

Chapter: 2

Quest for universal Metaphysics

In the first Chapter of this thesis we have tried to understand the nature of metaphysics by following by Classical Greek philosophy. They did metaphysics in the name of searching the ‘_first principle’. For them there is no difference between Philosophy and metaphysics, because both of them try to analyze and explore the fundamental or the basic truth of the reality. For The classical Greek thinkers, Philosophy is not something that subsists independently of the growth and decay of the spirit of man. It goes hand in hand with political, social, religious and artistic development. The philosophy of this classical Greek tradition influenced many great thinkers in later history of time. It is believed that it also inspired many Christian scholastic thinkers in formulating the Christian religious thought.

But for many critics the intense subjectivism is essential mark of the failure of Greek thought, which can be seen as a feature of all the post-Aristotelian schools. The pure scientific spirit, the desire for knowledge for its own sake, is gone. The motive power of philosophy is no longer the disinterested pursuit of truth, but only the desire of the individual to escape from the ills

of life. Philosophy only interests men in so far as it affects their lives. It becomes anthropocentric and egocentric. Everything pivots on the individual subject, his destiny, his fate, the welfare of his soul. Philosophy is now expected to do work of religion, and to be a haven of refuge from the storms of life. Thus for many thinkers classical Greek Philosophy results in the philosophy of Medieval period.

This kind of subjectivism has its necessary consequences, one-sidedness, absence of originality, and finally complete skepticism. Men no longer have universal, all-embracing systems like those of Classical Greek philosophers. Metaphysics, physics, logic are not studied for their own sakes, but only as preparations for religion. Absence of originality is a consequence of the subjectivism of the age. In this age philosophy is actually a revival of old thought.

With the rediscovery of Aristotle in the thirteenth century, after a period of ignorance of his philosophy in the west, realism about universals became the accepted view. There was, however, a connection between the issues over universals and theological issues because this period was totally dominated by Christian thought. If we analyze the development of

philosophy then we can see that philosophy contain two main periods, apart from the medieval period, namely the ancient period and the modern period. The ancient period, consists of philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, and the modern period, when the speculative reason once more began to enjoy freedom after the dark night of the *Middle Ages*.

In this present chapter, of the thesis we are trying to make a comparative study between the theosophy of medieval thinkers and the philosophy of some modern thinkers, to find out the answer to the question, ‘whether the essence of classical Greek metaphysical study get lost in the darkness of medieval era?’ or is it revised in the philosophical discourse of modern era?

Philosophy is founded upon reason. It is the effort to understand the reality of things intellectually. Hence, it cannot admit anything higher than reason. But in the middle age the place of reason is replaced by religious faith. In this era of philosophy, the human spirit had first to pass through the arid wastes of Scholasticism. The great majority of mediaeval philosophers or the philosophers of meddle age were priests and theologians, so, it is obvious for us to find a great relation between philosophy and theology in their philosophical thinking. The main metaphysical concerns of medieval philosophers were similarly theologically oriented, particularly the existence of God and the nature of soul. Anselm in the eleventh century

became famous for his ontological proof for the existence of God, maintaining that God's existence followed from the fact that God is that than which no greater can be conceived. The great Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century took a more Aristotelian line on the arguments for God's existence, relying in the main on considerations concerning the supposed nature of the world which point to the need to assume the existence of a deity. So after Aristotle western philosophy was totally dominated by religion. That period is generally known as the age of theology. So, the religion took the place of philosophy in human thinking. The period of A.D.400- A.D.1400 is counted as the era of medieval philosophy. During this period, philosophy was used as a tool to form certain theological belief, like the existence of God'. Greek Philosophy of Plato, Aristotle was used to elucidate theology. Philosophy in this period is characteristically theological. Medieval thinkers did not consider themselves philosophers at all; their concerns are theological. Although some thinkers of this age like St. Augustine, St. Anselm St. Thomas Aquinas etc. are important for their contributions to prepare the ground for the rise of modern philosophy. Medieval philosophy was subordinate to Christian theology.

But at the same time it is undoubtedly true that we can trace a progressive emancipation of philosophy from theology from the beginning of philosophical reflection in the early middle Ages up to the modern era.

St. Augustine (A.D.354 to A.D. 430) shared with all his contemporaries the belief that it was the business of philosophy to discover the way to wisdom and thereby to show men the way of happiness or blessedness (*beatitudo*). So, this wisdom is not purely theoretical. It deals not only with questions about physical universe, about man's own nature, about God but it shows men the way to happiness. After his conversion, Augustine accepted Christianity as the only way to happiness, and therefore, as the only true —philosophy—. The ultimate source of the saving truths taught by Christianity was the scriptures, which for Augustine had supplanted the teachings of the philosophers as the gate way to truth. Hence, authority rather than reasoning, faith rather than understanding came to be the emphasis of Christian Philosophy. In his book *De Doctrina Christiana* Augustine discusses the way in which the various intellectual disciplines may serve to assist the Christian in understanding the faith. Philosophy along with the other branches of learning is here seen as subordinated to the service of a purpose outside it, that of nourishing and deepening faith; it is no longer to be pursued for its own sake, as an independent avenue to truth. Therefore, Augustine is not interested in philosophy in the modern sense of the word. Philosophical concepts and arguments play a subordinate role in

his work; and where they occur; they are usually employed to help in the elucidation of some aspects of Christian doctrine.

St. Anselm (A.D. 1033 to A.D.1109) the Archbishop of Canterbury, like the other medieval philosophers, made no clear distinction between theology and philosophy. Anselm's Ontological argument for the proof of God's existence makes him important in the history of theological development. In his book *Monologium* Anselm develops the ontological proof of God's existence from the degrees of perfection which are found in creatures. He develops his ontological argument in the following way:

—God is that than which no greater can be thought:

But that than which no greater can be thought must exist,

Not only mentally, in idea, but also extra mentally:

Therefore God exists, not only in idea, mentally, but also extra-mentally”^{xxiv}.

This ontological proof for the existence of God starts from the idea of God as that than which no greater can be conceived, i.e. as absolute perfect being: that is what is meant by —God”. Modern philosopher like Rene

Descartes claims to provide a proof demonstrating the existence of God from the idea of a supremely perfect being was fully influenced by Anselm's ontological argument. Descartes adopted the idea; Leibniz defended it in an ingenious manner. Kant attacked it. So, the influence of St. Anselm on the history of modern philosophy is unforgettable.

St. Thomas Aquinas is another medieval thinker, who asserted the independence of philosophy as a separate branch of study. His philosophy is a rethinking of Aristotelianism. Aquinas' work in philosophy is a temperamental tendency to seek a middle way on questions that have been given a wide range of answers. For centuries philosophers had debated whether genera and species are realities in themselves or mere mental constructs. What made this discussion important was the conviction that these universals (such as humanity, justice, whiteness, dogness) are the primary objects of human understanding. Most thinkers in the middle ages felt that if something is to be explained, it must be treated in universal terms. Therefore, the problem of universals was not simply an academic question. Aquinas's position on this problem is now called moderate realism. He denied that universals are existing realities, but he also insisted that men's universal concepts and judgments have some sort of foundation in extra mental things. This basis for the universality, say of humanity,

would consist in the real similarity found among all individual men. It was not that Aquinas attributed an actual, existent universal nature to all individual men: that would be an extreme realism. Though Aquinas adopts the Aristotelian statement that First Philosophy or metaphysics studies being as being but it is perfectly clear that he does not presuppose a notion from which reality is to be deduced. But he starts from the existent world and inquires what its being is, how it exists, what is the condition of its existence. Moreover, his thought concentrates on the Supreme Existence. Being a Christian philosopher and theologian, Aquinas not only sees metaphysics as the science of being as being but also emphasizes the view that metaphysics or First Philosophy is totally directed to the knowledge of God as the last end. St. Thomas Aquinas attempts to reconcile Aristotelian thought with Christian theology. The first of the five proofs of God's existence given by Aquinas is that from motion, which is found in Aristotle. —...there is something which is always moved through an uninterrupted motion, and this motion is circular (as is evident not merely by argument but as a matter of fact), and consequently the primary heaven will be eternal.

But there will then also be something that moves them. And since that which is moved and which also moves is an intermediate, it follows that

there must be something that moves without being moved. This will be eternal, it will be a substance and it will be activation.”^{xxv}

Following Aristotle, Aquinas argues that everything which is moved is moved by another. If that other is itself moved, it must be moved by yet another agent. As an infinite series is impossible, we come in the end to an unmoved mover, a first mover and this unmoved mover is God. When Aristotle argued to the existence of an unmoved mover, he was answering a metaphysical problem; but when St. Anselm and St. Thomas proved God’s existence, they were showing the rational foundation for the acceptance of a revelation in which they already believed. Christian writers and Fathers applied Greek philosophy as a preparation for Christian wisdom because most of the mediaeval thinkers were primarily theologians. The development of philosophy in the Christian world had always a connection to theology. Looking back from the present day, we can see that Greek philosophy helps mediaeval Scholastic development.

St Anselm, St Thomas Aquinas and St Augustine prepared a path for modern philosophy as in their philosophy both the rights of reason and the rights of revelation were recognized. From this era the position of philosophy was changed. Modern philosophy is generally said to have begun with Descartes or with Francis Bacon. Sometimes it is said that

modern philosophy is autonomous; it is the product of reason alone, whereas mediaeval philosophy was subordinate to Christian theology. In the Middle Ages theology was esteemed as the supreme science, and we find theologians, who were also philosophers. But in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries we find philosophers, some of whom believed in Christianity while others did not. Seventeenth century philosopher like Descartes, Spinoza Locke etc. were fundamentally in the same position with today's philosophers who happens to be a Christian but who is not, in the professional sense, a theologian. Descartes was the first who tried to establish a philosophy in a systematic way, which was free from any theological dogma. He replaced reason in the place of faith. Descartes' philosophy was a revival of Aristotelian philosophy. Inspired by Aristotle's *Metaphysics* he named his book *Meditations on First Philosophy*. Descartes' book is both a challenge to authority and an enquiry into the nature of knowledge rather than faith. There is a meaningful distinction between metaphysical knowledge and religious experience. The mediaeval tradition in philosophy takes it largely for granted that metaphysical knowledge is both a way to and a form of religious experience. In his book, *Meditations on First Philosophy* Descartes, decidedly assume that philosophy, or the quest for metaphysical knowledge, must be detached from religious commitment. In invoking 'First Philosophy' Descartes' casts us back into the Aristotelian roots of metaphysical philosophy. According

to Aristotle, First Philosophy is the study of being qua being. But there are some difference between Descartes' understanding of First Philosophy and Aristotelian understanding of First Philosophy. For Descartes, First Philosophy is the study of that which is necessary for the experience of particulars rather than the study of that which is necessary for the being of particulars. Descartes' orientation to philosophy was mainly epistemological in character; it might indeed be said that his metaphysics was founded on epistemological considerations. In this context it can be said that Descartes opinion concerning the nature and function of Philosophy is quite similar with the opinion of Plato. As for Plato the main purpose of Philosophy is to have knowledge of unchanged reality. By following the Socratics' definition of Philosophy Plato in his book V of *Republic* writes, —Socrates defines what he means by philosopher, a lover of wisdom. True knowledge is concerned not with the physical world of the senses but with the qualities, the realities, that are inherent in the everyday world—with Beauty, not with beautiful sounds and colours. The changing world of the senses is the object of opinion, but the unchanging world of the realities is the object of true knowledge or wisdom, and it is this wisdom that true philosophers love^{xxvi}.

However, Descartes' main project was to construct a grand, all-embracing system of philosophy which would encompass metaphysics, natural science, psychology and morals, connecting all the objects within the scope of human understanding. Descartes was interested in mathematics because he thought mathematics gives us knowledge, which is certain and self-evident (especially Geometry). His vision was to establish a philosophy which gives us certain and self-evident knowledge like mathematics. For this reason, he wished to demolish everything completely and start again right from foundation. Descartes speaks of discovering the first principles of everything which exist naturally in our souls. According to Descartes we can construct metaphysics and physics by logical deduction from a number of innate ideas implanted in the mind by nature or by God. All clear and distinct ideas are innate. And all scientific knowledge is knowledge by means of innate ideas. For Descartes, the idea of God is innate. Such ideas are not, indeed, innate in the sense that they are present in the newborn baby's mind as fully-fledged ideas. But the mind produces them, as it were, out of its own potentialities. Mind does not derive them from sense-experience. Because empirical hypothesis cannot provide us real scientific knowledge and Descartes' project was to find a scientific knowledge which is absolutely certain. As a preliminary to the search for absolute certainty he thought that it was necessary to doubt all that could be doubted and to treat provisionally as false all that could be doubted. He was interested in

mathematics because he thought mathematics gives us knowledge, which is certain and self-evident knowledge like mathematics. As he said that —But I noticed, immediately afterwards, that while I thus wished to think that everything was false, it was necessarily the case that I, who was thinking this, was something. When I noticed that this truth I think, therefore I am was so firm and certain that all the most extravagant assumptions of the skeptics were unable to shake it, I judge that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy for which was searching.

Then, when I was examining what I was, I realized that I could pretend that I had no body, and that there was no world nor and place in which I was present, but I could not pretend in the same way that I did not exist.^{»xxvii} Descartes' doubt is methodic in the sense that it is practiced not for the sake of doubting but as a preliminary stage in the attainment of certainty and in shifting the true from false.

Descartes employed methodic doubt with a view to discovering whether there was any indubitable truth or not. He said, —But I have persuaded myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world: no sky, no minds, no bodies. Is it then the case that I too do not exist? But doubtless I did exist, if I persuaded myself something^{»xxviii}. ...”And let [the evil genius] do his best at deception, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I shall

think that I am something. Thus after everything has been most carefully weighed, it must finally be established that this pronouncement ‘I am, I exist’ is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind^{xxix}.

Descartes both in the *Discourse on Method* and in the *Meditation on First Philosophy*, describes how he was applying the method of doubt and rejecting one proposition after another as not being what he required, he realized that in order to doubt anything he must exist. According to Descartes however I doubt, I must exist; otherwise I could not doubt. So it is impossible to be mistaken about the proposition that – I exist. The same could be said for the proposition – ‘I think’: because to doubt something is to think, then it is impossible to believe that one is thinking unless one is indeed thinking; it is impossible to believe that one is thinking and to be mistaken. Doubting is a form of thinking. Then, I am thinking, therefore I exist—this is known as cogito argument, *cogito ergo sum* (I think, therefore I exist). According to Descartes, things which we conceive very clearly and distinctly are all true. In the *Principles of Philosophy* Descartes tells us that --I call that clear which is present and apparent to an attentive mind, in the same way as we assert that we see objects clearly when, being present to the beholding eye, they operate upon with sufficient strength. But the distinct is that which is so precise and different from all other objects that it contains within itself nothing but what is clear. So he says that I affirm the proposition, I think, therefore I am, not because I apply some extrinsic

criterion of truth, but simply because I see clearly and distinctly that so it is. The certainty of the cogito is, for Descartes, a curiously temporary affair: I can be sure of my existence only for as long as I am thinking. But from this fleeting and flickering insight, Descartes attempts to reconstruct a whole system of reliable knowledge. Here Descartes introduces the idea of God.

After discovered the indubitable truth, *Cogito, ergo sum*, Descartes inquires for a general criterion of certainty. Descartes tried to establish a general rule that is-- about a person's perception of all things which very clear and very distinct are true. According to Descartes, we affirm the proposition I think, therefore I am, not because we apply some extrinsic criterion of truth, but simply because we see clearly and distinctly that so it is. But the matter is not so simple as it appears. In the book *Discourse on Method* Descartes said that, "Having noticed that there is nothing at all in the proposition 'I think, therefore I am' which convinces me that I speak the truth, apart from the fact that I see very clearly that one has to exist in order to think, I judge that I could adopt as a general rule that those things that we conceive very clearly and distinctly are all true. The only outstanding difficulty is in recognizing which ones we conceive distinctly"^{xxx}. After that, he thought — as my being is not completely perfect so, I have to think about something that is more perfect than me and that is God. For God, the supremely

perfect being, liable to no error or defect to exists. It is certainty about God's existence which enables us to apply universally and confidently the criterion of truth. Descartes also considered that – as a less perfect being I have to depend on some more perfect being and from which I receive everything that I have. To prove God's existence, Descartes introduced the ontological argument. In connection of this theme Descartes analyzed that—if all which I know clearly and distinctly as pertaining to this object really does belong to it, may I not derive from this an argument demonstrating the existence of God? He also said that—as I know, for example, that all the properties which I clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to the essence of a triangle really do belong to it. Can I demonstrate the existence of God by considering the perfection contained in the idea of God? Descartes answered that this is possible. For existence is itself one of the perfections of God and belongs to the divine essence. The divine essence, however, being supreme perfection, comprises existence, which is itself a perfection. Hence we cannot conceive of God except as existing. In point of fact we cannot understand the idea of God, which expresses His essence, and at the same time denies His existence. In this regard Descartes said that — it is not within my power to think of God without existence (that is, of a supremely perfect being devoid of a supreme perfection), though it is in my power to imagine a horse either with wings or without

wings. Thus, according to Descartes this idea of a perfect being cannot be thought apart from His existence.

Substance plays a central role in Descartes philosophy. Descartes defined substance as an existent thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist. Strictly speaking, there is only one substance, namely, God, for He alone exists in Himself and through Himself and does not involve the existence of anything else. However, besides God, there are two relative substances, namely, mind and body. Each can exist without the other, though both of them depend on God for their existence. The attribute of mind is thought and the attribute of body is extension. There is no real casual connection between mind and body. The relation between mind and body is known as interactionism. So, we can see that Descartes affirmed the existence of two different types of substances, spiritual and material. In this sense of the word he can be called a dualist. But Descartes was not a dualist in the sense that he postulated two ultimate, independent principles. There is a plurality of finite minds and there is a plurality of bodies. But both finite minds and bodies depend on God as creator. God is the link between the spheres of finite spiritual substances and material substances. Descartes felt that by using a method of systematic doubt he could come to at least one indubitable true proposition—the assertion of the self's existence and this would then lead on to other equally certain propositions—the assertion

of God's existence. Descartes was convinced with the fact that by doubting one can establish his own existence which is beyond doubt and self-evident. As we have seen, Aristotle considered that it is metaphysics' business to seek self-evident premises — assumptions so basic that their evidence could be obtained only by considering them and not by referring them to any assumptions more basic. Descartes' approach has been helpful to metaphysics, for he raised the question of the starting point of philosophy itself.

When we turn to Spinoza, we find that although the monistic system of him is opposed to the pluralistic system of Descartes, there are equally obvious connections. It can hardly be denied that Cartesianism exercised an influence on the mind of Spinoza but it does not follow that his monism was adopted from Descartes. Descartes defined substance as an existent thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist. But Descartes did not draw any conclusion like Spinoza that there is only one substance, God, and that all creatures are simply modifications of God. He said that the term substance' can be predicated in an equivocal sense of God and of other beings. So, Descartes applies the term primarily to God and then secondarily, and analogically, to other beings. Substance is defined by Spinoza as, cause of itself: it is explained through itself and not by

reference to any external cause. This definition of substance implies that substance is completely self-dependent. Like Descartes, Spinoza, however, adopting a similar definition of substance, drew the conclusion that there is only one substance, God and that creatures cannot be more than modifications of the divine substance. In this sense his system is a development of that of Descartes. At the same time this two systems are very different as Descartes begins with the *cogito, ergo sum*, not with God but Spinoza starts his philosophy with God.

Substance is defined by Spinoza as that which is in itself and is conceived through itself: I mean that the conception of which does not depend on the conception of another thing from which it must be formed. Then substance is what Spinoza calls “cause of itself”, it is explained through itself and not by reference to any external cause. Therefore, the definition implies that substance is completely self-dependent. As Spinoza’s substance or God is an all-inclusive whole, outside of which nothing can lie, so Nature conceived as a whole is identical with God. Hence God and Nature are one. Here we can see the influence of Parmenides on Spinoza. The Greek philosopher Parmenides had regarded the all as one, and the one as indivisible and perfect, similarly Spinoza affirmed that there is only one substance—God. Spinoza described God as infinite, unique, eternal and

simple substance. If God were distinct from Nature and if there were substances other than God, God would be finite. Conversely, if God is infinite, there cannot be other substances. Finite things cannot be understood or explained apart from God's causal activity. They cannot, therefore, be substances in the sense in which Spinoza has defined the term 'substance'. They must, then, be in God. Whatever is, ~~is~~ in God, and nothing can exist or be conceived without God". For Spinoza finite beings are mere modifications of God. God possesses an infinity of attributes, each of which is infinite; and of those two are known to us, namely, thought and extension. Finite minds are modes of God under the attribute of thought, and finite bodies are modes of God under the attribute of extension.

Spinoza's major metaphysical treatise is entitled *Ethics*, and this title indicates that his metaphysical proposals cannot be understood without his ethical intent. On the other hand, Descartes could never develop a moral theory that was clearly related to his beginning point and Aristotle made ethics into a practical affair not subject to the same rigor as metaphysical inquiry. Spinoza's *Ethics* tolerates no separation of speculation and human practice. The reason for metaphysical construction is to provide the framework necessary for moral achievement. To understand how this can be done, we must first understand what Spinoza means by "freedom".

According to Spinoza, freedom means a lack of outside interference in the development and action of a thing. In the natural development of the powers of the thing, freedom means that it encounters no block to its expression. Since there is only one substance, nothing outside His nature exist to limit him. On the other hand man can never achieve full freedom since his existence as a finite thing means that his natural drive to achieve a full expression for his powers is always subject to a threat from outside himself. Still, freedom for man is possible in the intellectual sense. To come to understand this is in a certain way to share in God's freedom by an intellectual grasp of the causes which establish things as they are. The result of this understanding is the dissipation of useless and frustrating emotions, since these arise only through ignorance of the causes which establish all things. A fruitless attempt to change a fixed order, or the mental anguish to protesting against it, provokes passion, but a proper understanding can eliminate this danger. Man becomes free to the extent that he achieves God's self-understanding and thus shares God's freedom from useless passion. This freedom involves the fact that "good" means simply existence, so that all are good to the extent that they exercise their full power to exist. To understand one's nature, its causes and its powers, and the necessary connection of these to Substance as a whole is to understand that good means fulfillment and that evil means the failure to achieve what Spinoza calls a —adequate idea" of this. Thus, the ethical life is intimately

bound up with the intellectual life and its successful achievement. According to Spinoza the —intellectual love of God” is the goal of all men, and it is the one goal which can be shared in by all without exclusion. To love God in this way means to seek an adequate understanding. This is how God understands Himself—by grasping all of substance under the aspect of eternity.

Therefore, understanding is the way to freedom from the obedience of the passions. And the highest function of the mind is to know God. Here, it is important to remember that for Spinoza God and Nature are the same. Everything is contained in God. Whenever we conceive things in their relation to the infinite casual system of Nature, we conceive them under the species of eternity‘. Actually, we conceive them as part of the logically connected infinite system. In this system everything is connected. So, in a way Spinoza accepts determinism. Acceptance of determinism arise an important problem in regard to ethics as determinism denies human freedom. Of course, Spinoza did not deny that we often feel‘ free, in the sense that we feel responsible for making a given choice some action. But determinism was partly maintained by Spinoza as he said that we feel ourselves to be free because we do not understand the causes of our actions and the causes which determine us to desire things and to have certain

motives. In this way, ultimately freedom becomes a problem in Spinoza's metaphysics.

The continental rationalist metaphysicians from Descartes to Leibniz eliminate the study of spiritual reality from philosophy. The assertion of the existence of spiritual substance and of God is integral to the Cartesian system, and in his theory of monads Leibniz, spiritualized body. In his philosophy Leibniz tried to reconcile Plato with Democritus, Aristotle with Descartes and the Scholastics with the moderns. Like his predecessor Descartes and Spinoza, Leibniz was biased for a mathematical method in philosophy and as such he intended to give a geometrical proof in metaphysics. To discuss Leibniz's logical principle, at first we have to explain the fundamental distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact. For Leibniz every proposition possesses the subject-predicate form. But propositions are not all of the same kind, and a distinction must be made between truths of reason and truths of fact. For Leibniz all truths of reason are necessarily true, and their truth rests on the principle of contradiction. On the other hand, truths of fact are not necessary propositions, their opposites are conceivable; and they can be denied without logical contradiction. Leibniz's truths of reason are analytic and his truths of fact are synthetic propositions. These truths of reason are analytic

and *a priori* in nature. So, like Descartes, Leibniz also accepts the idea of innate or *a priori* truths. He thought that certain truths are virtually innate in the sense that experience provides no more than the occasion on which the mind by its own light perceives their truths. One can perceive the truth of a self-evident principle only on the occasion of experience; but its truth does not depend on experience. Therefore, they are virtually innate rather than actually innate.

Leibniz's metaphysics is pluralistic in nature. Reality consists of infinity of monads or active substances, God being the supreme monad. Thus, as far as pluralism is concerned, his philosophy is more akin to that of Descartes than that of Spinoza. At the same time he did not believe that there are two radically different types of substances. Each monad is a dynamic and immaterial centre of activity; and no monad can be identified with geometrical extension. The world is a dynamic harmony, expressing the divine intelligence and will. In the case of man there is a dynamic unity between the monads of which he is composed. And so it is with the universe. There is a universal harmony of monads. And the principle of this harmony is God. The monads are so knit together that, even though one monad is reflected throughout the whole system in the divinely pre-established harmony. Each monad reflects the whole universe. Like

Descartes and Spinoza, Leibniz also tried to explain some metaphysical problems.

It is customary to divide pre-Kantian modern philosophy into two main divisions, the first is the rationalist divisions of the Continent, from Descartes to Leibniz and the second is the British empiricism, from Locke to Hume. This division has been maintained here. On the above section we have discussed about some metaphysical problems in the light of rationalists like Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz and also their effort to search a universal metaphysics accepted for all. Now we may discuss empiricists' position in this regard. Empiricist David Hume have tried to pave the path for true metaphysics but ended in skepticism.

The aim of Hume's Philosophy is to make a critical analysis of human mind to know its capacity of having the empirically verifiable knowledge. In explaining the purpose of Hume's famous book namely, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Prof. J.N Mohanty writes in the very introduction of the said book that, —Sectin I of the Enquiry may be taken as the Introduction to the book...We gather that his aim is to make an —accurate scrutiny into the powers and faculties of human nature,” —to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming

disorder, in which they lie involved, when made the object of reflexion and enquiry”— in other words, to build up a ~~m~~ental geography”^{xxxix}

However, it is generally believed that Hume has rejected metaphysics as meaningless discipline. But if we look intensely into the philosophy of David Hume then we can realize that Hume’s intension is to not demolish Philosophy as a whole. Here it is important to mention that Hume has made distinction between ‘true metaphysics’ and ‘false metaphysics’. He has tried to provide us tool to do to true metaphysics with care. For Hume false metaphysics concerned with supernatural concepts which does not have any factual basis. Being an empiricist philosopher Hume tried reduce all this supernatural concepts from the domain of Philosophy. However Hume considered that limitation of the power of human intelligence and senses. Thus he never denies the possibility of the discussion of certain concepts within the domain of Philosophy, which are important for living a meaningful life, although these concepts are not primarily verifiable by any empirical means. Hume leaves a room for ‘academical skepticism’ in his philosophy.

Hume is partly concerned with distinguishing true from false metaphysics, and for this purpose he recommends two methods: first, an accurate reasoning against all false metaphysics, and secondly, an examination of the faculties and powers of the human mind with a view to showing that the human mind is not fitted for such abstruse subjects.

In this regard a comment of Prof J.N. Mohanty is important to mention. As Prof Mohanty says, —It is a common error to suppose that Hume sought to demolish metaphysics by which he meant nothing other than all profound, abstract and accurate reasoning. ...He is aware of the fact that metaphysics has been the source of —uncertainty and error” and so is not a science in the strict sense that it tries to give knowledge of a sphere which lies beyond the limits of human understanding, and that it has a tendency to get entangled with religious prejudices and superstitions. Hume is also aware that metaphysical enquiries into the supersensible get —involved in inextricable difficulties, and even contradictions.” But all this for Hume is not enough reason why metaphysics should be rejected in *toto*. The fact that metaphysics has as yet failed to give us certain knowledge is no reason for that metaphysics should be abandoned, for —the motive of blind despair can never reasonably have a place in the sciences”. Therefore, we should try to cultivate true metaphysics with some care.””xxxii

Thus from analyzing and understanding the essence of philosophical discourse of some modern Philosophers and some scholastic thickeners we come to a position at least to say that the spirit of metaphysical discourses of classical Greek thinkers (Specially Socratic, Plato and Aristotle) do not lost in the darkness in the medieval period. It revised in the Philosophy of many modern thinkers like Descartes. Even the radical empiricist philosopher like David Hume leaves the space for certain metaphysical by leaving space for academic skepticism into the world of human knowledge.