume's theory requires a double association of impressions and ideas? Again, the alleged association of ideas becomes suspect, since Hume compares ideas to "the extension and solidity of matter" and says, "Ideas never admit of a total union, but are endowed with a kind of impenetrability, by which they exclude each other.." (ibid., p.366) And for that reason how could there be any association between sorrow, disappointment and anger, since 'impenetrable' ideas are involved. There is a general epistemological thesis which underlies Hume's discussion of the passions. This is the thesis that all the passions are simple impressions. A simple impression is one that cannot be analysed into parts. If it is not

implied that a simple impression can only be inspected, or in other words, all that we can do is to point to it and name it; in that case it is possible to observe similarities between simple impressions. This similarity of impressions is essential for the principle of association which Hume uses. What is after all meant by holding that an impression is simple? Why should Hume make simplicity of an impression compatible with its being similar to something else, since the notion of being similar conceptually excludes the notion of being simple? If X is similar to Y, in that case X can not be simple, for X must consist of what is similar Y, and what is different from Y, otherwise it would be identical with Y. From the claim that simples resemble each other in being simple it follows that there are no simples. Hence the epistemological basis for the similarity of simple impressions essential for the principle of association appears untenable. But the argument is not altogether decisive. It could be argued contrarily, whether in saying 'X is similar to Y' Hume would mean to say anything _about_ X. Because the ideas or the impressions are simple, can there be anything over and above what they intrinsically are? Given two simple ideas X and Y, to say that X and Y are resembling, is not to say anything about X and Y anymore than saying that X is X and Y is Y, since the ideas are self-sufficient, and, resemblance is not a name of predicate or connexion of any sort, distinguishable from the ideas themselves. Association is also a relation, and a natural relation. In that case, it might not be unfair to suggest, X and Y are connected in the _imagination_, there is between them a _natural_ relation, or it is

natural to the mind. When love and benevolence are associated by similarity of sensation of the passions the relation derives its credibility from the linguistic usage that governs the meaning of the terms. I do not propose to settle the disputed issue of Hume's theory of relations, and would rather leave it pointing out some of the difficulties involved in the epistemological basis presupposed in Hume's theory of passions. According to Hume the individuality of the passions is determined by the ideas, i.e., their 'objects'. There appears no reason to suppose why the ideas which are less vivid copies of impressions should fare better than their originals in so far as associative dispositions are concerned. That the ideas are not "entirely loose and unconnected" is a fact of experience only. The vulnerability of Hume's epistemological position is due to his assumption that it is possible to analyse items of awareness in consciousness into elements derived exclusively from sense experience. We need not examine Hume's epistemological theses in detail here.

Another disquieting feature of Hume's principles of association is that he seems to drop the element of the separate sensations of pleasure and pain by redefining the passions of pride and humility. On p. 286 of the Treatise he makes two statements that are hard to reconcile. We have already found him making a distinction between "two supposed properties of the causes [of passions], viz. their relation to self, and their tendency to produce a pain or pleasure, independent of the passion."[7] This factor of "pain or pleasure, in-

dependent of the passion" is part of the cause of a passion, and identical with the passion itself. On the same page, a little above the passage quoted Hume makes a categorical statement, i.e., "pride is a pleasant sensation, and humility a painful". Pride is a feeling or we are told that it is an impression of reflexion, and no sensation could be admitted to this category. If pride and humility are sensations in the ordinary sense of the words, the whole division of the primary and secondary passions become redundant. One might feel uneasy because Hume insists on the identity of pride and humility with pleasant and painful sensations in such terms as to make the sensations not only the necessary but also the sufficient condition of the said passions: "upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in reality no pride nor humility".(ibid.) We might suggest levels in the language of our talking about emotions, corresponding to the emotive entities talked about. The language of sensation may be regarded as belonging to the first-order level, while that of the feelings (Hume's *indirect* passions) to second-order level. Granted that such language strata is admitted it may now be remarked that Hume's redefining the indirect passions of pride and humility in terms of sensations confounds the two levels besides upsetting the causal scheme of the passions which he had so elaborately worked out.

Now do the sensations by which Hume defines pride and humility (I am aware of the fact that according to Hume's conditions indirect passions are indefinable psychic elements in our emotive life. I am

speaking about the extension of the notions of pride and humility) differ from what he calls 'sensation of passion'? I should like to withhold my answer for a little while. Ardal has undertaken to clarify the meaning of the phrase 'sensation of a passion'. He explains the terminology as follows: "When, ... two emotions are said to have a similar sensation, this indicates that, independently of knowledge of the circumstances, a person who has experienced both could detect a similarity - a medicine can taste like a certain fruit" (*op. cit.*,p.39). Ardal's interpretation is based upon the entailment between the fact that passions are simple impressions and the fact that to experience a passion is to have a special sensation. There is no *apriori* reason for rejecting Ardal's view, though it must be admitted he does not clarify the notion to make it sufficiently perspicacious. The 'special sensation' that one might have while experiencing an *indirect* passion must be of a different sort from that of the 'primary' passion, as Kemp Smith puts it. The sensation of passion is an emergent experience, while a sensation which which is just painful or pleasant, unless one cares to qualify the expression as Hume does not, would belong to the 'cause' of the passion experienced. The 'sensation of passion' is relative to the 'object' of the passion, and cannot be a part of the complexly conceived 'cause' with its 'subject' and 'qualities'. Pride and humility can be said to be sensations only if by 'sensation' we here mean the 'sensation of passion' and not that which makes us aware of things either agreeably or disagreeably in the case of experiencing 'primary' passions of Kemp Smith's classification.

Kemp Smith admits the two different types of sensations while commenting upon the mechanism of association. He writes, "The 'subject', which excites the passion, is related, <u>causally</u>, to the 'object' (i.e. the self) to which the passion <u>qua</u> passion turns the view of the mind; and the sensation of pleasure or pain which the 'subject' separately produces is related <u>by way of resemblance</u> to the sensation of the passion."(<u>op.cit.</u>,p.185-6) Now, besides the question of the two sensations, the passage contains an important point regarding the causal association between the 'subject' and the 'object' of the indirect passion. Ardal has taken up this point and has made some remarks worth considering. The relation between the self and the 'subject' of pride is a 'natural' one as Hume would have had it. The 'natural' relation could only be noticed but not explained, because it only so happens that there is an association between the idea of the self and the idea of the 'subject', which here would mean anything that has the quality of being the cause of the passion. Now, apart from the difficulty in conceiving an association of ideas, which are 'impenetrable' as Hume himself has admitted, there seems to be the difficulty, which Ardal emphasises, of expressing a logical relation in causal terms.[1] We have already

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1. It can also be suggested that generally Hume's explanation of pride and humility in terms of association is presented as a hypothesis. And so is his claim for the ego-centric and hedonistic basis of other passions. See <u>Treatise</u>, pp.289-90,324,325,328. The word 'hypothesis' in these contexts is not used pejoratively as synonymous with 'conjectures'; for example, as p.xxii of <u>Treatise</u> or in the first <u>Inquiry</u> on page 145. Rather, he uses the term as a synonym for 'principle' or 'general principle' or 'doctrine', and a group of them with 'system'. Hence such uses of the terms have a potential verifiability. I have in mind Hume's set of 'Experiments' to confirm his system of the passions. While considering what emotions will be felt by a man who is shown a close friend or a relative in either a flattering or an unflattering light, Hume

Continued.....

considered that it is analytic to say that 'X is proud' entails that 'X is self-conscious', and it would be then self-contradictory to assert that 'X is proud' and the 'object' of his pride is some other person than himself. This is a strong sense of the 'natural' relation between the self and the passion of pride. But could we not think of some weaker senses of the relation? By a 'weaker' relation between the self and the passion of pride I mean some remote or indirect reference to the self of the proud person being involved. For example, when a father says to his son 'I am proud of you', it is this image of his son that draws his attention more than the idea that he is proud of his son. Again I would like to point to cases where we do sometimes are taken away by indirectly related 'subjects' and their 'qualities' and feel proud or humiliated, even if neither of these emotional states could be justified or we are not in any way responsible for the 'subject' of pride or humility in existence. In all such cases the 'natural' relation between pride and humility and their 'object' would seem to hold and appear to be in order.

Ardal seems to doubt whether resemblance is potent enough for the association of impressions. Hume holds that all resembling impressions are connected together, and no sooner one arises than the rest immediately follow. Now 'follow' here is not a logical word, because impressions (of reflexion) are 'matters of fact' and no

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(Continuation of footnote 1 from previous page)

proposes to consult experience in order to verify his hypothesis that either pride or humility should result. These considerations are ~~of course~~ of primarily methodological interest, and we need not enter into the detail of the issues involved.

so-called logical or 'philosophical' relation[1] can hold between them. We can at best *notice* the associated impressions. Impressions follow one another in our experience and we can only reflectively notice it, though, Ardal points out, "*noticing* a resemblance is no part of the operation of the association" (*op.cit.*, p. 25). But since the act of noticing does not associate the impressions, so it is one thing to compare reflectively the resembling impressions, and it is quite another thing that the resembling impressions are associated as a matter of fact. The association does not depend upon a prior reflective comparison. The impressions, given the quality of resemblance, 'follow' independently of our noticing the fact that they resemble one another. Hence Ardal remarks, "Hume is...in real difficulty, for if the association of impressions operates by resemblance only, it becomes hard to explain why any of a number of resembling impressions should be aroused in a given case." (*op.cit.*,p.26)

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1. Hume appears to be in two minds as regards his distinction between 'philosophical' and 'natural' relations. All knowledge on Hume's view, as on Locke's, is knowledge of relations, and '*proportions in quantity or number*' (*Treatise*, p.70) are the objects of mathematical knowledge. These belong to the class of relations which cannot change while the *relata* remain constant, in contrast to spatial relations, which may alter without any change in the objects or ideas related. The sharp distinction between mathematical knowledge and empirical knowledge is satisfactory to the logical analyst. But doesn't Hume prefer to restrict the term 'relation' to what he entitles 'natural'? His justification for the restriction is by an appeal to ordinary usage. That he should ever have wished to limit the term 'relation' to 'natural' relation is explained also by his interchangeable use of 'relation' with 'association', 'connexion' and his speaking of custom or habit as "producing a relation". He describes a "perfect" relation as being one in which each of the two associated objects carries the mind to the other. See *Treatise*, p.355.

In the case of the passion of pride the resembling impressions are the sensation of pleasure which the 'quality' of the 'subject' produces in us and the pleasant sensation (of passion) of pride itself. Ardal seems to take the association of impressions in isolation from the association of ideas, and it may very well be surmised that the reason "why any of a number of resembling impressions should be aroused in a given case" is to be sought in the association of ideas. For we find Hume putting it in clear terms that "'tis observable of these two kinds of association, that they very much assist and forward each other, and that the transition is more easily made where they both concur in the same object." (op.cit., p.283-4) Hume appeals to the principles of association only in order to give a genetic account of indirect passions in general, and pride and humility in particular, together with love and hatred. Of the double relation of impressions and ideas, he seems to, at least some times, give more importance to the association of ideas than that of the impressions. We might juxtapose two of his statements and find the relative value of the two principles of associations. First, let us have the statement concerning the association of impressions: "...the relation of resemblance operates upon the mind in the same manner as contiguity and causation, in conveying us from one idea to another, yet 'tis seldom a foundation either of pride or of humility" (ibid.,p.304). And secondly the statement about the value of the association of ideas: "The relation...of contiguity, or that of causation betwixt the cause and object of pride and humility, is alone requisite to give rise to the passions.."(ibid.,p.305) The value of the asso-

ciation of impressions seems to lie for Hume in "forwarding the transition betwixt some related impressions", i.e., from the impression of reflexion to the sensation (since every passion is an impression) of passion. Much depends on what Hume means by 'resemblance' and 'relation'. By 'relation' he means "nothing but a propensity to pass from one idea to another" (ibid.,p.309) and his equivocation of 'association' and 'relation' is a terminological characteristic. In Book I of the Treatise Hume mentions two senses of the word 'relation', "a quality by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination" or "that particular circumstance, in which, even upon the arbitrary union of two ideas in the fancy, we may think proper to compare them" (ibid.,p.13). In the case of the association of impressions by the relation of resemblance, Ardal's question is answered by the second alternative mentioned by Hume. Resemblance for Hume is "a principle of union" which is assumed in the cases of association, but it does not guarantee that the things associated are really resembling, and that is why Hume calls this relation "the most fertile source of error" (ibid.,p.61) Now if grief gives rise to anger, or anger to envy, we cannot ask why Anger' or 'envy' alone 'follow' in Hume's sense of the term, and any other impression, because there is something inherent in the impression of grief by way of a disposition (Hume's term is 'propensity') to give rise to anger, or anger to envy. Hume seems to have been perfectly aware of this difficulty mentioned by Ardal, for we find Hume qualifying his 'system' of associative mechanism by 'limitations', particularly of 'custom' and 'general rules'. The dispositional interpretation of

the association of impressions may be given a textual support. Hume seems to be quite clear and emphatic on this issue. He writes, "that we may understand the full force of this double relation, we must consider, that 'tis not the present sensation alone or momentary pain or pleasure, which determines the character of any passion, but the whole bent or tendency of it from the beginning to the end. One impression may be related to another, not only when their sensations are resembling,....but also when their impulses or directions are similar and correspondent."(ibid., pp.381-2) So Ardal's question might be answered as follows: In the case of the impressions (i.e. passions) changeableness is essential to our human nature (see Treatise, p.283) and when it changes, it does so from any one passion to which most resembles it. Why at all this should happen cannot be asked because Hume's analysis is empirical, and any trans-empirical pretension would be a philosophical perversity. The validity of his analysis can well be verified by 'consulting experience' as Hume puts it. From his own position, Hume would say in connexion with Ardal's question that "nature has bestow'd a kind of attraction on certain impressions...by which one of them, upon its appearance, naturally introduces its correlative." (ibid.,p.289) The arguments hang on the word 'naturally', and it is such an important word that its implications cannot be profaned by relegating it to the domain of the contingent.

But one could always doubt whether Hume is a consistent associationist. Two reasons go to support this doubt. First, Hume seems to disbelieve the efficacy of the principles of association

and proliferates a number of limitations and the 'supplementary agency' of sympathy. Secondly, his advocacy of association comes to be confined to mixed passions. On this issue he seems to even contradict himself. On pages 381-2 of the Treatise he exempts pride and humility from the rule of the double relation of impressions and ideas since "these are pure sensations without any direction or tendency to action", and hence "the full force of this double relation" cannot be realized in their case. Is this inconsistency of a formal or a real nature? What does he mean by the term 'pure'? Does he mean by it 'simple'? If such be the case, then all indirect passions are simple, and it makes no sense to say that only pride and humility are 'pure sensations'. If, on the contrary, Hume is proposing to redefine his notion of indirect passions in terms of conative dispositions as he does seem to suggest by his phrase "tendency to action", then his original intention of giving a causal account of the rise of indirect passions irrespective of their 'pure' or mixed nature, comes to be abandoned. All emotions are not equally conative, but this fact does not seem to affect the explanation as to how do they arise. And Hume unfortunately, perhaps unaware of it, comes to hold some such view. It has been suggested by John Laird that in fact Hume distinguished three types of association; besides those of impressions and ideas, Laird mentions association of dispositions. The third type of association, he hoped, might explain the disquieting feature of the passions with or without "a tendency to action". But it is far from the case. Laird took notice of another kind of

association which Hume calls a 'real' relation and gives it the name of the "principle of a parallel direction" of desires. Kemp Smith calls it "the principle of concurrent direction" (op.cit.,p.184). Laird's association of dispositions (Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature, p.201) does not really remove the difficulty mentioned above. It only goes to show that Hume did not believe his "double relation of impressions and ideas" sufficient to explain the transition of emotions, and his idea of a Copernican revolution remained unfulfilled.

But could we not find another line of defence that Hume might offer for the various limitations and types of associations that he said he needed? He might say that by careful examination he could show how extremely difficult it was to define and categorize precisely the internal phenomena of passions. Analysis, however subtle and ingenuous, remains still too coarse to grasp the delicate shades and far too inadequate to assimilate the rich and varied manifestations of our emotional life. The task of the psychologist is much more difficult than that of the natural scientist. A proof of this can be given as follows. Hume begins with saying that pride is a sensation of pleasure produced by the idea of something agreeable associated with our own self. But he soon finds it too wide a conception and puts various limitations, e.g., that pride is an indirect, combined and generally constant sensation of pleasure produced by the idea of something unusual; something frequently determined to be valuable by the opinion of our fellow begins, and consciously associated with the individual itself. Yet the words 'often' and

'generally' point to a failure in determining by scientific method (Hume calls 'experimental') the richly varied conception of pride. And the same argument would apply to no less complex phenomena of humility, love, and hatred. Whether or not their defence be granted, it may not be inconsistent with Hume's avowed intention for producing a 'statics and dynamics' of our mental life, though it remains veritably questionable whether this was his avowed intention. Hume suffers from a tension between professing his ability to give a naturalistic, mechanistic account of the human constitution and the Hutchesonian notion that our emotional life is divinely prearranged. Kemp Smith is right in his remark that in Hume the Hutchesonian and Newtonian influences are in conflict with one another.

We may now turn to consider certain general characteristics of Hume's theory of the passions.

Hume did not seek to derive or explain all passions through emotions. The 'direct' passions are not the products of the associationist mechanism. Hunger, lust, benevolence towards friends and resentment towards enemies are of such type and are considered by him to arise from "a natural impulse or instinct which is perfectly unaccountable". But the passion of benevolence is a test case. As an instinctive 'direct' passion, benevolence seems to be a passive passion. Is it quite that? For we do find Hume having benevolence among 'indirect' passions as well, though it is no longer passive. Hume's distinction between "pure emotions" or "pure sensations" and those passions that are attended with a "direction or tendency

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to action" makes him readjust his previous classification. Many of the direct passions reappear as non-pure, i.e., conative indirect emotions. In a sense, Hume is justified in his move, since he must have realised that besides the natural association of impressions and ideas, there is the association of dispositions, and this must have led him to formulate the principle of association of passions in order to account for the "transition of passions". A transition of passions is effected by the conjoined operation of the double associations of impressions and ideas. After a passion has been given rise to by the so-called "double relation of impressions and ideas" the passion, if it is conative, would glide into another passion of allied nature. Hume speaks of the "character" of passions. A passion stands related in two directions; one, causally with its 'subject' and 'quality' and 'object', and secondly, with other passions of resembling character. Hume writes, "One impression may be related to another not only when their sensations are resembling, ...but also when their impulses or directions are similar and correspondent".(Op.cit.,p.381) The word "impression" here obviously stands for passions. Hume finds "this peculiar relation of impressions only in such affections, as are attended with a certain appetite or desire; such as those of love and hatred." (ibid.,p.382) So we might say that the dispositional association of passions holds, in addition to those of impressions and ideas, only in the case of indirect passions, but "with a certain appetite". This association of passions on the basis of disposition or "character" of passions is an after--thought, and does not seem to belong to the original scheme of

theory of passions. There is a tension in Hume regarding a dispositional account of the passions. On the one hand, he avows that the passions are simple impressions, and on the other he resorts to a dispositional account of specific passions such as love and hatred. The self-referring passions like pride and humility are non-dispositional inasmuch as they are 'closed' states of mind. Since pride and humility presuppose man's social point of view in respect of the standards of worthiness prevalent in society, it could very well be doubted whether pride and humility are so 'closed' as Hume depicts them to be. It is possible for a man to be proud as a character--trait. In that case he may not be aware of it. But in the case feeling proud, it is natural to expect the proud man to display such behaviour patterns as we are accustomed to associable with the passion. Hume's thesis of simplicity of the passions has more often vitiated his intention of giving a dispositional account of the passions. Yet the various shifts he makes in his position lays it bare that underneath the so-called atomism ~~there~~ lies another design. There is the suggestion in Hume's writings that pride is a virtue, and if it be so, how could it be that intransitive an emotion? It is a question worth asking, how a virtue could remain unfulfilled in virtuous behaviour.

In view of the above considerations Hume's use of the word 'association' may be evaluated, together with his insistence on regarding indirect passions as simple impressions. John Laird distinguished between two senses of Hume's use of the word association: "[i] the clustering of unmodified entities, and [ii] a fusion where

the constituents lost their former identities and became indistinguishable in the new total fact." (op. cit., p.201) Laird thinks it "misleading to call such different processes by the same name". The association of ideas may be taken to illustrate the former case, since, ideas, as Hume tells us, are "impenetrable". Impressions, on the contrary, are "susceptible of an entire union" and "may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself". (op.cit.,p.366) This case may be taken to instantiate Laird's second kind of association. Now, one might legitimately ask that if association of impressions are "susceptible of an entire union" then how could one insist on the simplicity of the passions. Some passions are indeed simple, viz. those without any "direction", i.e., the non-conative ones, like pride and humility. But what about those with "direction"? Conative passions are born out of association of resembling impressions and could, in fairness to Hume's own admission, be said to be complex and compound. Much of the force of the view that passions are simple impressions, derives from the fact that Hume treats passions in such a manner as though they could be picked up from among various mental states (he says that the passions are "internal" impressions, and hence they could be taken as phenomena associated with introspection or "reflexion", rather than perception) and identified in isolation from others. Much of it is true of pride and humility, since they are self-referring or intransitive or closed mental states; or we might even say that they bear a relation of reflexivity to the person who experiences them. But there are passions that are not "completed within themselves, nor rest in that emotion

which they produce, but carry the mind to something further".(ibid., p.367) Love and hatred are such passions which are non-reflexive and hence, transitive. Perhaps, it is in this very sense Hume speaks of an "end" of the passions of love and hatred, besides their "object" and "cause", and says that "all which views, mixing together, make only one passion". (ibid.,p.367) It might be argued that conceptually the passions of love and hatred do not entail their respective ends — "not absolutely essential" as Hume says — yet it is only a counter-factual assertion. It may be noted in this connexion that to the passions of love and hate there corresponds explicit performative formulas, e.g., 'I love you' or 'I hate you'. In some cases the second person pronoun may be replaced by third person ones. If the formulas are not vacuous (or 'unhappy' as J.L. Austin would have it), they must be designed towards loving or hateful behaviour. Don't we in some manner commit ourselves by such speech-acts as saying 'I love you' and the like to treating the person addressed in a particular way? And if this case be granted the emotions of love and hatred could equally be looked upon as setting us in specific and appropriate dispositions. Similarly, the hearer would, in all propriety, have the gurantee of my intention from my utterances. The fact that lends force to the notion of complex or compound passions is "that benevolence and anger are passions different from love and hatred, and only conjoined with them, by the original constitution of the mind" (ibid.,p.368). And so far Hume is concerned there is no greater court of appeal than that.

There is again the difficulty about the 'object' of pride. The self as the 'object' of the passion of pride is spoken of sometimes as an 'idea' and sometimes as an 'impression'.[1] Does Hume use the words interchangeably? Perhaps Hume cannot so use the terms since 'impressions' and 'ideas' are for him, mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of the constituents of our mental life. Whatever sense the word 'self' may stand for, it is at least clear that it is a non-Cartesian conception and does not allow, as Laird puts it, "the introspective visibility of any ... inner mental zone". (op.cit.,p.190) Passmore is a little too much worried over Hume's use of the concept of the Self in the context of passions. It is difficult to understand why Passmore would say that "Hume is certainly not entitled ... to talk of an 'idea of ourselves'". (op.cit., p.126, emphasis added) I think, Mercer has rightly pointed out that Hume's scepticism is directed against the "the self as a unique, unchanging impression" within ourselves and not at the ordinary, everyday belief in personal identity we all share. (op.cit., p.30) And it is the everyday belief in personal identity which Hume speaks of as the object of indirect passions. But the difficulty is not so much in Hume's concept of the self, in its relation with the passion of pride. About this relation Hume speaks in an inconsistent language. For example, he says that pride "actuates us" (op.cit.,p.277), "produces" the idea of the self (ibid.,p.287). In one case the self is the effect, and in the other, it is the 'object' of the passion. To be an effect and to be the 'object' of pride are not an identical

1. See Treatise, pp.364 and 317. Hume has such phrases as "idea of ourselves" or "impression of ourselves."

state of affair, for the case of the self as the 'object' of pride the relation involved is a logically stronger one than the case of its being an effect.

Another difficulty concerns the relation of the passion of pride and its causes. Though Hume makes it clear that "everything related to us, which produces pleasure or pain, produces likewise pride or humility" provided the relation required is a "close one" (<u>ibid</u>.,p.291), this limitation seems to be waived when he comes to speak about general rules. Hume's example of the influence of general rules upon pride and humility turns out to imply that a man may feel proud of something which might bear no special relation to himself. This is an "enlargement" of Hume's original account of pride. It is significant that Hume speaks of two objects of pride; besides the self, there is "the cause or that object which produces pleasure" (<u>ibid</u>.,p.292). What is productive of pleasure is variable, and presupposes socio-cultural coordinates. The second object of pride, i.e., that which produces pleasure should have some relation to self. Since the self grows in a society, the notions of esteem and worthiness are derived from the social context and in this regard the general rules or "custom and practice" as Hume says, come to play contributory role for the production of pride and humility. What one ought to be proud of, that is, the standard of pride-worthiness is normally something which is public and commonly accepted. Pride is a social passion, and hence, open to the influence of general rules or custom prevalent in society. It may be that the

states of mind elude tidy classification, yet, no passion could be considered apart from the circumstances in which they arise. Human nature being what it is, no passion could be complete within itself. P.L.Gardiner takes Hume's interpretation of passions as "mere impressions...describable without reference to the objects towards which they are directed and in distinction from any of the forms of outward expression in which they typically manifest themselves" ('Hume's Theory of Passions' in David Hume, A Symposium ed. D.F. Pears, p. 39). Gardiner has generalised the point beyond warrant, and his generalisation gives a one-sided and somewhat distorted view of Hume's over-all position in his theory of passions. Hume might be said to have held an intentional theory of passions, and Gardiner seems to overlook this important point.

Let us consider Gardiner's view. He says "Hume in effect follows Descartes in sharply dividing the mind from the body; the relation between inwardly felt passions and emotions and their manifestations in overt behaviour is a purely contingent one, discovered by experience." (ibid., p.41) Now, two points can be made about this judgment. First, it is difficult to say with any amount of certainty whether Hume did sharply divide the mind from the body, at least in the Book II of the Treatise. For he often speaks of bodily states as belonging to the Self. Speaking about the subjects of the passion of pride, he says that the indirect passions of pride and humility are not confined to the mind, "but extend their view to the body likewise" (op.cit.,p.279). "A man could be proud of his beauty", as well as of every "valuable quality of the mind".

Hume's concept of a person is not that of a disembodied conscious existence like the Cartesian cogito. When Hume says that the passions cannot "look beyond self or that individual person"(ibid., p.286) he includes body also within the concept of the self and speaks of the mind and the body conjointly as we do in our everyday experience. The intimate presence of the "impression of ourselves" is the liveliest one that we could have, and it is so because it is concerned with, as in the case of pride and humility, "our thoughts, actions and sensations".(ibid.,p.329) If the Humean self were a disembodied ego, then, it would not have been intelligible to speak about "actions and sensations" of an "identical person". Secondly, about the so-called contingent relation between passions and "their manifestations in overt behaviour" Gardiner's statement needs to be qualified. Except for pride and humility, Hume does not speak about the non-conative nature of passions. As "pure emotion" pride and humility are complete within themselves, "without any direction or tendency to action". But we must bear in our mind that even about pride Hume speaks of "evident marks". "The very port and gait of a swan, or turkey or peacock show the high idea he has entertain'd of himself, and his contempt of all others" and he holds that this phenomenon is not confined to "merely human passions, but extend themselves over the whole animal creation".(ibid.,p.326) Though Hume says that a non-transitive relation holds between the affective and the conative states of mind, this is merely conceptual, and not natural. What matters for him is the natural transition of states of mind of one sort to another. The "original constitution of the

mind" is for him a greater authority than the logical relations. And lastly, the non-intentional nature of emotions as Gardiner ascribes to Hume's theory is also unfounded, because the impropriety of the concept of self-love as Hume has cared to show does not support Gardiner's view. "Self-love", says Hume, cannot be talked of "in a proper sense", since "Our love and hatred are always directed to some sensible being external to us".(ibid.,p.329) Not only this is so in the case of the passions of love and hatred, but also it is a general point that Hume intends to make that "Our self, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing: For which reason we must turn our view to external objects..." (ibid., p.340) Even in the case of pride, which he conceives as a form of self-valuation, he quite explicitly says that the sensation of such passions must not only be "closely related" but also be "peculiar to ourselves, or at least common to us with a few persons". (ibid.,p.291) Elsewhere, he says, "not only to ourselves but to others also".(ibid.,p.292) All these are sufficient to show that Hume did not propound a solipsistic theory of passions as Gardiner's over-generalisation makes it seem to be.

Gardiner is not the only scholar in recent years, to have drawn our attention to the point that 'in his theory of the passions Hume retained many of the assumptions that underlie Descartes' own book on the subject, Les Passions de l'ame. Mercer also has dwelt upon the Cartesian inheritance of Hume. But the matter, in view of its ambiguous nature, cannot be taken at its face value and calls forth a little detailed examination, which neither of the two have

actually done. Ardal simply has noted that Hume's theory of passions is not Cartesian, his explanation is "psychological and not physical or physiological." It has become fashionable in recent years, amongst writers on philosophical psychology, to say that Hume's theory of the passions is Cartesian. Besides Gardiner, Ardal and Mercer, G. Anscombe and Anthony Kenny also have held that Hume did hold a Cartesian notion of the passions and have expressed their views in one context or another. But most of these writers seem to have confused two issues. It is one thing to say that Hume retains many of the assumptions that underlie Descartes' *The Passions of the Soul*[1], and it is quite another thing to assert that Hume's theory is Cartesian. I do not waive the first statement, though by no means feel inclined to endorse it, but certainly am sceptical about the truth of the second.

Descartes' *The Passions of the Soul* is argued *en physicien* and has very scanty material for a theory of ethics. Properly speaking, *The Passions of the Soul* is not a treatise on moral psychology, far less a work on ethics, with of course the exception of the concluding part. The main bulk of *The Passions of the Soul* is concerned with that sort of physiological discussion, which Hume begged to be excused of in the beginning of the second book of his *Treatise*. On the contrary, what Hume calls "the sciences of anatomy and natural philosophy" (*ibid.*, p.276) form the corpus of Descartes' *The Passions of the Soul*. A brief outline of Descartes' views on the passions may be given before we argue why a Cartesian

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1. Translated by Lowell Bair in Essential Works of Descartes, Bantam Books, 1966, New York and London.

reading of Hume's theory of the passions would be illegitimate or misconceived. Let us begin with Descartes' notion of passion.

In Article 1 Descartes says that "everyone feels the passions within himself and therefore has no need to borrow observations from elsewhere in order to discover their nature" and goes on to observe that "whatever takes place or happens anew is generally called by philosophers a passion with regard to the subject to which it happens, and an action with regard to what causes it to happen". This passage is by no means clear and needs a little explanation. Descartes is ambivalent in allowing reciprocal action of mind and body and in denying it. But nonetheless, he seems to affirm some form of correspondence between the mental and the corporeal "occasion" when changes occur in the one and in the other. Since Descartes remarks in Articles 2, 3 and 4, "we cannot conceive of the body as thinking in any way" and "everything that is in us, and which we cannot in any way consider as capable of appertaining to a body, must be attributed to our soul"; hence "in order to understand the passions of the soul we must distinguish its functions from those of the body". In Article 17, he takes up the distinction between passions, volitions and actions. He writes, "there remains nothing in us that we must attribute to our soul except our thoughts, which are of two kinds: those which are the actions of the soul, and those which are its passions. I name all our volitions its actions, because we experience them as coming directly from our soul and seeming to depend on it alone; on the

other hand, we can generally give the name of passions to all the different forms of perception or awareness that are in us, because often it is not our soul which makes them what they are, and because it always receives them from the things they represent".
Actions of the soul are thoughts, and mental occurrences ensuing on bodily changes are passions of the self and actions of its body. If the occurrence be a movement, it is one of some body, otherwise it must belong to the self. Volitions or desires are actions of the soul inasmuch as they derive and proceed from the soul. In a volitional situation, the self is active only if the object of desire is due solely ot itself, and passive if it belongs to its body or to something external to it or both. In Article 18, Descartes mentions "will to love God" as a volitional action of the self since it is of that sort "which terminate in the soul itself". Mathematical truths may be of this kind as well, because in such cases we "apply our thought to some non-material object". The self is passive when, for example, we desire health, it is an action which terminates in our body. Perceptions are also another kind of action of the self, they differ from volitions as implying the awareness of the presence of the sensible. In Articles 23,24 and 25, Descartes discusses the perceptions which we refer to external objects, to our body and to our soul. When we hear the sound of a bell, or feel the cold of our hand or feel elated in joy — (all the examples are Descartes') all these are perceptions, but of different kinds according to the references made. In all these cases the self is passive. The passive states of the self's

history like sensations, unclear perceptions and emotions go, for Descartes, to constitute the domain of the passions of the soul. And in Article 27, he defines the passions of the soul "as those perceptions, sensations or emotions of the soul which we refer specifically to it, and which are caused, maintained and fortified by some movement of the animal spirits." Clearly, this 'definition' is a psycho-physical one. Passions are, for Descartes, unclear or confused perceptions, and for this reason alone, they are indefinable. They can be objects of indirect knowledge[1], or known only descriptively. The Cartesian notion of the passions of the soul are then the confused, unanalysable epiphenomena of certain analysable physical changes collaterally occurrent in the experients' body. It is a statement of a thorough physiological psychology.

Another task that Descartes sets himself to in The Passions of the Soul is of eliciting the irreducible kinds of emotion discoverable on introspection in terms of their functional characters. According to Descartes there are only six kinds of emotion (in a wider denotation the Cartesian passions include feelings, emotions, and in some cases, volitions) that are really primitive and irreducible, namely, the states of unmixed wonder, love, hatred, joy, sadness and desire. Seldom do we experience emotions in their purity but usually a secondary and complex one. They are derivative in being either a species of some primary emotion, for example, esteem

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1. I am not sure whether the word 'knowledge' is appropriate in this context. But Kemp Smith has sanctioned the usage in his New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes.

(Article 149) or a combination of one primary emotion with some other just as pity (Article 185) is. Pride (Article 157) is a kind of self-valuation for Descartes, but it differs from magnanimity (an Aristotelean echo indeed, see his Nichomachean Ethics Bk.IV.2) in being "without any reason". (Hume's notion of pride "well-regulated" and "well-founded" as distinguished from what he calls "over-weening conceit". See Treatise, pages 598 and 600) Besides the irreducibly primitive and derivative passions, Descartes recognises innumerable possible combinations of passions or mixed emotions, which can be descriptively indicated without being given a name.

Now despite Descartes' physiological reductionist theory of passions, emotional life involves an intellectual factor. All passions relate to our body and in fact occur only because our mind is so intimately united with it. Article 30 states: "the soul is truly joined to the entire body". And yet the relation between the external data of passions and the person who experiences it exists in and through the person's valuation of the object. Love and hatred are passions which involve an intellectual as well as an affective state. Love and hate are felt only if a judgment of good and evil has been passed on the object perceived: "when something is presented to us as being good with regard to us, that is, as being beneficial to us, this makes us have love for it, and when it is represented as bad or harmful, this arouses hatred in us." (Article 56) There is on one side a dependence on the body, a passivity of the soul, and on the other, a valuation, a belief affectively qualified one that something is really good or bad for

it by the self. This is the active factor. Descartes' definition of joy (article 91) makes the physiological and the intellectual aspect of the passions clearer: "Joy is an agreeable emotion of the soul in which consists the enjoyment it has of the good which the impressions of the brain represent to it as being its own... it is in this emotion that the enjoyment of the good consists, for the soul receives no other fruit from all the goods it possesses." This "intellectual" joy constitutes the hedonic quality of the objects experienced in passions. According to the Cartesian hypothesis it is of course possible to feel joy or sadness without fixing on any particular thing as its object, and it would only mean that, in that case, the intellectual act of evaluation is not performed, that is to say, the self is passive in its experience. For instance, our gaiety when we are in good health is an agreeable feeling of the self following upon some proper functioning of the organism, though by no means due to any operation of our intellect. But those feelings that may be called the passions of the soul have both the physiological actions and their corresponding pleasant or unpleasant kinaesthetic sensations on the one hand, and the self's assertive attitude of evaluation on the other. Descartes is quite emphatic on the intellectual factor involved in the experience of the passions of the soul, and this emphasis is highlighted when he speaks of definite judgments concerning good and evil, in accordance with which the self resolves "to conduct the actions of its life"(Article 48) as he says that "those who are most agitated by their passions (at the physiological and the corresponding kinaesthetic levels)

are not those who know them best" (Article 28). To 'know' a passion is to have 'clear cognitions' or as he says pensee claire, --- an active state of the soul, otherwise a passion is "to be counted among the perceptions made confused (pensee confuse) and obscure by the close alliance between the soul and the body." He cares them "sensations" (Article 28). It may be worthnoting that an idea of a passion is an idea of something obscure. But it is not the case that the idea of an obscure thing is itself obscure. In this sense there can be a "clear" idea of a passion, though not "distinct", i.e., what it is an idea of.

Descartes speaks of a natural order among emotions; one emotion tends to introduce another, but he does not offer any explicit principle for their evocation and connexion. All that he says is the following: "the principle effect of all the passions in man is to incite and dispose the soul to will the things for which they are preparing the body" (Article 40), and this statement may be taken to imply that the primary emotions, generally speaking, are founded on their objects' helpfulness or otherwise to our body. A desire for conserving or realising some state of affairs will be 'good' if it is really beneficial, and 'bad' if it is erroneously so judged. Hence the importance of the knowledge of truth for conduct. In Article 74, we read that "the usefulness of all the passions consists in their strengthening and prolonging in the soul thoughts which are good for it to conserve, and which might otherwise be effaced from it". For example, love, he says, is a passion "which incites it to will to join itself to objects which appear to be

beneficial to it" (Article 79).

What is significant in Descartes' theory of the passions is his almost unambiguous assertion about his rejection of the Platonic division of the soul into its rational and concuous parts, all the same it evinces a very disquieting feeling about body. One can almost feel a tension in Descartes' thought. Though he says that "there is in us but one soul, and that soul has no diversity of parts: it is both concuous and rational, and all its appetites are volitions", and yet almost in the same breath he argues that it is to the functions of the body "alone we must attribute every thing that can be observed in us as repugnant to our reason"(Article 47). Do we not have in the passage an anticipation of Kant's celebrated dichotomy of the ethical self as the rational will and the anthropological self of inclinations? It is risky to hazard any opinion in that matter, but this much is certain that Descartes believes that no conflict of passions is irresolvable[1], since "there is no soul so weak that it cannot, if well directed, acquire absolute power over its passions" (Article 50). Descartes emerges as a firm believer in the freedom of the will, which consists in the self's (in its active, rational dimension) capacity to assent to or reject the incitation of the passions. The Cartesian self is free almost in the Kantian sense of the term, i.e., as a noumenal cause it can set in motion a new series of causes. Descartes speaks of the moral sovereignty of the self, or its self-determination

1. Is it not the same in Kant? The realm of inclination is so alien to our rational nature that it becomes pretty difficult to envisage the possibility of any war between the two, and the ought implies can.

(Article 152). The will, he says, 'is by nature so free that it can never be constrained' (Article 41) except by 'the control we have over our volitions' (Article 152), and 'it makes us like God to some extent'. How far is Kant's 'holy will' from this? The whole motive of Descartes' The Passions of the Soul has been oriented towards the self and its freedom. It is a metaphysics of morals, a concern which Descartes would happily share with Kant.

The foregoing, an almost turncated account of Descartes' theory of passions would now give us a better perspective, for, judging whether and how far Hume's theory of passions may be said to have a Cartesian intention and methodology. However tempting the resemblance might seem to be between Descartes' and Hume's theories of the passions, we must be clear about a set of very basic differences between them. Hume does not have any explicit concern for "natural and physical causes" of the passions or those "impressions, which without any introduction make their appearance in the soul"(op.cit., p.275). Hume's is a psychological concern, far less physiological. Even where he proposes to give a causal account of the passions, his primary interest lies in the indirect ones. The concept of the indirect passions in Hume's theory is something unique, and may not, without overlooking the obvious differences, be put on a par with the Cartesian account of the passions of the soul. No less peculiar is Hume's notion of the self, which is employed in the everyday sense of the term. The Humean self is not defined as the subject of predicates that are inapplicable to the body, (in the terminology of the Meditations the distinction between mind and body is "absolute".

The mind and the body are "reciprocally different"), as it is in the case of the Cartesian self. The former is ideational, while the latter is essentially cognitive. Descartes speaks about a functional difference between the self and the body. He says in Article 2 that "there is no better way of gaining knowledge of the passions than by examining the differences between the soul and the body, in order to know to which of the two we must attribute each one of the functions that are in us". If we turn to Hume, we come across an altogether different picture. Hume's notion of the self is not only a succession of related ideas and impressions, but also used indifferently with the body. He does not deny that some passions may originate in the body, but he would have a physiological reduction of all passions to the body. Hume writes, "Bodily pains and pleasures are the source of many passions, both when felt and consider'd by the mind; but arise originally in the soul, or in the body, whichever you please to call it, without any preceeding thought or perception". (ibid., p.276, emphasis added[1]) It is strange that despite such explicit statements Gardiner could say that Hume in effect followed Descartes in sharply dividing the mind from the body.

It is doubtful whether Gardiner presents Descartes' case with fairness when he remarks, "we cannot be mistaken in our judgements" about our passions and they "refer to nothing beyond themselves". Now, the first remark seems a little hasty, because we have already

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1. See Treatise, p. 303. Hume uses "the self" for both "mind and body".

seen that Descartes makes the actions of the soul, the assertive attitude of evaluation so important in his theory. His very definition that passions are confused perceptions makes room for possible mistakes about our 'knowledge' of the passions. We have earlier quoted Descartes saying that "those who are most agitated by their passions are not those who know them best". It is true that Descartes holds that we have an immediate awareness of our passions, that "everyone feels the passions within himself", and yet in Article 2 he does not leave it ambiguous that a passion of the soul may be mistaken for an action of the body or vice versa; and hence a knowledge of the passions by examining the differences between the soul and the body is invoked. The discovery and identification of the passions for Descartes is a matter not only of introspective psychology but also of "clear cognition" as well. As we have already remarked that if our 'knowledge' of the passions consist in having 'clear' ideas, namely the idea that I have a passion. My having a 'clear' idea does in no way guarantee the distinctness of the idea. The content of the idea may very well remain obscure. In that case, Gardiner might argue that, for Descartes, it is possible to mistake one passion for another. Gardiner of course, does not take into account the fact that our idea of a passion may be clear yet not distinct. The paradox with Descartes' theory of the passions is that to have a "distinct" idea of a passion is not to experience the agitation of passion any longer. And the second remark of Gardiner's that the Cartesian passions are opaque or non-representative is difficult to be endorsed. Descartes

classifies passions as they are referred to the external objects, to our body and to our soul. Even with regard to the last mentioned class of passions he does not explicitly say that they are completely non-representative. Let us consider the Article 25, which is especially relevant to Gardiner's remarks. Descartes distinguishes between a "general" and restricted meaning of the word "passion". In the restricted sense of the term, the word "passion" means "the passions of the soul", i.e., "only those which are related to the soul itself". What does this phrase really imply? It implies that in experiencing such feelings as joy, anger, etc., we are more concerned with the effects of the feelings, and "to which we are usually unable to assign any proximate cause". The said inability does not imply the non-representative character of the passions themselves. For Descartes himself remarks that the feelings of joy, anger, etc., "are sometimes aroused in us by objects that move our nerves, and sometimes also by other causes". Since no passion is sui generis, it cannot ever be non-representative in Gardiner's sense of the term. Not only does he misjudge Hume, but also misrepresents Descartes.

Further Descartes is ambivalent in his dualism. Sometimes he defines the mind in exclusion of the other and vice versa, so that mind and body are mutually exclusive by definition, but there are ambivalent passages in The Passions of the Soul that make us hesitant in taking a definite stand. For example, speaking about the correspondence of emotions and their behavioural occurrents Descartes says, in Article 1, "the action and the passion are always one

and the same", though "the agent and the recipient are often quite different", or in Article 51 that the passions are "solely" caused "by the temperament of the body". It is not untrue to say that Descartes could never made up his mind with regard to the mind-body problem. In a letter to Princess Elizabeth he speaks of three kinds of primitive notions: the notion of mind, the notion of body, and the notion of mind and body together. Passions concern the latter notion, and hence can be said to be known only obscurely. Kemp Smith refers to Descartes' "strange and difficult theses" and makes the following remarks: "That the notion of union of mind and body is for us no less primitive and ultimate than the notion of either taken separately! That it is a notion certified by sense, not by thought, and yet in respect of certainty no less reliable! That it is a notion opaque to the understanding, and even to the understanding aided by the imagination, and yet 'known very clearly by the senses' !" (New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes, London, 1952.)

Apart from these difficulties of the Cartesian analogy for Hume's theory of the passions, we must bear in our minds that Hume's notion of the indirect passions is from the very outset invested with a social dimension, and no such similar facet could be discovered for Descartes' passions of the soul. The passion of self-love may be cited as a crucial case. Hume dismisses the notion of the passion as an improper use of terms, while Descartes makes it highly significant. Though Descartes has pride as a passion of self-valuation[1], yet this similarity is superficial, because in the Cartesian

1. In Enquiry II, p. 314, Hume explains that he does not use the word

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context, it means unreasonable self-esteem, a deviation from magnanimity. Nor does Descartes' passion of humility bear any resemblance to that of Hume's. Humility is a 'virtuous' passion in Descartes (Article 155), while for Hume it is a secular passion. Hume does not have any notion of the "usefulness" of the passions as Descartes has, for the Humean self is a passionate self, while that of Descartes' is a rational judge. Descartes' The Passions of the Soul is directed towards achieving freedom for the self from the confusion of the passions, in the purity of the non-corporeal ego, but Hume's intentions have been different; his psychology is only preparatory to his ethical theory of sympathetic and benevolent social commitment. And again the passions are indefinable, for Descartes, on account of their confused nature, while for Hume, because they are simple impressions. The Cartesian analysis is functional, i.e., the passions are descriptively known in terms of their function of inciting the self; in the case of Hume, the analysis of the passions is phenomenological, i.e., as they are found to occur in ordinary human experience.

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'pride' with its common meaning. By 'pride' he designates 'the continent of conscious worth, the self-satisfaction proceeding from a review of a man's own conduct and character'. In a footnote he expatiates: 'The term, pride, is commonly taken in a bad sense; but this sentiment seems indifferent, and may be either good or bad, according as it is well or ill founded, and according to the other circumstances which accompany it'. In the Treatise, p.297 Hume explicitly refers to those who moralize in 'the style of the schools and pulpit' and says that they might be surprised to hear him 'talk of virtue as exciting pride, which they look upon as a vice'.

Descartes' notion of pride is Aristotelean in conception. Aristotle's 'magnanimity' is a virtue concerned with money. Descartes seems to have Aristotle's 'pride' in his mind though he uses the term 'magnanimity'.

It is often said that, for Hume, the relation between passions and their manifestations in overt behaviour is a purely contingent one. Gardiner has ascribed this characteristic to Hume's Cartesian inheritance. I cannot make much sense of this objection. How Descartes would allow the contingent relation within his deterministic physiologically based theory of the passions is by no means clear. According to Descartes, something is contingent only if it is neither physically determined, i.e., it is not a state of a natural body explicable by the principles of mechanics, nor logically determined, i.e., it is a proposition that follows of necessity from a set of constituent propositions forming a deductive system. Passions seem to be contingent in this sense. Should this manner of stating the Cartesian position is regarded as philosophically harmless, Gardiner's ascription would become pointless. It can be argued whether Descartes ever entertained the idea of a deductive system. Without any pretension to Cartesian scholarship I would like to submit that despite the fact that Descartes speaks of his philosophical method as reason founded on immediate intuition, he no doubt aimed at deduction. One can even notice an obvious tendency, especially in the Principles, to supersede his original or intuitive method by the demonstrative or deductive. His account of the passions as given in the Part IV of the Principles appears quite decisive in that the emotions are given a neural explanation. Of the passions, says Descartes, "as far as they are confused thoughts which the mind has not from itself alone, but from its being closely joined to the body". If that be the case why should there be a

one-way traffic only, i.e., from the body to mind, and not *vice versa*? Then, as regards Hume's case, it might be rash to assert that between experiencing an emotion and its overt expression the relation is contingent. The notion is a logical sophistication, and it is difficult to say if and whether Hume did use the term "natural relation" in exactly the modern usage "contingent". Does Hume's notion of "matters of fact" answer to the idea of a proposition that is not tautologous? I do not aspire to settle the issue. Rather, I should like to avert that Hume's notion of the "natural" relation cannot be interpreted as a propositional case of mixed truth-values without doing injustice to the uniqueness of the notion itself. Besides, in Hume's case what we have is psychological determinism of the association of ideas, whereas Descartes takes mental states collaterally occurrent with associated physiological actions in the case of the former there is no suggestion of dualism, explicit or implicit; in that of the latter, it is a basic presupposition. Again, the status of the passions is even different in the two philosophers. For Descartes, the separation between the corporeal and the mental domains cannot explain the obscure and confused ideas and the passions connected with them. They are disturbances of the mind, *perturbationes animi*. The passions as perturbations present an indubitable fact, metaphysically incomprehensible, and recognized as an exceptional relation between two heterogeneous substances. With Hume, the passions are a sub-class of matters of fact, and are *naturally* related to their overt behavioural coordinates. In view of the fact

that the Cartesian passions of the soul are "contingent" in a specialised sense, and since the modern logical notion of "contingent" cannot be read into Hume's doctrine either of matters of fact or natural relation, Gardiner's opinion misses relevance. It would be interesting to see what could Hume say on the relation of the passions to their overt behaviour. It may be objected, as Hume himself comments, that while necessity is regular and certain, human conduct is irregular and uncertain. But we must bear in mind, he says, that although many of our beliefs are weak, we do not therefore abandon the idea of _natural_ necessity. Arguing in connexion with liberty _versus_ necessity he remarks, "No union can be more constant and certain, than that of some actions with some motives and characters; and if in other cases the union is uncertain, 'tis no more than what happens in the operations of body, nor can we conclude any thing from the one irregularity, which will not follow equally from the other." (_op.cit._,p.403) That the passions as motives determine our conduct is a point Hume pressed home and fashionable thought it has become in modern philosophical discourse to say that something is contingent. Even if it be so, for the sake of argument, 'contingent' need not imply 'defective', just because it is not analytic.

John Laird's discussion of this topic is much balanced and there would be sense in endorsing his considered view that Descartes' psycho-physical theory does not "seem to have played a very effective part in Hume's theory of the passions" (_op. cit._,p.207) although there are many striking similarities of assumptions and views

between the two thinkers. On these particular points of course I have differences with Laird's way of looking at the similarities, though I might agree with his remark that there was "the closest historical continuity between Descartes and Malebranche; and Hume, like Hutcheson, has studied Malebranche very carefully".

We have so far considered Hume's causal account of the indirect passions, and found that since indirect passions are simple impressions, the criterion for deciding whether a man is proud or not would be the presence or absence of a unique simple impression. The criterion can be questioned, because a person may not himself be the best judge of his mental states. Hume would not allow this, on the contrary, he holds that 'every one, of himself, will be able to form a just idea of them [passions], without any danger of mistake'. (op.cit.,p.277, emphasis added) But verbal mistakes are possible, a man might not know what a particular impression is called. In that case Hume would be admitting the view that words like 'pride', 'love', 'hate' etc., are names of feelings or experiences that involve feelings. It can also be asked whether he has given us the causal conditions for being proud, or he has simply given that for feeling proud. The two are not identical, because a proud man need not necessarily feel proud. Does Hume draw this distinction, or is it, for him, so that to be proud is to feel proud? It has been argued against Hume that he thinks of being proud as equivalent to feeling an impression of pride. What this argument questions is Hume's concept of emotion and his solution of the problems that the concept gives rise to. The most important of them concern the

function of statements about emotion and the criteria for their validity. How are we to justify the statements of the form 'X is proud'?

What are the assumptions of Hume's concept of emotion? Generally speaking, Hume seems to take the stand that an emotion is a feeling or at least an experience of a special type which involves a feeling. We have noted above that his view seems to imply that words like 'pride', 'love' etc., are names of feelings. Let us call these words 'emotion words'. The view that emotion words are names of feelings, is usually called, the traditional theory of the emotions. The theory is said to make two assumptions: (a) that to every emotion word corresponds a qualitatively distinct experience and (b) that the experience need not find expression in overt behaviour. If the relation between feelings and its behavioural expression is a contingent one, it would make shamming or pretending, i.e., feeling in one way and behaving in another way, possible. It is conceivable and often the case that a person behaves as if he were angry without feeling or having the experience of anger. What follows from the so-called traditional theory of the emotions is a picture which presents one mental life as being essentially a sequence of passive impressions and ideas following one another or combining in recurrent patterns. In case the emotional experience finds expression in overt behaviour, it then entitles us to infer the existence of the inner feeling and therefore to assert, with some degree of probability, statements of the form 'X is angry'. The theory has had a long carrer, and down to

Russell's The Analysis of Mind emotions have been looked upon as a process, interspersed with claims of cognitivity, conativity and involvement of bodily movement. But in recent times the so-called traditional theory has come to be systematically challenged both from the sides of philosophical analysis and the direction of observational enquiry and research.

I do not propose to defend the so-called traditional theory. What I intend to do is clarifying the issues involved and see how far the criticisms made against are just. This is something worth doing, since Hume is held as subscribing to the so-called traditional theory of emotions. In that case, how far the view is correct? To speak first about the issues. There seems to be a case between subjective experience and behaviour. The former is radically and essentially private in a sense in which no behaviour could ever be. The problem has assumed the form that how, if at all, it can be possible to draw valid conclusions about the subjective experience, the private consciousness, of other people from what seem to be the only premises which are, or ever could be available. The somewhat clumsy statement of the position is taken to imply that these premises, at best, consist in the sum total of the behaviour of those other people. The problem of other minds, as it is called in its epistemological formulation, is supposed to be based upon the traditional theory of the emotions. The critics of the theory, the logical analysts or analytical behaviourists maintain that words and expressions which have been taken to refer to mental events in fact refer only to actual and possible behaviour.

Thus, for instance, a claim to have understood emotion words would be construed as referring not to the occurrence of a moment of private illumination but to the acquisition of capacities to manifest understanding. The undisputed example of an attempt to logical behaviourism as far as it will go is Ryle's The Concept of Mind. Perhaps another version of it is to be found in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. The main point of criticism of the logical analysts against the traditional theory of the emotions is that it rests on a logical mistake, i.e., of taking emotion words as names of feelings.

The logical analysts in the moments of their high enthusiasm look like underlabourers of behaviourist psychology. A behaviourist point of view makes it imperative to explain behaviour without recourse to conscious experience, and emotion becomes emotional behaviour. A consistent behaviourist might also propose that the concept 'emotion' should be abandoned and think that an explanation of 'emotional' phenomena could be given without the use of the concept, simply for the reason that 'emotion' as a scientific concept "is worse than useless" (E. Duffy in The Nature of Emotion, ed. M. B. Arnold, p. 129).

Now behaviourism can be either methodological or dogmatic. The methodological behaviourism may propose to take only the overt behaviour of people into account and to construct theories in which mental concepts are not employed at all. But from the fact that for the purposes of methodological behaviourism mental concepts are not

needed it scarcely follows that such concepts are empty, which often seems to be the contention of the dogmatic behaviourists' criticism of the traditional theory of emotions. The dogmatist, instead of carrying out a methodological programme, is primarily concerned with what may be called a "dissolution of the realm of minds" (the phrase is Findley's in his The Discipline of the Cave, lecture X). They might be said to show that the so-called mental phenomena are, properly speaking, physical phenomena. According to many of them, statements about mental phenomena are synonymous with statements about overt behaviour, almost, perhaps, in the same sense in which propositions about brothers are synonymous with propositions about male siblings. But a logical difficulty seems to be over-looked. The statements about physical phenomena are truth-functional and existentially quantifiable, while those about mental ones are not. This reason seems to a great extent sufficient to rule out the possibility of reducing statements about one class of phenomena into another set of statements about a logically diverse sort of phenomena. The very idea that such a reduction is possible, as the dogmatists often seem to entertain, may well be said to rest upon a logical mistake.

Ryle in his The Concept of Mind has dealt with the problem of the emotions, and holds that since the term 'mental' does not denote a status, hence no special footing could be provided for sensations, feelings and images. He appeals to the findings of observational research and says that "our impressions and ideas" do not find a mention there (The Concept of Mind, p. 190). Again, the

"mood words" like 'happy' or 'depressed' are not names of feelings, because feelings "are things that come or go" (ibid, p.97). He rejects also the view that "motive words" the names of feelings. By a "motive word" Ryle means such words as 'vanity' etc., which stand for inclinations, which can be "relatively strong or relatively weak" (ibid.,p. 91). Incidentally, Ryle mentions Hume's use of the word 'passion' and says that Hume's distinction between 'calm' and 'violent' passions is applicable to states of mind or moods only[1], because inclinations cannot be either calm or violent. But Hume's use of the word 'passions' covers both inclinations and moods. This interpretation has nothing objectionable, and Hume's own words may also be cited to lend support to it. He includes both impulses and propensities besides affections and emotions, and his search for some abiding quality in the "personal character" of the agent, and the view that a calm passion is one "which has become a settled principle of action"(op.cit.,p.419) as contrasted with "any sensible agitation" -- all these go to make a strong case for a view that Hume was in a sense a precursor of the dispositional analysis of mental concepts. The emotion words are either "motive words" or "mood words", and none of these, according to Ryle, is a name of feeling, hence 'emotion words' are not names of feelings. It may be doubted whether Hume would be taken to have held such a suggestion.

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1. Ryle has taken the words 'calm' and 'violent' in a sense that overlooks Hume's intentions. By 'calm' passions Hume means settled principles of actions and hence dispositional in nature. Even the violent passions act as motives. Ryle appears to have chiefly the Section IV of Part III of the Book II of the Treatise in his mind when he mentions Hume.

His doctrine that passions are simple impressions does not generally encourage any such conjectures, yet it is quite clear that for Hume, 'X is proud' might mean that X could be expected to behave in a certain manner; though it may not be so always. The overt expression of a passion may be postponed by the agent on reasonable grounds, or delayed as a normal phenomenon. This possibility should be considered in respect of the alleged 'contingent' relation between a passion and its expression in overt behaviour. 'X is proud' may be a valuation as well, i.e., X is conscious of an 'excellency' in himself. Again, Hume makes feelings the sine qua non of the passions. Speaking about an "original quality" of the passions, he says that "their sensations, or the peculiar emotions they excite in the soul ... constitute their very being and essence. Thus pride is a pleasant sensation, and humility a painful ... Of this our very feeling convinces; and beyond our feeling, 'tis here in vain to reason or dispute" (op.cit., p.286). From this follows the importance of 'avowals' as Ryle calls them, in Hume's philosophical psychology. The statement 'X is proud' is ultimately verifiable by X's avowal to the effect that he has a particular pleasant feeling. This of course does not rule out that X can make a false avowal, but there is a limit to that as it is in the case of Y's being in pain. Y might well sham but cannot go on doing it in all the cases. The epistemologist's disquiet concerning privacy of experience and scepticism concerning the first person reports of mental states has some sort of a triviality.

The benefit of rejecting the thesis that emotion words are names of feelings seems to be the possibility of giving a logically adequate criterion for inter-subjective ascription of mental states, and a dispositional or behavioural analysis of emotion words or psychological verbs is often held to yield an interpersonal criterion of truth. As regards the statements about emotions are concerned, whether first person avowals or ascriptions to others, Hume's causal account of the emotions does not explicitly rule out the case of having a criterion. We have already seen that, for him, there is a sense in which one can say that he has a feeling, though he may miscall it. There is no sense in asking some one for grounds for his avowals. To say that one is one's own authority for the truth of first-person avowals of feelings is not necessarily to deny that his description of the experience is not corrigible by him and in some circumstances by others too. I may come to know that what I took for my love for A was only a case of infatuation. My friends, again, before it is clear to me, know that I was really not in love with A, and I might find it so later only. For my part, my avowals imply that descriptions of my experience of love are subsumed under concepts and it is possible to misapply concepts. There may be another reason for the corrigibility of my avowals. I can ask myself whether I am really in love with A, and it is quite a common experience. For Hume, the passions being impressions of reflexion, this possibility remains open. I can always correct a genuine mistake of fact about myself. For example,

Hume says that men "often act against their interest" but it is also possible to "counter-act a violent passion", and thereby one may come to know in what does his "greatest possible good consist".

To say that I experience a special feeling <u>and</u> it is pride does not preclude the possibility of having a different emotion word in the place of the second conjunct. Since the avowal 'I am proud' is analysable into a conjunction of a report and a name of the reported feeling, and remains corrigible either by myself or by others. There does not appear any need to exile the first conjunct from our discourse in order to make room for corrigibility. With regard to the statement 'X is proud', it might be suggested that it is verifiable in principle by X himself. The emotion word 'proud' being a name answers to a certain description, e.g., as Hume would say, the "evident marks" of pride and its cause, which is public. So secondarily, the statement is verifiable by others also. But what is more important is that behavioural expressions, for Hume, have criteriological significance for the ascription of states of mind to others, though he does not count them as logically adequate criteria. Granting the possibilities of pretending and shamming, the manifestation of the so-called appropriate behaviour cannot be taken to entail the presence of the relevant state of mind. There is no logical relation between behaviour and states of mind. Hume does not deny that the passions have appropriate behavioural expressions, though he doubts any logical or conceptual connexion between the existence of a certain form of behaviour and the existence of a certain mental state. But he does not deplore the non-logical states of affair

because it is likely to be so from the nature of things as they are, i.e., demonstrative certainty should not be looked for in the domain of the matters of fact. In the domain of passional experience the actual is the necessary. It is the necessity of nature, and evidence is human nature. Reason is a blind guide in respect of matters of fact, and it exhausts its legislative functions in adjusting the general character of the passions. What, then, is Hume's solution for our knowledge of ascriptions of emotion words to others? For this we must look to his assumptions. We have earlier noted that his concept of the indirect passions has a social dimension. We cannot think of a person who lives in a solipsistic world and could be said to be proud, hating, loving, jealous, envious or angry. An indirect passion involves three factors, a perceiver who feels it, good or evil things or attributes and the other self or selves who could be said to have these good or evil things and attributes. Indirect passions as evaluation cannot come about without some form of society, because evaluation implies comparison. The indirect passions are our feelings about ourselves or others, and can only be based on comparisons with the standard of worthiness prevailing in a given social domain where we may happen to belong to. Hume says that "the pleasant or painful object [has to] be very discernible and obvious, and that not only to ourselves, but to others also. We fancy ourselves more happy, as well as more virtuous or beautiful, when we appear so to others...." (ibid., p. 292) or "Men always consider the sentiments of others in their judgment of themselves" (ibid., p. 303). And that famous statement that men "has the most ardent desire of society....We can form no wish, which has not a

reference to society. A perfect solitude is, perhaps, the greatest punishment we can suffer" (ibid., p. 363). Hence it can be said that, for Hume, the existence of other minds is not problematic. Ascribing particular states of mind to particular persons, such as in the statement 'X is proud', is possible on the basis of which is normally expected of a person, because he is typical of people generally, or of some class of people. We act on the belief that "Every human creature resembles ourselves" (ibid.,p.359). So far Hume is concerned, and taking his picture of human existence as one of emotional life, knowledge of oneself is impossible without an awareness of one's relationship to other people. Similarly, the notion of knowledge of other people cannot be understood in independence of the notion of personal relationships. A man who cannot feel sympathy toward others, or cannot establish relationships with them with all the dimensions of feeling, can never be said to know people in full sense. Hume distinguishes peoples from things largely in terms of the kind of relationships that we can have with them. For example, his example of parricide as given in the Book III of the Treatise is case at hand (Of course my use of the word 'relationship' is different from Hume's). Sympathy, he holds is "more conspicuous in man" (ibid., p. 363) by virtue of which there can be "communication of sentiments from one thinking being to another". Hence against the background of an understanding of human relationships and a conception of what is to be expected of such relationships we cannot have any knowledge either of ourselves or of others.

The considerations made above are in no way to be regarded as

an answer to the question of what it is to know oneself and what it is to know other people. The question is a very difficult and complex one. But a few issues are involved in Hume's treatment of the passions and in his general position in philosophical psychology, and it is in connexion with these we have ventured to make certain observations. Moreover, the problem of the status of the statements about emotions, both in the case of first-person avowals and ascription of mental states to others is involved in Hume's concept of sympathy. The concept is crucial for Hume's ethical views, and it could not be introduced without making clear the epistemological issues involved in the concept. For such reasons as these we have ventured above a very brief and inadequate excursion into one of the most vexed problems of epistemology. Hume seems to invest his concept of sympathy with a sort of cognitive import. And in order to round off the observations a few comments may be made.

Our knowledge of other selves has an important bearing on our ethical attitude, and this truth seems to have been implied by Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative. 'Respect for persons', as a modern phrasing has it, is basic to an ethical view of life. Hence, the context and the hinterland of any ethical discussion must be supplied with an existential perspective, i.e., a general background of our ideas about the world, society and the concept of man that we happen to entertain. Again, the concept of a person or the ethical subjects or selves cannot be conceived in abstraction from their social roles that they play. The concept of a person is a multi-level concept, as far as ethics is concerned,

but the fact need not necessarily act as a barrier to knowledge. Again, the plurality of roles which an individual may play is a common-place in psychology. Its significance for selfhood has not been so generally recognised. The self whom I 'know' in knowing X is not the self which his younger brother or his son or his mother knows, or is there a common 'core' to all these many selves which may be said to be his 'real' self? This would not be admitted either by his wife or his mother, each of whom claims to know him best. There seems to be an inherent perspective about our knowledge of others. In shifting from one group to another we become 'different' persons, and this fact has been noted both by anthropologists and psychologists (See G.H.Mead in his _Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of Social Behaviourism_, p. 49). Is there anything analogous to the 'standard object' in the concept of the 'other self'? - a fact which often profaned by philosophers with a bare epistemological concern. A behavioural expression cannot always be a surer guide to other's mental state. The understanding of an expression hinges on understanding something of a context. For instance, the _lie_ is an example of a verbal expression, the _smile_ is a facial expression; and _silence_ is at first sight the absence of any overt expression at all, but it can be a powerful instrument of expression. In view of the last example, the charge that, for Hume, the relation between having or feeling a passion and its expression in overt behaviour is 'contingent' need not create much worry. For it is quite likely that a proud man may not 'speak out' his feelings. To demand that our knowledge of each other, should

be objective is to demand the impossible. To doubt, however, that there is anything to be known is to be 'unreasonable'. Hume seems to steer clear between the two extremes.

In the preceding paragraphs we have been considering whether the emotions can be explained solely in terms of a behaving body. The desire to avoid Cartesian dualism has perhaps been the main thing that has led philosophers to adopt behaviourism in recent times. But the denial of dualism is not equivalent to behaviourism, at least in the crude form. I have also been concerned with examining the thesis whether Hume could be taken to advocate a theory of the passions that could be taken as an instance of, what Errol Bedford (Aristotlean Society Proceedings, LVIII, 1956-57) calls, the traditional theory of the emotions. It has not been my intention to deny traditional elements in Hume's account of the passions. But it remains nonetheless true that for Hume emotions words are not purely psychological, rather they presuppose concepts pertaining to the domain of society. Hume's passions are social passions; and the causal account offered for their explanation places the individual experiencing the passions against a background of social relationships. It would be an understatement to say that Hume takes the function of emotion words as one of explaining behaviour by specifying an inner experience, without any reference to relevant external circumstances. As we shall see later, he holds that human actions are accountable, and as such he does take into account, besides the agent's motives, desires and dispositions, his relationship to other people as well.

It is possible to take a non-behaviourist view of Hume's account of the passions. One might argue that since the passions are naturally related to a behaving body, the passions do not explain behaviour. In fact, Hume's argument against any "local conjunction" of the passions with the body may be taken to confront the behaviourist. A body, says Hume, is something extended, and extension implies divisibility. The passions are simple, and hence indivisible. A passion, therefore, cannot be identified with a body, and for that matter, any bodily behaviour either. The crux of Hume's argument is that no predicate of quantifiable nature can be said to be true of the passions. He asks, "can any one conceive a passion of a yard in length, a foot in breadth and an inch in thickness?" (ibid., p. 234). It appears that Hume intends to distinguish between predicates or class of predicates that can be applied to the passions though not to a body; and these that can be applied to a body though not to the passions. One might say that Hume was anticipating what Strawson christened as P-predicates. But does not the taste of a fig permeates its body? Hume himself admits that the taste of a fig permeates its body. Ryle says that the feeling of pride pervades the whole body as do the glows of warmth. Can we not say that the taste of a fig permeates its body in much the same way as does pride for Ryle. At least the two cases are analogous. Whether be it the taste of a fig or the feeling of pride, a la Ryle, what matters, Hume would remark, is an impression of reflexion, and to suppose the impression figured and extended is "absurd and incomprehensible". To suppose so would be to entertain a confused notion, which arises, according to

Hume, as a result of the operation of two contrary principles of fancy and reason. To say that the taste of a fig is extended,since it is felt as permeating its body, or the feeling of pride pervades the body of the proud person would tantamount to materialism Hume calls one a 'materialist', i.e., one who conjoins "all thought with extension". Whether the Humean materialist is a behaviourist may be questioned. But if he holds that our statements about emotions are equivalent, without remainder, to statements about states of the body, then he certainly is a behaviourist of a sort, and Hume would part company with him.

But the behaviourists are not a monolithic folk. Some of them deny the existence of mind, and some hold that the mind is just the body in action. Again, behaviourism need not entail the view that only purely physicalist accounts of the nature of mind are worth considering. It is also conceivable that a behaviourist should give an account of the mind solely in terms of behaviour and dispositions to behave, yet think that behaviour betokens mind, and hence does not have a purely material cause. Hume can be not reasonably taken to espouse some variety of this view. He does not deny the existence of inner mental states that are potentially conative. In this way, dispositional behaviour is involved in the concept of mind. That is to say, for Hume, our emotional life does not merely consist in the having of experiences, it also involves acting in certain ways, or being disposed to act in certain ways. In Hume's usual manner of speaking, the passions place the mind in particular dispositions. The passions are the catalytic agents of behaviour. A statement about

a person's emotion normally carries implications about the person's behaviour and his situations.

As regards behaviourism, the notion of a behaving body is centrally important. Certainly, a behaviourist cannot allow the logical possibility of the disembodied existence of a mind. As a theory of mind, behaviourism, in the least, must take the embodied existence of mind for granted. A behaving body, in the words of Wittgenstein, the outer criterion of the so-called "inner processes". In Hume's case, we can ask, what sort of person the passions occur to? The passions _qua_ impressions of reflexion presuppose ideas and their sensible originals. Ideas and impressions, Hume tells us, can make their appearance in the mind only if there are pain and pleasure; and it is inconceivable to experience pain and pleasure unless one were an embodied being. We are told that impressions of sensation "arise in the _soul_, from the constitution of the _body_, ...or from the application of _objects_ to the external organs" (_ibid_., p. 275, italics not in the text). The phrase, the "mind, as well as the body" occurs on p. 186. This is Hume in his dualist mood. It might appear that he is distinguishing between the mind and the body, besides the existence of sensible objects. It may not be the whole story of his philosophical intentions. I have argued earlier that Hume is not a dualist, and in the present context, I will want to insist that, for Hume, the relationship between having passions and their expressions in overt behaviour would not be that "contingent" as as it is often alleged, only if it could be shown to be the case that mind and body of a man, for Hume, are not two different _entities_.

The following observations may be considered.

Hume uses the term "man" to persons embodied in human form, and the class of predicates typically applied to men is called "actions". Again, other persons are accesible to us through their bodies. For a person, to have a body, then, means that a host of complex correlations exist between him and other persons. A man is not something over and above a person embodied in human form. Hence, there does not arise any need to discriminate the passional and behavioural phenomena. It is convenient to speak of the system formed by the two as a single individual, since the correlations between them is extensive, enough to permit it.

Hume's theory of the mind is well-known. C.D.Broad has termed it the "bundle theory" of the self, a theory that takes its name from Hume's famous remark that a person is "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions". The implication of the statement is that the existence of a "perception" does not involve the existence of anything that perceives or has the perception. But can it be very strongly asserted that the bundle of perceptions are somehow linked with a material body? D.M.Armstrong attributes to Hume the theory of bundle dualism, but is himself quite hesitant on that score. He writes, "Although 'Bundle' Dualism is closely linked with Hume's name, it is not absolutely clear whether or not Hume himself was a 'Bundle' dualist. His view of the mind certainly fits our definition, but it is legitimate to doubt whether he holds a Materialist theory of the mind" (A Materialist Theory of the Mind, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1968, p.7). Armstrong's doubts rest

on Hume's ambivalence with regard to the notion of the body. But it would be very much unenlightening to take Hume as a dualist, ignoring thereby definite passages in the Treatise, which point to a view that the mind and the body are only indifferently so-called.

The notion of "our own body" as Hume puts it, is pretty difficult and cannot be easily explained. That it is an inalienable companion of the idea of the self is evident even from Descartes' struggles with the notion. Hume never exercises any doubt with regard to the existence of bodies in general; "'tis in vain to ask, whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings" (op.cit., p.187, italics in the text), says Hume. But "our own body" is different from other bodies in the sense that "our own body evidently belongs to us" (ibid., p.190, italics not in the text). The property of belonging evidently to us is so unique that any impression that appears exterior to our body is also supposed to be "exterior to ourselves". And if it be asked what the external objects are external to? - the answer would be indifferently ourselves or our own body. The indifference is also brought out on page 298 of the Treatise. Hume, referring to the causes of the impressions of pride and humility, says that it does not matter whether their causes are "plac'd on the mind or body". Further below the passage, he says, "Whether we consider the body as a part of ourselves, or assent to those philosophers, who regard it as something external, it must still be allow'd to be near enough connected with us...". On page 303, again, Hume says that pride and humility have for their causes

"the qualities of our mind and body, that is self" (italics in the text).

There is a sense in which "our own body" is not a body like other bodies, such as tables and chairs. We become aware of other bodies with reference to "our own body", i.e., their impressions appear exterior to our body. But why do the impressions appear exterior rather than internal is a question Hume neither raises nor explains. He takes it for granted "Our own body" seem to have a special status, it provides, us with a perspective. "Our own body" is our point of view upon the world, to borrow the phrase from Merleau Ponty. The uniqueness of "our own body" consists also in the fact that we have impressions of other bodies except of our own. Hume says, " 'tis not our body we perceive" (ibid. p. 191), and he would have agreed with Kant's celebrated observation that our embodied existence becomes possible only mediated by and through outer experience. Kant (Critique of Pure Reason, A 358) did not find any good reason to regard the soul as quite different from its body. We are led to believe that souls are different from their bodies only because we place our own body on a par with other bodies. Hume as well would shared this opinion with Kant. "Our own body" is not the non-descript one among external bodies.

I have no intention of suggesting that Hume advocates an identity theory of the mental and the physical. All that I want is to press home the point that ascription of dualism to Hume in an unqualified manner overlooks interchangeability of the mind and the body, which constitutes a feature of our world. Often our intention

and behaviour overlap, the relationship between our emotions and our overt behaviour is not customarily fortuitous. How are we to explain such cases? I do not pretend to any solution of the "World-knot" -- Schopenhauer's striking designation for the mind-body problem. But it remains worth noticing that Hume was driving at some common referent of the mind and the body, which, for common sense and also for the philosophically sophisticate, widely differ in sense. Ordinary language serves many purposes quite adequately, and it unhesitatingly combines mental and bodily states in many descriptions and explanations of human behaviour. One trembles with anxiety, eagerness is written all over one's face, an attack of flu leaves one in a depressed mood, and so on. These few illustrations indicate that ordinary language reflects an interactionistic view of the relations of the mind and the body.

But does it not presuppose some sort of dualism? Hume was no less aware of it. In a passage of the Treatise, he speaks of "the union of soul and body" and remarks that "everyone may perceive, that dispositions of his body change his thoughts and sentiments" (p.248). This is plain common-sense, but does the converse hold? It might be pointed out that shame and embarrassment involve blushing. This is not denied in a theory of the passions that takes the passions as such conative mental states which would be identified by certain causal patterns of mental and bodily behaviour. There need be situations in order to satisfy the claims of emotion words. But the difficulty lies in the fact that situations should have corresponding beliefs, and it is well-known that perceptions

may fail to correspond to reality. All these may be granted in cases of human intervention in social environment. But we must distinguish such cases from those of mind-body relationship. It is doubtful whether Hume relegates human body to the external world.

I do not wish to deny that Hume does have a trouble with dualism. In a letter to Arnauld Descartes retorted that how an incorporeal mind could move the body was a matter incomprehensible to man. Locke's inheritance was grateful, and he held the inability of matter to think. In the earlier parts of the Treatise, for example on pages 7 and 8, we find Hume holding the view that sensations arise from "unknown causes". This may, or in fact does amount to saying that the mental realm differs totally from the physical, and consequently, a philosophy of mind remains to be worked out independently of the physical conditions which make perceptual experiences possible. Even in the Book II of the Treatise we are given to understand that the physiological phenomena is a subset of the physical phenomena. All this is true, but this sort of dualism is, in a sense, different from that of between "ourselves" and "our own body", which is not easily ascribable to Hume. When he says that "our own body" is a part ourselves or that is "near enough connected with us", he emphasises a sense of ownership that would not be available were human body a member of the class of physical things without any difference.

Hume's dualist manner of speaking notwithstanding, it would not be unwarranted to say that his distinction between objects

(i.e. bodies) and perceptions (i.e. impressions and ideas) implies neither a dualism of the mind and the body, nor that the distinction is in any sense specific; "we may suppose, but never can conceive a specific difference betwixt an object and impressions"(ibid.,p.241), says Hume. The reason for the disavowal of dualism can be so stated. Spatial properties like extension and being composed of parts etc. are experienced in our perception of objects, but ultimately, are characteristic of our impressions and ideas of them. The qualities perceived as qualities of our perceptions. Objects and perceptions are not then two types of existents. We are thus landed into a tension of natural belief and perceptual evidence. The notion of objects having independent existence is a result of natural belief, while perceptions are yielded by immediate consciousness.

If I am right in this account of the matter, it follows that such a tension, with regard to "our own body", is scarcely encountered by Hume. Granted that he tacitly admits a dualism of a non--Cartesian sort in respect of bodies in general, even including the bodies of other persons, he would still have held what G.F.Stout called 'the unity of the embodied self'. Hume does not contest the experience of having feelings which we locate in our bodies, and he would also have agreed with the observation that we can move our own bodies in a manner in which we cannot move anything other than our own bodies. This, may be taken as a distinctive feature which differentiates volition from other types of causal experience. There is a sense of resistance which we meet with when we move bodies other than our own. It is true, it may be alleged that in the first Enquiry

Hume has cast doubts whether we can will to move all our organs. "Why has the will an influence over the tongue and fingers, not over the heart or liver?" (ed. Selby-Bigge, Second edition, Oxford, 52). I should like to point out that in the Enquiry Hume is, in fact, arguing against a dualistic hypothesis, and the argument is directed at showing the "connexion, which binds them [mind and body] together and renders them inseparable" (ibid., italics not in the text). Should one like to insist on the physiological exceptions mentioned by Hume, it could be said that there is a sense in which "our own body" is not an equivalent expression of 'physiology' or 'anatomy', because we hardly ever mean by "our own body" an assemblage of organs juxtaposed in space. We possess our bodies in an undivided fashion. Physiology or a physiological account of my body is not what I feel about my body, rather it is what my body would like to others if studied as a matter of science.

To put the matter in brief. The question whether the relationship between having a passion and its overt expression in bodily behaviour is 'contingent' can be understood in a two-fold manner. From the point of view of the agent mind and body are not apprehended as distinct phenomena, nor are mental processes taken apart from bodily in such wise as to raise questions concerning the way in which they are related with each other. It is this which is signified by our use of personal pronouns. As an agent one can vouch for a continuous history of one's having a passion and its behavioural satisfaction. The agent's volitional experience (which, for Hume, is like any other passional experience) need not

be necessarily construed as a conjunction of two separate occurrents, namely, his being aware of volition and his subsequently becoming conscious of its fulfilment. This would be the spectator's view of the matter, and for whom the gap between one's having a passion and its expression in overt behaviour can only come to be connected in their being given in experience as constant conjuncts. But does it follow from the spectator's view that the connexion between a passion and its expression in bodily behaviour is less strong, simply because it is yielded by constant conjunction? That the relationship between the two is "contingent" only methodological, i.e., it is simply an affair of analysis. Or could it not be said that the connexion between a passion and its bodily manifestation, or for that matter, mental phenomena and the bodily, is such that they are distinguishable only by an effort of analysis. As it actually takes place mental phenomena are also bodily, and the converse is no less true. If we could conceive dualism in hard and soft varieties, the former would be Cartesian; and the latter would be Hume's. The relationship between emotion and behaviour, or having a passion and its bodily behavioural expression will be strongly contingent in the hard variety dualism; whereas in the soft variety of Hume's sort the relationship would be different. For Hume, the connexion would be a strong one, far less "contingent" to provide a basis for a deterministic explanation of human conduct. "As long as actions have a constant conjunction with the situation and temper of the agent, however we may in words refuse to acknowledge the necessity, we really allow the thing" (op.cit. p.403). The "necessity" that Hume speaks of is a subspecies of

necessity as exhibited in natural happenings. If at all the factor of inference is what is denied in such cases, that does not render the notion of agency nill. A nill or empty notion of agent is essentially one of an impotent performer. An agent without performance is no agent at all. If an agent is a behaving agent, in that case, his having or undergoing a certain passional experience does in a sense point to his appropriate behaviour. The passions are "active principles" as Hume calls it, and become "settled principle/s/ of action". There should then be nothing mysterious about the fact that the passions are correlated with bodily actions; and that given the appropriate conditions they accompany one another. This somewhat long digression may not have been without any purpose; which I hope, besides settling the question whether Hume could be called a 'Bundle' dualist, helps us decide that Hume's philosophical psychology stands intermediate between extreme behaviourism and some form of Cartesianism.

We may now turn to considering some further problems connected with some of the indirect passions. The simplicity of the passions make them indefinable, so that only a description of them possible. In this sense, Hume's account of the passions is partly phenomenological, i.e., to see and describe what happens when we come to experience a particular passion. The term 'phenomenological' is to be taken in a restricted sense and only in order to emphasise the descriptive methodology involved in Hume's theory of the passions. In the middle of the nineteenth century the definition of 'phenomenon' was extended until it became synonymous with 'fact' or 'whatever is

observed to be the case'. As a consequence, 'phenomenology' acquired the meaning that it possesses most frequently in contemporary uses -- a purely descriptive study of any given subject matter. In this sense, Sir William Hamilton, in his <u>Lectures on Metaphysics</u>, spoke of phenomenology as a purely descriptive study of mind. Similar was Edward von Hartmann's use of the word in the title of his book <u>Phenomenology of Moral Consciousness</u>, which had as its task a complete description of moral consciousness. Of course the term 'phenomenology' as applied to Hume's case cannot have the meaning which Husserl invested the term with, namely, that it is a non-empirical science devoted to intuiting essences. But 'phenomenology' as a <u>method</u> has an applicability in characterizing Hume's treatment of the passions, the ultimate data of our emotional life, in a descriptive way[1], since the propositions of psychology, for Hume, are empirical.

It has often been said that Hume's preoccupation with the description of the conditions that give rise to the passions is the

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1. A phenomenological interpretation of the Book I of Hume's <u>Treatise</u> has already been done by C.V. Salmon in his <u>The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy</u>, Halle, 1929. Salmon writes, "The Phenomenological conception of Consciousness as the matter of philosophy ... resembles Hume's conception of Human Nature. Historians will see Hume's lineal successors, not in Kant or Mill, but in Brentano and Husserl. For the essential of Hume's philosophy is its subjective attitude, the notion that the ultimate explanation of truth and all ontologies awaits the practise of an introspection." (see, p.3) Even if one is not ready to go as far as Salmon, there does not seem to be any reason to object to his remark that Hume's method, like that of the phenomenologists', "aim at description and not at definition".

reason why he does not provide us with an analysis of the nature of the passions or the meaning of terms standing for passions. I do not quite understand the contention of the charge. Much depends on what one means by 'nature'. If one accepts that the passions are feelings of a special kind, i.e., simple, and hence indefinable impressions of reflexion, then, perhaps, nothing remains to be done except for describing the causal conditions that give rise to the passions, and as for the analysis of the meaning of the term standing for passions, one has to look for it elsewhere; I suppose, in the general theory of which Hume's is a special and important variation. The most important task of a philosopher of psychology is to answer two such questions which may be formulated roughly as follows: What kind of an entity is an emotion? Is it a feeling, conation, cognition, physiological condition, behaviour pattern, tendency or some combination of these? and, How does one distinguish one emotion from another, in oneself and in another?

What does and does not belong in the category of emotion is one of the subjects of controversy between different schools of thought. E.Claparede writes, "The psychology of affective processes is the most confused chapter in all psychology. Here it is that the greater differences appear from one psychologist to another. They are in agreement neither on the facts nor on the words." (The Nature of Emotion, ed. M.B.Arnold, p. 137). In the circumstance we might venture to suggest that by emotion, passion or affection we shall understand that what is designated by such words like 'anger', 'joy', 'disgust', 'grief', 'remorse' etc., and the common name of the class

of such words, as we adopted earlier, be emotion words. In spite of certain amount of circularity, the statement may be found to be workable. One might then distinguish between a kind of temporary state of a person, what Hume calls 'violent passions' and Ryle calls 'moods', from more or less long-term dispositions to various states, for which Hume's epithet 'calm' is very suggestive, together with his emphasis on 'durable' dispositional characteristics of certain passions such as love and what Ryle would prefer to call 'inclinations'. Dispositions may be said to include attitudes (admiration, contempt, jealousy etc.), dispositions to act and feel in certain ways (friendliness, benevolence, etc). Now psychological factors of such sorts have often been lumped together with what we would call 'emotion' or Hume calls 'passion'. But it must be admitted that many emotion words can be used to designate dispositions as well as a temporary mental state. Hume's insufficient emphasis on the dispositional analysis of emotion words may be viewed in another light. It is noteworthy of the typical uses of the general term 'emotion' that these have to do with emotional states under them than attitudes or other general dispositions. For instance, one is not termed an 'emotional person' because of one's having a lot of admiration, pride, humility or gratitude — all of these are dispositions or "character traits", but rather because of frequently getting into states of anger, grief, joy and expressing them freely. When some one is said to give way to one's emotion or control one's emotions, it is emotional states which are in question. The same is true of getting emotional over something and being emotionally upset.

A set of factors, i.e., feelings of certain kinds, a cognition of something as in some ways desirable or undesirable, marked bodily sensations of certain kinds, tendencies to act in certain ways, an upset condition of mind and body -- have been considered to be essential to emotions. But theories differ as to which of these items they take to constitute the emotion itself and which they take to be causes, effects or concomitants of the emotion. Now Hume takes conscious feeling to be the emotion. Passions, for him, are unique kinds of experiences which arise as a result of sense perceptions, including sensations of pleasure and pain and thoughts. Other subscribers to this general notion of emotion as conscious feeling would be Descartes, Kant and Hamilton. Believers as they were in what is called faculty psychology, for both Kant and Hamilton, emotions would be modes of feeling. Feeling is taken by them to be one of the ultimate faculties of the mind, along with cognition and will. So conceived, feeling is the faculty of being affected positively or negatively by objects cognized. Kant's famous distinction between sensation and feeling is worth quoting: "the word sensation is used to denote an objective representation of sense; and,.....we shall call that which must always remain purely subjective, and is absolutely incapable of forming a representation of an object, by the familiar name of feeling. The green colour of the meadows belongs to objective sensation, as the perception of an object of sense; but its agreeableness to subjective sensation, by which no object is represented: i.e., to feeling." (Critique of Judgment, p. 45, tr. Meredith)

What is common to all these views is the conviction that what

makes a condition an emotion, and what makes it the particular emotion it is, is the presence in the consciousness of a certain felt quality which is completely accessible to introspection. The one and only way to know what anger is, for instance, is to actually experience the feeling that *is* anger. This is the most disquieting feature of the theory, i.e., the emotion is only 'contingently' related with other factors, and this is what is bemoaned by its critics. It is true that Hume considers it an inexplicable fact that the passion of pride should regularly be induced by the awareness of things which belong to us rather than by consideration of objects which have no connexion with us. That means that Hume's designation of the object, in such an expression as "the object of pride" as "that towards which the emotion is directed" seems arbitrary, for it is possible to refer to the father as the object of pride in the expression 'he is proud of his father'. This would be a quite acceptable use of the term "object", though whether the father is the proper object of pride would not be easy to settle. But it would be convenient to distinguish an object properly so-called of pride from those which are only so-called. In the first case the passion of pride is directed towards the person who possesses the passion. If X is proud (not as a character trait, but in the sense of being proud, not merely feeling it) then we can say that (a) the being proud is predicated of X, and (b) the pride of X is directed towards himself. Similarly in the case of humility. As regards the objects so-called of pride (and humility) they as Hume says, "always consider'd with a view to ourselves". The self

self must bear a specially intimate relation to objects that one can be proud of. Moreover one's being proud of one's father, or a father's being proud of his children are states of feeling born of natural affection and far less evaluations proceeding from considerations of the qualities either bestowed upon or genuinely possessed by the objects. Since Hume's account of pride is a causal one, and the passion being self-valuating in character, it cannot be likened to such expressions as 'X is proud of his father' unless in a derivative sense. However, the distinction proposed above might be expected to remove much of arbitrariness from Hume's notion of object of a passion, of course without disregarding the difficulties of it. When the self is the object of a passion as in the case of pride the relationship is a reflexive one, and hence, stronger than the noso-reflexive instances. 'X is proud' will be always true as having his self as the object of his passion. 'X is proud of his father' is not guaranteed in that fashion. In a matriarchal society the chances of the expression's being true would be scarce, unless it is asserted as an instance of natural affection.

The foregoing observations are not intended to validate any theory of the emotions which holds that emotion is a conscious feeling. There are difficulties in the theory, and it is worth one's while to admit that. But what I have been driving at is that unless one makes reservations, Hume's view of the passions cannot be said to be an instance of such a theory. A few of the cases may be noted. The claim that an emotion can occur without its typical overt expressions can be challenged. As for the fact that one can be angry or annoyed

without any one else realising it, it may be argued that although one can inhibit an overt manifestations of an emotional state, if one needs to or has sufficient self-control, there would be limit to it. There will still be tendencies to those manifestations. It is true that the premises of the theory that emotion is a conscious feeling, imply also the fact emotion is an inner mental rather than a bodily state, since it is the sort of thing of which one can have the same kind of immediate infallible knowledge one has of one's sensations and thoughts, a kind of knowledge open to no one else. The critic might draw our attention to psychoanalysis, a theory that has very promisingly shown us cases in which one misinterprets or misidentifies one's emotional state. Indirect expression of emotion that are inhibited may be in dreams. It is a legitimate point, but it is also to go over to another set of premises about the nature of the mind and its operations than what Hume or Kant would have espoused. And since, for Hume, emotion words are names of feelings, it is quite possible to miscall one's state of mind, and one wonders whether Hume ever denied it seriously.[1] Now assuming that I cannot be mistaken about whether I am angry, then being angry cannot be just feeling angry. To be sure, the critic would further add, some claims that an emotion does not necessarily involve the usual state of feeling depend on using an emotion word in the

1. In the Enquiry, Hume writes, 'Our predominant motive or intention is, indeed, frequently concealed from ourselves, when it is mingled and confounded with other motives which the mind, from vanity or self-conceit, is desirous of supposing more prevalent'. p. 299.

attitudinal rather than the emotional state sense. But we have earlier mentioned that typical uses of general emotion words had to do with emotional states rather than general dispositions. But evidential grounds against any theory cannot settle the issue as a matter of logic. Let me explain. Suppose a theory of dispositional analysis sort claims to offer some evidential grounds, such that the theory T implies the evidential grounds in support of it E, i.e., $T \rightarrow E$. Now, in the circumstance, all that we can say that the theory is false, i.e., T is not the case or $\sim T$, because the claims of evidence are not observed, i.e., $\sim E$. This argument is validated by the logical rule of Modus tollens. But simply because E holds, we cannot infer that T is the case. More often than not these critics of Hume's theory of the passions forget this fact.

So rather than on evidential grounds, the criticisms are provoked by a generalized suspecision of states of consciousness, and data of introspection. Philosophers under Wittgenstein's influence have maintained that no term can have an inter subjectively shared meaning if it simply functions as a name for objects that are necessarily private, hence emotion words, as terms in a public language, cannot be so functioning. There is a demand for some sort of behavioural criterion for identifying or speaking about emotions. But the dogmatic behaviourists' insistence on the behavioural criterion does not seem to fare well all the time, because if feeling is 'supervenient' upon behaviour, there cannot be any relation of entailment between the two either way, since a feeling can sometimes be produced by drugs also. A doctor may expect his patient to report his mental

state as a result of administering certain drugs or having done a surgical operation on the patient. Such correlation, more than proving the identity, implies rather the distinctness of the two types of phenomena, physical and mental, or else the doctor would not expect his patient to report. In this connexion Hume's account of moral virtues and character may be alluded to. He distinguishes moral virtues from "the actions that proceed from them", and a man's character from those of his actions which are "sign(s)" or "indications" of it. In morality, he claims, we should consider "only the quality or character from which the action proceeded", because "these alone are durable enough to affect our sentiments concerning the person". These "durable principles of the mind" are described as causes, and they may exist without having their usual effects, if the other necessary conditions are lacking. An agent may have a certain "character even tho' particular accidents prevent its operation". Hume criticizes the libertarian for not recognising that actions cannot be blamed if "they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person, who perform'd them" (ibid., p.411). A man is not responsible for an action if it "proceeded from nothing in him that is durable and constant". Even when a spectator fails to grasp the connexion between our character and our actions, he judges rightly that there is such a connexion, and that it would be discoverable, "were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition" (ibid., pp. 408-409). Thus, even if no explanation of a

man's actions in terms of his character is now available, it is to be looked for, the lack is in our knowledge, not in the world. This is Hume in his non-reductionist mood, on the question of dispositions, i.e., mental (dispositional) terms are not exhaustively analysable into overt hypotheticals.[1]

Now to turn to Hume's treatment of individual passions. His thinking about the relation between passions in mechanical terms sometimes makes me feel uneasy. Let me take an example. He says, "To excite any passion, and at the same time raise an equal share of its antagonist, is immediately to undo what was done, and must leave the mind at last perfectly calm and indifferent." (*ibid.*, p. 278) Pride and humility are 'contrary' passions, and it is "impossible" that "a man can at the same time be proud and humble". If the passions are simple impressions, how could it be so conceived? Passions are non-extended, and as such they do exist but no where, in such a case the sense of "contrariety" can only be conceptual or by definition of the passions, which is impossible on Hume's own terms. And to say that the mind is in a complete equilibrium is to admit non-arousal of either passion. And can Hume admit any such state of mind without any agitation of passions of any kind? If it is so that he can, then his arguments against Spinozistic concept of mind

1. I have no intention of suggesting that Hume's view of dispositional terms is non-reductionist in an unqualified manner, since he can legitimately be cited to have very strongly asserted an explicit reductionist thesis by declaring the distinction between "*power* and the *exercise* of it" as one of "without foundations" (see *Treatise*, p.171). This only shows the unresolved tension in his thought between the two views, and that the non-reductionist view fits in well with his brand of dualism. I shall not defend either of his views about dispositional terms and have, in the present context, restricted myself to only a bare mention of them. That would have been a task beyond the scope of the present work.

makes no sense. We can perfectly conceive of a mental substance without its modes. The reasons for Hume's speaking opposition of passions leaving the mind in equilibrium may be sought in the science of mechanics, in particular, the law of the opposition of forces. In the Buddhist psychology the notion of contrary passions plays a therapeutic part. Emptying the mind of the passion has been looked upon as a desirable achievement, and as a means to that end contrary passions are enjoined to be evoked with the intention of cancelling or getting ride of any original given passion. The monks in order to get rid of amorous passion were admonished to think of decaying human corpses with a view to arousing the passion of disgust for human body in their minds. This procedure of course assumes that the passions do not simple 'happen' to someone, but can be so cultivated as to be able to aroused at will. What is important for our purpose here the practical application of the notion of "contrary" passions. It remains doubtful whether Hume would ever have cherished such a passionless state of mind as the Buddhists aspired for. Or how far the Stoic ideal of <u>ataraxia</u> would have ever allured Hume.

Hume writes, "the passion [pride] always turns our view to ourselves, and makes us think of our own qualities and circumstances." (<u>ibid</u>., p.287). What does he mean by the verbs 'makes' and 'turns'? Is it a causal statement? If it is taken as a causal statement, then what does it state, the sufficient condition or the necessary condition or both? Is it not absurd to suggest that we think of ourselves when we are already proud? It is an essential part of the meaning of

pride that it is a form of self-valuing. Could we think of such a case that we are proud, and through a change of human nature, we have another as its object? To be proud is a form of self-valuing, and it is a statement of conceptual clarification, and in that sense analytic. But Hume writes as if pride causes us to think of ourselves. 'Pride has the self as its object' is not a synthetic assertion, but it spells out the meaning of 'pride'. And since in no other case we think of ourselves than being in pride, Hume could be taken to laying down the necessary conditions of being proud.

Hume has dismissed the case of self-love as an improper use of words, and this follows from his analysis of 'love' as a word for other-regarding affective valuation. And so is 'hatred'. Pride and humility are self-regarding valuations. The question whether the self or the other is the object of passion makes the dichotomy sharp and clear. Now, love, for Hume, is a simple impression of reflexion, distinguished from what he calls 'the amorous passion', which is "compound" in the sense that it is derived from "the conjunction of three different impressions or passions" (ibid.,p.394). Three passions having three 'distinct' objects, aided by the double relation of ideas and impressions together with "the parallel direction of the desires" go to constitute the amorous passion. But if this analysis is granted, why could we not conceive of self-love or self-hatred, as genuine experiences that we all sometimes do have, on the conjunction of two passions and two objects? If we care to have a look to his second Enquiry we shall come across his implicit admission of self-love as a complex passion. In the second Enquiry Hume takes up the case of

self-love chiefly in connexion of his critique of what he calls "the Hobbish" doctrine of the total selfishness of man, whether presented as pure psychology or the result of a "philosophical chemistry". On page 218 of the Enquiry he refers to self-love as "a principle in human nature of.....extensive energy". What he means by the term 'principle' is left unexplained, and is a little ambiguous, for it may mean a law (in the sense of an interrelation of causal conditions, as he speaks of the double relation of ideas and impressions as "internal principles" on p. 327 of the Treatise) or a disposition or 'propensity' or 'quality' (e.g., Hume uses the words 'quality' and 'propensity' in connexion with sympathy and says on p. 316 that sympathy is a principle). If the expression of the Enquiry is taken in the second sense, i.e., in the sense of a disposition, then self-love amounts to a passion. Hume, in the Enquiry, distinguishes "the language of self-love"(p. 272) through which one expresses "sentiments, peculiar to himself" or "sentiments of self-love" (p.274) whereas the language of morals, which, according to him embodies "notions" implies "some sentiment common to all mankind". Hume's version of universalisability of the moral language is based upon a "general system of blame or praise", or as he puts it, "the humanity of one man is the humanity of everyone" (Enquiry, p. 273), the passion of self-love loses its moral relevance as the Hobbists would like to establish. Without entering into the debate any further, it may be inoffensively asserted that in the Enquiry, Hume does admit self-love as a passion, which he had dismissed as a contradiction in terms in the Treatise. The whole of the Appendix II of the second Enquiry is

concerned with self-love as a thesis put forward by "Hobbes and Locke, who maintained the selfish system of morals" (*ibid.*, p.292). On p. 297 again we find a mention self-love as a passion where Hume proceeds to argue by the rule of *reductio ad absurdum*. According to his "natural and unforced interpretation of the phenomena of human life"(*ibid.*, p.244) self-love as a passion is based upon benevolence: "from the original frame our temper, we may feel a desire of another's happiness or good, which, by means of that affection, becomes *our own good*, and is afterwards pursued, from the *combined motives* of benevolence and self-enjoyment" (*ibid.*, p.302). In the *Treatise*, by 'love' Hume means a kind of valuing, a simple, and "tender emotion", the logical compliment of the passion of pride, which he describes in the *Enquiry* as "self-value" (p. 253). In the sense of a 'tender emotion' self-love does not qualify, this is what Hume says quite explicitly: The sensation (i.e., feeling) selflove produces does not have "any thing common with that tender emotion, which is excited by a friend or mistress"(*op.cit.*,p.329). And it is by the criterion of tenderness that the various "appearances" (see *Treatise*, p. 448) of love are identified. But this point of view does not entitle Hume to refuse self-love as "a compound passion". And if self-love is a possible passion, then self-hatred can also be construed in a similar way.

Hume's account of pride and love as names of two indirect passions seems to make stipulations for the ordinary meaning of these words. Hume himself says that by 'pride' he means 'self-value' and similarly his phrase "love and esteem" is a conjunction of univocal words. For

Hume, pride and love are two basic forms of felt evaluations arising as our emotive response to a definite set of "causes", and their difference seems to lie the respective "objects" of the passions. He says, "As the immediate object of pride and humility is self or that identical person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are intimately conscious; so the object of love and hatred is some other person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are not conscious" (ibid., p.329 , italics not in the text). Granted that the logical relations between the "objects" of pride and love, and the person possessing the passions are different and that Hume is mainly concerned with such relations as are entailed by such statements as 'X is proud' or 'X loves Y' (where obviously X and Y are variables for persons), yet we do not necessarily have these logical relations in mind when we make such statements. It is not improbable that a person may be proud of another or loves himself. Self-love or narcissism is a psychological possibility as much as self-pride.

Hume has three different notions of love as a passion. Ordinarily, what he means by love is a simple impression of which the 'object' is always some other person. In having "some sensible being external to us" (ibid., p.329) as its object the simple impression or passion of love is distinguished from pride. Apart from this schematic statement of love as a passion, Hume puts two specific meanings on the word. As an other-regarding evaluative feeling love means "thinking highly of", and in this sense love is a correlate of pride. 'To be proud' means 'to entertain high self-esteem', and similarly, 'to love' means 'to think highly of'. In

a footnote on page 608 of the Treatise Hume says "Love and esteem are at bottom the same passions, and arise from like causes". As a social passion, love differs from pride inasmuch as unlike the latter it is conative. Pride and humility having the self as their immediate object, Hume observes, "are pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action" (ibid., p. 367). On the contrary, he continues, "love and hatred are not completed within themselves, nor rest in that emotion, which they produce, but carry the mind to something farther. Love is always follow'd by a desire of the happiness of the person belov'd, and an aversion to his misery"(ibid.). Much has been made about the contingent relation between the passion of love and that of benevolence in its two-fold senses, i.e., "desire of the happiness of the person belov'd, and an aversion to his misery". Hume himself is in a sense responsible for the confusion about the relation of love and benevolence. He notes that though it "evidently contrary to experience" that "we never love any person without desiring his happiness" (ibid, p.367), yet the relationship between the two states of mind is "not absolutely essential". Mercer attributes this contingent relation between love and benevolence to Hume's so-called Cartesianism, a phrase I cannot make much sense of. It is true that Hume writes in such a vein that might lend support to Mercer's thesis of Hume's Cartesianism. Hume says, "I see no contradiction in supposing a desire of producing misery annex'd to love and of happiness to hatred" (ibid., p.368). Here Hume equivocates between the sense of love as esteem or of thinking highly of someone and

another sense which he puts forward as the "tender emotion which is excited by a friend or mistress". Love in the sense of an evaluation of the qualities of some person need not be accompanied by a desire of his happiness, at least explicitly. But it is certainly self-contradictory to say that X entertains tender emotions for Y and does not desire his happiness. To say so and to hold that it is not self-contradictory is to violate ordinary usage of the word 'love'. Hume's notion of love as esteem or evaluation is a stipulation; on the other hand, his notion of love as "tender emotion which is excited by a friend or mistress" is the everyday meaning of the word. These two senses of the word must needs be separated. Hume's sense of love as esteem has a definite set of "causes", i.e., qualities found in the person loved or thought highly of. He writes, "The virtue, knowledge, wit, good sense, good humour of any person, produce love and esteem" (*ibid.*, p.330) as from "beauty force, swiftness, dexterity" (*ibid.*). But surely we do not expect a friend or our mistress to have these qualities. In some cases the qualities may be sufficient but not necessary conditions for the arousal of the passion of love in the sense of tender emotions. And this fact establishes that love as esteem and love as tender emotion are non-identical in their import, and Hume more often equivocates them. Love in the sense of esteem, like the passion of pride or self-esteem requires the double relation of impressions and ideas. An exception is made by Hume to this general requirement in the case of non-evaluative sense of love.

Our love of relations is an example. "Whoever is united to us by

any connexion is always sure of a share of our love, proportion'd to the connexion, without enquiring into his other qualities" (*ibid.*, p. 352). If this is true, as Hume says, then his example of tender emotion excited by a friend or mistress would also not require the double relation of impressions and ideas. In an ambiguous passage he writes that "the passion of love may be excited by only one *relation* of a different kind, *viz.* betwixt ourselves and the object; or more properly speaking, that this relation is always attended with both the others" (*ibid.*). What different kind of relation he means is not made clear, whether it is a relation of impressions or only of ideas. A few lines below, he says that "acquaintance, without any kind of relation, gives rise to love and kindness". He seems to take "acquaintance" in the sense "intimacy with any person", and in that case friendship and one's love for one's mistress are examples of acquaintance and do not need any relation for producing the passion characterised by Hume as "tender emotion". These difficulties issue from Hume's confusing the two distinct senses of the word love -- love as esteem and love as any intimate relationship between persons.

Hume's distinguishing between love of relations as requiring only one relation, and love arising out of acquaintance needing no relation is difficult to comprehend. Acquaintance itself is a kind of relation, may be of ideas. Whatever that be, acquaintance as such need not give rise to love in the sense of tender emotion. 'X is acquainted with Y' is non equivalent to saying 'X loves Y', though 'X is intimate with Y' may at times be taken to mean that "X has tender emotions for Y'. Acquaintance in some cases may cause love.

This may be Hume's intention, but acquaintance need not necessarily give rise to love, it may, as the saying goes, breed contempt as well.

The third sense of love that Hume speaks of what he calls "the amorous passion, or love betwixt the sexes". According to him, amorous passion is not a simple impression but a compound one and necessarily hetero-sexual. Hetero-sexuality is the characteristic feature of amorous passion. He says, "Sex is not only the object, but also the cause of the appetite" (ibid., p. 396). But in order to fit it in the scheme of his principle of double relation of impressions and ideas Hume adds the passions of beauty and good-will and thus the compound nature of the passion of love between the sexes is secured. Amorous passion does not seem to be compound on a logical ground but it is made compound on a psychological necessity. Hume admits that "reflecting on it [sex] suffices to excite the appetite" but as "this cause loses its force by too great frequency" (ibid., p. 396) the idea of "the beauty of the person" is needed. But is it so really? In the case of the infatuated lover the idea of the beauty or deformity of the beloved seems to play no part at all, although he very much experiences amorous passion. This improvisation of the idea of the beauty of the person loved seemed to Hume to give "a sensible proof of the double relation of impressions and ideas" (ibid.). Now, amorous passion has sex for both its "object" and "cause". Hume remarks that the "double relation is necessary where an affection has both or distinct cause, and object, how much more so, where it has only a distinct object, without any determinate cause?" (ibid.). But is it true? In the case of acquaintance

there is a determinate object, though no determinate cause, and yet no double relation is required. Either, so far amorous passion is concerned, sex is both the object and the determinate cause of the passion and the double relation is needed, or, it is only the object with no determinate cause and the double relation is not needed. Hume cannot have it both ways.

Again love as tender emotion excited by one's mistress is surely as hetero-sexual as amorous passion. The "beauty of the person" as Hume puts it may be a source of tender emotion as well. He himself says that "the most common species of love is that which arises from beauty" (<u>ibid</u>., p.395). A lot depends on what Hume means by "beauty". It may be real or imaginary. Can we say that love arising out of intimacy has anything to do with the beauty of the person? We fancy somebody as beautiful because we love her, and not that we love her because she is beautiful. The notion of beauty is brought in to a dubious role in Hume's account of amorous passion. It is devised to ensure kindness towards the person for whom one might feel bodily appetite. "Kindness or esteem, and the appetite to generation, are too remote to unite easily together. The one is, perhaps, the most refin'd passion of the soul; the other the most gross and vulgar. The love of beauty is plac'd in a just medium betwixt them, and partakes of both their natures: From whence it proceeds, that 'tis so singularly fitted to produce both" (<u>ibid</u>.,p.395). One simply wonders how it does.

Hume appears to be indecisive as regards the object of the amorous passion. At one place he says that sex is the object of the

passion, at another he remarks that amorous passion has no specific object. He further conceives beauty as the catalytic agent of the passion. But all this has something unsatisfactory about it. Amorous passion is an achievement, partly biological partly conventional. Hume nowhere mentions the role played by pleasure, almost of the paradigmatic sensual type, in amorous passion. Does he mean "the sense of beauty, the bodily appetite" is the same as sexual pleasure? But sexual desire is a part of the sexual pleasure, and cannot be conceived of existing outside it. Sexual desire transforms itself gradually into the pleasure that appears, misleadingly, to be an aim extrinsic to it. Again, when Hume speaks of "the beauty of the person" he comes very near the truth of erotic perception as analysed in recent times by Merleau-Ponty. There is both an embodiment as well as a transcendence. "What we try to possess" says Merleau-Ponty "is not just a body, but a body brought to life by consciousness" (Phenomenology of Perception, p.167). Sexually relevant aesthetic features may be perceived and recognised, but it is not those but their possessor who is the proper object of amorous passion. This recognition is mutual, and the factor of mutuality is important in considering judgments of sexual worth. In rape, for instance, no mutual recognition of desire by desire is involved. There is an element of respect for persons in amorous passion, which Hume does not sufficiently bring about. It is very important that the object of sexual attraction is a particular individual, who transcends the properties that make him or her attractive. Different persons may be attracted to a single individual for different reasons, eyes, hair or figure --

though the object of their desire is nevertheless the same -- the person. Lastly, Hume seems to smuggle "beauty" into "the appetite to generation", since both are variants of "bodily appetites". But this is obviously a male bias, and confuses that what is psychological with the physiological.

Hume's account of the passion of love has an important bearing. He says that "the object of love and hatred is some other person, of whose thoughts, actions and sensations we are not conscious"(ibid., p. 329). The other person, "of whose thoughts, actions and sensations we are not conscious" is a member of the social set, which is the domain of morality. The passion of love is thus essentially social, and since it is said to have a "tendency" or "end", the passion is intentional. Or we may say that Hume's account of love has possibilities of being developed into a mode of knowing other selves. Love and hatred constitute a universal component in the relation of persons, and may be found in the personal situation in all its forms. Philosophers who have written on love as a mode of personal relationship have emphasised on the element of mutuality. It is said that love is fulfilled only when it is reciprocated. An early recognition of it is found in Aristotle's Ethics (Book IX). He speaks of a friend being in fact another self. Aristotle says that a man is "related to his friend as to himself (for his friend is another self)... the extreme of friendship is likened to one's love for oneself" (The Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle, translated by Ross, The World's Classics, p. 228). This passage is often quoted in favour of the view that Aristotle's theory of friendship

is based on self-love. But it can equally well be regarded as the first philosophical treatment of "mutuality". He speaks of "man being a social animal and formed by nature for living with others". To readers of the Politics, this sounds familiar. Aristotle has a good deal to contribute about the relations between selves. Most of all in the line: "Friendship is acted out in intimacy," he offers the most 'practical' wisdom of all. Philia presupposes a certain equality of the two taking part and a mutual recognition of the worth of each. Hume's position is not far from Aristotle's, because though we are not intimately conscious of the thoughts and feelings of the person we may love, yet it is hoped to be overcome by the principle of sympathy, which Hume invokes for this exclusive purpose. The element of mutuality is not explicit in Hume's account of love, but not without it. The element of intimacy is secured by my having a special relation to the person I love, just as in the case of pride, something that I am be proud of needs shared in a special relation to me. Hume says that the relation has got to be "a close one, and a closer than is requir'd to joy" (ibid.,p. 291). Similarly, in the case of love, "Myself am related to the person" (ibid.,p. 339). The faculty of imagination assists the passions, and this is more so in the case of the other-regarding passions like love and hatred. On epistemic grounds the passions of pride and humility are easier to have than those of love and hatred because, "when the affections are once directed to myself, the fancy passes not with the same facility from that object to any other person, how closely so ever connected with us" (ibid., p. 340). The difficulty

besetting the transition of passions with objects other than ourselves, can be removed by invoking the principle of sympathy. Hume's notion of the moral self, one can say, is not a windowless monad, and hence it cannot rest with itself as the object of its passions. He makes this point quite clearly. The moral self becomes real only in the context of personal relationship. He writes, "Ourself, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing: For which reason we must turn our view to external objects; and 'tis natural for us to consider with most attention such as lie contiguous to us, or resemble us"(ibid). The principle of sympathy operates of itself, it is not artificially introduced, it is a 'natural' working of the mind. We shall later undertake a fuller consideration of Hume's notion of sympathy. It will suffice here to say that sympathy as Hume puts it, is a mechanism by which "the mind passes easily from the idea of ourselves to that of any other object related to us"(ibid). We find, then, that passions, when the object is some other person than myself are assisted by the imagination and sympathy. In this way Hume liberates us from the confines of the isolated self by way feelings. The self, whether of mine or of others, that can become the "object" of passions is no mere cognitive subject but a living and changing centre of experience in all its richness of affective and conative aspects as well. If the self were a mere cognitive subject then to speak of one self knowing another self would indeed be contradictory, for on such a view the 'subject' is that which, by reason of being the condition of knowing, cannot be regarded as an 'object'. But since the self is a living

self, it is not like the inhabitants of T.S.Eliot's *The Waste Land* -- "in a prison, waiting for a key". In fact, it already finds itself in a world where people are communicating with each other.

In connexion with love as an other-regarding passion the talk of self-love would come up once again. It is assumed that to the degree to which I love myself I do not love others, that self-love is the same as selfishness. John Calvin spoke of self-love as "a pest". In the Book III of the *Treatise* Hume speaks of self-love as "the source of all injustice and violence", though it is a natural appetite, his value judgment is the same as that of Calvin. He says that "each person loves himself better than any other single person" (*ibid.*, p. 487). It appears that Hume takes the term 'self-love' to mean selfishness. His position, then, with regard to self-love, stands as follows. Either self-love is terminologically a defective notion, i.e., the passion of love cannot have the self as its object, or self-love is selfishness. I have tried earlier to show that self-love is a conceivable passion. In the present context, I should like to argue that selfishness need not necessarily be the only meaning of 'self-love'.

"A propensity to the tender passions" (*ibid.*, p. 603-4) such as love and benevolence or friendship is for Hume the criterion for moral appraisal or commendation. "We praise", he says, "all the passions that partake of" the tender passions. The operation of the tender dispositions, i.e., the generosity of men, as Hume calls it, is a limited one, and "it seldom extends beyond their friends and

family, or at most, beyond their native country." Yet, we are told that "in our calm judgments" the limitations are transcended. Now love, then, becomes an attitude which is the same toward all objects including myself. The commandment "love thy neighbour as thyself" as speaking of love in the sense suggested above. If you love yourself, you love everybody else as you do yourself — so goes a Buddhist saying. Self-love in this specific sense has a history. The notion that love for others and love for oneself are mutually exclusive is unsound. If it is a virtue to love my neighbour as a human being, it must be a virtue — and not a vice — to love myself, since I am a human being too. Since there is no concept of man in which I myself am not included. The love for my own self is inseparably connected with the love for any other being. Love of others and love of ourselves are not alternatives. On the contrary, an attitude of love toward themselves will be found in all those who are capable of loving others. The arguments stand on the truth of the premise that not only others, but we ourselves are also the 'object' of our feelings and attitudes. And there is no foreseeable reason that Hume would disdain it. Love should then properly be contrasted with selfishness, which is a case of self-alienation. The over solicitous mother is said to be selfish. Psychiatrists say that such mothers actually have a deeply repressed hostility toward her child — the object of her concern, while she consciously believes that she is particularly fond of her child. She is over concerned not because she loves the child too much, but because she has to compensate for her lack of capacity to love him at all. The

selfish person seems to care too much for himself, while there is a lack of fondness and care for himself in any productive sense. Hume's notion of love as a tender sensitive feeling is also productive, i.e., it implies care, concern and responsibility. If an individual is able to love productively, he loves himself too. The following should be taken as about the behaviour of the self-loving man: " 'tis remarkable, that nothing touches a man of humanity more than any instance of extraordinary delicacy in love or friendship, where a person is attentive to the smallest concern of his friend, and is willing to sacrifice to them the most considerable interest of his own" (ibid., pp. 604-5). Such behaviour is taken by Hume as "a proof of the highest merit in any one". It is not for the love of a wife that a wife is dear, said Yajnavalkya to his wife, but for the love of the self that a wife is dear. This could not have been the utterance of a selfish person.

It has been argued that love is unreliable because it is a biased judgment. Love is a biased emotion and biased emotions may lead to unfair evaluation. Ardal has raised the point that either love can lead to a wrong evaluation or it may be aroused even when the object possesses no very obvious pleasing qualities. But as we have already attempted to distinguish between three senses of the word, love as esteem or thinking highly of is something different from, say, our love of relations or feeling of tender emotion for our friends. Ardal is right in pointing out that one may be called upon to justify one's pride in something, and such a justification consists in giving an account of the valuable characteristics of

the object of pride. But such a process of justification is not possible in the case of love. Ardal seems to argue, because, he says, "when referring to people, [love] usually stands for tender emotion .... and does not mean 'thinking highly of'. Thus we claim to love our children without having to meet the challenge that there is nothing lovable or valuable about them; but we cannot claim to be proud of our children unless we are prepared to say that they have some valuable qualities." (op.cit.,p.37) The argument is valid, but not sound, since Hume does implicitly distinguish between love as esteem as a correlative of pride, and love as tender emotion. The correlation between pride as self-esteem and love as esteem or thinking highly of others makes possible the transition from pride to love. Almost in the manner of Aristotle, Hume says that "the original passion is pride or humility, whose object is self; and .... this passion is transfus'd into love or hatred, whose object is some other person". (op.cit.,p.345. italics not in the text) The evaluative character of the passion of love remains unchanged, for our love for the other person is caused by his valuable qualities: "The virtue, knowledge, wit, good sense, good humour of any person, produce love and esteem." (ibid.,p.330) Hume explicitly says that the object of love and hatred is always some other person, but "the object is not, properly speaking, the cause of those passions, or alone sufficient to excite them."(ibid.) And for precisely this reason he was led to distinguish between "the quality that operates, and the subject on which it is placed" (ibid.) Ardal misses this point altogether. What is more important to remember is that Hume himself treats "love of relations" as an

exception to the rule of double association of impressions and ideas which is required for the passion of love as esteem. Love differs from pride, not as Ardal thinks, "without in any sense implying the existence of any valuable quality at all"(op.cit.,p.37) but in requiring the assistance of imagination and sympathy. There is in Hume an use of the word 'love' which does satisfy Ardal's description, and that is love as tender emotion, or a variant of it, i.e., love of relations.

And, finally, the misgiving that love can lead to a wrong evaluation may be disposed of by the following consideration. Hume's moral psychology is worked out with a view to showing that all our activities, at least the practical ones, have their motives and intentions, and are sustained by an emotional attitude. This is not to say that all our thinking is prejudiced or coloured by emotional bias. Whether we can escape completely from prejudice may be questioned. An element of emotion is present in most of our thought and it is also doubtful that to get rid of emotions is to escape from prejudice altogether. May be that we shall lose the capacity to think. Loose thinking or uncontrolled feelings do lead us into error. I do not mean to deny this. But strong emotions, which Hume calls "violent passions" such as love and hatred may sharpen the focus of our attention and quicken our apprehension of the object and lead to the recognition of truths, and even of facts, which otherwise could have escaped our notice. Personal relations have the merit that it minimises the possibility of shamming. Who knows a man better than his wife? Feelings arising out of personal

relationship constitute the hinterland of our approach to others. A certain modicum pro-feelings seems to be the presupposition of the whole enterprise of getting to know others. If I am not interested in X, and rather dislike him in fact, I will not embark on the project of getting to know him further. Our pro-feelings (and love is one such), moreover, seem to act as a kind of bridge spanning the gap between the various times when we are in actual contact. The stimulus to continue our knowing then appears to come not only from the will but from our affective life (Of course, this makes no sense in other knowings, e.g., mathematical knowing, though very relevant to our knowledge of others).

The general statements made above need substantiation. The problem of knowing other selves is riddled with grave epistemological difficulties, and any opinion expressed cannot go without hazarding opposition. In ethics the epistemological bearing of the problem has not much been probed, though the very notion of morality seems to presuppose a non-solipsistic universe. In his moral psychology, it appears to me, Hume has hinted at some probable solution which is worth considering. His investing the passions with a social dimension and intentionality prepares from the start for a non-solipsistic world of morality. The close relation that he shows between the two 'faculties' of the imagination and passions (op.cit., p. 339) and the 'principle' of sympathy (ibid., p. 316), which he invokes for knowing the feelings of others go to lay the foundations of what may be called the epistemology of ethics. To put in general terms, Hume is, in fact, attempting to reinstate the primacy

of feeling in our practical concerns. Or, he is trying the efficacy of feeling in our having a knowledge of other selves whom we must take into account before any moral action is possible.

The efficacy of reason as an instrument of discovery was by and large taken for granted by philosophers from the time of ancient Greece onwards. However, there have been periods in the history of philosophical thought when due recognition was given to a way of thinking not purely intellective. We may note some of these. The mediaeval distinction between _cognitio per modum amoris_ and _cognitio per modum rationis_ provides a case in point. Pascal perhaps came nearest to this notion with his conception of an order of the heart. Among later philosophers Lotze was alive to the intentional character of emotion and to its revelatory function, and it may be said to have been implied in the most thorough fashion of all in the writings of the romantics. In this theory of value Meinong maintained that emotions have what he called a 'presentative' function and that they therefore, had a part to play in cognition. Among recent philosophical writings one of the most challenging claims in favour of the cognitive role of feeling was made by W.E.Hocking. In his chapter on the 'Destiny of Feeling' he writes: 'All positive feeling .... reaches its terminus in knowledge. All feeling means to instate some experience which is essentially cognitive' (_The Meaning of God in Human Experience_, p. 67).

Feeling in the context of ethics are mostly regarded as a bar to the proper functioning of reason and the performance of duty. Plato's analogy of the unruly horses which seek to run away with

the chariot, or Kant's dislike of the category of the 'pathological' are what is typical of the philosophers' treatment of feelings in ethics. Whatever may be the shortcomings of feelings, neither Plato nor Kant provides us with a clue for knowing the other selves. Sartre's charge against Kant that from the transcendental apperception of the self or the barely logical 'I think' the existence of the other selves cannot be derived seems to hold truth. Though Kant was in a greater need of a non-solipsistic universe, otherwise his universalizability thesis or the kingdom of ends lose its meaningfulness, yet appears to take the existence of other selves as granted in both of his <u>Second</u> and <u>Third Critiques</u>. There could have been a possible line of approach through the intentional character of feelings, but Kant's deep distrust of the pathological prevented it from being done. In Hume we find a promising attempt at laying the foundations of moral epistemology. To say this is not to commit oneself to the soundness of his arguments, but to recognize what has long been unheeded: Feelings from the hinterland of our knowing other persons.

The Principle of Sympathy: Communication of Passion

In some of the foregoing sections I have tried to suggest the case that Hume does not subscribe to the idea of the contents of people's minds as shut off from each other by insurmountable barriers, so that what is experienced is eternally private and inexpressible. In the <u>Enquiry</u> he points out that we already possess a common evaluative language. The publicity and sharability of our language of evaluation is a pointer to the fact that we do communicate, or there does occur an exchange of feelings of approval or disapproval. He writes "The very nature of language guides us almost infallibly in forming a judgment of this [universal?] nature".(P.174) Expressions of esteem and affection or of hatred and contempt or of praise or blame are found in all languages. The possibility of such a language arises from the social nature of man. Hume might have said with F. Waismann that "the term 'communication' is in no wise problematic so long as we use this word practically"(<u>The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy</u>, p. 245). The word "practically" is important, because Hume does not make a claim for having given convincing answers to such questions as 'What is the nature of communication?', nor does he claim that perfect communication in all its aspects is ever possible. He is modest enough to say only that we start by knowing the feelings of another person, and then, with them as evidences, declare his possessions, attributes, and conditions as good or evil. We may turn to a fuller explication of the concept and the argument that he offers for its employment.

When we use the phrase 'concept of sympathy' what we intend to ask is the 'meaning' of the term. The difficulty in giving a precise meaning the term had for Hume is owing to the inconstant way he wrote about it. Apart from the fact that Hume nowhere defines the term, he describes it in more than one and often incompatible ways. For example, if 'sympathy' were a name of a special kind of feeling, then to ask for its definition would have made no sense, because, passions as simple impressions are indefinable, and this is a view which Hume adheres consistently to. But he does speak of sympathy as a feeling. On page 370 of the Treatise he speaks of the "passion of sympathy", though elsewhere he resorts to the usual nomenclature "principle". The commentators are also divided on this issue. Macnabb says that sympathy is a "calm, regular and general passion" (op.cit.,p.166), on the other hand, Kemp Smith denies it. He writes, "Sympathy is not itself a passion or emotion", it a name "for the 'manner' in which this or that ideally entertained emotion... comes to be experienced" (op.cit.,p.170). Further, Kemp Smith gives a convincing reason for his view, namely, if sympathy were a passion, it would have appeared in Hume's classificatory inventory of passion, just as the mode of experiencing is not a part of the constituents of experience. To a great extent sympathy is a psychological scheme for experiencing the feelings not originally felt by ourselves. But, above all, as Hume himself says, it is a "principle", or should we say, a hypothesis for explaining the phenomenon of becoming aware of the feelings of others at a second order level. Sympathy is a principle in the sense of an original tendency or a natural disposition of human beings in

so far as they are capable of communicating their "sentiments from one thinking being to another" (*op. cit.*, p.363). "Man," says Hume, "has the most ardent desire of society" (*ibid*) and no passion that man can feel would be benefit of reference to other persons. This statement may be explained as follows. Love and hatred, we are told, have necessary reference to other selves, they are other-regarding passions by virtue of their objects. But what about the so-called allegedly non-dispositional self-regarding passions like pride and humility, which have the self as their object? They are no less social than love and hatred. Hume tells us that the particular causes of pride and love, and of humility and hatred are much the same, they differ only in the different relation between the man who feels the passion and its cause. And as we have said earlier, pride and love, or humility and hatred are passions of a man who evaluates either himself or others, but the passions can come about only in some kind of society, and society alone provides us with a standard of worthiness. "We fancy ourselves more happy, as well as more virtuous or beautiful, when we appear so to others" (*ibid.*, p.292) says Hume. The inherent sociality of our passions is based on the principle of sympathy. For Hume, sympathy is the *constitutive*[1] factor of our social passions. There is a certain sharability about our feelings, a communicable aspect is there about our emotional re-actions.

1. On the Leibniz's pre-established harmony among windowless monads is *regulative*. But, for Hume, the individuals in society are not windowless. They affect one another by their feelings and actions, and that they can do so is due to the operation of sympathy. Since communication of sentiments is a fact, which is explained in terms of sympathy, it is in that sense constitutive. The role of imagination in the transition of passions, on the other hand, is regulative, for Hume.

It is apparent then that 'sympathy' is used by Hume as a technical term, it does not necessarily mean a favourable attitude of mind, or disposition to agree or approve. As a hypothesis, Sympathy is a general supposition put forth to account for the phenomena of the communication of sentiments. Let us see how it does its work.

"All human creatures are related to us by resemblance. Their persons, therefore, their interests, their passions, their pains and pleasures must strike upon us in a lively manner, and produce an emotion similar to the original; since a lively idea is easily converted into an impression" (ibid., p.369). In this passage Hume gives the reason why is it necessary to entertain the principle of sympathy. He seems to argue from a general case to a particular one. If it is true that all human creatures are related to us by resemblance, and that we have a lively idea of everything related to us, then it can be asserted that the lively idea is convertible into an impression. This manner of reasoning leads him to state what he means by 'sympathy' in terms of its operation: "Sympathy [is] nothing but a lively idea converted into an impression" (ibid., pp. 335-6).

Sympathy or "the communication of passions" (ibid., p.398) is the name Hume gives to what, for him, is one of the most important operations of human nature, and a few of the most eloquent rhetoric in the Treatise are those which describe its importance.[1] As regards

1. 'Let all the powers and elements of nature conspire to serve and obey one man: Let the sun rise and set at his command: The sea and rivers roll as he pleases, and the earth furnish spontaneously whatever may be useful or agreeable to him: He will still be

Continued....

the importance of Sympathy we may note two passages from the *Treatise* for our purpose. On page 363, he says that Sympathy is "the sole or animating principle" of all our passions like "pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge or lust". The list is by no means satisfactory, because it does not mention most of the direct and indirect passions we have been told about; and also due to the fact that it is difficult to conceive ambition as a passion. It is more a character-trait or desire than a simple impression. Again, revenge is the name of an act and may be taken as issuing from the passion of anger. However, in another passage on page 593, he says that the 'principle of sympathy is of so powerful and insinuating a nature, that it enters into most of our sentiments and passions'.

The conversion of an idea into an impression or the process or operation of sympathy is strictly speaking conversion of an idea of impression into an impression resembling that of which we have only the idea. And the reason for such a conversion is the liveliness or vivacity of the idea of impression. An enlivened idea can easily be felt by the mind as if it were an original impression. We can appreciate the operation of Sympathy if we remember that Hume compares this process of conversion to reflection in a mirror: "the minds of men are mirrors to one another" (*ibid.*,p.365) and all that is so mirrored in Sympathy is not passions alone "but also ... senti-

(Continuation of footnote from previous page)

miserable, till you give him some one person at least, with whom he may share his happiness, and whose esteem and friendship he may enjoy.' *Treatise*, p.363. It may be interesting to note that in Buddhism the person who can be said to be enjoying bliss is one who is lonely as a rhinoceros, yet the capacity of transforming one's self into that of one's neighbour's - *parātma-parivartana*, as they say, is regarded as a high moral achievement. The Buddhist idea of *parātma-parivartana* has a strikingly close affinity with Hume's notion of sympathy.

ments and opinions"(*ibid.*). And this is important. Not only can I feel what my friend or neighbour feels but I can share their thoughts and beliefs as well. This of course does not mean that there can be a complete identity of thinking, for in that case communication becomes meaningless. What Hume does imply is that the domain of sympathy extends over our affective, conative and intellective life. Another possible misconception that there is multilateral reciprocity among all men. This is not what Hume intends to assert when he says "So close and intimate is the correspondence of human souls, that no sooner any person approaches me, than he diffuses on me all his opinions, and draws along my judgment in a greater or lesser degree". (*ibid.*, p.592) He makes it clear that "my sympathy with him goes not so far as entirely to change my sentiments, and my way of thinking." (*ibid.*) Sympathy or communication, properly speaking, breaks or prevents the isolation of the individual;[1] no one is separate and lonely but caught up in a sympathetic exchange of emotions and judgements. "Whether we judge of an indifferent person, or of my own character, my sympathy gives equal force to his decision: And even his sentiments of his own merit make me consider him in the same light, in which he regards himself."(*ibid.*)

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1. Cf. 'No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of main' - John Donne, *Devotions*, no. 17. The Buddhists consider *parātma-parivartana* eliminating selfishness or egotism. It is a decisive factor in overcoming the barrier of selfishness, and a successful *parātma-parivartana* brings in its wake love, compassion and joy. *Parātma-parivartana* is the process essentially delineating and effective communication, while for sympathy as a feeling the Buddhists have the synonym *adosa*.

The *modus operandi* of communication is, to put it briefly, "first as an idea, then as an impression"(*ibid.*,p.369). The idea that a certain person is having such and such impression or passion is "at first known only by its effects"(*ibid.*,p.317) and by effects Hume means "those external signs in the countenance and conversation which convey an idea of it" (*ibid.*). While discussing the view that Hume's theory of the passions is Cartesian I sought to point out that his notion of passions is not that of a closed mental state, sealed in such privacy that no body could have any access to it. The passions have their behavioural counterparts, if not all passions, most of them have public expression. It would be a improbable conjecture that universal chamming of the passions can take place. It is not only difficult but rarely people do conceal their passions, that is to say, expression of peoples' emotional reactions find almost involuntary manifestations. These manifestations like smile, tears, facial gestures, words and deeds are in a peculiar way revelatory of their feelings. From the manifestations of feelings as signs, which all persons living in society can observe, we can become non-intimately conscious of the signified impressions by getting our ideas of them enlivened. My friend's deportment signifies his passions, and on observing it I come to form an idea of his feelings. It is an idea for me of my friend's feelings because I do not feel his passions with as much liveliness and vivacity as he does. Then from the "external signs" of the passion felt by my friend it is possible for me to form an idea of it only because he and I are men and so much do all men resemble each other in mind and body that the mere experience of the signs can be converted into an idea. It

appears that even if one grants that universal shamming is not possible, the programme of taking the deportment of the other person as a trustworthy sign of his passional experience might remain problematic. It is one thing to say that our emotions have expressions in our overt behaviour, and it is a different thing to say that a passion must have the particular expression or behaviour pattern that it usually has. Just as from the fact that a self must have a body, it does not follow that a self should have the body it has, similarly, from the admission that emotions have overt bodily expressions, it does not follow that an emotion must have the expressions it has. In that case, Hume's 'signs' become unfaithful. We cannot trust a sign, not because it may have been designed to deceive, but because an emotion often stands to its expressions in one-many relation. Emotional expressions are instinctive as well as learnt. In the case of learnt ones an individual agent's choice and decision may enter in such a creative way that signs simpliciter become ambiguous. And hence a merely enlivened idea would misplace sympathy. From the spectator's point of view signs need be interpreted. Often even on observing behavioural signs it remains significant to ask such questions 'What he is up to?' or 'Does she love me?' Many of our sophisticated emotions defy the spectator's straight-forward reading, because, as agents, we might refuse to be continental in our expressions. I need telling my lady that I love her in spite of my having displayed the signs of my emotions. Since Hume does not mention whether experience of signs sets in motion any interpretative process it might be the case that the spectator would come to have an enlivened idea of a signified impression that the

agent was not having at all. A simple sign such as a smile may stand inscrutably for love, greeting, sarcasm, embarrassment and even despair, and it is often not too easy to decipher the emotion or feeling it signifies. The relation between the possible range of emotions and the sign here is many-one. What we need for sympathizing with an impression is an approximately one-one relation between an enlivened idea and its corresponding impression expressed through signs. Such a biunique condition, though not altogether impossible, is yet often difficult to fulfil. Hume would not, I believe, discount foregoing considerations. Initially, his account of sympathy is not very informative. It presupposes his distinction between ideas and impression and, on the face of it, controverts his general thesis, ideas are derived from impressions. But sympathy as transition of passions has a stronger claim, namely, that it entails experiencing the same emotional experience as the person sympathized with is experienced. If this be the case, the contention can obviously be questionable.

The uniformity of human nature is taken by Hume as a basic unproven assumption. It is by virtue of the uniformity again that I can come to feel the way my friend has felt. Hume says that the conveyed idea is "converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection"(ibid.). Perhaps Hume is a trifle over-stating the case. For sympathy is by no means a perfect communication, and it cannot perhaps be so claimed without hazarding various epistemological objections. Hume himself

maintains that no impression can be as lively or vivacious as that "of ourselves, (which) is always intimately present with us" (*ibid.*). And, by definition, nothing can be experienced as "intimately present with us" as our own "impression of ourselves". So what Hume seems to emphasize is that within the limits imposed on us by the nature of the case, the impression converted from an idea of other person's passions *via* the signs through which that was formed is felt *as if* it were an original impression of one's own passion. This modification is called for by a number of considerations. The signs are not always the familiar ones and the ideas formed may also vary in their respective liveliness and vivacity. It is easier, in spite of the uniform human nature, to have a sympathetic understanding of one's friends' feelings than those of a stranger's. And the signs themselves are very complex phenomena and may often be conditioned by one's culture and tradition. Signs again may be subject to individual variations, some signs may be strong, and others weak, some may be good (in an instrumental sense of the term, of course) while others poor in merit. It seems that Hume was aware of these difficulties, and it led him to formulate the different relations that are or may be operative in a sympathy-situation.

The crucial factor in the operation of sympathy is the transfusion of liveliness to the ideally entertained emotion. What is the source of the liveliness, which converts an idea into an impression? We are told by Hume that nothing can go beyond the liveliness of our impression of ourselves: "our consciousness gives us so

lively a conception of our own person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go beyond it"(ibid.). And this paradigm of liveliest impression that we could have, sui impression, would naturally transfuse its intensity into any idea that may come or happen to be associated with it. The impression of the self guarantees that we have a vivid conception (Hume's terminology) of every object related to us. The strength of the relation between an object and the self is a factor of two other types of relation, resemblance and contiguity. Of all the objects that can be so related by resemblance and contiguity to the self, none leads to a stronger relation than the passions or sentiments of others. Hence the "very remarkable resemblance" between the passions and sentiments of others and our own "must very much contribute to make us enter into the sentiment of others"(ibid.,p.318). But resemblance is not the only relation which produces this effect for "the sentiments of others have little influence when far removed from us, and require the require of contiguity, to make them communicate themselves entirely" (ibid.). All these relations convey the impression of the self to the sentiments and passion of others and this "makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner". The self, by which a complex set of impressions which we call our self at a given time of our conscious existence, and it need not be anything unchanging, is the source of vivacity or liveliness. Anything less vivid than an impression cannot have the power of converting an idea to the vivacity of an impression. But it must also be added that the process of raising an idea to the vivacity of an impression can turn out to be the case, only if

the ideally entertained emotion is showed to be owned by somebody who is in some way related to us. The idea of the passion felt by another human being can be raised to the status of an impression by the enlivening influence by me because the person concerned is in a special way related to me, or my impression of self. To generalize the case, it is possible to assert that the emotions of a human being can and does affect any other human being because some relation holds between all human persons. "Whatever object...is related to ourselves must be conceived with a like vivacity of conception" (ibid.,p.317) and since "nature has preserv'd a resemblance among all human creatures ...that any passion...in others" would "find a parallel in ourselves" (ibid.,p.318). We find that the second stage in the operation of sympathy, i.e., the conversion of an idea into an impression rests on the notion of self as a source of liveliness and the fact that the relation of resemblance hold between all human beings, and that of contiguity between some of them. Another remark about the two kinds of perceptions involved in sympathy. If it is true, as Hume sets it out in Book I of the Treatise, that all ideas are borrowed from impressions and that the two differ only in the degree of force or vivacity, does not Hume maintain almost the converse of the thesis in saying that "a lively idea of any always approaches its impression"? The word "approaches" is certainly a vague term, and what warrant is there for the claim that a lively idea of a passion approaches so much to its impression that it can be converted into it? This assumption is central to Hume's account of the operation of sympathy, and yet it is based on a dubious assertion that emotions as objects of ideas enjoy a

special status compared with the many other possible objects of ideas. Perhaps emotions do enjoy this special status, but Hume does not argue the point, he only states it. Again, how do we identify a lively idea, what is the criteria of what constitutes it? Hume does not supply us with anything of that sort.

By the relation of resemblance among human beings Hume means "the fabric of the mind" and "that of the body", and however "the parts may differ in shape or size, their structure and composition are in general the same" (ibid.). He notes further that the resemblance enters into sympathy in a two-fold way: besides "the general resemblance of our natures" there is also the particular "similarity in our manners, or character, or country, or language"(ibid.). There is no doubt that the general resemblance does "very much contribute to make us enter into the sentiments of others"(ibid.), the particular similarities make the relation between ourselves and any object all the more 'stronger' (ibid). The second type of particular resemblance between human persons, in fact, prepares us for another sort of relation operative in sympathy, that is, the relation of contiguity. This second sort of relation is needed because, resemblance, by itself, may not be sufficient for entering into the feelings of others. The way other people feel may not affect us with that much of intensity if they happen to be, as Hume says, "far remov'd from us", and this consideration makes us reckon contiguity as another relation that influences communication of sentiments by adding new strength to it. It may be asked whether there is any justification for distinguishing between particular resemblance as

a relation and contiguity as another. There can be general resemblance among different sets of people who do not live as geographical neighbours. For example, there is general resemblance in the child-rearing process among women-folk all the world over. Is it possible, on the contrary, to have particular resemblance among people without the resembling persons being contiguous? And even if both particular resemblance and contiguity are available, does it guarantee a communication of sentiment in every possible case? People speaking the same language and with the same accent ordinarily live in contiguous territories, or people of same nationality will have to be contiguous to one another. The implication hardly seems to hold in the reverse order. A Jew and a Christian may be contiguous as neighbours and yet far removed in their particular resemblance as defined by Hume. In this respect the two relations may need be distinguished, though it need not always be like that. For the immigrants in a new country acquire both the particular resemblance and contiguity in course of their living in the country which they have immigrated to. But the main line of Hume's argument is clear enough, that is, resemblance alone cannot produce the vivacity of impression. That the liveliness of an impression derived from the impression of the self be transfused to the idea of other people's passions, the idea must be brought as close to the self as possible. Hence he says that "All these relations, when united together, convey the impression or consciousness of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others, and makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner."(*ibid.*) The insufficiency of these relations for "entering

into the sentiments of others" becomes apparent when we consider the fact that there is a sense in which one may not care to sympathize with others' feeling even the persons concerned may be resembling and contiguous with oneself. There can be, and often are, several alienating factors that impede sympathy or communication. Every society is not human society, and if what Marx said is true, there are notions of class society, civil society or bourgeois society. Again, the alienators such as racism, economic exploitation, imperialism, and religious fanaticism can frustrate communication by a process of dehumanization despite the necessary conditions of sympathy, e.g., general and particular resemblance together with contiguity, are present. As we had earlier remarked, there seems to be a decisional element in one's knowledge of other selves, and this element Hume appears to have left out of his account.

In order that an impression may be had from an idea the self as a source of enlivening anything that is resembling and contiguous to it does not tell the whole story about communication of feelings. The entire account presupposes a specific doctrine, which Hume takes particular care to remind us. Granted that we have an idea which is resembling and contiguous to the intimately present impression of ourselves, the communication does not follow of necessity, unless we hold also that (a) the "component parts of ideas and impressions are precisely alike"(ibid.,p.319), (b) the "different degrees of their force and vivacity are....the only particulars that distinguish them"(ibid.), and (c) it is possible that the difference may be removed, e.g., by the relations of resemblance and contiguity. There-

fore, it is possible to hold that "an idea of sentiment of passion may....be so enliven'd as to become the very sentiment or passion" (*ibid.*). Now the doctrine of ideas and impressions, having the same component parts and their manner and order of appearance, though differing only in vivacity is neither a self-evident statement nor it is analytic. As it has been suggested that the distinction between ideas and impressions in terms of vivacity is an empirical generalisation (see D.D.Raphael, *The Moral Sense*, p.3) then the possibility of communication of emotions turns out to be not certain and universal but highly probable. Of course, this argument does not affect Hume's contentions much, because the domain of the passions lies outside that of necessity[1] and the relations of resemblance and contiguity are not logical but natural ones. The problem for Hume is that communication of emotion does as a matter of fact happen, and if it be the case, how are we to explain it. The only thing that we might say against him is that he explains it perhaps in a mechanical way and consequently leaves out of account the decisional element often found to be involved in such situations.

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1. The view that every idea is a copy of some impression is often referred to as the Copy Principle. The logical status of the copy principle is interesting in itself as a problem concerning Hume's philosophical methodology. Is the principle a contingent generalisation (Raphael) or a tautology (Antony Flew, *Hume's Philosophy of Belief*, p.29)? A.H.Basson takes it to be a definition. It is true that Hume challenges anyone who disputes the copy principle to produce an idea which has no corresponding impression or an impression with no corresponding idea. Hume's celebrated missing shade of blue endangers the status of the principle as a necessary truth, and if it is an empirical or contingent generalisation, his crusade against metaphysical beliefs and ideas would be rendered ineffectual. A promising alternative could be to regard the principle a methodological device for analysis, or a rule of procedure. But that is another story.

Another important point made by Hume is that the communicated passion is a real passion. How can we be convinced of the "reality of the passion"? We get at the "reality of the passion" by the relation of cause and effect. But the relation of cause and effect by itself, cannot bring about the communication of emotion, and it needs to be assisted by the two relations of resemblance and contiguity. The cumulative effect of the assistance of the three relations of cause and effect, resemblance and contiguity is such that an idea is "entirely" converted into an impression, conveying "the vivacity of the latter into the former, so perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition" (ibid.,p.320). The note of sureness in Hume's language is a little baffling. The efficacy of the relations of resemblance and contiguity is no mean one, since they are potent enough for an entire conversion of an idea into an impression, except its "reality". In this sense, the relations of resemblance and contiguity may be called the necessary conditions of communication of emotions. But since the idea has to be so converted that it might be like an "original" one, i.e., as if it were a real passion of one's own, the relation of cause and effect is called forth, and could be looked on as another condition. For Hume's account of the causal relation in connexion with sympathy "in its full perfection" it might appear that he construes the relation in such a fashion as if it were a sufficient condition. He writes about the causal relation in somewhat stronger terms. He says that the relation of cause and effect converts an idea into an impression "so perfectly as to loose nothing of it in the transition". If the causal relation is a strengthening and enlivening factor, so is

"the relation of objects to ourself". Is the second relation causal? Or, that of resemblance? If I am not misunderstanding Hume, this point remains obscure whether the relation responsible for an entire conversion of an idea into an impression is causal "alone" (Hume uses the word on p.320), or both of cause and effect and of objects to ourself. And also whether the two relations together constitute the sufficient condition for communication of sentiments is left unexplicated. If "the relation of objects to ourselves" is a sub-relation of resemblance, in that case it could be taken as presupposed by the causal relation, since resemblance is employed in all arguments from cause and effect. But Hume says that sympathy is not only "exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding" but also "contains something more surprising and extraordinary"(ibid.). What could this "surprising and extraordinary" element that the relation of objects to ourself? Again, as "the conversion arises from the relation of objects to ourself" the self as the enlivening source remains constant and is presupposed by the relations of resemblance and contiguity, because only such ideas can be converted into an impression that are contiguous to and resembles ourselves. No less opaque in Hume's account is his comparing sympathy with such mental acts like inferring. He says explicitly: "sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding". Let us clarify the difficulty involved in the comparison.

In a footnote on page 371 of the Treatise Hume says that by 'understanding' he means demonstrative and probable reasonings,

when opposed to imagination. Sympathy, as it involves the relation of cause and effect cannot be imagination, which, for Hume, is no less an operation of the understanding, in the wider sense of the word. Nor it can be a species of demonstrative reasoning, since he holds that in sympathy we are concerned with matters of fact (ibid., p.319). Then sympathy or communication of emotions must be an instance of probable reasoning, which, in Book I of the Treatise, is either "philosophical" or "unphilosophical". Probable reasoning, when it is "philosophical" includes all evidence, except mathematical knowledge, and arguments from cause and effect. But when it is "unphilosophical" it is confined to uncertain arguments from conjecture, and distinguished both from mathematical knowledge and arguments from cause and effect. In this sense sympathy cannot be regarded as a case of "unphilosophical" probability. But curiously enough, Hume gives the example of communication of sentiments by signs as a case of unphilosophical probability. He says that communication of sentiments is a kind of "discovery" of other persons' sentiments with the help of the signs that they might use. The signs are "general and universal" and its use is compared by Hume to "taking off the mask" (ibid.,p.151). The metaphor of mask, apt and telling as it is, belies its classification as "unphilosophical" reasoning, which as Hume tells us, yields only a diminished assurance.

Again, what is the nature of the conversion of an idea into an impression in sympathy? Hume says that the change is "instantaneous" (ibid.,p.317). His appeals to human nature seem to suggest that communication of sentiments is almost an involuntary process. Then he goes

on to remark that in sympathy we infer "the real existence of the object" (ibid., p.318 and the phrase "the reality of the passion" on p.320). How obviously a species of reasoning which gives only diminished assurance, as "unphilosophical probability" does, cannot be held to enable us to have "the real existence of the object". But granted that sympathy is a species of causal inference, how could it be "instantaneous"? Because inferring is a mental act, a transition from available data to a conclusion, and its process depends on a set of rules or principles that may be responsible for the validity of the inference. If Hume means by "instantaneous" that feeling sympathy with the sentiments of others is dispositional then it cannot be of the same nature as that of inferring, since inferring is a conscious process which is resorted to with a definite purpose. On the other hand, if sympathy is inferential, as Hume does suggest, then it cannot be dispositional.

Complications arise when we look at Hume's commentators. Kemp Smith seems to take the dispositional view of the process of sympathy. He writes: "Just as in the awareness of others the awareness of their existence is immediate and involuntary, i.e., not inference but apprehension naturally determined in belief, so the awareness of the inner emotional experiences of others has the character of sympathy, i.e., of a direct entering into their experiences through a no less natural and no less immediate type of process" (Op. cit., p.176). Kemp Smith's observation is not unfounded, but there are other, even contrary, evidences as well. He seems to base his view on Hume's metaphor of mirror, i.e., "the minds of men

are mirrors to one another", and this is taken by Kemp Smith to be the central teaching of Hume's doctrine of sympathy. In his discussion, he refers to the relation of cause and effect but does not take it seriously. When we come to a recent writer, Philip Mercer, we note that the process of sympathy is said to be "inductive" in nature. He has interpreted Hume as implying that "since direct knowledge of another's state of mind is impossible, we have to rely for the knowledge we do have on a method of inductive inference" (Op.cit.,p.31). Now, historically, "inductive"[1] is a latter day term, and Hume does not use it. But, it may be pertinently asked, is sympathy a generalization? No, but it may depend on generalization so as to reach a probable conclusion. As so far Hume is concerned, it is difficult to say whether he intends to establish some sort of inferential link between the observed signs and the sympathised passion. It is true nonetheless that he explicitly states that communication of passions is inferential: "No passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind. We are only sensible of its causes or effects. From these we infer the passion: And consequently these give rise to our sympathy"(op.cit.,p.576). Hume's explicitness about the inferential element in sympathy is not also without an over tone of immediacy, which is rather perplexing. He says that the emotions "readily pass from one person to another",

1. Nowadays the word "inductive" is used to cover all cases of non-demonstrative inference in which the truth of the premises, while not entailing the truth of the conclusion, purports to be a good reason for belief in it.

on being presented with signs the spectator's mind "immediately passes" to their causes. In like manner, Hume tells us, the mind is conveyed to the effects, given the causes. Now, if the causal transition is brought about by a sort of mental disposition it could hardly be called an inference, for the transition, as Hume explains it, is a two-way traffic. But an inference in the strict sense is not necessarily so. An inference, stated as a conditional need not be co-implicative. At least, ordinarily, it is not so construed. Could we not say that Hume means, when he says that sympathy is inferential, that our act of inferring the emotional experiences of others is not an inference in the strict sense, rather an identification of others' passions or sentiments on the basis of human communication? The identification is inference-like, since it can be corrigible, but that would not present any serious difficulty as it would in the case of generalizations or conditional statements in the realm of non-demonstrative inference. The immediacy is born of association, and in this respect, it could be distinguished from the directness which marks of any valid inferential process. Immediacy does not yield knowledge, for Hume, and the certainty available for demonstrative reasoning cannot be had of our belief in the existence of passions of others through sympathy. Should the latter be said to involve inference it must be an inference with a difference, i.e., an inference which is immediate, though not direct. Again, inference in the strict sense hardly appeals to association, though it might and does introduce conventions. Hume's sense of "inference" in sympathy cannot then be taken to be inference in the logician's

sense. For clarity's sake it would not be worth one's while to confound the two sense. Nor it should be said to be "inductive", as Mercer does either. Kemp Smith has been partial to such passages which highlight immediate communication of sentiments, where as Mercer seeks to make the case induction a putative one.

In fact, Hume appears to overdo the case of causal relation. Even though the relationship between ideas and impressions is governed by the relation of cause and effect, and particularly the conversion of ideas into impressions, to say that in sympathy an idea is converted into an impression is an imprecise way of putting the affair. Because the uniqueness of communication of sentiments lies in the fact that in sympathy "the mind passes ... from the idea of ourselves to that of any other object related to us" (*ibid.*,p.340). This is an exception to the general rule that "we are at times intimately conscious of ourselves, our sentiments and passions, their ideas must strike upon us with greater vivacity than the ideas of the sentiments and passions of any other person" (*ibid.*,p.339). For this reason Hume himself has observed that the self-regarding passions such as pride and humility are easier to experience than the other-regarding ones like love and hatred. It is only because "Ourself, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing" (*ibid.*,p.340) that the passions of love and hatred and communications of sentiments become possible. There is nothing wrong in saying that in sympathy there occurs a conversion of an idea into an impression, but this is a partial account of the case. All cases of conversion of ideas into impre-

sions need not be cases of communication of sentiments. To take Hume's own example. On page 576 he gives an example in order to argue that given the causes of an emotion the mind is conveyed to the effects by means of a conversion of an idea into an impression. Obviously the example of "terrible operations of surgery" is not a case of communication of sentiments. In this case, no passion passes from one person to another. There seems to have been an indecision in Hume's mind as to the exact nature of sympathy -- whether it is a consequence of causal inference or, as he himself says, "all the affections *readily* pass from one person to another" (*ibid.*, emphasis added). On the one hand, we have the metaphor of mirror, on the other, arguments in support of a causal account.

We may now pass on to considerations of a different nature, e.g., the scope of sympathy. Hume says that "Sympathy is not always limited to the present moment, but ... we often feel by communication the pains and pleasures of others, which are not in being, and which we only anticipate by the force of imagination" (*ibid.*, p. 385). On Hume's account we can only sympathise with feelings which we ourselves have already experienced. The sympathized feeling is generally identified as one of the kind I have had before. This is consistent with Hume's empiricist point of view. But the concept of the future must be uncomfortable for an empiricist, since he cannot be committed to anything that has not been given in experience. How can he significantly talk about the future? Sympathy requires that the objects of the passions,

in this case, the enlivened ideas of the passions of other people, or for that matter, the people themselves be "contiguous to us, either in space or time" (ibid., p. 427). Contiguity in space is a relation easier to conceive, since spatial configurations are "capable of being at once present to the sight or feeling" (ibid., p. 429). Time, the idea of which is formed from the succession of ideas, consists of parts like space, but no two parts of time can be coexistent. From "the incompatibility of the parts of time in their real existence" follows their separability in the imagination. This itself presents the passions of the past with a loss of vivacity. Another consequence of the phenomenon is that the power of the past ideas over our will is generally less, since their succession in time is unalterable by our actions. As agents, we are conatively impotent in respect of the past, which, as the existentialists aver, constitute our facticity. All this is understandable. On the contrary, Hume notices that "the progression of the thought" from the present to the past is "contrary to nature", but "when we turn our thought to a future object" there is an "easy progression of ideas", and consequently, a greater influence on the will and passions, because the seemingly natural order of having ideas "makes it conceive its objects in a stronger and fuller light" (ibid., p. 431). This account appears to presuppose the notion of the future instead of explaining it. Even saying that the notion is conjured up by passing "from one point of time to that which is immediately posterior to it" (ibid.) does not necessarily yield the notion, since the relation of immediate posterity

can hold between any two parts of the past. Is, then, the *seemingly* natural passage of thought responsible for the notion? Hume, to all intents, takes the "*easy* progression of ideas" to characterise the succession of ideas in non-past time. The two facts that we "follow the succession of time in placing our ideas" (*ibid.*,p.430) and that we pass more easily to posterior ideas than those which go before are mere features of our mental life rather of the notion of the future. Apart from the method of thinking, the imagination needs promulgated in order to extend the method of thinking beyond perceptions, and the two could be said to contribute to our having a concept of the future. "We advance rather than retard our existence" (*ibid.*,p.432), says Hume. But why do we "conceive the future as flowing nearer us, and the past as retiring"(*ibid.*) is one of the inexplicable facts of human nature, and hence the question cannot properly be answered. Again, why do "we rather chuse to fix our thought on the point of time interpos'd betwixt the present and future, than on that betwixt the present and the past" (*ibid.*, pp.431-2), can only be ascribed to an original constitution of the human mind. In Book I of the *Treatise*, where Hume discusses his notion of time, he appears to suggest that time *is* the succession of ideas. "Wherever we have no successive perceptions, we have no notion of time, even tho' there be a real succession in the objects" (*ibid.*,p.35). It is obviously a non-Kantian notion of time, since the Humean notion of time is neither 'sensibility' or the capacity of receiving representations of objects, nor *a priori*. The idea of time is an abstract idea, and "nor is it

possible for time alone ever to make its appearance, or be taken notice of by the time" (ibid.). For Hume time is not only a mode of awareness but the mode of our historical being as well. Now, is the awareness of succession an organised structure? Hume would say, yes, though the so-called elements of time, past, present and time, for Hume, are not collection of "givens". The ordering principle of the succession called time, is the relation before - after. For developing a concept of future it is, then, desirable that there should be an experience of succession of ideas structured as before-after, an under-distancing of the gap between ourselves and the object, and above all, an extension of the awareness of succession beyond perceptions. Hume does not distinguish between real future and that which is posited for itself, in the manner of Jean-Paul Sartre. The anticipation or foreseeing the course of a billiard ball, a la Hume, would be an instance of real future, while a future posited in itself is isolated and cut off from all reality, it is a future detached from the present, and entertained for its own sake. It is doubtful whether Hume would call it a future all. Neither in sympathy nor in causal relationship, he would not have any room for a notion of future posited for itself. In causal relationship, for him, we are concerned with real existences. But whether Hume can altogether dispense with the notion of future posited in itself in the context of sympathy can perhaps not be very strongly asserted. If he can do that he would be required to revise his assertion that our passions concern real existence of objects.

We can look into Hume's teaching concerning causal predictions and see how does he explain the concept of the future in that context. According to Hume predictions are presumptive acts of the understanding, in the non-demonstrative sense of the term. Inferring is presuming, i.e., in arguing from a present cause to its absent effect, we argue on the basis of past experience. The guidance of experience cannot be followed up to the end, because past and present experiences can bear witness only to the past and the present. In inferring to the future, we, following the guidance of experience, presume a resemblance between the objects of which we have had experience and those of which we have had none. The truth of the presumption cannot be ascertained either by reason or by experience. Reason is of no avail because it has no jurisdiction over the domain of matters of fact, and experience cannot help us because it must be necessarily silent in respect of all that has never existed. In fact, there is no such thing as causal <u>inference</u>, instead have beliefs about the future course of events. When the mind passes from an idea or impression of A to that of B, it is through the office of the imagination which is operative in the situation, not the understanding. We, in inferring, come to have a belief about a possible state of affair. Belief is a name for the manner in which the mind comes to acquire a lively conception of an object not given to experience. Hume uses a family of genetic notions like custom, habit, and belief is just one of these. Belief consists in enlivening ideas. But it is also an attitude of the mind which carries the awareness beyond its

immediately experienced perishing states and actual events of past experience. In causal inference belief not only generates a vivid expectation but makes us disposed to feel that the inferred entity is an actual occurrence. Belief is Nature's safety-valve against scepticism, or suspension of judgment. In short, belief is not merely "a simple act of thought" but a "peculiar manner of conception, or addition of a force and vivacity"(ibid., p. 134).

Belief, on the one hand, is assisted by custom, and on the other, it operates in and through the imagination. There is the habit of the mind to transfer the past to the future. Custom is "a secret operation" (ibid., p. 104) and determines us to pass from the impression of one object to the idea or belief of another. Custom is nothing but a principle of association, while belief is particular manner of forming an idea. Imagination, says Hume, extends custom and reasoning beyond perception and continues in its course even when its object fails, to use his own metaphor, like a boat under way. One of the specific uses of the word, 'imagination' means for Hume the faculty which is at work whenever belief comes to be the distinctive mental attitude. It is the faculty-name for what he calls the "permanent, irresistible and universal" principles of the mind, and these are "the foundation of all our thoughts and actions" (ibid., p. 225). The Kantian insight that Hume expresses in talking of the imagination is coupled with his usual dispositional analysis and genetic account of our mental operations. A causal prediction like B will followed by A is equi-

valent to saying (dropping 'custom' and 'habit') when faced by an A we are disposed to expect B.

Now as in the case of belief, so do in sympathy custom and habit and above all, the imagination holds its sway. Kemp Smith has drawn attention to the fact that sympathy plays an analogical role in the case of communication of sentiments as does belief in causal inference. Both belief and sympathy are manners of experiencing and have a similar character and mode of operation. He also holds "that Hume arrived at his doctrine of Sympathy before tackling, or at least before finding an answer to the problems of belief, and that it was by analogy with sympathy, both in its intrinsic character and in its mode of operation, that he later formulated his doctrine of belief" (op. cit., pp. 169-70). The analogical mode of operation of belief and sympathy might help us understanding how it is possible to feel a passion which is "not in being" or anticipate it by the force of imagination, as Hume claims. Or, in other words, how is it possible to sympathise with an unfelt feeling? Aesthetic experience largely consists of feeling unfelt feelings. As spectators of drama we experience the feelings of the characters as if we were ourselves feeling them. The agony of Lear is felt by me as unfelt. An aesthetic sentiment is unfelt because it does not have the usual behavioural concomitants. The mature spectator of tragedy may not necessarily weep. There is maintained a psychic distance from the characters of the drama, yet the spectator feels the feelings of the characters in order to appreciate its aesthetic value. Kant, for example, says

that aesthetic feeling is <u>disinterested</u>, i.e., without having a concern for the real existence of the object of feeling. His distinction between feeling and sensation is worth recalling. Aesthetic delight that we have in art-experience is independent of any concern for the real existence of the object. It is the form of the art-object that delights us. Aesthetic judgment, says Kant, is reflective, or non-conceptual. It seems to me that Hume's notion of unfelt feeling or anticipated passions bear or, at least, suggests a resemblance aesthetic mode of feeling. There is of course one basic difference between Kant's and Hume's account of the unfelt feelings. In Kant's case aesthetic feelings cannot be motives for any moral concern. But for Hume they are. The anticipated feelings may prompt us to actions. To this point we shall come later. Let us look into some of his examples. When he says "future pains and pleasures" (<u>ibid</u>., p. 389) what he means is the pains and pleasures that are not "in being". By "future" he means "possible or probable". On page 369 Hume gives the example of "a spectator of a tragedy" and says that the passions of the characters are communicated to the spectator by sympathy. In this case, he notes that the feelings so communicated "have no existence". (<u>ibid</u>.,p.370) Again, blushing is a sign of the feeling of shame. One may come to experience the feeling of shame as a result of realising his foolish behaviour. But why do we blush when we see somebody behaving foolishly? Hume says that it is a case partial sympathy: "we blush for the conduct of those, who behave themselves foolishly before us; and that tho' they show no sense of shame, nor seem in the least conscious of their folly. All this proceeds from sympathy; but 'tis of a partial

kind" (*ibid.*, p. 371). Our behaviour of blushing results from our conceiving a lively idea of the passion of shame, that is, to feel the passion as if we were "really actuated by it".

So far we have tried to show that the notion of unfelt passions or feelings that are not "in being" is not empty. But how does Hume account for it? Hume's answer is: by imagination. He says that "the vivacity of conception is not confin'd merely to its immediate object, but diffuses its influence over all the related ideas" and gives us "a lively notion of all the circumstances....whether past, present, or future; possible, probable or certain" (*ibid.*, p. 386). Just as in the case of belief we are dispositionally led to posit the existence of entities not yet given to experience, but presume on the basis of our past or present data of associated ideas and impressions, similarly, on the strength of the history of our affective life we are dispositionally led to feel or anticipate a passion either for ourselves or for others. The future occurrence of a passion is nothing but a dispositional projection of a feeling on the basis of our past feeling-habit or affective custom. Ordinarily, the enlivening source in communication of sentiments is our impression of self, but on the whole, whether we come to feel a passion presently felt by others or that they might feel in future, the state of affairs is governed by the imagination, which induces us to "consider" others by liberating us from our usual, if not natural, self-centredness. Hume makes it clear when he says that "the imagination is necessitated to consider the person nor can it

possibly confine its view to ourselves"(ibid., p. 346). Again, the imagination which is "our natural temper" gives us "a propensity to the same impression (i.e.,passions), which we observe in others" (ibid., p. 354). It is no wonder, then, that it will facilitate the transition of the enlivened idea to the future. The passions are simple impressions, and qua impressions they come under the same belief-forming process of imagination. Communication of sentiments is itself a sort of belief-forming process. We start with an idea that the other person feels a particular passion (asserted on perceiving the so-called signs) is the case. This idea through being associated with an impression (of self), can be so enlivened as to become a belief that the other person is feeling a particular passion is the case. There seems to be nothing objectionable in so putting the matter, especially in view of the fact that, for Hume, belief is a lively idea or impression. In making a causal prediction, i.e., in asserting a belief in the future occurrence of an event, we are aided by the imagination in entertaining a vivid expectation and taking the inferred entity as if it were an actual occurrence. Correspondingly, in sympathising with an anticipated passion the imagination makes us feel as if the anticipated passion were an actually felt one.

Two points may now be made. First, to have said that we can, in sympathy, feel passions of others that are not "in being" is virtually to modify the initial statement that communication of sentiment is confined to actual passions of others. But now it no longer does seem so. Any passion, actual or possible, felt by

others may be felt by ourselves. By a "possible" passion is meant a passion that is likely to be felt any person in so far as he is a human being. Aesthetic passions are a special class of possible passions. The mad agony of Lear over Cordelia's death is not surely one that a father might experience when his daughter dies, but nonetheless it is a passion, and a possible one. We do not doubt its credibility. We have already noticed that Hume gives the example of communication of passions by the actors in drama. Ardal thinks that in this case "there is no emotion to be communicated" because "an actor portraying an emotion on the stage need not necessarily feel the emotion he portrays" (*op. cit.*, p.52). Despite the evidence of the James-Lang theory of emotions, it is not really important whether the actor really feels the emotion he portrays, rather that he does *portray* (by signs, i.e., by gestures and verbal utterances in keeping with the aesthetic intention of the playwright) an emotion, and that the spectators do feel it. What is communicated is a possible emotion and it is identified as that. When I hear my neighbour lamenting his daughter's death and when I witness Lear's volcanic speech, in both the cases I can feel the emotion, though in my neighbour's case I reckon it as an actual one (unless, of course, he is shamming, which is unlikely) and in the latter case I feel a possible emotion. The difference in reckoning the two sorts of presentation of the same emotion would evoke different reactions in my behaviour. In one case, I might go to console my neighbour; in another, I may come have a realization about human destiny.

Secondly, it has been said in recent times that in Hume's account of sympathy the sympathizing agent does not imaginatively put himself into the position of another person. Mercer says that "there is no question for Hume of sympathy involving an agent's imaginative realization of another's feelings" (op.cit.,p. 36). And Ardal remarks that in Hume there is "no suggestion that in sympathizing one imaginatively puts oneself into the other person's place" (op. cit., p. 45). Such remarks may be either charges or descriptions. As charges, Mercer's and Ardal's comments are unfounded, and if meant as descriptions of Hume's account of sympathy, then it is inaccurate. Hume does speak about "entering" into the original passions of other persons (op. cit.,p.359) and this act, though physically impossible unless persons are disembodied selves can only be possible in imagination. On page 360 of the Treatise again, entering into somebody's sentiment is made equivalent to sympathising with the idea of his passion. Speaking of our appreciation of other people's property and the role played by sympathy in such situations Hume writes "We enter into his interest by the force of imagination, and feel the same satisfaction, that the objects naturally occasion in him"(op.cit., p.364). Another related point is that had the sympathizing agent not imaginatively put himself into the position of another man, how could Hume say that in sympathy we "conceive a lively idea of the passion [of another person], or rather feel the passion itself, in the same manner, as if the person [who is not aware or capable of feeling it] were really actuated by it" (ibid.,p.371). Hume's example of our blushing for the conduct of other's foolish behaviour is so remarkably close

and parallel to Adam Smith's example of our blushing for "the impudence and rudeness of another, a passion of which he himself seem to be altogether incapable"(*British Moralists*, II, p.204, ed. D.D.Raphael) that it appears unfair enough to say that Hume was not alive to the question of one's imaginatively putting oneself into another's position. In fact, Ardal makes his comment by comparing Hume's view with that of Adam Smith's, and T.D.Campbell (in his *Adam Smith's Science of Morals*, pp.95-6) does the same thing only, perhaps, at the cost of ignoring striking similarities between the two thinkers. Both Hume and Adam Smith hold what may be called the spectator's view of sympathy. By the 'Spectator's view' I mean a notion of sympathy which amounts to saying, as Shaftesbury actually said, that the mind is "spectator or auditor of other minds"(ibid.,I, p.173)[1], and there is no reason to suppose that the notion of spectator or the sympathising agent who conceives himself to be in the position of any other person with whose feelings he may be sympathising is to be found in Adam Smith alone and not in Hume. Campbell says that in a specific sense "sympathy is not a success word"(*op.cit.*,p.96). This specific sense of sympathy is not peculiar to Adam Smith. Hume speaks of the future passions of other persons, or passions which have no existence and even of the past -- in none of these cases sympathy is an achievement word in the sense that our conceiving ourselves in other person's position does not result in a coincidence of two sets of feelings, the original ones and the sympathetically felt ones.

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1. Hume speaks of the sympathising agent as "beholder" and "spectator". See *Treatise* pages 362 and 364.

I would like to take further liberties in interpreting the Rylean notion and proceed to show why in some cases 'sympathy' cannot be a success word in a tentative manner. There can be interpretative uses of emotion statements. I can be in an emotional state and realise it but not know its significance, that is, cannot able to identify it. My friend may tell me, on the basis of his sympathising with my emotional state, that I am in love with so and so, and go on to support with evidence his interpretation of my emotional state. Provided I am honest and do not endorse my friend's interpretation, my friend's sympathising, in that case, is not an achievement. A statement of the form 'He loves her' can be an interpretation of his behaviour, and if the situations do not answer to the emotion statement, the speaker's sympathetic understanding of the (third person) subject's emotional state becomes corrigible, and not an achievement again. If the statement is a report, in that case like all reports, those based on sympathy, can also fail. In such cases 'to sympathise' is a verb of failure, rather than one of success.

The word 'sympathy', for Hume, is a process of converting an idea into an impression. The process may have been gone through but without success. An encounter with the other person's emotional sign-behaviour does not by itself guarantee that I will be in a position decode his passional experience. 'To sympathise' is then an "episodic verb" that describes, in Ryle's words "items in the inquisitive life of human beings" (op. cit., p.145) and which at times meets with success. It is a "try verb", since, on Hume's analysis,

we are not, and cannot be, directly conscious of the states of mind of another person.

Campbell is emphatic on Adam Smith's situational view of sympathy, i.e., his view that "Sympathy...does not arise so much from the view of the passion as from that of the situation which excites it." (*op.cit.*,II,p.204) Let us recall Hume's example of the murder of the infant prince (See *Treatise*,p.371). What we find there is "the wretched situation of the person" that, Hume says, "gives us a lively idea and sensation of sorrow". Again, in sympathising with a miserable person it is the "circumstances"(*op.cit.*, p.386) that induces sympathy, and evoke my interest in him.

In citing evidences I do not intend in the least to imply that there is no difference between Hume's and Adam Smith's respective concepts of sympathy. Indeed there are differences. What I would like to draw attention to is their striking similarities, not only in their pattern of thought, but in common examples, metaphors and even in turns of phrases. Before I move on to other points about Hume's concept of sympathy I would like to dispose of another critical comment closely related to those we have been considering. Mercer says that Hume "nowhere suggests that when we are sympathising (as opposed to merely entertaining the idea of the other's state of mind) we are at all conscious of the fact that our feelings are, as it were, 'not really our own'." (*op.cit.*,p.35) But is it true? When Hume says, as Mercer himself has quoted, that in sympathy our idea of another's passion is converted into "the very passion itself", what he actually means is that the sympatheti-

cally felt passion, aided and enlivened as it comes to be by our impressions of self and imagination, acquires an almost closely resembling liveliness of the original passion. Had Hume said to that effect, as Mercer seems to suggest that Hume really did, in that case assertions based on communication of sentiments like 'X is sad', or 'Y is envious' etc., would be either impossible to be asserted, or would become equivalent to first person pronouncements or avowals. There is not, and cannot be a class of sympathy statements. On Hume's terms the class of emotion statements has two sub-classes, one, the first person avowals and two, the sub--class comprising of second and third person emotion statements. That there can be second and third person emotion statements is accounted for by sympathy. None of the two sub-classes includes the other, though the sub-class of second and third person emotion statements presuppose the sub-class of first person ones. For Hume, avowals are non-transferable statements, since they are verified by immediate experience of the speaker, but assertions about the mental states of other persons have a lesser degree of confirmability, since they are read off from the exhibited signs and come to be felt by a vivacity that is borrowed from diverse sources, e.g., impression of self and imagination, and are conditional upon the relations of contiguity, resemblance and cause and effect. Speaking about indirect passions Hume says (<u>op.cit.</u>,p.276) that they proceed from the same principles as the direct ones,i.e., "arise immediately from good and evil", and he would never say this about communicated sentiments. The word that he uses for the process of sympathy is "instantaneous"(<u>ibid.</u>,p.317) yet the conver-

sion of an idea into an impression, he says, "proceeds from certain views and reflections". By "certain views and reflections" Hume means the impression of self and the relations needed as conditions of the conversion. Let us have a look into some of Hume's own statements which very clearly distinguish between the original passions of other persons and the sympathetically felt ones. On page 389 he says that the imagination renders "present to us" the mental state of others and "operates *as if* originally our own" (italics not in the text). Again, "Riches give satisfaction to their possessor; and this satisfaction is conveyed to the beholder by the imagination, which produces an idea *resembling* the original impression in force and vivacity" (*ibid.*,p.362). The two passions, the original one felt by some other person and that which is felt by the spectator have a resemblance in an approximating vivacity, but they not indistinguishable. One is felt as an impression the other is a converted idea. The relation between the two passions has been brought about in a letter that Hume wrote to Adam Smith: "the Sympathetic Passion is a reflex Image of the Principal" (*Letters*,I, 313). An image and that which something is an image of are two separate entities. But there is a statement that occurs in the *Treatise* : "When we sympathise with the passions and sentiments of others, these movements appear at first in *our* mind as mere ideas, and conceiv'd to belong to another person...the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent".(p.319). This is a misleading way of putting the matter. What Hume intends to say is that we conceive the "sympathetic passion" "in the strongest and most lively manner". If we bear in

our mind Hume's initial distinction between direct and secondary passion, we might say that the original passions may be either direct or secondary, though the sympathetic ones will, of necessity, will be secondary, i.e., felt by the mind only after a "preceeding thought or perception"(ibid.,p.276). As we tried to put it earlier the sympathetic passion is a part of a statement of belief, such as "I believe that X is in pain", which we could not make unless we had the idea that X is in pain. On the other hand, the original passion is either a first person avowal to the effect that somebody is in a particular mental state or, is exhibiting certain bodily behaviour appropriate to the mental state. Hume does of course give the critic much scope by his way of writing, part of his unhappy vocabulary is due to his thesis that any idea is but a copy of an impression, and that they differ only in vivacity and in no other respects.

We may now turn to Hume's account of the different kinds of sympathy. In cases where we are sympathising with a "real" emotion of another person, 'to sympathise' could be taken as an achievement verb. But there is another sense, as Campbell suggests, a non-'success word' meaning of sympathy when we come to feel the possible passions of another person. A possible passion is one which "neither belong to ourselves, nor at the present moment have any real existence" (ibid.,p.386). A real passion, on the contrary, belongs to ourselves and has a real existence at the present moment. Brentano speaks of the category of the emotions as mental states which go beyond perception and belief. In a manner, Hume's notion of

possible passions anticipates Brentano's category. When we reflect on the sufferings of the unborn victims of a thermo-nuclear war, it is the possible passions that we could be said to be sympathising with. It is a sort of modal awareness. As compared with the real passions, the possible ones are such for which the element of intentionality remains vague. In so far as the identification of a real passion is to be made, there can be a hearer's sense, and a speaker's sense, of 'identify'. Borrowing Strawson's phraseology once more, a real passion can have identification within history, whereas, a possible passion can have it in a weak sense, or within a story. In sympathising with the passions of the people of the past, we have possible passions that are identified within history, though in a weak sense. With those of the future, perhaps no similar claim can be made, and hence the possible passions of such sort can be identified within a story. Similarly identified are the passions of literary characters, in epics, drama, odes and ballads, with which we sympathise in asmuch as do with persons alive, dead or yet unborn. In either case, the possible passions colour our attitudes, even though the element of belief involved in the passions of the past is likely to be different from those of the future. Now, to feel such passions is to have what Hume calls "extensive sympathy", a communication of sentiments in which we are able to form "a lively conception of all circumstances of that person, whether past, present, or future; possible, probable or certain" (ibid.). Such an extension of sympathy in the temporal order becomes possible because the vivaciously conceived idea of another person's passion "diffuses its influence over all the rela-

ted ideas", and "If I diminish he vivacity of the first conception, I diminish that of the related ideas" (ibid.). Now all this appears to be an application of Hume's more general thesis that "lively passions commonly attend a lively imagination" (ibid., p.427) and that "the mind has always a propensity to pass from a passion to any other related to it" (ibid., p.339). But the distinctive feature of extensive sympathy is to enter into the sentiments of others "with so vivid a conception as to make it our own concern" (ibid., p.386). How is the factor of "concern" derived? Does it follow from Hume's concept of sympathy? No. Because the technical sense which he gives to the word no commitment is entailed by communication of sentiments. Hume thinks that we cannot have any idea without feeling some kind of emotion, and an idea of a passion has some uniqueness insofar as "it gives a more sensible agitation to the mind, than any other image or conception" (ibid., p.393). If this be true, then the "concern" must have been derived from the vivacity of the conception of another's passion. It is the intensity with which I feel his passion that compels me to be concerned about him. Concern can only be a property of a passion, and since sympathy is not a passion, the notion of concern cannot be entailed by the concept of sympathy, by which Hume means the manner of communication of sentiments or in general, the process of conversion of ideas into impressions. But all passions do not make us concerned, for instance, self-regarding passions like pride or humility. Of course, when and if we come to smell an intention of another person towards hurting my pride, I may be said to feel concerned. In sympathising with my adversary's passions I naturally take care as not to let my self-esteem injured.

This is self-concern that is, in a sense, entailed by self-esteem. But concern for others does not seem to follow from the so-called self-regarding passions. It is only the other-regarding passions that can make feel concerned about others. Again, the feeling of concern is not a merely passive state of mind, or "pure emotion", it is a dispositional attitude of the mind, and can be found to accompany only those passions that have a tendency or an end or which "carry the mind to something further" (ibid.,p.367). Some passions are characteristically conative, and "follow'd by or rather conjoin'd with" such passions as those that are attended with a desire and excite us to action. Viewed as a conative disposition Hume redefines the notion of the passion of love as "the desire of happiness to another person and hatred that of misery" (ibid.). Now, this is in partial modification of his earlier description of love (or hatred) as that passion of which the "object" is necessarily the other person causing an agreeable or disagreeable feeling as the case may be. Hume's assertion that the ideas of happiness or misery of the "objects" of love and hatred do not form a part of those passions is scandalous enough, but is not as disdainful as it appears to be. It depends on what he means by the word 'desire'. 'Desire', for Hume, is a passion, and that also a 'direct' one (ibid.,p.438). So is aversion, love and hatred are 'indirect' passions. Hence, the passion of love and the desire for the loved one's happiness are conceptually unrelated. Even though Hume's argument can be made sense of, yet it is difficult to resist feeling that he is torturing the common usage of the words. Anyway, Hume is quite clear in saying that the desire for

the happiness or misery of other persons "arise only upon the ideas of the happiness or misery of our friend or enemy being presented by the imagination" (ibid.,p.367). To love is not to entertain the idea of someone's happiness, rather to have him as the "object" of my feeling. The word 'love' is so much overlaid with emotive and conative associations (which Hume does not of course deny) that it seems paradoxical to think that love is unrelated (by the logical behaviour of the words) to the desire of happiness of the person loved. Accordingly, Hume would have to say that to hate somebody is not necessarily to wish his misery, since the idea of his misery is something adventitious to the impression of hatred. We love somebody at the same time desiring his happiness or hate him while wishing his misery, only if the ideas of the loved or hated persons happiness or misery are "presented by the imagination". Hume intends to assert that it is not analytic to say that to hate somebody is to wish his misery, just as 'X loves Y' does not entail that 'X desires Y's happiness'. It is conceivable that somebody may be hated without his misery being wished or loved without his happiness being desired. However consistent Hume's analysis may be, one feels uneasy to accept it. In ordinary language hatred or the emotion of hate is an emotion of extreme dislike or aversion. To hate someone is to hold that person in very strong dislike, or to bear malice to him. Malice is active ill-will or hatred, and generally we do not distinguish between the two, as Hume, in fact, does. Malice, for Hume, is an indirect passion, which "imitates the effects of hatred"(ibid., p.372). It is "the contrary appetite' of pity (ibid.,p.382) and

is described further as "the unprovoked desire of producing evil to another" (<u>ibid.</u>, p.377). In that case, how does it come to be related to hatred? Obviously not by any mechanism of association, rather by "a natural and original quality"(ibid., p.382) of the mind. Malice is related to anger, anger to hatred, just as pity or "a desire of happiness to another" (<u>ibid.</u>) is related to benevolence, and benevolence as "a desire of the happiness of the person belov'd" (<u>ibid.</u>) attends love by "the original constitution of the mind" (<u>ibid.</u>, p.368). Some explanation may be offered by way of clarifying the mysterious-sounding phrase before we take up the consideration of the relation between sympathy and benevolence.

Hume called all those "unskilful naturalists" who forsake philosophical economy and have recourse to "a monstrous heap of principles" "in order to explain every different operation"(<u>ibid.</u>, p. 282) of the mind. In fact, he devised the principles of association, particularly the so-called double association of impressions and ideas with a view to explaining all the phenomena of the indirect passions. But as he progressed with his description of the passions (which are unanalysable on account of being simple impressions) he espoused more and more number of ultimates, besides those of the associative ones, which govern the domain of our emotive life. A motley of custom, general rules, imagination for transition of passions (i.e., the succession of passions belonging to one individual and the way in which one passion may give way to or give rise to another passion) and sympathy (for explaining the communication of a passion from one individual to another) was

presented. Kemp Smith has remarked that "All impressions of sensation, and as regards impressions of reflexion, the various appetites and passions moral and aesthetic, approvals and disapprovals, custom as an agency capable of generating a quite new feeling, the propensity in the mind to spread itself over external objects, these — with sympathy in the moral sphere and belief in the theoretical sphere standing ready to yield support to one and all of them — are the sort of factors which Hume was prepared to regard as ultimate, and to which he freely resorted in circumventing the obstacles that beset his path" (op.cit.,p.59). Now, without either disputing or subscribing to the view expressed above may we not find a justification for Hume's numerous concessions to his original plan and premises. Starting with his initial premise that all indirect passions are simple impressions pride and humility were shown to be "pure emotions" and the passions of love and hatred were described as parallel to pride and humility, differing only in their respective objects. But it was soon found that the analysis was inadequate, because some passions are characteristically conative, have a "tendency" or an "end", and lead us to action. The earlier account of love and hatred was modified by a dispositional account. It was found also that passions may be related to one another not only through their characteristic sensations but also through their characteristic conations. Love and hatred are attended by respectively, benevolence and anger. For a similar reason pity is related benevolence and anger to malice. The passions were taken as atomic psychic entities, any connexion between them was sought to be explained with the help of the princi-

ples of association. But soon it was found that ideas come to be enlivened, and the enlivening source was found in the impression of self. Not all and any idea could be so enlivened but those that were resembling and contiguous to ourselves. It was also found that the passions were not isolated mental events, they were divested with a social dimension. From the social nature of man communication of sentiments emerged as a special phenomenon, and the principle of sympathy was evoked for the purpose of explaining it. The passions, originally conceived as distinct existences, came to be related by various means, by association, by imagination, custom and general rules, by sympathy. At first, the passions were passive consequences, but later on, if not all, at least the most social or other-regarding ones, were declared to be dynamic. The passions linked by associative relations are left far behind by those that are the products of a "mental chemistry". In a sense, Passmore's remark is true that "a species of sentimentalism gradually replaces Hume's associationism" (op. cit., p.128). Of course, it all depends on whether the statement is intended as an evaluation or a descriptive judgment. Without attempting an assessment of Hume's methodological success or failure it can certainly be said that there has been an honest and undogmatic endeavour on his part to modify his position with a view to accommodating new sets of facts which have not been accounted for by the initial premises. It is in this light that Hume's numerous concessions to his avowed aims might as well be seen. We, then, find that though he started with the thesis that passions are simple impressions, the paradigmatic ones being pride and humility, as "pure emotions", yet he was led to giving a dis-

positional account of love and hatred even if the parallelism between the two sets of passions, the self-regarding and the other--regarding ones could not be adhered to any farther. If it might be argued that love and hatred are not purely dispositional passions, it can nonetheless be asserted that these are the ones that involve a tendency to have special feelings. The contrast Hume draws between the passions that are "pure emotions" and those that involve a direction and tendency to action suggests a re-statement, and a more adequate view, of the passions of love and hatred. We have earlier tried to show that pride and humility are no less social passions than love and humility, because pride and humility can be experienced only in a society where there already is some criterion of excellence and worthiness present. One may also wonder how far Hume is right in suggesting that pride and humility are "pure emotions" and that they do not essentially involve any tendency to action. Does he not himself speak of the signs that a proud peacock displays? Pride as self-esteem may be expected to show itself in confident behaviour while humility as self-debasement manifests itself in diffidence.

And now coming back to our original point, we might say that Hume is giving a two-level analysis. On one level, taken "abstractedly" (*op.cit.*, p.368) as he says, to love somebody does not entail wishing his happiness, just as to hate him does not necessarily imply wishing his misery. On the other, love and benevolence, hatred and anger are conjoined "by the original constitution of the mind"(*ibid.*), and this consideration seems to be upper-most

in his mind. What does he really mean by the phrase "original constitution of the mind?" There are passions like desire, hope or fear, which are dependent upon antecedent mental experiences, just as the conative characteristics of a class of passions extend and in some cases even pre-determine the range other passions, though not their origin. The conjoining of love and benevolence, hatred and anger may be seen as resulting from the nature of the passions. They are linked by a natural relation, but the absence of any logical relationship between them does not in any way weaken the connexion. This is a believed order wherein the passions, though not entailing, yet determine one another in an expected and established manner. The order of the passions has a necessity other than the logical.

Hume's position may be understood in another way. The statement " 'X loves Y' implies 'X desires Y's happiness'" could be analytic if and only if the implicate would express at least a part of the meaning of the implicans. But even then, the analyticity of the statement cannot raise it to logical immunity, because an analytic statement may not be a logical truth. For example, 'All bachelors are unmarried' is analytic but is not an instance of logical truth. On the contrary, 'it is raining or it is not raining' is a logical truth, though hardly could be said to be analytic. I do not intend to enter into the debate whether logical truths can be non-analytic. What I am trying to emphasise is that the demand for logical certainty of relationships between passions does not make a good case. Because statements about relationships

between passions are so-called contingent propositions, which may also be termed a posteriori propositions, in the sense that their truth or falsehood is dependent on our affective experience. The passions are just not the sort of entities about which a priori assertions could be made. In most cases to say, as the critics often do, love and benevolence (for Hume) are contingently related or the connexion between sympathy and concern is psychological and not logical is either to assert a triviality or to make a descriptive statement. So far Hume is concerned the fact that the assertions of relations between passions are not instances of logical truth does not take away their validity nor diminish their evidential value. They are validated by principles which constitute the constant element in human nature. The 'original constitution of the mind is a set of non-rational synthetic principles which are reason-like in their invariability and operations. These alone have legislative powers over the passions.

To return to Hume's account of the different kinds of sympathy. We have already noticed that Hume distinguishes between benevolence and pity. His distinction is remarkable for its precision. Pity, he says, is a concern for the misery of others, without any friendship to occasion this concern. Thus even strangers can be pitied. But benevolence can be felt towards those who are loved. It is the lively idea of the miseries of others which is responsible for our experiencing the passion of pity for them. More important is the fact that pity, like benevolence, is a secondary passion, arises from the original impression of pain or uneasiness produced by the

lively or enlivened idea of another's suffering. But for the conative aspect of pity, sympathy with uneasiness involving the sympathising agent himself in uneasiness, does not relate to hatred. We do not hate the person we pity, simply because pity is also a "concern", "a desire of happiness to another, and aversion to his misery" (ibid.,p.369 and p.382). Benevolence is described by Hume, embarrassingly enough, in almost identical terms with pity. Both pity and benevolence conatively share a desire for the happiness of the person sympathized with and an aversion to his misery. In spite of the conative similarity, there must have been a "logical difference", as Ardal (op.cit.,p.67) very rightly points out, between pity and benevolence. Though Hume has carelessly obscured the difference by talking of pity and benevolence "as to be indistinguishable" (op.cit.,p.382), yet an admission that they are different is not all too imperceptible. Ardal could have looked for Hume's very significant assertions that "pity is an uneasiness" (ibid.,p.381) and "benevolence is an original pleasure arising from the pleasure of the person belov'd, and a pain proceeding from his pain" (ibid., p.387). No man is ever pitied for his pleasure, rather for his afflictions. One's being in a state of misery is a necessary condition of his being pitied. As regards benevolence, Hume makes it quite clear that sympathising with somebody's pleasures or miseries alone would not become sufficient for the passion of benevolence. He says " 'tis requisite we should feel these double impressions (of his pleasures as well as of pain)... nor is any one of them alone sufficient for that purpose" (ibid.,p.387). There is another important factor. The "object" of benevolence is

a person who is loved, and this particular condition is absent in the case of pity.

Now love, benevolence and pity are related by a common conative concern, which, Hume says, is "a natural and original quality". Mercer (op.cit.,p.18-9) does not think that pity necessarily implies a concern for the welfare of the other person. But Hume does, in fact, describe pity as a feeling of concern. Without questioning Mercer's interpretation, it may be pointed out that there is certainly a sense of 'pity' which implies concern. When the psalmist says "Like a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him" (C iii,13), there is a clear implication of concern, otherwise it is idle on the part of a father to pity his children. Tennyson speaks of pity "for a horse O'ver-driven" (In Memorium lxiii) which undoubtedly points to a desire for the animals' relief. Hobbes defined pity as a special kind of grief "for the calamity of another", which obviously could not be idle. Hume's stipulation of 'pity' as a feeling of concern does have sanction of usage, and the Shorter Oxford Dictionary describes pity as "a feeling of tenderness aroused by the suffering or misfortune of another, and prompting a desire for its relief". Curiously enough, Mercer (op.cit.,p.39) himself brings out the conative aspect of pity in order to show how Hume could hold pity being related to benevolence.

Hume speaks of sympathy being either strong or weak. This division has a built-in paradox in it. Hume says "when a sympathy with uneasiness is weak, it produces hatred or contempt by the

former cause; when strong, it produces love or tenderness by the latter" (op.cit., p.385). It could be so, when from sympathy with somebody's pleasure there arises love and from that with his uneasiness hatred. The passions, we are told, are always either agreeable or uneasy, and the agreeableness or uneasiness of the indirect passions give force to the direct passions and increase our desire or aversion to the object. Now the state of dispositions as they are cannot explain the cases of strong and weak sympathy. But Hume produces an argument from imagination, as we might call it, to show how it is possible for us to have a lively interest in other's plight, in spite of the fact our sympathetic encounter gives rise to an uneasy feeling. Let us first grant the presupposition that "In our common way thinking we are plac'd in a kind of middle station betwixt the past and future, and ... our imagination finds ... a facility in following the course of the latter" (ibid., p.437). Then the second premise that we do "look forward to the future in sympathising with any person" (ibid., p. 386) and that we can do so by "a great effort of imagination" (ibid.). Sympathy can be imaginatively extended to the future only if the present state of affairs of the person we are sympathising with is somehow remarkable. That means that we must have some lively idea to take off in our flight of imagination. Hume produces a viable case for looking forward to the future in sympathy with any person in the following manner: "When the present misery of another has any strong influence upon me, the vivacity of the conception is not confirm'd merely to its immediate object, but diffuses its influence over all the related ideas, and gives me a lively notion

of all the circumstances of that person, whether past, present, or future; .... By means of this lively notion I am interested in them"(ibid.). Two points arise from the fore-going account, namely, that in order to feel strong sympathy, the notion of other's misery must not be feeble, but sufficiently lively. And secondly, what does Hume mean by taking or being interested in other's misery? He makes the word to mean a concern, or even a dispositional state of mind: "to concern myself in his good fortune, as well as his bad" (ibid.). This is, in fact, Hume's description of benevolence.

Hume's statement of strong sympathy, however consistent it is with his general position with regard to the imagination in particular, appears to have curious consequences. Interest or concern cannot be an idle recognition of other's state of feeling or a mere lip-service sort of endorsement, it is a commitment. But this commitment depends on the fact that the notion of other's misery must be a lively one. If, for the sake of argument, it is said that one should care about one's fellow men's miseries, that would imply a prescription. But in Hume's causal analysis it is always possible for one to say that one is unable to feel one's neighbour's pain with sufficient vivacity. At least it may be a kind of dodge that one might always use in order to escape one's duties. This example is significant in view of the fact that Hume thinks that our sense of duty always follows the natural course of our passions. Here, of course, the interpretation of the word 'natural' becomes important. What is crucial is that the liveliness of the notion or idea of other's miseries is a necessary, but not sufficient condi-

tion of strong sympathy. Hence one can escape the "obligations of interest" (the phrase is Hume's on page 314) by pointing to the insufficient vivacity of his ideas of other person's misery. This seems to go against Hume's view that sympathy "acquires strength from the weakness of its original" (*ibid.*,p.370), of which I can not make any sense. And, if it were the case, there would have been no need for saying that "'tis impossible we cou'd extend....sympathy to the future, without being aided by some circumstance in the present, which strikes upon us in a lively manner"(*ibid.*,p.386). Extended sympathy depends on the strength of the initial experience or impression we got of the other person's misfortune. There is another attendant difficulty. Since sympathy "depends on the relation of objects to ourselves" (*ibid.*, p.322), strong sympathy may not be very easily felt and for any person who approaches us. "The breaking of a mirror gives us more concern when at home, than the burning of a house, when abroad, and some hundred leagues distant" (*ibid.*,p.429). It is for such reasons as these that Hume bases his account of sympathy not only on his favourite association of ideas and impressions, but ultimately on the twin premises of human uniformity and the supplementative role of the imagination. An Oxfam poster is an appeal to both.

Hume has been trying to show a relationship of sympathy with concern and the most characteristic passion that is related to sympathy is benevolence, which is a concern for the pleasures and pains of the person sympathized with. The phenomenon of sympathy, when it gives rise to benevolence as a desire of the other person's

pleasure and aversion to his pain, is renamed, by Hume, extensive sympathy. It is extensive in the sense that the sympathizing agent is not only aware of what the other person is feeling at a particular time, but also of the present state of his feeling and what *might* happen to him. Now, it is not clear whether Hume would differentiate between the awareness of the other's possible circumstances and the passion of benevolence. I say this because Hume has a tendency for equating benevolence and extensive sympathy. The phrase "strong extensive benevolence" actually occurs on page 495 of the Book III of the *Treatise*. On page 385 he uses pity interchangeably with sympathy, almost forgetting his own distinction that pity is a passion and sympathy is a principle. He writes "pity or a sympathy with pain produces love", and could we not think that in this case he uses 'sympathy' as a passion of concern? Granted that sympathy were an emotion, then sympathy would entail feeling an emotion, which the object of sympathy does not experience. Hume could be said to have realised that his account of sympathy in terms of the communication of emotion did not adequately deal with the phenomena covered by the word 'sympathy'. And hence he brings in wider considerations, especially the imaginative reconstruction of what is good or evil for another. This much is clear that benevolence in the sense of "an original pleasure arising from the pleasure of the person belov'd, and a pain proceeding from his pain" (*ibid.*, p.387) can be experienced only if there happens to be an awareness of what the person sympathized with is feeling at a given moment of time *and* what he might feel in future. Sympathy with the other person's present and future

states of emotion is a precondition of benevolence. Or in other words, strong sympathy logically precedes extensive sympathy. Extensive sympathy is strong sympathy causing the passion of benevolence to be felt by the sympathising agent. If we remember that benevolence is a conative passion, a 'desire', it becomes easier to understand how from a strong sympathy a conative passion could subsequently arise. In fact, Hume does seek to institute some kind of causal connexion between the vivacity of the initial feelings and the "subsequent" feeling of benevolence. Let us see how could it take place. To sympathise with somebody's feelings is epistemologically equivalent to believing that the person concerned is in a particular mental state. To believe is nothing other than having a vivacious perception of an idea, and sympathy is precisely the process by which an idea is transformed in the characteristic vivacity of an impression. In Book I of the Treatise Hume has stated that a perception of pain and pleasure is "the chief and moving principle" of all our actions. Pains and pleasures can appear in the mind only as either ideas or impressions, and the latter can "actuate the soul in the greatest degree". On the other hand, belief "is nothing but a more vivid and intense conception of idea" (ibid., p.119). Now, schematically, to sympathise with somebody is to have our idea of his feelings converted into "a more vivid and intense conception". The sympathising process is a belief-generating one. Hume further mentions that belief influences actions via the passions. "The effect ... of belief is to raise up a simple idea to an equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the passions.... For as the different degrees of force make all the original

difference betwixt an impression and an idea, they must of consequence be the source of all the differences in the effects of those perceptions...."(ibid.). It is no wonder, then, that a vivid conception of the actual and possible pains and pleasures of a person would bring about a conative passion. It is precisely in this way that benevolence is related to sympathy. Hume's argument is somewhat as follows: Given that belief influences action and benevolence is a conative passion, sympathy amounts to a belief about other person's feelings, and, in consequence, evokes benevolence. To sympathise, in the "extensive" sense of the term, is to feel some conative passion towards the person we are sympathising with.

Benevolence has some characteristic features. It is a case of sympathising with both the pains and the pleasures (actual and possible) of the other person. There is thus, what Hume calls, the double correspondence of impressions, a sympathy with his pleasures (actual and possible) and his pains (actual and possible). In the first case, we feel love for the person, in the second pity. The joint feeling of love and pity make us feel benevolent towards him. In benevolence there is a combination of two impressions, of the other person's pleasures as well as his miseries, and both these impressions are felt with such an intensity that an interest in his fortune results. Ordinarily, if the impression of his pain lacked in vivacity it would lead to hatred. Sympathy with pain arouses in the mind of the sympathising agent the passion of hatred on account of the uneasiness thus experienced. But in extensive

sympathy the impression is felt with such an intensity that, instead of hatred, the sympathising agent feels pity for the other person. The intensity with which the feeling of the other person's pain is communicated is responsible for a lively notion of all the circumstances of that person, resulting finally in a concern for his misery. Hume's chief intention is to show that in extensive sympathy some specially conative passions are aroused, and benevolence is paradigmatic of these passions like love and pity with "a bent or tendency" "leading us to action"; and this is possible only if the sympathising agent ceases to be a disinterested spectator and becomes interested in the other person's fortune. But a strong sympathy with pain alone again is not sufficient to arouse benevolence, one naturally likes to see the person pitied happy, and so there must also be sympathy with his pleasures. Here is an ambiguity in Hume's manner of exposition. He writes, "When we sympathize only with one impression, and that a painful one, this sympathy is related to anger and to hatred, upon account of the uneasiness it conveys to us" (ibid., p.387). How a weak painful impression is related to anger and hatred by "the resemblance of sensations" is understandable. But why extensive sympathy with pain be related to hatred and anger is not comprehensible. If he means weak sympathy with pain results in pain though weak sympathy with both pain and pleasure results in benevolence the whole purpose of formulating the concept of extensive sympathy is defeated. And certainly he does not mean that what he does mean is that strong sympathy with pain, by itself, is not sufficient for bene-

volence. Hence an extensive sympathy with <u>both</u> the pains <u>and</u> the the pleasures of the other person is at once the sufficient and necessary condition for the passion of benevolence. But to say this is to assert an equivalence of extensive sympathy with benevolence. It would be a sort of category mistake, because sympathy, after all, is a principle and benevolence is a passion. This difficulty is almost insurmountable since Hume does not treat sympathy as a passion, and in that case, any talk of relationship between passions on the one hand and principle of communication of passions must retain some ambiguity. A tentative interpretation would be that in order to have a special set of conative feelings sympathy needs to be extensive, otherwise the sympathizing agent may be left uncommitted if the feeling tone of the communicated passion is weak and enocided.

Hume's account of the relationship between extensive sympathy and benevolence is beset with ambiguities. Apart from his equivocation of 'benevolence', once as an appetite that attends love (p.382), at another time, as an original pleasure and pain arising out of the beloved person's pleasure and pain (p.387), the relationship between extensive sympathy and benevolence is expressed in terms of a new concept "double correspondence of impressions", which is by no means perspicuous. In order to render the notion of extensive sympathy explicit we shall attempt a tentatively schematic statement. Let sympathising be conceived as a relation <u>S</u>, and <u>x</u> and <u>y</u> the sympathizing agent and the person sympathized with respectively. Now <u>Sxy</u> may be interpreted as a dyadic relation of x's

sympathising with the feelings of *y*. But if *Sxy* is to present the case of extensive sympathy, it will have to be taken to co-imply that in case *y* suffers (or *y* is miserable, i.e., *My*) *x* also is in misery (*Mx*), and when *y* is happy or experiencing pleasure (*Hy*), *x* likewise is in a state of happiness (*Hx*). In both the cases of *Mx* and *Hx*, *y*'s being happy or miserable covers actual and even possible, i.e., imagined feelings of *y*. Then *Sxy* is true if, and only if (*Hx.Hy*) and (*Mx.My*) are also true. Or, in other words, *x* can be in extensive sympathy with *y*, if and only if, *x* is in sympathy with both *y*'s misery and happiness. Then the conjunction of (*Hx.Hy*) and (*Mx.My*) can be said to define the dyadic relation *Sxy*. The sentence '*x* feels benevolent towards *y*' can be represented by another relational expression *Bxy*. Hume says that extensive sympathy leads or gives rise to benevolence. But can we assert an implication between *Sxy* and *Bxy*? Perhaps not, because sympathy is a principle of communication of passions and benevolence is a passion. A principle cannot imply a passion. On the other hand, one passion can imply another passion by virtue of its conative characteristics, that is to say, a passion, if it is a dispositional one, involves to have special feelings. As regards the relationship between extensive sympathy and benevolence Hume writes, "In order...to make a passion run parallel with benevolence, 'tis requisite we shou'd feel these double impressions [of happiness and misery], correspondent to those of the person, when we consider...etc."(*ibid.*). The question arises as to which passion he is speaking about is to be kept parallel to benevolence. Does he take, unawares, the feeling ofthe double

impressions, which is sympathy, as a passion? Another ambiguity lurks in his previous remark that from the "correspondence of impressions there arises a subsequent desire of his [the other person's] pleasure, and aversion to his pain" (ibid.). Is Hume investing sympathy with some kind of conative power? The correspondence is two-fold: one, between the other person's pleasure and my feeling it sympathetically, and secondly, between his pain and my feeling it by communication. From the first correspondence there would arise love, and from the second, hatred and anger. A desire for the other person's pleasure can arise from the first correspondence, and an aversion for his pain from the second. As Hume appears to suggest, benevolence can arise, only if, there occur the two correspondences, or unless one has felt the two impressions of pleasure and pain correspondent to those of the other person, one cannot feel benevolent towards him. In other words, the two impressions together constitute the sufficient and necessary conditions for benevolence. Extensive sympathy has been described by Hume as an interest-generating phenomenon. It is said to take account of "all the circumstances of [the other person], whether past, present, or future; possible, probable or certain" (ibid., p.386). By means of a lively notion of them one gets interested, comes to "feel a sympathetic motion". What could this feeling be other than benevolence? Does not a vivacious conception of all the circumstances of the other person cover the "double correspondence of impression" spoken of in connexion with benevolence? Since Hume has already explained sympathy in terms of communication, he could not

have assigned to it the status of an emotion, and hence the distinction between extensive sympathy and benevolence. Of course, benevolence, for Hume, is a motive or cause of a certain type of action, i.e. benevolent action. He would allow only the adjectival and adverbial forms of the noun 'benevolence' by way of describing certain actions, e.g., 'he acted benevolently'. It is doubtful whether extensive sympathy could be regarded either as a motive or cause of an action. And should one insist on the fact that benevolence is an "original" pleasure etc., that is, it has no cause by way of a precedent impression, in such a case, one's experiencing extensive sympathy can in no way be regarded a sufficient reason for one's acting benevolently towards the person one is sympathising with. But does the account succeed in rendering benevolence contra-causal? On page 417 of the Treatise Hume mentions the passion as a calm desire. Now, if from the double correspondence of impression there does arise a desire equivocally characterised as is benevolence, then we are to understand either that extensive sympathy is potentially conative, or that benevolence, qua desire, presupposes extensive sympathy. There is a matter of sharing the other person's joys and sorrows in sympathy; and it is more so in extensive sympathy, when I compare his position with that of mine. In such wider relationship I am bound to feel benevolence. " 'tis evident, that, in considering the future possible or probable condition of any person, we may enter into it with so vivid a conception as to make it our own concern" (ibid.). The passage plainly admits that extended sympathy inevitably involve benevolence.

Hume wants to show practical commitment of extensive sympathy, but his argument in this section of the Treatise is so unclear that any interpretation can be at a hazard. We may, in the present context, disregard Hume's view in the Book III that in spite of extensive sympathy one may not be willing to sacrifice self-interest. If extensive sympathy is practical, that is, if sympathy and practice are so related that the former entails the latter, it is not wholly clear how does Hume show the connexion between one's being sensitive to all the circumstances of the other person influences one's practical attitude towards the other's good and ill fortune. How does the interested concern for the other person follow from extensive sympathy? It is the conceptual relation between sympathy and practice that remains hard to grasp. In a disquieting passage on page 387 Hume speaks of "a double tendency" and "direction" of the passions. Benevolence and love have "a similarity of direction", i.e., they are equally conative. One wonders whether the "tendency" of a passion would be different from its "direction". The word "impulse" has been use alternatively with "direction" on page 381, and it is asserted also that the character of any passion is determined not only by its "sensation", i.e., its hedonic quality, but equally by its "bent or tendency". What are we then to understand by the following passage on page 387: "A strong impression, when communicated, gives a double tendency of the passions; which is related to benevolence and love by a similarity of direction; however painful the first impression might have been"? Does the phrase "double tendency of the passions" points to what has previously been called "the

double correspondence of impressions"? Does Hume mean that a strong painful impression is characterized by "the double correspondence of impressions"; and since benevolence, just much as love, is stated to involve the said correspondence, one's extensive sympathy with pain practically commits oneself to benevolence?

Mercer has rightly suggested that "direction" of a passion must be distinguished from its "tendency". Obviously sympathy cannot be conative, because it is a manner of experiencing a passion instead of being itself a passion. The "tendency" of a passion can be its hedonic qualities, e.g., the tendency of benevolence would be the pleasure and pain arising from the other person's pleasure and pain. In other words, the double correspondence, which is involved in the experience of benevolence. Its "direction" would be the desire for the other person's happiness and aversion to his misery, that is, the conative of benevolence. But if so be the case, how are we to explain the alleged "similarity of direction" between extensive sympathy and benevolence in Hume's passage? Between the two there is of course a similarity of tendency, though as regards the "similarity of direction" unclarity persists.

There need not be any doubt regarding Hume's intentions. The practical commitment of extensive sympathy is one thing that he would not disavow. In the Book III he tells us that sympathy "takes us.....far out of ourselves". An essentially social creature as man is, his most self-regarding passions cannot be as alienating as could be supposed. And in this respect, sympathy keeps others constantly before the mind. "We can form no wish, which has not a

reference to society" (ibid.,p.363). It has been suggested by Mercer that the practical commitment of sympathy is "undermined" by Hume because an "awareness of the subjectivity of the other person" is not required in order to enter into a communication of sentiments. While it is true that a practical concern for another requires a prior recognition of the other's existence, it seems hardly viable to hold that Hume's principle of sympathy altogether dispenses with an awareness of the subjectivity of the other person. Sympathy works as a social mirror, and man is the mood of man. Social-consciousness precedes I-consciousness. A solitary man lacks both definition and description. If 'man', for Hume can be defined and described in terms of fellow-feeling, and should his description of "man as with-the-man" be considered to bear a near existentialist ring, in that case an awareness of the subjectivity of the other person would obviously be implied by any inter-personal communication. Transcendence of egoistic boundaries is achieved by, let us say, a sympathetic leap. But this is no leap of the inductive sort, it is a direct going out to others and attending to them. In "sympathy our own person is not the object of any passion....Ourself, independent of the perception of every other object ['objects' includes other selves], is in reality nothing" (ibid., p.340). This could not have been an assertion of an egoist, and not all critical assessors of Hume's psychological theory ascribe egoism to it.

I do not propose to suggest that practical determination of the will by sympathy is "logically" guaranteed in Hume's theory.

But the point I would like to press here is that if pleasure and pain felt in sympathy are efficient causes in arousing in me certain passions which have another person as their objects, in that case my desire for his happiness, arising from sympathetically generated passion, would be ultimate. The desire would not only "constitute the very nature" of the passion, but would inseparable from the passion itself. I allude in particular to a passage on page 367 of the Treatise where Hume criticises those who distinguish between cause and objects on the one hand, and end on the other, in the case of other-regarding passions. The determination of the will by the experience of extensive sympathy, or its practical commitment is then guaranteed by human nature; and the certainty it begets is of mean order. The life of action or of engagement is more a life of natural principles. We live our nature. And on the recognition of this fact a great deal hangs.

Mercer has remarked that in showing the relationship between extensive sympathy and benevolence Hume has performed "a little sleight-of-hand" (op. cit.,p.41). I would not like to say that because, it is important to bear in mind, in explicating the notion of extensive sympathy Hume seems to have intended a partial modification of his initial concept of sympathy conceived as a mechanical communication of sentiments entailing no commitment at all. In fact, his very distinction between the passions that are "pure" emotions and those that involve a "direction" and "tendency" to action marks a change in his outlook; and similarly, his transition from adaption of conceptions from mechanics

to explanation of the emotions to a dispositional analysis, at least, of certain passions, is no less crucial. If we care to compare his notion of the "double relation of ideas and impressions" with that of "the double correspondence of emotions" it will be immediately apparent that a shift has taken place in the manner of his thinking about the passions, that is to say, though he set out with the view that the passions are related by resemblance in their sensation, yet having come to discuss the passions with a "bent or tendency" he is now paying attention to their similarity and correspondence in respect of impulses or directions. His apparently shocking view that love and benevolence are contingently related is not retained to the end, for we find him saying that benevolence "attends" love, they are related "by the original constitution of the mind", which, for all practical purposes, is inviolable. Love and benevolence may be logically unrelated, but in feeling love does tend to produce an interest in the happiness of the beloved. This common tendency of pity and love to make us interested in the suffering and happiness of other persons causes us to love somewhat those whom we pity. The passions such as love, pity and benevolence are the important ones in Hume's moral psychology; and on the basis of his consideration of these other-oriented passions he comes to declare that there is a more than mere causal link between the passions felt by a man and the acts done by him. At least this appear to be Hume's intention.

There is a difference between the passions felt on their own

account and the passions felt in sympathy, and this point is significant in understanding the connexion between extensive sympathy and benevolence. Sympathetic perception of the other person's feeling is an idle awareness of his mental state. Ordinarily, the experience of a passion is having an impression attended by an idea, but in the case of a passion felt in sympathy we acquire an idea attended by an impression, and by this doubling its quality is heightened. On page 363 Hume says that sympathy is the "animating principle" of such violent passions as pride, ambitions, revenge or lust, and "nor wou'd they have any force, were we to abstract entirely from the thoughts and sentiments of others". This is virtually to admit that the so--called "pure emotion" pride is not as self-oriented as was initially held. And if, for a passion to be self-oriented is not coextensive with its being non-dispositional, in that case, even pride, besides its other-orientedness by virtue of having sympathy as its animating principle, ceases to be a closed passion. Again, what is it to experience a passion with a greater intensity? Obviously, it is to act in accordance with the "bent or tendency" of the passion felt. The feelings of others when known by extensive sympathy strike us with so greater an intensity as to set us in a <u>practical</u> attitude of mind. Hume says that pity is a concern <u>for</u> the misery of others, and if it be the case, the feeling of pity cannot leave us indifferent. In the <u>Enquiry</u>, Hume asks, "if the effects of misery touch us in so lively a manner; can we be supposed altogether insensible or indifferent towards its causes;....?" (p.220). A practical concern is built

into our other-oriented feelings. It would not be contrary to Hume's intentions to hold that even the self-directed passions like pride and humility must have a reference to others, though, of course, related to the self. As Kemp Smith has put this point, "It is not our own 'identical' self that is the source of pride... its source is some particular action or possession, and the major part (if not the whole) of our esteem or disapproval of this action or possession, and so of our pride or humility in its relation to the self, is derived from our sympathetic entering into the passions and emotions with which other selves respond to it." (op.cit., p.175) Hume's initial assumption about man's essential social nature of keeping even in his self-regarding passions the consideration of others no less than the self before the mind, makes sympathy an inevitable factor in the explanation of the inter-relation of passions. And specifically, there are certain passions which perhaps could not be explained otherwise than by the principle of sympathy, and benevolence seems to offer a specific instance. In view of these considerations, Mercer's contention of circularity, or rather the question begging nature of the relation between extensive sympathy and benevolence appears to be without much significance. If one agrees that our other-directed passions are conative, i.e., involves a "bent or tendency", and that passions can be related by their dispositional resemblance, as Hume explicitly says,[1] then in extensive sympathy

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1. Hume says, "Impressions or passions are connected only by their resemblance, and...where any two passions place the mind in the same or in similar dispositions, it very naturally passes from the one to the other" Treatise, p.343. On this basis, is it not possible to say that extensive sympathy and benevolence are by a

Contdd.......

we could be said to experience a conative state of mind which makes us feel benevolent towards the person we sympathise with. The conceptual passage from extensive sympathy to benevolence is, no doubt, very unsatisfactorily and ambiguously delineated by Hume, but the general outline of his argument seems sufficiently clear. The entire argument depends on the possibility of our having conative passions and feeling practically concerned over other's pains and pleasures, and should these considerations are acceded to, it is then possible to say that some feeling of practical concern is most likely to emerge from the experience of extensive sympathy. In order to reject the thesis that extensive sympathy leads to benevolence one will have to reject also the thesis that passions are connected on the ground of their resemblance of direction. In other words, the relation between extensive sympathy and benevolence appears as a corollary of the essentially social nature of Hume's concept of man and the conation or practical concern built into some of man's other-directed passions. The entire notion of extensive sympathy is founded on the view that a sympathised passion has a greater degree of intensity, aided as it is by imagination, premises his view that extensive sympathy leads to benevolence seems credible enough howsoever ambiguously it might have been expounded by him.

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connected by a <u>natural</u> relation? It would be dogmatic to say that a natural relation, since it is not logical, has no or a mean authority over our affective life. Logic, or Reason, for Hume, has no sovereignty in the domain of the passions, at its best, it can assume the role of an occasional suzerain.

Another of Mercer's remark is that Hume's concept of extensive sympathy is "compatible with hatred or indifference" in so far it is "merely thought of as a double correspondence of impressions". It is doubtful whether the remark is justifiable and the word "merely" is crucial. Is it really the case that Hume thinks of extensive sympathy "merely" as a double correspondence of impressions? Perhaps not. On the contrary, Hume is insistent on the strength of the sympathized passion, which alone is capable of giving "a double tendency of the passions". "A strong impression, when communicated, gives a double tendency of the passions; which is related to benevolence and love by a similarity of direction; however painful the first impression might have been." (op.cit.,p.387) To take such a view as Mercer does is unduly narrow and could be held only at the cost of ignoring Hume's intentions. Extensive sympathy could be said to be compatible with hatred or indifference only if Hume's view that the "same object causes contrary passions according to its different degrees" (ibid) were shown to be false, and surely Mercer does not undertake any such task. Sympathy with a weak painful impression can give rise to hatred by "the resemblance of sensations". The distinction between similarity of direction and resemblance of sensations among passions is overlooked by Mercer. Sympathy as such could certainly be compatible with contrary passions, since it is only a non-committal awareness of others' feelings. But extensive sympathy, conceived as a unique phenomenon based upon a greater intensity of communicated feelings, is in the first place cannot have the sympathising subject indifferent to the fortune of the

other persons and by a 'similarity of direction' leads to specific other-directed passions of practical concern. Howsoever extensive sympathy be related to benevolence, that there is a natural connexion between the two is borne out by Hume at least in one context. Our sympathy with "our relations and acquaintance" as with others in general is aided by imagination and custom. In the former case, irrespective of their fortune, ill or well, we feel concerned in sympathising with their feelings, and "this correspondence of sentiments is the natural attendant of love, it readily produces that affection" (ibid., p.389, italics not in the text). This case, as it is put by Hume, goes to show that even to assert that sympathy and benevolence are attached by a natural and original quality would not require Hume to "revise" his whole psychology of the passions as Mercer (op.cit.,p.42) would like us to think.

The attitude of the sympathising agent functions in a two-fold manner. "When we observe a person in mis fortunes, we are affected with pity and love; but the author of that misfortune becomes the object of our strongest hatred, and is more detested in proportion to the degree of our compassion" (ibid.,p.389). The "author of the misfortune" of the person we sympathize with becomes an object of our hatred because he "bears a relation...to the misfortune". The passion of pity, in this case, gives rise to two contrary passions: love of the person pitied and hatred of the "author" of his misfortune. This is possible because the sensation of the passion of pity makes us interested, on the one hand, in the welfare of the sufferer, and on the other, hate him who has caused the pitied

person to suffer. Hume holds that pity is a passion that arises "from the imagination, according to the light, in which it places its object" (ibid.,p.381). Accordingly, there is "a mixture of love or tenderness with pity", and in so far as it is "an uneasiness", in the case of sympathy, it produces hatred for the cause of that uneasiness. It is the situations of the persons considered and the relation in which they stand to the feeling of uneasiness that determine the identical sensation to produce contrary passions in the sympathising agent.

There are aspects of our emotional life which cannot be explained by sympathy. For example, why does one feel "a joy from the grief of others" or is actuated by the desire of misery and aversion others' happiness. In fact, malice is as much a natural passion as pity and benevolence. If sympathy be the "animating principle" of the latter, how are we to account for such passions are envy or malice? For this specific purpose Hume appeals to "an original quality of the soul" (ibid.,p.372) called comparison. He mentions that "in their sentiments and opinions" men "always judge more of objects by comparison than from their intrinsic worth and value". It is a fact of our emotional life that "Every object is attended with some emotion proportion'd to it; a great object with a great emotion, a small object with a small emotion. A great object, therefore, succeeding a small one makes a great emotion succeed a small one" (ibid.,p.374). This inter-relation of objects and emotions is in part derived from Hume's causal explanation of the generation of passions. Since emotions are apporpor-

tioned to the magnitude of the objects, there is expected to be a concomitant relation between the variative of the intensity of the passions and the magnitude of the objects. But this may not always happen, because "comparison" says Hume, "may change the emotion without changing anything in the object" (<u>ibid</u>.,p.374). Objects of passions appear greater or less by a comparison with others. From the principle of comparison the anti-social passions like malice and envy are derived. One feels envy or malice towards others according he compares his own happiness or misery with theirs. One's idea of one's happiness or misery is thrown into higher relief or gets enlivened only when it is compared with the happiness or misery of others. Hume explains the operation of the principle of comparison as follows: "as we observe a greater or less share of happiness or misery in others, we must make an estimate of our own, and feel a consequent pain or pleasure. The misery of another gives us a more lively idea of our happiness, and his happiness of our misery. The former, therefore, produces delight, and the latter uneasiness" (<u>ibid</u>.,p.375).

One characteristic feature of comparison is that it makes possible to experience reversed or contrary sensations, pleasure from uneasiness, uneasiness from pleasure. The feeling of contrary sensation need not be always occasioned by comparing one's state of affairs with those of others. It may be occasioned by one's own past or future pleasures or pains. Hume invites, "the prospect of past pain is agreeable, when we are satisfy'd with our present condition; as on the other hand our past pleasures give us uneasiness,

when we enjoy nothing at present equal to them" (*ibid.*, p.376). Considered in this light, comparison involves both symmetrical and reflexive relations, where as sympathy involves, necessarily, symmetrical and transitive relations.

Let us now see how does Hume explain the passions of envy and malice by the principle of comparison. He says that "envy is excited by some present enjoyment of another, which by comparison diminishes our idea of our own....malice is the unprovok'd desire of producing evil to another, in order to reap a pleasure from the comparison" (*ibid.*, p.377). We need not go into the details of Hume's analysis of envy. What is important is that the relations of resemblance and proximity help producing a relation of ideas in comparison, and a consequent relation in impressions. The source of enlivening is the idea of self, which is augmented by the process of comparison. The chief difference between the principles of sympathy and comparison is that in the case of the latter the process is more conscious than the former, which Hume conceives as almost involuntary. Again, though both in sympathy and in comparison it is the other person who is the object of our passions, the relations involved in the operation of them, except for resemblance, are utterly diverse. There is, in comparison, no inferential movement from one's idea of another's passion to the feeling of the passion itself, though comparison results in producing passions with conative propensities. Malice, for example, is highly conative feeling: "the unprovok'd *desire* of *producing* to another" (*ibid.*, p.377, italics not in the text). But there seems to be some

difference between the conation related to sympathy and those with comparison. It is well known that Hume distinguishes between desire and its end. In the case of the other-directed passions like love and hatred we have a cause which excites the passions and an object to which they are directed. The cause of love and hatred are the direct passions of pleasure and pain, and their object is invariably some person or "thinking being" other than our own self. Love and hatred are passions, distinguished from pride and humility, by their dispositional properties or conations, i.e., desire to produce happiness or misery for the person loved or hated, as the case may be. Desire is a passion for good not presently enjoyed, and aversion is one for the removal of evils. This fact points to the inter-relation that exists between the direct and the indirect passions: "indirect passions...give in their turn additional force to the direct passions, and encrease our desire and aversion to the object". (ibid.,p.439) This statement, an unqualified one, should be interpreted as true of conative indirect passions only. Certainly, "pure emotions" likewise to lead to desire. In fact Hume's own example of pride, an indirect passion, leading to "the impressions of volition and desire" would amend his basic view of "pure emotions" and those that lead to special dispositions. However, besides the cause and the object, there is the end as another component of the passions. The end is that which the passions endeavour to attain, and hence the dispositional account of love[1] as

1. "...love is nothing but the desire of happiness to another person, and hatred that of misery. The desire and aversion constitute the very nature of love and hatred. They are not only inseparable, but the same." Treatise, p.367.

a desire for the happiness of the person loved and an aversion to his misery. Now turning to malice, we find that the end and the desire are not identical. The malicious agent desires to produce evil to others "*in order to* reap a pleasure from the comparison" (*ibid.*,p.377, italics not in the text). The feeling of malice is due to comparison, and to be malicious is to desire evil of another, and the process does not end at that, there is a motive, a further end, the enjoyment from comparison. Perhaps, in sympathy, when the passions like pity, benevolence and love arise in consequence, no such further end seems to be in view, except the sensations. Ardal remarks when Hume distinguishes between a desire and its end "there is no suggestion that the end of this desire is not the ultimate end of the desire, or that it can be further analysed" (*op.cit.*,p.73). Obviously, in the case of malice as a desire the end is further analysable. If the motive were not "to reap a pleasure from the comparison" the end of the desire, i.e., producing evil to another, would not have been sought.

The question next arises: how are the two principles of human mind, comparison and sympathy, related? Hume says that "comparison is directly contrary to sympathy in its operation" (*ibid.*,p.593). 'Sympathy' means to sympathise with the feelings of *others* and 'comparison' is always comparison with *ourselves*. In spite of the "close and intimate....correspondence of human souls"(*ibid.*,p.592) comparison takes place "on all occasions" and "mixes with most of our passions" (*ibid.*,p.593). How are we then to decide which of the two principles would govern our emotional life? One answer,

says Hume, is to be found in "the particular temper of the person, for the prevalence of the one or the other" (*ibid.*,p.594). Surely it may be case, but in view of the mighty influence sympathy is said to have on human nature, personal temper appears weak enough for the decision. Another answer, and a better one, is suggested by Hume, and in this connexion he gives the famous analogy of the man at peril in sea. The epistemological point that emerges from the analogy may be stated as follows. When an idea is less vivid than comparison ceases to operate, and when it acquires greater intensity it makes us sympathetic. "Sympathy being the conversion of an idea into an impression, demands a greater force and vivacity in the idea than is requisite to comparison" (*ibid.*,p.595). All this is perfectly consistent, but doubts linger on as to the involuntary nature of sympathy emphasised by Hume. Shall we then say that we are operated upon by sympathy only if an idea acquires sufficient vivacity for its conversion into an impression? In any case both sympathy and comparison appear conditional upon the degree of vivacity of the ideas concerned, and this conditional nature of sympathy and comparison as regards their prevalence goes to impair their status as *principles* of human nature.

Sympathy and comparison are said to be contrary to one another in operation. Can there be no point of concurrence between the principles? Hume says that it is possible to bear malice against oneself and one's present fortune, "and carry it so far as designedly to seek affliction and encrease [one's] pains and sorrows" (*ibid.*,p.376). Hume calls such an affair of disposition "irregular

appetite for evil". What is important for our purpose is the example that he gives. An extension of malice against oneself may be undertaken "upon the distress and misfortune of a friend, or person dear to him" (*ibid.*). Now, the distress of a friend or an endeared person can be known by sympathy, and in consequence, with a desire to lessen his distress I may court discomfort and poverty, lest he might feel more distressed by comparing his state of affairs with mine. Patriots often go for voluntary poverty. In such cases as these it is difficult to decide whether the practical concern is due to sympathy or to comparison, or both. And if this is true, the relation of contrariety between sympathy and comparison seems to be weakened.

Both sympathy and comparison, despite their contrary operations are subject to general rules. The concept of general rules is important in the *Treatise* and in the *Enquiry*. What does Hume really mean by *general rules*?

A rule is a prescriptive linguistic expression, and at times a rule may have descriptive force as well. The prescriptive nature of rules is all too familiar, though the descriptive aspect of rule is what is often lost sight of. It is with both these aspects of rule that Hume speaks of in the *Treatise*. When, for example, he says, "our adherence to general rules...has a mighty influence on the actions and understanding" (*ibid.*,p.374) he does not of course mean to indicate way in which our actions and understanding should operate, rather the way our actions and understanding do *actually* operate. Again, the conflict of imagination

and judgment is resolved by him into the conflict of two sorts of general rules. What he calls "the more general and authentic operations of the understanding" (ibid., p.150) involves general rules of the prescriptive sort, and "wise men" follow it. Now having distinguished two sorts of general rules, we may say that Hume's moral psychology being primarily a descriptive study, the general rules he speaks of or refers to in Book II of the *Treatise* are mostly of the descriptive sort, they are rules of the mind and not, to borrow a phrase from Descartes, rules *for* the direction of the mind.[1]

One of the effects of custom on the imagination is the formation of rules of a certain sort. By 'general rule' Hume means a generalising propensity of the imagination which extends the scope of judgments or opinions to a new set of conditions. In our causal thinking 'general rules' are involved in this sense of the term. The propensity of the imagination to generalise is governed largely by the degree of resemblance of the conditions, though not solely dependent on it. A general rule, for Hume, is an imaginative propensity. The imagination and the passions, we have already noticed, are intimately related, and it is no wonder that the passions will be subject to the generalising propensities of the imagination. The *modus operandi* of the general rules in the generation of passions is similar to that of in the formation of belief. "Custom readily

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1. Stuart Hampshire thinks that Hume lacks any distinction between rules to which any thinking *must* conform and mere habits and uniformities in our thought and behaviour. See *David Hume*, ed. D.F. Pears, p.3. This is challenged in T.K.Hearn's paper in the Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol VIII,1970. For us a settlement of this issue is not imperative.

carries us beyond the just bounds in our passions, as well as in our reasonings"(Ibid.,p.293). This is said of the descriptive general rules. A little below the passage Hume refers to the general rules of the prescriptive sort which guide us in preferring one passion to another: they "guide us, by means of general establish'd maxims, in the proportions we ought to observe in preferring one object to another"(ibid.,p.294). General rules as they do have an influence over the passions are then of two sorts, one "carries us beyond our just bounds" and the other sort "guides" us "in the proportions we ought to observe". General rule, in both its descriptive and prescriptive aspects governs sympathy. In the descriptive aspect a general rule influences the imagination and makes us conceive a lively idea of the passions of others, even though we are presented with only the signs of the passion. In other words, a general rule as a propensity of the imagination functions in a supplementative fashion, just as it does in generating belief. The prescriptive aspect of general rules serves as a corrective of the variability of sympathy. In as much as sympathy depends upon relations it is variable, and if sympathy is to become a source of moral sentiments, it must remain steady and overcome its variableness. General rule corrects the variations in our sympathies and so give steadiness to our sentiments of morals. "In order...to... arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation"(ibid.,p. 581-2). As regards comparison, the general rules hold only in their

descriptive operation. Having been given in the past constant conjunction of two objects, the mind customarily expects the one when the other is presented. The influence of general rules is described by Hume in the following terms: "we naturally fly to the conception of the second [on being given the first] and form an idea of it in as lively and strong a manner, as if we had infer'd its existence by the justest and most authentic conclusion of our understanding"(ibid.,p.374). The general rules condition a fact of our mental life that there happen to be a correspondence or concomitant variation in the intensity of emotions and the magnitude of objects. This correspondence is presupposed by the principle of comparison which, in effect, changes the emotion "without changing any thing in the object". From the account of the dominion of general rules over the two principles of sympathy and comparison, it is, by now obvious, that general rules govern comparison in an indirect way than it does sympathy. In the former case, the general rule hold in both of its aspects, though in the latter, the question of prescriptive role of general rules does not arise at all. But could we not suggest that Hume's second example of "irregular appetite for evil", i.e., "When a criminal reflects on the punishment he deserves, the idea of it is magnify'd by a comparison with his present ease and satisfaction; which forces him, in a manner, to seek uneasiness, in order to avoid so disagreeable a contrast"(ibid.,pp.376-7) is a remote case of the prescriptive aspect of the general rules, because a notion of ought is involved in the comparative process undertaken by the criminal. He,in fact,

reverts back to a correspondence of emotion and object. I am not sure of this suggestion, but it does seem worth considering.

One of the remarkable features of Hume's account of sympathy is that its end-product is an interest in the welfare of the other person. Since sympathy is a principle of human nature, in that respect an interest in human welfare is an aspect of human existence. If that sounds to be a taller claim, it could be put in milder terms, that is to say, constituted as we are, we can never become absolutely indifferent to the happiness and misery of other human beings. In the Enquiry, Hume speaks of "a warm concern for the interests of our species" (p.225). It is interesting to note that even Kant, who ordinarily held that the facts about human nature do not suffice to determine man's duty, admitted that an interest in the happiness of others can be a part of our nature, and such an interest is present in at least some men as a sympathetic disposition: "We have an instinct to benevolence, but not an instinct to righteousness" (Lectures on Ethics, p.194). Though in the Critique of Practical Reason(152,197) Kant mentions sympathy as 'burdensome' when precedes the consideration of what is duty, the anti-feeling crusade was not altogether there in such pre-critical works of his like the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime; and we across him in that work deciding in favour of feeling as the source of moral ideas as much as in the manner of some of British moralists whose legacy Hume in fact inherited. In the Metaphysic of Morals Kant derives the duty of sympathy because it is "one of the impulses which nature has implanted in us so that we may do what the thought of duty alone would not accomplish" (126).

These are perhaps the famous passages in Kant, just as there are terrible passages in Hume.

Action and Freedom

In course of the development of Hume's theory of the passions, culminating in the doctrine of Sympathy, two points call for special notice. They are, one, that Hume makes a gradual shift to, what may be called, a dispositional analysis of the passions on the basis of his view of "the whole bent or tendency" of the passions "from the beginning to the end" and the other, that since the passions are related to their corresponding behavioural signs it is possible to have an inferential awareness of the other person's state of mind. The correspondence between the passions and their manifestation in terms of behavioural signs is based upon the conative quality of the passions themselves. There is a special class of the passions, i.e., the other-directed passions such as love, hatred, malice etc. which are "attended" by certain specific propensities of action or on the part of the feeling agent as a matter of fact. However non-logical the necessity might appear between the passions and their behavioural expressions it cannot be ignored, given the human condition. And though Hume does make a distinction between "pure emotions" and those that call forth special feelings, or he puts it, "immediately exciting us to action" (op.cit.,p.367), yet the passions like pride and humility are, strictly speaking, cannot be "completed within themselves"(ibid.). Hume himself speaks of "the port and gait" (ibid., p.326) of swans, peacocks and the turkey, and considers it as "proof" of their pride. However unsatisfactory the examples chosen might be, it is clear that even the so-called "pure emotions" have

their manifestation in behaviour. In the Inquiry Hume explains that he does not use the word 'pride' with its common meaning. By 'pride' he designates "the sentiment of conscious worth, the self-satisfaction proceeding from a review of a man's own conduct and character" (p.314). So even in the case our feelings about ourselves, just as it is about others, are implied the standards of worthiness prevailing in society, and can very well be conceived of as causes of behaviour. The causal relation between the passions and their corresponding behavioural expressions is what is assumed both by the principles of comparison and sympathy. The difference between the two principles lies in that in sympathising with other's feelings we know his feelings by giving ourselves up to them, where as in comparing we know them in subordination to our own. But in both the cases a special relationship between the passions felt by others and its expression in behaviour-sign is assumed. Moreover, Hume is emphatic in saying that the causes of the passions must "be constant and inherent in his (the other person's) person and character" (op. cit.,p.348, italics not in the text) and the pleasure or the uneasiness which produces the passions in us 'proceed' from an 'action' of the other person, who is its "cause and author" (ibid.,p.349). The action and the agent, Hume says, are "sufficiently"(ibid) connected. Man's actions exhibit "a particular fore-thought and design" (ibid.). In so far as "the action arise from the person"(ibid.) the passions are not ineffectual stirrings of emotions, they are conatively potent.

Now, given that actions and their agents are there, the question arises are the actions free or determined? This leads us immediately on to an ancient and vexed problem of philosophy. The problem consists in encountering two of our commonsense beliefs in conflict with each other, namely, that all our actions are caused and that man is a responsible agent. The former is the thesis of determinism and the latter that of the libertarians. Determinism places actions due to human agency in a class with events in general and seek to explain actions in causal terms without any reference to human agency or deliberate human intervention or non--intervention in the course of nature. The libertarians, on the other hand, define the concept of action as deliberate human intervention or non-intervention in the course of nature. For them, action is necessarily not an event like eclipse or earthquake, and the term cannot be understood without reference to persons who are responsible agents. Action, for that matter, is human action. It is obvious that both the views, the deterministic and the libertarian, cannot be held together, yet each of them appears plausible when considered severally. Action is an extremely problematical idea and engenders many paradoxes in moral psychology. It would be convenient to take the term as denoting a proper sub-class of behaviour, which, again, covers a rather wide range of phenomena. But 'behaviour' is a natural word to employ for categorising a certain kind of animal movement, and I would like to leave the word unexplained, taking it as basic. A very common kind of human behaviour is called <u>action</u>, and episodes of this kind of behaviour is called <u>acts</u>. We

speak of the magistrate's action, and in this sense 'action' can be taken to signify something done, while 'act' generally signifies a doing. Apart from our locutions about physical transactions involving inanimate objects, actions are spoken of as purposive. Again, 'action' directs our attention to what happens, to the movements made and the results thereof. Then it is something overt. There is a sense in which we speak of mental acts, e.g., trying to remember, say, the French word for 'love'; perhaps we cannot speak of mental actions. An action is not an activity like gardening, walking or teaching, which may be engaged in or cultivated. An act is performed, begun and terminated at specific times. We can and do talk of failure or success of either acts or activities, but perhaps not of actions as such. Actions can be identified as being of certain kinds and described in certain respects. It is not the case that there are no over-lapping of 'action', 'act' and 'activity'. What is important is not to get the notions smudged so as to overlook their differences. However, 'action' as purposive overt behaviour is a sophisticated notion than its cognates. With this rough and ready account of the notion of action, I propose to turn to Hume's view on the matter.

Hume does nowhere say what he means by the term 'action', though it is clear that for him, the term 'action' entails personal agency. Let us take his celebrated example of the acorn destroying the oak by outgrowing it. Now this botanical event is not an action, since the charge of parricide cannot be brought against it. "Actions" says Hume, "may be laudable or blameable"(ibid., p.458)

and events cannot be so evaluated. Actions "may cause a judgment" (*ibid.*,p.459) and are in their turn caused by the will, and are thus "signs of motives" (*ibid.*,p.479). A moral judgment is an evaluation of the motives of the agent *via* his actions. That our actions are in a peculiar way revelatory of our character is brought home by Hume's interchangeably using "action or character" (*ibid.*, p.469). An action can be an object of moral evaluation only if the agent is *morally* responsible. Sometimes it is possible to distinguish the notion of moral responsibility from that of causal responsibility. The relation between the two types of responsibility is asymmetrical. If an agent A is morally responsible for his action, he is causally responsible too, but not *vice versa*. Deaths due to earthquake may be lamented but the natural phenomenon can be in no way be morally responsible for the sorrowful state of affairs. On the contrary, Brutus kills Caesar, and the Roman senator was *both* morally and causally responsible for the emperor's death. Brutus' causal responsibility lies in the series of bodily movements that he might have had to make, e.g., lifting his hand, holding the dagger, swooping it down and thursting it into Caesar's skin, etc.; but his moral responsibility consists in his motive. Without further elucidating the distinction between moral and causal responsibilities, we might now say that an event is an action, if and only if, both moral and causal responsibilities for its happening is ascribable to a person. The concept of action co-implies the concept of personal agency. Actions are, for Hume, properly speaking, "actions of the will" (*ibid.*,p.405).

Let us now move from this brief and roughly stated account of Hume's concept of action to his views about liberty and necessity. The passions, direct and indirect, or the feelings that we have about good and evils, and those about ourselves and others, cause us to act. But what does it mean 'to act'? Or, since all actions are "actions of the will", what is the will? The notion of the will is not elaborately discussed by Hume as one can find in Kant. But he does define the will as a faculty of exertion, and says that it is closely allied to the direct passions like desire and aversion. "Desire arises from good consider'd simply, and aversion is deriv'd from evil. The will exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attain'd by any action of the mind or body" (ibid., p.439). The passage is significant owing to Hume's interchangeable use of "mind or body". The actor or the agent is a <u>person</u>, of whom both the predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics and predicates ascribing states of consciousness respectively, are predicable. Hume is neither a physicalist nor a Cartesian, and for him, persons are neither exclusively bodies as it was with Hobbes, nor are they minds only, as they were with Descartes. Because the concept of a person is identified by both the sorts of predicates it attracts, action and willing are coordinated in the life history of the moral agent. However, the will is not a passion, though it does share some of the characteristics of indirect passions. On page 399 of the <u>Treatise</u> Hume describes the will as one of the "immediate effects of pain and pleasure", and in that sense, we may take the will as a direct passion. Kemp Smith upholds this interpretation. But though

Kemp Smith does have the textual support in holding the will as a direct passion, Hume's statement is not enough clear. He says, "it [the will] be not comprehended among the passions" (*ibid.*) and that, as already noted, it is one of the "immediate effects of pain and pleasure". Now a direct passion is, by definition, one that arises in the individual immediately by original impressions. Then what does Hume mean by saying that the will is not a passion? The division of the passions into direct and indirect is in accordance with their origination, and does Hume intend to reserve the term 'passion' for the indirect ones alone? It does appear so, though he does not say anything to that effect. The indirect passions being simple impressions are indefinable, almost in the manner of Moore's dogma[1], since they are unanalysable. It is this indefinability what the will shares with the indirect passions. Despite their indefinability the indirect passions like pride[2] and humility, love and hatred etc. are describable (see *Treatise*, p.277) in terms of their "nature, origin, causes and objects" (*ibid.*,p.329), and the description could be dispensed with only because of our familiarity with the passions. About the will Hume remarks that " 'tis impossible to define, and needless to describe any farther". But what does he mean by the term 'will'? And Hume's answer is the following: "by the *will*, I mean nothing but *the internal impression*

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1. Could Moore have derived his notion of indefinability of a term in the sense of its unanalysability from Hume? Of course Moore does not mention Hume's name either in the *Principia Ethica* or in the *Ethics*.

2. Hume in fact defines 'pride' in *Enquiry*, page 314.

we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body or new perception of our mind." (ibid.,p.399, italics in the text). It is in fact a definition, since we define the terms, and not the objects or things designated by the terms. So Hume's notion of indefinability is in fact the notion of unanalysability of any simple entity whatsoever. In Hume's case it is the indirect passions, in Moore's case it was the non-natural properties. Anyway, Hume's definition of the will, as I would call it, has two main features, one, that the will is an internal impression, and the other, that to will is to "knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind". If we take common examples of willing such as moving one's hand or calling up an image in one's mind it is the second part of the definition that is more important than having a particular impression which we come to experience only in consequence of willing. Nothing can be a better chosen instance of willing than the ability of performing a voluntary act. But somehow either Hume intends to explain away the will, or owing to his commitment to an empiricist theory of knowledge he is constrained to admit an entity only if we could have an impression of it. But the matter, as it stands, is that it is the impression, Kemp Smith very rightly remarks, and not the 'knowingly' giving rise affair that Hume proceeds to deal with, to the effect that "voluntary actions are treated like other perceptions and ideas of the mind" (op. cit.,p.435). If the will is an impression, and "like any other passion in the mind" as Kemp Smith points out, in so far as its unanalysability is concerned, wherein then does the will's difference from the passions lie?

But for Hume to make the will an impression is advantageous, because then, like any other impression, the will as well could be explained in causal terms. He introduces the notion of "necessary actions" (op.cit.,p.400). What he really means by the phrase is opaque, perhaps that actions as effects are determined by their causes. Actions are not sui generis, rather caused: "we conclude one body or action to be the infallible cause of another"(ibid.,p 400). Of course, everything depends on what does Hume mean by 'cause'. The word 'cause' is often employed whenever questions of explanation arise. 'Explanation for', 'cause of', etc., are near synonyms over a wide variety of cases. Hume often thinks of a cause as a happening which explains a subsequent happening. He also often talks about 'cause' and 'causation' as if they were co-extensive with explanation. It may not be altogether unplausible to interpret his phrase "determination of the mind" to mean 'explanation', since the sense of 'cause' is, at times, relative to forms of explanation. Even the word 'reason' is used in the sense of facts knowledge of which might explain. In the case of explaining human behaviour there are a number of items which one might mention to explain. Dispositions, emotions, motives, sympathy,etc., are a few of the explanatory factors. All of these are causes in the sense of occurrences or happenings that explain the subsequent occurrences or happenings. They operate by occurring or happening. As explanatory factors they are present in the phenomena to be explained, and mention of their presence might explain the actions done. It remains, of course, an open question whether explanatory

items or causes are necessary or sufficient to explain an act. But what is clear is that by calling these facts, occurrences, etc., 'causes' we view ("determination of the mind") them as items of a kind, mention of which might explain actions performed by human agents.

It remains to be added that Hume's anti-thesis of the "actions of the mind" and the "actions of matter" designate _mutatis mutandis_ what we now-a-days call event and human action respectively. His set of synonymous expressions for human action consists of the following: besides "actions of the mind", "actions of the will" and "voluntary action". Voluntarity, for Hume, is built into the notion of human action. In this sense, he is echoing Locke, for whom the exercise of the power of the will was the distinguishing characteristic of voluntary action. Whether in performing a voluntary action one performs two separate actions -- the act of willing to perform the action and the action itself -- remains open to interpretations in view of Hume's account of the relationship between mind and body. At least, the matter cannot be very readily decided.

The phrase "necessary action", in the present context, calls for elucidation. The term 'necessary' belongs to the causal discourse, and characterises the type of connexion that is felt by the mind in its passage from observed sequences of "constant conjunction" to the habitually expected state of affairs: " 'tis from the constant union the necessity arises" (_ibid._). An action could be called necessary in the sense that its occurrence could be explained in terms of

"the constant *union* and the *inference* of the mind" (*ibid.*, italics in the text). Events or what Hume calls "actions of matter" are usually so explained, as items in causal sequences, as being indifferently either causes or effects, according as we regard them in their relation to their consequences or in connexion with their antecedents. An action then is necessary, for Hume, only if it is causally explicable. The "actions of matter", he says, "are..regarded as instances of necessary actions" (*ibid*); and he asks whether the "actions of mind" could be said to be necessary in the specified sense of the word as well.

Hume's position is somewhat unique. He does not propose a reduction of the "actions of the mind" to the status of the "actions of matter" as any physicalist or behaviourist would do, though he extends his criterion of determinism over the domain of the "actions of the mind" without reservation. He holds that the "actions of the mind" are "necessary" in the same sense as those of the "actions of matter", and says that "our actions [i.e., actions due to personal agency] have a constant union with our motives, tempers, and circumstances" (*ibid.*, p.401). This is Hume's premise for inferring the necessity of the "actions of the mind", and he seeks to prove the truth of his premise on a "general view of the common course of human affairs" (*ibid.*). The "common course of human affairs" is marked by a "uniform and regular operation of natural principles" (*ibid*). What are the "natural principles" is not easy to decide, for Hume does not mention it explicitly; but from the examples that he discusses it appears that by "natural principle" he intends to

designate statements of a posteriori sort about natural relation. Obviously, the paradigm of such a "natural principle" would be the principle stating the necessary connexion between cause and effect. The natural relation between cause and effect is characterised by two factors: uniformity and regularity; and in terms of these two factors Hume defines the concept of necessity. "Necessity is regular and certain" or "uniformity forms the very essence of necessity" (ibid.,p.403). The proposition "Like causes...produce like effects" is a second order instance of a necessary principle. That "Men can not live without society" is another instance of necessary principle. In fact, Hume goes on to observe that man's social existence and behaviour exhibit a uniform and regular pattern. Uniformity is "a general course of nature in human actions" (ibid.,p.402). Despite the diversity and difference in men's stations in life and circumstance in their sexual and social positions, geographical and political state of affairs, they act in a uniform pattern. Men's acts are in a uniform and regular way conformable with their characters as human beings, as members of their age, group and sex, their vocational group, as members of their nation. "The different stations of life influence the whole fabric, external and internal; and those different stations arise necessarily, because uniformly, from the necessary and uniform principles of human nature" (ibid). Again, "There is a general course of nature in human actions, as well as in the operations of the sun and the climate. There are also characters peculiar to different nations and particular persons, as well as common to mankind. The knowledge of these characters is founded on the observation of an uniformity in actions, that flow from them;

and this uniformity forms the very essence of necessity"(ibid., p.403). Now from "the general view of the common course of human affairs" Hume claims to have shown that "actions have a constant union and connexion with the situation and temper of the agent" (ibid). The uniformity of human actions is a logical condition for asserting the necessity of human actions. But what sort of a logical condition? Sufficient or necessary, or both? The structure of Hume's argument is not enough perspicacious. He says that the 'knowledge' for that matter, belief that human actions are necessary is "founded" on the "general view" that human actions are uniform. He uses logically provocative phrases such as "flow from them". In fact, he does not argue, simply puts the matter equivocally in another terminology; as if it were the case that "necessity" meant "uniformity". Anyway, for Hume, there does not arise any question of denying the uniformity of human actions in order to escape the conclusion that human actions are necessary. If the relation between the premise of uniformity and the conclusion of necessity were that of a conditional proposition, then the premise could be denied only if the conclusion could be shown to be false. That is to say, it could have been the case had Hume's argument been a substitution instance of modus tollens. It is doubtful whether it has that form. Again, if uniformity of human action implies its necessity, the consequent cannot be escaped by denying the antecedent, as Hume says, for that would involve a fallacious logical move. But Hume does say that the argument that human actions are necessary can be eluded "by denying that uniformity of human actions, on which it is founded"(ibid). It could be so only if

Hume had in mind some relation like entailment or strict implication. If uniformity of human actions entails the necessity of human actions, then of course the latter cannot be rejected without denying the former. Such a strong claim, perhaps, cannot be put forward on Hume's behalf.

Granted that human action is necessary in the sense that it uniformly exhibits a constant union with the agent's motives and circumstances, it remains to be shown that the necessity of human action is the same as the necessity of cause and effect relation. Hume says that "in judging of the actions of men we must proceed upon the same maxim, as when we reason concerning external objects" (ibid.). The constant conjunction of phenomena generates a propensity in the mind to expect similar occurrences in future when familiar conjuncts are presented. The so-called necessary connexion is felt in the mind or "in the imagination", and in all cases of probable reasoning the mind is guided by custom. The process of non--demonstrative inference, for Hume, is in fact, a process of habitual expectation. The probability of the inferred state of affairs may vary in degrees, but "the mind balances the contrary" instances, and restores the feeling of necessary connexion between constantly united phenomena. The constancy of union is the formal ground of causal inference on the basis of which "a connexion in the imagination is established". The idea of necessary connexion is derived from the impression of constant conjunction or union of two particular phenomena in experience. Now the same formal criterion of necessity is observed in the case of human actions. "No union can be

more constant and certain, than that of actions with some motives and characters; and if in other cases the union is uncertain, 'tis no more than what happens in the operations of body"..(_ibid_.,p.404). Just as the union of phenomena _determines_ us to infer the existence of one from that of another, similarly from the union of motives and actions, inference i.e. prediction of actions from motives becomes possible. Here we come to have another way of saying the same things. To say that human actions are necessary is equivalent to saying that human actions are predictable. Various objections can be raised against Hume's view that human actions are predictable since they are uniform and hence, necessary. Protagonists of popular version of libatarianism often appeal to the Heisen berg principle of certainty. The principle is alleged to state that it is impossible to predict the future state of affairs of the universe because we can never determine what the past is. If the causes cannot be fully known, the effects cannot be fully predicted. F. Waismann has said that the principle renders the present even unknowable, let alone the future. The objection does not seem specially relevant. No one would deny that we are often able to predict the actions of our friends, or the thoughts or emotions they will experience in certain circumstances. Having seen how they have reached on frequent occasions in the past, we have built up an idea of their characters, and this knowledge can be used as a guide to their future behaviour. If such expectations were not usually fulfilled, all social life would become impossible. An uncharacteristic behaviour falsifying a prediction does not prove that it does not follow from the agent's character.

may be that the predictor was unacquainted with a facet of the agent's character that explains his behaviour. Again, it may be argued that all actions cannot be explained on the same logical level. Compulsive behaviour can be explained in causal terms; but to explain intelligent, purposive behaviour we have to use the concepts of reason and motive. We have stated earlier that Hume's notion of cause is often co-extensive with 'explanation'. Furthermore the onus would rest with the libertarian to show that motive language is not causal language. If a motive can be no different from any character trait as far as the determining of action is concerned, in that case, in Hume's sense of 'cause', the two languages become inter-translatable in the context of human action. Motives are a special class of reasons which apply to actions which are performed with a particular end in view. To give the motive for an action is to give the reason for that action, i.e., to explain that action. Though to give the reason is not necessarily to give the motive, yet this fact does not require us to hold that a motivated action is causally inexplicable. There is another point worth mentioning. To say that an agent is reliable is, to a large extent, to admit that his behaviour is predictable. Perhaps it is not possible to assert that an agent is reliable and yet his behaviour is not predictable. To say that so-and-so is reliable is to imply a sort of unasserted prediction based on our past acquaintance with him. Or, in other words, prediction in human affairs can apply to those events about which we have been able to form expectations because we have witnessed other similar examples in the past. Accuracy of our past observations

concerning the character of the agent and his actions may be questioned, but this fact in no way goes to invalidate the predictability thesis as a principle. That we do expect agents to behave in a particular fashion is no less true that the feeling of 'freedom' that we often experience, e.g., the certainty that I feel that I can lift my arm whenever I please. More about such matters later.

Any attempt to predict the possibility human actions on the basis of the motive and character of the agents themselves would be to offer, what Hume calls, moral evidence in support of the view that human actions are necessary. Moral evidence, he says "is nothing but a conclusion concerning the actions of men, deriv'd from the consideration of their motives, temper and situation"(ibid). By virtue of a constant union of men's actions and motives it becomes arguable that should a man with a specific character be placed in a specific situation his acts will follow by natural necessity in exactly the same way as the effects of any other set of causes.

We may now pause for a while to consider some of the points that arise from Hume's argument that human actions are necessary. In the first place, Hume defines 'necessity' in terms of 'uniformity' and this uniformity is observable in the operations of nature. We have the experience of similar objects in constant conjunction with the consequence that the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other. This is the genetic account of our idea of necessity. Now if the necessity that we feel in the mind and entertain the consequent belief that "Every object is determin'd by an absolute fate to a certain degree and direction of its motion"

(*ibid.*,p.400), necessity of the causal sort, or of that encountered with or resorted to in connexion with causal reasoning would be paradigmatic. At least, it is so with Hume. The next move made by Hume is to extend the idea of necessity to cover the domain of human actions. The idea of necessity in the sense of a feeling consequent upon our experience of constant conjunction of similar objects could be said to hold in the case of human actions only if it were shown that man's motives and actions are also constantly conjoined. Hume said that he would "prove"(*ibid.*,p.401) it, but in fact, as has been rightly noticed by Ardal (*op.cit.*,p.85), he does not do any such thing. Nor does he point to any case of constant conjunction of motives and actions of human beings, granted that it could be so done. He is honest, though, to take into account the alleged irregularity and uncertainty of human conduct. What then is the status of the assertion that human actions are necessary? At this point, Hume resorts to his distinction between demonstrative and probable reasoning. In the domain of matters of fact demonstrative certainty could not be hoped for, all that we might aspire after is a statistical average of evidential probability. On this issue, the force of natural evidence is as much non-demonstrative as that of moral evidence. In all cases of arguments from experience any movement from restricted generalisation ('All known *X*'s are F') to unrestricted or universal generalisation ('All *X*'s are F') will and does involve a fallacious deductive step. We could certainly move from 'All known *X*'s are F' to 'All *X*'s are F' only if the necessity were logical, and, embodied in the structure of things. But Hume desires the existence

of logical necessity in the non-linguistic world or the domain of matters of fact. In the circumstance, the status of the conclusion inferred from the observed constant conjunction of similar objects would be one of belief. It is as much a matter of belief that human action are necessary as to hold that every event has a cause. The _idea_ of cause entails the _idea_ of necessary connexion with the effect, and since "there is but one kind of _necessity_, as there is but one kind of cause"..."the common distinction betwixt _moral_ and _physical_ necessity is without any foundation in nature (ibid.,p.171, italics in the text). It has been one of Hume's intentions to "cement together" (_ibid._,p.406) the natural and the moral evidences on the basis of one definition of 'necessity'.

It may be worth-while to consider the value of uniformity for viewing human actions. The main source from where Hume gets his moral evidence strengthened is history[1], because, "nothing more interests us than our own actions and those of others, the greatest

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1. The student of human nature has more to learn from history. Hume appears to suggest that science of human nature must draw from or at least should be ready to learn from history of human acts. His references to Greek and Roman history are significant in this respect. He believed that there are "constant and universal principles of human nature" (_Inquiry_,p.83) that can be discovered from history. This can be done because "Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places"(_ibid._). A study of history shows "men in all varieties of circumstances and situations", and thus acquaints us "with the regular springs of human action and behaviour"(_ibid._). Professor W.H. Walsh, in a conversation, has drawn my attention to this very interesting point about Hume. If I have understood Professor Walsh aright, he meant to say that, for Hume, since the conceptual apparatus of mankind has remained unchanged and shall remain so, an understanding of historical characters in their situations and circumstances would not be dissimilar to understanding the behaviour of living persons. But there is a sense in which such a view amounts to a denial of history itself. No Marxist, for example, would accept Hume's view, which presupposes that the objective correlate of human behaviour does not change.

part of our reasonings is employ'd in judgments concerning them" (*ibid.*,p.405). In fact, history, says Hume, would be impossible without making inferences about the behaviour of other people. In the *Enquiry* the list of studies that depends on moral evidence is enlarged so as to include, besides history, politics, morals, and literary criticism. The chief function of history is "to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature"(*Enquiry*, p.83). The discovery that motives are "the regular springs of human action and behaviour" is a part of the wisdom of mankind: "The same motives always produce the same actions. The same events follow from the same causes"(*ibid.*). Now why is it that "mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of necessity?" Mainly because the concept of necessity renders actions intelligible, just as it does a brute matter of fact. Events in nature are not episodic merely, they acquire intelligibility only if they could be construed as items of a causal sequence. We often explain people's behaviour by reference to emotions in the sense of motives or inclinations, or what Hume would call "calm passions" that are, he says, "settled principles of actions" as distinguished from mere agitations (the calm/violent dichotomy is not always intended, in the *Treatise*, to be based on the criterion of intensity of the passions). Philosophers have taken motive-explanations or reason-explanations to be non-causal. For Hume this would not be the case. The idea that human actions can be divided into those which are explicable by reference to reasons and those which are explicable by reference to causes does not stand up to scrutiny. Some explanations can be found which are not clearly classifiable

one way or the other. Again, reasons do not operate in the absence or to the exclusion of causes; they function in a context in which causes are also functioning. We shall take up this matter later. In the present context it may be allowable to say that to explain an action by reference to the agent's emotions is to subsume it under a propensity or behaviour-trend. Many of the concepts in terms of which we describe human behaviour are dispositional, and, according to an influential view on this matter, such words are generic or determinable. That is to say, 'X love his wife' ('love' is a dispositional emotion-word for Hume, and the passion has a 'bent' and 'tendency') does not have any episodic use. On the contrary, the statement can be construed as an explanation or interpretation of X's episodic behaviour. As a dispositional statement the sentence is a tendency-stating assertion. The description that X loves his wife or 'X is a loving husband' makes a wide range of different actions predictable. There is nothing harmful in thus putting the case, only if the argument is not tailored to advocate a non-causal view of the relation between dispositions and actions. A departure from the so-called generic view of dispositional terms would called for on a determinist's part. The dispositional verb 'love', it may be agreed, does not have a corresponding episodic use, yet the range of different actions predictable from the description that X is a loving husband can be identified as forming a class inasmuch as they would be episodic explicable in terms of X's love for his wife. In other words, a disposition is _regulative_ of its determinable episodes, while these, in their turn, constitute the class

or satisfaction-range determining, as it were, the truth of a dispositional account or explanation of human actions. The sentence 'X loves his wife' would be vacuous if there did not exist identifiable episodes that satisfy the description 'X is a loving husband'. In fact, it is these episodes that fill the history of X's marital relationship with dynamic interest. On the other hand, if the episodes were not explicable by reference to X's love for his wife, they would hardly have been intelligible. Hence, intelligibility on the part of the episodes and significance on the part of dispositional accounts of human action require a causal relationship between the two.

Intelligibility of episodes lies, in other words, in their predictability. This predictability may be merely epistemic without being logical. Logical predictability could hold only if the necessary connexion were real or structural to the sequence of events. But Hume does not allow this to be the case on any account. He says that "in no single instance the ultimate connexion of any objects is discoverable, either by our senses or reason....we can never penetrate so far into the essence and construction of bodies"(op.cit., p.400). The necessary connexion between constantly conjoined events is felt by the mind "in the imagination". The imagination is an epistemic constitutive factor in our probable knowledge, and hence the observed regularity of sequences, or for that matter, uniformity of nature and human actions renders it credible. The credibility of the necessity of human actions is a necessary condition of the epistemic predictability of human acts. The felt necessity may not offer

us any logical assurance, yet it is a practical guide to our making judgments alike in the case of natural phenomena and human actions. Often freedom is taken to be the unpredictability of our actions. But this tends to create an opacity of understanding of our fellow-beings in their reaction to social reality.

Now that human actions are caused, does it imply that they are not free? Does freedom, or as Hume has it, liberty belong to the will or to the agent? That *liberty* and *necessity* are consistent with each other is a view that has had a long history in the British moral thoughts. Hobbes, for instance, in the *Leviathan* argued in its favour. He categorically remarks that "when the words *free*, and *liberty*, are applied to any thing but bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to motion, is not subject to impediment: and therefore, when it is said (for example) the way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop.....So when we *speak freely*, it is not the liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise than he did. Lastly, from the use of the word *free will*, no liberty can be inferred of the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do" (*op. cit.*, ed. D.D.Raphael, I. p.55). That *freewill* is an improper terminology is a view not only held by Hobbes but also accounted for in another context in the following manner. What is it that make us call an act *voluntary*? 'Liberty', for Hobbes is to be conceived in a negative way as an absence of impediments and only those

actions can be called voluntary which are performed by an agent who "hath time to deliberate" and "the action follows his opinion of the goodness or harm of it" and follows "immediately the last appetite" (ibid.,p.66). To deliberate is to ask oneself whether he should do a thing or not, and deliberations consist of "an alternate succession of contrary appetites, the last is that which we call the will" (ibid.,p.67). He distinguishes the will from intentions and inclinations which "change often", but the will being the last is one. The will, since "nothing taketh beginning from itself" is also caused by other things, and "of voluntary actions the will is the necessary cause" (ibid.). In brief, then, for Hobbes, the concept of voluntary actions is to be analysed in causal terms, actions are causally determined by the will, though there is no question of the will's being free, unless, of course, one chooses to abuse the term. It is the agent, properly speaking, who can be said to be free. The view has passed into the main stream of British philosophy, and we shall find Locke too expressing the same opinion. He says that voluntary is not opposed to necessary, and considers the question whether man's will is free as "altogether improper". For him to ask that question is as insignificant as to ask whether virtue is square. Volition, says Locke, "is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or with-holding it from any particular action. And what is the will, but the faculty to do this?" (ibid.,p.146). Now since, for Locke, both the will and freedom are powers, to ask whether the will is free, is, in effect, to ask "whether one power

has another power"(*ibid.*). The absurdity arises from one's overlooking the fact that a power can only belong to an agent. Hence, Locke thinks that "*the question is not proper, whether the will be free, but whether a man be free*" (*ibid.*, p.147, italics in the text). Again, Locke sees willing or choosing as an action, and man's freedom consists in doing or not doing that what he wills, and it is also true that man cannot forbear volition. Hence man is not free with regard to volition. He puts the point as follows: "the act of volition...being that which he cannot avoid, a man in respect of that action is under a necessity, and so cannot be free; unless necessity and freedom can consist together and a man can be free and bound at once" (*ibid.*, p.148). Man's freedom, for Locke, consists in the absence of external compulsion. I choose a certain line of action and there is nothing in the conditions in which I attempt to perform the act which restrains me in any way. In this sense I am free. But am I free to will? Why do I choose this action rather than another? Can I remain inactive? On the whole, it seems that Locke feels that we are not free to will, that we are determined as to what we do will.

We, in fact, shall leave the account of Locke's position rather half-way, without deciding as to what, according to him determines our will, the greatest good in view or some pressing uneasiness. But for our purpose in view, the account will be sufficient in relating Hume's concept of the will to the tradition of British moral thought. Two points emerge from our consideration of Hobbes' and Locke's views about *liberty* and *necessity*. One is that they are not incon-

patible with each other; and the other is that every human action is causally related with man's will. There is, of course, difference of emphasis between Hume on the one hand, Hobbes and Locke on the other. For Hume, the most engaging question is whether man's actions are free, rather than whether the will is free. The feeling of the inappropriateness of the expression 'freedom of the will' is not so marked in Hume as it is in Locke, or in Hobbes. In respect of man's freedom Hobbes and Locke do not think in identical terms, but both agree that freedom cannot be a property of the will. We shall have occasion to note other shades of difference between these thinkers when we have completed an examination of Hume's concept of the will.

Hume's concept of the will has echoes of Locke's. The verb 'to will', for Hume, is "knowingly to give rise" to any action of mind or body. Both Locke and Hume take willing to consist in knowingly exerting oneself. The adverb 'knowingly' stands for voluntary or intentional character of the action given rise to. For Hume, to say that an act is voluntary is to give a causal account of the way the act comes about, or, in other words, the intentionality of an act implies a causal statement. The statement that an act *a* is voluntary on the part of an agent A would be analysable, from Hume's point of view, into a causal statement that the act *a* is knowingly given rise to by A, or *a* was initiated by an act of A's willing. It may be recalled that for Hume actions are intentional, and in this context his phrase "actions of the mind" is significant. A logical connexion between will and action can hold only when 'action' implies

intention. A man may be said necessarily to want to do things he does on purpose, since he does not necessarily want to do the things he does inadvertently, accidently, by mistake, that is, unintentionally. Now supposing the relation between will or intention and deed is logical, can it be causal as well? There is no reason to suppose that the former exclude the latter. It might be said that an agent's intention that *p* cannot be adequately described unless it includes a description of *p*. In this case the relation between 'A intends *p*' and '*p*' is logical. But does it prevent that A's intention that *p* cannot be recognised independently of *p* ? Otherwise discovery of error and failure would become impossible. And if it be the case that A's intention that *p* can be a state of affairs distinct from and independent of *p*, there would be nothing to preclude the existence of a causal relation between these distinct and separate states of affairs. Hence the argument that since the nature of intention cannot be specified independently of its effects, the logical relation between the two excludes any possible causal relation between them does not cut much ice. The purpose of our contention will be immediately evident. If the relation between intention and action can be both logical and causal, ascriptivism and causal analysis of actions can, then, as well go together. It seems hardly plausible to say that Hume explains away the intentional aspect of actions at the cost of their causal analysis. From the regularity of man's volitional decisions, we can speak of motives in a causal context. To judge that an agent is morally responsible for an action, he must

not only have brought that action about, but he must also have done it knowingly (that sometimes it is correct to judge that the agent is wrong to bring about an action even when he does not do so knowingly is admitted). Any sudden, unexpected, unpredictable action which does not come from the agent is not something for which the individual can be held morally responsible. And there must be some connexion between the individual and his action before he can be held responsible for it. All determinists, from Hume to Mill, have such a course of reasoning as an "interpretation of universal experience". It has been remarked that in Hume's account the causal side gets the upperhand, the intentional aspect of an act, designated by 'knowingly' is either explained away or left completely out of consideration. Kemp Smith had noticed it. In recent times P.T.Geach has made a similar observation about Hume's definition of the 'will'. (Whether Hume really *defined* the will could be and, in fact, has been questioned. H.A.Prichard, for example, holds that the character of willing is *sui generis*, and says that "the activity of willing is indefinable". Obviously, no act could be defined, but a term or a concept can be. We submit that Hume did *define* the concept of the will, since he was stating what *means* by the term. Again, the will could be indefinable if it were an indirect passion, which *qua* simple impression, would be indefinable. But the will is not an indirect passion, though it is stated to share some of the characteristic features of the indirect passions. For Prichard's views see his essay 'Acting, Willing, Desiring' in *Moral Obligation*, p.187.) Geach writes about Hume's

definition of will that he "concentrates on the supposed internal impression" and deals with the causal relation between this and the "new motion" or "new perception" on the same lines as other causal relations between successive events. Like a conjuror, Hume diverts our attention; he makes us forget the words "knowingly give rise to" which are indispensable if his definition is to have the least plausibility" (The Philosophical Review, LXIX, 1960, p. 225). Geach's position seems to verge on a non-committal analysis. It is not clear whether Geach wishes to abolish the notion of volition or the reduction of the voluntary into the causal. He is mainly fighting against the view called 'ascriptivism', which holds that to say that an act *a* is voluntary is not to describe how the act came about, but, on the contrary, to adopt a moral or legal attitude and thereby ascribe responsibility for the act to the agent. The ascriptive and descriptive strata of language are logically independent, i.e., the truth or falsity of the one in no way determines the truth or falsity of the other, because descriptive language is in a quite different logical realm from ascriptive language. Now Hume's view about the will may be called in Geach's own phrase "voluntary causality", but to hold the view that Hume was not an ascriptivist is to court over simplication. There can not be any dispute about the fact that Hume belongs to a tradition of modern thought, beginning more or less with Descartes, which attempts to reduce agency to causation. According to this tradition, to describe an event as a man's action is to assert that the event was caused in a certain way. This, of course, does not mean

that Hume did not have in mind the notion of responsibility. Ascriptivism, or the methodological analysis of the notion of voluntary acts as ascribing responsibility can be traced back to Aristotle. In his *Ethics* Aristotle lays it down that praise and blame attach to voluntary action, i.e., actions done not under compulsion and with knowledge of the circumstances. In Book III Aristotle discusses the conditions of responsibility for actions. The agent can be held responsible for his acts only if his actions were voluntary, that is, if he were not compelled to act the way he did. Aristotle's definition of compulsion is strict: actions are involuntary only when the cause is in external circumstances and the agent contributes nothing. While knowledge of the circumstances and absence of compulsion are the necessary conditions of voluntary actions, choice discriminates character better than actions (voluntary ones) do. Choice, according to Aristotle, is the adoption of action decided on after deliberation about means. And consequently we are responsible for bad as well as for good actions. Now ascriptivism and a causal analysis of voluntary actions, are two different things though as we contended earlier, neither of them need exclude the other. Kurt Baer has pointed out, ascriptivist account of human actions or the social practice of bringing people to account is a result of an evaluative attitude. We bring people to account only when their actions have any relevance to obligatory social rules or directives. On the other hand, the causal analysis is primarily epistemological, it is concerned with the intelligibility of actions as events. Whether there can be any act which does

not come within the purview of social practice is not the question, nor would Hume consent to such a view, since he is so much emphatic or the social nature of man. His main interest in analysing liberty and necessity is not to demonstrate the incredibility of ascriptivism as Geach seems to suggest, rather to bring the concept of action within the perspective of a unified methodological category of cause defined as felt necessary connexion. If Hume is a determinist, his determinism is methodological (Ardal, op.cit.,p.87; O'connor calls him a 'soft-determinist'. See the latter's Free Will p.72-3). He held that our actions are determined in the sense that they are the outcome of psychological influences and mechanisms, but this view was never meant to deny that praise and blame could be ascribed to human actions. A moral judgment is not rendered futile by the fact of the will's being determined. And whether it can be determined independently of the agent's consciousness of right and wrong is as incredible an issue as that every human action is uncaused. Neither of these squares with the everyday convictions about moral responsibility. Neither Hobbes nor Hume had any such intention. Hobbes' definition of free agent is frankly Aristotlean, he defines liberty as "the absence of external impediments". He mentions also the factor of deliberation, as Aristotle does, in the process of voluntary acting. Again, the point of ascribing responsibility, or as Hobbes puts it, "praise, dispraise, reward and punishment" (op. cit.,p.64) does of course arise, but only from a socio-political point of view: "what is it else to praise, but to say a thing is good? Good, I say, for me,/or for somebody else, or

for the state and commonwealth"(ibid.). Hume, it is well-known, always looked to the character of the agent as the proper object of evaluation. Ascriptivism and "voluntary causality" are not indifferent to each other. It is not always that ascriptive and causally descriptive language belong to two logically different language sets, though sometimes the intentions of the two kinds of analyses may be different. I do not in the least wish to suggest that simply on that ground the two can have no relationship whatsoever. For example, I may discover why I did a particular act, and my discovering so does not prevent me from feeling remorse or joy according to the nature of the act. Similarly, we may know why someone did an act, and at the same time, bring him to account. Ascriptivism and reducing agency to causality are not mutually exclusive affairs, but depends on what attitude we take, evaluative or epistemic.

So far we have been trying to understand Hume's position in the light of Geach's remarks. The causal analysis of voluntary acts did have its critics. Even within the tradition of British moral thought, Cudworth held Locke's sort of determinism to be "childish argumentation" (op.cit.,p.133) and Reid worked out a strongly voluntaristic account of man's freedom. But before we can consider these views we should see what Hume has to say on the concept of liberty.

After having shown that human actions are caused, or in other words, subsuming the concept of agency under that of causation, Hume now will have the task of explaining the concept of liberty or

freedom. Like Hobbes or Locke, for Hume, the adjective <u>free</u> can not be applied to actions. Does Hume, like Locke, treat the question 'whether man be free' in a paradoxical manner? The concept of liberty or freedom is a metaphysical concept, designating some power or ability of exertion that belongs to an agent. In a sense, <u>agency</u> and liberty is synonymous. If by <u>liberty</u> meant some occult power, then obviously Hume would have no room for it in his system. About occult power he was allergic. Writing in connexion with the metaphysical notion of cause as power, he found it "obscure and uncertain" (<u>Enquiry</u>, p.62). Part of Hume's analysis of the idea of necessary connexion is concerned with showing that the idea of power or efficacy is not derived from reason nor any single experience. He points to a synonymous family of terms, which result in absurdity when any one of them is defined in terms of others. His argument is simple, but potent. If the idea of power is one that we really have, in that case we must look the impression from which it may have been derived. "If it be a compound idea, it must arise from compound impressions. If simple, from simple impressions" (<u>op. cit.</u>, p.157). Again, the idea of power cannot be derived from any unknown quality of matter. This is impossible because an idea can not be derived from any thing else than from an impression, and we "never have any impression that contains any power or efficacy. We never therefore have any idea of power" (<u>ibid.</u>,p.161). But can it not be said that we have an idea of power "in general"? In that case, it must have "some particular species of it", and "as power cannot subsist alone, but is always regarded as an attribute of some being

or existence, we must be able to place this power in some particular being"(*ibid.*). But these requirements of "conceiving a particular power in a particular body" is not fulfilled in experience, nor is it demonstrable. The inevitable conclusion then is that "we deceive ourselves in imagining we can form any such general idea"(*ibid.*,p.162). Or, in other words, since the legitimacy of the alleged idea cannot be shown, when we talk of the idea of power, we only use words without any determinate idea. The corollary that is drawn from the polemical dialectic is that we have no idea of any being endowed with power.

But there is a sense in which Hume uses the concept of power, demystified of course. Power is a quality perceptions, not of objects. Mind, says Hume, "has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects" (*ibid.*,p.167) and "the same propensity is the reason, why we suppose necessity and power to lie in the objects we consider, not in mind, that considers them" (*ibid.*). The "real model" (*ibid.*,p.165) of the idea of power is a mental propensity, which, after having experienced constant conjunction of resembling things in a sufficient number of instances, is felt as "a determination of the mind to pass from one object to its usual attendant" (*ibid.*). In this sense, power is an impression of reflexion, which is a product of custom. Power is necessity. Now the will is thought to have a power of producing effects in the form of actions. Like every other causal relation, there is no real connexion between the two. The epistemic status of the will is that of a cause, and like other causes, it bears no discoverable connexion with its effects.

Hume seems to suggest a distinction between the two ways of looking at human actions: the agent's view and the spectator's view. The latter may be said to include one's view of one's own past actions as well. The agent can become a spectator of his own actions as he can be of the actions of others. It is from the spectator's view that actions could be said to be necessary, because the necessity is nothing but a determination of the mind of the spectator. Hume's notion of "moral evidence" is founded on a two-fold data, one, that "our actions have a constant union with our motives" (*ibid.*,p.401) - the testimony of any agent *qua* spectator; and the other, that our "knowledge" of other's characters is based on an inference concerning a constant connexion of their actions with their motives. In both cases the necessity arises in the mind of the spectator as a result of experiencing actions having "a constant union and connexion with the situation and temper of the agent". Power, which is, for Hume, another name of necessity, does not lie in the will of the agent, but in the spectator's mind. To say that the actions of the will arise from necessity is to have recourse to an *ipso facto* belief that actions are results of human motivation. And this belief is presupposed in making judgments about human actions. The spectator's view of necessity is very clearly stated by Hume in the following observation: "The necessity of any action, whether of matter or of the mind, is not properly a quality in the agent, but in any thinking or intelligent being, who may consider the action, and consists in the determination of his thought to infer its existence from

some preceding objects" (*ibid.*,p.408).[1]

But what happens from the agent's point of view? "The will," says Hume, "seems to move easily every way, and casts a shadow or image of itself, even to that side, on which it did not settle" (*ibid.*,p.315). These words about the will's power is repeated by Hume on page 408 where he gives an account of the agent's feeling about his own abilities. The feeling is there, but it does not prove that the agent is really indetermined the way he feels. The feeling is characterised by Hume the "false sensation of liberty" or "*illusion of the fancy*" (*ibid.*,p.314). The justification of Hume's so calling it lies in the consideration that the passage from the *feeling* of freedom or liberty to the *fact* of it cannot be logical. The "false sensation of liberty" writes Hume, "makes us imagine we can perform anything"(*ibid.*), but from the feeling that we are free it does not follow that we *are* free. As agents we "feel that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions, and imagine we feel that the will itself is subject to nothing" (*ibid.*,p.408), yet the evidence of the feeling could not be taken as, what Hume calls, "an intuitive proof of human liberty". Perhaps

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1. Another stronger assertion on this point: "the necessity or power, which unites causes and effects, lies in the determination of the mind to pass from the one to the other. The efficacy or energy of causes is neither plac'd in the causes themselves, nor in the deity, nor in the concurrence of these two principles; but belongs entirely to the soul, which considers the union of two or more objects in all past instances, 'Tis here that the real power of causes is plac'd, along with their connexion and necessity". *Treatise*, p.166.

Hume was reacting against the Cartesian tradition of thought concerning the will. Descartes, in his fourth Meditation argues that we experience our will "as being without limits" (op.cit., p.85). The will, says Descartes, is the most perfect of our faculties, and it is the only faculty "which is not small and circumscribed in me" (ibid.). The power of will, according to Descartes, "consists in this, that we can either do or not do something, or rather only in this that when we affirm or deny, pursue or avoid the things that are presented to us by the understanding, we do so without feeling that our choice is imposed upon us by any external force" (ibid., p.86). Descartes' conviction that one could experience one's will as "without limits", i.e., "genuine free will" was reasserted in his The Passions of the Soul. In Article 41 he writes that "the will is by nature so free that it can never be constrained" (ibid., p. 128). It is interesting to note that Leibniz in his Theodicy found the Cartesian thesis unacceptable. Referring to Descartes he remarks, "the reason M. Descartes had advanced to prove the independence of our free actions, by what he terms an intense inward sensation, has no force. We cannot properly speaking be sensible of our independence, and we are not aware always of the causes, often imperceptible, whereon our resolution depends. It is as though the magnetic needle took pleasure in turning towards the north: for it would think that it was turning independently of any other cause, not being aware of the imperceptible movements of the magnetic matter" (tr. E.M.Huggard, ed. Diogenes Allen, The Library of Liberal Arts, 1966, part one, 50). Leibniz's example would

naturally remind one of Spinoza's metaphor of stone. In a letter he wrote that if we imagined a stone suddenly endowed with consciousness, it might think that it was falling of its own volition, since it would not perceive the cause of its movement; but it would not be free not to fall, even if it imagined that it was (Letter 58. *The Correspondence of Spinoza*, ed. A. Wolf, 1929).[1] The similarities in the arguments purporting to denying freedom of the will are striking, though the differences among Hume, Leibniz and Spinoza are hardly to be overlooked. Hume's determinism, if his views could be so called, depends on his own view of necessity, defined in terms of a determination of the mind in consequence of an experience of constant conjunction of similar objects in the past. For Leibniz, the determination is logical, and nothing could be farther away from Hume's intention. By calling Leibniz's determinism 'logical' I mean that according to him the notion of an individual contains in itself all that the individual is to do or to become. Man, held Leibniz, is a kind of spiritual automation, and in this specific sense every action of a man issues from his own nature, and is not imposed on him from without. The soul has in itself the principle of all that it does, or in his own words, "the soul has within it the principle of all its actions, and even of

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1. Another well-known example: "an infant thinks that it freely desires milk, an angry child thinks that it freely desires vengeance, or a timid child thinks it freely chooses flight" *Ethics*, Everyman edition, p.88. Anscombe quotes Wittgenstein to the effect that he imagined some leaves blown about by the wind saying, "Now I'll go this way...now I'll go that way". *Intention*, p.6.

all its passions" (op. cit., p.65). This is a corollary of the doctrine of the pre-established harmony. A related point may be raised in this connexion. Leibniz distinguished between the truths of fact and the truths of reason. Only the latter are necessary. Actions are not necessary in that sense, they are, rather, contingent, because taken by themselves, there is no contradiction in conceiving them otherwise. So, for Leibniz, the acts of men are all determined, though not necessary. But how far the contingent character of human acts is viable may be doubted. Let us clarify this point with the help of one of his own examples. If the monad that constitutes Julius Caesar has once and for all built into it, as it were, the attribute 'crosser of the Rubicon' (this predicate being, like all the others, contained in the subject), how can it be said of Julius Caesar that he freely chose to cross the Rubicon? For, under Leibniz' Schema, the decision was necessarily a 'part of him'. Leibniz might have answered that it was logically possible that Caesar should not have crossed the Rubicon; hence there was no necessity about his decision to cross the river; for "nothing is necessary of which the opposite is possible" (Discourse on Metaphysics, XIII). The suggestion here is that 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' is a truth of fact, not a truth of reason, to say 'Caesar did not cross the Rubicon' is not to contradict oneself. But if 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' is analytic, then its negation would be self-contradictory. This is another matter, and we are not concerned with it in the present context. But this answer merely glosses over the difficulty. For if God chose the universe which was the best

and most perfect of all possible universes, and Julius Caesar (together with all his attributes) is a constituent of the universe that God in fact selected as being the most perfect, then it is hard to see how Caesar's decision was in any meaningful sense open, or 'up to him'. The mere possibility that God might have selected another universe in which there was a deutero-Caesar who did not cross the Rubicon is hardly enough to bestow any genuine freedom or avoidability on Julius Caesar's actual decision. The distinction between being determined and being necessary is hardly satisfactory. So far Leibniz' position is concerned, to say that there is an individual *a* who chooses P (any decision or course of action), i.e., '$(\exists x)x = a \rightarrow Pa$' is in fact asserting a necessary proposition, because the mere fact in the best of all possible universes that '$(\exists x)x = a$' necessitates that 'Pa' will be true. The contingency of '$(\exists x)x = a$', which Leibniz in all cases might take care to point out, is a doubtful one, how far it is viable remains an open question. It is impossible that *a* could choose anything but *P*. '$(\exists x)x = a \rightarrow Pa$' is a modally necessary proposition.[1]

But both Leibniz and Hume share the following premises in their argument against freedom of the will: that our sense or feeling of freedom is not sufficient evidence for establishing that we are

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1. "Leibniz has admitted that God created human beings such that they will act in certain specified ways; how then can they act in any ways other than those in which they do act?" G.H.R. Parkinson, in his *Leibniz on Human Freedom* (Studia Leibnitiana, Sonderheft 2,1970,p.17), mentions this possible objection. He has also given Leibniz' possible reply to the objection, which does not appear convincing.

really free, and that we are often ignorant of the causes on which our choice or decision depends. Both of them seek to preserve some kind of spontaneity on the part of the human agents. And neither of them, Hume's case we shall examine below, succeed in doing it.

Spinoza and Hume had a common Stoic heritage, which is evidenced in their common acceptance of determinism. Spinoza, like Hume did not deny that we often feel free. For example, he writes in the Appendix of the Part I of his Ethics, "men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and as they are ignorant of the causes by which they are led to wish and desire, they do not even dream of their existence" (Everyman edition, p.30). Hume would have argued and does in fact argue in this view. But the determinism of Spinoza is again different from Hume's. For Spinoza, the determinism is born of metaphysical necessity. The proposition that there is no free will has been proved by Spinoza in the following way. "The mind is a fixed and determined mode of thinking, and therefore cannot be the free cause of its actions, or it cannot have the absolute faculty of willing and unwilling: but for willing this or that it must be determined"(Ibid., p.24-5). It is obviously that Hume's notion of necessity is outrageously anti-metaphysical. But the fact remains that for both of them freedom in some form is felt and its appearance is due to our ignorance of the causes of our actions.

Let us now go back to Hume. For him, necessity is opposed to chance, which is the denial of causes of actions. When he says that

chance implies a contradiction and is "directly contrary to experience" (*op. cit.*,p.407), what does he really mean? The answer could be found in his distinction between the liberty of *spontaniety* and the liberty of *indifference*. The former is opposed to "violence", or external compulsion, while the latter, "means a negation of necessity and causes". The distinction is of some importance. Of both sorts of liberty, we have "false sensation", but what characterises the liberty of indifference is that we come to have an experience of it, as Flew has remarked, owing to "interplay between our dual roles as agents and as spectators" (*op.cit.*,p.151). For the spectator the concept of necessity or the causal interpretation of actions as due to motives is a methodological imperative. As spectators we seldom feel any "looseness" or "want of determination" between the agent's motives and his actions. But as agents "in performing the actions themselves we are sensible of" "a looseness or indifference" (*op.cit.*,p.408). The feeling is not denied by Hume, though he points out, it cannot be regarded as "an argument for its real existence" (*ibid.*). He does not clarify his notion of the liberty of *spontaniety*. In the *Inquiry* he writes, "By liberty...we can only mean *a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will*; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here, then, is no subject of dispute" (p.95). A few points may be noted as regards the account of the liberty of spontaniety. First, it is conceived

as the absence of violence or external physical compulsion. To be free is not to be externally or physically compelled. A moment later we shall find that the account overlooks other forms of compulsion. Secondly, supposing that an agent is not compelled in the sense put forward, according to the account there cannot be any gap between the will as a causal power and its exercise. A lot of misunderstanding has arisen on this issue. Hume's general thesis is that "*power* has always a reference to its *exercise*, either actual or probable" (*op.cit.*,p.313). Though generally the distinction between power and the exercise of it is invalid, Hume holds that it is admissible in morals. He says, "the distinction, which we sometimes make betwixt a *power* and the exercise of it, is entirely frivolous, and that neither man nor any other being ought ever to be thought possest of any ability, unless it be exerted and put in action. But tho' this be strictly true in a just and *philosophical* way of thinking, 'tis certain it is not *the philosophy* of our passions" (*ibid.*, p.311). The domain of the passions could be treated as an exception to the law of entailment between *power* and its *exercise*, only if the power of the will were conceived to "consist in the possibility or probability of any action" (*ibid.*,p.313). Now granted this proviso, Hume's account is entangled in compromises and revisions. The original ardour of his view that necessity is the law of human actions comes to lose much of its force. To take his own example."I do not think I have fallen into my enemies [sic] power, when I see him pass me in the streets with a sword by his side, while I am unprovided of any weapon. I know that the fear of the civil magistrate

is as strong a restraint as of any iron, and that I am in perfect safety as if he were chain'd or imprison'd" (*ibid.*,p.312). Certainly the enemy had the liberty of spontaniety since he was not "a prisoner and in chains". Why then was the gap between his power and its exercise? Obviously because besides "violence" or external compulsion, there may be other forms of compulsion, e.g., the psychological ones like "the fear of the civil magistrate". Hume was not oblivious of this fact; in fact, he puts it quite clearly, "we ascribe a power of performing an action to every one, who has no very powerful motive to forbear it" (*ibid.*,p.313). On Hume's terms the enemy had both power and a "very powerful motive to forbear it", that is, the fear of the civil magistrate. The initial conception of the liberty of spontaniety falls short of psychological causes, which can and does restrict freedom just as much as physical causes. On the one hand, necessity requires that *power* will always imply its *exercise*, but this view was modified in deference to the passions; on the other hand, the liberty of spontaniety conceived as opposed to violence was found insufficient to explain the non-exertion of power. These are the two distinct trends of thought in Hume which do not leave his picture of man's freedom in its sharper outlines.

Hume has been, in effect, following Hobbes' dictum "that a *free* agent is he that he can do if he will, and forbear if he will; and that liberty is the absence of external impediments" (*op.cit.*,p.68). It may be argued that liberty is the necessary condition of the agent's acting, but it may not be sufficient. But once we allow the thesis that *power* implies its *exercise* in the case of the

passions, as Hume does, the agent's forbearing the act what he wills must have to be accorded some status in the causal scheme, because his *not* forbearing what he wills does, in fact, bring about the act together with his having the power to do it. One's forbearing what one wills is not implied by the so-called absence of external impediments. Hence the two conditions of an act, the agent's liberty *and* his *not* forbearing what he wills cannot be subsumed under one concept of "absence of external impediments". Herein lies a difference between Hobbes and Hume. Hobbes does not seem to consider this point despite his distinction between *sufficient* and *necessary* causes of actions. It might have been that Hobbes regarded liberty as both the sufficient and necessary causes of human actions, and as we have tried to show, it cannot be the case. "I hold that to be a *sufficient cause*, to which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the *effect*. The same also is a *necessary* cause" (*ibid.*, pp.67-8). If we recall the fact that Hobbes recommended the use of the word 'free' in respect of bodies only, it will be possible to see why he interprets *liberty* in the physical sense of the term. For Hobbes liberty is "the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent" (*ibid.*, p.67). From this definition it would follow that all human actions are caused by motions external to them. Now granted that there is liberty for an agent in the sense that he is physically free to do what he will, it remains to ask whether this liberty alone would also be sufficient to have him acted the way he willed. Hume's enemy in the

example was physically free, and yet, on the psychological side, he did not exert his power. There is a morally relevant sense of liberty which he lacked. He was constrained by the fear of civil magistrate. The difference between 'can' and 'may' illustrates the point. Granting that *power* does not necessarily imply its *exercise* in the domain of the passions, Hume could have said that his enemy *could* strike him, but he *might* not.

By admitting that entailment between *power* and its *exercise* is not the philosophy of the passions, Hume, in effect, has considerably softened his deterministic thesis. But it should not be supposed that the admission amounts to espousing a weaker relationship between the will and any action that it might determine, and for that matter, a non-causal view of human actions. Rather, it makes the will's determination of actions a defeasible affair. That is to say, determination of actions is often modified by reasons for forbearing to do what is willed; cases of exceptions can, and often are, taken into account. If the reasons for forbearing to do what is willed are made explicit, and looked upon as an aspect of willing, the relation between power and its exercise, or in other words, will and action, would hardly remains in any manner loose. The position becomes regulated. When somebody does not act in the way we expect him to act, we look for the constraints that might have prevented him acting in the way expected. When getting to know the constraints, i.e., his reasons for forbearing to do what he willed, we come to have an explanation of his unexpected performance. We now see a pattern, that is, we take him to have acted in the way

expected provided the constraints were absent. Such explanations can be *post eventum* as well as predictive.

Notwithstanding the exceptions owing to possible constraints, the determination of actions by the will renders the liberty of spontaneity somewhat trivial; though an explanation provided on that basis need not always be uninformative, because what could be counted as a reason for forbearing a willed action depends on the specific situations in which the agent may find him placed.

Now trivialization of the concept of the liberty of spontaneity was inevitable if one should like to show that human actions are necessary. In order to be compatible with causal necessity the liberty of spontaneity cannot be contra-causal, a privilege which the liberty of indifference alone is said to enjoy. In fact, the liberty of indifference, the strongest libertarian thesis, is the full-blooded freedom. Either we have it or do not have any freedom at all. The disjunction is mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Once freedom in the strong sense of indifference has been denied, spontaneity on the part of the agent does not make any point, because, after all, it is the spectator's view that matters ultimately: "Whatever capricious and irregular actions we may perform....the desire of showing our liberty is the sole motive of our actions; we can never free ourselves from the bonds of necessity. We may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves; but a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character"(*op. cit.*,p.408). Granted that the liberty of spontaneity is all that we have, and the liberty of indifference is impossible, the question

arises, since spontaneity is compatible with necessity, whether neurotic behaviour is spontaneous and necessary or compulsive. Psychologists often speak of 'compulsive neurosis', and it has been clinically found that the neurotic even acts against his own desires. The inconsequential nature of the liberty of spontaneity becomes apparent in such cases as these. Ardal has made a similar point when he remarked that a kleptomaniac would not have the liberty of spontaneity according to Hume's definition, but a thief had, since his actions did follow from the determination of his will. Nor can the kleptomaniac could be said to have the liberty of indifference, because even the actions of mad men, says Hume, are not "remov'd from necessity" (*ibid.*,p.404). The resulting paradox is something that Hume would have to put up with, unless it is regarded as the *reductio ad absurdum* of his denial of the liberty of indifference.

Before we take up other questions concerning Hume's concept of spontaneity, we may ask a question about the status of the feeling of the liberty of indifference. There is a specific feeling that the agent becomes "sensible of". Hume says that this is a false feeling. Some of our feelings can, of course, be false like that of a phantom leg. Perhaps the import of Hume's phrase "false sensation" is similar to that. What characterizes the feeling of the liberty of indifference is that it is felt by the agent alone. We become "sensible of" it only "in *performing* actions" (ibid.,p.408, italics not in the text) and "in *reflecting* on human actions" (*ibid.*). This feeling is the prerogative of the agent. If the feeling were a real one, it could have been felt by the agent and the spectator alike.

Since it is not so felt, it could be called a "false sensation" or even "an illusion of the fancy" (ibid., p.314). To say that a feeling is a false sensation amounts to declaring it to be neither a passion, which is a "real existence" nor an item in the causal sequence. Again, if it is asked, why is it that the spectator's judgment is more important than the feeling of the agent? The answer could be that the spectator might be more experienced or competent; for example, a psychiatrist is better-suited to make an assessment of the patient's mental state than the patient himself. The spectator's view of human action has the merit of objectivity, based as it is on the knowledge of the agent's character and the uniformity of human nature.

It is possible for a man to be ignorant of or mistaken about his motives, reasons or purposes in acting, to know what he wants and not to know what there is about it that he wants. And it is possible for other people to know this better than he does himself. So far this is alright. But there may as well be cases where both the agent and the spectator could be in doubt or uncertain as regards the motive of the agent. For example, when one registers one's name as a conscientious objector in wartime, it may be quite uncertain whether one does so motivated by pacifist considerations or fear of death. On the spectator's side, it may be argued that we may look for some generalisation of which the agent's, in this case, the conscientious objector's behaviour may serve as an instance. His conduct may have to be examined in order to ascertain whether avoidance of danger or pacifism is a regular feature of his

action. Or in other words, attribution of motive as a causal determinant of an agent's behaviour or action would succeed only if the action could be shown as an instance of behavioural regularity. It is here presupposed that human actions explicable by causal determination are implicitly general, and that generalisations about human motives can be made. Hume says that inferences concerning human actions "are founded on the experienc'd union of like actions with like motives and circumstances" (*ibid.*,p.409).

There is another point. Is the spectator's view necessarily exclusive of the agent? Cannot the agent adopt a spectator's view about his own actions? Hume thinks it possible to "fix on some *steady* and *general* points of view", and "place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation" (*ibid.*,p.582). I do not know if he would accede to such a possibility with regard to the so-called spectator's view. But there does not seem to be any reason to suppose that an agent cannot be a spectator of his own actions. It may be difficult, though not altogether impossible. Just as "the language of morals" corrects "the language of self-love", in like fashion, we may be said to deliver ourselves of the illusion of enjoying the liberty of indifference by adopting a spectator's view about our own actions. This seems feasible.

To come back to Hume's notion of spontaneity. The notion is not quite modern in philosophy, and it dates back to Aristotle. It is mentioned by Descartes in his Principles, and even Leibniz uses it in order to characterise voluntary action. What is meant by the term? Man, says Aristotle, "is a moving principle or begetter of

his actions, as of children" (*op.cit.*,p.59). Something is said to be 'spontaneous' if the principle of action is in the agent. But all spontaneous actions need not be 'free', unless the course of action is chosen by the agent deliberately. Responsibility could be ascribed to the agent of the spontaneous action only if the course of action was chosen by him. Aristotle makes the class of free actions a proper subset of voluntary or spontaneous actions. Leibniz repeats this Aristotelean view. Hume's view of spontaneous liberty has similarities to the classical view, but it may be doubted whether his concept of spontaneity would ever imply choice as an undetermined determinant of human actions. As we have pointed out earlier that the will *qua* impression, to Hume, is only an item in the causal sequence, and thus the question of its playing the role of an uncaused cause does not arise. It is a hazardous conjecture whether Hume's notion of the liberty of spontaneity could be interpreted to be 'free' in the sense of 'self-determined'. Hume uses the word 'choice' only once, and there too, he makes it interchangeable with the will; and the context in which he does it is no less significant for his disavowal of the classical meaning of the word 'free'. He is considering what is it that makes parricide different from the oak sapling's destroying the parent tree? "'Tis not sufficient to reply, that a *choice or will* is wanting. For in the case of parricide, a will does not give rise to any *different* relations" (*op.cit.*,p.467, the first set of italics is not in the text), though to a "different cause" than the other. Now, whether the choice or will is free in the sense that we are to will the

will, is a question that Hume does not discuss. That such a conception of free will leads to an infinite regress has been shown, in recent times, by Ryle and earlier by Leibniz, when he remarked in the Theodicy that we will to act, we do not will to will. The will, for Hume, is an internal impression, and for this very reason, the question of voluntariness or the involuntariness of the volition or the will, or in other words, the questions about the anterior acts of will do not arise. An impression is a primary datum of our emotive life, and Hume does not deny that an impression is caused. The will is not strictly a passion, direct or indirect, and in that case it must be, in Hume's scheme, an impression of sensation, and impressions of this category, he tells us, "arise in the soul originally from unknown causes" (ibid.,pp.7, 84), and elsewhere we are told, "depend on natural and physical causes" (ibid.,p.275).

A word about Hume's phrase "internal impression" used for the will. What does Hume mean by the word 'internal'? Does he mean that an impression can be 'internal' in the sense that it does not arise from any antecedent perception? Impressions of sensations are said to be 'original' in this senses. An impression of reflexion is called 'direct' when it arises immediately from pain and pleasure. Desire is a direct impression of reflexion. When Hume says that will is a direct passion does he mean that the will is unobstructed desire? But again he holds that the will is not strictly a passion, though both the passions and the will are indefinable. What could be the criterion of indefinability to Hume? I suppose it must be, to put the matter in his own terms, distinct-

ness, separability, or, apparently intransitive character of the passions. Does Hume's notion of the will satisfy these conditions? It appears that his notion is intentional, and hence transitive. Can we become conscious of the internal impression called the will without being conscious of what is believed to be the good or the absence of the evil together with an awareness of the possibility of their attainment by an act of ours? If that be the case, willing cannot be an isolated affair without reference to its intentional coordinates. Hence, the impressional character of the will, in so far as it is called a passion or passion-like; and secondly, its internality or directness -- are not very clear. It may be that the will is said 'direct' in the sense of their unaccountability (see _Treatise_, p.439) or owing to its appearance from "unknown causes" (_ibid_.,p.7). This is then a genetic epithet. Or, shall we use Hume's own phrase that the will is a 'direct' passion in the sense of an "original existence"?

Hume upholds a variant of the causal theory of human action. That every human action is caused is a proposition that can be supported by identifying the concept of human action with events, and appealing to the generalised universal statement that every event is caused. But Hume does not deny the difference between events and human actions. An instance of it can be readily had in his affirmation that in parricide we have a "different cause". Another version of the causal theory might start from the concept of necessity and lay down the general proposition that whatever follows necessarily on its cause is caused, whichever interpretation of 'necessity' may

be put on the word. Human action could then be said to be caused in the sense that it too follows necessarily on its cause. Hume's argument seems to be modelled on our second version of the causal theory. A defender of freedom need not unequivocally deny that every event is caused, as Hume seems to suppose him to do. The libertarian may reject the equation of events and human actions instead. It is also possible that he might agree with Hume that no feeling could be taken as constituting an 'intuitive' proof of human freedom. Kant seems to my mind to be such a protagonist of human freedom. In the first instance, like Hume, he refuses any proof value of our inner experience, or of any psychological state insofar as freedom is concerned. In his the Metaphysic of Ethics Kant says that "It is not enough...to prove it [freedom] from certain supposed experiences of human nature" (tr. Abbott.,p.80). But thus far only. Hume in no case would go along with Kant in holding that freedom is to be presupposed as a property of the Will of all rational beings. Hume calls in question the very notion of rational Will itself. Kant's picture of the moral world is a double decker one, the two worlds of necessity and freedom differ so much in their status that it becomes quite strenuous to conceive any struggle between them. It is also possible to argue that 'will' is an implicate of an agent self or the self as actor. What does it mean to say that our acts are determined though our wills are free? The Kantian will does not determine the acts, but itself. What sort of a will is this that determines nothing but itself. There is a shadow of unreality about the acts in the Kantian world, such that

the rational will as a cause is a cause without effects. A cause, in order to be a cause should be on the same ontological level with its effect. The Kantian will is not a member of the world of appearances wherein the acts occur.

Hume's type of causal theory of human actions may be further specified. A causal theory of human action may imply a foreknowledge about the future. A human agent, if he claims to know in advance what he would be going to do, then he is not free to do it or not to do it. Hume would hardly endorse any such version of the causal theory. One's future actions are members of the class of possible actions, to claim to have a fore-knowledge of these actions would be equivalent to claiming a priori knowledge of a set of possible states of affair, which is impossible, or hypothesis. So Hume would reject any argument against human freedom based on the possibility of human fore-knowledge of what a man will do. According to Hume, our knowledge of the future is nothing but a habitual expectation, and given this view, every fore-knowledge, in the strict sense of term, is ruled out. An act, says Hume, is an existence, and we "can never demonstrate the necessity of a cause to every new existence, or new modification of existence" (ibid.,p.79), because "all actions and sensations of the mind" are not derived from reason (ibid.,pp. 189 and 190). A recent variety of Hume's argument on this issue appears in R.M.Hare's criticism of 'Cartesianism in morals'. In The Language of Morals (pp. 32 and 39) Hare argues that conclusions concerning 'matters of substance' cannot be derived from self-evident rules. And even if

it be argued that the fore-knowledge may be probable, Hume would like us to recall that "there is no probability so great as not to allow of a contrary possibility" (*ibid.*,p.135). If the alleged fore-knowledge were possible on the part of the agent, then the phenomenon of acting against one's interest would not have taken place at all, and, Hume tells us that "the greatest possible good does not always influence" men, and they "often counter-act a violent passion in prosecution of their interests and desires" (*ibid.*,p.418). If it be true as Hume claims, in that case the aim of action would be the cause, a final cause, as Aristotle would have called it. But no final cause can explain human action, because, actions originate as a result of our passion's pursuing good and avoiding evil. And the passions would vary in their intensity depending on the remoteness or nearness of the good or evil. "The same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one" (ibid.,p.419). If the passion is calm enough, action may not take place at all. Hence a fore-knowledge of future good *simpliciter* cannot either cause or explain human action, apart from the fact that the notion of fore-knowledge itself is suspect.

What about the spectator? Before we answer the question, an earlier remark of ours calls for partial amendment. We observed that one of the merits of the view that human actions are necessary, was epistemic predictability, and predictability meant causal explicability of human actions. Now causal explicability could operate in both ways, from cause to effect, and from effect to cause.

The necessity of human actions, as Hume seems to argue, is more re-gressive in character, i.e., we normally infer the cause of the actions. Hume does give one or two examples of forward-looking predictions. For example, "A prince, who imposes a tax upon his subjects, *expects* their compliance" (*ibid*., p.405, italics not in the text). The action here is merely *expected*, and is this expectation is another name of necessity? Hume does say that "nor is there any thing but strong motives, which can give us an absolute certainty in pronouncing concerning any of his [the agent's] future actions" (*ibid*., p.313). Yet, I believe, my way of looking at Hume's version of causal theory as essentially involving regressive inference is not basically incorrect. But the way Hume defines his notion of "moral evidence", i.e., "a conclusion concerning the actions of men, deriv'd from the consideration of their motives, temper and situation", it becomes clear that the "inference" is regressive, or in other words, it is *post eventum*; it takes place in the minds of the spectators only after the actions have been performed by the agent. The inference is directed towards a state of mind of the agent that may be no longer there, as the actions themselves, which are "by their very nature temporary and perishing" (*ibid*., p.411). Considering these points, I find 'predictability' an unhappy term, and would like to retain it on two grounds. First, no better term is available. And, secondly, Hume does not distinguish between re-gressive inference and 'prediction' in the strong sense, i.e., an inference about *future* states of affair. To Hume, of course, the direction of inference has the same logical form, but the time

scheme involved in the two cases is different. Hume's causal theory of human actions could then be said to provide predictability in the sense of intelligibility of human acts. He himself says that he seeks to invest the will with an "intelligible quality" (ibid.,p.410) which he calls "necessity".

The spectator, since he is obviously engaged in inferring, can not be said to possess any fore-knowledge either. For him the actions of other men are "signs" of their character: "actions are only signs of certain principles in the mind and temper" (ibid., p.477) of the agent. By a sympathetic process of knowing, the spectator becomes aware of the agent's mental state, and only by virtue of the "communication of sentiments" he arrives at his conclusions concerning the agent's actions. The conclusion, properly speaking, is a belief about the explicability of the actions of the agent. Thus we may say that on no grounds, either on the part of the agent or that of the spectator, any fore-knowledge is available for the causal conditioning of human actions. This feature of Hume's version of the causal theory of human acts is important to bear in mind.

Without projecting the theoretical order into the realm of practice, it can, I suppose, be held that in some sense knowledge is inseparable from action. The agent must know that he is acting when he is acting and what his purposes are. What one is upto or about is a piece of knowledge that the agent should have as a necessary condition of his action, as well as by the spectator should he be to identify others acting. This knowledge may be practical,

the term is inoffensive, and it implies the possibility of explaining the agent's actions (either by himself or by the spectator) by reference to his awareness. This is intentionality of human actions in terms of projects. William James has suggested that the will is always directed to an idea (*Principles of Psychology*, Chap. xxvi) and consciousness is by its very nature impulsive. Goal-directed action, or actions following from motives or done with a purpose in view, in short, volition is discerned in human action in connexion with the agent's awareness of his world. All this is not fore-knowledge in the sense we have been talking about. But given the awareness on the agent's part, can he not have an intimation of the line of action that he would be undertaking or should undertake? It is admitted that in spite of his awareness of the world, which includes the agent's items of belief, true or false, he does not act. There may be reasons for his forbearing or inhibiting his behaviour. But, *ceteris paribus*, when he acts, some idea of what he is about become necessary if his action is to be called an intended one. We shall say something more about on a later occasion.

The terms 'will' and 'volition' are related especially to the causation of human actions. Whether or not Hume believes that in the case of an agent "the mind of a man consciously bent on doing something" (H.L.A. Hart, in *Freedom and the Will*, ed. Pears., p.46), it can be safely affirmed that the mind experiences a class of passions that are predominantly conative. Our other-oriented passions are the members of that class. These passions as Hume tells us, have a "bent or tendency" of leading us to act in certain manner.

The passions are the motives of our actions. Together with the understanding, the passions make up human nature, and are requisite in all its actions (see Treatise, p. 493). Given that the passions are the springs of action, where does the will come in? Does the will stand somewhere between the passions and our actions? Hume says that actions have a constant union with motives, and any inference that is made concerning actions is from one to the other. If this be the case, what is then the need of entertaining the concept of the will? Ryle has shown that the will is an artificial or technical concept of no utility. This view was, in fact, to an extent, held by Hume. He said that the notion of the will "enters very little into common life, and has but small influence on our vulgar and popular ways of thinking" (ibid.,p.312). This is evidenced moreover by Hume's defining the will as an impression, though, he says that the impression called the will is not a passion, either direct or indirect.

Yet, I do not wish to say that Hume would like to find himself in the company of those philosophers who hold that the doctrine of volitions is "a mare's nest of confusions" (A.I.Melden, 'Willing,' Philosophical Review, vol.69, 1960,p.84). Traditionally, the will is conceived as a necessary condition of something's being an action. The idea that a human action is a bodily movement following from or caused by the will or a volition runs from Hobbes through Locke to Hume. It is found in Mill and remained dominant in nineteenth century and early twentieth century philosophy. Prichard himself, in his essay, Acting, Willing, Desiring, quotes from William James,

Cook Wilson and Stout. Austin also has subscribed to the view of the will or volitions as antecedent desires of our bodily movements which immediately follow from our desires for them. It is only with Prichard that philosophers in recent times have begun growing conscious of the difficulties that beset the doctrine of the will. The view that an action is preceded or caused by the will has well-known difficulties, and these are set out by Melden, Ryle, Wittgenstein and others. They hold in some fashion or other, that it is pretty difficult to characterise the alleged antecedent cause of action, called the will. Though we speak of 'acts' of will, yet willing does not have the qualities of an act; nor can it properly be regarded as an instrument with which movements are made. Nor is it, or can it be identified with decision, intention, etc. And, above all, the relation between the will and action that follows it, appears to be both logical and causal. Some of the difficulties of the doctrine of the will Hume was well aware of, namely, he was conscious of the artificiality of the notion of the will. He only differed from Ryle and Melden also, in not putting the notion to the class of concepts devoid of any utility. His notion of the will is not very far removed from the notion of the exercise of a power to make actions take place, or happen, if a particular happening is an action. Hume could also be taken to hold that we acquire such a power <u>directly</u>; we are not in a position to tell how to exercise it, except exercising it, on occasions that call for its exercise. This may be one of the reasons why Hume said that philosophers who seek to define the will "are wont to perplex rather

them clear up this question" (ibid.,p.399). We are intimately conscious of our emotions and feelings, our experiences of pain and pleasure, and this consciousness is seldom without a conative element. In our attempts to attain "the good or the absence of the evil" our desire remains tied to intention, and intention to an awareness of what we may, at the moment, be aiming at. When good is "consider'd simply" (emphasis added), we merely desire; but when it is accompanied by the consciousness of its attainment "by any action of the mind or body", we are said to be willing. To Hume, will is unimpeded desire.

What is the relation between the will and the motives? Hume speaks of motives influencing the will, and points to the passions as motives to "any actions of the will" (ibid.,p.413). Again, on page 415 he seems to place the passions on the same footing with the volitions and on page 416 he remarks that the passions are exerted in action. If we care to recall his statement that the will 'exerts itself', it is possible or at least not unlikely for one to become suspicious whether the will is not a passion.

But what is a motive that influences the will? A motive could be the agent's purpose, what he aims at, what he thinks good. It is supposed to be an exciting cause that which moves or induces a person to act in a certain way. It has also been said that a motive is that which influences a person's volitions. Sometimes, the term 'motive' is applied to a result or object which is desired. It must be admitted that the term is highly elusive, and not much unanimity is found amongst philosophers. Some of them think that motive is

that what explains an action. Actions are done 'out of....'. Names of motives are answers to questions of the form: Why did X, an agent, do a particular act, a? Ryle seems to have advanced such a view (op. cit., pp.85 and 89). An act is a behaviour consequent on a disposition, and which satisfies a law-like proposition. Motives, as dispositions can be so analysed as to satisfy such an analysans. But Anscombe holds that a motive is an aim or purpose. G.R.Grice appears to support the purpose-view of 'motive'. He says that to have a motive for an action is to believe that some end will be furthered by doing it together with a want on the part of the agent to further that end. The belief together with the want constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions of having a motive.

What Hume means by 'motive' cannot be so simply put, because he hardly mentions the term nor does he enter into any discussion on it in the manner of present-day philosophers. On the contrary, in accordance with his interest in the moral worth of the character of man, he uses the term in connexion of his views on moral judgment. Actions are "only signs of certain principles in the mind and temper" of the agent, and it is on this ground that possibility of inferring actions from agent's character arises. By 'character' Hume means 'something durable and constant in man', and it is what gives his actions moral quality. Actions are virtuous only as signs of some virtuous quality of the agent's personal character. Actions are produced by motives. Hume makes it clear that evaluation is of motives via actions. When we praise

or blame any actions we regard only the motives that produced them. "The external performance has no merit. We must look within to find the moral quality. This we cannot do directly; and therefore fix our attention on actions, as on external signs. But these actions are still considered as signs; and the ultimate object of our praise and approbation is the motive, that produc'd them"(op. cit.,p.477). This is an important passage, and we find in it what may be called the object of moral judgment. We also notice that Hume views the motives as the efficient causes of actions. But what entity of our psychic life could be such a sort of cause? The obvious answer appears to be the passions, the indirect ones. As efficient causes of actions the motives are reasons for actions, and it is worth noticing that Hume uses 'reasons' and 'motives' as inclusive disjuncts. On page 479 of the Treatise the phrase "reason or motive" occurs. Of a benevolent agent it could be asked: Why did he do it? And the answer could be: Because he felt benevolent towards the other man. We may presently overlook the complications such as the notions of moral obligations, the sense of duty, artificial and natural virtues etc. On the whole, Hume's stand is that "Our sense of duty always follows the common and natural course of our passions" (ibid.,p.484).

Now a passion can be a "reason or motive" of an action only if it is conative. In our example above, benevolence is a passion characteristically marked by its conation, a desire for the happiness of the other, as Hume has, in fact, put it. The question that now arise is: If a conative passion is a motive of an action,

the action is caused or 'necessary' in Hume's sense of the term, but what about the motive itself? Is it itself caused? Given the causal explanation of the passions as Hume does offer, the answer should be affirmative. The passions have their causes. But it does not follow that we are certainly compelled to have the feelings we have. This point needs a little clarification. Hume distinguishes between the cause and the object of passions. What entitles us to say that we are not compelled to have the passion we experience is that passions being matters of fact are contingent states of affair, and thus could have been otherwise. Or in other words, given that X an agent feels a passion (P_1) at the time t_1, it does not make sense to ask why should X feel (P_1) at t_1? It does not make sense not because that (P_1) and t_1 will have to be jointly true for the mental history of X. He could have another passion, say (P_2) at t_2. But that does not mean that (P_1) is uncaused. It is only as a matter of fact that X feel (P_1) at t_1. This freedom, as distinguished from compulsion, is a part of the meaning of the liberty of spontaniety.

Another feature of Hume's account of motives is that, and this is a crucial one, a motive is a motive in reference to the agent's view of the good. That is, in other words a motive is not value--neutral. Without this factor the account of motives as conative passions would have been bald enough. An agent undertakes a course of action only if he has a motive for it; and to have a motive for that action is to be actuated by a particular direct passion, either desire or aversion. This becomes clear if we recall Hume's description of desire or aversion as arising from considering good or evil.

The description holds equally in the case of volition. Does he distinguish between volition and motive? I would like to suspend the judgment for a while. 'Willing', 'desiring' etc. are mental conduct terms and could be defined with precision only if they are regarded as names of mental states or unconnected psychic episodes. Hume's official doctrine of the passions as simple impressions seems to lend support to such a possibility. We have earlier attempted to show that the official view underwent change yielding gradually to a more or less dispositional analysis of the passions since Hume's coming to speak of "bent or tendency" of the passions and distinguishing the so called "pure" emotions from those that are not complete in themselves, and lead us to actions. Like Ryle Hume would not say that in using mental-conduct terms we are implicitly making law-like or hypothetical propositions only to the exclusion of episodes of our mental history. Human conduct, I doubt, for Hume, would be divisible into a set of labelled actions within and without the 'machine'. Hume would, rather like Stuart Hampshire, say that every action is a part of the agent's "manner of life and of a set of attitudes to experience" (Thought and Action, p. 222). Our mental history does consist of impressionistic episodes, but there is no chaos of atomistic unrelatedness, there runs a thread of continuity through them forged by the imagination, the memory, custom and the laws of association. The passions do not simply occur, rather they are integrated in their ownership by the agent, the "intimately present" impression of the self. Again, the self is a social self, the moral world is essentially non-solipsistic, and our passions also

have a social import. These facts are significant and important for an understanding Hume's notion of motives as causes of actions. Actions are, for Hume, symbolic of our motives, and the symbol and symbolized are in a constant union. The 'will' is not conceived by Hume as a solitary psychic episode unrelated with what it intends to do. Only on this ground the spectator can evaluate an action through the motive that produced or initiated it. The verb 'to will' is an achievement word, intentionality is built into it, the intended action may be frustrated by conditions or factors beyond the agent's control, but that is a contingent affair. If Hume's notion of the will is to be conceived as a process, it would include the intended action or the idea of the action in it, or else it is no will. This means Hume's notion of motivation is a conscious process -- "Knowingly giving rise to" an action. To will, for Hume, is not to act in idea. The intended effect and the actual effect do not fall apart as a matter of fact, though it may fall apart as matters of fact. This assertion takes us back to our remark made earlier in connexion with Hume's denial of any foreknowledge of what the agent is going to do. And we should like to restate our position in a slightly different form. Now if the acts of the will are intentional, does it not presuppose on the agent's part that he has a foreknowledge of what he is going to do? For example, should an agent X desire a certain thing P, then X will do Y, the means for bringing about P. In this case that X will do Y follows in a sense from X's desiring P, and what is more, granted that X has the liberty of spontaniety, the knowledge that he is going to do Y does in no way seem impossible.

But P may not be brought about. X's abilities might not be adequate, he could have been wrong in his estimation of the effectiveness of Y, some other unforeseen factors may have intervened and so on. These considerations have nothing to do with X's knowledge that he is going to do Y or with his willing or intending Y. Nor is the knowledge and the intention in any way incompatible. The case appears specially interesting in view of Hume's denial of foreknowledge on theoretical grounds. But foreknowledge need not be knowledge in the 'demonstrative' sense of the word. Could it not be, as it is sometimes suggested, a piece of non-evidential knowledge?[1] Can we not say that, given that X loves Y and love is a conative passion, implying thereby

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1. This point was suggested to me by Dr J.Cottingham of the University of Reading. I do not mean to suggest that a person always has non-evidential knowledge of what reasons he is acting on in performing a particular action. But <u>commonly</u> he has. There is a non-evidential knowledge that one will do or try to do, such-and-such in a given future situation. The knowledge is of what one will do in situations where, in the light of one's factual beliefs, the policy enjoins a certain action. William McDougall held purposiveness of behaviour as a characteristic of living things. Characterising voluntary actions he writes as follows: "the goal and means having been pondered, developed in imagination, and deliberately chosen among alternative possibilities, before overt action began....We rightly feel that we did not act as a mere machine, but that the action was a purposive action in which our nature was truly expressed, and we may confidently infer that the goal was foreseen, however vaguely and incompletely, the moment of action" (<u>Motivation</u>, ed.Bindra and Stewart, Penguin, 1966, p.163).

Hampshire and Hart in a paper in <u>Mind</u>, LXVII (January,1958) write, "There is a kind of certainty about human actions....which is different from the kind of certainty about those subject(s) that is based upon empirical evidence: it is a kind of certainty, or knowledge, to which the notion of evidence is irrelevant". The example they give is conspicuously telling: 'I know now what I will do'; in such cases Hampshire and Hart say, "an entirely voluntary action is envisaged".

the desire of the beloved's happiness 'attends' on the passion of love, X would, at a level of reflection, know that he is going to be benevolent to Y? Or to put the matter in other words, can act of will, a volition, be individuated independently of the bodily motion that it is meant to produce? For Hume, from the spectator's point of view, it can be so individuated such that given a specific volition one can foresee what motion will occur in a body, though not as a matter of logical necessity. The possibility of individuating depends on the spectator's experience of past conjunctions of will and action. But from the agent's point of view, there should not be any *prima facie* difficulty in foreseeing his future moves, though *qua* agent the data of constant union would not be available to him, it could only if he reversed his role. Individuating a volition independently of the action intended presupposes a connexion between the two, and the connexion is discovered by one's playing the role of an observer, rather than of an agent. Hume had, in effect, denied that there was anything about the act of will that allowed the bodily motion to be foreseen, and on the basis of his denial we tried to show that his type of causal theory of human action excludes human foreknowledge. But the problem remains open whether did he really need doing so?

Hume had tacitly admitted that our goal or end - directed actions are guided by "reason and design". In a section called 'Of the reason of animals' of the Book I of the *Treatise* he remarks, "We are conscious, that we ourselves, in adapting means to ends, are guided by reason and design, and that 'tis not ignorantly or casually

we perform those actions, which tend to self-preservation, to the obtaining pleasure, and avoiding pain" (p.176). In this passage the types of actions considered are those that do not have our sense of duty as their motive, rather they are actions of policy. The word 'reason' is also non-demonstrative, meaning "a wonderful unintelligible instinct in our souls, which carries us along a certain train of ideas, and endows them with particular qualities, according to their particular situations and relations" (ibid.,p.179). It is wellknown that in Hume's value theory the evaluative norm is applied with an eye to the hedonic overtones of actions. "To approve of a character is to feel an original delight upon its appearance. To disapprove of it is to be sensible of an uneasiness"(ibid.,p.296). These two experiences are, in fact, made the defining characteristic of virtue and vice, "not only inseparable....but constitute their very nature and essence". But the hedonic quality of an act is only a necessary criterion of any moral predicate being applied to it. An unintentional act may and at times does qualify for being called either virtuous or vicious. Moral predicates could be properly applied to acts only if they "arise knowingly, and with a particular design and intention"(ibid.,p.348, italics not in the text. Hume's definition of 'will' may be recalled). Now what do the words "knowingly" or "design and intention" mean if they do not imply foreknowledge of what the agent is going to do, of what he will do or what he now intends to do? In a section of the Book II of the Treatise Hume makes a few remarks about intentions of the agent. Actions and agents need be connected in order to be evaluated, and

it is only by intentions actions are connected "sufficiently with the person" (ibid.,p.349) who performs them. Actions "arise from" the agent inasmuch as he is "its immediate cause and author". But Hume considers this relation "feeble and inconstant" because it "reaches not the sensible and thinking part" (ibid, italics ours). On the other hand, intention, which is, for Hume, "knowledge and design" of the act before it is performed, is a part of the spectator's idea of the agent, and it is what remains "after the action is performed" (ibid.); properly speaking it is the agents' character, which is the object of the spectator's evaluation. Now these considerations regarding the agent's foreknowledge are in flagrant incompatibility with the crippled picture of "the empire of the will" that Hume has painted in the Appendix of the Treatise. He declares any argument about non-evidential knowledge on agents' part of his actions as "fallacious". The will as a cause, he says, "has no more a discoverable connexion with its effects, than any material cause has with its proper effect". "So" he goes on, "fare from perceiving the connexion betwixt an act of volition, and a motion of the body; 'tis allow'd that no effect is more inexplicable from the powers and essence of thought and matter. Nor is the empire of the will over our mind more intelligible. The effect is there distinguishable and separable from the cause, and could not be foreseen without the experience of their constant conjunction" (p.632, italics not in the text). In view of the uncompromising manner of expression of this passage it is possible to appreciate the tension between the spectator's and the agent's views of action, the denial

of foreknowledge of bodily motion from any act of will on the one hand, and the admission of "knowledge of design" of the act on the agent's part on the other. A consequence of Hume's denial of foreknowledge of intended acts could be that to say that nothing can be said about an effect from a consideration of the cause alone, prior to the experience of their conjunction is to deny that the relation between the mental aspect and the bodily aspect of an act of will or volition is a causal one. But how far this objection is damaging to Hume's theory of the will, I am not sure. Because Hume challenges any one to reject this thesis without altering his definitions of the terms like cause and effect, and necessity etc.: "I dare be positive no one will ever endeavour to refute these reasonings otherwise than by altering my definitions"(Ibid.,p.407). And, further, Hume is not a dualist, though he seems to distinguish between mental-conduct words and words of object-language. His phenomenalist analysis of causal necessity and its application in the explanation of acts of volition certainly arouses many issues that are not merely "verbal" as he thought it to be. What interests us particularly is that given Hume's definition of 'causal necessity', does it become a logical imperative that one should deny foreknowledge of intended acts on the agent's part. Strangely enough Hume often writes as though he admitted that the effect or the intended action could be foreseen from a consideration of an act of will. For instance, 'I may will the performance of certain actions as means of obtaining any desired good;....founded on the supposition, that they are causes of the propos'd effect'. (Treatise, p.417. Italics not in the text.

The words "design'd end" occur on page 416). Besides the fact that Hume himself commits himself to admitting such knowledge, is it not implied by the liberty of spontaniety? There have been thinkers who have held one or other variants of causal theory of human actions, and yet admitted foreknowledge of intended acts on logical grounds. William James misunderstood the issue and thought that to say that the concept of voluntary actions imply some foreknowledge of the intended acts would be to demand some "prophetic vision" on the part of the agent. Schopenhauer, who like Hume believed that men's actions follow upon given motives with the constancy of a law of nature, remarked about the issue of foreknowledge that "Will is the knowledge a priori of the body, and the body is the knowledge a posteriori of the will". (The World as Will and Idea, tr. Haldane and Kemp, in Freedom and Responsibility, ed. H.Morris, Stanford, 1969,p.73.) Though Schopenhauer does not subscribe to a causal theory of human actions in deference to a sort of ideo-motor theory, yet apart from his metaphysics of the will, what he says is relevant for our context. If, as Wittgenstein, provocatively says that "Voluntary movement is marked by the absence of surprise" (Philosophical Investigations, 628) there has got to be some foreknowledge of the agent's intended actions, at least, despite the differences, some "evident kinship" as Wittgenstein himself admits between the language of prediction in intending actions and doing a scientific experiment. Perhaps both Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein expressed the same truth, which Hume admitting it on one hand, rejects it officially, on the other. The problem of the connexion between knowledge and freedom,

as it has been recently put, has been approached by Hume in a rather external way. The agent is seen through the eyes of the spectator, who is credited with the experience of the constant conjunction of the agent's motives and his actions. The determinist's, for that matter, the spectator's knowledge bears unfavourably on the agent's freedom. The agent can have another point of view, in the non-trivial sense of the liberty of spontaniety, which might be different from the spectator's point of view. He may often know that he will do something simply because he has decided to do it, and this non-evidential knowledge alone can rescue the liberty of spontaniety from suffering trivialisation.

If human actions are predictable, from the spectator's point of view, as the physical events are from consideration of their causes, yet there is a "fundamental" difference as well. In what does the "fundamental"difference consist? Hume has remarked that the agent may try to show that he is really possessed of a free-will: "the desire of showing our liberty (may be in cases) the sole motive of our actions" (op.cit.,p.408). On being told that the agent's actions are determined, i.e., he does not have any liberty of indifference, he may become motivated to show that he is really free to do whatever he likes. As Hume puts the case, "when by a denial of it [free will] we are provok'd to try, we feel it moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself even on that side, on which it did not settle. This image or faint motion, we persuade ourselves, could have been compleated into the thing itself; because, shou'd that be deny'd, we find, upon a second trial, that it can" (ibid.). Hume, in

this passage speaks of two cases, one before the agent's free will has been denied, and the other, after it is denied, and he points out that the two cases of the agent's acting are by no means identical. There is a change of motives. In the second case, "the desire of showing his liberty", is the motive of the agent's actions. In the second case the agent acts with an intention of acting as if in a contra-causal manner. Macnabb commenting on this example remarks that the second case illustrates a "general truth" that "a human action is liable to be affected by any thought that the agent may have about it, including his thought that he is or is not certain or likely to do it" (op. cit.,p.201). In the light of the "general truth" the causal view of human actions becomes differentiated from a causal view of physical events. Both human actions and physical events have their causes, though the latter are not predictable,from the spectator's point of view of course, in the same way. "For", says Macnabb, "the thought that I am bound to do a certain action may touch off motives which will prevent me doing it; and the thought that another man is bound to do something may lead me to communicate to him thoughts about that action which will prevent him doing it" (ibid.). But the "general truth" about actions does in no way serve to disprove that our actions take place according to causal laws. To me the logical merit of Hume's example seems to lie in the fact that the psychological case provides a sort of reductio ad absurdum proof of the determinist's thesis. In order to refute the determinists' view of our actions as caused by our motives, one may try to show one's liberty, and in doing it "the desire of showing our liberty"

becomes the motive in its turn. This contradictory state of affairs proves that the determinists' thesis was true. In other words, the libertarian might seek to demonstrate the falsity of the determinist's thesis by an exhibition of his liberty. This exhibition is a result of his desire of showing that he is free. Hence we get a contradiction: exhibition of freedom (i.e., an action not determined any motive) on the one hand, and an action motivated by the desire of showing one's freedom. Hence the assumption that one can exhibit one's freedom must be false, since it leads to a contradiction. Thus the negation of the libertarian's assumption must be true. The determinists' thesis, it may be mentioned, is essentially the spectator's view of our actions: "We may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves; but a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character" (op. cit., p. 408, italics not in the text).

Another feature that Hume claims for his variety of determinism is that it makes the ascription of responsibility to the agent possible, and in this sense "necessity is so essential to...morality" (ibid.,p.410). He gives a notion of "human laws" as "founded on rewards and punishments", which presupposes it "as a fundamental principle, that ... motives have an influence on the mind, and both produce the good and prevent the evil actions" (ibid). This notion of human law rests on the belief that motives are "usually conjoin'd with the action", and hence commonsense regards the motives as causes of our actions. Let us call it the commonsense view of human laws. What Hume advocates is the inherent assumption of the Rule of Law in modern times. The assumption is the general recognition of

the principle that responsibility is personal and individual. But what does it mean to say to someone that he is responsible for what he does? It is often assumed that a man's responsibility is an identifiable factor that may at any particular time be present or absent, or even diminished. To be responsible for one's actions is thought of as equivalent to being in a certain mental state. English law sometimes speaks in terms of the presence of a guilty mind (<u>mens rea</u>) and Homicide Act of 1957 speaks of 'mental responsibility' (See <u>The Idea of Law</u> by Dennis Lloyd, Pelican, 1970, p.65). We should note that from Hume derives what may be called the uniform belief of the philosophers of the empiricist tradition that determinism is incompatible with responsibility is confused and false. If it is a doctrine, then it is to be found beginning with Hobbes down to Mill, Russell, Schlick and Ayer. Sir Isaiah Berlin tells us that the doctrine was originally formulated by the Stoic Sage Chrysippus (<u>Four Essays on Liberty</u>, Introduction). Before we come to see how Hume reconciles his causal view of human actions with the ascription of responsibility to agents, let us consider what does the concept of responsibility mean.

It must be confessed that the concept of 'responsibility' is quite opaque. How are we to decide when a man is responsible for an action? There are sciences that study the causes of what men do, and there are problems of devising practical tests of psychological inabilities and criminal responsibility as well. But, putting aside these specialised aspects of legal and psychological inquiries, it appears that on a commonsense level the application of the word

'responsibility' is in some way connected with some form of the deterministic thesis that human action is governed by causal laws, or its denial. Whatever may be the case the general concept of human action becomes at once important.

We have on a previous occasion noted that Aristotle had rejected the view that an action is a bodily movement that is chosen or deliberated, because 'choice' and 'deliberation' do not apply to spur-of-the moment actions which we call 'voluntary'; and for which an agent is held responsible. But Aristotle's own elucidation of the term 'voluntary' is unilluminating. An action is voluntary, he tells us, if "the moving principle is in a man himself". What he means by a moving principle he does not say, and in a sense, the statement is circular, unless meant as a <u>definition</u> of the concept of voluntary action. Whether or not one accepts Aristotle's notion of answerable actions, its chief feature remains a relation between the physical movement and a mental event as its psychological cause. Traditionally the psychological cause has been called by various names like 'having the intention', 'desiring' or 'willing'. The dispositional analysis of the concept of voluntary or human actions requires satisfying a law-like proposition. H.L.A. Hart, who has given currency to the view of human action known as ascriptivism finds both the traditional and the Rylean analyses to be "wrong". As Geach has observed, Hart's version of ascriptivism disfavours the causal view, which holds that the so-called mental element is related to the action performed either in the capacity of a necessary condition, or a sufficient condition, or both. Instead Hart comes

to hold that such sentences as 'He did it' etc. are not descriptive at all, rather they are, as he calls, ascriptive, i.e., "a non-descriptive utterance ascribing responsibility". ('Ascription of Responsibility and Right' in Logic and Language (First Series), A.G.N. Flew, ed., Oxford, 1952, p.161. Professor Hart has since altered the views set out in this paper.) 'Action' then, is not a descriptive concept that could be defined through a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Further, Hart insists that the concept of action being essentially ascriptive, any reference to the mental state of the agent "eliminate or reduce responsibility" (ibid., p.145). He does not deny, of course, that the mental state of the agent may be relevant in ascribing responsibility though "by no means an essential element in all action" (ibid.,p.163). Granted that the verbs of action have a descriptive use, Hart points out that their use is confined "especially in the present and future senses, their ascriptive use being mainly in the past tense" (ibid.,p.160). Now Hart is in effect rejecting the definition of an act as voluntary bodily movement favoured in legal theory since John Austin. Austin's attempt at definition reflects a commitment to the will. He believes that what we do (our act) is limited to what we can will. Since we can will only movements of our body, it follows that acts are willed bodily movements. Even in Jeremy Bentham, we notice the importance of the intentionality that accompanies the act. Intention or the state of the will, as Bentham puts it, is what need to be considered in order to ascribe responsibility to the agent. The whole issue seems to be divided into two mutually exclusive views: Whether or

not the mental state of the agent is worth considering in ascribing responsibility to the agent for his act. Besides, there is the question of the logical character of the verbs of action, whether they are descriptive or ascriptive. Hume, is obviously one of the tradition which Bentham and Austin belongs to, and he believes that the concept of action does have a descriptive import in so far as it is causally interpreted and in virtue of descriptive import ascription of responsibility to the agent becomes possible.

An action has to be sufficiently connected the agent, and as Hume very clearly puts it, is "deriv'd from a particular fore-thought and design" (op.cit.,p.349). Not only is the agent the "immediate cause and author" of the act, it was intended by him. Only because an action arises "from the person" "knowingly, and with a particular design and intention" (ibid., p.348), the agent could be said either praise or blame-worthy. Evaluation of conduct is aimed at the person's intentions. "A man, who wounds and harms us by accident, becomes not our enemy upon that account, nor do we think ourselves bound by any ties of gratitude to one, who does us any service after the same manner. By the intention we judge of the actions, and according as that is good or bad, they become causes of love and hatred" (ibid, italics not in the text). Hume was in a sense alive to the point made by Hart that the ascriptive use of the verbs of action refers to the past tense. This is so because of the nature of actions as phenomena. "Actions" writes Hume, "are by their very nature temporary and perishing", and this fact renders it all the more reasonable to view the actions as proceeding "from some cause

in the characters and disposition of the person, who perform'd them" (ibid.,p.411). The concept of agency can be said to entail the concept of responsibility, only if, the concept of action be definable, for Hume, in terms of a set of causal conditions. Otherwise, as Hume says, "The action itself may be blameable....But the person is not responsible for it; and as it proceeded from nothing in him, that is durable or constant, and leaves nothing of that nature behind it, 'tis impossible he can, upon its account, become the object of punishment or vengeance."(ibid.). The concept of responsibility in Hume's terms, presupposes that actions are performed by responsible agents, and the notion of a responsible agent entails the idea of causal authorship.

There is, again, the logical distinction made by Hart between descriptive and ascriptive use of the verbs of action. He does not give any reason why a sentence like 'He did it' cannot be conceived as a report, and for that matter, descriptive. The sentence can very well be an answer to a question demanding a descriptive account or report. As Geach has pointed out in his paper on 'Ascriptivism', descriptive and ascriptive uses are logically independent, or to put it more accurately, the two uses do not conflict. But Hart seems to suggest something else besides, i.e., the verbs of action have the ascriptive force as primary, and the descriptive force as secondary. R.M.Hare has familiarised us with a similar distinction between evaluative and descriptive meanings of value terms.[1] But the

1. See his The Language of Morals, chap.7. Geach assimilates Hare's prescriptivism as a variety of Ascriptivist thesis, perhaps, not without justification.

consequence of Hume's distinction appears to be that the primacy of the descriptive or non-commendatory force of value words is never so sufficient as to entail the evaluative or the commendatory use or meaning of the words. Now even if such a distinction as Hart has proposed could be made in connexion with Hume's view of human action, it is doubtful if the ascriptive function could be "principal" and the descriptive be secondary. Because for Hume, that responsibility could be ascribed to the agent necessarily presupposes that the action was caused by his motives. Again, much depends on whether the word 'responsible' is an evaluative word at all. It seems that in Hume's case the logical status of ascriptive and evaluative terms would be somewhat the same because in both the cases one can have their descriptive meaning as secondary. If such a simple sentence like 'He did it' has the ascriptive use of the verb in the past tense as its principal function, ascription of responsibility can itself be in some sense a judgment or evaluation. Ascription of responsibility is indeed a prerequisite of any evaluation of human conduct, though the act of ascribing responsibility is not by itself an evaluative act. As Hume has argued that to say that a word or a term is evaluative is to mean that the commendatory meaning of the word or the choice-guiding function of the term is primary, while its descriptive meaning is secondary. Now to say, an agent X is responsible for an act A is not to use the word 'responsible' in any non-descriptive manner. It could be said that to say that X is responsible for A is to make a reportive statement about the causal agency of X insofar as A is concerned. And should

this manner of arguing turns out unobjectionable, the 'principal function' of the verbs of action need not be necessarily ascriptive. It is pertinent to ask what does the view that responsibility is an ascriptive and not a descriptive concept avail against determinism? Sometimes responsibility has been explained in terms involving freedom, and such arguments assume that the concept of responsibility is as clear cut as that of freedom. There may be no harm in assuming that we know that what we mean by a responsible act and agreeing that such acts sometimes occur. Supposing that we are not describing an act by calling it responsible, and also that in ascribing responsibility to an agent what we do is to assign his act a certain status or according it a certain social recognition. Hart says that responsibility is a social concept. All these may be granted. But does the non-descriptivist thesis help us in inferring that a particular act is free because it is responsible? That an act A is responsible is not a fact, rather an ascription, and one may have reasons, good or bad, for making it. Now part of the reason for calling A responsible is the freedom of the agent. And if this is so, the argument would be circular, and hence of no use. Ascriptions are decisions, social or individual, and thus are exempted from having any truth-value. Since, according to the thesis of ascriptivism, ascriptions are neither true nor false, an expression to the effect that an act is responsible cannot be used as a premise against determinism and even for libertarianism. Since both of them express truths.

Hart's view that responsibility is a social concept would have the determinist's approval. If it is meant that responsible actions

are controllable by the usual social incentives of approval, we shall have Hume for it. Let it be noted that he says something that comes near what Hart calls defeasibility of ascriptive terms. The adjective "responsible" accorded to a given action is capable of being withdrawn in the light of further evidence. On page 411 of the Treatise, we read, "The action itself may be blameable;..... But the person is not responsible for it; and as it proceeded from nothing in him that is durable or constant, and leaves nothing of that nature behind it, 'tis impossible he can, upon its account, become the object of punishment or vengeance" (italics not in the text). If the passage has something in line with defeasibility, it is not conceived on the denial of the descriptive import of the notion of responsibility. Again, what is significant for Hume is that he does not use responsibility as a criterion of voluntary actions, as it is done by some libertarians. On the contrary, necessity or "necessary connexion of cause and effect in human actions" (or even "acting according to the determination of the will") is, to Hume, part of the condition for assigning responsibility. Could we say that the employment of the whole family of ascriptive and evaluative terms has a pragmatic justification which is consistent with determinism. Indeed it implies a belief that our actions are very largely determined. If everything one did depended only on pure chance or on nothing then the so-called action-guiding force of the evaluative and ascriptive terms would be ineffectual. Ascription of responsibility is allied to social praise and blame, and utility or disutility of actions normally

correspond to utility of praise or blame of it.

Further, when Hume tells us that "We fancy ourselves more happy, as well as more virtuous or beautiful, <u>when we appear so to others</u>" (italics not in the text), shall we not take it to mean that to an extent ascription of responsibility together with employment of evaluative discourse is an empirically controllable matter? Education of normal moral agents consists of praise and blame, rewards and punishments. An individual is characterized as a responsible moral agent if he behaves in the manner in which a normal moral agent behaves. And it may quite well be a mistake to claim that men cannot be genuinely responsible for any of their acts just because there are conditions inherent in the psychological (even biological) structure of human beings under which such responsibility manifests. It is a fact that men deliberate and decide between alternatives, and yet all the conditions which make it possible for men to function as moral agents may often be not within their control on occasions. The conditions under which men deliberate and choose cannot be taken as evidence for denying that deliberative choices do occur.

How far the descriptive-ascriptive distinction is viable can be questioned. Because what an action sentence (i.e., one in which a verb of action occurs) purports to describe or ascribe would depend upon the situation in which it is made. There seems to be no reason to suppose why any verb of action cannot be taken to be used either descriptively or ascriptive, or both. But what is more important in Hart's thesis that ascriptive use of the

verbs of action dispense with the notion of causal agency altogether. The concept of action, owing to its ascriptive character, is not definable in terms of causal or a set of sufficient and necessary conditions, says Hart. But there can be ascriptions of causality as much as that of responsibility. A low pressure in the North Sea can be responsible for a storm in England just as much a man's intention or motive can be responsible for any event or state of affair. May be that the sense of responsibility in the cause of the storm in England is not the model moral sense of the word. But this is not the question. And if it be insisted that the idea of person as agent should rank as a moral-cum-legal concept, even in that case causal agency can be ascribed in the sense of responsibility. There appears to be a causal sense of 'responsible', which is presupposed by our evaluation of others' conduct. There can be and, in fact, are causal inquiries that are often answered by an indifferent action sentence of the type: 'So-and-so was responsible for a particular state of affair'. If that be the case, it will be quite harmless to say that ascriptions of causality whether to persons as agents or to impersonal sources of agency equivocally employ the language of responsibility. And it was one of Hume's central thesis that the equivocation was true conversely as well. In the case of human actions causal responsibility lies with the motive of the agent, and that the notion of responsibility is not ascribed to physical events is but a contingent linguistic convention. In animistic societies ascription of responsibility would be equivocally made to both personal and impersonal sources of agency.

There is another objection against Hume's causal theory of human actions brought by Hart and Honore in their Causation in Law. Hart and Honore on page 9 of their book alleged Hume to have implied in his causal theory that "even singular causal statements which appear to be confined to the connexion between two particular occurrences are in fact covertly general; their causal character is derivative and lies wholly in the fact that the particular events with which they are concerned exemplify some generalization asserting that kinds or classes of events are invariably connected". And on page 52 they give this argument : "The statement that one person did something because, for example, another threatened him, carries no implication or covert assertion that if the circumstances were repeated the same action would follow". They say that particular causal statements imply generalizations, or to put the matter in other words, particular causal statements are regarded as instantiations of universal causal generalizations. But all general statements are by no means causal, and the causal generalizations are a sub-class of the class of general statements. Now the universal general statement $(x)[Ax \rightarrow Bx]$ has its instantiation in the proposition '$Aa \rightarrow Ba$'. Hume thought that motives as causes of actions also imply generalizations as much as the proposition '$Aa \rightarrow Ba$' does. Hart and Honore appear to argue that if it were the case, that once a man, for example, has acted in a particular way under threat should have guaranteed that given the conditions again he will act in a similar fashion in future. No such guarantee is available. The argument is calculated to reject Hume's

thesis that "actions of the mind" just as any other action "are to be regarded as instances of necessary actions" (*ibid.*,p.400). Two points can be made about the objection. It is true to an extent that threatened people do not always respond in the same way, and much depends on the nature of threats and agents' beliefs and attitudes, which may change at the time of subsequent threat. A guerilla organization engaged in subversive activities in an area may be threatened of dire consequences by the local government. The threat may be successful and some members of the guerilla organization may surrender. But next time may not obviously be the same story, the leadership of the party may become more efficient and the members more trained. The government would of course *expect* that its threat to operate as it did on previous occasion, when the guerilla organization would launch a fresh offensive. The relative force of the threat needs be evaluated before it could be concluded that people do not respond similarly whenever they are threatened. And secondly, ignorance of predictive laws on the part of the predictor does not inhibit causal explanation. Hume seeks to defend the thesis that in order to know that a particular causal statement is true one needs to know that some law covering the events at hand exists. Or, that the statement '*A* caused *B*' may be said to be true if and only if there are descriptions *A* and *B* such that the statement obtained by these descriptions for '*A*' and '*B*' in '*A* caused *B*' follows from a true causal law. Causal laws are distinguished by the fact that they are inductively confirmed by their instances and they satisfy counter-factual and

subjunctive causal statements. Often one case is enough to persuade us that a law exists. Even without inductive evidence, we are often led to believe that a causal law exists. Causal necessity, for Hume, is nothing but a determination in the mind of the spectator towards making an inference, and there cannot be, on Hume's terms, any *a priori* specification about the number of instances required for the inference to be properly made. Hart and Honore appear to have overlooked this basic fact about Hume's causal theory. What Hart and Honore are calling in question is the thesis that for the singular causal statements, the concept of cause involve the concept of law. Do we by asserting a particular causal statement commit ourselves to asserting any other generalization of which our particular sequence of events is an instance? The causal relations may be instances of some universal laws, but they need not be instances of any law indicated by the statements or believed by the makers of the statements. All these may be granted. But does this entitle us to say that Hume's view of the origin of causal beliefs is faulty. I should say that it has a good deal of truth. Hare and Honore appear to be undecided as to whether their offensive is against Hume's view of the analysis of causal statements or his view of the origin of causal beliefs. Hume's view is frankly a 'regularity' thesis. I doubt whether Hume ever intended that causal explanation is to be interpreted as the deduction of statements about particular events from general statements about sequences of events. Causal relations are not matters of direct observation. The only reason we can have for believing

that an act <u>A</u> is the effect of a motive or passion <u>M</u> is that we have observed or have reason to believe that actions of some type to which <u>A</u> belongs have been regularly followed by motives or passions of some type to which <u>M</u> belongs. And 'regularly' does not mean here 'invariably'. Our judgments like 'Othello killed Desdemona, because he was jealous' are based on approximate regularities concerning "the union betwixt motives and actions", and that such generalizations admit of many exceptions have been noticed by Hume himself. We read on page 404 of the <u>Treatise</u> : "No union can be more constant and certain, that of some actions with some motives and characters; and if in <u>other cases</u> the union is uncertain, 'tis no more than what happens in the operations of body, nor can we conclude any thing from the <u>one irregularity</u>, which will not follow equally from the other" (italics not in the text). The argument that since some actions are not caused by some motives, hence no actions are caused by any motive is obviously fallacious.

Formulating general laws of behaviour is no easy matter. Because of the immense complexity and variability of the factors which determine human behaviour in any given case, it is not possible to say that all men or all men of a certain description will always behave in specified circumstances in a specified manner. The notion of syndrome thereby becomes relevant. And more so to a student of human nature, since for him, it is on the approximately repeated patterns of human behaviour that his explanations rest. His concern lies with what usually happens. An explanation need not be void of

worth only because it does not hold necessarily of all cases. Giving us the typical pattern or syndrome of motive and action connexions, the predisposing factors of behaviour, etc., is the task Hume has addressed himself in his programme of methodological determinism. In view of the great practical importance the task is indeed a commendable one.

Back to the question of responsibility again. There are various factors that are commonly taken to excuse one from responsibility for what one does. Decisions to hold someone responsible can be criticised or defended in the light of different attitudes. To say that someone is morally responsible for what he does may be to say that he can legitimately be praised or blamed if either of these responses is appropriate to the action in question. In legal context, to say that someone is responsible for an action may be to say that he is liable to the normal legal consequences of it. Aristotle discusses the question of excuses under the two heads of 'ignorance' and 'compulsion'. There may also be pleas of self-defence or of provocation. These may be used either as justification or in mitigation on the agent's part. Hume's ideas about excuses are confined to a few passages at the end of his discussion on liberty and necessity. "Men are" he says, "not blam'd for such evil actions as they perform ignorantly and casually, whatever may be their consequence" (ibid., p. 412). Elsewhere, he seems to suggest mental illness as an excuse as in the case of 'mad-men' on page 404, and finally 'compulsion' is interpreted as the loss of the liberty of spontaniety, or being in prison or in chains. 'Hasty

temper', he thinks can be an excuse since it "operates only by intervals, and infects not the whole character" (ibid.). But it must be observed that whether something, a fact in the situation or in the character of the agent, would be considered as an excuse depends on the judge's view of the gravity of the offence. Aristotle, for example, thought matricide as an inexcusable offence. Hart's list contains inadvertance as a plea for excuse. A man may be excused for treading on a snail on the plea of inadvertence, but the plea will have no force if someone tread on a baby.[1] Hume's example of acting "casually" seems to be what Hart calls the plea of inadvertence. Again, Hume's case of "hasty temper", if it is interpreted as sudden irresistible impulse, is open to question. It remains to be asked and settled whether some one acting on hasty temper really acted that way or simply did not resist the impulse.[2] Of course in a causal explanation of a man's action irresistible impulse may be generally recognised as an excuse, since the temper being 'hasty' does not form a part of the agents' character.

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1. Austin writes in his 'A Plea for Excuses': "We may plead that we trod on the snail inadvertently; but not on a baby — you ought to look where you are putting your foot." The example illustrates the case that it is characteristic of excuses to be unacceptable. Acceptability of excuses depends on the standards and codes invoked by the defendant. The word "inadvertence" itself constitutes a plea, says Austin.

2. Austin believes that one may act at once on impulse and intentionally, since an intentional act is not necessarily deliberate. Austin's view contains a good deal of psychological insight.

But does the notion of excuse fit in with the causal theory of human action? We have noticed that Hume, in advocating what may be called intentional morality, insisted ascription of responsibility should be reasonable. By 'reasonable' I mean 'just'. We often speak of just or unjust praise or blame. An ascription of praise or blame to an agent may be just or unjust in accordance with what the judge demands of the actor and in what degree. Decisions concerning excusable circumstances involve matters of degree and the practicability of the standards of worthiness prevalent in the society of which both the judge and the agent are members. Again, our approval or disapproval of other people's actions depends also on our attitude towards them, and Hume has put it, more than once, that we do not judge men's actions, but their characters, of which their actions are signs. A definitive assertion on this issue may be quoted: "by asserting that actions render a person criminal, merely as they are proofs of criminal passions or principles in the mind; and when by any alteration of these principles they cease to be just proofs, they likewise cease to be criminal" (*ibid.*, p. 412). To admit an excuse is to deny the proof-value of the agent's action, to reject a plea for excuse is to take an action as a 'proof' of the agent's intentions. It is at this point that the notion of non-intentional acts comes in. An action is non-intentional only if it disavowed as having been intended, or judged as such. And the question of intentions becomes relevant only in the social context, i.e., in view of the acts' consequences, or as Hume would put it, when it arouses either a feeling of pain or of

pleasure in the spectator. It may also be said that in order to give a proper description of what we are doing reference to intentionality has to be involved. But this must be something different from the intention of the agent or what he means to do. The two -- the intentionality involved in describing a human act and the intention of the agent are not unrelated. The latter becomes describable in terms of the former, which is the spectator's point of view. This would be the case only if description of an act is something necessarily public, or depends on the proper use of interpersonal rules of language. The agent's intentions become accessible to us through his avowals (the cases of shamming, etc., excepted) and his behaviour of 'signs' of his behaviour. Hume would agree that the agent's intention is a relevant fact which should be taken into account in connexion with any explanation or description of human act. What perhaps he would not concede to is that it may be possible for the agent to reflect on his own intention. Hume would say that even though the agent can never be mistaken as to his own intentions, he can be mistaken as to the proper description or explanation of his act, he might delude himself with the myth of the liberty of indifference. Hence the spectator's point of view. Men, qua agents, are potential actors; they, together with the spectators, are placed in the same social theater, though they often do but may not share the same point of view.

From Hume's remarks concerning responsibility of agents it appears that he links the question of reward and punishment thereto. Hart wants to disentangle the question of ascribing responsibility

from the moral therapy of praise and blame. He does not deny the connexion between the two questions, but warns against possible confusions. He says that "assigning responsibility in the way we do assign it tends to check crime and encourage virtue"(op. cit., p. 166) is a matter for society, and not for "the wretched individual in the dock". Whether such an individual of Hart's description could exist so alienated would be doubted by Hume, for whom man is identified by his social nature. And secondly Hume's mention of repentence wiping off crime seems to imply the therapeutic value of evaluation (op.cit.,p.412). And he holds that the question of responsibility, its assignment and dispensing justice, i.e., reward and punishment are closely allied. Responsibility is implied by causal necessity of actions, and it is on the ground of necessity that reward or punishment is justified. Thus, for Hume, the notion of responsibility is closely allied to the notion of desert. To praise or blame a person for an action is to imply that it is something for which the person is responsible. Praising and blaming actions are grading them morally plus an ascription of responsibility to their doers. And his theory of punishment, as can be formulated on the basis of his scattered assertions, seems to be more of retributive in nature than deterrent.

What is the emergent picture of the agent in Hume's scheme? Is it possible to say of him that he could not have acted otherwise than he did? That is, how far, to put the question in general terms, freedom is reconcilable with determinism? There is a

sense in which, for Hume, the problem of reconciling 'liberty' with 'necessity' does not arise at all. It is the sense in which the liberty of spontaneity is trivial, and the spectator's view that all human actions are caused by motives is supreme. Or in another way, to Hume, freedom is necessity in a stipulated meaning of the term 'liberty' or 'freedom'. Both these words are used by Hume not only as names for a characteristic of actions, but more significantly, as dimensions in which human actions are assessed. To him, to have acted freely is, in Austin's words, to have "acted not un-freely", i.e., in an unconstrained fashion. But there is another sense in which the problem appears worth considering and pertinent. It has been held, and perhaps not without good reasons that, for Hume, there is no philosophical problem of free will, and he describes the whole dispute as purely verbal in character, involving only confusions in the meanings of words. Causation, he held, is essentially constant conjunction, there is no 'real' connexion between causes and their effects. Besides the factor of constant conjunction, there is a determination felt by the spectator to infer one of the conjuncts from the presence of another. He has argued that human actions have always been associated with motives with the same constancy and regularity that one finds between any causes and their effects. Human actions are caused, then, in the same way that everything else is caused. But far from concluding from this that no human actions are free, Hume concludes the opposite, for he considered it the very nature of a free action that it springs from the motive of the agent. Hume can be said to

have, therefore, defined 'freedom' as being able to act according to the determinations of one's own will, and this definition presupposes that one's free actions are caused. In the Enquiry we are told: "By liberty we can only mean a power of acting according to the determination of the will" (VIII,i,73). Hume tells us the liberty of his conception is "hypothetical" and belongs "to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains". He is saying in effect: (a) everyone who is not subject to external constraints, e.g., chains, prison walls, is free; (b) the fact that human behaviour is causally determined makes no difference to this freedom. Therefore,(c) a man can be both free and determined. This is essentially the view put forward by Hobbes, namely, "Liberty and necessity are consistent" (Leviathan, chap. XXI). One's actions are not unfree if they are caused, but if they are caused by something other than the determinations of one's own will. Freedom is determination by the will. It is a disquieting situation indeed. The actions of a causally determined agent are 'free' only in a technical sense. Is it not a far cry from the ordinary man's notion of freedom? By 'free action' Hume means such an action that is in keeping with one's preferences, desires and volitions; the ordinary man, on the other hand, means one that is avoidable. To say that a given action is free means that the agent could have done otherwise given the very conditions that obtained. The moral 'can', for the ordinary man, is an absolute power word, somewhat 'categorical' as distinguished from Hume's sense of the word, which he says is

"hypothetical". Hume's version of 'avoidability'[1] as he would have it is as follows: an agent could be said to have done otherwise if something within him were different. For Hume, to say that an agent is obliged to perform a certain action does not logically presuppose that he can (categorically speaking) perform it, rather he can if he wants, prefers, or wills to. The Humean agent has freedom both to do and to forbear doing a certain action under a specified set of conditions. Hume exasperatingly reduces the conjunction 'freedom and determinism of the will' to the equation that freedom is determinism of the will. There is no indeterminism in psychology as there is none in physics. And the denial of indeterminism does not imply the denial of freedom. No action springs from undetermined choice. The thesis that there is no genuine antithesis between liberty and determinism can now be rounded off. Hume would reject the assumption that freedom is contrasted with causality and that a man cannot be said to be acting freely if his action is causally determined. There are laws that compel as there are that describe. And a determinist only seeks to comprehend human behaviour under laws which describe. Hume would have agreed with one of his latter-day followers, Moritz Schlick, who maintained the so-called problem of free will arises from the fallacious assumption that compulsion is an ingredient of

1. The phrase is Stevenson's in his Ethics and Language, chapter XIV. Moore maintains, obviously following Hume, it is not the case "that right and wrong depend upon what the agent absolutely can do, but only on what he can do, if he chooses". Ethics, p. 103.

law as such. If predictability is not the same as coercion or compulsion, no antithesis can be said to be there between liberty and predictability. Mill wrote in his Logic (ii, p.416) "the doctrine called Philosophical Necessity is simply this: that given the motives which are present to an individual's mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he will act may be unerringly inferred". The word "unerringly" may be disquieting, and one may quite like to modify the claim. Even then, the fact would remain that it is predictability in either a strong or a weak sense that the determinist asks for. Again the question of the freedom of the will is taken to be one concerning the truth of such a statement as 'I could have acted otherwise'. Whether such statements can be truly made is taken to decide the issue between the libertarian and the determinist. The determinist is sometimes thought to deny that a man could truly say 'I could have acted otherwise'. The determinist would lay down conditions to be fulfilled for making the assertion 'I could have acted otherwise' significantly. Further, to have acted as I did does not fight shy of being explicable. And if such a point can be made that explicability entails predictability, then the libertarian claim gets reconciled with the postulate of determinism. Of course the libertarian might point out that his issue is not whether one can truly say that one could have acted differently, rather whether one could have chosen or decided differently. Our actions are behavioural evidences of preceding choices. This matter is crucial. Actions are said to be avoidable depending on the fact is

the agent had not made a certain choice, his action would not have occured. How can we say that our choices are caused? Sartre says that conscious deliberation is always faked, the deliberation which precedes decisions is irrelevant. To Hume the argument would not prove difficult. We are free insofar as we follow our own desires and inclinations and implement our own decisions. The fact that such desires, inclinations and decisions are states and events each with its own causal history and explanation does not make them any less unfree or our own. Only constraining cause is the kind of cause that is inconsistent with free choice. On page 404 of the Treatise Hume speaks of actions of men "deriv'd from...their motives, temper and situation". Actions are the outcome of all sorts of psychological and external influences. And so could be the case with choices. 'Why did I choose to do one thing rather than another?' can be answered by referring to my character. Just as we are often said to act in character, so do we choose. My choice depends upon my character. Hume uses 'choice' alternatively with 'will' on page 467, and hence a choice is asmuch accountable by motives and desires forming the character of the agent as is the will. 'I could have acted otherwise' and 'I could have chosen otherwise' -- both could be said with truth, since one is an alternative manner of saying the other, and neither of them admits of categorical interpretation. Thus if our choices and decisions are effects they, as much as our actions, could be shown to have followed, according to some rule or other, from a given cause.

Ordinarily determinism implies that an agent cannot say that he could have chosen otherwise, and this is compatible with his freedom of action, and libertarianism is the contention that freedom requires the ability to choose otherwise as well. But if choice is effective choice, that is, to choose is undoubtedly to have done what is chosen, and as Hume suggests by his phrase "choice or will" no wedge is driven between doing and choosing. Again if doing is choosing-to-do, then to say that an agent could have done otherwise though he could not have chosen otherwise is self-inconsistent. Choice and action are, for Hume, virtual synonyms, in the sense that to speak of choosing X is to speak willing to do X.

The problem of freedom has been construed as the problem of power or effort. Moore, in his Ethics, has analysed the power word 'can' in the context of past actions, and it would not be foolish to suggest that what he has done is in fact to have stated a position along Hume's lines. It is held that an agent is free only if he could have acted differently. To say that one could have acted differently is equivalent to saying that one would have done otherwise if he had chosen to. Moore, in effect, pioneered the type of analysis that was brought into vogue by C.L.Stevenson and P. Nowell-Smith. The advance that was made by Stevenson's or Nowell-Smith's analysis was the consideration of conditions in conceiving the notion of avoidability. Both of these attempts have been taken as standard reconciliationist view of the subject or the problem of freedom and determinism. The Humean legacy exemplified in the

analyses of Stevenson and Nowell-Smith has been, with appropriateness, called instances of a hypothetical analysis in view of the importance ascribed to the if-clause in the analysans of the can - statements. The greatest critics of the hypothetical analysis have been Austin (in his 'Ifs and Cans' in Philosophical Papers) and C.A.Campbell (in 'The Psychology of Effort of Will', P.A.S., XL, 1940). Without going into the details of Austin's treatment of the can-statements, namely, whether it could be analysed with or without an if-clause, or whether 'could have' is a past conditional or past indicative, it might be asserted that Austin did not defend any particular thesis, libertarian or deterministic. On the contrary, he was on the whole, critical of the reconciliationist analyses in terms of hypothetical if-clauses, though did not take sides. Nowell-Smith thought that Austin was giving an indeterminist account of the word 'can' interpreted as to stand for abilities. This is consistent with Hume's premises, though there is a methodological difference between Hume and his modern followers. He tried to deal with the problem from a phenomenological standpoint, exploring the nature of conative or volitional experience, whereas his modern followers are concerned to analyse the notions involved in the dispute. To say this is of course not to mean that Hume did favour or did not himself do any conceptual analysis. "I dare be positive no one will ever endeavour to refute those reasonings otherwise than by altering my definitions, and assigning a different meaning to the terms of cause and effect, and necessity, and liberty, and chance" (ibid.,p.407, italics in

the text). There is much evidence in support of the assertion that to the question how the two beliefs, namely, that human actions are causally determined and that human actions are free, can both be true, Hume found the answer in analysing what is meant by saying that one's action may be caused and yet be free. And it seems true to say that Hume's intention has been more phenomenologically oriented than that of a conceptual analyst's.

Hume's thesis has been that to say that a man acted freely is to say that he was not constrained, or that he could have done otherwise if he had chosen. He held that the "liberty of spontaneity ... which is oppos'd to violence" should be contrasted with the non-existent "liberty of indifference....which means a negation of necessity and causes" (op.cit., p.407). The main trend of the thesis has been put forward by all those subscribed to the view that from the fact that one's action is causally determined it does not follow that the agent is not free. This is how Ayer summed up the position (in his Philosophical Essays, p.278). Or, Nowell-Smith remarked that freedom implies causality ('Freewill and Moral Responsibility', Mind, LVII, 1948, p.46). They have also held that the absence of causal laws governing action does not give the moralist what he wants, or in other words, freedom is the absence of constraining causes, not that of determining causes, which is presupposed by ascription of responsibility.

The position has been found unsatisfactory by those who favour the categorical analysis of the word 'can'. C.D.Broad, argued

that 'Obligability entails substituability' (see his essay 'Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism' in Ethics and the History of Philosophy, London, 1952). Freedom, for Broad, must be 'categorical' if the phrase 'ought implies can' is to make any sense. Largely in sympathy with Broad was C.A.Campbell, who advocated a categorical interpretation of 'can', and which is incompatible with determinism. Tenability of Campbell's thesis depends on his notion of the self of the agent, the maker of decisions; and in this sense 'self' is not replaceable by the Humean notion of 'character'. We speak of actions as being "in character" while still holding the agent responsible. 'Character' is usually a determinist word, though it may be a blanket word to refer in general to our likes and dislikes, principles, habits, traits and so forth. It does not normally indicate precisely what we will do, but rather the sort of thing which in a particular situation we are likely to do. Thus it may leave plenty of room soft-determinism. It can also be pointed out that Campbell's analysis presupposes such a notion of the self, which, to my belief, is transcendent in character, so much so that it can hardly be considered a reply to the Humean position. To make Campbell's position more explicit it should be mentioned that he claims that it is the self that is the cause of free actions Humeans enjoy "freedom of a kind not compatible with unbroken causal continuity". He lays it down that an act is a "free" act in the sense required for moral responsibility only if the agent is the sole cause of the act; and could exert his causality in alternative ways. An appeal

is made to our conscious experience of making decisions, and Campbell complains that determinists decline to recognise the testimony of what he calls "practical self-consciousness". Now Campbell's contention that a moral agent acts in a "contra-causal" ways would at once be rejected by Hume, since for him an altogether different concept of man is involved. Again, the evidence of our own inner awareness of making choices hardly justified that the self is a special kind of a cause (it may be another thing to say that the agent-self is a cause, and Hume says that the agent is "immediate author" of his actions); and its evidential value remains poor indeed. It is not clear how out of a number of possible choices one could have been substituted for a particular choice made at a certain time. Ryle's example of "might-have-been" is relevant in the present context. And so is his remark: "What does not exist or happen cannot be named, individually indicated or put on a list..." (Dilemmas, pp. 25-6). If such a thing cannot be characterised as having been prevented, it cannot be mentioned as having been chosen either. The fact that agency can be exerted in alternative ways can hardly be established by an appeal to experience. Again Campbell's notion of the self is conceived as a continuant or as that which undergoes states and in which events occur. Such a notion of the self of the agent is alien to Hume's worken-day idea or ever-present impression of the self. There is a possibility of misconception. Hume appears to have held two different notions of the self, one in his epistemology and another in his moral psychology. The self as a "bundle of perceptions" is essentially non-Cartesian,

and "the ever present impression of our self" spoken of in the Book II of the Treatise may seem to reinstate the Cartesian notion of the self as a permanent psychic substance. But it is not that. Mercer has shown that the import of such expressions as "ourself is always intimately present to us" (ibid., p.320) or "the idea, or rather impression, of ourselves is always intimately present with us" (ibid., p.317) etc. is to vindicate the commonsense belief in personal identity and not to demonstrate the existence of a simple immutable self through introspection. There is no question of Hume's not revising his moral psychology in the light of his theory of knowledge. Further, Hume thought that a causal theory of action was presupposed by any theory of responsibility, for an undetermined action would be one which it would be impossible to praise or blame, since it would be connected with nothing permanent in the agent's nature. Philippa Foot (in her essay 'Free Will as Involving Determinism', The Philosophical Review, LXVI, No.4, 1957) thinks Hume was 'wrong' in asking for something "permanent or durable" in the agent's character so that he could be praised or blamed or for that matter, responsibility could be ascribed to him, since Hume was already committed to an impermanent view of the self. It appears to me that she misconstrues Hume's intentions, because Hume's search was for the character-traits of the agent, and by his phrases such as "the characters and disposition of the person" or "durable and constant" (ibid., p.411) elements in the agent nothing was meant which could be taken as contradicting his phenomenological discovery of the self as a bundle of perceptions.

Now I must answer the question I posed earlier: What is the picture of the agent in Hume's causal theory of human actions. Without subscribing to the categorical analysis of the power word 'can' or committing myself, for the present moment to a transcendent, continuant view of the self, I cannot help feeling the truth of Campbell's remark that Hume was looking at the problem "from the standpoint of the external observer; the standpoint proper to, because alone possible for, apprehension of the physical world" ("Is 'Free Will' a Pseudo-Problem?" Mind, LX, No. 240, 1951, p.462). Whether Hume's orientation was 'wrong' I cannot endorse, but given his premises, as he himself says, his conclusions do follow.[1] The older advocates of freedom like Reid and Clarke favoured an absolute or categorical analysis of the concept. Reid did not deny that human beings are influenced by motives, or that they influence action, but he refused to credit motives with causal status. Motives, he held, are not the sort of entities that could be said either to act or acted upon. Motives, Reid thought, "may be compared to advice, or exhortation, which leaves a man still at liberty" (British Moralists, ed. D.D.Raphael, II, pp.276-7). This pros-

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1. Moritz Schlick writes, "this pseudo-problem (of the freedom of the will) has long since been settled by the efforts of certain sensible persons; and above all,....with exceptional clarity by Hume." Problems of Ethics, Dover, 1962, p.143. Perhaps Schlick was echoing Schopenhauer who approvingly mentions Hume, among others, who have demonstrated the 'complete and strict necessity of the acts of will with the appearance of the motives'. On the Basis of Morality, tr. E.F.J.Payne, The Library of Liberal Arts, 1965, p.109.

criptivist view[1] ignores the fact that motives, as McDougall says, are the "springs of action", and secondly, does not touch Hume's causal theory in any effective manner. Granted that motives are exhortory experiences (that appears to be highly unsatisfactory a case to admit, because "advice or exhortations" are linguistic phenomena, and it is difficult to conceive motives as that), its constant conjunction with actions of similar nature will lead the spectator to infer the one from the other. Reid, in fact, overlooks Hume's definition of cause or the nature of the causal relation. He does not meet Hume on the latter's empirical grounds. And at this point I would like to make my second answer to the question.

Causal determination of human actions by the agent's motives does not imply that the agents are instinctive automata. It is possible to combine a sensitive regard for the value of human personality with determinism. A determinist need not deny that we often change our character, or we do make decisions, we resist temptations or subdue impulses. It will depend on his view of the nature of man. The spectator may yet conclude, as Hume says, about the causes of the actions performed by us as agents, or even about our future behaviour from a consideration of our motives and situations, though the inference or the prediction has no "real" nece-

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1. Thomas Reid appears to conceive 'freedom' as much the same way as R.M.Hare does in latter's <u>Freedom and Reason</u>. Both Reid and Hare seem to hold that moral decisions are dictations of psychology, there is so much of what we freely choose, commendations are not efficient causes, moral exhortations carry weight only the agents are in a good position to make the decisions that they do make.

ssity; and this follows from Hume's stipulation of the concept of cause. The inferences or the predictions about the agent's actions made by the spectator are particular causal statements which imply universal laws, but they are by no means instances of paradigm predictions or inferences as we come across in mathematical or logical deductions. Causal determination of action is the spectator's view of the agent's actions, and Hume nowhere says that given a set of motives, actions of particular sort will be entailed. Again, predictions are predictions, they are modal utterances, and as such remain on the verge of possibility. Inference as regards a possible action or a prediction about it leaves it open what in actuality happens. Predictions are instanced by what in fact occurs, and what in fact occurs is a "free occurrence", as Paul Weiss has put it, and predictability of a state of affairs does not entail its occurrence. And in Hume's view of our knowledge of the world this position seems perfectly plausible to be held. "A true sceptic", says Hume, "will be diffident of his philosophical doubts, as well as of his philosophical conviction; and will never refuse any innocent satisfaction, which offers itself, upon account of either of them". (op.cit., p.273). My second answer to the question of the status of the agent is a kind of "innocent satisfaction" that Hume would not refuse.

Lastly, I would like to consider a view about the reconcilability of 'freedom' and 'necessity', advanced by Professor D. D. Raphael in his Moral Judgment. This view, in part, is a critique of Hume's basic position, and otherwise, a reconstruction of Hume's

distinction between the 'agent' and the 'spectator'.

Raphael's critique of Hume's position may be briefly stated as follows. There are two kinds of talks that are confused, the "talk of forces" and the "talk of human volitions". According to Raphael the talk of forces is characterised a "positivist interpretation" of observable phenomena, no assertion of this talk says anything about the "character" of the events, it simply states regularity of sequence of classes of things; and seeks to explain the relation between regular sequences in terms of mathematical commensurability, and spatio-temporal considerations. The so-called 'causal' laws can be stated without employing the concept of 'cause', which is an unanalysed notion, as it is used in scientific discourse. Now the "talk of forces" conceived as a language bears no resemblance to another language with which it is often confused, that is, the talk of human volitions. In the talk of human volitions the questions of mathematical commensurability and spatio-temporal considerations are out of place, they do not arise at all. As a language, the talk of human volitions is animistic, and the "basic meaning" of the term 'cause' as "free activity" marks it off from the talk of forces. The two talks are so non-identical that no extension of the categories of one language to the domain of another is possible. Statements of one talk cannot be translated into that of the other. Our attempts of interpreting regularity of sequence of classes of things in terms of 'cause' is a sign of animistic hangover, in asmuches the "basic meaning" of the term 'cause' is derived from human actions. Our idea of ourselves as agents is one of efficient

initiator of change, and on the analogy of our own idea of ourselves as agents we proceed to explain the regular sequence of classes of things, and end up in formulating 'causal' laws. And once such laws are formulated, human actions may also be thought explicable in terms of such laws. And it is here the confusion between the two kinds of talks arises. According to Raphael, the whole problem, at the philosophical level, starts with confusing the language of science, or the "talk of forces", which describes the uniformity, or regular sequences, of nature with purposive terms drawn from the language or talk of human actions, and *vice versa*. "The two languages are quite different, expressing two different points of view, and there is no conflict between them" (*op.cit.*,p.207), says Raphael.

He charges Hume for confusing causal law in the sense of "universal regularity of sequence" and efficient cause as free activity. But is it true? Hume could have been so charged only if he had said that the problem of freewill *versus* determinism was a genuine one, and he did not really say that. As far as Hume is concerned there is no problem of free will, and the whole dispute has, he said, heretofore been purely verbal in character, involving only confusions in the meanings of words. Instead of maintaining that there are two different talks, one of forces and the other of human actions, he has argued that causal language must be identified not in terms of *what* it talks about, but *how* does it talk about, i.e., constant succession. The syntactical formulation of causal language, to the neglect of the semantical considerations,

is not that deplorable. And if it be so, then Raphael's second charge that Hume's account of 'necessity' is unacceptable because it is an "animistic projection" on to external world is unfair. This charge could have been valid, if Hume could be shown to have maintained a double-decker view of the world, one of mechanics and the other of psychology. The phrase "animistic projection" is specially unhappy, since it fails to do justice to Hume's complex notion of the external world, which has a custom-bred or belief-formed status. Even if an animistic notion has to be projected on to the world, the latter should enjoy or possess a different reality than the idea or ideas projected thereon. In Hume's case it is not easy to assert whether the external world is privileged to exist independent of our belief that it exists. If existence of bodies is characterized by constancy and coherence of our impressions, and the conclusions that we draw from them are "deriv'd from custom, and regulated by past experience" (op.cit., p.197) aided by the imagination, it is hardly possible to say that there exists an objective world in any guaranteed fashion. But this is a philosopher's description. Yet beyond the sceptical reflections there exists the world of our every-day experience. For all practical purposes this world of natural belief is taken for granted. Now it can be argued that since the world of our every-day experience is itself a product of imaginative projection, what special sense could be ascribed to 'animistic projection' in the case of necessity? Again, granted that 'necessity' is a projection, then why should there at all be a projection of the specta-

tor's point of view and not that of the agent? 'Necessity', to Hume, is chiefly a spectator's word. If it were a case of animistic projection as Raphael has argued, it could likely have been a projection of the agent's view derived from his liberty of indifference. Our idea of efficiency has anthropomorphic roots, and Hume explicitly refuses to admit the notion of efficient cause. When he refuses to distinguish between "moral and physical necessity" he does not seem to be primarily concerned with effective production prevention or modification of events. Rather, he invokes causal language in order to explaining human actions. For him, "cause" is essentially a schematic word, a "determination of the mind" to view human actions in a certain way. Nothing much is gained by calling the determination animistic. In the Enquiry (footnote, p. 94) Hume says that necessity of any action is discovered by "reflecting on human actions" by the spectator. Now it can be an open question whether reflection that Hume is talking about is animistic projection. Of course, "reflecting on human actions" and "performing the actions themselves" have different feelings. But, it should not be forgotten that he discounts a great deal of the evidential value of the feeling of "looseness or indifference" that an agent might have. Hence it can hardly be said that he confuses "compulsion of passivity" with "freedom of activity" as Raphael has suggested, because Hume's "determination of the mind" or "reflection on human actions" are schematic phrases and should not be taken as standing for passive mental states.

Raphael has sought to rescue efficient causation from being reduced to universal regularity of sequence. The latter affects us as passive spectators and hence the words 'law' or 'necessity'. The mental state experienced by witnessing either regularity in a class of things or universality of regular sequence is not initiated by us, "it is not a case of acting, of our causing the change", says Raphael. On the other hand, efficient causation is free activity in the sense that "the change is one initiated by, we can act or not act, as we choose". Raphael then charges Hume of equivocating the two senses of 'cause'. This is hardly justifiable. First, it remains to be argued that the "determination of the mind" is a passive experience, or that we are "forced" to expect the second term of a regular sequence. On our expectation much of our practical programming depends, and hence it cannot be said to be an isolated state of affair. Secondly, Hume could have been charged of equivocation only if he had distinguished the two of Raphael's sense of 'cause'. On the contrary, Hume puts it very clearly that our idea of efficiency cannot only be introspectively had, but also that "there is no foundation for that distinction, which we sometimes make betwixt efficient causes, and causes sine qua non; or between efficient causes, and formal, and material, and exemplary, and final causes. For as our idea of efficiency is deriv'd from the constant conjunction of two objects, wherever this is observ'd, the cause is efficient..." (ibid., p.171). For Hume, it is the spectator's prerogative to ascribe efficiency to an agent, and this is not on any animistic analogy. Similarly, there is for him, only

one kind of necessity, which, he says, is "the constant conjunction of objects along with the determination of the mind" (ibid.). Consequently, Hume's intentions run counter to Raphael's suggestion that the two languages, one describing events or actions as deliberately initiated, and the other, treating events or actions as falling under regular classes, do not conflict. This could hardly be the case with Hume. He would not say that both determinism and libertarianism are true. On the textual evidence it is difficult to assert that he held two points of view, from one of which men are determined, from the other free. Raphael says that the two points of view are based on "a distinction between interpreting what we find as 'things happening' and as 'persons acting'" (op.cit.,p.210). One wonders if Hume would agree to this version of his views. His own words are memorable in this context: "Let no one....put invidious construction on my words, by saying simply, that I assert the necessity of human actions, and place them on the same footing with the operations of senseless matter. I do not ascribe to the will that unintelligible necessity, which is suppos'd to lie in matter. But I ascribe to matter, that intelligible quality, call it necessity or not, which the most rigorous orthodoxy does or must allow to belong to the will. I change, therefore, nothing in the receiv'd systems, with regard to the will, but only with regard to material objects." (op.cit.,p.410). For Hume, the same 'causal' language can be employed for both the "actions of the mind" and the "actions of matter". Unless the two domains of the mind and of matter are distinguished by the two

kinds of languages in order to be talked about, there cannot arise the question of confusing the two languages, or for that matter, confusing the two senses of the term 'cause'.

We may now turn to Raphael's reconstruction of the solution of the problem of freewill. Drawing upon Hume's distinction between the 'agent' and the 'spectator', Raphael writes, "From the outlook of scientific observation....a man's act is 'explained' by bringing it under a regular law through comparison with similar acts in similar circumstances; it is dealt with as a 'thing' or event observed, and as liable to be correlated with similar observed events ('things happening'). From the outlook of agents (which may be taken not only by the actual agent, as Hume suggests, but also by spectators thinking of themselves as potential agents, imagining themselves in the actual agent's shoes, instead of thinking of the situation detachedly as an external object of their observation), the act is considered, not in relation to similar past acts, but as issuing from a freely choosing and responsible 'person'. The distinction between the approach of a detached, scientific observer and that of an agent, is a distinction between interpreting what we find as 'things happening' and as 'persons acting', between thinking of 'events' and thinking of 'persons'"(op.cit.,pp.209-10). This is indeed a novel way of developing Hume's view, but the passage tells us also that Raphael is a secret libertarian. In spite of his two language explanation, in course of developing his own view he resorts to ways of 'interpreting'. Does this appear consistent with his critique of Hume, or even with his proposal for keeping the

talks of forces and of human actions separate? Interpretations can be linguistic asmuch as languages can be interpretative. But the "talk of forces" as Raphael himself admits is reportive or descriptive, and when it is interpretative, it is "positivistic". Now once it is admitted that the two languages are categorically dissimilar, how is it possible to carry on two diverse interpretations within one language, whatever it may be, unless of course it is a higher-order or more generalised type of language than both the talks of forces and of human volitions? These doubts of course does not take away the cogency of Raphael's observations, but there is another side of the problem. He does not appear to be as thorough going in his separation of the 'spectator' and 'agent' roles, as might appear from the separation of the two kinds of talks. I do not intend to suggest that the separation of the agent and the spectator roles should or could be absolute. The interdependence of action and observation is so built into any viable notion of man that without reducing the concept of a human person to a passive observer it cannot perhaps be said that we can be in possession of knowledge of other selves without taking into consideration the fact they could not ever be observed unless they were sometimes active experimenters. Similarly, no one could ever be experimenters unless one were sometimes observers. Verbs of perception have both an active and a passive form, looking at and seeing, for instance. Again, the things that one might do intentionally include what one does an observer as well as what one does an agent. There is, it seems, a situational factor involved in the distinction. In

the Enquiry (p.89) Hume remarks, "The mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce any human action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without some reference to the actions of others,...." We play the role of spectator or make observations with the intention of interpreting or discovering the way other people behave in human situations; and we become actors or perform actions as agents with the intention of changing the way things are in the world (which would of course include other men, and to that extent action is a social concept, and an agent is a social engineer). In the like manner, the two talks can hardly be kept in separation. Things can be done by words as well. Uttering a performative is an action. And if one does not commit what Austin calls "descriptive fallacy", there would be nothing to prevent recognising the fact that we use language in order to perform actions. The assumption that language is used only to describe what is observed is a consequence of thinking of people primarily as passive spectators. If actions can be performed by using language, then it is also a fact that people are agents as well as spectators. But this is another matter.

In fact, Raphael holds two theses, one linguistic and the other metaphysical. His metaphysical thesis derives much from Thomas Reid (ibid., p.205, also his Introduction to his edition of Price's Review, p.xl) and involved there is a view of a transcendent self or 'person'. In this manner of looking at the problem Raphael is one with Campbell. It is true that the concept of freedom loses quite a lot of its significance without a concept

of self, since it is the agent or the person who can be said to be free. Locke was right in saying that the proper question should be whether man is free. But do we have any empirical evidence of the freedom, except the feeling that the agent might feel? And against this objection the notion of a personal agent as an efficient cause does not seem to have any fair chance of survival. The so-called feeling of freedom is not a feeling in the sense of a sensation. It is merely a strong conviction that I can do what I want to do. Again, I do not experience both the feeling and the freedom. I experience the conviction that I am free to do what I choose, and I experience doing what I choose. But do I experience that my choice is the only cause of my action. What evidence is my feeling of freedom for the existence of it? As Spinoza said it can sometimes be quite illusory. A stubborn feeling of freedom of choice count as evidence against determinism, for this kind of feeling can be deceptive. Again the feeling can be irrelevant to the question of causal determination. In order to decide whether a given act of choice is causally determined we have to judge whether there is an antecedent event with which the choice is connected by a general law. And the data of introspection has no bearing on this question. Engels wrote in his Anti-Dühring : "Freedom of the will ... means nothing but the capacity to make decisions with knowledge of the subject....the freer a man's judgment is in relation to a definite question, the greater is the necessity with which the content of this judgment will be determined; while the uncertainty founded on ignorance, which seems to make an arbitrary

choice among many different and conflicting possible decisions, shows precisely by this that it is not free, that it is controlled by the very object it should itself control." (Part I, XI, p. 137, Moscow, 1969). Raphael thinks that Hume did entertain a belief in "moral freedom" as distinguished from "social freedom" (ibid., p.208). The passage he refers to in Hume's Enquiry, p.94, is a restatement in almost unaltered language of what Hume says in the Treatise, pp.314-15 and 408. It is difficult to agree with Raphael that in the said passage Hume says that "both determinism and libertarianism are true". However much the distinction between "reflecting" and "performing" points of view in relation to human acts may be correlated, it is, for Hume, the spectator's point of view which is supreme: "however we may imagine we feel liberty within ourselves, a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character" (Enquiry, p.94, footnote, a slightly different version in the Treatise, p. 408). And, what is surprising is that far from concluding from this that no human actions are free, Hume concludes the opposite, for he considered it the very nature of a free action that it springs from the motive of the agent. What distinguishes free from unfree actions is the mode of causation, not the absence of causes. For Hume, there is no freedom other than "social freedom", and what Raphael designates as moral freedom would consist in the agent's feelings alone, and for which no empirical evidence could possibly be produced. Perhaps it would be truer to say that since Hume does not maintain any theory of two independent languages or talks as Raphael does, he need not distinguish also bet-

ween two sorts of freedoms, social and moral. Price, we have mentioned earlier, sought to correct or amend Hume's account of necessity by remarking that the motives were not the sort of things that could be called efficient causes, and Raphael seeks to revive the attempt. But, however trivial Hume's notion of social freedom may be, no room can be made for moral freedom in the sense of efficient causation, without of course revising his epistemology and non-transcendent notion of the personal agent. And if this be agreed upon, then Raphael's account may be said to be an independent point of view, still less an interpretation of Hume's doctrine, though he does attribute the view directly to Hume.

One final remark about Raphael's two language thesis. He is surely correct in believing that one cannot go on talking about in both the languages. To hold that the laws of human action are not as quantifiable as natural sequences, or to put in other words, they are not laws of 100 per cent regularity. Hume himself had said, "Nothing is more fluctuating and inconstant....than the will of man" (op.cit., p.313). But this fact cannot be regarded as the logical ground for maintaining that there should be two independent languages for talking about regularities of varying degrees. Arguments for dropping out one of the languages in preference to the other are not without force, since the fact that there are two languages does not guarantee that both of them are equally viable. In history there are instances of many languages being dropped out of usage, for example, the language of geo-centric universe or the language of witchcraft. I believe, when Hume sought to ascribe

"intelligible quality" to matter what he did really propose was that there be one language, whether we speak about mechanical forces or human volitions. I do not claim that this would settle the dispute of free will *versus* determinism. The metaphysician might still go on insisting on filling the term 'free' with his own meaning, but he can only do so on non-logical decisions, and this might leave the determinist to thinking that it could be done only because the term empty of empirical content.

Postscript : Can motives be causes of actions?

Recent writers on philosophical psychology do not look favourably on the thesis that motives are *causes* of human actions. This thesis is logically secondary to the contention that the concept of cannot intelligibly be applied to the explanation of human actions. Since Ryle's analysis of mental concepts, Austin, Peters, Urmson, Anscombe, Dray and Melden have discovered new categorical boundaries separating psychological concepts from the language of natural events. A psychological explanation is not a causal explanation, the two, it is held, are logically incompatible. To cite the motive for an act and to cite the cause of an event is, in either case, to answer the question 'why' but the meaning of the question is different in the two cases. It has been argued that to ask 'why?' about a human action is to make the action rationally intelligible by filling out its purpose content including the beliefs and attitudes of the agent who performs it. A motive explains an action by

identifying the agent's reason for doing it. Reasons, like causes, are said to have explanatory power, but a reason is not a cause in the sense of an antecedent event. Or to put the matter in a more radical manner, the rational explanation of an action is so incompatible with any causal explanation that in the former case we should only have description of behaviour in purposive language, while in the latter it would be inappropriate, since causally explicable behaviour could only be involuntary.

In the present context it is not my purpose to attempt a critique of the views which insist on a radical distinction between reason and causes. Without any intention of minimising the value of the conceptual insights of such views, I shall content myself with simply indicating that Hume's thesis that human actions are caused by motives is not rendered a howler by recent philosophical disfavour it has fallen into.

Some of the criticisms advanced against the view that human actions are causally explicably may be taken as directed against Hume. I propose to offer the following considerations. Usually, Hume's view that the cause and the effect are logically distinct or independent is appealed to with a view to showing that the concept of cause cannot be applied to the explanation of human actions. It is argued that a cause must be logically distinct from the alleged effect; but a reason for an action is not logically distinct from the action; therefore, reasons (for that matter any motive) are not causes of action. In one or more versions this argument, inspired by Ryle's treatment of motives in The Concept of Mind,

is fairly common and can be found in Kenny, Hampshire, Peters, Melden and Winch. The credibility of the argument depends on the contention that a reason makes an action intelligible by redescribing it in purposive language. We do not have two events, but only one under different descriptions. Causal relations, however, demand distinct events.

Let us consider Hume's logical independence thesis concerning the relationship between cause and effect. That the cause and the effect must be distinct existents is certainly what we have learnt from Hume. But is that the whole story about his views of the causal relation? In some moods there is nothing he wants more than to say that there is no "real intelligible connexion" between external objects. The words 'intelligible' and 'real' are hardly synonyms, and he cannot be said to be committed to a denial of the possibility or actuality of real connexion. On page 29 of the Treatise he says something that might set the idea of causal necessity in another light: "Wherever ideas are adequate representations of objects, the relations, contradictions are agreements of the ideas are all applicable to the objects". If that be so, why not likewise in the case of cause and effect? Hume does not ever contend that the ideas between which the necessary connexion or the causal relation holds are not adequate representations of objects. What then shall we decide about the intelligibility and reality of the relation or idea of necessary connexion? I am aware that it might of course be objected that the relation of cause and effect does not hold between ideas qua ideas but only between ideas qua existents. This point is in

fact raised by Kemp Smith, and hence the relation is not discoverable by comparing independently given entities. Without contending the validity of the objection it may be submitted that there can be an interpretation on which the causal relation in some sense shares in the character of knowledge. If the proposed interpretation is not a wild guess then the relation between causes and effects no longer remains to that degree open to the so-called logical independence view. Further, unless one should be inclined to discount a great deal of Hume's characterization of a relation as "that quality, by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination" (ibid., p.13) the proposed interpretation of the relation of cause and effect would not be without viability. If the necessary connexion between cause and effect is a relation (which Hume says it is) and the ideas it relates are in no way inadequate representations of objects (there is no reason why they should be so); then one can, by Hume's criterion of reference, apply the relation or idea of necessary connexion to objects.

How then what is called "the determination of the mind" be accounted for? It is said that the determination is a specific mode of causation, in the imagination, when one adopts the attitude of the spectator in respect of objects or ideas in constant conjunction. A feeling of being necessitated is experienced, and hence a transition from a given object to its usual attendant becomes possible. The feeling and the transition need not be sharply distinguished, though a mental content and a mental activity are to be kept separate. We are in no way concerned with such nice ques-

tions. The value of this experience of necessity lies in that any assertion of causal connexion between objects is argued from it. In this sense, it would not be improper to say that the determination is a universal condition, for asserting causal relation being external objects. Hume says, "Had ideas no more union in the fancy than objects seem to have to the understanding, we cou'd never draw any inference from causes to effects" (ibid., p.92). That the feeling of necessity is transferred to the external world is what we find in the Treatise. But this should be taken as a metaphor, far less as a confession of animistic projection. Rather, the determination is significant as a "model" (ibid.,p.165). If we take the model view of the determination of the mind seriously certain important consequences follow. There has got to be some sort of structural similarity between the model and the phenomena in respect of which it is used. If determination of the mind is a specific mode of causation and forms thereby the basis of causal connexion, then as a model it is an analogue of causal phenomena. The structural similarity between the model and the phenomena helps us in understanding and explaining the phenomena by providing us with a technique for talking about it. As an analogue model of causation "the determination of the mind is authenticated by our causal inferences. Their natural character does not mean that they have to be arbitrary. On page 484 of the Treatise Hume points it out. His reasons for the non-arbitrary character of our causal inferences is that they are based on such principles of the imagination that "are permanent, irresistable, and universal" (ibid.,p.225).

Unless I have badly mistaken the nature of Hume's notion of determination, it will be clear that it has not been his intention to say that causation is nothing but constant conjunction, as the protagonists of the logical distinctness of cause and effect appear to imply. Rather, "necessity makes an essential part of causation" (ibid., p.407, italics not in the text) is what Hume says. If causal explanation of human actions is a methodological device for Hume, the practical utility of the model of the determination of the mind cannot be underplayed. The union of determinant factors with human actions is not enough, it has got to be "certain" or reliable if explanations of human actions are to be viable. If the union is natural, i.e., peculiar to human nature (at this point another model of Hume, e.g., the model of mirror: "the minds of men are mirrors to one another", is interesting to notice) then causal explanation of human actions become reliable and practically interesting. As for assurance, in the context of practical interest, causal explanations of human actions it should be preferable on account of its non-empty character as opposed to the empty assurance of logical necessity.

Now about motives. Hume holds that human actions, when they are voluntary, are determined or have causes. To the class of causes he assimilates a variety of items, the agent's motives, temper, situation, character, and the indirect passions with "bent or tendency". Jointly or severally of these can be antecedent determinants of human actions. Whether they uniquely determine an action is another question. But it has been Hume's contention that ante-

cedent determinants settle or select the range of possibilities that an agent can choose from. To be more exact, according to him, since actions have a constant union with motives, temper and circumstances, an inference from one to the other is possible. Hume sometimes uses 'motive' and 'character' in an interchangeable fashion, when, for example, he says that character is something durable and constant in man which gives his actions moral quality, or for that matter, "When we praise any actions we regard only the motives that produced them" (*ibid.*, p.477). To this class of "durable principles of the mind" can be assimilated what he calls the calm passions which are "the settled principles of action". Motive then, for Hume, is a name for whatever influences the will. The causal view concerning human actions is derived from the "uniformity of human actions" or from the fact that there is "a general course of nature in actions" (*ibid.*, pp. 402 and 403). This uniformity consists in the constant union and connexion between like human actions and like motives of agents. The constance of "the *union* betwixt motives and actions" together with the "determination of the mind" make it possible to infer the existence of one from that of another.

The causal model invoked by Hume is an explanatory device, and if this assertion is philosophically unobjectionable his determinism can be said to be methodological. Various factors occur in explanation of human actions. Some may be antecedent factors, others may be law-like factors. And Hume employs both including teleological factors as well. It is not easy to say if he intends

any of the factors to do the explanatory job. He mentions antecedent, law-like and teleological factors as those that might influence the will, besides good and evil. Sometimes 'motive' is a general term for all the factors determining the will. He takes the word 'motive' in the philological sense meaning that which moves or induces a person to act in a certain way; and the candidates would be found in a mixed bag. He includes intention also as a factor in the causal explanation of actions. "By the intention we judge of the actions" (ibid., p.348), says Hume.

It might be objected that while it is right to say that singular causal statements imply generalizations, it is wrong to suppose that motives, desires, passions and intentions are causes of actions. Hume is said to suppose that the statement that a person did something because, say, he was angry, carries the implication that if the circumstances were repeated the same action would follow. Such an argument is put forward by Hart and Honore. Further, it may be that we do have rough laws that can be improved. Whether such laws can be made on the basis of reliable predictions is another issue. But it does not follow that Hume is essentially wrong in claiming that singular causal statements entail laws. If he is taken to mean that no particular law is entailed by a singular causal claim, then it can be defended without defending any law. In another way, we may by way of settling the claim look for some generalization of which an action in question may serve as an instance. If a causal claim assigns a motive, the success or failure of the assignment would depend on showing it to be an instance of a regularity. In

this respect assignment of motive works in the same way as the attribution of causes. Generalisations about human behaviour need not be on the whole about behavioural regularities. That is why Hume includes interpretations of situations, temper of the agent, etc., in the set of attributive conditions. The uniformity of human actions presupposed in assignment of motives is hardly mechanical quantifiable uniformity. It is a matter of aim, purpose and value that involve both the agent and the spectator. Some prisoners, on discovering the impossibility of their escape, choose to work upon the nature of the goaler, some upon the stone and iron. But none perhaps resist from attempts for their freedom. I think this use of Hume's own example would be permissible.

The inferences on which we base our beliefs about matters of fact are not formally valid. There should be no reason for appealing to this logical point, nor can be decisive. The relation of cause and effect is a law-like one, and when we are to deal with human actions we are not really concerned with the formal validity of such relations. When we are to formulate our predictions in non-metrical terms, as we do for human actions, the sort of inference that leads to predictions will not have to specify a class of similar actions. We hardly ever demand any detailed and delicate description capable of identifying unambiguously one and only one action whose occurrence would satisfy the prediction. There is a limit to precision, and human actions are no exception to the fact that in nature no prediction can identify a determinate event without ambiguity. It is we, *qua* spectators, who set up conventions

(this too is based on socio-cultural considerations and not an arbitrary, isolated affair) as regards what performance of an agent will be taken as satisfying our predictions about him. In the domain of human actions, predictability and determinism need not be equivalents in the strong logical sense of the terms. Predictability in practice is what Hume demands for his methodological determinism.

'Motive' is indeed a puzzling word and yet ascription of causal role to the determinants of human actions is a commonsense position. A complete abandonment of the position is urged by many recent writers. Hume has observed that a motive need not always be an antecedent occurrent. On this issue Ryle thinks that a motive is a disposition to behave, while Anscombe and Melden hold that it is intention to do the deed. But despite their differences they agree that explanations of human actions are possible in terms of motives. It may be ask: how are the explanations of human actions in terms of antecedent factors, dispositions and intentions related, and if they are compatible? Now Hume does not much distinguish between the factors in terms of which explanations of actions are offered. His inventory of determinants of actions, we have noted above, includes dispositions as well as occurrences, and the fact that they are categorically separate appears to have been glossed over by him. He has been content with some sort of relation between them. As regards the question of compatibility, however, he was keenly aware. We find him carefully distinguishing actions done from motives from those that are done without design or by accident. Even actions that can be done without any other motive than their own sake

(see *Treatise*, p.479) has also been taken account of.

But Hume's general position remains such that he assimilates the explanatory features of human actions, namely, the agent's desires, intentions, passions and motives — all that we now-a-days call reasons — to causes. What does it mean to assimilate reasons for actions to causes? It is to give the necessary and/or sufficient conditions of actions to be explained. Generalisations link reasons for actions and actions, just as causes of occurrences and occurrences are linked. Both the cause-explanation and reason-explanation are signified by such words as 'because', and 'cause' and even 'reason'. Again, motive or reason explanations could not be given if there were not regular causal sequences in the world. And since actions could not be directed to ends unless one action was more likely to be followed by a certain consequence than another. This matter is important equally for the agent as well as the spectator. In this respect it would be wrong to say, as Flew has suggested, that in the spectator's world "there seems to be no room for the interests of agents".

There are philosophers who would separate reasons and causes. They argue that psychological antecedents do not explain actions. It has been observed that a cause must be describable without reference to its effect, while reasons for actions cannot be so described. Hence reasons for actions are not causes. The argument, if the assumption about the independent describability of causes from effects is not unsound, is valid, though it over-simplifies the case. Hume's candidates of 'motive' are not a homogeneous lot, they are as diverse

as dispositions and psychological occurrences, antecedent factors as well as teleological ones. Some passions like pride (when it is not a character-trait) may, qualify for such a notion of cause which can be described in isolation from its effect, though there are reasons to doubt whether pride can be so understood. When Anscombe says that motives can be "backward-looking", does not the class include feelings and emotions? And I suppose it would be pertinent to ask that. Again, what she calls "forward-looking" motives or intention, does not an explanation in its term require mention of some of the agent's character-traits, emotions, beliefs and ends in order to be intelligible? Should it not be regarded a mistake to claim that it does, surely some causal factors would have to be admitted in the explanation. That psychological antecedents of actions and the conative dispositions of the agent need then be taken into account in giving an explanation of human actions is a matter that merits admission. Hume's view that the psychological antecedents and dispositions are causally related to the agent's actions, or that they have a necessary place in causal explanation of human actions, has a methodological advantage, namely, this way of thinking renders human actions intelligible by relating them to the agent's experiences, and beliefs which determine his behaviour. Attribution of causal efficacy to people's conative attitudes seems to be in order since conation is among the causes of behaviour.

Psychological concepts are explanatory, and a reason for an action, if our explanation has to be causal, may be a kind of cause. Motives are identified in terms of the actions they motivate. But

can we, on that account say that there can be a motive before an action has been performed? Much would depend on what one means by 'motive'. Supposing that one means by 'motive' intention, does the claim that it makes no sense to speak of a motive before an action has been performed supplant the causal model of explanation of human actions? Melden has argued that the motive of an action is part of the way in which we identify the action (Free Action, Humanities Press, 1961, p.77). It is specially interesting since Melden is one among others who would never ascribe causal status to a motive. Even Ryle, who had argued that motives were not causes, Kenny noted, offered a theory no less causal. The irony, if it is one, is not plain and not without deeper reasons. The causal model of explanation is good for two purposes as far as Hume is concerned. It is employed with a view to explaining human actions, identifying the agent's motives by what he does. On the other hand, we venture to tell how our agent would behave if his motives were such and such. In either case the attribution of a motive is the sort of assertion that can be justified by showing it to be an instance of a regularity. And in this respect the concept of motive works in the same way as the concept of cause.

Reasons and Action

Let us have a look back at Hume's earlier contentions. His theory of the passions is an investigation into the nature of the causes that move us to act. The direct and indirect passions, or in other words, the feelings we have about goods and evils, and those feelings we have about ourselves and others are conative in varying degrees. It is a natural disposition with us that we desire goods as such, and desire to move away from evils as such. Similarly, we desire to help those whom we love or pity, and desire to harm those towards whom we feel envious and malicious. Then there are the two principles of sympathy and comparison. Just as much we enter into the feelings of others, as we compare our own condition with the fortune of others. In sympathy the imagination operates on our social nature, while in comparison on the egocentric nature of our perceptions. The whole range of indirect passions is an outcome of the double operation of the principles of sympathy and comparison. The conative efficacy of the passions with regard to the goods and evils depends on our belief that we can achieve the desired state of affairs by the actions of mind and body. The direct passions, desire and aversion, can move the will on account of that belief. We _knowingly_ give rise to mental and bodily actions. If we have a lively idea, for that matter, believe that goods may be achieved and that evils may be averted, our passions will move us to act. Our actions then proceed from our desires or motives. Our actions conform to our characters, or our

dispositions as human beings endowed with passions. Having the character as we do have, we are the causes of our own actions. Nothing separates our characters from our acts. Any spectator, to put it differently, having observed constant union of our character and our actions would feel a necessary relation between the two, and institute a causal relation between the two items of the life-history of the agent. We are moved to act only by our desire for what we feel to be good or by our aversion from what we feel to be evil. Good and evil, or pleasure and pain are the ultimate forms of our emotional or even sensitive reaction.

Now, granted that our actions are the expressions of our character (the word being an umbrella-word covering the range possible for human nature, of his education, his direct and sympathetic experience, his station in life, sex and interests) and our passions together with our belief in our abilities move us to action; it is significant to ask what is it to be moved or to have a motive? The question is on a higher level of language than the statement that our desires are the motives of our actions. Clarifying the question, 'what it is to have a motive?' can itself be a very engaging task, and it will not be my purpose in the present context. I would rather make some general observations.

To take an example: Othello killed Desdemona. It is often said that Othello killed her our of jealousy. The phrase 'out of' is a typical motive-stating expression. Other members of the family of motive-stating expressions are 'because', 'in order to so-and-so' etc. The phrasal form 'in order to so-and-so' is adequate

also for cases of acting with a purpose. In using these locutions we seek to explain actions and thereby try to specify what it is that motivated an agent to do what he did. Assigning motives to actions is giving a certain kind of explanation of the actions performed, and in giving motivational explanations we relate the actions to a special sorts of facts. My action of getting up early in the morning in order to catch the first train to London would find a motivational explanation in the statement that I got up early in the morning out of a desire to catch the first train to London. This suggests that to give a motivational explanation of an action is to explain it as in some way due to a 'want' or a 'desire' (we may overlook the subtle differences between the two notions). Motivational explanations often imply desire in the sense that in specifying motives for actions we refer to relevant desires or wants. If any desire or want motivates an agent to do an action then the desire can be said to be the agent's motive for acting in the manner he does. This way of formulating the problem of motivation is to formulate the problem as how motives give rise to actions. There is a sense in which one can be always motivated by some desire. The question 'what was P's motive for doing A?' (where P is a person and A an action) can be answered either by specifying some desire or using some desire-implying phrase. But the important point to bear in mind in this context is that it makes no sense to ask an agent, apart from reference to some particular action or a set of actions, what motives did he have, though it does make sense to ask what does one want most at a given time,

or what desires does one feel most keenly. Such questions do make sense in being asked because desires acquire the status of motives for particular actions, by virtue of the fact that they motivate the agent to perform those actions. Now the view that motivational explanations imply desire has been held by Hume, since he appears to believe that to have a motive is to feel a passion or have a desire. And this point of view is implied by his theory of the passions. He argues his case against the view that reason alone can be our motive for action. His argument presupposes his conception of the offices of reason and the passions, to a consideration of which we shall now turn.

If we could put the matter in a terminology borrowed from Kant, it would not be false to say that, for Hume, the notion of 'practical reason' is empty, or at best a rationalistic legend. Reason, by definition, is theoretical, and hence it could never be practical. Theoretical reason is demonstration, which is the meaning of 'reason' in the strict sense of the term. In a looser application the term includes 'probable knowledge'. In other words, knowledge is either demonstrative or probable. To reason is to form a judgment as to what is logically necessary or, if we might so say, <u>naturally</u> necessary. The domain of reason in the sense of demonstration consists of 'relations of ideas'. The paradigm of necessary knowledge or the system of <u>a priori</u> propositions, where knowledge solely consists in comparing the relations among our ideas is mathematics. On the other hand, probable knowledge consists in investigating causal relations among 'matters of fact'. Human nature manifests itself

under two operations, that of the understanding and of the passions; and the understanding, Hume tells us, "exerts itself after two different ways, as it judges from demonstration or probability" (op. cit., p.413). The disjunction of demonstration and probability exhausts the operations of the understandings, and it is one of Hume's major contentions that in neither of the senses reason can cause any action. One of the characteristics of the demonstrative operations of the understanding is that they yield "a perfect exactness and certainty" (ibid., p.71). In what does the demonstrative operations of the understanding or reasoning consist? Hume says, "All kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but comparison, and a discovery of those relations, either constant or inconstant, which two or more objects bear to each other" (ibid., p.73). Comparison and discovery of relations is a common feature of both demonstrative and probable reasoning, except for the fact in the case of demonstrative operations we possess "a precise standard by which we can judge of the equality and proportion of numbers" (ibid., p.71), or in other words, we are solely concerned with relations. In probable reasoning we are concerned with "existences and objects", and that makes all the difference. The non-existential nature of demonstrative reasoning is put by Hume with a greater force and clarity in the following passage from the first Enquiry: "Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid for ever retain their certainty and evidence"(p.25). If Hume may be taken to equate the body of knowledge yielded by relations of ideas with the system of mathematical propositions, we may also say that their chief propor-

ties lie in analyticity and a priori concept formation: "Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe."

The two operations of the understanding have also been referred to by Hume as two kinds of truth. In Book II of the Treatise, he writes, "Truth is of two kinds, consisting either in the discovery of the proportions of ideas, considered as such, or in the conformity of our ideas of objects to their real existence" (p.448). There is another statement in the Book III which should be mentioned before we make any comment about Hume's conception of reason. On page 463 he says that "the operation of human understanding divide themselves into two kinds, the comparing ideas and the inferring of matter of fact". Now much would depend on whether he means by the two operation of the understanding, two kinds of perceptions or the two sorts of propositions that the human mind is capable of formulating. There is much reason for this consideration. In probable reasoning we have both the relations and the objects in relation, and in such cases the mental act of comparing is more a case of having a perception that formulating a proposition. If we care to take notice of Hume's own distinction between perceiving and reasoning much confusion could later be avoided. He says, "When both the objects are present to the senses along with the relation, we call this perception rather than reasoning; nor is there in this case any exercise of the thought, or any action, properly speaking, but a mere passive admission of the impressions thro' the organs of sensation."(ibid., p.73, italics not in the text). Now if probable reason-

ing is a case of having a perception, then 'reason' becomes an umbrella word, and much of Hume's supposedly anti-rationalist dialectic loses force, because, in a sense, formulation of an analytic proposition can scarcely be contended to be a motive for action, though reason as 'perception' can sometimes be. That probable or causal reasoning can influence actions is fully endorsed by Hume in different contexts. Belief, implied by causal reasoning, is, for Hume, a vivacious idea approaching the intensity of impressions, and thus "is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our passion" (ibid.,p.120). In fact, the "manner our reasonings from causation are able to operate on the will and passions" (ibid., italics ours) is one of Hume's undertakings in the section entitled 'Of the influence of belief' in the Book I of the Treatise. If the evidence is acceptable, then it becomes a little puzzling to understand why Hume would say as he does that both the operations of the understandings, demonstrative and probable, are incapable of influencing action or becoming motives.

There is another aspect of Hume's denial of the view that probable reasoning or "inferring of matters of fact" can influence action. Such reasonings involve descriptive statements, and it has been argued by Hare in recent times that such statements do not have action-guiding force, action-guiding statements are statements about matters of substance, and as such they cannot be derived from self-evident principles. Does this thesis restate in a modern form Hume's view that neither demonstrative nor probable reasoning can influence action? If Hume is taken to hold that the two kinds of

truth or operations of the mind, namely, comparing of ideas and inferring of matters of fact are a distinction between the two kinds of propositions, then Hare's thesis appears to be a higher-order formulation of Hume's view. But even if the Hume-Hare conjecture is not admissible, one point remains valid, namely, that Hume appears to deny that causal reasoning, implying belief, can influence actions. And this he cannot do. Prima facie he claims that reason is merely the ability to make inductive and deductive inferences, and he contrasts reason with passions. This is his basic dichotomy. There are grounds for arguing that the ability to make inductive inferences is not unconnected with passions and often move people to act. His denial that causal or inductive reasoning can play such a role is inconsistent with his description of our passional life. I shall try to argue this point later.

Hume's concept of 'reason' as comprising both demonstrative and non-demonstrative operations of the understanding has been an unhappy formulation. That apart, what reasons does he give for his view that reasonings of the mathematical type as well as of the causal type cannot influence actions? Let us first take the reasons concerning mathematical or demonstrative operations of the understandings.

Hume's denial that demonstrative reasoning alone is ever the cause of any action is based upon the following considerations. The "proper province" of such reasoning "is the world of ideas" and "the will always places us in that of realities" (ibid.). The domains of "demonstration and volition" as he puts are "totally remov'd, from

each other", and hence no inference from one to the other can be made. Therefore, demonstrative reasoning does not influence any actions. The argument is analogous to the relation of the non-inclusion between classes. If two classes stand in the relation of non-inclusion, then the question of inferring any member of one class from a consideration of members of another does not arise. Mutual exclusion of the worlds of ideas and realities make it impossible for any traffic from the one to the other. But doubts can of course arise as to whether demonstration and volition could be so conceived. How far, the notion of total removal of volition from demonstration can be substantiated? Is not mathematics used in mechanical operations? Hume does not deny that, but he says that " 'tis not of themselves they have any influence". He explains his statement as follows: "Mechanics are the art of regulating the motions of bodies _to some designed end or purpose_; and the reason why we employ arithmatic in fixing the proportions of numbers, is only that we may discover the proportions of their influence and operation" (_ibid._, pp.413-14). In this example, demonstrative reasoning is shown to have a _directive_ influence, i.e., "directs our judgment concerning causes and effects" (_ibid._). Obviously, a directive influence is not a _promotive_ influence, which is precisely what Hume is denying.

To say that reason can have a promptive influence as regards to our actions is to commit oneself to the view that men are rational _qua_ agents. Hume does not consent to any such view. On the contrary, he puts it quite categorically that "There is implanted in

the human mind a perception of pain or pleasure, as the chief spring and moving principle of all its actions" (*ibid.*, p. 118). That there can be no passion which is indifferent to the hedonic quality of experience is a basic fact or primitive assumption of our emotional life. Hume puts it as a "general maxim" that "no object is presented to the senses, nor image form'd in the fancy, but what is accompany'd with some emotion or movement of spirits proportion'd to it" (ibid., p.373). Our emotional reactions are geared to our experience and prospect for pleasure and pain and their sources. Why this is so is an illegitimate question, and if analysis of human nature is intended as the foundation of morality, the emotional reactions natural to man, i.e., the passions, will have to be considered as prime movers, or the promptive influences. Much of Hume's negative thesis that reason 'alone' cannot be a motive for action is directed against those who hold that men *qua* agents are rational beings, and men's agenthood consists in acting in accordance with such mental acts that may be called instances of *a priori* reasoning. A human agent acts *reasonably*.

Let us have a look at such arguments. Samuel Clarke holds that human understanding can comprehend entities such as "eternal and unalterable relations, respects or proportions of things, with their consequent agreements or disagreements, fitnesses...etc." (*British Moralists*, ed. D.D.Raphael,I,p.198). No empiricist would agree with this contention because of the unexamined hypothesis concerning the limit and extent of human understanding. Granted that human mind can comprehend such fitnesses and unfitnesses that are

eternal, it remains to be shown that the same "reason of things" (*ibid.*,p.199) *does* determine human will. When Clarke says "that the same reason of things, with regard to which the will of God always and necessarily *does* determine itself to act in constant conformity to the eternal rules of justice, equity, goodness and truth" (*ibid.*), he is making a theological statement. To say that the reason of things that determines God's will *does* also determine human will as well would be to make an empirical claim of undecided truth-value. And Clarke does not make it. On the contrary he makes a prescription, namely, that the reason of things that 'does' determine God's will "*ought* also constantly to determine the wills of all subordinate rational beings, to govern all *their* actions by the same rules" (*ibid.*). Where does this prescription follow from? Obviously from the theological premise of the reason of things determining God's will. And even if the case of subordination of human will to that of God does not make the argument logically valid, unless of course the premise is a value generalisation. (A prescription can be validly deduced from a value generalisation together with a factual premise. This is a fairly current view.) Clarke's intention seems to have been to assert an empirical claim that human will in fact determined by, what he calls, the reason of things, except for the fact that human beings "willfully and perversely allow themselves to be over-ruled by absurd passions, and corrupt or partial affections, to act contrary to what they know is fit to be done" (*ibid.*). To this Hume might have answered that acts of passion are not necessarily vile, as Clarke's

argument appears presuppose. In fact, Hume rejects the popular view that acts of passion are necessarily evil, and acts of reason are necessarily good. Clarke asserts, what Hume would remark as "popular declamations" of the "suppos'd pre-eminence of reason above passion" (*op. cit.*,p.413).

Clarke's intended isomorphism between *assenting* to the reason of things and *acting* according to that breaks up, on his own admission, "by the natural liberty of his will" (*op.cit.*,I,p.200), which he finds "inexcusable and ridiculous" (*ibid.*,I, pp.200-201). That reason *obliges* man in *practice* is affirmed by Clarke and does this by transforming mathematical predicates into moral evaluations. He seems to take it for granted that it is "the very same in *action*, as *falsity* or contradiction in *theory*" (*ibid.*,I,p.208). Mathematical, or for that matter, logical relations hold equally of practical commitments. For Hume, this alleged deduction of "the *original obligations of morality, from the necessary and eternal reason and proportions of things*" (ibid.,I,p.216) would itself be an illicit one. The concept of reason implied in Clarke's argument is so characterised by absoluteness and omnipotence that the logical distinction between the two kinds of assertions, the 'ought' and the 'is', is very easily transgressed. It is one thing to say that reason *ought* to determine human will, and it is quite another thing to hold that reason does in fact so determine. It appears difficult to decide as to whether Clarke intends to make an empirical claim or a prescription. As regards the empirical claim Hume would be sceptical about the potency of reason, *qua theoretical*, in its *practical* en-

employment. Reason cannot be both regulative and constitutive of human conduct, and since the theoretical-practical dichotomy cannot be overridden, Clarke's 'ought' scarcely be said to imply 'can'.

Closer to Hume was Thomas Reid; and though he was one of Hume's chief critics, yet he presents a case of a mitigated rationalist claim. Since there is no exercise of reason without judgment, for Reid, the theoretical operations of the mind are judgmental, though what he means by 'judgment' is nowhere made clear. He, further, holds that all reason is grounded on first principles that are self-evident, and such principles are available both in mathematics and in morals. Reid does not argue why first principles are to be self-evident, nor is it clear whether his self-evident first principles are analytic propositions. It would not be contrary to philosophical usage to hold that the denial of a self-evident principle yields a self-contradictory proposition. Ordinarily analycity of a statement is ascertained by the same criterion. But with Reid the role played by the self-evident first principles is slightly different in morals than in other sciences. "From such self-evident principles" he writes, "conclusions may be drawn synthetically with regard to the moral conduct of life; and particular duties or virtues may be traced back to such principles, analytically" (ibid., II , p.276). The statement has two parts, and we shall consider them separately. What does the phrase "synthetically" mean? Reason, for Reid as for other rationalists, is a principle of action, i.e., "a principle by which our actions ought to be regulated" (ibid., II, p.265); but he points out, it does not regulate actions directly. In acting morally

we are "acting according to reason" (ibid.,II, p.267. Kant would have said 'acting on reason'). Reason as a body of principles of action must be related to the will and intention of the agent, since Reid's concept of reason is embedded in the will as it is with Kant. For Reid, reason as principles of action "necessarily imply" (ibid.,II,p. 266) judgment inasmuch as they are rational; and the rational principles of action are distinguished from, what he calls, "animal principles, which imply desire and will, but not judgment" (ibid.). Now reason as the source of the principles of action must imply both judgment and desire and will, but qua rational, how can it so imply is not clear from Reid's account. He writes that the rational principles of actions "in all their exertions...require not only intention and will, but judgment or reason" (ibid.,II, p.309). This is a crucial statement, and needs be argued and defended by any rationalist. I do not believe that Reid actually does it, if I understand him aright. Of course, Reid has given an argument from the use of language. "To act reasonably" is a locution common in all languages. Aside from the correctness of such an empirical claim, he holds that to act reasonably is to have reasons for what one does. And the reasons must be good ones. Now what constitutes 'goodness' of a reason is by no means an easy affair to settle. Does a reason have to be 'good' from the agent's point of view, or from that of the spectator or the judge? Unless the questions are met, universal linguistic evidence above would not make the usage significant. In fact, Reid is appealing to "the commonsense of mankind", and he is assuming that human commonsense

guarantees significance of linguistic usages. Now the phrase "to act reasonably", it is claimed, is a universal usage; and since no thing can become a universal usage unless human commonsense did ensure its meaningfulness, hence the phrase is not devoid of meaning. Granted that an action _A_ is reasonable is a meaningful assertion. Is the meaningful denomination of an action as "reasonable" implied by rational principles of action in logical independence from desire and will? An answer to this question will be decisive on the issue whether reason _alone_ regulates human conduct. If it is a case that the rational and the animal principles (one implying judgment, the other desire and will) often cooperate, a Hume-like student of human nature, I suppose, would find it worth noticing. But those who like Reid and Kant hold that the _active_ powers of man are at best rational, should hardly be in a position to make out anything of the _natural_ cooperation of the two allegedly distinguished principles. Granted again that there are two principles, one 'rational' and the other 'animal', such that one implies judgment, while the other will and intention, but the mere coexistence of the two principles in human constitution does not _prove_ that rational principles of action _imply_ judgment as well as intention and will. The gap between the understanding and the will is left unbridged by Reid's argument. The cooperation of the two faculties is an ideal one, and the supposition that the former necessitates the latter which is an empirical claim remains undecided. The derivation of conclusions about the moral conduct of life 'synthetically' from self-evident principles seems to have no force as an answer to Hume's scepticism concerning reason as

the sufficient condition of human action.

The second part of Reid's statement, i.e., that particular duties can be "traced back" to the self-evident first principles of reason, can be disposed of briefly. If by "tracing back" is a logical operation, it could mean derivability. Now to say that particular duties are derivable from self-evident first principles of reason, it is equivalent to saying that the principles entail the duties concerned. But if the self-evident first principles are analytic propositions (and there seems to be no reason why they cannot be so construed) Reid's case amounts to what Hare criticises as 'Cartesianism in morals'[1]. Statements concerning particular duties or singular imperatives are substantive, i.e., they tell us about matters of substance, and as such cannot be derived from analytic or tautologous premises. Particular duties could of course be derived from universal value judgments; but whether the self-evident first principles of reason are coextensive with universal value judgments will remain an open question. If the self-evident first principles include universal value-judgments then of course the matter would be different.

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1. See his <u>The Language of Morals</u>, p.39 : "Many of the ethical theories which have been proposed in the past may without injustice be called 'Cartesian' in character; that is to say, they try to deduce particular duties from some self-evident first principle....A Cartesian procedure in morals is as illusory as it is in science". And also on p.41 : "it might be said that a principle of conduct was impossible to reject, if it were <u>self-contradictory</u> to reject it. But if it is self-contradictory to reject a principle, this only be because the principle is analytic. But if it is analytic, it cannot have any content; it cannot tell me to do one thing rather than another".

That the principles of virtue are self-evident is a belief shared also by Richard Price. He holds also that "morality is capable of demonstration" (ibid.,II, p.187). The demonstrability of the principles of virtue consists in its self-evidence. He addresses himself to the question, "whether our moral ideas are derived from the understanding or from a sense" (ibid.,II, p.135) and his answer is that the moral ideas like 'right' or 'wrong' are simple ideas, and like any other simple idea, they are immediately perceived by the understanding. Price argues that "It is undeniable, that many of our ideas are derived from our INTUITION of truth, or the discernment of the nature of things by the understanding. This therefore may be the source of our moral ideas. It is at least possible, that right and wrong may denote what we understand and know concerning certain objects" (ibid.,II,p.142). In this passage Price is arguing as an intuitionist, and by taking the moral ideas to "denote" what we "know" or "understand" by the operations of the understanding, he would say that moral judgments are cognitive. We are not here concerned with Prices intuitionism, nor with the question whether or not moral judgments are cognitive. Such questions as Price has raised in the passage are those with which Hume is concerned in the Book III of his Treatise. One remark will suffice now, that Price holds just the opposite view of what is held by Hume, namely, that our moral ideas are derived from the understanding; and it is also remarkable that Price expresses his views not in categorical assertions, rather in modal expressions. But whatever may be the manner of his expression, this much is clear that Price is arguing to defend the demonstrability

of moral ideas, and if moral ideas are demonstrable, then some sort of a bridge could be said to have been between *reason* and *conduct*. Morality, for Price, is "a branch of necessary truth" (*Ibid.*, II, p.157) just as geometry is. Apprehension of necessary truth is intuitive, and by "intuition" Price means the mind's capacity of surveying its own ideas. Intuition is the source of our self-evident truths, or those body of propositions that are known *a priori*, analytic truths that are revealed to us by the mere operation of thought. What would be disquieting to Hume in this part of Price's teaching is not the idea of self-evident truths that are necessary and intuitively apprehended, for he himself accords such a status to what he calls the relation of ideas. Propositions expressing relations of ideas[1] "are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe". Whether Hume differentiates intuition from deduction as Price (ibid., II, p.160) does may be a point interesting enough in itself, but we can gloss it over.

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1. The concept of relations of ideas is a blanket term. It includes such bodies of knowledge as arithmetic and algebra together with geometry, to which Hume, in the *Treatise*, refused the status of a "perfect and infallible science" (p.71). Of course this point dropped in the *Enquiry*, and he classes geometry along aside arithmetic and algebra. Moreover, he uses *intuition* and *demonstration* interchangeably in the phrase "either intuitively or demonstratively" in the *Enquiry*, p. 25. Price, on the other hand, not only distinguishes intuition from demonstration, but even regards several propositions of geometry as intuitive, and yet non-demonstrative. See *British Moralists*, ed. D.D.Raphael, II, p.160. But is it not odd on Price's part to say that geometry is an instance of intuited self-evident truth, and yet some of its propositions may be not clear enough and thus need demonstration? How can a self-evident truth be unclear? Theorems are said to belong to axioms of a systems, they are demonstrated, though not considered as self-evident.

But what Hume would positively not have it allowed is inclusion of moral ideas to the body of truths that are known a priori. Moral ideas, for Hume, are not barely relational, they are intentional. The identical relations obtain between parricide and the case of oak and the acorn; and yet one is judged by taking a moral point of view, and the other indifferently.

But does Price mean that the concept of practical reason is identical with that of 'reason' in general? If "morality is a branch of necessary truth", then "truth and morality should stand and fall together" (ibid., II, p.157). Price seems to offer two answers to the question. First of all, he holds that the thesis of demonstrability of morality is implied by the fact that the human will by its very nature requires the understanding to guide and determine it, and if such be the case, every act of the will should necessarily be implied by some judgment. The connexion between the two, qualities of actions and "discernment" of the qualities, obligation and judgment of the mind concerning it, is so close that Price says, "it is not very necessary to distinguish them" (ibid.,II, p.168). Thus, "an action which is under no influence or direction from a moral judgment, cannot be in the practical sense moral" (ibid.,II, p.195). The thesis of demonstrability of morality, if strictly formulated, would mean subsumption of moral principles and maxims "under the general self evident principles of morality" (ibid.,II, p.187). But this happy state of affairs does not ordinarily prevail, and Price, taking into account the dangers of "mistake to action" is led to his second answer. He admits that "if we consider the several moral principles singly...

we find that we must frequently be very uncertain how it is best to act" (*ibid.*, II, p.188). We must make several considerations about the possible effects of the actions, "compare their respective influence and demands" (*ibid.*). But this is a contingent difficulty, and not theoretically or logically insuperable. "In reality", says Price, "before we can be capable of deducing demonstrably, accurately and practically, the whole rule of *right* in every instance, we must possess universal and unerring knowledge" (*ibid.*). This ideal condition is forbidden by our "finite understanding" alone. But this admission does in no way affect Price's central thesis : "Moral agents are liable to mistake the circumstances they are in, and consequently, to form erroneous judgments concerning their own obligations. This supposes, that these obligations have a real existence, independent of their judgments. But when they are in any manner mistaken, it is not to be imagined, that then nothing remains obligatory, for there is a sense in which it may be said, that what any being, in the sincerity of his heart, *thinks* he ought to do, he *indeed* ought to do, and would be justly blameable if he omitted to do, though contradictory to what, in the former sense, is his duty" (*ibid.*,II, p.190). To put the matter in brief, "The knowledge of what is right...will certainly be attended with *correspondent,actual practice*, whenever there is nothing to oppose it....The intellectual nature is its own law. It has, within itself, a spring and guide of action which it cannot suppress or reject." (*ibid.*,II,pp.194-5).

The statement of Price's position calls for a few explanations. Rational intuitionists do not accept that there is any fundamental

difference between moral and mathematical thinking. Price, though he is in sympathy with them, does not go the whole way with them. A rational intuitional like Wollaston, whom Hume mentions and criticises in his Treatise, identified morality and truth. To Price morality is a "species of necessary truth", and hence, practically speaking, 'truth' is of wider extent than 'right'. This difference is partially helpful in alleviating the charge that could be brought against any rational intuitionist, namely, that if moral and mathematical truths were identical in point of necessity, then how is it that we should ever be in doubt about what is right? It is a matter of common experience that we frequently are. But, as we have remarked earlier, this experience of uncertainty regarding casuistry, i.e., what a singular principle of conduct requires one to do in a particular case, does not affect the issue of the self-evidence of moral principles.

I have so far tried to consider the contentions of some of the British moralists concerning the nature and scope of reason vis-a-vis human conduct. I am well aware of the inadequacy of my treatment of such important thinkers as Clarke, Reid and Price, yet a consideration of their views on the practical relevance of reason was needed for my purpose. All the thinkers I have considered claim that reason can be practical in the sense that reason can cause action. A denial of this is intended by Hume. Another point worth noticing is that Clarke, Reid and Price could be called rationalists in the sense that they seem to be committed to a concept of man which is essentially rational, and the rational self of man is autocratic. This spiritual

autocracy, if I might say so, legislates for the rest of human existence. Any passional violation of the rational self's legislation alienates human existence from its essence, and since the rational essence of man is superior to the passional life of man, disobedience on passion's part of the legislations of reason may well be considered as a "fall". Apart from the difference in philosophical anthropology between the so-called rationalists and Hume, there is another aspect of their rationalism. They seem to suggest that actions can be true or false in the sense that actions follow, in the appropriate sense, from truth or self-evident principles as premises. That actions can have truth-value would be rejected by Hume. The essentially theoretical nature of reason, for Hume, precludes it to be connected with actions in such a way that if judgments are conclusions of reason, so could not actions. The rationalists, on the contrary, hold that practical matters are a species of theoretical matters. The notion of self-evidence, further, is not simple notion. If it is a psychological fact, then it can hardly applied to reason. If it is not analyticity, does it mean "infallible"? In that case even, self-evident principles cannot guide our conduct, since, Hume tells us in his Section "Of Scepticism with regard to reason", we may fall into error while applying infallible rules of demonstrative sciences. If by "self-evidence" is meant intuitive, non-rational or even unique, then it would be a different story. But when principles are rational and yet self-evident, what one is to understand? Are they ultimate and underivative, primitive and uninferable as well as synthetic, since they bear on practical matters? Or rather that self-evidence

as a property of propositions? In that case it can fairly be said that self-evident principles cannot have any practical import.

A related account is found in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. To say anything about Aristotle's example of the incontient man is to risk an interpretation. Since Anscombe's interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of the practical syllogism, the problem has been variously stated and argued. Without hazarding any view, Aristotle's problem can, I believe, be put as follows. How from a general principle, a conclusion regarding an action or some sort of judgment which implies a commitment to action can be deduced. Anscombe points out that Aristotle never states the conclusion of a practical syllogism (see her Intentions, p.60). It appears that the conclusion is an action. However, it is clear that Aristotle thinks that acting incontinently is possible. There is nothing, says Aristotle, "to prevent a man's having both premisses (the major premise being a general principle, and the minor a statement of fact) and acting against his knowledge, provided that he is using only the universal premise and not the particular; for it is particular acts that have to be done" (op. cit., 1147a). The particular facts, Aristotle argues, come within the sphere of perception, and, further, that the knowledge the incontinent man possesses is not "scientific" knowledge, since the minor premise is a particular. It is the factual minor premise which is obscured to the agent under a passion, and it the "appetite" which "is contrary, not the opinion — to the right rule" (ibid., 1147b). Aristotle's analogy for an agent's regaining knowledge is getting up from sleep, and this is very apt since in a state of sleep

a man can be said to have "knowledge in a sense and yet not having it" (ibid., 1147a). The importance of the "perceptible object" or, the subject of the minor premise is such that it "determines our action". Now Aristotle's difference from the rationalists is evident, and his affinity to Price is no less clear. The difference lies in the fact that even if a syllogistic analysis of moral judgments be allowed, it is not a full-fledged rational business as the rationalists might suppose. The 'practical' syllogism does not possess the paradigmatic superiority as theoretical syllogism, for which alone the epithet "scientific" is reserved. In a practical syllogistic reasoning the conclusion is contingent and might not have been. There are philosophers who of course think that principles of conduct entail particular commands, and the entailment is rigorous. Practical reasoning is "calculative" and not purely "scientific" in Aristotle's sense of the term. Rational intuitionists of course do not accept this view, and Price, in spite of his admission, on casuistical grounds, that particular principles of conduct require separate treatment, would not agree with Aristotle that reason could be anything short of scientific in morals, because, for Price, it is "founded in truth and reason" (op. cit., p.175).

Finally, a general discontent remains about any form of rational intuitionism, and this is apart from the unsatisfactory account of the logical connexion between moral judgment (or, practical reason) and human action. What does intuition avail in moral matters? A rationalist might answer that by intuition we come to know what is right to do. If, as Price says, "Right and wrong...denote what actions

are" (*ibid.*, II, p. 147) the predicates 'right' and 'wrong' then are *descriptive* terms. To intuit an action as right is to perceive a certain *fact* about the action, namely the action has the property of rightness (it does not matter whether the property is non-natural or natural. Moore's non-natural properties are albeit facts, though, facts of a different kind). To come to know that an action has a certain property is to perceive intuitively that something is the case. And, it would then be a commonplace to point out that how from such a perception an imperative could be derived? The rationalist might like to say that by saying that an action is right he wants to assert that the action concerned is such that it is right to do. But it would be to argue in a circle, a charge that Hume brought against Wollaston. Hume thought that the "whimsical system" of Wollaston was such that "it leaves us under the same difficulty to give a reason why truth is virtuous and falsehood vicious". He observed, "if you please, that all immorality is derived [the] falsehood in action, provided you can give me any plausible reason, why such a falsehood is immoral. If you consider rightly of the matter, you will find yourself in the same difficulty as at the beginning" (*op. cit.*, p. 462 footnote). Needless to say that even Hume's famous declaration that 'ought' cannot be derived from 'is' was formulated in connexion with his critique of rational intuitionists.

We may now turn to a consideration of Hume's concept of reason and its office in moral matter. Hume's explicit pronouncements about reason as a discursive faculty we have already referred to.

We have noticed also that in none of the senses of the term 'reason', i.e., as a body of "demonstrative" or analytic knowledge and as a system of "probable" or synthetic knowledge Hume would accept it as a motive to action. To put Hume's central point in short, the distinction between propositions which have to do with relations of ideas and those which express, or purport to express, matters of fact is clear. The propositions which have to do with relation of ideas constitute the domain of 'reason' as a source of knowledge, or reason in its sheerly analytic, discursive employment. Often, Hume uses the word 'Truth' in order to express the sense of 'reason' as a discursive, analytic body of knowledge also. I have in mind two passages of the Treatise. In one, Hume says, "Truth is of two kinds, consisting either in the discovery of the proportions of ideas, consider'd as such, or in the conformity of our ideas of objects to their real existence" (p.448). In another passage, he tells us that "Reason is the discovery of truth and falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact" (p.458). Truth or reason, when contrasted with passion, is characterized by being "representative". To say that truth or reason, on Hume's account, has a representative quality is to hold that it reveals a relation between itself and reality. That is, reason is not an original fact complete in itself. In asmuch as truth or reason is "a copy of any other existence", its products can be said to be either true or false. Products of reason represent or misrepresent "original existences" in the world of realities. An allied passage occurs in the Enquiry, on

page 35: "All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely, demonstrative reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact and existence". 'Truth' or 'reason' or 'reasoning', as Hume uses them interchangeably, are notions essentially theoretical and a matter of propositions, hence the question of truth-value.

Now my point is that Hume uses the term 'reason' or its cognates in two very different senses, and this fact renders obscure the sense in which reason can be practical. This equivocation is very disquieting indeed. It is difficult to comprehend in what sense reason in the sense of relations of ideas can be "representative". Demonstrative certainty is non-substantive, i.e., "without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe". A proposition from Euclid's geometry or mathematical propositions for that matter, are as non-substantive as the logical principle of _modus ponens_. Neither of them gives us any information about the way things are, and truth of each is obvious. If Hume would accept this, then he did have a notion of analytic reason. This notion of reason cannot of course be practical. But there is another notion of reason, I should like to say, "representative" properly so-called, which is non-analytic. When reason ascertains "the conformity of ideas of objects to their real existence" or we reason concerning matter of fact or existence, what we have is a notion of reason which is substantive. How can the two different senses of the term 'reason', one analytic and the other synthetic, be brought together under one designation? Reason in its synthetic function

does and can have practical import in deciding or choosing means towards achieving our desired ends. This is what I shall be concerned with showing. Sometimes the two passages I have cited above have been interpreted with a view to making a concept of reason pervasive through the theoretical-practical distinction. I believe R. Edgley's attempt has been one in that direction. This leaves, if I am not mistaken, Hume's critique of the rationalists' claim that reason can cause action unappreciated. Kemp Smith remarks that Hume's two notions of reason, analytic and synthetic, are equally "creative". This should not perhaps be true, since reason, when it is analytic, is "inert"; and precisely in taking this stand Hume is rejecting the claim of the rationalists.

Another word, in Hume, for what we call analytic reason, is 'knowledge', and we know how restrictive a use he puts the term into. Our assurance in knowledge is grounded in certain types of relations holding between ideas. Thus narrowly delimited, knowledge properly so-called is mathematical. Whatever falls outside the domain of certain types of relations of ideas or mathematics is not and cannot be any object of knowledge. All apprehension of matters of fact and existence is not knowledge at all. Assurance in this field is of a completely different nature. Hume has put it in clear terms that there is no path by way of <u>knowledge</u> to the world of realities, which concerns man as an active, passional being. Even mathematics gains its human relevance through its applicability to matters of utility. The closing section of Book II of the <u>Treatise</u> puts it in unmistakable words. Speaking of truth consisting in "the discovery of the pro-

portions of ideas, consider'd as such", Hume says that it is "not desir'd merely as truth, and ... 'tis not the justness of our conclusions which alone gives the pleasure....The truth we discover must also be of some importance" (ibid., pp.448-9). All these considerations are I suppose enough to show that Hume's use of general terms like 'reason' or 'knowledge' misguides and obliterates valuable distinctions. His soundly saying that reason does not have practical import is an overstatement. 'Reason' as analytic, just as 'knowledge' as narrowly delimited, has nothing to do with the problems of human actions, their causes and motives. But reason as synthetic, though it yields no knowledge, does and can have an important bearing on practical matters. This reason alone can be creative.

For the moment let us concentrate on the analytic function of 'reason'. It was something like analytic or discursive reason that the rationalists were talking about and held that practical reason was either a "species" (Price) of it or identical with it. Hume's position has been that whatever is non-susceptible of agreement or disagreement in either of the two ways he speaks of (e.g., the passion, the predicates like 'right' etc.) is "incapable of true or false and can never be an object of our reason". Hume brings, we have seen, both demonstrative and non-demonstrative reasonings under one notion; it is unhappy, but we may for the time being put up with it. May be that he is formulating a generalised notion of reason, though it is only in his denial of the view that demonstrative reason functions as a director of the will his anti-rationalistic dialectic primarily

consists. Why demonstrative reasoning cannot be regarded as a spring and the guide of human actions? The answer to this question lies in taking note of the characteristics that reason in its analytic function possesses.

Hume's concept of reason is remarkable or significant from an historical point of view. It must be admitted that there is no universally agreed or uniquely correct sense of the word 'reason', though there is one particular sense of the word in which it is taken to designate a mental faculty or capacity. In this sense reason might be regarded as coordinate with, but distinguishable from passions or will. The issue debated upon by the rationalists and those who do not like to be so denominated is 'what can reason do?' Or in order to make the question look more sensible it could be rephrased as 'what are human beings in a position to do, in virtue of their possession of the faculty of reason?' Or simply, what, by means of reasoning, are we in a position to achieve? Historically reason has been contrasted with various other faculties of man, and it is particularly important to consider with what reason is contrasted. When reason is contrasted with experience, as Hume does, what we can achieve by reason is much narrowly circumscribed. But perhaps there is nothing empirical in this contrast. If it be held that reason is the faculty of grasping necessary connexions and granted that we know what necessary connextions are, one can find Plato arguing that no necessary connexions are to be distinguished in the everyday world. Hume's position, in this respect, is that strictly necessary connexions are to be found only in the formal abstract relations between our

concepts, and hence, by implication, causal relations are not cases of necessary connexions, and, finally, in the field of moral judgment reason is inactive. In a sense, the most significant statement about reason made by Hume is that it is a passive faculty. The view that reason is a passive faculty or principle goes much against the traditional claim held for the office of reason. Neither Greeks nor the latter day rationalists took reason to be a passive principle. The Heraclitean Logos, or the Platonic or the Aristotelean nous as near synonyms of reason are all active principles or potent creative powers. For the Stoics the principle of morality and that of rationality in the universe was Logos. For the Stoics the principle of morality was living in accordance with nature, and as the nature of man was to be rational and indeed nature as a whole was the rational product of Logos, living according to nature could be equated with living according to Logos. Logos was then the source of law and morality. It is no less interesting to note that Hume, in spite of his avowed Stoic sympathies would ascribe passivity to the faculty of reason.

Contrasted as reason is with experience, for Hume, the domain of reason is circumscribed to discovering necessary connexions among our concepts, or to put it differently reason exhausts the relations of ideas or truths that are "discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe". It is evident then that we cannot do or achieve much by reason. Hume's view about the passivity of reason follows from his very concept of it, the way it is contracted and circumscribed. Let us

look at some of his characteristically scandalous statements. Reason, Hume says, is "inactive", "impotent" and its judgments are "calm and indolent" (op.cit.,p.457), it has no "original influence" and as such "incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion" (ibid.,pp.414-15). What does Hume mean by saying that reason is impotent or a passive principle? Or, what does the passivity of reason consist in? Obviously, in its incapacity in producing any emotional state of mind: "Reason ...exerts itself without producing any sensible emotion" (ibid., p.417). It is worth noticing that Hume does not deny that reason is a self-exerting principle, but what he is insisting on is the fact that to be self-exerting is not necessarily to be able to produce any emotion, because no impulse arises from its exertion. When Hume says that reason of itself "can never produce any action, or give rise to volition" (ibid.,p.414) he can be said to put reason on an opposite footing of the causes of direct passions, namely the goods and the evils of life, because, he says that our "desire or volition" arises from our considering the pleasures and the pains. However insufficient Hume's views on this issue are owing to the scanty remarks that he has made (see the Treatise, pp.438-439) this much could be asserted with certainty that the will occupies a place logically posterior to the direct passions. The question of willing comes only if there could be desire or aversion. We resort to acting only in order to secure objects of desire or avoid pain. The logical priority of desire and aversion, or for that matter, the whole class of direct passions over the will relegates reason to the

role of an ineffectual angel. In an early part of the Book I of the Treatise Hume says, "that two objects are connected by the relation of cause and effect, when the one produces a motion or any action in the other, but also when it has a power of producing it" (p.12). The statement is significant, because reason could be said to produce any motion in the will only if it were conceived as inducing us to will any action. But according to Hume's scheme no causal relation can be instituted between reasoning and willing, since we will not because we reason, but because we experience direct passions. The will is only a part of the complex determining antecedents of our emotional life from which actions are derived. And since the will appears to be the last item in the set of antecedents, Hume often says that the will is the cause of actions (see Treatise, pages 439 and 400 for Hume's statements about the will). The motives "influencing the will", in a Humean manner of speaking, are our experiences of the passions, either direct or indirect.

Reason is incapable in a two-fold way, it can neither give rise to any volition, i.e., "impotent", and secondly, nor can it prevent volition. The first of the alternatives we have clarified, but what is it like preventing a volition? It may be noted that Hume does not much distinguish between preventing a volition and preventing a passion. In a passage on page 415, he speaks about "preventing volition", "retard[ing] the impulse of passion" or opposing a passion etc., much in the same sense, though there should have been a subtler difference between "impulses" and "passions". However, let us see what is it to "oppose" or retarding a volition or passion. In con-

nexion with his discussion about the object and the cause of the passions of love and hatred Hume has observed that they are "contrary" to each other. Now passions can be "contrary" to each other only in a weak sense of the term. It could not be Hume's intention to assert a logical relation between the passions. The notion of contrariety if applicable to the phenomena of the passions must be otherwise understood. We could recall Hume's division of the indirect passions in accordance with their intensity into calm and violent ones. To divide the passion in accordance with their intensity is to divide them by their strong and weak sensations, or by the hedonic quality of the sensations of the passions. Love and hatred are "directly contrary in their sensation" (ibid.,p.330) in asmuch as "the sensation of the former passion is always agreeable, and of the latter uneasy" (ibid.,p.331). Here we get a notion of contrary passions, which may have the same object in common, i.e., "some sensible being external to us", as Hume says, and yet differ in their hedonic quality. In one sense contrary passions are those which differ in their sensations or hedonic qualities. There may be another sense in which passions could be said to be contraries. The passions may be so related that "one passion upon its appearance destroys the other, and they do not both of them exist at once" (ibid.,p.344). In this case, Hume tells us, the degree or the intensity of the passions "depends upon the nature of its object" (ibid.). To generalise the point, the passions can be contrary to one another either according to their sensations or hedonic qualities of agreeableness or uneasiness, or the nature of their objects.

But there may be a third possibility. It is possible to produce a contrary passion by intensifying the sensation, without changing the object. Hume uses this possibility in connexion with his view that an impression of a particular hedonic quality would produce to "contrary" passions according to its intensity. "The same object causes contrary passions according to its different degrees", and he illustrates the point in the following way: "the passion of love or hatred depends upon the same principle. A strong impression, when communicated, gives a double tendency of the passions; which is related to benevolence and love by a similarity of direction; however painful the first impression might have been. A weak impression, that is painful, is related to anger and hatred by the resemblance of sensations". (ibid., p.387) Now, having distinguished the possible senses in which the passions can be said to contrary to one another, namely, differing in hedonic quality or intensity, we may say that in order to retard a passion all that we are required is to produce a passion of different hedonic quality or intensity. And if this way of understanding the phenomenon of preventing or retarding passions be found unobjectionable, it must then needs be said that Hume's charge that reason cannot do it is somewhat trivial. Because the function of reason is so conceived by Hume that it is a tautology to say that reason being non-impressionistic in nature has nothing to do matters of impressions. It is something like giving a dog a bad name before hanging it. If 'reason' could have been otherwise conceived, it could have performed the functions that it is allegedly incapable of doing. For example, the Kantian

notion of 'practical reason'. Kant thinks that the moral law can be demonstrated *a priori*, because the will is rational and self-legislating as well. I do not for the present wish to defend any such position than suggesting that Hume's ascription of passivity to reason can hardly be looked upon as an adequate reply to all rationalists. 'Reason' has been conceived by Hume in so purely "speculative" (*ibid.*,p.457) a manner that it can scarcely be expected to achieve anything 'practical' or "to influence our passions and actions" (*ibid.*). The dichotomy between *speculative* and *practical* is so complete and mutually exclusive that to say "reason is not practical" is to imply tautologously that 'reason is speculative'.

But this trivilization may be one of Hume's strongest points as well. His whole argument is conducted in so rigorous fashion, that once it is acceded to that the office of reason lies in pure and simple discovery of relations among our concepts, everything appears to follow of necessity. Herein lies the methodological value of the trivilization. Now granted that reason is a passive principle which way shall we turn for the active one? And the answer to this question will take us to his concept of morality.

Morality is 'practical' in the sense that "Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions" (*ibid.*,p.457). It is, as Hume says, an "active principle". The notion of 'morals' as an active principle is nothing novel in the history of philosophy. Aristotle laid it down that the concept of the 'practical' is "concerned with any coming into being" (*op.cit.*,1140b). Though Hume does not distinguish, in the manner of Aristotle, between art or production, mani-

fested in *making* something distinct from the act of production and *doing* something in which the end is no other than the act itself, yet Hume shares a large part of Aristotle's notion of the word 'practical'. One can say that it is a revival of Aristotelian ways of thinking against Platonism, for Descartes and some of the ethical intuitionists are more Platonist than Aristotelian. I would not like to insist on the similarities beyond a point, since differences between the two thinkers is as great as their affinities; on the contrary, I would content myself by pointing out that Hume is Aristotlean inasmuch as he admits and defends the separation of the domains of the speculative and the practical. Both of them protest against rationalising moral matters, though how far did they succeed is, of course, another matter. I believe following remarks of Aristotle would have been endorsed by Hume that "matters concerned conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health. The general account being of this nature, the account of particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness; for they do not fall under any art or precept, but the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or of navigation" (*op. cit.*, 1103b). The decisional character of morality and the criterion of the 'practical' as that which influences conduct was emphasized by one of Hume's predecessors, Francis Hutcheson. According to Hutcheson motives of human actions are to be found in the passions and affections, from which the actions 'flow'. "Election", as he put it, i.e., "purposing to do an action" or "exciting to action"

(*op.cit.*, I, pages 305 and 306) is different from 'reason', that is, "our *power of finding out true propositions*" (*ibid.*, p.307). Or in other words, the question 'what is the case?' is non-identical with the question 'what to do?' The primacy of feelings in morality is such that without presupposing the "*instincts* and *affections*" we can not even talk about "*exciting reasons*". The conclusion that "there can...be no *exciting reason* previous to *affection*" (*ibid.*, p.309) is reached by Hutcheson in course of his analysing the notion of conformity of actions to reason as a standard of evaluation. "Reasonableness in an action", Hutcheson held, is a common but "very confused" expression, and could not be supposed "the motive to *election*" (*ibid.*, p.307). There is much in common between Hutcheson and Hume, for instance, that moral evaluation proceeds from a specific faculty or moral sense, without which "no explication can be given of our *ideas* of *morality*" (*ibid.*, p.318), that reason has a corrective role to play in our moral life, etc., and yet there are differences, which must not be overlooked. In particular, Hume appears more radical in his treatment of the question of allowing reason any determining influence in moral life than Hutcheson. For Hume, and as it has been for Hutcheson, moral evaluations are not cognitive assertions. But apart from the non-propositional nature of moral evaluations, the question whether reason can be a motive for actions is not as sharply debated by Hutcheson as it is by Hume. There is a difference between the two questions. Whether reason could be a motive for acting in certain ways, or whether reason can direct the will, is a question that can be asked from the agent's point of view. The question whether

reason can cause actions need not be strictly the agent's prerogative to consider. It can as well be considered from a general point of view. But when I say that the question is significant from the agent's point of view, I mean that since it is he who experiences the conflict between reason and passion, his way of resolving it should assume a significance not otherwise possible. Whether the conflict is real is another issue, just as saying that the conflict is not between reason in the demonstrative sense and the passion, rather between reason as calm passions and the violent ones. On the other hand, whether moral evaluations are conclusions of reason is a question peculiar to the spectator's point of view. In Hume these two questions are carefully differentiated and considered separately. That passions are active principles is conceived both by Hutcheson and Hume. Whether "reasonableness in an action" is to be supposed as "the motive to <u>election</u>, or the quality determining <u>approbation</u>" (<u>ibid.</u>,p.307) are two different issues which Hutcheson does not appear to be much aware of, though both he and Hume develop their positions in course of their criticism of the views of such philosophers as Samuel Clarke and Wollaston.

The juxtaposition of two unrelated faculties, that of reason and passions, one passive and the other active, leads Hume to assert his first thesis that the supposed conflict between them is due to a confusion. The confusion is two-fold. In the first place, it is a case of confusing reason as a faculty of demonstrative knowledge with a whole body of non-representative, "original", or "modi-

fication of existence" (op.cit.,p.415), and secondly, with a reason-like disposition called the calm passions. The latter instance of confusion has important consequences, namely, that of confounding reason proper as an active principle. The traditional image of reason, is marked by "calmness and tranquillity" (ibid.,p.417), and, therefore, whatever is calm and tranquil is mistaken for rational. Such judgment from "the first view and appearance" (ibid.) has been responsible for confounding the calm passions with reason.

Let us have a look at Hume's doctrine of the calm passions. Hume's division of the passions into calm and violent is in accordance with their intensity and cuts across his division of the passions into direct and indirect, which is proposed according to their origin. Now he has remarked that the division of the passions into calm and violent ones is "vulgar and specious" (ibid.,p.276); and since the division has been intended to group the passions by their intensity, no prescriptions are then made in regard to preferring the calm passions to the violent ones. On the contrary, admitting the fact that the calm passions "often determine the will", Hume reminds us that "there are certain violent emotions...which have likewise a great influence on that faculty [the will]" (ibid.,pp.417-18). Again, the division between the calm and violent passions is not anything final, because calmness or violence of passions depends on the "object" of the passions. We have already taken note of Hume's view in this regard. Mention may be made of Hume's principle that he enunciates in connexion with his view of comparison, namely, "Every object is attended with some emotion proportion'd to it", and the fact that

"comparison may change the emotion without changing any thing in the object" (*ibid.*, p.374). It follows then that the intensity of passions is variable, and that a violent passion can become calm and *vice versa*. This is quite consistent with Hume's causal explanation of the passions. Another important fact to be borne in the mind is that Hume does not uphold any special doctrine of the calm passions as some of his commentators appear to have supposed. R.Kydd seems to argue that Hume's has a special doctrine of calm passions, and that the calm passions are rational in their import and operations. But she, arbitrarily enough, picks up instances of Hume's ambivalent use of the word 'reason' and bases her interpretation on a few notoriously ambiguous statements. What is more provocative is her thesis that determination by calm passions is identical with a kind of rational determination. What is more, she overlooks the fact that since calmness or violence of passions is variable intensities that could be causally initiated. "The same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one" (*ibid.*, p.419). And so far as the passions are the springs of action, a violent passion may be at times preferred to a calm one. "When we wou'd govern a man and push him to any action, 'twill commonly be better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passions" (*ibid.*). Kydd has argued that the calm passions are to be specially recommended since this set of passions is geared to our view of the good and consequently "determined by judgment" (*op.cit.*, p.150). But there is not much evidence in Hume that supports this contention. On the other hand, Hume says clearly that "Both these

kinds of passions pursue good, and avoid evil" (ibid.). There are also the "circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent" (ibid.) together with the effects of custom and imagination.[1] In the light of these considerations it cannot then be said that the calm passions are the only motives to action, and far less that they are rational.

The calm passions are "vulgarly call'd" (ibid.,p.419) reason. But why are they so confounded? We have already had Hume's answer, and now propose to look into the matter a little more closely. Hume speaks of "certain calm desires and tendencies" like benevolence and the love of life etc., and "the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil consider'd merely as such" (ibid.,p.417. Compare also his remarks about the direct passions such as desire and aversion on page 439) that "produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation" (ibid.). Two points that Hume makes in the passage are important. That these passions are primarily conative, and hence they lead us to actions. Owing to their characteristically low intensity our experience of them is not so keenly felt as the ends towards which they are directed. For example, benevolence is more apparent in the appropriate acts born out of one's interest in the beloved or the sympathised person's fate than in the original delight felt by the sympathising agent. To put it in other words, a conative passion can be identified by the actions it leads to, and not by the

1. Sections IV, V and VI of Part III of Book II of the Treatise are especially relevant in this context.

immediate experience of certain self-certifying passion like, say, pride or humility. There are good reasons to believe that even these passions are not as complete in themselves as they appear or Hume supposes them to be. I have argued this point earlier and I need not repeat it here. But there certainly can a distinction be made between more and less dispositional passions. The more dispositional a passion is, the less agitation it produces in the mind. And if this hypothesis be found unobjectionable, it could then be said that a conative passion is identifiable more in terms of the special feelings it evokes than by its intensity. Secondly, the characteristic low intensity of the conative passions is no guarantee that they might not be violent should the conditions change. It is the shift in the identity criterion of the conative passions that is responsible for their being mistaken for "determinations of reason". When the conative passions are calm they are mistaken for reason owing to similar sensations, i.e., calmness. But passions cannot be reason at the time when they are calm, and non-rational when they are violent, since it would be odd to suggest something like that. Passions and reason are diverse categories, and to take the one for the other is to commit a category mistake. To say that <u>x</u> is a passion and that it is calm does not entail that <u>x</u> is a "determination of reason", because rational determination forms no part of a passion's being designated or identified as 'calm'.

There are two senses of the words 'reason' or 'truth' that could be found in Hume's writings. In the strong sense the word, 'reason' means demonstrative reasoning and secondarily, probable

knowledge about matters of fact. But in the weak sense of the term, 'reason' is often explained as terms of feelings, or other sensible operations of the mind like imagination, belief etc. In a passage in Book I Hume speaks of reason as "a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls" (*ibid.*, p.179). When Hume exhorts us to follow our "taste and sentiment" "not solely in poetry and music" "but likewise in philosophy" it becomes clear in a flash that 'philosophy' in the sense of serious thought about matters of fact, or for that matter "probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation" (*ibid.*, p.103). Hume's view that "all reasonings are nothing but the effects of custom" (*ibid.*, p.149) is an evidence of the weak sense of the word 'reason', corresponding to the "world of realities" as opposed to the "world of ideas", which is the province of demonstration. The two classes of realities, one the object of the memory and the senses, the other of the judgment correlate to the weak and the strong senses of the word 'reason'. Hume does not always keep the two senses of 'reason' apart, and this has led many of his commentators to suppose that when he is speaking of 'reason' in its weaker employment he must be talking about 'reason' in the strong sense of *a priori* deliberations of the understanding.

Hume's juxtaposing reason (in the strong sense, of course) and passion is achieved by designating the two faculties as inactive and active principles respectively. The active, though calm principles of actions or passions are related to such a family of expressions as "morality", "sense of morals" and "taste" or "sentiment". The non-reductivist dualism of reason and passion is renamed as the dualism

of sentiment and reason. Truths that can be demonstrated, are distinct and not reducible to even "belief" in "matters of fact and existence". If the two operations of the understanding are irreducible to one another, how much unrelated must be reason in the strong sense and the phenomena of the passions. The autonomy of morals may be, for Hume, a consequence of the irreducible distinctness of the domain of the passions from that of reason. By autonomy of ethics I understand the point of view that moral evaluations are grounded on the passional nature of man and are quite a distinct phenomena of human nature and as such must be understood in their own right and never be reduced to become affairs of reason and knowledge in the strong senses of the words. Hume's anti-rationalist dialectic is to a greater extent directed towards establishing some such point of view. If morality is not demonstrable it can be shown that there is a real and necessary distinction between reason on the one hand and passion and value on the other. In the Book I Hume does not exclude the phenomena of morals from the limits of human understanding, though certainly beyond the scope of reason. He refers to "those immense depths of philosophy" (ibid., p.263), i.e., the domains of the passions and morals only after a sceptical exposure of the powers and limits of reason. That the passions are mathematically unamenable[1] is a conclusion that reinforces the view that reason and morals are distinct spheres of human nature. After having spoken of the

1. Hume discusses the possibility of conceiving the passions and their relation to one another after mathematical models, especially those of geometry in Part IV, Section V of the Book I of the *Treatise*. See pages 234 to 239. He finds all such attempts 'ridiculous'.

rules by which to judge causal phenomena and of any unavailable *a priori* or rational security, Hume remarks, "If this be the case even in natural philosophy, how much more in moral, where there is a much greater complication of circumstances, and where those views and sentiments, which are essential to any action of the mind, are so implicit and obscure, that they often escape our strictest attention, and are not only unaccountable in their causes, but even unknown in their existence?" (*ibid.*, p.175). This passage appears as if it were a prolegomenon to Hume's view that reason can never be a motive to the will. The careful distinction that Hume makes between the "decisions of morality" and "conclusions" of the understanding is an outcome of his scepticism concerning the power and office of reason. This distinction between reason and taste, says Kemp Smith, is done "for the first time in history" (*op.cit.*,p.199). And one of the consequences of the precise distinction is that in the moral sphere, taste is autonomous.

The said autonomy is based on a rejection of the view that reason can determine the will. Let us look at Hume's conclusions to this effect. He observes that the two faculties, reason and passions do not conflict. "We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason" (*op.cit.*,p.415). The statement is not as self-explanatory as it stands, because the word "combat" is ambiguous. Is it used in the logical sense of 'opposition'? Propositions are said to be 'contrary' or 'contradictory' to one another. Obviously such a relationship cannot be thought to exist between two faculties, those of reason and the passions. Two

classes are also sometimes spoken of as standing in relation of complements of each other. It is not certain whether reason and the passions could be interpreted as two classes with no common membership or any over-lapping area. Hume's remark to the effect that the passions cannot be interpreted according to models prohibits such a possibility, though 'reason' can perhaps be interpreted as a class of a priori propositions. It is possible, then, that Hume may have been speaking of 'combat' in a psychological sense. This seems to be a plausible view, since it is more understandable to say that one is suffering from psychological conflicts than saying that one is experiencing a conflict between reason and his passions. Psychological conflicts are of everyday occurrence, unless one is a Quixotic type of a person. What we call being in a state of indecision may be taken as an instance of a psychological conflict. Hamlet's utterance "to be or not to be" is an expression of psychological conflict, and no one would perhaps suggest that the Prince of Denmark was experiencing a conflict between reason as a faculty of demonstrative knowledge and his immediate suicidal impulses. On the contrary, it sounds sensible to say that Hamlet, to put the matter in Hume's terminology, was suffering from the original instinct of love of life and a suicidal impulse. There seems to be good reasons to suppose that in denying any conflict between reason and the passions Hume is simply trying to point out that in cases of psychological conflicts we have nothing to do with reason, properly so-called. His examples may help us elucidate the point further. When Hume writes, "'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole

world to the scratching of my finger" or, "to prefer...my own acknowledg'd lesser good to my greater and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter," etc. (ibid., p.416) he is in fact illustrating what we ordinarily call psychological conflicts, which Hume proposes to explain in terms of his distinction between calm and violent passions. Hume's intention in denying that there cannot be any combat or conflict between reason and the passions may be stated as follows. It is worth asking what we as human beings can do, and also just what we cannot do, in virtue of our capacity for abstract reasoning. We can establish logically necessary truths, or deduce and demonstrate. The products of reason, in the strict sense, are the propositions of mathematics. But there are many other qualities like controlling irritation, or saying 'no' to an impulse, that are loosely described as rational. But Hume would say that none of these is an operation of pure reason. In problems of human action, reason is, by constitution, causally inert. The control of passion by reason is often spoken of by the moralists. Reason is also considered as the source of moral rules. Such ascriptions to reason are highly inappropriate. Saying 'no' to an impulse or curbing an irritation is certainly possible, but certainly not in terms of the inert thought of some premises and conclusions. A countervailing passion, like self-interest or shame comes to our aid. Such passions may resemble reason in being unperturbing or, as Hume says 'calm', but they differ from it in being dynamic.

Kemp Smith has made a significant observation which brings out how the calm passions determine the will, and in this capacity often

mistaken for rational operations. Besides reason, "properly so-called" there is, says Kemp Smith, "a faculty supposed to be capable of determining moral distinctions and of justifying beliefs in regard to matters of fact and existence. This so-called 'reason' ... is merely a misnomer for instinctively determined sentiments and beliefs" (<u>op.cit.</u>, p.288). There is no reason to doubt Kemp Smith's statement as a viable interpretative report of Hume's position; and if that be so, then the calm passions are "so-called 'reason'". Any conflict with this so-called reason and the passions are on an unsophisticated view appears as a conflict of reason properly so-called and the passions. That there are similarities of sensation between the so-called 'reason' and the reason properly so-called has already been pointed out. Now we may turn to Hume's account of the determining role of the calm passions in the context of the will.

In connexion with the effects of custom on the passions Hume notes two phenomena, a <u>facility</u> and an <u>inclination</u>. Any passion as such puts the spirits in agitation, whether it is agreeable or disagreeable. But a repeated experience of a passion or a set of passions loses its initial shock, "the novelty wears off, the passions subside; the hurry of the spirits is over; and we survey the objects [of the passions] with greater tranquillity" (<u>op.cit.</u>,p.423). And if it is way the calm passions originate, then they are what Wordsworth would have called "emotions recollected in tranquillity". The experience of calm passions imply a state of mind where there is no "morbid passions, no disquietude" (quoted by Basil Willey in his The Eighteenth Century Background, Pelican, 1972, p. 242). It

is not 'morbid' because Hume explains that the habitually experienced passions, if they are not disagreeable ones, produces a tendency or inclination towards the object of the passions.[1] The facility of the calm passions is an important point. He writes that the "pleasure of facility does not so much consist in any ferment of the spirits, as in their orderly motion" (ibid., p.423, italics not in the text). And it is the "orderly motion" of the calm passions that lends it a reason-like dispositional quality, an activity, sometimes "so powerful as even to convert pain into pleasure, and give us a relish in time for what at first was most harsh and disagreeable" (ibid). Hume is in fact contrasting the dispositions mollowed by custom and those that "arise from novelty". The former are the calm passions, having lost their intensity owing to repeated experience, while the latter ones are violent. We can now better appreciate Hume's remark that the calm passions are able to determine the will in sofar as they become "a settled principle of action" or "the predominant inclination of the soul" (ibid.,p.419). Hume's notion of the "strength of mind" also is based upon his idea that the calm passions can become settled principles of action."What we call strength of mind implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent" (ibid., p.418). Which passions, the calm or the violent ones, would prevail in the mind of an agent in a given situation is a question that cannot be settled a priori. It could be answered only according to, Hume says, "the general character or present disposition

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1. Hume writes, "One can consider the clouds, and heavens, and trees, and stones, however frequently repeated, without ever feeling any aversion". Treatise, p.423. See also page 424.

of the person" (*ibid.*). Even our notion of duty could be construed as a considered opinion about the objects of the calm passions. Hence the conflict of reason so-called and the passions is actually "an opposition of passions" (*ibid.*, p.421), calm and violent ones.

In order to round off Hume's notion of the calm passions as "reason so-called" a few points that emerge need be stated. That the distinction between the calm and the violent passions may not be as "vulgar", i.e., popular as Hume suggests. The passions that are calm are quite a sophisticated lot of emotions. A passion may be calm on two counts, one according to the nature of the object such that it fails to evoke sufficiently vivacious impressions or agitate the mind in a considerable degree of intensity. Again, a passion may be calm as a result of custom, its intensity is worn out so as to allow an undispassioned view of its objects in a given situation, and determine our will since it has by now become a settled principle of action. It is the latter view of calmness of passions that is particularly germane to Hume in connexion with the alleged conflict of reason and passion. This point can be further illustrated. In Aristotle's practical syllogism, the inference, an action or an action-implying phrase, depends on the conjunction of a general proposition and a factual minor premise. The major premise may be a value judgment of universal import. But crucial role is played by the factual minor premise, which states whether a particular object does have or not the specific property. The conjunction of the two premises constitute what may be called the principle of decision. In cases of incontinence the content of the factual minor premise,

i.e., whether an object a has the property P, is obscured as the agent comes under the impulse of his immediate impressions, and he fails to take an objective view of the situation. Aristotle states the conditions which may obscure our vision with regard to qualities of an object: "the influence of passions; for outbursts of anger and sexual appetites and some other such passions, it is evident actually alter our bodily condition, and in some men even produce fits of madness" (op.cit., 1147a). What Aristotle appears to make the case is that which Hume works out as the state of being under the sway of violent passions. The merit of the calm passions is that they generate a state of mind which enables the agent to consider the objects of desire with tranquillity and unhurried emotion. It may also be noted that, for both Aristotle and Hume, in order to be virtuous it is necessary to do certain things, but above all it is necessary to do them in certain state of mind. For Hume, the virtuous state of mind, we could say, is habitual, i.e., one in which the passions that prevail are calm.

What makes the calm passions reason-like is its "orderly motion" or tranquillity. But if one is not to judge things from their "first view and appearance", the calm passions are never reason properly so-called. Kydd has taken the calm passions as the rational determinants of conduct on the ground that their operations are determined by a "distant view or reflection" or according to the "real and intrinsic value" of an object. But given Hume's too narrow view of reason proper and the notion of the calm passion as explicated above, it could hardly be asserted, as she does, that a

passion, whereby we give preference to what is in itself preferable or in conformity with the real value of an object is rational in nature. If I understand Kydd's argument aright, it appears that her conclusions are largely unwarranted. She has argued that to be determined by a calm passion is to be determined according to the real and intrinsic value of an object or by a distant view or reflection is identical with rational determination. Such determinations are, it is true, determinations by judgment. But it is hardly true, for Hume, that to be determined by judgment is equivalent to being rationally determined. "Rational determination" is a strong expression, and its instances are to be found in logical entailments, and such relations can hardly be said to hold, for Hume again, in the moral sphere. Hume has a two-fold view of judgment. One view, the logical one, occurs in a footnote on page 96 of the Treatise, where he takes it in the sense of "the separating or uniting of different ideas by the interposition of others, which show the relation they bear to each other"(italics ours). Obviously, Hume has 'analyticity' in his mind in the passage cited. The other sense of 'judgment' is an expression of belief, a perception, the content of which is a "system of realities" (see pages 456 and 108 of the Treatise). The second view of 'judgment' does not rule out the possibility of holding counterfeit beliefs, and in that case determination by such judgments can scarcely be called rational determination. Granted that a judgment expresses a genuine belief, even then it will be a case of determination by "empirical reason" (Kydd's phrase, op.cit.,p.99) and not one of rational determina-

tion, in the strong sense. Hume has no quarrel with the rationalist on this issue. But the question that is important is whether Kydd's interpretation of calm passions as rational determinants of conduct solves any problem, either for the rationalists or for Hume. The question had troubled Hume, and besides his remarks in the Treatise, he makes his clearest statement in the second Enquiry: "Our affections, on a general prospect of their objects, form certain rules of conduct, and certain measures of preference of one above another: and these decisions, though really the result of our calm passions and propensities are yet said, by a natural abuse of terms, to be the determinations of pure reason and reflection" (p.239, italics in the text). From the nature of the case calm passions may involve thought and the calculation of causes and effects, but this fact does not, in Hume's scheme, warrant the assertion that determination by calm passions is rational determination. Thomas Reid, in explicit opposition to Hume, maintained that the principle involved in acting in pursuance of what is good for the agent on the whole is a rational principle. He criticised Hume for abusing language by incorporating a rational principle under the category of passions. He was obviously referring to the calm passions. He argued that 'reason' is a correct, and 'calm passion' an incorrect, way of referring to a general determination to pursue what we know to be in our own interest, because the very existence of a general idea of what is good for me requires the exercise of reason and intelligence. It seems that Kydd has been working under an influence of Reid. This may not be an idle supposition.

What happens then to such locutions as 'reasonable or unreasonable actions'? Hume admits that actions can be "design'd and premeditated" (op.cit.,p.411), or for that matter, intentional actions presuppose certain beliefs on the part of the agent, and these beliefs or judgments accompany the passions that motivate him. Such beliefs or judgments are also called "opinion" (ibid.,p.409). But it should never be supposed that these judgments determine the will, they simply "accompany" (ibid.,p.416) the passions, which are the impulses to the will. Why should they accompany the passions at all? And Hume's answer appears somewhat as the following. When we are motivated by desire with regard to the ends of human life, we also look for the right means for attaining the ends. Desire and aversion do not rest at "the prospect of pain orpleasure from any object", says Hume, but in each case makes "us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect" (ibid.,p.414).[1] Motives are accompanied by causal judgments about ends and means. But in giving this account Hume is careful to note that the causal reasoning employed in the search for means cannot be taken as the motive, because, he says, "the impulse arises not from 'reason', but is only directed by it" (ibid.). What he means is that the reason-

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1. Discovery of causal relationship between the desired end and the means for its attainment is a contribution of 'reason', and accordingly human actions get a direction. Apprehension of causal relationship between our ends and means need not be two distinct moments of our practical life, as Hume's language might taken to suggest. Rather, he tells us that "reason is nothing but the discovery of this [causal] connexion."

ing could not have been employed had we not already desired the end. The role of 'reason' in this case consists in making a "discovery" or in other words, in deliberating upon the courses of action or the right means for the attainment of the desired end, we come to form an opinion or a judgment of causal nature. But the discovery is simply a directive factor in bringing about the action. But the impulse or the desire for the end is logically prior to the discovering function of causal reasoning involved. Our actions or modus operandi of our attainment of ends might vary according to the discovery we make. A means that appeared suitable may be rejected after deliberation, but this does not entitle us to say that discovery made by causal deliberations is the motive of the action, or that it determines the will. The position so far seems quite straight forward. But there is one point that I would like to make before I pass on to other considerations about the relationship between judgments and action. Earlier I have remarked that Hume's inclusion of the non-demonstrative causal reasoning to the concept of reason was unsatisfactory. My chief reason for making the remark is that, for Hume, judgments of demonstration and those of probability are so sharply differentiated that to say that "the understanding exerts itself after two different ways and it judges from demonstration or probability" (ibid., p.413) is to flatten down the sophisticated difference between analytic and synthetic propositions. And it is all too important a distinction to be summarily grouped together. Two consequences follow from this grouping. (a) It might lead one to suppose that Hume, like Aristotle, considers synthetic (non-

demonstrative causal) reasoning to be a part of reason properly so-called or demonstrative reasoning. Aristotle's idea of practical wisdom is what I am referring to. He says, after distinguishing scientific and calculative intellect, that the latter "is one part of the faculty which grasps a rational principle" (op.cit.,1139b). And this is virtually to suffer a defeat at the hands of Socratic intellectualism. For Hume, if his grouping together of demonstration and probability is taken to suggest a similar view, it will amount to a betrayal of a revolution. Does not Hume say that he is out to rescue moral philosophy from the subversive doctrines of the rationalists? He compares his task to that of Copernicus on page 282 Causal reasoning is not, Hume has shown, an operation of tracing logical implications. But to allow to use expressions like 'reasoning' or 'reason' in a loose manner for what is denied to be reasoning or reason in their strict sense would be to encourage unwelcome ambiguity or equivocation. (b) There is another reason for my dissatisfaction. The two operations of the understanding are differently related to actions. I should say that demonstrative reasoning has practical application, as arithmetic has in accountancy, but the directive force of arithmetical conclusions depends on assisting us in making causal judgments. In engineering we use calculations to help us discover how to achieve certain ends, such as the rigidity of structures needed in the building of a bridge. In applied mathematics we use our calculations to some purpose or designed end. Just because we are interested in the ends themselves that discovery of causal connexions about them can affect our conduct. In non-demons-

trative reasoning the relation between discovery of means and actions is closer than in the case of mathematical applications. In the latter we _interpret_ the _variables_ and _connectives_ as if mapping a practical situation, whereas in causal reasoning we are concerned with the _individuals_, i.e., the various possible means to an end. Reasoning in mathematics is constructing ideal models with uninterpreted variables, but in causal thought we are from the very beginning concerned with objects. It is essentially practical, which mathematical or abstract, demonstrative reasoning is not. This basic difference is much obscured by Hume's manner of speaking. May be that in both cases causal connexions are discovered in our own interest, yet there is a difference. Mathematical connexions may be causally interpreted, the non-demonstratively discovered ones are as such causal. Perhaps Hume, misleadingly enough, suggests that it is proper to talk of a faculty of understanding that has different operations. This is what Aristotle does; and is there any reason to believe that it could as well be Hume's intention? Or, does he intend to put forward a generalized meaning of 'reason'? In that case trenchancy of his arguments against the rationalists would be considerably lost. Again, causal reasoning has, for Hume, an alternative status; it is removed from the class of things decidable by demonstrative reasoning. When we are concerned with matters of fact, we do have to reflect on general rules, but such reflecting is not the type of reasoning we engage in mathematics. Ascription of alternative status to causal 'reasoning' hardly squares with the suggestion of

subsuming demonstrative and non-demonstrative operations of thought as operations of one faculty. I do not say that it is altogether impossible, rather that it is difficult in view of the consequences that would follow.

Discovery of relations is regarded by Hume to be the function of all reasoning. This might be regarded as the generalised meaning of 'reason', the discovery of causation albeit its special work. Apart from this, what other ground could be there for assimilating non-demonstrative 'reasoning' to reason? Rational operations are characteristically calm; and usually whatever has this quality is reason-like, e.g., the calm passions. Now if the operations of non-demonstrative 'reasoning' can be shown to be similarly characterised by reason-like calmness as those of the calm passions, it may then be possible to say that the former is 'rational' in that special sense of the word. It can plausibly be suggested that Hume does something similar. What he has said about reason-like activities of calm passions is transferred on to the functions of causal reasoning. The viability of my suggestion will be evident if we compare the following passages. Speaking about causal or non-demonstrative reasoning in the domain of passions Hume writes, " 'Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object: And these emotions extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience" (<u>op.cit.</u>, p.414). And now let us look at his definition of 'reason' as calm passions. "By <u>reason</u> we mean affections of the very same kind with the

former [violent ones] ; but such as operate more calmly, and cause no disorder in the temper: Which tranquillity leads us into a mistake concerning them, and causes us to regard them as conclusions only of our intellectual faculties.....'tis often found, that the calm ones, when corroborated by reflection, and seconded by resolution, are able to controul them in their most furious movements" (*ibid.*, pp. 437-38). If we recall also the fact that in causal reasoning the principle of custom has an important role to play, we are left in no wonder to think whether there is a difference between the judgments of causal reasoning and the judgments of the calm passions, and neither of these two is properly speaking an "intellectual" faculty. It might be argued against our suggestion that probable reasoning is *directive* and not *determining* as the calm passions in respect of the will. But it may be pointed out that the calm passions in their reason-like function determine the will only when they prevails over the violent passions, otherwise they can have only a directive role to play.

To come back to the problem of judgments and actions. The judgments that accompany desire, when it exerts itself in action, may be either true or false, and since these judgments are causal, i.e., concerning matters of fact and existence, mistakes in making judgments concerning means would be factual. Hume uses the phrase "a mistake of fact" (*ibid.*, p.460) in this context. Judgments, whether causal or analytic, have to do with "agreement or disagreement" of either relations of ideas or real existence. The terms 'true' and 'false' are truth values of judgments according to

their agreement or disagreement to "real relations of ideas" or "real existence" (ibid., p. 458). Further, the passions are not susceptible of judgmental relations like agreement or disagreement, owing to their non-representative character. Since the passions, says Hume, are "original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions and actions" (ibid.), they cannot be said to either true or false. We find, then, truth or falsity of whatever sort, logical or factual are properties of judgments that accompany passions, and it is by an extension of the property of accompanying judgments that passions can be said to be either true or false. Hume sounds quite definitive on this point. He writes, "as nothing can be contrary to truth or reason, except what has a reference to it, and as the judgments of our understanding only have this reference, it must follow, that passions can be contrary to reason only so far they are accompany'd with some judgment or opinion".(ibid.,pp. 415-16) He produces an analogous deductive argument for the sense in which passions can be called reasonable or non reasonable. Judgments which direct our choice of means, if they are factually erroneous, frustrates the goal-oriented pursuits. That is, "a passion must be accompany'd with some false judgment, in order to its being unreasonable" (ibid.,p.416). Again, actions are caused under the direction of judgments, they can also be called reasonable or otherwise according to the truth or falsity of the directive judgments. In short, it is neither the passion nor the action "properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment".

(*ibid.*) Reasonableness or unreasonableness either of passions or of actions is only, by extension, a linguistic convention, a manner of speaking which is logically untenable.

Hume's position appears somewhat as follows. Truth-values can be assigned only to judgments; and since judgments accompany actions assigning truth-values to them becomes possible by extension. Now passions are exerted in actions, one can ask whether 'reasonable' or 'unreasonable' can be ascribed to them. Passions have objects, and if one experiences such a passion that is directed towards something which does not exist at all, in that case the passion, Hume would allow, can be said to be unreasonable. We can remark that there can be genuine passions without objects, existential dread, for instance. But fear of ghosts would of course illustrate Hume's point. Again it may also be the case that the supposed quality of an object of passion may be lacking. I mean that the judgment or belief about the object of passion is not true. One may jump up and be scared by the sight of a rat, supposing it to be a carrier of plague. If the rat be not a carrier of plague, one's fear may be called unreasonable. This point would go to strengthen Hume's view. But all cases, may not be so simple. Fear at the sight of a mice and fear at the sight of a cobra differ qualitatively, and one say that the former is unreasonable in a sense in which the latter is not. We do speak of unfounded fear. Similarly one hears about superstitious fear, neurotic fear or even abnormal fear. Except perhaps in cases of existential dread and neurotic fear which are passions without objects, for the rest there

are accompanying judgments or beliefs that are not true, and it is those judgments what render the passions unreasonable. At least Hume would argue in such a manner. He could also point to emotion-situations and their characteristic features. His causal view of emotion would oblige him to do that. But doubts may still persist, however strongly Hume might put his case. Fear experienced in dream may be called unreasonable, even though there is no proper false judgment accompanying it. Cases of univeridical perception can prove equally difficult. Macbeth's dagger is as threatening as one that is waved by a bandit. It is more disquieting to say that a wrongly chosen means can render a passion unreasonable. Acting out of love I might follow a course of action that fails to bring about my intention to make my friend happy. Does this entitle one to say that my love is unreasonable? Hume's specification of the senses in which a passion can be unreasonable is too narrow. His contention that causal inefficiency of the means alone can render a passion unreasonable does not sound convincing in all cases. He does not take adequate cognizance of the fact that passions can be reasonable also. To say that passions can be unreasonable does not prohibit saying that they can be reasonable as well.

To say that action is reasonable or unreasonable is to make an evaluation, and it is against such a contention that Hume has been arguing. The concept of reasonableness or unreasonableness of actions was upheld by rationalists like Reid, for whom it was not a mere figurative way of speaking but a viable thesis. Let me

make the point a little more clear. Hume seeks to keep two things separate: an assessment of conduct and a description of its antecedents. Among the antecedents of conduct are desire and judgments or belief about the desirability of the object of desire. By 'desirability' I mean 'desire-worthiness' or the prospects of pain or pleasure that an object of desire arouses in the mind of the agent. Hume puts a restriction on the use of epithets like 'reasonable' or 'unreasonable' on the passion or the action that follows. His reason for imposing the restriction seems owing to the consideration that the epithets strictly speaking belong to the domain of judgments or beliefs, and hence the predicates that are cognate with the concept of 'reason' cannot have any legitimate application in another domain. His restriction is based on philosophical considerations. A passion can be called unreasonable only on the ground that it is accompanied by a false judgment, and even in this case the passion is called unreasonable only by extension, because, it is, in fact, the judgment, not the passion that is false or untrue, and therefore contrary to reason. The same restriction applies to actions, when they are to be assessed by the predicates in question. Hume writes, "These false judgments may be thought to affect the passions and actions, which are connected with them, and may be said to render them unreasonable, in a figurative and improper way speaking" (*ibid.*, p. 459). When Hume says that such locutions are "improper" he obviously means that it is *logically* or *philosophically* improper, he is not suggesting a change in the linguistic usage. As expressions of ordinary language they

are quite harmless. But to assert there are connections, logical ones, between passions or actions and judgments is a logical howler. The plain man has the liberty of joining on with such extensions in his everyday linguistic usage, but to think that the linguistic usage is a guide to genuine opinion on the philosophical level is a sign of logical inalertness. Reid in his criticism of Hume missed this point. When he says that " 'to act reasonably' is a phrase common in all languages and therefore has a meaning" (op.cit., p. 266) he misses Hume's intention. Hume never denies the meaningfulness of ordinary language expressions, he is chiefly concerned with the logical validity of verbal formulations of the kind such as actions can be true or false, reasonable or unreasonable and so on. I shall consider this issue in a slightly different manner at the end of the present context. Till then I postpone expressing my own views on Hume's thesis that actions can neither be reasonable nor unreasonable.

When Hume denies any logical connexion between judgments and actions, he is anticipating a point made by Stevenson, that is, reasons or beliefs for or against ethical judgments function to influence attitudes, and they do it psychologically. A reason offered in support of an imperative may influence the person addressed only psychologically, it does not have any logical compulsion. This follows from Stevenson's more general thesis that only disagreements of belief are resolvable, not those of attitudes. The need for having correct belief about the situation in which one is acting has been accorded an importance by Hume, and following him, by Stevenson.

What does Hume mean by a reasonable judgment, or for that matter, a reasonable belief? Or, what is it that makes a belief reasonable? Much depends on what Hume means by 'belief'. His definition of 'belief' as "a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression" (op.cit.,p.96) is emphatic on the manner in which a lively idea is formed. On the following page he says that "belief is somewhat more than a simple idea. 'Tis a particular manner of forming an idea". Further, Hume differentiates the authentic from a "counterfeit belief". What is it that marks off, what he calls, "serious conviction" from "counterfeit belief"? Mere feeling will not differentiate authentic from counterfeit beliefs, since it is equally present in both. But the phrase "serious conviction" is not enough enlightening. That some scene we picture carries with it the flavour of authenticity is not enough to ensure that it agrees with "real existence". That p is conceived in a certain manner does not entail that p is true. It can only lend some sort of a support to the proposition that p is likely to the true. Hume has discussed the question of differentiating "authentic" from "counterfeit" beliefs at the end of Section X of Part III of Book I of the Treatise and again in the Appendix (see pages 123 and 631). From the nature of his consideration of the problem it appears that he attached great importance to it. His definition of 'belief' refers to association of ideas with impressions, and he tells us that ideas are associated according to the principles of resemblance, contiguity and cause and effect. Of all these principles, cause and effect alone can enliven an idea to

produce belief. It is possible to say that the only reasonable belief is one which is founded on cause and effect. A reasonable belief has causal power. He makes this quite clear when he says that the objects the relation of cause and effect "presents are fixed and unalterable. The impression of the memory never change in any considerable degree; and each impression draws along with it a precise idea, which takes its place in the imagination as something solid and real, certain and invariable" (ibid., p. 110). The causal relation is "the only one, on which we can found a just inference from one object to another" (ibid., p.89).[1] It turns out then that one could be said to have a reasonable belief, if, and only if, one's ideas are enlivened by being connected causally with a present impression. This appears consistent with Hume's view that beliefs or judgments that accompany passions are causal judgments, statements laying bare the causal connexion between the means and the end or the object of desire.

It may seem that according to Hume a reasonable belief is a true belief, at least that what is suggested by his talk about "just" inferences. But it may be doubted, and perhaps not without linguistic sensitiveness, that 'true' or 'false' are not cognate with 'reasonable' or 'unreasonable', or in any case they are not equivalent expressions. For Hume, actions can be called reasonable,

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1. Whether Hume could be said to be entitled to speak about 'just' or 'unjust' inferences is a question that cannot be settled now. I have benefitted by Professor W.H.Walsh's correspondence in clarifying my views about Hume's notion of 'reasonable belief'.

by extension only; according to reasonable beliefs actions are performed; and a belief can be called reasonable only if it enables one to make "just" inferences. It becomes then unavoidable to assert that a reasonable belief is one that is true. But the logic of the word 'reasonable' is not the same as that of the word 'true'. A true belief entails that it is a reasonable belief, but that a belief is reasonable does not logically imply that it is true. 'Reasonable' is logically a weaker expression than 'true', and a belief is said to be reasonable not always because it enables us making "just" inferences, but on the strength of evidence that one may have for entertaining it. Conditions that make a belief true are often waived in cases of having a reasonable belief. A high degree of probability or evidential support may go to recommend a belief as reasonable. The problem we are trying to state has a semblance of the epistemological question concerning 'knowledge' and 'belief'. As Austin remarked that to say 'I know' is to give one's warrant to something, and a warrant that is somehow different in degree from that involved in saying merely 'I believe'. Knowing is being in the appropriate position to certify or to give one's authority or warrant to the truth of what is said to be known. Likewise, to say that a belief is true is to make much stronger a claim than merely asserting that it is reasonable.

This somewhat lengthy digression was needed for clarifying the notion that an act can be called reasonable which one has reasons to do for. One can think of reasonable actions, even while agreeing with Hume that it is only in a stricter sense beliefs can be

said to be reasonable. The word 'reasonable', when applied to actions is not used in the same sense when it is used for beliefs, and the two senses are logically independent, for it is one thing to have reasons for acting and it is another thing to have reasons for believing. Kant's notion of maxims of action may be particularly helpful in this context. If an action could be accounted for by appealing to a maxim, no matter whether or not the maxim is a categorical imperative, the action could be said to be reasonable. Or in other words the reasons for acting are intended to answer the question why the agent did perform the action. Reasons for believing and reasons for acting should be different, since in the former we are concerned with truth and falsity, with entertaining the idea that something is the case; while in the latter our main concern lies in making something the case.

Thus far we get the following points: (a) That a true belief is different from a reasonable belief; (b) that reasons for believing are different from reasons for acting. The former are validating reasons, i.e., evidences determining the character of a belief, whether it is true or merely reasonable; the latter are justificatory reasons. One tends to offer justificatory reasons only in order to claim that what one did was what he thought right. Rightness of actions depends on the reasons for performing it. I use the word 'right' in a value-neutral sense, of course, meaning thereby, what the agent, in a given circumstance, thinks exactly the thing to do, and state why does he think so. It might be objected that my notion is too wide and it rules out the possibility

of any action being unreasonable. In a sense it does not, since one can always formulate or find out maxims on which one has acted. And the very concept of voluntary actions presupposes the fact that the agent can account for his performance. Anyway, what concerns us at the present moment is the question whether the distinction between reasons for acting and those for believing would be tenable on Hume's premisses. I believe it should be, because once it is agreed that a reasonable belief is not necessarily a true belief, there remains no possibility of erring by taking an action as reasonable in the sense a belief can be true. It runs counter to the rationalist view that actions can be reasonable or unreasonable in a fashion that propositions can be true or untrue. Since actions or their motivating causes, i.e., passions are not propositional entities, and hence the epithets appropriate to propositions cannot be applied to them. This point is made by Hume with great clarity and conviction. But his whole procedure implies a very strict concept of reason, and it might appear that there is also a consequent exclusion of all talk of reason as applied to conduct as illegitimate. Such a way of thinking would be taking Hume amiss. His logical concern leaves our everyday way of talking sufficiently unaffected and there seems to be no reason to believe that he was proposing a revision of linguistic usage, as Reid thought. The merit of Hume's discussion lies in pointing out that the justification of actions, by the nature of the case, must differ, in important respects, from logical proof and inductive arguments.

Another point of related interest is Hume's use of the word "discovery" in the context of the function of reason. He says, "Reason is the _discovery_ of truth or falsehood" or "it _discovers_ the connexion of causes and effects" (_ibid_., pp. 458 and 459, italics not in the text). Now to discover something is to find out what _is_ the case. "Discovery" is an achievement word just as the word 'know' is. In this sense how can one discover what is _not_ the case? When Hume includes 'falsehood' with 'truth' that reason discovers, and true with erroneous, or for that matter, mistaken causal relationships, he precisely appears to suggest as if falsehood could be discovered. If it be said, as Hume says, that reason informs us about the means of attaining our desired ends by 'discovering' causal connexions between them, and thereby influencing our course of action, one is just left to wonder how a discovery of falsehood could lead us to act. Of course, 'discovery' of a false causal relationship between a chosen means and the desired end can lead us to refrain from acting. If one happens to know beforehand that a particular means was unsuited to the attainment of one's desired end, one in all likelihood, will abandon the course of action or will not simply adopt it. On page 416 of the _Treatise_ he says, "when in exerting any passion in actions, we chuse means insufficient for the design'd end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects. When a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chuses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it." It is clear from this passage that it is only later

that we find that our means was ill-chosen, and by implication, that the belief which led us to choose that particular means was erroneous. An ill-chosen means is a late discovery. It cannot be that we come to know it beforehand, or pre-eventum, that the means we are going to adopt was defective. It does not make any sense to say so. It could not have been Hume's intention to ascribe mistaken causal inferences or unsound deductive reasoning to reason. If reason were to discover both truth and falsehood then in a sense it cannot by itself be a motive to the will. For it is the belief, seemingly reasonable on the basis of available evidence, that determines our conduct, not the truth of what we believe. Reason as a faculty of judgment is outside the domain of right, a passive, inert principle. But in a less strong sense of the term, reason as belief based on evidence, may and does influence conduct. When Hume says that our actions can be contrary to reason only in so far as they are false beliefs about the nature of an end or the means to that end, what he appears to suggest that the truth-value of a judgment has no causal power, it is our belief in the judgment that prompts to action. A false belief may appear to be reasonable to an agent, and he may act on it and fail to achieve the end, simply because what we call a "reasonable belief" does not entail that it is a 'true' belief, though the converse will always hold. It is one thing to say, post eventum, that an action was based on poor evidence, and it may be another thing to say that it was based on false belief. Considerations such as these have led some to recognise

a further distinction, <u>belief</u> in the truth of a proposition, and <u>truth</u> of a belief.[1] The belief in the truth of a proposition has important bearings on conduct, such that passions may "yield to reason". Hume writes, "I may desire any fruit as of an excellent relish; but whenever you convince me of my mistake, my longing ceases" (<u>ibid.</u>, pp.416-17). In the example, it is the conviction about "the falsehood of that supposition" or, the <u>belief</u> that a certain proposition was not true that settles the matter. And should be it allowed to be said that the belief in the truth of a proposition is reason in a secondary sense, and Hume's example does seem to suggest such a possible interpretation, in that case, reason is not indifferent to conduct and does influence it, even "our passions yield to our <u>reason</u> without any opposition" (<u>ibid.</u>, p. 416, italics ours). Of course, the primary sense of the word 'reason' is reserved for the faculty of judgment, which is concerned with truths of our beliefs. And it is in this special sense of 'reason', to be "contrary to reason" is to be inconsistent with some truth. That such a view is not unwarranted will be immediately realized if we recall Hume's equating 'reason' with 'truth' on page 415 of the <u>Treatise</u> : "nothing can be contrary to truth <u>or</u> reason, except what has reference to <u>it</u>" (italics not in the text). In the sense of 'reason' as the <u>belief</u>

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1. Hume distinguishes between what is believed and believing it, between what he calls "the idea" and "the manner of conceiving" it, its force or vivacity. What can be true or false is what is believed, a proposition, something "representative", but believing is a psychological state. Often we call the former theoretical.

in the truth of a proposition, can it be argued, that reason does offer some opposition to passion? If the argument is valid, Hume's example can be taken as a counter-example of his own thesis that reason is an 'inactive' principle. But, the argument would not be valid on two grounds. First, for Hume, it is only a secondary sense of 'reason', and secondly, in the example, the passions "yield" instead of "opposing". For the rationalist, it would be a bloodless victory, if at all. Again, reason as *discovery* is concerned with *truths* of our belief, whether they are true or false. To say that truth of our beliefs does not influence our conduct but the beliefs do is not to imply that it is not important. There may be a greater likelihood that if a man's actions are based on a true belief he will succeed than if his actions were based on a false one. But whether our beliefs, be true or false, they can influence actions in an equal degree. The discovery view of reason opens up a dilemma. If our belief about the efficacy of a means is true, we are likely to succeed in achieving our end, and, if the belief is false, we may fail to realise our end. Either our belief about the efficacy of a means is true or it is false. Hence we may either succeed or fail to realise our end. It is our belief that such-and-such means is worth adopting together with the fact that the means leading to the end is desired by us are which motivate us to act, rather than the truth or falsehood of our belief. Our concern for the end becomes our motivation for acting, not the discovery of truth or falsity of our beliefs about the means. If the discovery view of reason is accon-

tially rationalistic, then in adopting it for him, Hume shows also that it cannot be a motive to the will. Theoretical reason is non-substantive, and actions concern us with matters of substance. Beliefs influence our conduct only when it arouses concern in us for our desired ends. If our beliefs are such that they interest us, or we are interested in what we belief, then our beliefs become practically potent. This is the teaching of Hume's account of sympathy and benevolence. In sympathising we come to have a belief about the other person's state of mind, and only if we are interested in the person's welfare, we go out of our way to help him. "The breaking of a mirror gives us more concern when at home, than the burning of a house, when abroad, and some hundred leagues distant" (ibid., p. 429). In both the cases we have beliefs, and may be true beliefs, but its influence on our conduct depends on our feeling of concern for the content of the belief, i.e., only if we are intimately related with it. Only if, in other words, we are interested in what is believed, beliefs determine our conduct. This is a complicated process, and much depends on our view about the world, what we believe it to be, that affects us, not reason as such. If 'reason' means belief in the truth of a proposition, or beliefs about "matters of fact", then there is no reason why it should not affect us. And this, I think, Hume never denied. We are 'passionate' beings, in our actions as well as in our beliefs. It is the passions that determine the ends of conduct, since they are the incentives, and decide us in the "election" (a la Hutcheson) to this or that

action. Reason enters only as instrumental factor in enabling us in choosing the appropriate courses of action. "It can never in the least concern us to know, that such objects are causes, and such others effects if both the causes and effects be indifferent to us" (ibid., p. 414).

The view that feeling determines all our ends, and reason makes these explicit and decides when and how they can best be attained has been criticised by Kurt Baier in his The Moral Point of View (Cornell University Press, New York, 1963). He dismisses Hume's whole position as "absurd" and "unsound". We shall see how far Baier's opinion is tenable. The first point made by Baier is that Hume's concept of reason is absurd, or rather, Hume holds "a false conception of the nature of reason" (The Moral Point of View, p. 259) and says that "We mean by the word 'reason' something that can make us do things" (ibid., p.260). Now obviously, this is not to meet Hume on his own ground, rather to start with an altogether different premiss. Baier's concept of reason is dispositional, like Ryle's reduction of 'knowing that' to 'knowing how'. The causal power attributed to 'reason' as a faculty of judgment would not be admissible for Hume's position. Of course in a secondary sense of the word 'reason', i.e., in the sense of our beliefs about matters of fact, it can have causal power or the power to "make us to things". But whether 'reason' as a faculty of analytic or demonstrative knowledge could be looked upon as conative remains an open question. We had remarked earlier that there is no unanimous view of 'reason' and much depends on the set of entities

reason is contrasted with, or from what it is distinguished. Hume contrasts actions with propositions, for example, and hence the exclusion of doing from what is theoretical. The question what we can achieve by reason can be settled only on the considerations of the sort mentioned above. In the light of Baier's full account of 'reason' his charge against Hume loses much force that it could have otherwise had. Baier bases his whole argument that Hume's concept of reason is false on the issue that there is no empirical question concerning reason's causal potency as there is regarding the heart's "power to pump the blood through our veins?" (ibid., p. 260). The significance of asking an "empirical" question lies in our knowing the notions involved in the verbal formulation of the question, before we know the answer sought. There is no reason to suppose, as Baier does, that in asking 'Does reason or does it not, have the power to move us in action?' we are ignorant of the meaning of the expressions like "moving us to action" and "reason". From our experience of emotive life we already know what is it to be moved to action, when for example, pity moves us to action, or when we feel desire or aversion. In the light of this experience we can significantly ask whether a faculty like reason which is concerned with analytic or demonstrative certainty of our ideas could be said to move us in the same way as pity, or desire, we experience, move us. Baier appears to overlook the fact that Hume asks the question in the light of his theory of the passions, and if it be granted that the passions are causally efficient, then it follows that nothing that is not passion-like

in its office and nature can be said to move us.

Baier's second objection is directed against Hume's contention that the ultimate human ends cannot be accounted for by reason. Baier says that Hume's concept of reason is 'unduly narrow', and with this remark I am in partial agreement. His second charge that Hume had a "confused conception of what it is to have and to find reason" (*ibid.*, p. 251) is false. Hume never said that "the task of reason was to find reasons" (*ibid.*), rather his main task was to show that there must be some difference between logical proof and providing justificatory reasons for conduct. Baier's view is based on a wrong reading of Hume and he appears to take Hume as prohibiting *a priori* all talk of reason to conduct, which is far from the truth and this is what we have tried to show above. Hume was trying to point out that in its practical application reason can have a means-finding office, and this is by no means an unimportant task assigned to it. Secondly, in the light of our discussion about reasonable beliefs, it is possible to say that validating reasons are a different lot from justificatory reasons and Hume could hardly be said to have confused the two. One's reasons for acting in a particular way are one's reasonable beliefs about the objects that one desires or avoids to have. But a reasonable belief need not necessarily be a true belief, its workability is its criterion for its being relied upon or adopted. There is no belief reasonable as such, it is the agent, in respect of his set ends, who decides which means to adopt. This *calculative* procedure is so-called reason, but cannot be called reason, properly so-called.

As regards the notion of ends Baier holds that it is wrong to think that our ends are not capable of being determined or accounted for by reason. Baier's concept of 'reason' is such that there could be no dialogue between him and Hume. Hume's inquiry was primarily directed towards motivational explanation of human behaviour, and accordingly, given human nature as it is, and the constitution of the individual agent, it remains only to ask, why did the agent do what he did? An answer to such questions would be a motivational explanation, or a statement of explanatory reasons for the agent's action, i.e., reasons why he has any particular end. Baier insists on having an answer to the question whether his ends are in accordance with reason or 'justified from a rational point of view' (*ibid.*, p.266). The chief difference between Hume and Baier lies in respect of their attitudes to hypothetical imperatives. Courses of action, according to Hume, are recommended by reason as means to an end determined by desire, but Hume points out that reason cannot command a course of action as an end itself. The force of the recommendations come, not from reason, but from the fact that certain ends are desired by the person. The recommendations are contingent and conditional. A means 'M' can be undertaken to be pursued *only if* an end 'E' is set before the agent, such that 'M' and 'E' are causally connected. Baier thinks that there can be ends not determined by desire, as Hume thinks, but by reason. He says that reason determines our ends in the sense that when we ask 'What shall I do?' we demand for rationally determined ends, or 'ends backed by reason'.

Now there are two things, reason recommending ends intrinsically worth pursuing and ends "backed up by reason". The first would not be admissible on Hume's premisses simply because, in consistency with his rigorous notion of reason, it does not come within the purview of reason to make any such recommendation. One may not hold such a view of reason but there cannot be any quarrel with it. As regards the second, let us take Baier's example. To the question "Shall I aim at becoming a doctor or an engineer?", one might like to answer 'a doctor' or 'an engineer' only if being a doctor or an engineer is more rewarding a course of action in a particular job-situation of a country. There is no reason to suppose that there is any absoluteness about one's being a doctor or an engineer. And the 'justificatory' reasons that might be adduced in backing up such decisions are simply a set of beliefs that appeals most to the agent in the context of his future employment prospect. And also what suits his natural expression. It is erroneous to suppose that Hume dismisses the possibility of either having or giving such reasons. Lastly, in what sense an end of the like sort can be 'determined'? Does the end 'follow' from the set of backing reasons. I do not think that it could be the case, on the contrary, the backing or supporting reason are as contingent and conditional as the recommendation of reason in the case of hypothetical imperatives. What appears to me to be the 'justificatory' reasons may not so appear to others. My wife can always think that I have been in a wrong profession while I may enjoy complete job-satisfaction. Baier

remarks, "If he [the agent] adopts as his end what he has worked out to have the support of reason, then his end is determined, is accounted for, by reason in the most important sense of that phrase" (*ibid*). What this "important sense" is left unclear by Baier. A determination is either logical, i.e., that of entailment, or psychological. If Baier's "important sense" of determination of end by reason is 'justificatory' beliefs that appear to the agent as 'reasonable', then it is Hume's point that he is actually making. Hume speaks of two kinds of judgments that may accompany a passion, one that discovers causal connexions between means and ends; and the other which "excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it" (*op.cit.*,p.459). The appropriateness of the object recommends itself to the passion for it, and the passion is aroused and informed about the proper object by a judgment. This is a case of determination of an end "backed up" by reason, which cannot claim anything better than psychological validity. The accompanying judgment can be said to determine or "backup" the end, i.e., the object of the passion or action in the sense that it produces the passion. But Hume reminds us that such judgments "may often be false" (*ibid.*). There is another case of our actions being determined by the end. On page 451 of the *Treatise* Hume says that "where the mind pursues any end with passion; tho' that passion be not deriv'd originally from the end, but merely from the action and pursuit; yet by the natural course of the affections, we acquire a concern for the end itself and are uneasy under any disappointment we meet with in the pursuit

of it". What Hume is speaking of as "a concern for the end itself" is not an implicit admission of deontology, rather a mistaken view of the situation, as if the passion was legislated by the end, or derived from it. There cannot be any exciting "reason" previous to our feeling of a passion for an object. This is Aristotelean wisdom in ethics that there are ultimate ends derived without a view to anything else. An end is an end not because of the reasons that back it up, on the contrary, the "reasons" are reasons, because there is an end to be supported. The passions are determined for us by our nature (this is consistent with Hume's doctrine of liberty) and they in turn determine for us the ultimate ends of conduct. Reason occupies itself solely with the means of their fulfilment. The different alleged roles of reason, exciting or justificatory do not change the situation. Baier has completely ignored Hume's characteristic use of the term <u>reason</u> in the sense of calm passions. If to have an end in the rational way is to say 'no' to our "violent" passions, to take "some distant view or reflexion", then calm passions do determine the will as if it were by reason. This particular use of 'reason' is significant in view of the fact that " 'tis not contrary to reason to prefer any acknowledged lesser good to any greater". Determination of ultimate ends cannot then safely allowed to be vested in the office of reason.

There is a misconception in Baier's account of Hume's position. In ascribing hedonism to Hume, he remarks "Pleasure he [Hume] thinks, is an ultimate end" (<u>op.cit.</u>, p.266). The misconcep-

tion is based on a misunderstanding of Hume's theory of passions and the role of the concepts of pleasure and pain in the theory. Pleasure, and pain, for Hume, are sub-passional data of our emotive experience. The hedonic character of our experience is predetermined, and whether an object would be pleasurable or painful is not dependent on the will. It is a fact of human nature that in our experience we cannot be indifferent to the hedonic qualities of our sensations, and the question why some of them are pleasant or others are disagreeable cannot be properly answered. The apprehension of the hedonic character of sensations is categorical, that is to say, we cannot have any experience without becoming at the same time aware of its hedonic characteristics. But what is more important is how do we react to our hedonistically characterised experiences, and it is with this question Hume's theory of the passions start. For the reasons alluded above the passions do not include pleasure and pain, which are sensations. The passions are, properly speaking, our emotive reactions to the sensations with characteristic hedonic properties. On page 192 of the Treatise Hume describes pains and pleasures as arising "from the application of objects to our bodies" and the example that he gives is that of "the cutting our flesh with steel". The passions are posterior to such sensations. When pleasure or pain arise from contemplation, Hume usually speaks of "agreeable feeling" or "uneasiness". There is at least one express statement in which Hume recognises the vagueness of the concept of pleasure. "A good composition of music and a bottle of good wine equally

produce pleasure; and what is more, their goodness is determin'd merely by the pleasure. But shall we say upon that account, that the wine is harmonious, or the music of a good flavour?" (op.cit., p. 472). It is the ambiguity of the term 'pleasure' obscuring the difference between a pleasurable sensation and the "sentiment of pleasure", which is chiefly responsible for committing Hume to a hedonistic position. But in spite of this, Kemp Smith has rightly pointed out for Hume, pleasure and pain "are merely the efficient causes, not the objects or ends of action" (op.cit., p.164). Our choice of ends may be influenced by hedonistic criteria, but it is directed or guided by our passions. Some of our passions may arise directly from our experience of pleasure and pain –– the direct passions like desire and aversion, some others arise when the hedonistically characterised experiences are accompanied by certain ideas involving some kind of reference to a self. And this is the most important point. To say that for Hume pleasure is the ultimate end is to ignore the sophisticated refinement of his theory of passions on the first instance, and, secondly, to misdescribe his position. These two are inter-related. Ardal has given a convincing argument to the effect that hedonism cannot be attributed to Hume. On Baier's ascription, it would follow that pleasure is an end of desire, but the case is just the reverse for Hume. Pleasure is a cause or as Ardal has put it, "the part-cause of a desire". I will first put Ardal's argument and then give another supporting illustration, which, I believe, he could have used effectively. Given that Hume describes the passion

of love as a desire for the happiness of the beloved person, together with the fact that he distinguishes between *cause* of a desire and *end* of a desire, it follows that if pleasure be the cause of the desire (or the passion) of love, it cannot be its end as well. Hume's distinction between a cause and an end of a desire occurs on page 367 of the *Treatise*. The distinction of a *cause* and an *object* of a passion is devised for allegedly non-conative passions like pride and humility, and the distinction is carried over to the discussion of conative passions like love and hatred. A re-statement of the distinction is given with a view to explaining the conjunction of desire and aversion with love and hatred. The re-statement admits a new distinction, i.e., of an end of desire, besides the cause and the object. Love and hatred, says Hume, "have not only a *cause*, which excites them, viz. pleasure and pain; and an *object*, to which they are directed, viz. a person or thinking being; but likewise an *end*, which they endeavour to attain, viz. the happiness or misery of the person belov'd or hated..." (*op.cit.*, p. 367). By saying that pleasure is the *cause* of love Hume means that it is the "sensation" of the passion that matters, and the sensation given rise to by the *qualities* of the person (the *object* of the passion) in question leads us to desire his happiness for the "satisfaction" of the sensation of the passion. Now the "sensation" of the passion (conjoined as it is with desire) and the satisfaction that follows when the disposition is exerted are not identical items of the emotive scheme of our experience, and if they are not identical, it can in no way be allowed to be said that pleasure is the end of conduct.

I now come to give another example. There are certain passions in experiencing which we come to have a diminution of our own pleasure. Of such nature is the passion of envy, which is "excited by some present enjoyment of another which by comparison *diminishes* our idea of our own" (*ibid.*, p. 377, italics not in the text). It might be said that the envious man seeks "to reap a pleasure from the comparison", but Hume makes an acute observation and says that the envied pleasure is "superior to our own"(*ibid.*). Does it sound plausible to say that granted that pleasure is an ultimate end, who would choose an inferior pleasure to one that is superior in comparison? It might be urged that people *are* envious, but in that case to choose less pleasure by comparison is also to choose the inevitable disagreeable feeling, which is inconsistent. Hence no one could be said to choose *consciously* both less pleasure *and* and disagreeable feeling all at once. It is one thing to say that as a matter of fact people feel envious and experience a diminished pleasure, and quite another thing to say that they choose it *consciously*. For an end is not worth its name unless it is a matter of conscious choice. It could also be argued that when an envious man compares his present pleasure with one of his inferiors the pleasure will be greater and such comparison may be sought as an end. But this can only be a makeshift arrangement, and not a proper case of an end, since "when the inferiority decreases by the elevation of the inferior, what shou'd only have been a decrease of pleasure, becomes a real pain" (*ibid.*). There may be another case against Baier's thesis. Hume's concept of benevolence affords an

example. Sympathy with another's present misery has an effect of disagreeable feeling in me, but perchance the intensity of the sympathisized feeling is vivacious enough, instead of producing a greater degree of disagreeableness, I become interested in his fate and may, in consequence, go out of my way to relieve him of his pitiable condition. And before I might embark upon any relief project, I may experience "a lively notion of all the circumstances of that person, whether past, present, or future; possible, probable or certain" (ibid., p. 386). In all this there is no suggestion that in sympathising with him in this manner I hope to have pleasure as my end, since in spite of the fact that sympathy is an involuntary process, it is not blind, and in entering "deeply into the sentiment of others" we are certainly conscious of the emotive experience we undergo. Thus it may then be concluded that Baier's view that according to Hume pleasure is an ultimate end is a misconceived one.

What then is the relation between reason and conduct according to Hume? It has sometimes been suggested that, for him, there is a gap between reality and reason. The attractiveness of the phrase recommends itself on a superficial level. A part of Hume's programme was directed towards a conceptual clarification of the question 'What is it to say that reason can be a motive to the will?' As a sequel to his doctrine of liberty Hume holds further that it is not analytic to say that reason is a motive. No motivating power could be attributed to reason. The concept of 'reason', strictly defined, is only demonstrative. Or to use his own term a faculty of

"discovery". There is, of course, room for applied reason in morals, but not for reason, properly so-called. And the faculty or rather the calm passions also called reason are more sensible than intellectual, though reason-like in its operations. To quote Hume on this point, "that <u>reason</u>, which is to oppose our passion and which we have found to be nothing but a general calm determination of the passions, founded on some distant view or reflexion" (<u>ibid</u>., p. 583). The word 'that' is significant, since the function of opposing passions is denied to reason properly so-called, though in its capacity of stating instrumental insufficiency of our means to an end can have the passions yielded to it, <u>without</u> opposition. Hume, in saying these things, is, in fact, making much subtler points. To <u>oppose</u> a passion is not necessarily to <u>influence</u> it, rather its converse. Passions, he tells us, acquire "new force and violence" (ibid., p.421) from opposition, and even if reason were to <u>oppose</u> the passions, it would have been morally inconsequential. What is morally significant is whether the passions could be <u>influenced</u>. To <u>influence</u> a passion is to cause some change in its direction and should this interpretation of 'influence' be not objectionable, the calm passions appear to fare better by virtue of their "active" nature and the reason-like power or capability of transcending the immediate impulses, in taking a "distant view" of emotive situations. There is another ground for favouring the determination of the will by calm passions, that is, they are habitual choices of our character, principles of action. Stability of choice determines the moral-worthiness of character.

On the other hand, reason is non-committal in case-stating, it neither approves or disapproves. In matters of fact and existence reason is a blind guide. Its criterion of self-contradiction trifles with the earnestness of moral situation. For reason, "Any thing may produce anything" (*ibid*., p.173) provided it is not self-contradictory. These considerations, based as they are on a rigorously narrow conception of 'reason' which can be properly called 'theoretical', lead Hume not to look upon reason as the guide or the supreme legislator of human life.

But from this it does not follow that logic and ethics, reason and reality are left by Hume with a gap between them. His concept of human nature does not allow any such presupposition. It is true that "Morality....is more properly felt than judg'd of" (*ibid*., p. 470, the following lines refer to the calm passions which are mistaken for reason because of "our common custom of taking all things for the same, which have any near resemblance to each other"). But does Hume say that morality is *never* judged of? In a supplementary passage he says that "nature by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel" (*ibid*.,p.183). How, then, is the alleged gap bridged? We have already referred to the notion of "reasonable beliefs". Our reason giving activities are judgmental in the sense that our reasons for acting in a particular manner are based on our beliefs about matters of fact and existence. My choosing a particular course of conduct is guided by my belief, that seemed reasonable at the time of choosing the course of conduct, about the efficacy

of a particular means for a desired end. The question 'Why did I choose a particular course of action?' is answerable partly in terms of a certain set of beliefs that are related to the end in view, that is to say, had I not a particular set of beliefs that seemed reasonable to me at the time of choosing the course of action I would have chosen differently. When Hume says that judgments "obliquely" (ibid.,p.459) cause our actions by accompanying passions, what he seeks to bring home is the idea that judgments are the necessary conditions of our conduct, though not sufficient. A bare knowledge of causal relations between a course of action and an end do not influence the will, unless the end is desired by the agent. Thus a passion accompanied by a judgment together constitute both necessary and sufficient conditions of any action that may be described as goal-oriented or voluntary. But to say that judgment (reason) alone is sufficient to influence the will is "an abusive way of speaking" (ibid.) because no inference as to the character of an action can be made from the truth of a judgment or belief that accompanies a passion. The thesis of uninferability does not warrant a denial of any connexion between them. The distinction between opposing a passion and influencing the will has often been blurred or overlooked by the commentators. The phrases "conclusions of reason" and "decisions of morality" are not equivalent expressions. But this non-equivalence has been mistakenly interpreted in Hume's case as a romantic slogan for irrationalism in matters of conduct. Sartre invokes Hume in order to strengthening his view that choices or human actions are criterionless. This

is positively misleading. Hume, like Sartre, is no disappointed rationalist, even though, we should note, the former's description of his experience of epistemological vertigo is very close to the world of the latter. Hume is able to assume a social context and Sartre is not. Again, for Sartre, desires and passions appear to play no role in our choice of ends. There is, in fact, absence of an account of desires and emotions in Sartre, and this, I believe, is linked to his unwillingness to give causal explanations of human behaviour. Again, if Hume be said to have a notion of 'practical reason', it cannot be construed on Kantian lines. For Kant it is the will that is reason, and in legislating itself, reason becomes practical. Since the notion of rational will is inadmissible in Hume's context, the phrase 'practical reason', for him, would be primarily empty. It can be entertained only in a secondary sense of the term 'reason'. Or, it is not reason *qua* reason that the term would occur in the phrase 'practical reason', as far as Hume is concerned, rather as *applied* reason. In this role, it may do a lot of work as an efficient bureaucrat, and yet have to depend on the 'yes' or 'no' of the minister, the passions.

These considerations may help in clarifying another doubt, namely, if reason is perfectly 'inert' as Hume says, then does not he contradict himself in saying that reason *together with* something else, i.e., passion, could influence the will? How can a faculty which is originally conceived as inactive become active when it comes to operate with some other thing? Reason, as we have tried to indicate earlier, has no special impulse attached to

it, but when some judgments accompany our passions, conation properly speaking belongs to passions, and not to judgments. Judgments play an informing function, i.e., they disclose the proper means to be adopted in order to attain a desired end. And the disclosure consists no more than a 'discovery' that something or other is the case, but it never makes something the case. Seen in this light any such remark that actions can be effects of reason in conjunction with other emotions may appear misleading, unless one is sure about what he means by 'reason'. It is worthwhile to remind ourselves over again that the relation between reason and reality, is not logical, but psychological. The distinction that Hume makes between 'reason' and 'reality' does in no way imply a disconnexion, provided we do not overlook his ideas about 'pure' and 'applied' reason.

I should like to make a passing reference to some views about the relationship between reason and the passions. Are there rational passions? For Plato the passion for order was one of the main features of reason. The feeling of reverence for the Moral Law, to Kant, is no less important. These are the passions peculiar to the life of reason. Can we say that the calm passions are rational? Hume would say 'no'. They are reason-like, though not rational. Ryle in his A Rational Animal (London, 1962) has remarked that the ideas of rationality, reasonableness and reasons are internal to the notion of thinking that may be graded as intellectual work; and such thinking, he says, possesses self--correction as an essential element. Disciplined thinking is

self-corrective. Similarly, disciplined passions would be rational by virtue of embodying an element of self-correction. Ryle says nothing exceptionable so far his main contentions go. But should his view be taken to suggest that there is a set of passions that overlaps the domain of reason, then it would be to have Hume mistaken. Hume's account of the calm passions does make room for self-referential reactions independent of reason. Most of the jobs ordinarily assigned to reason are performed by the calm passions. A mention should also be made of general rules which, at the level of conduct, correct the variations in our sympathies. These are not rational rules. The phrase 'rational passion' may not be a happy one for Hume.

It is usually thought that the passions are non-neutral, hence one has to care for truth, consistency and clarity, and these pertain to the domain of reason. It is often argued that actions performed under the direction of reason are free or rational. Any such view would be based on a distrust of the passions. Sometimes we are affected by passions. Some of our passions do enslave us. Does this fact entitle us to infer that all our passions enslave? As a deductive argument it would be fallacious. Our use of the language of enslavement or irrationality in relation to the passions can only be limited to a narrow range of our actions that feels discernibly different from others. The evidence of enslaving passions cannot be used for a generalization about all passions. Again, supposing that all passions do not enslave, it does not follow that the passions that do not enslave are rational.

Some of Hume's commentators have attributed to him the view that the passions, strictly speaking, are not criticizable as reasonable or unreasonable. Such an attribution can be made only on the basis of partial evidence. Hume has said that when any passion motivates us to act, the passion becomes criticizable in two ways, in terms of the beliefs and judgments that accompany it. The truth or falsity of such beliefs and judgments make it possible to criticise the passion as reasonable or unreasonable. But this is not the whole story about the criticizability of the passions. There is much else besides the truth or falsity of the accompanying beliefs and judgments. The passions have objects, and the situations that give rise to the passions consist in apprehension and evaluation of the objects. Hume does not even deny that there can be reasons for one's apprehension and evaluation of the objects of one's passions. For example, on page 294 of the Treatise, he speaks about the "reason for" one's being proud. Criticizability has to do with all these.

It is often overlooked that to criticize a passion, say, when it is affected by a false judgment is only to point to "a mistake of fact" (ibid., p.459). Similarly, to say that a passion is affected by a true judgment would be to make a factual consideration. What is more important is to criticize a passion in terms of evaluations. The calm passions make such criticism possible, "when corroborated by reflection, and seconded by resolution" (ibid., p.437). In the Inquiry Hume has remarked, "Our affections, on a general prospect of their objects, form certain rules of conduct, and certain

measures of preference of one above another; and these decisions, [are] really the result of our calm passions and propensities, (for what else can pronounce any object eligible or the contrary?)" The passage occurs on page 239, without of course the italicized expressions. We find here an explicit statement to the effect that the passions can be criticized, i.e., declared "eligible" or otherwise only if there are normative constraints, or rules of conduct. And there can be such rules only if we are capable of taking "a general prospect" of the objects of the passions. On page 296 of the Enquiry, we are told again that by "a refinement of reflection" the passions can become "disinterested". Such passions are calm, and these, says Hume, constitute our "sense of beauty and deformity of actions" (ibid., p.276). All these go to show that the calm passions, when they prevail, subject other passions to criticism.

It has sometimes been contended that Hume has a special doctrine of calm passions that is stated in rationalistic terms, and that the disinterested calm passions are specially associated with the use of reason. The former is quite exceptionable, while the latter misrepresents Hume's intentions. I am not seeking to refute these views. I should rather make a brief statement about the reason-like operations of the calm passions.

There are in Hume two senses in which a passion can be called calm. First, a passion is calm if it be of low emotional intensity on a particular occasion. The second, and more important, is the sense in which a passion is called calm when it is associated with

a firm disposition, and in such cases it can be a stronger motive than a violent passion. When we view a situation objectively, there is aroused in us a passion directed towards this object. This passion also involves little emotional disturbance; and it may keep a violent passion in check. But the further important point in this context is that the calm passions, in the second sense, are evaluations. These passions are sometimes strengthened by reflection, though it need not be a necessary condition the passions to be calm. Reflection may add strength to the passions, which are already calm. Again, a calm passion, which is an evaluation, may acquire greater emotional intensity from attending passions without losing its identity. Beside adequately considering the objects of our desire, a calm passion forms an unbiased or "distant" view, or "a general prospect" of situations. It is the *view*, rather than the adequacy of conception, which is more significant.

A disinterested passion has a social relevance. To criticize a passion is to point to its "defect and unsoundness" (*ibid.*,p.488). This can be done only in the social context by taking an objective or a disinterested view. Our passions are social, and some of them, in particular, are directed towards other people. There are degrees of partiality attending the passions, and this has an influence on our social conduct. The passions then are criticisable according as their "enlargement, or contraction" (*ibid.*). It is also possible to criticize "what is irregular and incommodious" (*ibid.*,p. 489) in them according to social conventions. To criticize

a passion is either to approve or to disapprove of it. Approval and disapproval are calm passions. Approval and disapproval are not simple feelings but complicated sentiments. It should be a mistake to say that for Hume these are feelings that just occur. Approval or disapproval differ from simple reactions in the sort of way desire differs from an impulse. These are feeling worked up by and in evaluative thought.

What do we criticise when we praise or blame a person? First, not any single action of his, rather "the quality or character from which the action [has] proceeded" (ibid.,p.575). Actions indicate the character of the agent. By 'character' Hume means the motivating passions, "the ultimate object of our praise and approbation is the motive" (ibid.,p.478). By the operation of sympathy, we can put ourselves in the position of the agent; and form an idea of his motivating passions. We then, secondly, "fix on some steady and general point of view...whatever may be our present situation" (ibid., pp.581-2). It is the view of the character of the agent that makes criticism of his passions possible. One can adopt the view with regard to oneself as well. The calm passion when it prevails over the violent is called "strength of mind" (ibid.,p.418). Intersubjectively the critical function of the calm passions include, besides evaluating, "regulating and restraining", and even "correcting" (ibid., pp.492 and 582) other passions. The office of the calm passions is to adopt an objective, or intersubjective point of view. The adoption of this point of view can be accounted for in terms of the calm passions that are evaluations.

This is Hume's answer to the rationalists.

Does Hume propose to reserve the term 'reasonable' for criticising a person for holding a true or false belief about a matter of fact; and 'unreasonable' for expressing disapproval of his character? It does not seem so. A man may be called reasonable even if he had acted on a false belief. For example, I hear that my friend is in trouble and I rush to his help. I discover also that my information or belief on which I acted is false, yet my action or my feeling of benevolence would be deemed reasonable. Hume would not disagree. Suppose again that a person prefers "the destruction of the whole world" by dropping hydrogen bomb. His belief in the destructive power of the nuclear weapon is true, still his preferring the destruction of the whole world would be eminently unreasonable. And Hume would endorse it. Hence criticisability of the passions is not tied to the truth or falsity of the beliefs accompanying the passions. It is another issue whether criticism of the passions as reasonable or unreasonable, or for that matter, evaluation is necessarily involved by the truth or falsity of beliefs. Reasonable or unreasonable as criticism of passions need not always have to do with reason in the sense of discovery of true or false beliefs. Passions are criticisable even on other grounds than being based upon a true or false belief about the nature of a situation or a true or false judgment about causal relationships. This is no less an indubitable Humean doctrine. The following remarks of Kemp Smith are worth quoting in this context: "Each and every passion is in itself, no doubt,

perfectly legitimate. Reason can neither justify nor condemn it. But since life, especially social life, demands organization, we learn to govern our 'selfish' passions in the light of those general utilitarian considerations which constitute the rules or maxims of personal prudence and of social justice. The controlling influences, however, are still to be found not in reason but in the passions...."(op.cit.,p.453). Kemp Smith has made the foregoing remark in connexion with what he calls the "the regulating power of reason". But is it reason as a demonstrative science that regulates our passional life? I have tried to show that it is the calm passions "so-called" reason.

On page 413 of the Treatise Hume has made an explicit reference to the view of reason that runs from Plato to Descartes. It is the traditional view of reason as the supreme legislator for human life, or that reason ought to guide our actions in preference to the passions.

Hume does not criticize the traditional view of reason, rather he has argued that in the human situation the legislative powers do not belong to reason as a demonstrative science. As actors we are passionally determined. Concerned even as it also is with truth or falsity of our beliefs about matters of fact and of causal judgments, reason has nothing to do with either producing or opposing any passion. A passion can only be opposed by a counter passion. In short, as no passion is produced by reason, none is controlled by it. Hence any talk of the combat of reason and passion should then be philosophically unsound.

Reason alone can never be a motive to action. The word "alone" is significant. Hume does not say that reason has no function. It has, he says, functions as well as limitations. In the field of matters of fact and existence with which our passions make us concerned, reason has a useful part to play. It is an ally, with a directive, though not a determining influence.

Reason and the passions cannot oppose each other. Reason, says Hume, has a "representative quality", while the passions are original existences. No passion "can be oppos'd by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider'd as copies, with those objects, which they represent" (op.cit., p.415). No passion bears any reference to reason, and hence, no sense can be made of any talk of opposition between the two.

Hume intends "opposition" to stand for a strictly logical relation. It could mean 'contrary' as well. Now his use of these words might be regarded as imprecise. If the relation of opposition can hold only among entities with "representative quality", how can there be any talk of a passion opposing another? A reasonable anger, for instance, is said to oppose an unreasonable one. "Nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse" (ibid., p.415). Here the word 'contrary' has hardly been used in the logical sense. Apart from the logicians' use of 'contradictory', 'opposition' and 'contrary', there is the ordinary man's sense of these terms. When the relationships signified by these terms are asserted to hold among the passions

(which have no "representative quality" in them) what one should mean is something like 'preventing', 'controlling', 'countering', or 'diminishing the intensity of a passion'. Hume has distinguished between <u>influencing</u> and <u>opposing</u> a passion. Beliefs about matters of fact and existence can and does <u>influence</u> our conduct, but cannot <u>oppose</u> it. A calm passion or a settled principle of action opposes a momentary impulse. On page 350 we are told that a passion can be "diminished", i.e., its intensity can be lowered by looking upon it in an objective manner. This shows again that a passion alone can adjudicate between the passions, and that the question whether a passion can be reasonable or unreasonable can hardly be settled without taking into account the whole range of human emotions, their roles and inter-relations.

The office of reason is limited in such a way that it can only affect our conduct as subservient to passions. Reason alone can never a motive to any action. But along with a motivating passion, it can exert a directive influence. It is never be a legislator, it can only "serve and obey" the passions. Hence the maxim, "Reason is, and ought only be a slave of the passions" (<u>ibid</u>., p.415).

Is to "serve and obey" to become a slave? Hume's maxim is far from being unambiguous. If it were intended as a shocker, we could have then ignored it, because much of the shock is derived from the rhetoric. If, on the other hand, his way of expressing himself has been with a view to declaring the autonomy of the passions, in that case too the use of the word 'slave' is indeed

loud. Is Hume advocating a reversal of the roles of reason and passion? This seems improbable, since he does not criticise the view that reason ought to be the guide of our conduct. Why should he then say that reason is a slave? Even the limitations of reason such as that it can never be a motive to action, or its incapability of "preventing" the will, etc., hardly justify employing the word 'slave'. On these considerations I should like to take the maxim as an over-emphatic statement concerning the autonomy of the passions with regard to the determination of the will.

What sense can be made of Hume's saying that reason "ought" to be a slave of the passions when it is already a slave? Does the 'ought' refer to the controversy as to whether reason does or does not make good its claims to sovereignty? Yes, but only in an oblique manner. Kemp Smith is right in saying that the 'is' of the maxim is a sceptical contention. If I am not mistaken he is not quite explicit about the 'ought'. What then is it about? Ardal has suggested that the 'ought' is a terminological recommendation to the effect that in the context of criticising human conduct we should use the word 'reason' in the sense only of truth or falsity of our beliefs about matters of fact and causal judgments. In other words, reason, when we criticise human conduct as unreasonable can only point to a "mistake of fact", and can neither approve nor disapprove of the said conduct. It is one thing to say that one's action is based on true or false belief, and quite another thing either to approve or to disapprove of it. In both cases

we might use the word 'unreasonable', but the criticism is not of same kind.

There is much that I care for in Ardal's suggestion. The passions, according to Hume's account, are evaluations. And seen in this light, the maxim that "Reason is, and ought only to be a slave of the passions" can with fairness be taken also as a remark about the independence of evaluation from factual considerations. One can advance explanatory as well as justificatory reasons for an action. The former sort of reasons do not compel anyone to give reasons of the latter sort. To say that somebody has acted in the manner he did because he held a true or a false belief, or relied on a true or a false causal judgment is not sufficient for saying that the action concerned is either reasonable or unreasonable. Justificatory reasons are of another sort. They are not theoretical, if we may say so, rather practical. An explanatory reason may be said to be concerned with the truth or falsity of one's beliefs or of causal judgments, and given these antecedent factors, one's actions or passions follow the course of the scheme of one's emotive life. It is only "afterwards", says Hume, "we seek for reasons upon which we may justify and establish the passion" (Ibid., p.351). At this point the calm passions step in.

There can be no conflict between reason and passion in the philosophical sense. On page 459 of the Treatise Hume tells us that judgments of reason are our cognitive beliefs about matters of fact and their inferential relationships. Such judgments, or

for that matter, reason may excite a passion we already have by informing us of the existence of something which is the object of that passion; and may discover the connexion of causes and effects so as to afford means exerting our passion. Neither our beliefs about matters of fact nor those about relations of ideas have any motivational influence. Only a passion can directly move us to act. Excluded of course are cases where reason is in concert with a passion. The function of adjudicating on the issue as to which passion is to be modified, criticized, rejected or developed belongs to the calm passions. It is at this that any talk of "combat" can become meaningful. One should rather say 'talk of criticism'. The critical role assigned to the calm passions, marked as it is by calmness and tranquillity, and objective point of view, its reason-likeness is easily mistaken for reason, as if repatriated to another domain.

Hume's view that only a passion can move us to act is put forward as a strong claim. That reason by itself can have no motivational influence on action is also no less strong. On the question of having a motivational influence on action, reason is contrasted with the passions. The two are distinct. Something is said to hold with respect of the passions which does not hold with respect to reason. Hume's figure of the slave with respect to reason *vis-a-vis* passions has been interpreted to imply such a meta-ethical theory as emotivism. This meta-ethical theory is often explained as stating the contention that an evaluation is not a cognitive judgment, or the use of descriptive language does

not commit oneself to take any particular attitude. Hume in the present context is more concerned with actions rather than with attitudes. A non-descriptivist meta-ethical theory like prescriptivism would be nearer to Hume. But that would be another story.

I should like to make brief comments on the sort of claim Hume could have possibly intended in saying that reason <u>alone</u> can have no motivational influence on human actions.

Let me begin with the case for the passions. Suppose we can say that the passions <u>alone</u> can have a motivational influence on action. How is it as a <u>matter of fact</u> or of <u>necessity</u> that passions have such influence? To say that the passions <u>as a matter of fact</u> have a motivational influence on action, would be a less controversial though a weaker claim, and hardly it could have been Hume's intention to say that. If on the other hand, the passions as a matter of <u>necessity</u> have a motivational influence on action, is this necessity logical? Hume says it explicitly that necessity is only a determination of mind produced by constant union, and "the <u>union</u> betwixt motives and actions" is regular and certain. In other words, it is logically possible for a passion by itself to motivate a person because there is experienced a constant union between motives (including passions, temper and situation, and character of agents) and actions. Human actions are passionally determined. This is what Hume calls "moral evidence" (<u>ibid</u>., p.404). Hume seems to have argued that it is possible that passions can have a moti-

vational influence on action because it is 'necessary' that they do. One might say that the necessity is only in relation to our experience of the constant union between the motivating passions and actions. It is a thesis of Hume's determinism that "all actions....have particular causes" (ibid.,p.412), and obviously the claim is a generalization with an almost 'necessary' force. When it is said that the motivating passions are such causes of actions, it can hardly be such a contention as that it is possible for (motivating) passions to have a motivational influence on action. The claim tends towards analyticity. But apart from it, since we cannot think of any other domain except the human one wherein the motivating passions do not cause actions, the claim that the passions alone can have motivational influence on action is a matter of necessity. Despite Hume's own avowal to the effect that there is no other mode of necessity than in the spectator's sense, it perhaps remains arguable if he can do without a claim of logical necessity.

How about reason. It is not easy to understand if Hume makes an empirical or a logical claim in saying that reason alone can never be a motive to any action. Does he mean to say that reason of necessity cannot be a motive to action, or that reason not of necessity can be a motive to action? We have here two modal assertions. In the first alternative, the dictum that reason (by itself) can be a motive to action is denied, while in the second, it is the mode 'of necessity' is denied. The placement of the negation sign matters. The first alternative is

equivalent to saying that it is impossible that reason can be a motive to action. This would be a rationalist's despair, for the claim rules out *a priori* any possibility for reason having a motivational influence on action. In that way, it is a very strong claim indeed. The second alternative is equivalent to saying that it is possible that reason is not a motive to action. But the ambiguity of 'possible' is well known, and it does by no means disconfirm its sub-contrary, namely, that it is possible that reason is a motive to action. The claim that reason cannot have a motivational influence on action is then contingent. It is logically possible for one to have a cognitive belief and not to act up to it, just as it is also possible to have such a belief and to act up to it. Did Hume intend to prove a contingent claim? Should he meant what our second alternative says, it would become disquieting to believe that he intended to say merely that it was not impossible that either reason has or does not have a motivational influence on action. Such an intention hardly appears consistent with what he proposed to prove, i.e., that "reason alone can never be a motive to any action". If one wishes to do justice to the words 'alone' and 'never', should Hume not be taken to have intended something like our first alternative? It can always be possible for a person to make a judgment of reason and remain unaffected by it, unless of course he is concerned about the object of his desire or passion. Hume's is a causal account of human action, and therein must figure some reference to the agent's desires and motivating passions. To deny this would

be to imply, what may be called, causation of action by belief — a position Hume would evidently reject. Hence his contention that cognitive beliefs are not causes of human actions.

Modal formulation of Hume's views namely, whether reason or the passions have a motivational influence on action, has just been a conceptual curiosity since it can be questioned if this was essential for his purpose. His so-called proof for the view that reason alone can never be a motive to any action is hardly demonstrative. Rather it is a case persuasively argued with the help of the figure of the slave: "Reason is the slave of the passions". The function of reason is limited to indicating the means whereby our desires may be satisfied. It is desires or direct passions that are the fundamental determinant of conduct. Generalizations such as these are supported with the help of the persuasive example. The generalizations are neither inductive inferences nor do they follow from the examples. But the force of the example cannot be denied in the reason, which may otherwise be formally unsound. Hume's use of the figure of the slave is almost paradigmatic. The only knowledge relevant to action, for Hume, is know how.[1]

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1. Knowledge is sometimes said to be valued for its own sake, and not as a means to an end. The pleasures of mathematical thinking may be an instance of it. Hume identifies love of truth with simple curiosity. The "discovery of the propositions of ideas, consider'd as such,...." he says, "is not desir'd merely as truth, and...'tis not the justness of our conclusions, which alone gives the pleasure". "The truth we discover must also be of some importance". The pleasure of mathematical thinking, for Hume, "arises from utility". <u>Treatise</u>, pp. 448-450.

I should now like to turn once more to the question of reasonableness or unreasonableness of human actions with a view to stating what I consider to be Hume's final teaching on this point.

On page 176 of the Treatise we are told that human actions performed with a view to attaining desired ends "are guided by reason and design". Such actions are neither inadvertent nor results of mere habitual adaptation of means to ends. How does such a view square with Hume's remark that actions properly speaking are neither reasonable nor unreasonable? If goal-directed human actions are guided by reason and design, how can they be independent of considerations of reasonableness or unreasonableness? Hume has taken a too narrow view of reason, and consequently of reasonableness and unreasonableness. He keeps the question of reasonableness or unreasonableness of human actions hooked on to the notion of reason as the discovery of truth or falsehood, or to true or false judgments.

Hume takes up this issue in Book III of the Treatise in connexion with his critique of such views that hold that moral distinctions are derived from reason. He argues that for any thing to become an object of reason is to be susceptible of agreement and disagreement. If a certain thing is referentially opaque, that is, it does not refer to any other thing, then no question of agreement or disagreement arises. Actions, together with passions, he tells us, are such entities that are "compleat in themselves", and no action can be said to be an object of reason,

or, for that matter, reasonable or unreasonable, since it does not imply a reference to any other actions. Whether such a thoroughly non-intentional view of actions is viable is open to question, just as his view about the non-intentionality of passions. As regards the latter, Hume has gradually veered towards a dispositional and intentional account. As to actions of course we have a different picture. But it can, I suppose, be pertinently asked if one gives up the notion of reason as the discovery of truth or falsehood, would one also have to maintain that actions are neither reasonable nor unreasonable? I do not think it would be the case. What is more interesting is that there is another notion of reason in Hume according to which actions can be said to be reasonable or unreasonable.

This is the notion of reason as causal explanation, and our goal-oriented behaviour may be said to be guided by it. One can speak of an action as reasonable if it be causally explicable in terms of reasons, i.e., the motives and intentions of the agent. An unreasonable action would be one that is uncharacteristic of the agent, given his motives and intentions. Hume does not explain what he really means by "reason" in the context above. But if it be possible to take the term to stand for desires, intentions, beliefs, situations and character of the agent, then reason would be assimilated to what may be called mental causes. Should this reading be permissible, then to say that our actions are "guided by reason" and also to say that actions are neither reasonable nor unreasonable would be to leave one certainly uneasy.

There is no denying the fact that given Hume's notion of reason as the discovery of truth or falsehood, he is consistent in saying that actions are neither reasonable nor unreasonable.

The Indian philosophers of the Nyāya school had anticipated the Humean sort of argument when they said that actions are never properly speaking objects (viṣaya) of knowledge, or reason, of one so likes. To say that one can have a knowledge of actions is only a borrowed decoration - yācitamaṇḍana, a figurative way of speaking. Yet it is interesting to notice that yukta, the Sanskrit word for 'reasonable', according to the Nyāya philosophers, means related. An action, they say, if it is reasonable, is related to such causal factors or mental causes as the agent's desires, beliefs, characters and dispositions (saṃskāras) including and in part formed by his past actions. Reasonableness of an action is its causal explicability. To say that an action is reasonable would mean that it is possible to adduce reasons for the agent's having done it, or to state the mental causes which would explain the action. Mental causes like motives, dispositions, passions, etc., move men to action, and cause people to have the aims they do have. It is in conjunction with some desire or aim that a passion can determine action. We do sometimes attribute human actions to desire for this and that, and sometimes characterise actions as due to this or that passion. Often ordinary language does not make any systematic difference between reasons and causes. And in many cases the distinction between being determined by reasons and being determined by causes may be

impossible to draw. On this view there can be a sense in which actions may be called reasonable if some explanatory account is available for them.

To come back to Hume. It may fairly be objected that it is one thing to say that actions are guided by reason, while it is quite another thing to say that actions are produced or prevented by reason, taking the term 'reason' in the sense of the discovery of truth or falsehood. *Guiding* and *determining* are non-identical tasks. It may be one of the employments of reason to *guide* actions, it does never *determine* them. In other words, reason has, according to Hume, a directive, though not a determining influence on actions through our will. Let us call it the action-guiding view of reason. If one takes the action-guiding view of reason an interesting point would emerge. To say that reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood is to imply that the action-guiding business of reason can only be asserting indicative sentences. Such sentences state or say that something is, or is not, the case. Now telling some one that something is, or is not, the case is not primarily intended to guide actions. There is another class of sentences, i.e., imperatives, which are primarily action-guiding. This is an influential contemporary view. The philosophers of the *Mīmāṃsā* school in India also held a similar position. If an indicative sentence has action-guiding force, they said, it should rather be construed then as a disguised imperative. It turns out then that action-guiding need not be any task of reason *vis-a-vis* determination of the will. Hume, we have seen, assi-

similates reasons to mental causes, and if that be the case, it seems sensible to ask whether one can have a notion of reason, which would perform both the tasks of guiding and determining actions. This should be unexceptionable on Hume's terms. His view of mental causes of actions is such that they not only guide or direct our action, determine them as well; and thereby render actions reasonable or unreasonable in the sense of their explicability in causal terms.

Hume's thesis that actions do not imply any reference to other actions is grounded in his epistemological view that actions are simple impressions. It may be a conceptual point to say that entitative simplicity of actions implies their non--intentionality. I do not wish to consider this point in the present context. Rather, I should like to point out that actions, despite their simplicity, can hardly be taken to constitude a homogeneous collection. The concept of action extends over diverse human phenomena, from man's communicative enterprises such as speech-acts to a variety of his committed behaviour called moral, political and even economic actions. Again, such actions can become significant only in a non-solipsistic world. This means that the epistemological status of actions as simple impressions does not matter much in respect of their relevance in a social world, where we find ourselves either as agents or spectators.

The non-intentionality of human actions, as a thesis, can be taken to deny any logical relationship between actions.

Speech-acts are an important sub-class of human actions. Suppose a speaker makes a speech-act saying that he did not make another speech-act. Let us designate the two speech-acts as S_2 and S_1 respectively. Now our speaker makes S_2 or says that he did not say S_1. If he is lying, we have two real speech-acts such that they cannot be true together. If he is not lying, we have one real speech-act, and the other is intentional. In both the cases S_2 implies a reference S_1. We may consider another situation, which would illustrate the fact that the word 'consistent' is used for principles as well as human actions. Some one says to another person, 'What you say now is not consistent with what you said last week'. What comes into question is not only the consistency of the propositions asserted, but also of the two speech-acts made by the addressee. The use of the word 'consistent' in this case is not necessarily a metaphorical one. It is no less interesting that abstracted from social situations in which human actions are performed, any question concerning their intentionality tends to lose its significance. If any action implies a reference to another, this may itself be a matter pertinent to the situation or context in which it is performed.

Again, the social world, which is the domain of our actions, is a continuous world. And in such a world as this there may be no reason to suppose that actions are disparate. Some form of necessity binds them together. The action of forming a political party and the action of framing its constitution are related by what we may sometimes like to call 'historical necessity'. Politi-

cal and economic decisions often entail (in whichever sense of the term) actions that do imply a reference to one another. Such actions, had they been referentially opaque, would have remained inexplicable to political and economic spectators. Furthermore, according to Hume, 'necessity' lies in a determination of the mind of a spectator, if that be the way we have got to look at human actions, causal relationship between actions would also allow actions to imply a reference to other actions. There are regularities in human actions, and these occur in a governed manner. Should it be unexceptionable to allow that there are no radical discontinuities among actions, it could then be thought that these implied a reference to one another. This may not be a knock-down argument against Hume's view of actions, it is at least worth considering. If it be possible to hold that causal relationship operates on the level of motives and actions, it need not be absurd to say that such a relationship would be un-ubiquitous on the level of actions.

Human actions are identified by the world they bring about. An action is said to transform a given world into another. Let an action a_0 transform the p-world into the q-world. Similarly, another action a_1 brings about the r-world. To use von Wright's notation, a_0 is causally efficient for pTq, and a_1 for qTr. Now if the worlds pTq and qTr are not discontinuous, then actions a_0 and a_1, identifiable as these are in terms of a common social world, should not be referentially opaque. Hume himself admits that actions leave something behind in the actor, i.e., his

intentions, and actions arise from him, and in this way actions stand related to one another. Often do we take into account the agent's past actions in order to arrive at an estimate of his present actions. Ascription of responsibility, on Hume's terms, requires us to look for something "durable" in the agent; similarly, evaluation of actions in relation to the agent's conduct or character may not be made if his actions were isolated phenomena. Actions are inalienably related with actors on the one hand, and the social world on the other. To say that actions are simple impressions implying no reference to one another is to rob actions of their concrete social character. Any attempt to settle the questions concerning reasonableness or unreasonableness of human actions solely on epistemological grounds, not only denies the possibility of a social science, but leaves the issue in a state of practical disquiet.

There are philosophers who have argued that human social behaviour is to be understood as rule-following behaviour. Human actions in social situations are meaningful actions. Meanings are attached to their actions by human agents, and as for the spectator, what matters is whether such actions are rule-following behaviour. The rules that govern human social behaviour are public, this implies that criteria are available for assessing human actions. It is also said that the relationship between rule--following and making behaviour intelligible to oneself or to others is conceptual, since it is a connexion of meaning. To borrow an example from H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law, the

connexion between the lights turning red and the cars stopping is conceptual, for in terms of the rules governing our behaviour on the road a red light means stop. This connexion of meaning is not causally explicable as is that between clouds and rains for instance. The intelligibility of our social life depends on the meaningfulness of our social actions, and if such of our actions are not referentially opaque, rather imply a reference to one another, it is because the relationship that holds between these in one of meaning.

Actions, according to the view sketched above, can be called reasonable or unreasonable only with reference to the rules governing human behaviour in social situations. What we are consider is what is expected of an human agent in a social situations, given the rules. On that view, there would moreover be no asymmetry between the agent's and the spectator's way of looking at actions, since, given the publicity of the rules and the fact that human actions are rule-following social behaviour, the only term on which we can understand ourselves are those on which other people can also understand us. The criteria of significance of actions is the logic of the social order.

All these point to an interesting matter. Hume also is aware of the importance of rules in society. On page 210 of the Enquiry we notice that he speaks about traffic rules. In another passage on page 239 we are told that rules of conduct are "the result of our calm passions, (for what else can pronounce any object eligible or the contrary?)". It would not be to have Hume's remark mistaken

if it were said that in the passage cited he was endorsing some connexion between actions and the rules governing the actions. The calm passions are operationally reason-like and become settled principles of action. Reasonableness or unreasonableness of actions may then be a matter to be decided in reference to, what Hume calls, "our calm and general principles". When such principles determine our actions, these should be called "eligible" or reasonable, and unreasonable, if contrary to the determination. The rules that guide human actions in social situations, or social rules, may also be considered as principles of calm passions. Such rules are intersubjective or general; and Hume tells us on page 531 of the Treatise that general rules are formed by extending "our motives beyond those very circumstances, which gave rise to them". In a passage on page 583, it has been remarked that "a general calm determination of the passions.... [is] founded on some distant view or reflexion". In this capacity the calm passions are reason-like, or so-called reason. There is another consideration which adds force to the intersubjective or a general nature of social rules. Advantages of language depends upon in allowing us to communicate with our fellow men, and for this purpose, a general rule of usage must be observed by people speaking the language. Similarly, there is in society a tacit agreement to abide by intersubjective standards if its members are to perform meaningful actions. It is a matter of convenience, or in Hume's terminology social rules are artificial.

To consider one of his own examples: "Waggoners, coachmen, and postilions have principles, by which they give the way". This means that, for Hume traffic rules are <u>artificial</u>. Now giving way by the traffic rules is a rule-guided action. Would Hume be prepared to say that there holds a <u>conceptual</u> relationship between the traffic rules and giving way according to them? A difficult question indeed to answer. Let us take another case. Borrowing money and paying back one's debt are actions guided by artificial rules, and each one of them implies a reference to the other. In that case, there might be no fair reason to suppose that these are conceptually unrelated. The unclarity about the logical status of <u>artificial</u> rules would have the issue left undecided. Even then, it appears that Hume would go a long way with those philosophers who argue for the intersubjective nature of social rules, and for rule-guidedness of human actions. He would even agree with them in holding that language is essentially social, though it may not be said with certainty if he would also say that human actions in social situations is essentially linguistic. He would rather say that learning a language is learning to share rules with others in a community, just as learning to behave meaningfully is to learn to behave according to public rules. On that score, he should concede that there are normative constraints of actions, and in this sense, actions can be reasonable or unreasonable, just as linguistic usage can be correct or incorrect. But in both the cases, for Hume, the primary consideration for having rules is the advantage or utility in view. Of course, in another way, it might be suggested that

given the social nature of man meaningfulness of human actions is *defined* in terms of the rules of social situations. We are inhabitants of a non-solipsistic world, our passions, which motivate us to act in social situations, are "social passions". Even pride, which Hume tells us is a "pure" emotion, is a "social passion" in Book III of the *Treatise*, and it is rightly so. Since if our passions be social passions, they would presuppose social standards of worthiness, and could only be experienced in a non-solipsistic world. (Hume's explicit statement in this regard occurs on page 491 of the *Treatise*: "*Vanity* is rather to be esteem'd a social passion". We might in this context overlook the subtle difference between pride as self-esteem and vanity as the desire of reputation. What is more important is the fact that both pride and vanity have the same qualities, circumstances and causes.) It seems arguable that given "human conventions" or "human society" (the phrases are Hume's), human actions in social situations would be rule-guided, and if that be the case as Hume also agrees, such actions would acquire meaningfulness by their being connected with one another in terms of the social rules. Hence the question of reasonableness and unreasonableness would not remain irrelevant to the locus of human actions. Hume's own story in Book III shows that his social philosophy does not appear at all places agree with his philosophy of the passions.

He treats the words 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable' as cognates of 'truth' and 'falsity'. One might feel that he wishes the words to be differentiated from such words with commendatory force as 'laudable' or 'blameable'. But can we say of an action that it is

laudable *and* unreasonable? Something sounds unhappy about the conjunction. If 'reasonable' be primarily a descriptive epithet, by virtue of its being a cognate of 'truth', even then we cannot perhaps say that to commend an action as laudable is unrelated to its being reasonable or unreasonable. There is a sense in which to say that an action is reasonable is also to engage in commending it. Even if Hume consents to allow the use of the words 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable', he might yet maintain that these words behave in logical independence from such words as 'laudable' and 'blameable'. This would be consistent with his notion of reason as the discovery of truth or falsehood.

We have so far tried to bring forward the suggestions of two views implicit in Hume. According to one, we can use the words 'reasonable' etc., in the context of human actions only if these are causally explicable. This may be called the regularity view. The other states that reasonableness or unreasonableness of human actions is a matter to be decided only in the context of social rules. Meaningfulness of human actions in social situations is implied by their rule-guidedness. Let us call this the rule-guidedness view. Now what could be the relationship between rules and regularities in terms of Hume's philosophical position? The two views are not so incompatible as it might be supposed. An avowal of either of them need not entail a rejection of the other. Often display of regularities in human actions are used as evidence for the existence of rules. The regular aspect leads us to look for a meaning to actions. To Hume, in social situations and for

actions, regularity implies rules. On page 499 of the <u>Treatise</u> he tells us that "the actions themselves are artificial". This should mean that human actions in social situations become explicable in terms of the concepts available to the agents and spectators. Such concepts are the mirror-image of the social rules which shape their lives in their society. The <u>artificial</u> rules <u>define</u> the human society. And hence among human actions there holds a connexion of meaning. A tacit admission of this may be read into the following passage on page 490: "<u>the actions of each of us have a reference to those of the other</u>, and are perform'd upon the supposition, that something is to be perform'd on the other part. Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, tho' they have never given promises to each other" (italics not in the text). This characterisation of human actions hardly suggests that the data of regularity are either unnecessary or illusory. Regularity is necessary, though not always sufficient for the explanation of human actions.

We are at the end of our study of Book II of Hume's <u>Treatise</u> where the relationship of reason to passions and action has been one of the most crucial issues raised by him.

Some of Hume's contentions in this regard have been harsh and loud. For example, his thesis that "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" would have appeared preposterous to Descartes, who, in his <u>The Passions of the Soul</u>, Article 50, wrote, "There is no soul so weak that it cannot, if well

[illegible], together as [illegible] over his passions". In contin-uously putting his figure of the slave against that of the so-vereign, Hume was only betraying the fact that he was a true child of the Enlightenment. His insistence on the contention that rea-son neither influences the will nor gives rise to moral judgments, nor determines our choices, is owing to his view that reason does not have any part in producing those associations of ideas by which men think and live. The Enlightenment was not an age of rea-son, but a revolt against rationalism, which consisted in exaggera-ted claims for man's power to control his passions. The analysis of passions was a celebration for the philosophers of this age. Diderot was convinced that without passion nothing could be done either in the arts or in the civilization as a whole. Alexander Pope (*Essay on Man*, II, 53-202) has devoted many lines of argumenta-tion to showing that the motive or the principal determining force in man's life was not reason, but the complex of instincts and passions which made up our natural constitution. Hume has argued that all efforts, all activity spring from passion. His rehabili-tation of the passions should be viewed as a part of the programme of the Enlightenment's rehabilitation of man as a natural creature: "man's as perfect as he ought".

I should like to say further that Hume dismissed reason as a motive to human actions without exalting unreason. The fallacy of the Enlightenment's revolt against reason lay in the fact that it was also a revolt against anti-rationalism. To explore the limits of rea-son and the range of the passions does not oblige one to embrace

either unreasonable rationalism, or anti-rationalism. Hume's view concerning the relationship between reason and passion steers clear between the pre-Enlightenment misconceptions about the limits of reason and the range of the passions. On page 493 of the Treatise he has stated what may be called his 'passionate naturalism'. Hume writes: "Human nature being compos'd of two principal parts, which are requisite in all its actions, affections and understanding; 'tis certain that the blind motions of the former, without the direction of the latter, incapacitate men for society". This recalls Goya's obiter dicta. The sleep of reason, said he, begets monsters, and united with reason the imagination is the mother of all arts and the source of their wonders. Hume, too, no less wryly regrets man's susceptibility to irrational impulses.

His too narrow view of reason (i.e. inferring of logical relationships and our power of arriving at beliefs about causal connexions) apart, Hume had to invoke other senses of 'reason'. These are non-theoretical, rather practical, general and philosophically idiomatic. A calm-passion, or a social rule is reason or reason-like in this respect. But why did he have to do this? Here is a lesson that we should learn from him. Matters of moral sciences are substantive, hence cannot be expected to be settled by logical analysis alone. The relationship of reason to human actions is one such issue. Human motivation does not occur in a vacuum, and actions are social phenomena. Whatever connexion reason may have with human actions is only to be ascertained in the

content of society. Reason and passion, or for that matter, actions, are distinct. And this is a matter of theory of knowledge. But it should not be forgotten that Hume, who insisted on the strictest possible separation of facts and values, also insisted on the social relevance of reason in its practical senses. Without keeping in view the image of the human agent as an interacting individual (in politics, economics and history -- the moral sciences for Hume) any attempt to settle the matter of the relationship between reason and passion or human motivation would succumb to a sort of epistemological schizophrenia. In a far more important sense than the truth or falsity of a belief about causal connexions or matters of fact human actions can be reasonable or unreasonable. Despite his uneven emphases Hume does in no manner leave us in any doubt about this. The point of his anthropology is that man is a social person, and the science of man cannot dispense with the social perspective of human actions. In the closing section of Book III of the *Treatise* Hume has contrasted the functions of the anatomist with that of the painter. The former, it may be said, concentrates on what could be known, simplicity and logical analysis. The latter is more ambitious and seeks to be comprehensive. Human nature being what it is, simplicity and comprehensiveness are both necessary ingredients for a proper understanding of human nature, a point, which I submit, is well incorporated into Hume's anthropology in spite of its apparent ambiguities and obscurities.

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