

## CHAPTER-3

### The Concept of Will-generated Cognition in *NavyaNyāya*:

There are few instances of ‘Will-generated Cognition’ in *NavyaNyāya* school of thought. Generally, they introduced such concepts entirely free from any sort of determinants. The *Navya Naiyāyikas* admitted the concepts of *Āhāryajñāna*, *Sambandha*, *Pakṣatā*, *Tarka*, *Tātparya* as different forms of will-generated-cognition. In these cases, knowledge is attained through the instrumentality of desire (*icchākaraṇajanyatva*).

#### Part -1

##### The Concept of *Āhāryajñāna* in *NavyaNyāya*:

The concept of *āhāryajñāna* (deliberately imposed cognition) has been admitted by the *Navya Naiyāyikas*. In order to give honor of an individual’s desire certain philosophical activities start. The *NavyaNyāya* system, which is commonly known as realistic, has prescribed some methods in order to arrive at certain truth, which is purely ‘deliberate’ (*icchājanya*). A solution to this problem may be offered in the following way. Let us look towards the exact nature of *āhāryajñāna*. Etymological meaning of the term ‘*āhārya*’ is ‘that which is capable of being imposed or collected’ (*āharaṇīyaitiāhārya*). We can collect some cognition by way of imposing it on another out of our will. The literal meaning of the term ‘*āhāryajñāna*’ can be expressed as deliberately imposed cognition. The word ‘*āhārya*’ was first defined by Mahāmohapādhyāya BhīmācāryaJhalkikār in *Nyāyakoṣa*. ‘*Āhārya*’ means ‘artificial’, which is super-imposed is artificial and

should be taken as ‘āhārya’. The *Naiyāyikas* define āhāryajñāna as “virodhijñānakālīnecchāprajojyajñānatvamāhāryajñānatvam” or “vādhakālīnecchājanyam jñānam”<sup>1</sup>; i.e., in spite of knowing impossibility or irrelevance between two objects, one is deliberately thought as otherwise. In this sphere of cognition, knower is aware of the presence of ‘vādhakajñāna’ (contradictory knowledge). In spite of this, such imposition has been recognized by the *Navya Naiyāyikas* to honor the freedom of expression of an individual. Such āhārya-congnition has not only taken role in epistemological domain, but it is also discussed in *Bhāṭṭikāvya*, *Alamkāraśāstra* and Grammar etc. In *Bhāṭṭikāvya* and *Alamkāraśāstra* it is introduced for the sake of bringing out aesthetic pleasure, and in Grammar to honor autonomy of will, which is called *vivakṣā*.

The Āhārya-cognition is one sort of artificial knowledge as the knower superimposes some distinct features of an object on another one, inspite of the presence of contradictory knowledge due to having stronger sense of desire. We may cite a number of examples to make our understanding regarding such type of cognition.

When someone speaks- ‘The Lake is fiery’ (*hradovanhimān*), it is an instance of āhārya type of cognition. As he knows that fire cannot exist in lake, he told this out of his strong desire. All of us know that fire cannot exist in lake. Inspite of this, if someone gives the above statement due to his strong desire, it is called āhāryajñāna.

This sort of imposition is always due to one’s own desire. Another example can be shown in this regard. Someone deliberately says-” if you are sky, I would have stretched wings under you”<sup>2</sup>, it will be taken as a form of

*āhāryajñāna*. Though we clearly know the absurdity of this knowledge, the speaker uttered this sentence due to fulfillment of his sweet will. Inspite of having no justification of such statement, this sort of cognition is taken as promoter to *pramāṇa*. We deliberately impose ‘birdness’ to human being, though it shows the impossibility in reality. Such imposition of ‘birdness’ is known as ‘*āhārya*’ (artificial).

Though the justification of *āhāryajñāna* is not at all tenable, this sort of knowledge is promoter to *pramāṇa*. Inspite of having ambiguity in this artificial cognition; it explores true nature of an object indirectly. So in Indian epistemology this artificial cognition has much utility. Henceforth, this cognition is defined as ‘*pramāṇānugrāhakanatupramāṇam*’ i.e., the main purpose of accepting *āhāryajñāna* is to explore the true nature of an object.

The importance of *āhārya* cognition may be realized by showing the following examples. If ‘p’ is taken as a conclusion to someone and ‘~p’ is my conclusion, we can accept the conclusion of *pūrvapakṣa* for the time being. When we think in such a way, we find a kind of contradiction in our mental state. This contradiction proves indirectly that the conclusion of *pūrvapakṣa*, i.e., ‘p’ is not correct. It will automatically prove that my conclusion i.e. ‘~p’ is true. In Indian Logic this method is known as ‘*VipakṣavādhakaTarka*’.

If an opponent having knowledge in the form:-“Smoke can exist without fire”, the form of *āhāryajñāna* in *Nyāya*- perspective is as follows –“Had there been smoke without fire, then smoke would not have been produced through fire’, which is due to one’s instrumentality of desire (*icchājanya*) .This sort of statement hints to the conclusion: - ‘As smoke is produced through fire and

hence, it exists in fire. Hence, the view of opponent is proved as wrong and the conclusion claimed by him is not correct. As the knowledge is produced out of one's desire so it is taken as *āhāryajñāna* and also it helps to ascertain the conclusion. That's way; *āhāryajñāna* has taken a room In Indian Logic, especially in *NavyaNyāya* system of thought.

Opponents may raise a question on accommodation of the concept of *āhāryajñāna* in *Nyāya* as it lacks *yogyatā*. Inspite of having such peculiarity in such type of artificial knowledge in *Nyāya* school of thought, it is an essential one. This is a unique contribution of *NavyaNyāya* in philosophical enterprise to give strength to epistemological structure of knowledge. An effort may be done to understand this fact. If it is uttered that water causes burning, one may raise objection in the form – 'If it is so, the drinking of water would cause a burning sensation'. The burning sensation from water is contradictory in our day-to-day life. The claim of opponent as mentioned above cannot be established. This *āhārya*-cognition sometimes called *aniṣṭāpatti* or *aniṣṭaprasaṅga*<sup>3</sup> i.e., the desired one is established by showing inadequacy of the undesired. This kind of mental construction is another form of *āhārya cognition*.

The incorporation of *āhārya*-cognition in *NavyaNyāya* context is mainly to promote an indirect method through which the real nature of an object is revealed. We should keep in our mind that *āhārya*-cognition should not be in conflict with illusion. In case of illusion (*bhramajñāna*) also an object is taken as otherwise, the sensation of an object differs from its own nature. When we have sensation of snakeness in rope, snakeness that is imposed on rope is not to be taken as conscious-imposition. There is no room for intentional imposition of a

knower. An agent has no awareness of such imposition. On the contrary, the adoption of *āhārya*-cognition presupposes the desire of speaker. When someone speaks: "I would have stretched my wings like a crane" – the speaker is, of course, aware of imposition of 'birdness' to him. So an individual's desire has much more importance in such cases of imposition.

This is a unique contribution of *NavyaNyāya* in philosophical enterprise to give strength to epistemological structure of knowledge. *Āhārya*-cognition is produced out of one's own desire (*icchājanya*), at the time when one is aware of the contradictory knowledge (*vādhakajñāna*) through which the desired one is established. So *icchājanyatva* and *vādhakālīnatva* are regarded as two distinct characteristics of *Āhārya*-cognition. It should not be confused with other forms of imaginations such as music, dance, drama, abstract painting etc. In this above-mentioned case, the second feature i.e., *vādhakālīnatva* (contradictoriness) is absent, inspite of having the first one i.e. will-generatedness. These are not admitted as *āhārya*-cognition in Indian Logic. *Āhārya* cognition is obviously one sort of imagination; or it may be said imposition of some features on one another, but all type of imagination should not be taken as artificial cognition. Due to the absence of second feature of *āhāryajñāna* this sort of imaginations suffers from the defect of over-coverage (*avyāptidosha*).

In this sphere, we are trying to explore the real nature of an object indirectly, though this sort of artificial cognition has no semantic competency (*yogyatā*).

Hence, the *NavyaNyāya* position of admitting will-generated cognition is much stronger than other system. When we talk of *āhāryajñāna*, it has to be

taken as an artificial cognition on account of three different aspects that – i) whatever is collected from others is taken as artificial, ii) speakers may utter some sentences which really does not exist, inspite of strong will one may speak of absurdity of knowledge, iii) pointing out the defect of opponents.

## PART-II

### The Concept of Tarka in the light of *Prācīna* and *NavyaNyāya*:

The relevance of the application of such type of *āhāryajñāna* in philosophy, especially in *NavyaNyāya* school of thought is closely associated with the *Nyāya* view of Tarka. The old *Naiyāyikas* have enlisted it as one of the sixteen categories (*padārtha*) following Goutama as he has stated- “*pramāṇa-prameya-saṁśaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-sidhāntāvayava-tarka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpa-vitāṇḍā-hetvābhāsa-chala-jāti-nigrahasthānānāṁtattvajñānānniḥśreyasādhigamah*” (*Sutra--1*)<sup>4</sup>. The old *Naiyāyikas* admitted Tarka as *viśayapariśodhaka-tarka*, whereas Neo-Logicians have incorporated it epistemology as *vyābhicāraśāṁkānivartaka-tarka*.

Indian Philosophy has regarded *apavarga* (*nihśreyasa*) as highest end of life among four different *puruṣārtha* i.e., *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*. As *nihśreyasa* means the cessation of all suffering, Goutama recognizes sixteen

categories in *Nyāyadarśana* and told that liberation comes through the right cognition (*tattvajñāna*) of those categories. *Tarka* is one of those sixteen categories. When doubt is found in epistemological domain particularly in case of ascertainment of *vyāpti*, *Tarka* removes doubt and act as promoter to *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇanugrāhaka*).

It is known to us that *Tarka* is admitted in Indian Philosophy as a form of invalid cognition (*apramāṇa*) and it is also applied as a logical method for arriving at an objective truth indirectly. Usually, the *Nyāya* thinkers have put different opinions regarding its nature and they (old and new both of them) have accepted its role in generating the valid cognition described as promoter to *pramāṇa*, i.e *pramāṇanugrāhaka*, not *pramāṇa* in itself. First, we will discuss the old *Naiyāyika*'s view regarding the very nature of *Tarka*.

The cognition is, in general, generated in our self is of two types: 1) definite cognition (*niścaya*) which includes *pratyakṣa*, *anumiti*, *upamiti* and *śābdabodha*; 2) invalid cognition (*apramāṇa*) including memory (*smṛti*), doubt (*samsaya*), error (*viparyaya*), and hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*). Doubt of deviation may arise in such following cases: 1) doubt of limiting adjunct (*upādhi-sandeha*) and 2) the absence of the cognition of specific features as well as the presence of the cognition of common properties (*sādhāraṇa-dharma-sahakṛta-viśeṣādarśana*). Second sort of instance gives rise to the doubt of deviation which can be removed by application of *Tarka*. It counters the opponent's view and establishes the true nature of an object indirectly.

Let us start with the old *Nyāya* view by quoting Gautama's definition of *Tarka*. In *Nyāyadarśana*, *Tarka* is defined as: "Avijñātētattve'

*rthe kāraṇopapattitaḥ tattvajñānārthamūhastarkah*" (verse 40)<sup>5</sup> i.e., the knowledge of existence of common properties and absence of specific features generates the doubt about real nature of object. The valid knowledge cannot be attained through *pramāṇa*. In such case *Tarka* removes contradiction and helps to ascertain valid cognition. *Tarka* is applied to reveal the true nature of an object, not in a purely unknown object. Let us explain the above definition of *Tarka* in details. First, we analyze the term '*avijñāta*'. If '*tattva*' is not inserted in the definition, it will hint that *Tarka* cannot be applied to an unknown object as there is no question of doubt. Doubt arises where there is contrary knowledge. So, doubt is the prior-condition of *Tarka*. '*Tattva*' is conjoined with '*avijñāta*' and the term '*Avijñātetattve*' points to the fact that an object partially known is not known as it really is known through *Tarka*. The term '*Artha*' indicates an object having an unknown character.

The term '*Kāraṇopapattitah*' is the combination of two terms, i.e. '*kāraṇa*' and '*upapatti*'. '*Kāraṇa*' means '*pramāṇa*' and '*upapatti*' means 'possibility'. Hence, '*kāraṇopapattitah*' denotes that instrumentality of knowledge is applicable in those objects which are partially known. The term '*tattvajñānārthamūhastarkah*' points that to know the real nature of an object is '*tattva*'. '*Artha*' means requirements. So, the term '*tattvajñānārthamūhastarkah*' implies the requirement of true knowledge. True knowledge is attained through '*pramāṇa*' but *Tarka* helps to eliminate doubt as a promoter to *pramāṇa*.

The explanation of *Tarka* from the view point of *Prācīna Naiyāyikas* indicates some characteristics of this cognition: 1) *Tarka* is a form of cognition and cognition is regarded as *guṇa-padārtha*. 2) If doubt arises, *Tarka* as helping

condition to *pramāṇa* dissolved the doubt. According to *Nyāya* perspective, *Tarka* is not an independent means of cognition, it is regarded as promoter to *pramāṇa*.

The *Prācīna Naiyāyikas* claim that *Tarka* does not directly give us any cognition of an object; rather it plays a negative role. It actually removes the obstacles. The task of *Tarka* is to eliminate the obstacles, and helps the independent instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). *Tarka* should be regarded as an independent instrument of knowledge. The term ‘*Avijñātētattve*’, indicates universally known and particularly unknown object wherein lies doubt having *tattvajñānā* and only *pramāṇa* could not help to attain true knowledge. When such crisis arises in the domain of knowledge, *Tarka* is a helping condition dissolves doubt and *tattvajñāna* is acquired by applying *pramāṇa*. In this way, *Tarka* acts as a promoter to *pramāṇa* and doubt is considered as earlier than *Tarka*.

Let us try to understand the method of hypothetical reasoning following Vātsyāyana. He says that sometimes we have some opposite features of a same object and we become confused. Suppose a knower desires to know the real nature of self. We have some rough ideas regarding the nature of soul and this is partial knowledge. To know the self perfectly, we face some doubt. We may express our doubt in the form: “whether the soul possesses the features of produced or unproduced characteristics.” Now we have to eliminate one of the alternatives. Until and unless the doubt is removed, we cannot know the cognition of soul. If soul possesses the unproduced properties, which is called eternal, the theory of Liberation, law of *karma* is justifiable. If the soul, on the contrary, is taken as possessing the produced features, then the doctrine cannot

be taken place. It will indicate that soul is non-eternal; and as a consequence, theory of Liberation, *karma* will be failure. These basic fundamental doctrines are unalterable. So, the soul cannot possess produced properties. *Tarka* shows the absurdity of taking such properties. Therefore, the remaining alternative, i.e soul possesses eternal properties must be true. *Tarka* indirectly proves the real nature of soul by refuting the opponents. *Tarka* is a helping condition of *pramāṇa*. This type of argumentation of eliminating of doubt is called *Tarka*. Here *Tarka* helps us to remove the doubt, just by eliminating one of the characteristics.

Vātsyāyana describes the process as a promoting to the attainment of true knowledge, but *Tarka* should not be taken as valid knowledge itself. After removing doubt and byeliminating one of the alternatives by applying such method, *pramāṇa* will be applicable to ascertain knowledge.<sup>6</sup>

VācaspatiMiśra holds the same view after supporting Vātsyāyana and both of them state that *Tarka* is nothing but an accessory to the right knowledge (*Tattva*). *Tattvajñānā* means true nature of an object, to know an object as it really is.

According to the *Prācīna Naiyāyikas*, when we possess the knowledge of common property regarding an object, but at the same time there is lack of the knowledge of uncommon property there we have found two alternatives which is entirely different from each other. Until we dissolve one of the alternatives among the two, knowledge cannot be ascertained. This hypothetical reasoning method helps to dissolve one alternative. On the other hand, it confirms the anotherone. If doubt is not removed by this method, application of independent

instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) will not possible. So, the view point of Vātsyāyana is, of course, justifiable.

But Udayana differs from them in one point. He raises objection against *Tarka* as an eliminator of doubt. He maintains that doubt is not dissolved by *Tarka*; rather doubt is eliminated through some other means. He shows the example of perceiving an object in a long distance with the help of dream light. We may have doubt in the form- “whether it is man or tree”? This doubt cannot be removed by application of reasoning method. Perception helps to remove doubt. In this way, Udayana tries to establish that *Tarka* does not eliminate doubt. If *Tarka* and doubt are antagonistic then *Tarka* helps to remove doubt. But *Tarka* is not logically opposed to doubt in their context. That is why; *Tarka* does not help to remove doubt.

Such observation of Udayana is not accepted at all. Though *Tarka* helps us to remove the doubt, but this is not the only cognition. There is another concept which he has been overlooked, e.g., ‘*parvatovahnimāndhūmāt*’—in this case there is perceptual knowledge as well as inferential knowledge. In case of doubt “whether it is man or tree” —the cognition of invariable concomitance between hand and feet and the human being is not derived through perception only. Here in lies the necessity of *Tarka*. *Tarka* ascertains to the relation of *Vyāpti* between two and that’s why; this method is an accessory to *pramāṇa*. So, the observation of Udayana is not accepted. The purpose of *Tarka* is to help us to remove our doubt and to know the contrary alternative. So, *Tarka* does not require epistemological justification- this view of Udayana cannot be accepted.

Finally, it could be said following the *Prācīna Naiyāyikas* that *Tarka* as a promoter to *pramāṇa* needs to clarify the nature of an object, though *Tarka* itself is not regarded as independent instrument of knowledge. By applying this hypothetical method, one alternative is eliminated among two contradictory statements regarding an object. The implementation of *pramāṇa* is possible to produce knowledge. If we don't admit *Tarka*, *pramāṇa* cannot be applied. *Tarka* is an accessory to arrive at certain truth indirectly.

Next an attempt is made to explain NavyaNyāya view regarding the nature of *Tarka*. The neo-logicians differ from the old view-point on account of the fact that the former type of *Tarka* cannot be accepted as a separate one, as it is superfluous. And after criticizing the old-view point Gangeśa has admitted only one sort of *Tarka*, i.e. *vyābhicāraśāmkaṇivartaka-tarka* (*Tarka* needs for removing the doubt of deviation existing in *anumāna*). This method can remove the doubt of deviation between *hetu* and *sādhya*. *Tarka* helps us to get the cognition of *Vyāpti*. *Tarka* along with the knowledge of *hetu* and *sādhya*, accompanied by the knowledge of the absence of deviation is the cause of ascertaining *Vyāpti*. Udayana speaks of three conditions, when these conditions are satisfied then the relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* can be established. These conditions are as follows: i) cognition of co-presence between *hetu* and *sādhya* (*sahacāradarśana*); ii) cognition of the absence of deviation (smoke exists, but there is no fire); iii) after satisfaction of these two, application of *Tarka* is needed.

Inspite of having first and second condition the doubt continues to exist; this doubt has to be eliminated. Until and unless the doubt is removed, the relation of *Vyāpti* cannot be established.

In future such type of situation may arise, though there is *hetu* but *sādhya* does not exist. So the scope of doubt is still remaining. To eliminate this doubt *Tarka* is applied to get certainty about invariable concomitance between *hetu* and *sādhya*. When we go through this process, our cognition of *Vyāpti* will be valid. This is how Gangeśa justifies the necessity of incorporation of the method *Tarka* in *NavyaNyāya* epistemology.

Some critiques have raised objections here. If we ponder over the case then it seems that *Tarka* cannot eliminate the doubt in question. They hold that *Tarka* cannot eliminate the doubt under consideration, because of fallacy of ‘Infinite Regress’ (*anavasthā*). So the observation of Gangeśa is not correct at all.

The form of *Vyāpti* is –“where there is deviation of fire, there is the negation of being a product of fire (*yatra yatravahnivyabhicāritvam̄tatratastravahnijanyatvābhāvah*). In this form of *Vyāpti*, the first portion is *Vyāpya* (pervaded) and the last one *Vyāpaka* (pervader). If we take an example of “*yatra dhūmasti travahniḥ*”-i.e., fire is inferred by existence of smoke, smoke (*dhūma*) is pervaded (*vyāpyavattva*) and fire (*vahni*) is pervader (*vyāpakavattva*). Relationship lying between *Vyāpya* and *Vyāpaka* is called *Vyāpti*.

Pervader (*vyāpaka*) is established on the basis of cognition of pervaded (*Vyāpya*). The relation of *Vyāpya*- *Vyāpaka* is also found in case of *Tarka*. It may be stated as “if there were no smoke, there would be no fire”. The *Vyāpaka* (the second part of the inference) is deduced by the *Vyāpya* (the first part of the inference). The same type of mechanism is available in *Tarka*. One acute difference between *Tarka* and *anumāna* is – in case of *anumāna* there is the cognition of *Vyāpya*- *Vyāpaka*, none of them actually is *āhāryajñāna*. Whereas, in case of *Tarka*

*āhāryajñāna* remains in the cognition of *Vyāpya-Vyāpaka* relation. Though both the cognition of *Tarka* and *anumāna* is based on *Vyāpti*, the knowledge of *Vyāpti* is presupposed by *Tarka*. In order to remove doubt remaining in this *Vyāpti*, another *Tarka* will have to be resorted to. In this way, the defect arising from such situation is called ‘Infinite Regress’ (*anāvasthā*). But this view is not tenable. If we go on doubting, our doubting would be subject to doubt. So, each and every case should be regarded as doubt. *Tarka* only satisfies the formal conditions of inference, not material condition, i.e., why *Tarka* cannot be considered as a form of proper inference.

In *Tarkasamgraha* Annāmbhaṭṭa defines *Tarka* as “*vyāpyāropenavyāpakāropah tarkah*”<sup>7</sup>, i.e *Tarka* is an imposition of the pervader with the help of the imposition of the pervaded.

In *Nīlakanṭhaprakāśikā* commentary on *Dīpīkā* of *Tarkasamgraha* *Tarka* is defined as “*āhāryavyāpyavattvā-bhramajanyaḥāhāryavyāpakavattvā-bhramastarkah*”<sup>8</sup> i.e. ‘*Tarka* is illusory cognition of the imposition of the pervader which is caused by the illusory cognition of the imposition of the pervaded”. In this definition there is a tendency to interpret the nature of *Tarka* as one of the forms of *āhāryajñāna*. Both the parts of *Tarka*, i.e., antecedent (*āpādaka*) and consequent (*āpādya*) are imaginary. In order to defend *pūrvapakṣa*, we have taken some hypothetical statements which is contrary to our daily-life experience. If someone having doubt whether water quenches thirst, then a hypothetical reasoning may be formed in the following way- ‘If water does not quench thirst, no thirsty person seeks for this’. In our everyday life we have experienced that there is no scope of doubt between water or any type of drink and thirst. So,

there is an entailment relation between two parts of *Tarka*. If the former part (*āpādaka*) is true, another part (*āpādya*) would follow it without giving no effort. This sort of ascription is similar to *āhāryajñāna* and that's why, this method of argumentation is defined as a form of *āhāryajñāna* in *NavyaNyāya* school of thought. In this case, our day-to-day experience acts as a *vādhakajñāna*. Due to having excessive will an individual imagines such hypothetical argument.

Finally it could be said that *Tarka* removes the doubt of deviation and helps to provide us cognition of *Vyāpti*. *Tarka* is definitely a form of *āhāryajñāna*, not the vice-versa.

## PART-III

### **The Concept of *Tātparya* in *NavyaNyāya*:**

The intention of speaker (*tātparya*) has taken a significant role in *NavyaNyāya* school of thought. The eminent *NavyaNyāya* thinkers like Gangeśa, Viṣvanātha, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Dīnakara, Rāmarudra, Raghunātha Śiromoṇi and also some contemporary thinkers enriched this concept.

Before we are going to discuss the nature of *Tātparya*, the origin of this concept should be mentioned. The *Navya Naiyāyikas* have admitted four conditions of sentence-meaning for having a successful verbal communication between hearer and speaker. These are-*ākānkṣā*, *sannidhi*, *yogyatā*, and *tātparya*<sup>9</sup>. Among these four, *Tatparya* can be tankan as an instance of non-compulsive will.

As we know that the relation lying between *pada* and *padārtha* is called *yṛtti*. And again *yṛtti* is of two types, i.e., *śakti* and *lakṣaṇā* in the attainment of sentence- meaning. To denote the meaning of *pada*, God's intention is final according to the old *Naiyāyikas* whereas, the *Navya Naiyāyikas* have admitted an individual's intention to define the nature of *śakti*. The concept of *tātparya* has to be understood in the contest of implicative meaning (*lakṣaṇā*) of word. *Lakṣaṇā* does not come into verbal testimony suddenly. It is another form of *vṛtti*, which memorizes the word-meaning and applying this verbal communication is possible. *Lakṣaṇā* is an indirect relation between *pada* and *padārtha*. The meaning which is denoted by *śakti* is called primary meaning (*sākyārtha*), i.e., a direct relation between *pada* and *padārtha*. In *Dīpikā* commentary of *Tarkasamgraha*, *lakṣaṇā* is defined as “*Lakṣaṇāśakyasambandhaḥ tātparyānupapattita*”<sup>10</sup>i.e., to remove *tātparyānupapattita*, the primary meaning of a word has to be replaced by the secondary meaning (*lakṣyārtha*) of the same word. If there is an inconsistency between primary meanings of two words, application of *lakṣaṇā* helps to remove the inconsistency (*lakṣaṇā śakyasambandhaḥ iti*). We take an example of “*yaṣṭhīpraveśaya*”. Stick is the primary meaning of the term ‘*yaṣṭhī*’. The unconscious object cannot be requested. So, the secondary meaning of ‘*yaṣṭhī*’i.e stick-holder is considered here.

One may raise objection that why should not *anvayānupapatti* be taken as a root- cause of implicative meaning of a word? If it is admitted as root- cause of *lakṣaṇā* some problems may arise. For, an example- “*kākebhyaḥdadhirakṣyatām*”- suffers from ‘purport-difficulty’ (*tātparyānupapattita*), not ‘syntax-difficulty’ (*anvayānupapatti*). The *sākyārtha* of ‘crow’ is ‘bird’, there is no scope of syntax-difficulty, and rather it has purport-

difficulty. The intention of speaker is curd which should be protected from any type of creature harmful to it. In this example, we admit the *lakṣyārtha* of ‘crow’, not the primary meaning. The primary meaning of ‘crow’ is ‘only birds’. Whereas the secondary meaning of ‘crow’ is ‘any type of creature’ who may damage the curd. It is clear from the above statement that, for understanding the meaning of a sentence ‘consideration of purport’ is to be admitted. Because of this Annambhāṭṭa seems to be in favor of the view that *tātparyānupapttita* should be treated as the origination of *lakṣaṇā* for understanding the meaning of a statement.

Another one of the famous example can be cited here. In the case- “*gangāyāṁghoṣaḥ*” – the direct meaning of the word ‘*gangā*’ is ‘continuous flow of water’. If we admit the direct meaning of the word ‘*gangā*’, it shows purport-difficulty. Milk-man colony cannot live on ‘continuous flow of water’. So it is better to take the indirect meaning of ‘*gangā*’, i.e. ‘bank of the river *gangā*’. So, the statement means ‘Milk-man–colony lives on the bank of the ’*gangā*’and this is surely free from the purport-difficulty. The indirect meaning of the word ‘*gangā*’is taken into the account for understanding the meaning of the above sentence and the removal of non –reliability of relation between word and it’s direct meaning is the result of *lakṣaṇā*.

The *Prācīna Naiyāyikas* seem to admit *Tātparya* as an origination of implicative meaning or as a removal of the difficulties between direct and indirect meaning of a word. In *Tarkasamgraha* ākāṅkṣā, *sannidhi*, *yogyatā* and *tātparya* are considerations for understanding of verbal statement. On the contrary, the *Navya Naiyāyikās* considered for having sentence–meaning. The desire of a

speaker in the context of verbal communication is most important one. Especially, in case of ambiguous sentence, the sense intended to be conveyed by the speaker should be realized. It has both epistemic purpose and also significant in our daily life. The intention of speaker should be reflected through sentence, otherwise inspite of fulfillment of other conditions, i.e., *ākānkṣā*, *sannidhi*, *yogyatā*, due to lack of *tātparya* sentence-meaning can't be grasped. We may find such ambiguous sentence and we should ponder over the desire of speaker. An ambiguous statement in the form “*nava-kamvalamānaya*”-the word ‘*nava*’ denotes two meaning, i.e., either something ‘new’ or ‘nine a numerical figure’. Which meaning should we take is determined by the desire, as convoyed by the speaker. The desire of speaker plays a significant role for having successful communication.

So, it is clear from the above discussion, an individual's desire is central to any discipline. As a pre-condition of verbal comprehension desire is manifested in the form of sentence. Sentence is an expression of mood of the speaker, either it is uttered or not. Speaker's will is reflected through sentence. Such sort of desire is known as in *NavyaNyāya* discourse. Until and unless we grasp the *tātparya* of sentence, no linguistic communication is possible. Any sort of linguistic problem is generated due to lack of intention of speaker.

*Tātparya* also plays a significant role in our social-life. We may cite an example of traffic signal, abstract painting, expression of love, showing anger – these are also the instances of intention of speaker not expressed through utterance.

In *NavyaNyāya* discourse, intention of speaker may be defined in two ways. First, *tātparya* is defined as, “*Vakturicchā tātparya*”<sup>11</sup> -i.e., the desire of speaker is *tātparya*. One should understand the purpose intended to be conveyed by the speaker. If one says, “*saindhavamānaya* i.e., ‘bring *saindhava*’. The ambiguous term ‘*saindhava*’ occurs in this statement. For the right apprehension of this statement, we must have a clear idea about the intention of speaker. The term ‘*saindhava*’ indicates two different objects -either it will be ‘one type of salt’ or ‘horse, which is found in the land of *Sindhu*’. What type of meaning should be taken by the hearer is entirely dependent on the context of the statement. If the statement is made at the time of meals, one has to take the term ‘*saindhava*’ in the sense of ‘salt’. If it is taken as otherwise, it is exactly unintelligible. When the same statement is uttered at the time of travelling, the term is taken in the sense of ‘horse’. So, in case of, successful communication, the proper understanding of a statement depends on realizing the intention of speaker. That’s why; *tātparyajñāna* is to be admitted as a condition for understanding the meaning of a statement by the *NavyaNaiyāyikas*.

Another definition of *tātparya* is found, which is as follows, “*tat pratitīcchayāuccharitatvam*”<sup>12</sup> i.e., when speaker is desirous to make ourselves understand something and utters a statement, the utterance of statement is taken as *tātparyajñāna*. This definition emphasizes on the term ‘*uccaritatvam*’ (utterance). But in our social life, there are a number of instances free from utterance though it will carry a great significance. We may cite an example of traffic signal, the verses of dumb persons, abstract painting etc. When we express our psychological dispositions (like, anger, love), there may not be utterances, though conveying a deep meaning in our life. So, these are the cases having

*tātparya*, suffers from ‘uccaritatva’. If second definition is taken into account,<sup>≡</sup>these statements will become meaningless. The second definition is suffering from *avyāptidoṣa*. These statements are lack of the feature “uccaritattva”, though the desire of a speaker is reflected here. In order to show honor to the desire of speaker, and acceptance of intention of speaker in the context of unuttered statements *tātparya* has been admitted in *NavyaNyāya* school of thought, and the second definition is rejected. And the first definition of *tātparya* is widely accepted. The desire of speaker is *tātparya*, whether it expresses through language or some other expression.

The *NavyaNyāya* admitted four types of sentences through which the desire of the speaker is expressed. These are discussed as follows:

1) Ambiguous sentence: - Let us try to understand the meaning of *tātparyajñāna* in an ambiguous word. If someone utters a sentence ‘navakambalamānaya’, it would seem difficult for hearer to realize the exact meaning of the word ‘navakambalam’. This word may be used in two different senses, either it express as ‘new blanket’ or “nine number of blanket”. So, in case of successful verbal comprehension, hearer must be aware of the desire of speaker which he has conveyed through the term ‘navakambalam’. Which sense of term is to be taken is entirely depends on the circumstances, uttered by the speaker. Another example of ambiguous word has been mentioned above. So, the exact meaning of the term ‘navakambalam’ is determined according to a particular context under which the speaker utters the statement.

2) Non-ambiguous sentence: - We use simple words having no dual meaning. This type of statement also has *tātparyajñāna*. For example, if someone says:

‘*ghaṭamānaya*’ –i.e., ‘bring the jar’, the hearer performs an action. Whether a statement is either imperative or portative such as ‘don’t tell a lie’, ‘please tell me your name’, ‘May Heaven help us’, ‘May God bless you’ etc. Apart of epistemic purpose intention of speaker is significant in our social life also. We become very much unable for having successful verbal communication without realizing the desire of the speaker. The desire of speaker is reflected here.

3) Vedic sentence:- As Nyāya philosophy belongs to heterodox system, it regards Veda as eternal and authorless. Vedic injunctions can never be contradicted by any successive/succeeding knowledge. Vedic sentence is valid in itself. If we cite an example of Vedic injunction, such as, “*svorgokāmoyajeta*”- the intention of such Vedic sentence is reflection of desire of God.

4) *Śūkavākyā*:- The sentence uttered by a parrot is also taken as another form of knowledge of *Tātparya*. *Śūkavākyā* is also containing intention. Some of thinkers seem to claim that God’s intention is reflected in *Śūkavākyā*. If it is found that a sentence uttered by parrot is *samvādī* (contains of truthfulness), we must take an account that God’s intention is reflected through bird. Now one may raise question, if sentence as expressed through bird is *visamvādī* (contains of falsehood), whose desire would be reflected on that particular case? As we know that. Nyāya thinkers admit the concept of God as an auxiliary cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) of the world, so is also regarded as auxiliary cause in case of *Śūkavākyā* having truthfulness. Then why should he not be regarded as sufficient cause of *Śūkavākyā* which contains falsity? If God is thought as *nimittakāraṇa* of world, He should be remaining same in both of truthfulness or falsity of a cognition. Actually, when parrot uttered a sentence, it does not contain of any

sort of desire. It indicates that in our real life, through a bird, none of an incident is reflected. For example, it can be said that if it is raining outside, the bird can't state the fact by perceiving it's raining. When a bird is trained, he utters a sentence inspite of his habituates. When the sentence as uttered by the parrot is quite similar to factual statement, it would be taken as accidental one. So, the truthfulness or falsity of *Śūkavākyā* is a consequent of his trainer, the desire of trainer is reflected here, not God.

So, it may be said that, all knowledge, whether it is Vedic or secular, conveying the desire of a knower. And it is reflected in various forms of knowledge. For having successful communication, the hearer must be aware of the desire of the speaker, either expressed through sentence or some other means.

## PART-IV

### **Concept of *Pakṣatā* in *NavyaNyāya*:**

Another instance of epistemic desire is *NavyaNyāya* concept of '*Pakṣatā*' (the property of being a *pakṣa*). *Pakṣatā* is to be understood in the context of *anumāna*, accepted by the *Nyāya* thinkers as a valid source of knowledge among the four *pramāṇas* (perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony). The literal meaning of the term *Pakṣatā* is in which cases inference may be possible. There is disagreement about this. *Siddhi* (confirmation of inferable object) is not regarded as an obstacle in case of perception. But if *Siddhi* is present, *anumiti* is not possible, because the absence of *siddhi* is *Pakṣatā* and

henceforth *Pakṣatā* is not regarded as reason for perception. It is stated here that, though the absence of *siddhi* is *Pakṣatā*, still an qualifier is needed to be added to the *siddhi*, and that adjective is ‘*siṣādhayiṣāvirahaviṣṭatva*’. The term *siṣādhayiṣā* means the desire for inference. *Anumitsā* and *siṣādhayiṣā* are same things. The meaning of the term ‘*viraha*’ is *abhāva* (absence). *Sādhyā* must be on *pakṣa* ----such type of certainty is stated as *siddhi*. We have already stated that the absence of *siddhi* is *Pakṣatā*. If *siddhi* is not present but *siṣādhayiṣā* is there, in that case *Pakṣatā* is possible. In other words, it can be stated as if there is the desire for inference, *Pakṣatā* is possible inspite the presence of *siddhi*. If the situation is the *vice versa* i.e. if *siddhi* is there, but there is no *siṣādhayiṣā*, there is no *Pakṣatā*. In *Tarkasamgraha* Annambhaṭṭa states that “*Sādhyasiddhiḥanumitivandhikā*”<sup>13</sup> i.e., if we have certain knowledge that *Sādhyā* is on *pakṣa*, we don’t need any further inference of that *Sādhyā* on that *Pakṣa* anymore. If we have certain knowledge of *Sādhyā* on *pakṣa* and if there is a strong desire to infer again, then there may be *anumiti* at that *pakṣa*. *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* are of the view that if there is no desire to infer and due to having presence of *siddhi*, the question of *anumiti* doesn’t arise. The term ‘*siddhi*’ refers to what we want to establish. If it is already ascertained, in that case whether we can infer again or not -herein lies the significance of desire or *siṣādhayiṣā*. The product is not originated if there is an obstacle even if the productive material of effect is present. Sometimes it is seen that if a substance is present, the effect is produced even there is an obstacle. In spite of having resistance, the effort is generated in the presence of that substance, the very substance is meant by the word ‘*uttejaka*’ (stimulant). The origination of an effect can’t be confined by the resistant while in the presence of stimulant. In this context *siṣādhayiṣā* should be

taken as ‘*uttejaka*’. Even if there is ‘*siddhi*’ (certainty), if the speculator is willing to infer in that case *anumiti* is possible. Desire is important in this case. So our observation is that if there is *siddhi* qualified by *siṣādhayiṣā* (*anumitīcchā*), then it is not a barrier to inference. *Siṣādhayiṣā* is a form of desire.

If there is the lone desire of inferring (*siṣādhayiṣāmātra*), it is not *pakṣatā*, because it has been found that many cases of inferences occur without having desire for them e.g. the existence of cloud is inferred as soon as we hear the roaring without giving any scope of the desire for inference. From this it follows that even the doubt of *Sādhyā*, can’t give rise to inference, because inference of *sādhyā* (cloud in the above-mentioned case) does not depend on the doubt of *sādhyā*. From this example it is proved illogical/absurd that *sādhyā-samśaya* is considered as *pakṣatā*. When clouds are inferred after hearing the roar of cloud then the doubt of *sādhyā* does not exist. So, it would seem clear that absence of *siddhi* (certainty) is the chief characteristic of *pakṣatā*. So, the absence of *siddhi* is not the root cause of *pakṣatā* in all cases. In spite of having certainty, *sādhyānumitīcchā* is often establishing *anumiti*. In “*Kārikā*” the absence (*viraha*) of the desire to infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*) is conjoined as the qualifier of *siddhi*. In “*Sidhānta-muktāvalīpakṣatā*”, it is stated as the absence of certainty that is accompanied by the absence of the desire to infer.

Viśvanātha shows four fields about *Pakṣatā* in his “*Sidhānta-muktāvalī*”[14](#). He discusses how the interrelationship of *siddhi* and *siṣādhayiṣā* make *anumiti* possible. These four fields are as follows:

- 1) One is allowed to infer *sādhyā*, even though it is already established, because of there is a strong will to infer. Sometimes in case of inference

the presence of an established object acts as an obstacle. We may dissolve that resistance by applying the intensity of desire. ‘Desire to infer’ is regarded as a stimulant to the inferential knowledge. If there is presence of strong desire, inferential knowledge is made despite the presence or absence of that certain object (*siddhi*).

- 2) *Pakṣatā* lies there where there is no *siddhi* (substantiation of *sādhya*).  
The existence of desire to infer or absence of it does not matter here.
- 3) If *siddhi* (ascertained object) is there and desire to infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*) is not present, *anumiti* is not possible. So, NavyaNyāya emphasizes on strength of desire. In case of *icchāprayojya-jñāna* it is claimed that will is not determined by necessity. Due to presence of this will, after established an object by applying among any sort of *pramāṇa*, other *pramāṇa* on the same subject may also apply.

In this case, the presence of *siddhi* acts as an obstacle to infer. So this barrier is removed through desire and the implementation of another instrument of knowledge helps to re-establish it.

- 4) If there is a strong desire to infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*), there is *pakṣatā*. Whether *siddhi* remains here or does not remain is out of the question. *Pakṣatā* is not possible there where there is *siddhi* but having no desire to infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*). In the last alternative alone there is the presence of *siddhi* (non- absence- *siddhyābhāva*), which is endowed with the absence of the desire of inference ('*siṣādhayiṣāviraha - viśiṣṭa- siddhiḥ*'). If an object is already established and there is the absence of the desire of inference ('*siṣādhayiṣāviraha - viśiṣṭa- siddhiḥ*'), there is no *pakṣatā*.

An object is bearing the characteristics of *pakṣatā* as shown above is a *pakṣa* (*tadvānpakṣah*).

Thus among the four alternatives as mentioned by Viśvanātha in first and third alternatives impotence of desire lies there. ‘*Siṣādhayiṣāviraha - viśiṣṭa-siddhiḥ*’----- Annambhaṭṭa explains this matter with an example. The absence of the gem (*candrakāntamaṇi*) is considered as cause to fire, similarly ‘*siṣādhayiṣāvirahaviśiṣṭa- siddhyabhāva*’ is regarded as cause to inferential knowledge. Burning occurs when the hand connects with the fire. But if first gem is in front, even if there is a fire, there is no burning. Then the burning capacity of fire is destroyed. So, the *candrakāntamaṇi* is regarded as resistance to fire. When another gem (*sūryakāntamaṇi*) is brought up in the presence of first gem (*candrakāntamaṇi*), then the burning process is not interrupted. Hence, the second gem (*sūryakāntamaṇi*) is treated as stimulant (*uttejaka*). Where the fire is connected to hand, and also there is absence of *candrakāntamaṇi*, whether *sūryakāntamaṇi* is or does not remain there, still there will be cremation. If there is *sūryakāntamaṇi*, it will burn even if there is *candrakāntamani* or not-- it doesn't matter. If both of the gems are present there, it will burn. If *candrakāntamaṇi* only remains there, but *sūryakāntamaṇi* does not remain, then there will be no cremation. In the same manner, *sūryakāntamaṇi* is compared to *siṣādhayiṣā* (*uttejaka*), and on the contrary *candrakāntamaṇi* is be taken as *siddhi* (*prativandhaka*). Similarly, (*uttejaka*) i.e., the absence of desire to infer, acts as a stimulant (absence of *siddhi*) to cause of *anumiti*.

So, the importance of desire has shown here. Desire acts as a necessary factor in the attainment of inferential knowledge. The same subject can be known

through different way. Only necessity does not control the implementation of desire. Cogniser sometimes have strong will to know the object repeatedly by applying various instrument of knowledge. This sort of cognition, produced out of one's epistemic desire is known as *icchāprayojya-jñāna*. In *NavyaNyāya* school of thought there is a room for such form of cognition.

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