

## Chapter-4

### ***Some Critical Evaluative Remarks and NavyaNyāya Defense:***

In this work an effort has been made to show how 'will-generated cognition' acts in a philosophical activity. The term 'will-generated cognition' (*'icchā-prayojya-jñāna'*) means 'cognition generated through the desire of an individual which is not determined by any compulsion'. Our will may have some determinants which may act as promoters to do some activities. At the same time it may be admitted that there are certain philosophical activities which are prompted by the will of an individual having no determinants at all. In this case, an individual's will alone is honoured in getting certain cognition, but not other factors. Sometimes an individual has no alternatives than to desire something in a particular situation, which I would like to call as 'situational will', i.e. will having some determinants. In case of pure 'will-generated cognition' (*icchā-prayojya-jñāna*) philosophical activity starts with the 'pure desire' or 'sweet will'. The role of such will has been admitted in Navya Nyāya and other systems of Philosophy. If a family faces some difficulty for maintaining his family, I may have some pious desire to help the family financially or otherwise. This is also a kind of will-generated cognition and action which is due to some moral compulsion in us. If an individual meets a road-accident, it is our moral compulsion to help the helpless person in many ways i.e., taking him to hospital, providing medicines etc. All

these actions are obviously will-generated being prompted by moral compulsion. This type of will-generated action is performed by all the sections of philosophers. But the NavyaNaiyāyikas have some specialties of their own, which needs a great attention of the scholars. Such type of desire-generated cognition is free without any moral compulsion or without any situational compulsion or without any illusory cognition. In this connection the following problems can be raised:

First, though the *āhārya*- type of cognition belongs to the category of wrong cognition (*apramā*), does it not have any positive effect in the field of philosophical enterprise? Though such cognition is purely a product of an individual's will (*icchājanyā*), is it arbitrary or purpose-oriented? If the former, it cannot be philosophically viable. If latter, it cannot be taken as "generated by free will". The concept of *āhārya*-cognition (deliberately imposed cognition) has been admitted in *NavyaNyāya*, which has already been discussed earlier. In order to give honour of an individual's desire certain philosophical activities start. The Navya Nyāya system, which is commonly known as realistic method school, has prescribed some methods in order to arrive at certain truth, which is purely 'deliberate' (*ichhājanya*). Among these *āhārya-jñāna* may serve as a means of knowing something indirectly. A problem may be raised how one can think of 'knowledge produced through desire' (*icchājanyajñāna*). A solution to this problem may be offered in the following way. Let us look towards the exact nature of *āhāryajñāna*. The knowledge, which is conduced out of one's own desire at the time when there is the contrary knowledge, is called *āhāryajñāna(virodha-jñāna-kālīnechhā-prayojya)*.<sup>1</sup>In order to justify the position of *NavyaNyāya* we can give another interpretation of such *āhārya* cognition, which is as follows. The word '*āhārya*' means 'artificial', which is found in the

*Bhaṭṭikāvya* where the ladies are described as *āhārya-śobhārahitairamāyaiḥ* (that is, free from artificial beauty). From this, it follows that the word ‘*anāhārya*’ means ‘natural’ which is expressed by the term ‘*amāyaiḥ*’. The *āhārya* knowledge has to be taken as an artificial knowledge on account of the fact that between two objects an object is *deliberately* thought as otherwise in spite of knowing the distinct character or real nature of these two objects.

Those who are self-realized can alone capture Truth (*satya*) in life, the definition of which is given by Śankara as follows: ‘*Satyamityamāyitā kāyamanovākyeṣu akauṭilyam*’ (*Sankarabhāṣya* on *Kenopaniṣad* Mantra no.4/5) That is, ‘adoption of truthfulness’ means ‘adoption of non-artificiality or naturality’ (*amāyitā*). An individual who is simple or non-crooked in speech, mind and action is called non-artificial or truthful or natural. In fact, a person having one to one correspondence between what he possesses in mental world, what he speaks and what he performs is considered as a truthful one. In the present day society a person is normally found to play hide and seek between the content of thinking and that speaking. An individual normally loves to speak something what he does not think or he prefers to act something what is not thought or spoken by him. It is a kind of hypocrisy which is called crookedness (*vakratā*) in a different way. If someone adopts non-crookedness in speech, mind and action, he is called true to himself, which is otherwise called *anāhārya* situation.. Such person is the locus of Truth which is, again, the abode of *Brahman* (“*tasyāyatanaṁ satyam*”). The term ‘*amāyika*’ means non-artificial or natural or simple. When an artificial means of knowing is adopted, it is called *āhāryajñāna*, which has got an indirect bearing of proving an object. Not only this the crooked type of saying which is called *vakrokti* has got some ornamental value in literature and hence it is taken as a kind of rhetoric or *alamkāra* due to having its suggesting or beautifying factor. The natural

way of speaking is called in literature as *svabhāvokti* as opposed to *vakrokti*. In the like manner, the artificial way of saying in logic has got an indirect bearing due to having its value to prove the otherwise.

Rāmānuja in his philosophy argues that when an individual says something which is true, loving and beneficial to others, acts to protect and relieve others with his body and thinks others welfare, benevolence and compassion through mind with due surrender to Lord, he is described as someone engaged in *bhajans* towards Lord.<sup>2</sup>It is told that a human being can feel for integrity for the society and social beings if he attains truth or abode of simplicity which is equivalent to the attainment of Brahman.

Another point has to be added in this connection. The term *amāyika* is the negation of *māyikatā* which, again, comes from the word *māyā*. It (*māyā*) has been described as ‘artificial form’. When it is called *māyāvana* (artificial forest), *māyākrandana* (artificial weeping), *māyāmṛga* (artificial deer), it is taken in an artificial sense. Magic is also called *māyā* and hence a magician is called *māyāvī* capable exhibiting artificial or illusory performances. From this it is to be taken that an individual free from artificiality is called *amāyika* or simple. In the level of epistemology there is a sort of artificially designed knowledge called *āhāryajñāna* which is described as will-generated cognition.

In these cases, one’s strong desire of thinking an object as otherwise acts as an instrument (*icchājanya*). It is to be borne in mind that the Navya Naiyāyikas have given much importance to *vivakṣā*(i.e. will to say). Let us cite some cases where the knowledge produced through the instrumentality of desire (*icchājanya*) is found. One is allowed to say ‘*sthālīpacati*’(‘The clay-pot cooks’) with the nominative case ending to the pot instead of the correct expression ‘*sthālyāpacati*’(cooking with clay pot) with the instrumental case ending with the

word *sthālī* if one so desire. Someone may also use locative case-ending with '*sthālī*' i.e., *sthālyāmpacati* (cooking in the clay pot), if he desires so. Though these usages are grammatically incorrect yet the grammarians have given the individual beings to exercise their strong intention which is afterwards justified by adding a *sūtra*- '*Vivakṣāvaśātkārakāṇibhavanti*' (i.e., the usage of the case-endings is said to be taken as liberal depending on the desire of the individual).<sup>3</sup> Moreover, there are certain usages in Sanskrit which, though grammatically incorrect, are honoured as usages of the seers or *ārṣa-prayoga*. If a great poet or saintly man uses some grammatically incorrect words to fulfill his strong desire or to fulfill a particular *chanda*, it is permitted in literature. Just as the transformed Vālmīki from Ratnākara spontaneously composed the primordial or maiden *śloka* which goes as follows-'*Māniṣādātvamagamaḥpratiṣṭhāmsāśvatīḥsamāḥ*'. In this part of the *śloka* the actual correct grammatical form is '*tvam̐gamaḥ*' but not '*tvamagamaḥ*' as used by Vālmīki as two grammatical rules, i.e., '*māni lung*' and '*namānyoge*' are not applied here. This incorrectness of the word is ignored by the poetic world by taking the usage as done by the seer-poet (*ārṣa-prayoga*). This freedom of expression is given not only in *NavyaNyāya* but grammatical literature also.

Apart from these there are a few cases where the knowledge attained through the instrumentality of desire (*icchājanya*) as in case of *pakṣatā*, though it is not absolutely necessary for logical point of view. If an individual bears a strong desire to infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*), he can infer in spite of having *siddhi* (*siṣādhayiṣāsattve'numitirbhavatyeva*).<sup>4</sup> It is permissible as the Naiyāyikas believe in the theory of *pramāṇasaṃplava* (i.e., capable of applying various *pramāṇas*) to ascertain a single object. According to this theory, 'fire' which is perceived can be

inferred if someone possesses such desire. That a cloth is completely different from a jar is completely known from the perception and hence there is not at all any necessity to infer a cloth as distinct from a jar. In spite of this one is found to infer: 'It (i.e., a cloth) is endowed with the mutual absence of a jar, as it has got clothness' (*ghaṭānyonyābhāvavānpraṭatvāt*). All these cases are supportable as an individual desires to do so and hence the role of *icchājanyatva* in the attainment of knowledge cannot be denied. In fact, in our philosophy the desire of an individual being is strictly honored and hence such type of cognition has found an entry in Indian logic. But it should be clearly borne in mind that all *icchājanya-*inferences are not *āhārya*. The *icchājanyajñāna* as found in the case of *rūpaka* and *tarka* are the instances of *āhāryajñāna*. From the above mentioned cases it is proved that desire may act as the instrument of knowledge i.e. which is called *icchājanyajñāna*.

The *Navya Naiyāyikas* are called as *sambandhins* by the contemporary thinkers on account of the fact that they have put maximum importance on the phenomenon of *sambandha* or relation particularly in the field of philosophical discussions. To Dharmakīrti, a Buddhist logician, does not admit relation as a category of real on account of the fact that it is nothing but mental ascription (*kalpanā*) which has got a secondary status as a *pramāṇa*. To him any type of mental product has nothing to do with reality and language is nothing but something expressed through it. This entity is nothing but the product of mind or mental ascription. But the *Navya Naiyāyikas* do not believe in such type of dichotomy- real world and mental world. Whatever exists can be expressed through language and hence mental ascription does not have any secondary status as envisaged by the Buddhists. Any philosophical analysis is linguistic and

hence to establish something with the help of language is to adopt certain relation. Many contradictions involved in linguistic usage can be resolved if some relation is kept in view. Any determinate expression (*savikalpakajñāna*) is called 'relational' as it involves a relation. Without relation no language can express an object, because in linguistic usage there is an expressed-expresser-relationship (*vācya-vācaka-sambandha*). If a relation is taken into account, one might say the apparent contradictory statements like- 'I exist in this room and simultaneously I do not exist in the same room'. It is a clear case of contradiction, which can easily be removed by taking a relation in one case and another relation in other case. It can be interpreted in the following way. One can exist in a particular room if his existence is taken through the relation of contact or *saṁyoga* while one can say that he does not exist in the same room if his non-existence is taken through the relation of *samavāya*. An individual may remain in a locus i.e., room as there is a relation of contact between him and the room. The existence may come to an end at any time due to the temporality of such relation. But inherence or *samavāya* is an inseparable relation (*ayutasiddhasambandha*) having some permanent character and hence an individual cannot stay in a room permanently which suggests his non-existence there in view of such particular relation. The NavyaNaiyāyikas have admitted the existence and absence of existence of the contact of monkey (*kapisam̐yoga*) in the same tree through insertion of another relation called *avachhedakatā* (being limited by some limiter). The monkey-contact (*kapisam̐yoga*) remains in the tree in so far as the base of the tree is concerned (*mūlāvachhedena*). At the same time the monkey-contact (*kapisam̐yoga*) does not exist in the same tree in so far as the branches of the tree (*śākhāvachhedena*) is concerned.<sup>5</sup>In the same way it can be said that an individual

exists in a room so far as the eastern side of the room is concerned (*pūrvadiśāvachhinna*) while he does not exist in the same room if the space is limited by the northern side of the room is concerned (*uttaradiśāvachhinna*). Our cognition needs such relation as operator to understand the proper meaning of certain expressions. To the *Navya Naiyāyikas* any standpoint of understanding can be taken as separate relation and hence the relation cannot be *seen* but *realized* through our independent intellect and desire, which can discover the relation.

Our day-to-day behavior through verbal communication depends on the determinate cognition (*savikalpakajñāna*) of an object which reveals a structure of qualified-qualifier-type. Knowledge is of two types: relational and non-relational. In Western Logic the relational cognition is expressed as 'aRb', which signifies relation combining two relata. In this context 'R' stands for 'Relation', 'a' stands for relatum1 and 'b' stands for relatum2. Relatum1 is called qualificand and relatum2 for qualifier. When the qualifier, the qualificand and their relation is not apprehended (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sambandhānavagāhī*), it is called cognition of non-relational type (*nirvikalpaka*). In the relational knowledge the qualificand, qualifier and their relation are properly grasped as contents (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sambandhāvagāhī*).<sup>6</sup> It is otherwise called *savikalpaka* or determinate one, as it is revealed through the combining factor or relation. *Nirvikalpaka* is the cognition of the existence of a thing in its true form while *savikalpaka* is the real cognition of its characteristic factor. The existence of determinate knowledge (*savikalpakajñāna*) is inferred with the help of syllogistic argument in the form: 'A piece of relational cognition apprehends the relation between qualifier and qualificand, as it is a case of relational knowledge, just as we find a relational

cognition in the case – ‘a man possessing a stick’ (*viśiṣṭa-buddhiḥviśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sambandha-viśayāviśiṣṭabuddhitvātdaṇḍīpuruṣaitiviśiṣṭabuddhivat*).<sup>7</sup> Just as in order to know the meaning of the sentence- ‘*daṇḍīpuruṣaḥ*’ (a man possessing a stick) the meaning of *daṇḍa* or stick) is to be understood in the initial level, the cognition of relational nature depends on the relation between qualificand (*viśeṣya*) and qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). Hence such comprehensive cognition is not possible without the insertion of relation. In other words, unless relation is admitted as a category of real, a cognition cannot be verbally communicated in *lokavyavahāra* (day-day-usage), because this relation (*saṁsarga*) abides in two-*viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa*as known from the preliminary definition of it- ‘*dviṣṭhaḥsambandhaḥ*’. Each and every determinate knowledge is manifested to us as such through the medium of relation or *saṁsarga* (*saṁsargamaryādāyābhāsate*). The NavyaNaiyāyikas believe in the theory of *saṁsargamaryādāvāda* i.e., a theory where two or three relata are conjoined with the help of relation and manifested.

There is another way to understand the *savikalpaka* or determinate cognition. When the content of knowledge can be made distinct from other objects, this knowledge is called *savikalpaka* or determinate. When a jar, for example, is in contact with the eye, the knowledge of it can be called a determinate one if and only if it can be distinguished from other objects like cloth, chair, table etc. Otherwise, it would be regarded as an indeterminate one. An object possessing three characteristics like qualificand, qualifier and their relation, it cannot be known as differentiated from others due to having some apprehensive features. Such type of knowledge is not possible if one is not aware of the possession of an entity with the universal (*sāmānya*) existing in all the

members belonging to the particular class. An individual becomes aware of the entity called 'jar' which is different from 'pot' etc. with the help of relation That which cannot be expressed verbally is called indeterminate, the existence of which is inferred with the help of some sign or *hetu*. Hence, the determinate knowledge capable of being verbally expressed is relational as it apprehends the relation between at least two relata.

In so far as a clear knowledge of this world is concerned, it really exists according to the principle *-jñānādhīnāvastusattā* (i.e., the existence of an object depends on its knowledge). If there is knowledge, there must have been some content, because knowledge presupposes 'knowledge of something'. That is to say, the existence of an object depends on its cognition which has got again some content.

The *AdvaitaVedānta* system of philosophy admits two-tier knowledge- having some content (*saviṣayaka*) and having no content (*aviṣayaka* or *nirviṣayaka*). The former refers to the 'knowledge of something' which is found in our empirical world (*vyavahārika*-level) while the latter refers to Pure Knowledge having no content (*aviṣayaka*) which is nothing but Brahman available in the transcendental level called *pāramārthikasattā*. In this connection it may be mentioned that Brahman is not the content of knowledge, but knowledge itself. It is accepted that there is a knowledge which is not actually knowledge of ...', it is to be taken as Pure Knowledge which is no other than the essence of Brahman itself as per the Śruti. '*SatyamJñānāmanantam Brahma*' (i.e. Brahman is Truth, Knowledge and Infinite). To distinguish such knowledge (*aviṣayaka-jñāna*) from the ordinary one (*saviṣayaka*) DharmarājaAdhvarīndra has incorporated the term

‘*arthaviṣayakamjñānam* (i. e. the knowledge having some object as its content). In the definition of valid cognition which runs as follows : *pramātvamanadhigatāvādhitārthaviṣayakajñānatvam*<sup>8</sup> i.e. valid cognition is a cognition having some object as its content which is not contradicted by the latter cognition and unacquired, Dharmaraja Adhvarīndra has incorporated the term *arthaviṣayaka* as the adjunct of cognition in order to show that he is dealing with the definition of *pramā* (valid cognition) in phenomenal and epistemic level, but not knowledge in the transcendental level where there is substantially no knowledge of something (*saviṣayaka*). This is very much consistent to the Advaitins as they believe in a kind of cognition having no content (*aviṣayaka*). As the phenomenal world is known to us, it has become the content (*viṣaya*) of our knowledge. When a jar is known, the jar forms the content of our knowledge. For this reason, a jar is really understood as the object of knowledge and also is known as distinct from non-jar. How is it considered to be distinct? There are some properties which exclusively exist in a jar, but not in other objects. This property is ‘jarness’ existing in an individual jar. If there is any distinct knowledge whose object is capable of being expressed, its content is said to have characterized by a property (*dharma*) and this property distinguishes the object (*dharmin*) from the rest. That is why; the property or *dharma* is called a distinguisher (*bhedaka*) which is otherwise called ‘differential element’ (*itaravyāvarttaka*) from other objects, which is substantiated through the definition- ‘*bhedakamviśeṣaṇam. Bhedamtuitaravyāvarttakam*’. In this way the NavyaNaiyāyikas have pointed out that each and every object which is known must abide in the relation between *dharma* and *dharmin* (*dharmadharmibhāvaḥ*).

Since relation binds one with another, the basic characteristic of relation is that which rests on two entities (*dviṣṭhaḥsambandhaḥ*). When one hand is connected with another, the relation called contact (*saṁyoga*) rests on both the hands. If blue colour is found in a cloth, the relation called inherence (*samavāya*) remains in both blue colour and cloth as told earlier.

Relation (*sambandha*) is a kind of conjoining factor (*sannikarṣa*) which serves the purpose of determining the property of being qualificand and qualifier between two objects completely different from each other (*sambandhaḥsannikarṣaḥsa ca vibhinnayarvastunorviśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāvapravyayaḥ*).<sup>9</sup> In this case *sambandha* or relation is the main factor through which two isolated things are related in the form of qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and qualificand(*viśeṣya*). Had there been no relation, such description would not have been possible at all.

Some of the philosophers belonging to *NavyaNyāya* school are of the opinion that *sambandha* is a special means of knowing a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭa-pratītiḥ*) or the determinant of a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭadhīḥ*). Something through which a qualified cognition is conceived of as content is called a relation (*viśiṣṭadhī-niyāmakasyaivatathātvāt*). In other words, a relation is that which possess the capability of providing or generating a qualified cognition. In fact, relation only has got capacity of generating *viśiṣṭapratyaya* which is the only function of it. The term *viśiṣṭapratyaya* means the knowledge of a set of objects which are qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) qualificand (*viśeṣya*) and their relation (*sambandha* or *saṁsarga*).

The above-mentioned definition of *sambandha* is reformulated by Jagadīśa in a very precise manner. The definition runs as follows: *Viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇatvānya-viśiṣṭa-dhī-viśayatvam*.<sup>10</sup> That is, *sambandha* contains contentness (*viśayatā*) qualified by the difference of qualificandness (*viśeṣyānyatva*) and qualificierness (*viśeṣaṇānyatva*) of a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭadhī*). The contentness or *viśayatā* of three types: *viśayatā* remaining in qualificandness (*viśeṣyatā-niṣṭha-viśayatā*), *viśayatā* remaining in qualificierness (*viśeṣaṇatā-niṣṭha-viśayatā*). The *viśayatā* existing in *sambandha* which is different from the *viśayatā* existing in *viśeṣyatā* and *viśeṣaṇatā* is called *sambandha* or *saṃsarga*. In this context relation is defined in terms of *viśayatā* with the help of the method of residue (*pariśeṣa*). Something which comes to our awareness must have some contentness (*viśayatā*) which may be either of the three already mentioned. *Sambandha* is also capable of being understood and it must have some *viśayatā* which is different from *viśeṣaṇatā* and *viśeṣyatā*. Each and every piece of knowledge is endowed with the property called *viśayatā* or contentness. The *viśayatā* existing other than these two must exist in *sambandha* or *saṃsarga*. In the piece of the relational knowledge (*viśiṣṭadhīḥ*) in the form: ‘*gandhavatīpṛthivī*’ (i.e., the earth is full of smell) there are three things that have become the content of knowledge viz. *pṛthivī* or earth as *viśeṣya*, *gandha* or smell as *viśeṣaṇa* and the relation in the form of *samavāya*(inherence) existing between them. Among these three *viśeṣyatā* existing in earth (*pṛthivī-niṣṭha-viśayatā*) is in the form of *viśeṣyatā*, the contentness existing in smell (*gandha-niṣṭha-viśayatā*) is in the form of *viśeṣaṇatā*. The contentness existing in inherence (*samavāya-niṣṭha-viśayatā*). Here in lies the *sambandha*. What relation is to be admitted in a

particular case depends on the desire of an individual. Relation is the criterion through our intention is expressed, which can be explained in the following way.

Relation is perceived with the help of sense-organs in some cases and in some it is beyond the reach of the sense-perception (*atīndriyasambandha*). If the relation is taken in the sense of determinator (*niyāmaka*) of the qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭa-dhī-niyāmaka*) but not in the sense of *janakatā* (generating factor), it cannot cover the second category of relation i.e., *atīndriyasambandha* (super-sensual relation) leading to the defect of under-coverage (*avyāpti*), which is not at desirable. Apart from this, the term cause cannot provide us with the accurate meaning leading to the state of ambiguity. The cause may sometimes mean a cause connected with the generation of result (*phalopodhāyaka*) or sometimes it means something having essential potentiality of being a cause (*svarūpayogya*). The said problem may be avoided if the determining factor of qualificative cognition (*viśiṣṭadhīniyāmaka*) is taken in the same sense of being the object of cognition. Gadadhara's suggestion may be explained in the following manner- "x is a relation of y if x is the object of the cognition of something z as qualified by y and at the same time x is not z. (Literally, relation hood with respect to y is that contentness of a cognition which is conditioned by the qualificierness in y and at the same time is different from the qualificandness of that cognition).<sup>11</sup>

Gadādhara finally has arrived at the decision by pointing out a new definition, according to which relation is defined in terms of two key terms- adjunct (*pratiyogī*) or subjunct (*anuyogī*). The relationship with a jar is a specific property of having a ground as its subjunct. A particular type of absenteeess

existing in an absence of an absence is a property of being a particular relation. In the same way, a particular type of subjunctness (*anuyogitāviśeṣa*) of a subjunct is a property of being a particular relation.

Western thinkers have divided relation into (a) monadic, dyadic, triadic etc. (b) into symmetrical, asymmetrical etc. This has been done by them for the schematizations of the mathematical logic. Indian thinkers are not directly interested in formal logic. The outlook of them is confined to empiricist and positivistic world as far as possible. Hence regarding monadic relations like 'A is identical with itself', the Indian philosophers reformulate the statement as 'A has its identity' or simply as 'A's identity'. Had there been really any difference, it would have been nothing but verbal. The linguistic usage puts forth an object as different though it is actually not. Language can create many things through its expression like relation etc.

Relation, according to the West, may be dyadic, triadic etc. in accordance with the terms they contain. The dyadic relation is that which exists between two really 'different' objects but not the same object ascribing as two as in the case of identity. When one object simultaneously comes in contact with two or more substances, the contact is called triadic one. Regarding this triadic relation or relation occurring in three or more terms the Naiyāyikas prefer to reduce them to the dyadic relation of known type to honor the definition- '*dviṣṭhaḥsambandhaḥ*' (i.e., that abiding in two is relation). When A comes in contact with C through B simultaneously, the Western logicians accept a triadic relation there. But the Indians interpret this case as follows. A and B simultaneously and directly connected with C, or A simultaneously with B or C.

The *NavyaNaiyāyikas* will explain the former case in the following way. A and B are the adjuncts of the relation (*saṁsargapratiyogī*) and C is the subjunct (*anuyogī*). In the latter case A is the subjunct (*anuyogī*) and B and C are the adjuncts. Otherwise, there would be no end of such complications like multiterm relations. What would be adjunct or subjunct would be determined by an agent through his own will.

Let us consider the following triadic relation – *saṁyogajasam̐yoga* to explain the above statement. When it is seen that our body is in connection with a pen which is again connected with a table, there is a triadic relation called *saṁyogajasam̐yoga* (the contact generated through contact). The first contact (*saṁyoga*) remaining in between body and a pen gives rise to another contact existing between the pen and the table. All these triadic relations are called by the *NavyaNaiyāyikas* as *paramparāsambandha* i.e., indirect relation.<sup>12</sup>

Moreover, it is relation which gives us precise and accurate cognition. When it is said – ‘The Mountain possesses fire’ (*parvatovahnimān*), the existence of fire in the mountain is known through the relation of contact (*saṁyoga*). From this, it follows that through the relation called inherence (*samavāya*) the fire cannot remain on the mountain. It is the relation through which an object is apprehended as existing or as non-existing in certain locus.

Considering relation as a mental product or will-generated Professor B.K. Matilal has taken every relation as direction. He observes: “As a general rule, every relation can be said to have a ‘direction’ such that it may be taken as pointing from one relation to the other, but when we express a relation simply as a relation between x and y, we do not specify whether it is (a) a relation of x and y

or (b) a relation of y to x. It is evident that the relation involved in (a) is not in general the same as that involved in (b). Hence to express a relation adequately. It is necessary to specify its so-called 'direction'. For that purpose, Nyaya draws a distinction between the two relata, so that whatever specific descriptions of the two relata are given, one can easily identify the relation concerned. In other words, to give the condition for the identification of a relation, we should not only mention the two relata but also indicate the 'way' in which they are related. To do so the Naiyāyikas follow this procedure. If a relation is described as the relation of x to y 'the relatum x is called the *pratiyogin* (adjunct) and the relatum y is called the *anuyogin* (subjunct) of the relation in question. In ordinary, Sanskrit, the genitive case-ending (*ṣaṣṭhī*) usually marks off the adjunct and the locative case-ending (*adhikaraṇa*) the subjunct."<sup>13</sup>

Though relation exists in two relata as found in the contact between vessel and jujube, an object remains in another object through another relation. Through the relation of contact (*samyoga*) the jujube fruit remains in the locus i.e., vessel, but not the *vice-versa*, i.e., the locus i.e., vessel does not remain in jujube fruit. In the same way, it can be said that a jar remains on the ground, but not ground on the jar. There are two objects in a relation – adjunct or *pratiyogī* and subjunct or *anuyogī*. An object taken as a *pratiyogī* through certain relation may remain in its locus through the same relation. In the present case of contact between vessel and jujube fruit, jujube fruit remains in a vessel as the former is *pratiyogī* and the latter is *anuyogī*. In a relation between attribute (*dharma*) and the possessor of the same (*dharmī*) is *anuyogī*. Hence, the attribute remains in the possessor of the same, but not the *vice-versa*. Relation is to be invented among the things existing in this world. Without accepting this no *savikalpaka*

knowledge is possible and hence it occupies an important place in verbal understanding and day to day behaviour.

The Naiyāyikas admit that more than one *pramāṇa* can be applied to know a single object, which is called the theory of *pramāṇasamplava*. The nature of an object is not a factor for applying *pramāṇa*. As for example, 'fire' can be known through perception, inference or verbal testimony. But so far as the Buddhist view is concerned, a particular nature of an object determines the particular means of knowing (*pramāṇa*) through which alone it is revealed. An object having a unique characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) is revealed by perception alone. A *svalakṣaṇa* –entity cannot be revealed by inference and in the same way the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*-entity can be known by inference alone, but not capable of being known by perception. This metaphysical presupposition leads them to admit the system of *pramāṇavyavasthā*. On the basis of the above-mentioned arguments, we may come to the conclusion that Indian Epistemology is always vitiated by will-generated cognition.<sup>14</sup>

*Pakṣatā* (the property of being a *pakṣa*) is the absence of *siddhi* (confirmation of the inferable object), which is endowed with the absence of the desire of inferring (*siṣādhayiṣāviraḥaviśiṣtasiddhyabhāvaḥ*).<sup>15</sup> In this case the term '*siṣādhayiṣā*' means the desire of inference. Viśvanātha has shown different cases where *pakṣatā* is possible. If there is a lone desire or inferring (*siṣādhayisāmātra*), it is not *pakṣatā*, because it has been found that many cases of inferences occur without having desire of them e.g. the existence of cloud is inferred as soon as we here the roaring without giving any scope of the desire for inference. From this it follows that even the doubt of *sādhya*, cannot give rise to

inference, because inference of *sādhya* (cloud in the above mentioned case) does not depend on the doubt of *sādhya*. Secondly, one is allowed to infer the *sādhya*, even though it is already established (*siddhi*), provided the inferrer possesses a strong desire to do so (*siṣādhayiṣā*). Thirdly, *pakṣatā* lies there where there is no *siddhi* (substantiation of *sādhya*). The existence of desire to infer or absence of it does not matter here. Fourthly, if there is a strong desire of infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*), there is *pakṣata*. Whether *siddhi* remains or does not remain is out of the question. *Pakṣatā* is not possible there where there is *siddhi* but no desire to infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*). In the last alternative alone there is the presence of *siddhi* (not absence- *siddhyabhāva*), which is endowed with the absence of the desire of inference (*siṣādhayiṣāviraha - viśiṣṭa –siddhiḥ*). If an object is already established and there is the absence of the desire of inference (*siṣādhayiṣāviraha - viśiṣṭa –siddhiḥ*), there is no *pakṣatā*. An object bearing the characteristics of *pakṣatā* as shown above is a *pakṣa* (*tadvān pakṣaḥ*).

*Tarka* is a kind of hypothetical argument. Both the parts of *Tarka* are full of imaginary thought. If smoke were endowed with doubt of deviation of fire, it would not be caused by fire. If the first part is true, the second part would also be true. But it is known through experience that the second part is not true in so far as we do not get any smoke, which is not caused by fire. From the falsity of the second half, (i.e. smoke is deviated from fire) is determined. In our everyday life also we remove doubt in respect of something after following this method of argumentation. From the knowledge of consequence the idea of an antecedent is revealed. *Tarka*, being a kind of mental construction, is useful for removing doubt and hence *Tarka*, though invalid (in the sense of not being a source of valid cognition) is the promoter of the *Pramāṇas*. This *Tarka* is otherwise known as

*Āpatti* i.e. the introduction of the undesired through which the desire is established. It is also a kind of indirect method through which the truth is ascertained. If the negation of P is proved as absurd, it would automatically follow that P is true. For these various reasons much importance has laid on this method in *Navya Nyāya*.<sup>16</sup>

Secondly, the 'deliberately imposed cognition' (*icchājanya-jñāna*) is also available in the case of metaphor in the sense of *rūpaka* e.g., moon-face (*mukha-candra*), man-lion (*puruṣa-simha*) etc.<sup>17</sup> What are the points of difference between pure *āhārya*-cognition and *āhāryatva* remaining in metaphors? Though there are will –generated factors in both types of expression, is there any difference? In response to this, the *NavyaNaiyāyikas* might say that pure *āhārya*-cognition is wider than that existing in the metaphor or *rūpaka*. The former is admitted in many cases or may be in all cases. If somebody wrongly says that this is a piece of jar, one can refute this with the help of *āhārya*-cognition which is the following type. Had it been a pot, it would be able to fetch water etc. As the object concerned is not able to do such work, it would not be taken as a pot. If it is asked why a jar is not identical with a cloth, the answer would be as follows. Had a jar been identical with a cloth, the purpose of a cloth would have been served by a jar. As such thing is an absurd one, a jar is not identical with a cloth. In this way, the *NavyaNaiyāyikas* can prove that each and every entity is different from the other by applying such type of *āhārya*-cognition. In this way, one may say what is normally impossible. By showing the impossibility of such incident it indirectly hints the possibility of the opposite. If it is said, for example, that had a human being a bird, he would have gone from one city to another by flying, it shows directly the impossibility of the matter. It indirectly gives us a message that

the opposite standpoint i.e., human being cannot be a bird leading to another to the impossibility of flying from one place to another is to be taken as true. There are so many ways or methods in Indian Philosophy to refute the views of the opponents. The application of *āhārya*-cognition is most honorable way to refute the opponents. Normally the proponents are found to pass judgment about the opponents' view with the phrases like '*tanmandam*' (i.e., the opponent's view is not up to the mark), '*tacchuchham*' (i.e., the opponent's view is not having any worth), '*tadayuktam*' (i.e., the opponent's view is improper), '*maivam*' (i.e., the opponent's view is not so as narrated), '*namantavyam*' (the view is not to be commented as such) etc. Though all the comments are with regard to the opponent's view yet there is a subtle distinction among the terms '*manda*', '*tuchha*', and '*ayukta*' *namantavya* etc. The term '*manda*' only indicates a sort of sympathy to the view while the remaining words lack the same. The later does not only have sympathy to the opponent, but it indicates the out and out rejection of the view. Hence the view of KD can be taken as partially correct in the sense that sometimes sympathy is shown to the opponent and sometimes rigidity. The attitude of sympathy is evidenced from quoting even the opponent's view if any argument comes in favour of the proponent. As for example, Sāṃkhya has referred to the opponent's view i.e., the Cārvāka's view while substantiating his view of regarding the origination of the world called *Pradhāna-kāraṇatā-vāda* as endorsed by Śankara in his *bhāṣya*. Sāṃkhya argues that if body is perceived, the inclination etc is also perceived. If body is not seen, the inclination etc. is not seen. From this it is proved that inclination is possible in the unconscious body, which has been endorsed by the Cārvākas also.<sup>23</sup>The application of *āhārya*-cognition is most honourable way to show regards to the opponent. Initially it is

taken for granted the opponent's view and afterwards it is refuted by way of showing its absurdity and contraction. This is, I think, most honourable way of refuting the opponents.

In case of metaphor or *rūpaka* there is an *āhārya*-cognition which can only be applied in case of comparison of something with something else, but not in other cases as shown above. In the case of *mukha-candra* (moon-like face) there is an imposition of face on the moon though it is completely known to him that face can never a moon. Though there are so many dissimilarities between face and the moon due to having black spots and round-shaped size in the moon yet there is at least one point of similarity which is glamour or *lāvaṇya* which exists both in the moon and face. Such type of *āhārya*-cognition or superimposed cognition is less wide in the sense that it can be used only in the case of metaphor where there is partial similarity between the object in the form of metaphor (*upamāna*) and the object metaphorized (*upameya*). For this reason, it is admitted by the *NavyaNaiyāyikas* that though the object metaphorized (*upameya*) is different from the metaphorical object yet there is a similarity between them ('*Tadbhinnatve sati tadgatobhūyodharmavattvam*'). That is why, the *āhārya*-cognition remaining in metaphor can also be given a great importance.

Thirdly, one could raise a question whether the application of the collocation of *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇa-saṃplava*) is mere a redundant process? If an object is known through one means of knowing, is it not true that the application of other means to know the same is the adoption of *gaurava* which is taken to be a defect? Is there any argument against *pramāṇa-vyavasthā*? In response to the

problem, it may be said that it is true that to know an object with the help of more than one means of knowing (*pramāṇa-s*) leads to the defect called *gaurava* or logical cumbrousness. If something is known through one *pramāṇa*, what is the reason of applying more than one? The theory of *pramāṇa-samplava* (conglomeration of sources of knowing) is admitted by the *Naiyāyikas* to prove that our specific knowledge may come from more than one sources. Though there is no necessity to apply more than one source to know an object yet it is allowed by the *Naiyāyikas* if someone *desires* so or if someone has got over confirmation of the existence of an object. If an individual is strongly desirous to infer which is technically *siṣadhayiṣā* (will to infer), he can do so and hence *siddhi* or establishment of an object is not at all taken as a bar. Even after inference he is not satisfied with the cognition, he may take help of a reliable source or *āptavacana* to be over confirmed about the object of knowing. There is another justification for the same. To the Buddhists the nature of objects is of two types- uniquely particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and universally particular (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). If the former is taken into account, it is momentary (*kṣaṇika*) and causally efficacious (*arthakriyākārī*). Hence there is only one way to grasp it, i.e., perception. For, the Buddhists perceptual cognition lies in that which is free from mental ascription (*kalpanāpoḍha*) and non-erroneous (*abhrānta*). The definition goes- '*Tatralpanāpoḍhamabhrāntampratyakṣam*'. If this definition is taken for granted, the *svalakṣaṇa* character of an object which is momentary is to be grasped by perception alone giving no scope of other *pramāṇa-s*. It is the nature of an object which determines the applicability of a *pramāṇa*. A cognition conjoined with mental ascription and non-momentary known as *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* can be known only through inference due to not having any scope of

perception.<sup>18</sup> To them non-conceptual object is known through perception alone while conceptual entity is grasped through inference as determined by the nature of an object. That is why; the Buddhists believe in the applicability of a single *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇa-vyavasthā*) to know a particular object. To *Nyāya* *pramāṇa* is not determined by the nature of object. The existence of fire in the mountain can be known through inference, verbal testimony and perception to become over sure about the object. Though there might be the probability of *gaurava* yet it is not to be taken as a vicious one, but virtuous called *phala-mukha-gaurava* (i.e., cumbrousness leading to the attainment of good result). Satisfaction or fulfillment of desire is provided to the knower, which is very much essential in the epistemology of the *Naiyāyikas* as well as *NavyaNaiyāyikas*.

Fourthly, what are the points of difference between the autonomy of will as adopted by the grammarians and that adopted by the Navya Naiyāyikas? It is well said by the grammarians that one can use any *kāraka* to honour his own personal sweet will (*vivakṣāvaśāt-kārakāṇi bhavanti*). Can such 'sweetwill' persist in the theories of NavyaNyāya? In reply, it can be said that the grammarians have admitted the sweet will or *vivakṣā* of an individual in so far as the grammatical constructions are concerned. Grammar has formulated some rules for making a word or sentence grammatically well-formed. These rules are mostly compulsory to all for making linguistic structure but the grammarians have made certain exceptions for the poets, saints, seers and strong desire-holders to do something which is deviated from the rules of grammar. For showing honour to the seers or seer like poets grammarians grant them to exercise their will to put language in a different manner as the cases shown earlier. This is due to maintenance of *chanda* and sentence or word of a *mantra*. Sri Aurobindo was asked a question by

his disciple why he has used same line twice in the epic *Sāvitrī*. His answer was very much natural and fantastic. He said that he has not chosen the term intentionally, but the truth revealed to him in that language. In these cases, the seers desire is also guided by Divinity as told in the *Kenopaniṣad*- ‘*yad vācānabhyuditamīyena vāgabhyudyate*’ i.e., that which is not disclosed by language but language is disclosed by him). Considering these aspects Pāṇini has admitted some usages as *ārṣaprayoga* where deliberately done grammatical mistakes are justified. In *NavyaNyāya* the liberty of an individual is given in so far as his will is concerned. This liberty is theoretical, expressional or will-generated but not grammatical. They do not want to distort grammatical rules but express a theory as per desire of their own. Hence liberty promoted by both the schools is the same.

Fifthly, the intention of a speaker (*tātparyā*) is admitted by the Navya Naiyāyikas as one of the conditions of verbal apprehension (*śābdabodha*). The word ‘*tātparyā*’ is defined as ‘*vakturicchā*’ i.e., ‘intention of the speaker’ which is almost similar to the notion of *vivakṣā* defined by the grammarians as ‘*vaktum icchā*’ (‘will to say’). Is the concept of *vivakṣā* identical with that of *tātparyā*? Can any word be intended as having any meaning? Is there any role of relation (*sambandha*) and limiter (*avacchedaka*) in expressing our sweet will? In response to the above problem, the *NavyaNaiyāyikas* might say that, though *vivakṣā* or *tātparyā* is same to some extent. Grammarians admit *vivakṣā* in formation of certain grammatical words and meanings. If the speaker has got desire to express something which is not allowed by grammatical rules, it is called *vivakṣā* just as in the cases of application of *kāraka*-s and some specific rules like *nipātanēsiddha* etc. But so far as *tātparyā* is concerned, it is also the desire of the speaker not

only applicable to the above-mentioned *kāraka* etc. but also in ambiguous sentences like *saidhamānaya* etc. That is, in this context the term ‘*saindhava*’ may mean both ‘salt’ and ‘horse’. The intention of the speaker is not clear to us and hence the intention of the speaker is to be taken into account after considering the context (*prakaraṇa*). Such ambiguity may remain in other Vedic and non-Vedic usages. The grammarians’ intention is to see the necessity of a term for the completion of *chanda* which is called *pādapūraṇa*. For the sake of *chanda* and *alamkāra* some concession of the will of the speaker is granted. Such will is *vivakṣā* but the intention of the speaker to disambiguate a statement or to express the inner significance of a statement is called *tātparya*. In other words, a particular *Mahāvākya* like *Tattvamasī* etc. is uttered by the seer to intend for certain implicative meaning like the similarity between ‘*Brahman*’ (*Tat*) and ‘an individual’ (*tvam*) in so far as their essential identity (*svarūpa-tādātmya*), but not an absolute one, is concerned. In this context all the Vedic statements are having special intention of the seer which is called *tātparya*. The same *tātparya* has to be admitted in the case *lakṣaṇā* or implicative meaning as found in the usage-‘*gangāyāmghoṣaḥ*’ etc. In both the cases the root is will-generated cognition. In such cases certain terms or sentences are uttered to intend some special thing and hence *tātparya* is called *tatpratīchhayāuccaritatvam* (i.e., to utter something after keeping an intention to refer something).

Sixthly, a problem may be raised by the opponents if any kind of will-generated cognition is allowed in NavyaNyāya or not. So far, we have seen that will-generated cognitions are admitted only if they are efficacious to uphold the truth. In case of *Tarka* it shown that such will-generated cognition is very much essential to prove indirectly the truth with help of absurdity and contradiction.

When someone is comparing the face of the heroine with moon, it is the product of great desire of the poet. A poet's will is such that he has full freedom to exercise it. The term *mukhacandra* may be used to fulfill his multifarious desires. One meaning may be assigned to the above-mentioned term as per the particular desire of the poet. It may mean the face and moon are considered to be absolutely identical (*rūpaka*), the same term may also mean that the face is like the moon (*mukhaṁcandraiva*) where we find *upamā*, again the term signifies that the face is as if moon which is *utprekṣā*, sometimes it is thought that the face is so beautiful that hundreds of autumnal moon are lying in her feet (e.g., *ke bale śāradaśaśī se mukhertulā/padanakhe pareāchetārkatagulā//*) i.e., who is telling that the autumnal moon is comparable to her face? Hundreds of such moons are lying on her feet, which indicate the superiority of the object metaphorized (*upameya*) and hence it may be an instance of *vyatireka*. The single term *mukhacandra* may be interpreted in various ways considering the desire of a poet. For the poets or literary beautification such will-generated cognition is permissible. But if some one's will is whimsical or having no intention to prove indirectly the truth or other purposes as shown above, it may not be taken for granted. Will-generated cognition which is a healthy one constitutes a good part of philosophy while will which is unhealthy having no efficacy for in philosophical methodology is not to be considered for philosophical exercise.

Lastly, some of relations admitted by the *NavyaNaiyāyikas* are related to the indicator dependent on the desire of an individual. In the case of *nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāva* relation it is the desire of an individual which indicates what would be determinator (*nirūpaka*) and determined (*nirūpya*) between two relata. A problem may be raised of the following type. Between son and father there is

the above-mentioned relation but it is not understood by us what the determinator (*nirūpaka*) and the determined (*nirūpya*) is. It depends on the intention of the speaker leading to no fixed rule in this matter. If an individual thinks the son is the determinator (*nirūpaka*) of the father which is determined (*nirūpya*), it is taken for granted. If the case is otherwise, i.e., father and son are taken as determinator and determined respectively, it is equally acceptable. Such is the case between teacher (*śikṣaka*) and student (*chātra*), preceptor (*guru*) and disciple (*śiṣya*) etc.

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