

**‘WILL-GENERATED COGNITION’ IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO NAVYA NYĀYA**

**Thesis submitted to the University of North Bengal
For the Award of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy**

Submitted by

Indrani Choudhury

Research Scholar, Dept. of Philosophy

University of North Bengal

Under the supervision of:

Prof. Raghunath Ghosh

Former Professor, Dept. of Philosophy

University of North Bengal

December, 2021

I DEDICATED THIS WORK TO MY MOST RESPECTED

Swami Sundarananda Maharaj

DECLARATION

It is here by declared that the thesis entitled "*Will-generated Cognition' in Indian Philosophy with Special Reference to Navya Nyāya*" has been written by me under the supervision of Prof. Raghunath Ghosh, Former Professor, Dept. of Philosophy, University of North Bengal. I would also further like to state that no part of this thesis has formed the basis for the award of any degree or fellowship of any other institute previously.

Date: 14.12.20 21

Indrani Choudhury 14.12.21
Indrani Choudhury
Research Scholar,
Dept. of Philosophy,
University of North Bengal

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

P.O. North Bengal University, Raja Rammohunpur, Dt. Darjeeling, West Bengal, India, PIN - 734 013

Department of Philosophy



☎ : 0353-2776334(O)

visit us at : <http://www.nbu.ac.in> , Fax : 0353-2699001

E-mail: deptphilosophy1@gmail.com

Ref. No. :

Date : 14.12.2021

To whom it may concern

This is to certify that Sm. Indrani Chaudhury has prepared the thesis entitled: '*Will-generated Cognition in Indian Philosophy with Special Reference to Navya Nyaya*' for the award of PhD degree in Philosophy (Arts) of the University of North Bengal under my supervision as per the UGC's new regulations. The thesis is not submitted wholly or partially for the award of any other degree of this University or any other Universities. I sincerely wish her every success in life. Nothing would be more pleasing than to find her well-placed in life.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Raghunath Ghosh'.

(Professor Raghunath Ghosh),

Professor of Philosophy (Retired) & Supervisor,

University of North Bengal

Supervisor
Department of Philosophy
University of North Bengal


Document Information

Analyzed document Indrani Choudhury_Philosophy.pdf
Submitted (D120276112) 2021-11-29T09:22:00.0000000
Submitted by University of North Bengal
Submitter email nbuplg@nbu.ac.in
Similarity 3%
Analysis address nbuplg.nbu@analysis.orkund.com

Sources included in the report

W	URL: http://inet.vidyasagar.ac.in:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/1274/2/5-13.pdf Fetched: 2021-11-29T09:26:00.0000000	 9
W	URL: https://www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jhss/papers/Vol20-issue11/Version-1/E0201113032.pdf Fetched: 2021-11-29T09:26:00.0000000	 1

Indrani Choudhury.
14.12.21
Ph.D. Research Scholar.


14/12/21

Supervisor
Department of Philosophy
University of North Bengal

Preface

In this thesis I have made an effort to show the cognitive aspect of 'desire'. In the poem of Rabindranath Tagore named as "*Janmabr̥ṭṭānta*" the concept of desire is introduced. In this poem an innocent child wanted to know the secret of life to his mother (where have I come from / "*elem āmi kothā hote?*"). And the mother replied that you were in my mind in the form of desire (*icchā rūpe chili moner mājhāre*). This is the simplest and most basic form of human will. I have described it as creative aspect of desire. We usually see this creative aspect of desire in the world of literature. The role of desire has been beautifully explained in the *Gītā*, *Upaniṣad*, also in our traditional Indian culture. Apart from this the cognitive aspect of desire is especially found in *NavyaNyāya* school of thought. Desire has been admitted by the *Navya Naiyāyikas* as one of the quality among twenty four qualities of soul. Desire has a sociological impact as well as epistemological quest. Our social life is governed by combination of both will and rule. We use many words in practical life that are not grammatically correct. The term '*śrīcaraṇeṣu*' has been used to show honour to our parents and teachers. Though it lacks of grammatical construction, we are allowed to apply it in order to show honour to the seniors. It should have been '*śrīcaraṇayoḥ*' in terms of grammatical accuracy. We intentionally use the term '*śrīcaraṇeṣu*' in plural to show respect. Human will has got foremost position in any sort of scientific discovery. Desire should be taken as seed of any type of invention.

Many philosophical issues have been shown here and I am trying my best to find a solution to them. I want to convey my sincere regards to Prof. Raghunath Ghosh, Former Professor, Dept. of Philosophy, NBU, without the guidance and co-operation of whom this difficult task would not have been possible. Apart from this, I shall be happy if I receive the sense of appreciation and criticism, if any, from the scholars specialized in this field.

Indrani Choudhury

Research Scholar, Dept. of Philosophy

North Bengal University

Acknowledgement

“Tomār pāyer pātā sobkhāne pātā/ konkhāne rākhbo praṇām”

My research would not have been possible without the cooperation of some respectful persons for which I am heartily grateful to them. First, I express my deep sense of gratitude to Prof. Raghunath Ghosh (supervisor of my thesis). Sir has extended his hands of cooperation; his knowledge and perseverance. He also helps me with his valuable suggestions and guidance which have been helpful in various phases of the completion of the project. He gave me the golden opportunity to start this wonderful journey of Philosophy. I would forever thankful to him.

Secondly, I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my parents, my husband Rajkumar Mukherjee, our small daughter, Choko, for sparing me to do my work, my elder sister Paramita Choudhury and my friends Sharmistha Majumder, Suchetana Paul and Dr. Biplab Kumar Saha who helped me a lot in finalizing this project within the limited time frame. I owe a lot to my teachers in the Department of Philosophy, specially, Professor Laxmikant Padhi, the then H.O.D, for helping directly and indirectly.

Whose guidance, suggestions, encouragements and very constructive criticism have contributed immensely to the evolution of my ideas in the project.

Indrani Choudhury

Research Scholar, Dept. of Philosophy

University of North Bengal

.....

Abstract

In this work an effort will be made to show how 'will-generated cognition' (*icchā-prayojya-jñāna*) acts in a philosophical activity. Human being has got autonomy to express something in his own manner. In epistemology, 'desire' has a significant role. An attempt has been in this work to this. The term 'will-generated cognition' means 'cognition generated through the desire of an individual which is not determined by any compulsion'. Our will may have some determinants which may act as promoters to do some activities. At the same time it may be admitted that there are certain philosophical activities which are prompted by the will of an individual having no determinants at all. In this case, an individual's will alone is honoured in getting certain cognition, but not other factors. Sometimes an individual has no alternatives than to desire something in a particular situation, which I would like to call as 'situational will', i.e. will having some determinants. In case of pure 'will-generated cognition' (*icchā-prayojya-jñāna*) philosophical activity starts with the 'pure desire' or 'sweet will'. The role of such will has been admitted in *Navya Nyāya* and other systems of Philosophy.

First, in introduction of my thesis I have stated that the role of desire is of twofold: creative and cognitive. In support of my statement references are given various scriptures like *Upaniṣad*, *Bhagavdgīta*, and writings of Rabindranath Tagore. In *Upaniṣad* it is stated that - "*svābhāvīkijñānavalakriyāca*" i.e. desire is free from any sort of artificial influences outside of it.. The 'creative aspect of desire' is beautifully shown in dance drama '*Tāśerdeśa*' written by Rabindranath Tagore. The 'Cognitive aspect of desire' is described especially in *NavyaNyāya* who admit desire (*icchā*) one of the qualities. The Navya Naiyayikas have developed a systematic language through which philosophical concepts can be analyzed systematically. They accepted after reforming Sanskrit language and this is widely accepted by Advaitins,

Grammarians etc. Doubt has got positive role in philosophical methodology. In *Kathopanishad* Naciketā possessed the strong will of knowing self to the great teacher Yama --- which is appreciated. Maitreyī in *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* has expressed her strong will to Yājñavalkya- ‘*yenāhamnāmṛtamsyāmtenāhamkimkuryāma*’ (What can do with that which cannot provide me Immortality?). Swami Vivekananda, in his pre monastic life, asks Ramkrishnadeva “have you seen God?” These questions are prompted by some doubt regarding a particular some object. This sort of curiosity or will to know about the true nature of an object has given a room in philosophical discussion.

Secondly, the second chapter of thesis deals with desire is through which one’s *pravṛtti*, *nivṛtti*, *upekṣa* can be explained. Will has a significant role in case of doubt. This uncertainty of mind can generate a tendency to search for the specific qualities, which can distinguish an object from the other. The search of ‘desire to know’ (*bubhutsā*) the specific feature of a thing is the essential character of philosophizing. In our traditional Indian culture, a desciple’s desire is taken as seed for any academic matter. According to *Bhagavadgītā*, if someone is desirous for knowing, he starts questioning, prostrating and nursing. Desire also has significance in the case of any scientific discovery. In Loss Elamas after seeing the first experimental explosion of an atomic bomb, scientist Oppenheimer was panicked and said: “Good, God, the long-haired boys have lost control” and then he said the verse of ‘*Gītā*’.

In the third chapter it has been discussed Metaphor as will- generated cognition I have shown that such intentional desire is found not only in Navya Nyāya but in addition to this in other traditional treatises like Grammar, *Alaṅkāśāstra*, *Bhaṭṭikāvya* also. The nature of metaphor has been discussed as a will-generated cognition. Just as in the metaphor ‘moon-like face’ (*mukhacandra*), it is known to an individual that face and moon can never be identified yet there is a strong will to identify them, which is called ‘deliberate identification’.

In chapter four some instances of ‘Will-generated Cognition’ in NavyaNyāya school of thought have shown with reasoning. These are the concepts of *Āhāryajñāna*, *Sambandha*, *Pakṣatā*, *Tarka*, *Tātparya* etc. The Navya Nyāya system, which is commonly known as realistic school, has prescribed some methods in order to arrive at certain truth, which is purely

'deliberate' (*icchājanya*). Among this *āhārya-jñāna* may serve as a means of knowing something indirectly. A problem may be raised how one can think of 'knowledge produced through desire' (*icchājanyajñāna*). A solution to this problem may be offered in the following way. Let us look towards the exact nature of *āhāryajñāna*. The knowledge, which is produced out of one's own desire at the time when there is the contrary knowledge, is called *āhāryajñāna (birodha-jnāna-kālīnechhā-prayojya)*.

Apart from these there are a few cases where the knowledge attained through the instrumentality of desire (*icchājanya*) as in case of *pakṣatā* is found, though it is not absolutely necessary for logical point of view. If an individual bears a strong desire to infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*), he can infer in spite of having *siddhi (siṣādhayiṣāsattve'numitirbhavatyeva)*. It is permissible as the Naiyāyikas believe in the theory of *pramāṇasaṃplaba* (i.e. capability of applying various *pramāṇas*) to ascertain a single object.

In the conclusive portion of the thesis some evaluative critical remarks have been made regarding the will-generated cognition as mentioned above. The NavyaNaiyāyikas are called as *sambandhī* by the contemporary thinkers on account of the fact that they have put an adequate emphasis on the phenomenon of *sambandha* or relation particularly in the field of philosophical deliberation. Any philosophical analysis is linguistic and hence to establish something with the help of language is to adopt certain relation. Many contradictions involved in linguistic usage can be resolved if some relation is kept in view. It can be said that an individual exists in a room so far as the eastern side of the room is concerned (*pūrvadiśāvachhinna*) while he does not exist in the same room if the space is limited by the northern side of the room is concerned (*uttaradiśāvachhinna*). Our cognition needs such operator like relation to understand the proper meaning of certain expressions. To the Navya Naiyāyikas any standpoint of understanding can be taken as separate relation and hence the relation cannot be *seen* but *realized* through our independent intellect and desire. In order to bring clarity in thought the artificial languages like *pakṣatā*, *āhāryajñāna*, *tarka* etc. have been created by the NavyaNaiyāyikas. Moreover, some of relations admitted by the NavyaNaiyāyikas are related to the indicator dependent on the desire of an individual. In the case of *nirūpya-*

nirūpaka-bhāva relation it is the desire of an individual which indicates what would be determinant (*nirūpaka*) and determined (*nirūpya*) between two relata. A problem may be raised of the following type. Between son and father there is the above-mentioned relation but it is not understood by us what the determinant (*nirūpaka*) and the determined (*nirūpya*) is. It depends on the intention of the speaker leading to no fixed rule in this matter. If an individual thinks the son is the determinant (*nirūpaka*) of the father which is determined (*nirūpya*), it is taken for granted. If the case is otherwise, i.e., father and son are taken as determinant and determined respectively, it is equally acceptable. Such is the case between teacher (*śikṣaka*) and student (*chātra*), preceptor (*guru*) and disciple (*śiṣya*) etc. All these provide us the freedom of expression.

Content:

	Pages
1. Introduction.....	1-19
2. The Concept of 'Will –generated Cognition' and it's Role in Philosophical Enterprise.....	20-37
3. Metaphor as Will-generated Cognition.....	38-45
4. The Concept of Will-generated Cognition in <i>NavyaNyāya</i>	46-74
5. Some Critical Evaluative Remarks and <i>NavyaNyāya</i> Defense.....	75-104
Bibliography.....	105-109

INTRODUCTION

The Cosmic world has got the first and foremost responsibility of awaking all our efforts. The world aware us in many different ways--- it is trying to make us cautious, but not enthrall. We are cautious because of enjoying our own conscious-authority.

A prince is handed to the teacher so that he will make able the Prince to rule the nation by removing his unwillingness through teachings. But sometimes it would seem that the teacher captivates the prince so much by his learning and when the prince gets the ruler ship, existing in name only. Ultimately the teacher ruled over the King, i.e. the teacher has great influences on the King by way of converting him. When the outer world becomes so powerful that it tries to take out our entire attempts, it is called *vāsanā*. This psychological process attached us to the various object of cosmic world. When something is presented in front of us, it draws our attention. In this way our mind become scattered in worldly objects. This is the easiest method to interact with other.

If *vāsanā* does not stop in a proper place, its excessiveness becomes prior to our life, and then our life cannot come out from this dark (*tāmasika*) situation. We cannot prove and fill our own authority. We are outside masters without gaining any kind of wealth. The present attraction takes us from one of our smaller to the smallest. In this situation man cannot build any permanent object.

This *vāsanā* is going to stop at desire (*icchā*). The objective of *vāsanā* is an outside affair; on the contrary, the goal of desire is an inner intention. Desire is the thing of heart. All of the *vāsanā* is bound up by the desire around a sincere purpose. The desire does not allow *vāsanā* to wonder outside as such.

Then people come from one to many. But if *vāsanā* is stronger than will, if it does not want to accept the intention, only then the external authority grows up and minimizes inner authority. And finally the purpose is lost. Then the work of human creation does not function. Where the will power is strong, where the authority is well established in heart, people evoke the attraction of darkness (*tāmasika*) and excel in *rājasika* qualities.

But the subject of *vāsanā* is as diverse as it is. In the same way, the subject of will is not only one in the realm of desire. Many more intentions come to mind in a couple of times. The intentions of learning, wealth, fame etc., become chief to an individual. Thus anarchy is created in the world of desire. This anarchy is dispelled when we associate all of our desire with the will of the world. That desire is the good-will of the world. It is neither just my wish, nor just your will, it is the basic eternal desire of the Cosmic world 1.

The desire is at the root of the universe, and hence, the *Upaniṣada* says about it-“*svābhāvikījñānavalakriyāca*” i.e., it is easy and independent. There is no artificial influence outside of it. Our will when bound with the original eternal desire of the Universe leads to all of its actions that are normal in nature. That is, all of its actions are not done by any inclination. Pride does not let it push, the imitation of folk society does not create him, encouragement of communal factionalism does not give strength, blasphemy does not hurt him, harassment does not stop him, the misery of the material does not deter him.

Those who have associated their will to the will of Mars, they gain the immortal power of the Universe, that natural power of action ----there is a lot of

evidence of it in history. We may cite the instances of Goutam Buddha, Jesus Christ etc.

Buddha avoided the happiness and prosperity of Kapilāvastu and went to the welfare of the world, the treasury and soldiers had nothing to do with him. He is then equal to the tenants of his ancestral kingdom in external materials. But as he associated his desire with the eternal desire of Universe, his desire gained the natural action. Though he has lost his mortal body since a few centuries, but the natural desire of his good deeds is still going on today. It can still be seen in the secluded temple of Buddhagaya, a devotee surrenders to the world-welfare will and praying with his folded hands: "*Buddham śaranam gacchāmi* ". Even today his teachings are giving life to people; his words are giving fearlessness to the people. His will still in action today, a thousand years later.

Another such radiant personality is Jesus. He was born in a stable and remote village --- not in any scholar's house, not in any King's palace, not in any opulent capital, even not in a great field of pilgrimage. Only a few Algerian youths who made living by fishing became his disciples. When the Roman emperor ordered him to be crucified, no sign was ever revealed the particular day that the day will be blessed forever in the history of the world. His enemies thought everything was gone; this tiny spark was completely crushed and extinguished. But no one can't put him out. The Lord Jesus reconciled his will with the will of Father--- that desire does not die; there is no end to his normal actions. What manifested itself in an extreme lean way on that day, has conquered the Universe after two thousand years.

The absolute good-power manifested his knowledge, power and action through the midst of unknown poverty. Evidence of this fact has been found repeatedly in history. From the above discussion we may easily draw our conclusion how important the role of desire plays in our lives. We cannot afford to violate it. Desire is inextricably linked with our existence.

Human beings have got their autonomy to think something in his own manner. The role of desire is of two -fold: -creative aspect and cognitive aspect. Any sort of creation is rooted in the seed of desire. On the same way, the 'desire' is a fundamental factor in epistemology, because it prompts us to perform certain activities. If human being is alienated from 'desire', then how much an atmosphere of peculiarity, mechanical and absurdity hanging over the whole life, has been shown by Rabindranath Tagore in his dance drama '*Tāserdeśā*' 2. Beside this he also has made an effort here to show that there is always a victory of one's desire ('*jai, icchār jai*'). In this drama Rabindranath introduces us to the land of artificiality having no room for autonomy. Mechanical order (*niyama*) has taken first and foremost position in the land of cards. That is why; the inhabitants of the land of cards are bound with so many rules which make them artificial and rule-based. Even the normal physical movements towards left or right, to bent shoulder etc are prohibited (*ghaḍbānkiyonāko...*).

In the very beginning of *Tāserdeśā*, same sort of disgusting attitude is found in the Prince. The cause of it was enquired by businessman, i.e. what is the reason of being fickle-minded? The Prince replied that this fickleness is what is called 'natural' which is found in the group of swans rushing towards the Himalayas in a body. He has expressed his wish to the businessman that he wants

to fly in the sky like those birds, free from all the bindings. Sometimes he feels that as usual life of palace had made himself just like a bird confined within a golden cage. Due to fickleness of his mind, he is starting blame all the rules and rituals of palace which make his life boring. He wants to be free from all these rites and rituals, and decides to go somewhere else like those birds, in spite of having a permanent residence. He has made a number of instances in favor of his decision. The businessman asked the royal Queen (*Rājamātā*) that the Prince was determined in searching of knowing the unknown. Finally the royal Queen blessed the prince towards his unknown destiny.

The Prince came in new-land along with his attendant acting as co-businessman. According to his own words, '*elem natundeśe* (we have arrived at a new country). But the businessman criticizes the term '*natundeśe*' after observing the peculiar activity of the inhabitants of the land and has defined it as a land of death (*marādeśa*).

They were enjoying after seeing various peculiar activities of the inhabitants of that land. At that time the Prince thinks that these kinds of attitudes hint the fact that such type of absurdness is a kind of an imposition, made by the masters of land of cards. The purpose behind there is that they have to read off such veil of artificiality so that the natural form of life may come out and will make wonder.

Prince and businessman have defined those activities of the inhabitants of the land as 'dance of ghosts in a dying-land' (*marādehe bhūternṛtya*) and they were laughing at it. This was noticed by the inhabitants of this land and they think that prince and businessman cut joke about them. They take it too seriously and

have got angry and said that 'laughing' is strictly prohibited here as it violates 'order' (*niyama*) in *Tāserdeśa*'.

Prince replied that whatever they were performing has no significance or meaning at all. During this conversation they introduce themselves together and came to know that they have reached in a new land, named '*Tāserdeśa*'. And the Desire is revealed in the form of beauty, prayer, truth, love and enjoyment. For Rabindranath Tagore, desire of God is twofold- 1) Where desire manifested in the form of rules (*vidhāna*) is nature (*prakṛti*) and the same desire manifested in the form of enjoyment (*ānanda*) is regarded as self (*ātman*). We prayed to God as he is the possessor of *icchāvṛtti* or a desirable state of mind; he is regarded as '*ānandarūpam-amṛitamī*. i.e., in the form of Bliss and Immortality.'

Gradually, Prince and businessman realize that each and every smallest activity is regulated by 'order' in land of cards. The slogan of this land is '*calo niyamamata*' i.e. 'to move forward as per rules'. But the prince opposed this view point and hinted at the forest, fountains, hills where there is no restrictive order. Actually, the inhabitants of *Tāserdeśa* have taken 'order' in an objective manner; they think that it is (*niyama*) rule which moves us throughout our whole lives. They are of the view-point that why will a man move forward? But it is restrictive order which will drive the movers (*calā! calābe keno tumi! calābe niyama*). There regulation is identified with self.

In the last section of the dance drama we see that Prince and his co-businessman have got success in their plan to some extent in order to bring changes in women of *Tāserdeśa*. The flow of new thoughts extends to the entire land and these have made them realized that how much artificiality they are

holding their life. And also realize the important role of desire in the field of individual being. Now they are in a new chapter in their life.

This particular desire (*icchā*) impels us to obtain knowledge and to perform different types of action autonomously. So, desire and intellect is not contradictory to each other, rather they are complementary to one another. Desire makes us curious for knowing the unknown, seeing the unseen and exploring the unexplored.

The concept of desire is revealed by the old Naiyāyikas as a quality (*guṇa*) of soul. Soul is defined as '*jñānadhikaraṇam*' (i.e. the substrate of *jñāna* or cognition). And soul is of two types –Supreme Soul (*paramātmā*) and Finite Soul (*jīvātmā*). TSD defines Supreme soul as 'the substrate of an eternal state of consciousness'; on the contrary Finite Soul is many in number, eternal and ubiquitous. In TS it is further stated that the word '*jñānadhikaraṇa*' (locus of cognition) alone cannot be taken as a mark of defining soul; '*icchādhikarana* and *prayatnādhikaraṇa* – these two terms also hint both forms of soul. Annam Bhatta asserts that cognition (*jñāna*), desire (*icchā*) and volition or effort (*prayatna*) - these three are equally stated as the qualities (*guṇa*) of soul. The Neo-logicians also admit (*icchā*) desire as one of quality among 23 qualities mentioned in *Bhāṣāpariccheda*³.

'Desire' is something which serves as window in human civilization. Through 'desire' (*icchā*) one can exert oneself. Hence where there is excessive will, there is desirelessness. For this reason it makes a human being artificial dealing with only law. Implementation of law without giving any freedom is not desirable at all, as it leads to dishonor to human being. An individual is

combination of both choice and intellect. Any type of creation, social changes are made possible through desire of an individual. Whenever we perform any action, or we go in quest of something is because of desire. Desire can represent the different aspects of this-worldly phenomenon.

The *Nyāya* philosophy is a famous school of thought among six orthodox (*āstika*) systems as admitted in Indian Philosophy. The *Nyāya* philosophy has been divided into two parts after Udayanācārya –*Prācīna* and *NavyaNyāya*. This particular system primarily concerns with object of knowledge (*pramā*) and means of knowing (*pramāṇa*). Sometimes *Nyāya* Philosophy is called *asanvīksikī*, which comes from the words ‘*anu*’ (*afterwords*) and ‘*īkṣā*’ (*viewing*). Hence the term *anvīkṣā* means critical viewing 4. The school primarily dealing with such critical observation is called *ānvīkṣikī* or the science of reasoning or Logic.

A comparative study between old and neo-logicians can be discussed on the basis of following points 5.

- 1) Maharṣi Gotama is said to be the profounder of *Nyāya* school of thought and his time of appearance is almost 6th-7th century. The world view he has formulated is known as *PrācīnaNyāya*. Apart from him, the great thinkers named with Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra, Udayana and Jayanta Bhatta are included in this old-discipline.

The well-known works of this discipline, such as Gotama’s *Nyāyasūtra*, Vātsyāyana’s *Nyayabhāṣya*, Vācaspati’s *Nyāyavārtika*, Udayana’s *Nyaya-Vārtika-tātparyaṭīka* are collectively known as *Nyāyacaturagranthikā* (i.e., combination of four major books of *Nyāya* system). And it would be said that *Nyāyakusumānjali* marked the boundary between *Prācīna* and *Navya* school of thought.

On the contrary, the period of NavyaNyāya begins from 14th century. It begins with the epoch-making *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gangeśa. All the books of *Nyāya* written between 14th to 17th centuries probably from Gangeśa to Gadādhara are included in *Navya-Nyāya*. Gangeśa was the inhabitant of Mithila and his teachings concluded in Mithilā up to Pakṣadhara Miśra during 15th century. Later, the teachings have been spread in Nadiyā. The name of another who first introduced *NavyaNyāya* in Nadiyā, he wrote a commentary on *Nyāyakusumāñjali*. From then *Navya Nyāya* became famous continuously in Nadiyā, and the group of Mithila became fade. Since then, the neo-logicians of Nadiyā maintain the progress which was admitted by the Indian scholars.

Raghunath Śiromani was contemporary of the famous Vaisnava reformer Caitanyadeva. Raghunath Śiromani, Mathurānāth Tarkavāgīśa, Jagadīśa Tarkālankāra, are the eminent logicians of this school. *NavyaNyāya* language is adopted in order to remove the inadequacy of natural language. This discipline has developed a systematic language through which a concept can be analysed non-ambiguously. By applying this sort of language, philosophical discussion can touch all the domain of human activities. The way of philosophizing has flourished in such new thinkers.

2) The language, *NavyaNaiyāyikas* have adopted after reforming Sanskrit language is widely accepted by other disciplines also like Advaitins, Grammarians etc. They define the nature of object of knowledge much more accurately, precisely than from old *Nyāya* thinkers. Neo-logicians have developed a kind of systematic language through which a concept can be analyzed non-ambiguously.

3) Philosopher tries to systematize the world in an order and classification in worldly entities is the way to explain phenomena. So, old *Nyāya* thinkers have classified whole world i.e., internal or external, in 16 categories. Gotama has admitted liberation (*mokṣa*) as an ultimate goal of human life. And until and unless we acquire right cognition of worldly objects, *niḥśreyasa* cannot be attained.

Tattvajñāna helps us to discover the real nature of an object; i.e. to explore 'x' as 'x' and 'y' as 'y'. So, through the development of *Tattvajñāna*, the effect of *mithyājñāna* can be taken out and finally an individual can achieve *apavarga*.

On the contrary, Neo-logicians have introduced innumerable entities in order to explain their world-view in their own different manner. Apart from *saṁyoga* and *samavāya*, they admit some of new categories like *avacchedaka* (*limitor*), self-linking relation (*svarūpa-sambandha*), *nirūpya–nirūpakasambandha* (*contextual properties*), *ādhāratā*, *ādheyatā*, *kāraṇatā*, *kāryatā*, *vyayadhikaraṇatā*, *viśeṣaṇatā–viśesa*, *tādātmya* etc. and hold that acceptance of these categories are necessary for developing the growth of philosophical discussion. These newly-introduced entities play a significant role in the region of logical thinking and help to attain valid cognition regarding an object.

4) The old *Naiyāyikas* have shown their equal interest both in epistemology (*pramāṇatattva*) and metaphysical (*prameyatattva*) discussion. So, the discussion based on four types of *pramāṇa* equally has been founded in the field of *ātmatattva*, mind (*manas*), space (*dik*), time (*kāla*) etc.

Comparatively neo-logicians have emphasized on epistemology. It can be further stated that, Gangeśa wrote four sections of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* which was based on four different kinds of *pramāṇa*. In this way, epistemological discussion became more analytic and the various smallest things which were overlooked in *PrācīnaNyāya* discipline have been elaborated in *NavyaNyāya* school of thought. As the Neo-logicians especially concentrate on epistemology, their assertion about metaphysics is restricted by limitation. In *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, only the concept of God has been discussed.

So, it is clear from the above discussion that *NavyaNaiyāyikas*, intellectual contribution to epistemology is more significant than *Prācīna Nyāya*.

5) In *PrācīnaNyāya*, the opponents mainly belong to Buddhist–logicians. But the position of opponents has been changed in *NavyaNyāya* Philosophy. Mainly, *Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas* and *Prācīna Naiyāyikas* have been found as *Pūrvapakṣa*.

6) Old-logicians have cited different examples from *Śruti*, in order to substantiate the existence of God, soul etc. But Neo-logicians always have a tendency to resist them from mentioning such examples of *Śruti*. They present metaphysical doctrine through proper reasoning. Arguments for the existence of God as stated by Gangeśa can be shown here. He has mentioned the causal argument as a proof for the existence of God which is as follows.

“*KṣityankurādikaṃKartṛjanyamKāryatvātghaṭavat*” -- The earth and its dyadic compound are created by an agent, as it is an effect, just as a jar. Finally, he quoted a sentence from *Śruti* which he did not explain. He stated that God, having created heaven and earth, has become the agent of the world and

protector of the world (*“dyāvābhumījanayan devo viśvasyakartābhuvanasyagoptā”*).

Indian Philosophers have undertaken some methods of debate regarding the determination of the truth of an object. These methods are neither biased nor dogmatic, but based on some ethical and argumentative values. Logic developed in Indian soil is called *vāda*, a discipline dealing with the categories of debate over various religious, philosophical, moral and doctrinal issues. They are introduced in order to train the students who wanted to learn how to conduct debates successfully, what tricks to learn, how to find out loopholes of the opponent’s position etc. Debate, according to the *Naiyāyikas*, can be of three types: a) an honest debate called *vāda* where both sides, proponents and opponents, are seeking the truth, i.e., **desirous** to establish the right view, b) a tricky debate called *jalpa* where the goal is to win by fair means or foul and c) destructive debate called *vitanḍā* where the goal is to defeat or demolish the opponents. The first kind favors the employment of logical arguments, and use of rational means and proper evidence to establish a thesis. It is said that the participants in this kind of debate were the teacher and the student or students themselves belonging to the same school. In honest debate *the desire for knowing truth (tattvabhūtsu)* is the fundamental basis.

In the *Nyāya* system of Indian Philosophy the right cognition of categories leads us to the attainment of the mundane and transcendental values which are called *dr̥ṣṭa* (seen) and *adr̥ṣṭa* (unseen) well-being (*niḥśreyasa*). The ethics of propagating such view lies in the fact that the right cognition of the categories can associate us with mundane well-being which has got some

pragmatic value in our life. At the same time, the import of the transcendental value like emancipation etc has not been ignored. The right cognition of the categories like '*pramāṇa*' ('means of knowing') '*vāda*' ('debate to arrive at truth without any desire to get victory over the opponent'), '*jalpa*' (argumentation for achieving victory, but not truth), '*vitandā*' (argument only to refute others views without substantiating one's own), '*chala*' ('adopting tricks in argumentation'), '*hetvābhāsa*' (fallacy of arguments') etc leads to the former while the right cognition of the 'objects to be known' ('*prameya*') leads to the latter. In a debate between an opponent and a proponent the determination of truth which is called technically *vāda* is the main objective of the *Naiyāyikas* leaving the question of victory aside. In the *vāda* type of debate there should be the adoption of one of the two opposing sides (*pakṣa-pratipakṣa-parigraha*), which is defended by *pramāṇa* and *tarka* (*pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopalambha*) and which is not opposed to the established tenets (*siddhāntābirudhha*) 6.

If the desire of victory prevails in debate, and determination of truth is by passed, it is called *jalpa*, which is not taken as an ideal pattern of forwarding argument in a philosophical debate. If someone refutes the opponent's view only without forwarding his own, it is called *vitandā*, which is not honored as a better philosophical method. Hence each and every theory based on philosophical doctrine is called *vāda*, e.g., *nirvikalpakavāda*, *apohavāda*, *īśvaravāda* etc.

We may recall Udayana in this connection. To him if there is mistrust among the family--members, social-beings etc, our empirical doubt will not be possible. If, on the other hand, there is no doubt, there does not arise any philosophical enquiry. (*Śamkācedanumāstyevanacecchankātatastarām /*

vyāghātāvadhīrāsankātarkahśamkāvadhīrmatah.//) If there is doubt, there is inferential cognition or an inferential procedure is to be resorted to with a view to resolving doubt. If not, inference is established easily. Such doubt is permissible so long there does not arise self-contradiction (*vyāghāta*). Sometime the method of Tarka (reductio-ad-absurdum) is taken into account. From this it is proved that doubt has got a positive role in philosophical methodology if it is taken as a category 7.

Apart from the above-mentioned arguments we can supply some from common sense point of view. Any discovery, scientific or philosophical, presupposes doubt about something. Newton had discovered the law of gravitation as he had some doubt regarding the falling of an apple downwards. His doubt was why it cannot go up. Before this inducement many times apple had fallen down, but no question was raised about it due to the absence of doubt. That is why; doubt is taken as the key of discovery or invention. Doubt prompts an individual to question regarding something. If there is questioning, it is to be presupposed that there prevails a kind of doubt. Our *Upaniṣadas* start with a question from an innocent disciple 8. The *Kenopaniṣada* has started with a question which runs as follows: '*keneṣītāmpatati preṣitammanah, kenaprānahprathamapraitīyuktah/ keneṣītāmvācamimāmvadanticakṣuhśrotram ka u devo yunakti//*'. That is, by whose desire does our mind direct towards an object? By whom our vital organ has received first prominence? Why whose desire our speaking organ functions? And by whom our eye and hearing organs are engaged in revealing the objects. Again, in *Kathopaniṣada* Naciketā asks the question of knowing self to great teacher *Yama*, which is very much appreciated as '*barāṇameṣobarastṛtīyaḥ*' (i.e., among the three boons third was the most

desired one as it involves doubt regarding self). Following the same line Maitreyī in *BṛhadāranyakaUpaniṣada* asks the question to Yājñavalkya- ‘*yenāhamnāmṛtamsyāmtenāhamkimkuryāma*’ (What can do with that which cannot provide me Immortality?). Even Narendranath who was known as Swami Vivekananda afterwards went to Ramakrishna with a question- ‘Have you seen God?’ All these questions are prompted by some doubt regarding a particular object. Keeping this in view *Śrīmadbhagavad-gītā* has taken *paripraśna* or repeatedly questioning as a method of learning (*pranipātenaparipraśnenasevayā*). In fact there are three methods of learning- repeatedly questioning (*paripraśna*), deep regards towards teachers (*pranipāta*) and service to the teachers (*sevā*). All these activities are backed by certain doubt to know the truth. In ancient time when a student used to feel tension being disturbed by some doubt regarding some incident, he tried to dispel his /her doubt through questioning about this again and again. Sometimes the teacher is given service to get some enlightenment from him, which is also prompted by doubt in mind on certain subject. It is already known to us that a student having profound regards to his preceptor can attain knowledge alone (*śraddhāvānlabhatejñānam*). One who has regards can attain education from the preceptor and in this way doubt in the form of darkness is dispelled. If we seriously think about it, the proper education is meant for removing doubt from the mind.

Those who are engaged in laboratory for scientific discovery try to dispel some sort of doubt. Had there been no doubt, no discovery is possible. That is why, we get discovery of so many scientific discoveries. There are two types of doubt- positive and negative. The positive doubts are called non-pathological

doubts which are otherwise called epistemological or metaphysical doubts. These doubts are virtuous in nature as they lead us to phenomenon of philosophical analysis. At the same time there is another type of doubt called pathological doubts which have no importance in our philosophical enterprise. It has been said in the *Bhagavad-gītā*—‘*saṁśayātmāvinaśyati*’. Those who are possessing doubt are on the way of destruction. For smooth running of our empirical and spiritual life we must have a sense of reliance towards our Vedic and secular codes that are called *vidhi*-s. If we do not have reliability towards our laws formulated by the state machinery, our society would be turned into an anarchic state, which is not desirable. That is why; we must maintain the laws and orders in the society. If we nourish doubt always regarding the efficacy of such laws, we shall refrain from obeying it, which ultimately leads to the world of chaosness technically called *mātsyanyāya*. Just as big fishes can swallow the smaller ones due to having greater physical power, the powerful persons would have killed the weaker section (*śūlematsyānivāpakṣyanduvalānbalavattarāh*). If we want to live in a society, we have to maintain civic laws without any doubt on them. We always depend our near and dear relatives and hence some sort of reliability lies on them. Had there been doubt, our life would not have been smooth and steady. In habitual cases we cannot doubt about the efficacy of an object as told earlier. Depending on our past experience we take food when hungry, drink water when thirsty, when sick, take medicines, when tired take rest. These are habitual behaviors grown after repeated experience. If somebody expresses doubt even in these cases, this leads to contradiction. A question may be ask to a person entertaining doubt- if doubt pertains whether water will quench thirst or not then why does he ask for water? Even after this if he on doubts about the efficacy of

water, food, medicine etc., and this doubt is to be taken a pathological one having no importance in philosophical activities.

This type of doubt is taken as *bhayāvaha* or frightening. Because, the phenomenon of doubting may be treated as psychological disorder.

The *Sāmkhyakārikā* begins with enquiry being hurt by the suffering of three types (*dukkhatrayābhighātādbhavatijijñāsā*)⁹. When an individual suffers from sorrow, he will have doubt whether such suffering can be removed or not. This doubt gives rise to innovation of a way for it. In *Tattvakumudī* it has been explained that a sufferer has got doubt about its removal, because such suffering cannot be dispelled through an ordinary means (*laukikaupāya*). The suffering related to body (*ādhyātmika dukkha*) and suffering caused by external factors like animal etc. (*ādhibhautika dukkha*) can somehow be managed if an individual takes prior precaution. But doubt regarding its removal is more prominent when we see our helplessness in case of suffering arising out of Divine will (*ādhidāivika dukkha*). The calamities caused by earth-quake, draught, flood etc. are not under the control of human being and hence it under Divine will. So the prior precaution cannot help us to remove such suffering. Doubt becomes stronger in such cases regarding the impossibility of its removal. To the *Sāmkhya* system the absolute cessation of suffering is not possible even through the super-normal means (*alaukikaupāya*). Doubt is clear when *Īśvarakṛṣṇa* has prescribed a path of its removal. Most of the systems of Indian Philosophy are found to be worried about suffering and its removal. Hence Indian systems are not free from doubt giving rise to philosophical exercise.

Again, a question may be raised that sometimes over reliance on some authority; person or institution makes no room for doubt which sometimes leads to a chaotic life. Just like over confidence overreliance is harmful and hence the doubt on some principles of the authority or person or institution makes them self-critical and self-assessing. Others doubt or critical points help them to rectify themselves. This is true in case of philosophical or any type of writing. Had there been doubt giving rise to critical analysis, the writer would cautious is self-assessment leading to their self-rectification. All these cases are the results of positive or constructive or virtuous or non-pathological doubt and hence its methodological value can never be ignored.

References:

1. Rabindra Nath Tagore, *Śāntiniketana*, Viswabharati, 6, Acarya Jagadisha Basu Road, Kolkata, 1404(BC). Pp 64-66, 128-132.
2. Rabindra Nath Tagore, *Swaravitan 12(TāśerDeśa)*, Viswabharati, 6, Acarya Jagadisha Basu Road, Kolkata, 1416(BC). Pp 2-44.
3. Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana *Nyāyasūtra-1.2*, pp42-44 *Vātsyāyanabhāṣya* on them. *Nyāyadarśana* of Gotama, Edited by Raghunath Ghosh, New Bharatiya Book Corporation, Delhi, 2003
4. Ibid, 1.2.42.with Vātsyāyanabhāṣya
5. Sri Rajendranath Ghosh, *NavyaNyāya*, Sahitya Accademy, New Delhi, 1962. Pp 73-90.
6. Sri Fanibhusan Tarkavagish, *Nyāya Darśan (Goutam Sūtra) Vātsāyan bhāṣya (vol.1)*, Paschimbanga Rajya Pustak Parsad, Kolkata, 2006, pp46-50.
7. Ibid, pp194-196
8. Swami Gambhirananda, *Upaniṣada Granthāvalī* Udvodhan Karyalaya, Kolkata, 1962, pp 20-21
9. Swami Virupakshananda, *Sāṃkhya Kārikā of Tīswara Kṛṣṇa (with the Tattva Kaumadī of Śrī Vācaspati Miśra)*, Sri Ramkrishna Math, Madras, 1995, pp 1-10.

CHAPTER – 1

The Concept of 'Will-generated Cognition' and its Role in Philosophical Enterprise:

In epistemology, knowledge is the fundamental factor. In order to acquire knowledge, we have to go through various ways of knowing or the means of knowing like perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, presumption, non-cognition etc. In epistemology, knowledge presupposes the knowledge of something. The knowledge without content (*aviṣayaka-jñāna*), however, is found in case of AdvaitaVedānta. The Advaitins only admit a kind of knowledge which is of without content (*aviṣayakajñāna*) in case of Brahman. Brahman is the Knowledge itself. To them this knowledge has no content at all because Brahman itself is Knowledge, but not the knowledge of *Brahman*. In other words, we cannot tell that this is the knowledge of Brahman, but Brahman itself is Knowledge *par-excellence*. Apart from this system all others believe that knowledge has got some content of its own.¹ That is why; knowledge is something through which an object is illumined. There are several ways of knowing as told earlier.

Apart from these we normally came across a peculiar type of cognition which is generated through our will, which is technically called *icchājanyajñāna*. It may seem to be peculiar to us how cognition arises through the intervention of desire.

It may be argued that there is no novelty in such cognition by virtue of the fact that all cognitions are generated through will. It may be said that without knowledge there is no inclination for doing any work. Inclination or *pravṛtti* towards certain activity is possible if someone has got a concrete knowledge towards that. And knowledge is possible if there is a tendency for acquiring the same. Will-generatedness in an individual for doing something is the cause of human inclination (*pravṛtti*) or refraining (*nivṛtti*) from certain activity. So, whenever a person is found to do work, it is presupposed that he has knowledge about the object which has been taken as an effect of the desire to know. So, desire is the main thing through which one's *pravṛtti*, *nivṛtti* and *upekṣā* (indifferent attitudes) can be explained.² These are discussed in the following pages.

Moreover, the desire to know is the fundamental factor for knowing an entity which again leads one to the world of activity or otherwise.

The *Naiyāyikas* may come up with the following justifications. To them doubt does not arise at all if there were no reference (*apekṣā*) to particular attributes or peculiarities (*viśeṣa*). First, the *Naiyāyikas* give a description of an instance of doubt. After seeing an object from a distance there arises an uncertain cognition or a wavering judgment (*vimarśa*), which provides an uncertain cognition in the form: 'It is a man or a trunk of a tree'. In this case some common features between man and a trunk of a tree are perceived. It is justified by the definition- '*tad anavadhāraṇamjñānamsamśayah*'. Secondly, *Vātsyāyana* explains how the doubt is resolved. To him when the specific characters or differentiating features of a man or a trunk of a tree is known, the doubt ceases due to having

certainty in the mind in the form-'It is a man or a trunk of a tree'. Lastly, Vātsyāyana has added a novel feature of doubt. For, the perceived object can be or cannot be a man or a trunk of a tree, as the qualities common to the both are seen. This uncertainty of mind can generate a tendency to search (*apekṣā*) for the specific qualities, which can distinguish an object from the other (*vimarśa*). As soon as these are available, doubt is resolved. As these differentiating factors or 'some features different from that' are searched for, it leads to the presupposition that doubt persists in our minds. The 'looking for' or the search of 'this desire to know' (*bubhutsā*) is the specific feature of the thing is the new element in the Vātsyāyana's definition of doubt (*viśeṣāpekṣahvimarśahsamśayah*). Over all we get three stages: a) perception in a correct cognition or erroneous cognition. b) The perception of special features, which generate the correct cognition and rectify the wrong one. c) There is a third moment when a knower's mind wavers due to the non-ascertainment of the thing perceived, which leads to the look for the specific character. The last one generates doubt in one's mind.

The *Naiyāyika* could say that doubt arises when there is a cognition touching both the alternatives (*ubhayakoṭīkajñāna*). When an object is known as either as a man or a trunk of a tree, it is true that there is some lack of cognition. It can be interpreted that when there is cognition of a man, it is due to the lack of cognition of a trunk of a tree. If the cognition of a trunk of a tree arises, it is due to the lack of the cognition of a man. Whatever may be the case we must admit that there is certainly a cognition sometimes taking man as its content and sometimes taking a trunk of a tree as its content? An individual's mind wavers between two cognitions successively, but not simultaneously. That is why; such wavering cognition arises from the mental state metaphorised as the movement

of the cradle (*dolācalacittavṛtti*). The cognition of a man may be caused by the absence of the cognition of a trunk of a tree or otherwise, but the existence of the cognition of a man for one moment and the cognition of a trunk of a tree for the next moment must be accepted. In this case the existence and non-existence of the peculiarities in a man is known in the successive moment, but not simultaneously as accepted by Nāgārjuna. Here in lies the difference between two schools- *Bauddha* and *Nyāya*.

When the determinants are not available in determining the nature of an object, doubt arises there. The absence of determining proof of an entity, which is the object of knowledge, is the cause of doubt. Doubt plays a positive role in generating critical thinking of mankind after removing blind faith from them. In other words, doubt is the revealer of the windows of our critical and open-minded thinking. Considering this aspect Gotama has enumerated it as one of the sixteen categories, the right cognitions of which lead us to the land of success--mundane and transcendental (*niḥśreyasādhigama*). To Vātsyāyana doubt has been given a due emphasis in *Nyāya* on account of the fact that logic can alone be applied to the object in doubt, but not to an object which is purely known or unknown (*'Tatranānupalabdhenanirṇīte' rthenyāyahpravarttate. Kimtarhi? samśayite'rthe' - Nyāyabhāṣya* on sūtra no.1. 1. 1). From this statement it is proved that Nāgārjuna's thesis that something is either known or unknown is wrong. If it is known, he says, it is a kind of valid cognition. If it is unknown, it is to be taken as illusion. Vātsyāyana is of the opinion that this is the ideal case where we can have doubt. To him doubt is a kind of intellectual activity arising out of the confrontation by two different philosophical positions called *pakṣa* (thesis) and *pratipakṣa* (antithesis) at the same time. To think an entity as both known and

unknown does not lead us to admit its fictitious character, but it is a kind of doubt. This view of the Naiyāyikas will find support in VācaspatiMiśra's *Bhāmatī* where he accepts the dubious character of an object as a criterion of an enquiry about it (*Bhāmatī on Adhyāśabhāṣya*).

We may recall Udayana in this connection. To him if there is mistrust among the family--members, social-beings etc, our empirical doubt will not be possible. If, on the other hand, there is no doubt, there does not arise any philosophical enquiry. (*Śamkācedanumāstyevanacecchankātatastarām / vyāghātāvadhīrāśankātarkahśamkāvadhirmata.// Nyāyakusumāñjali-3/7*) If there is doubt, there is inferential cognition or an inferential procedure is to be resorted to with a view to resolving doubt. If not, inference is established easily. Such doubt is permissible so long there does not arise self-contradiction (*vyāghāta*). Sometime the method of *Tarka* (*reductio-ad-absurdum*) is taken into account. From this it is proved that doubt has got a positive role in philosophical methodology if it is taken as a category.

Those who are engaged in laboratory for scientific discovery try to dispel some sort of doubt. Had there been no doubt, no discovery is possible. That is why, we get discovery of so many scientific discoveries. There are two types of doubt--positive and negative. The positive doubts are called non-pathological doubts which are otherwise called epistemological or metaphysical doubts. These doubts are virtuous in nature as they lead us to phenomenon of philosophical analysis. At the same time there is another type of doubt called pathological doubts which have no importance in our philosophical enterprise. It has been said in the *Bhagavad-gītā*--'samśayātmāvinaśyati'. Those who are possessing doubt are on the way of destruction. For smooth running of our empirical and spiritual life we must have a

sense of reliance towards our Vedic and secular codes that are called *vidhi*-s. If we do not have reliability towards our laws formulated by the state machinery, our society would be turned into an anarchic state, which is not desirable. That is why; we must maintain the laws and orders in the society. If we nourish doubt always regarding the efficacy of such laws, we shall refrain from obeying it, which ultimately leads to the world of chaosness technically called *mātsyanyāya*. Just as big fishes can swallow the smaller ones due to having greater physical power, the powerful persons would have killed the weaker section (*śūlematsyānivāpakṣyanduvalānbalavattarāh*)- (*Manusāṃhitā*, Canto-7). If we want to live in a society, we have to maintain civic laws without any doubt on them. We always depend our near and dear relatives and hence some sort of reliability lies on them. Had there been doubt, our life would not have been smooth and steady. In habitual cases we cannot doubt about the efficacy of an object as told earlier. Depending on our past experience we take food when hungry, drink water when thirsty, when sick, take medicines, when tired take rest. These are habitual behaviors grown after repeated experience. If somebody expresses doubt even in these cases, this leads to contradiction. A question may be ask to a person entertaining doubt- if doubt pertains whether water will quench thirst or not then why does he ask for water? Even after this if he on doubts about the efficacy of water, food, medicine etc., and this doubt is to be taken a pathological one having no importance in philosophical activities.

This type of doubt is taken as *bhayāvaha* or frightening. Because, the phenomenon of doubting may be treated as psychological disorder.

The *Sāmkhyakārikā* begins with enquiry being hurt by the suffering of three types (*dukkhatrayābhighātādbhavatijijñāsā*). When an individual suffers from sorrow, he will have doubt whether such suffering can be removed or not.

This doubt gives rise to innovation of a way for it. In *Tattvakumudi* it has been explained that a sufferer has got doubt about its removal, because such suffering cannot be dispelled through an ordinary means (*laukikaupāya*). The suffering related to body (*ādhyātmika duhkha*) and suffering caused by external factors like animal etc. (*ādhibhautika duhkha*) can somehow be managed if an individual takes prior precaution. But doubt regarding its removal is more prominent when we see our helplessness in case of suffering arising out of Divine will (*ādhidāivika duhkha*). The calamities caused by earth-quake, draught, flood etc. are not under the control of human being and hence it under Divine will. So the prior precaution cannot help us to remove such suffering. Doubt becomes stronger in such cases regarding the impossibility of its removal. To the Sāṃkhya system the absolute cessation of suffering is not possible even through the super-normal means (*alaukikaupāya*). Doubt is clear when Īśvaraḥṣṇa has prescribed a path of its removal (*Sāṃkhya-kārikā-1*). Most of the systems of Indian Philosophy are found to be worried about suffering and its removal. Hence Indian systems are not free from doubt giving rise to philosophical exercise.

Again, a question may be raised that sometimes over reliance on some authority; person or institution makes no room for doubt which sometimes leads to a chaotic life. Just like over confidence overreliance is harmful and hence the doubt on some principles of the authority or person or institution makes them self-critical and self-assessing. Others doubt or critical points help them to rectify themselves. This is true in case of philosophical or any type of writing. Had there been doubt giving rise to critical analysis, the writer would cautious is self-assessment leading to their self-rectification. All these cases are the results of positive or constructive or virtuous or non-pathological doubt and hence its methodological value can never be ignored.

Apart from the above-mentioned arguments we can supply some from common sense point of view. Any discovery, scientific or philosophical, presupposes doubt about something. Newton had discovered the law of gravitation as he had some doubt regarding the falling of an apple downwards. His doubt was why it cannot go up. Before this incident many times apple had fallen down, but no question was raised about it due to the absence of doubt. That is why; doubt is taken as the key of discovery or invention. Doubt prompts an individual to question regarding something. If there is questioning, it is to be presupposed that there prevails a kind of doubt.

From the above statement it is proved no action is possible without the cognition which is connected to an individual's desire to know. So, desire or will can be taken as a universal factor for generation of any activity. In fact, desire to know (*jijñāsā*) is the primordial factor for initiating a discussion of the concern subject. The whole Upaniṣadic literature is created to satisfy the desire of a disciple. So, a strong will comes first or desire to know comes first. Even God has created this beautiful earth due to having tremendous desire to create, so that human beings can enjoy their result of *karma*. It is due to the desire of God (*Īśvarasyaśrīkṣā-vaśāt*). Rabindranath Tagore had highlighted the existence of desire or will in an individual's mind as a seed of creation. In a poetry, named with '*janmavṛttānta*' he said that a small girl is asking her mother: 'where have I come from'? Though there were so many probable answers to this question, but mother hinted at the basic thing and replied that she was in her mind in the form of desire or will (*icchārūpe chili manermājhāre*).³

If we turn towards the whole Upaniṣadic literature we will see that all the *Upaniṣadas* are written after keeping a particular question or questions remaining in a disciple's mind. In first verse of The *Keno-upaniṣada* stated as:

“Omkenēṣitaṃpatatipreṣitaṃmanah

Kenaprāṇahprathamahpraitiyuktaḥ.

keneṣitāṃ vācamimāṃvadanti

*Cakṣuḥśrotraṃ ka u devo yunakti”.*⁴

The philosophical enquiry starts with the desire or will to know who is the impellor of the sense-organ like eye, ear etc; who directs our mind to go towards certain object, under whose direction we have been able to speak with the help of words? Who is the luminous person who employs the eyes and the ears in their own objects? By whose will matter is distinct from the conscious one? Mind is not independent about *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti*. Because it would seem that which is not acceptable as duty, the mind is preoccupied with that subject or cannot refrain from it. This non-individual mind must have a controller and the question arise who is He? These questions point to the fact that the huge part of creation above the trivial world, which beyond the reach of ordinary people, *Upaniṣadas* helps to understand its nature.

In *Kaṭho-Upaniṣad* we see that Viśvajit had a son named Naciketā. When he told his father- ‘Upon whom you have surrendered me? (*sahovācapitaraṃ, tata kasmaimāṃdāsyasīti*). And his father replied, “you will be given to Yama” (*taṃhovācamṛtyavetvā dadāmīti*).⁵ When Naciketā met Yama, he had expressed his strong will to know the nature of self and the way to get

liberation. Since Naciketā had been starving in his (Yama) house for three night, and Yama gave him three boons for each night. The preceptor as Yama wanted to offer him enjoyable these worldly properties as a boon; but Nacikatā's will was so strong to know the nature of self leading to liberation. That is why; he gave up all the enjoyable properties and had shown inclination to know the nature of self. Ultimately Yama, the teacher, was bound to tell him the true nature of self and result of its realization which eventually gave rise to the whole literature of *Kaṭha-Upaniṣada*.⁶

The same story regarding will-power is found behind the composition of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣada*. *Upaniṣada* is one of the supreme treasures of *Brahma-jñāna* (i.e., the knowledge of self) in Indian culture. Among the famous *Upaniṣads*, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* is much older. The great teachings of this *Upaniṣada* come out through the conversation of Yājñavalkya and his wife Maitreyī. Though we see that all most in all of the *Upaniṣads* only the male voice has been echoed, only in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* we have seen the role of woman. The great teachings of this *Upaniṣad* come out through the conversation of Yajñavalkya and his wife Maitreyī. Only in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣada* we have seen the role of woman. The 4th *Brāhmaṇa* of 2nd chapter in *Upaniṣada* Yajñavalkya has advised the nature of Immortality to his wife Maitreyī. This conversation also found in the 5th *Brahmaṇa* of 4th chapter in the same book. In these two chapters it has been shown that the great sage Yajñavalkya had two wives, named Maitreyī and Kātyāyanī. When he decided to go for renunciation (*sannyāsa*) after leaving his domestic life (*gārhasthyāśrama*), he wanted to distribute his assets to both of his wives. Rejecting this profitable proposal Maitreyī asked him eagerly that if the whole world is filled up by wealth, could she become immortal by having such

properties. And Yajñavalkya replied- “No, your life will be same as those of rich people”. There is no hope of gaining immortality through wealth” (*‘yenāhamnāmṛtāsyāmtenāhamkimkuryāma’*). ⁷Maitreyī, one of the wives of Yājñavalkya was reluctant to this worldly property offered to her by Yājñavalkya. This could not satisfy her due to transitoriness of these worldly properties. Maitreyī thinks that these worldly properties cannot give her Immortality and hence these are worth-rejectable. Maitreyī told to Yājñavalkya that she has no desire to take those which cannot give her Immortality. From this it is proved that Maitreyī had a strong desire to get that knowledge which can provide her Immortality.

What does Immortality mean here? Does it mean of carrying the worldly-body for eternity? Or to survive in any way, even after death. It is certain that Maitreyī did not want the Immortality of body. Then how did she want to be Immortal?

Yājñavalkya had understood the desire of Maitreyī and started telling the nature of self, realizing which one can get Immortality. Leaving aside economic and other needs Yājñavalkya emphasized on the spiritual knowledge after giving due honor to the desire of Maitreyī. This ultimately leads her to acquire the knowledge of Self which is the main cause of Immortality as discussed in the whole *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣada*.

In fact, in our traditional Indian system a disciple’s desire is taken as seed for any philosophical discussion. In the system of residing in a preceptor’s house (*gurugṛhavāsa*) a disciple being desirous of hearing any academic matter from the preceptor’s mouth starts nursing him. From the fact of his nursing the preceptor

comes to know the hidden desire of the disciple of hearing some academic matters from him. That is why; in Sanskrit one-term i.e., *śuśrūṣā* has been used both in the sense of 'desire of hearing' and 'nursing'. From this it follows that the pre-condition of desiring to know is nursing to the preceptor. This is also endorsed in the '*Bhagavad-Gītā*' that if someone is desirous of knowing he starts questioning, prostrating and nursing (service) (*paripraśnenapraṇipātenasevayā*)⁸. The different chapters of *Gītā* i.e., *karmayoga*, *jñānayoga*, *bhaktiyoga*, *viśvarūpa-darśana*--- all of these are outcome of satisfaction of strong desire of Arjuna. When Arjuna starts questing to Lord Kṛṣṇa out of his strong will about the worldly phenomena and as well as the nature of Self. He was answering spontaneously by showing honor to the desire of Arjuna. In eleventh chapter, when Arjuna prayed to Lord Kṛṣṇa that, the knowledge of self as he stated was absolutely true. In spite of this he is desirous to see the exhibiting numerous shapes and figures of Lord Kṛṣṇa. Respecting this desire of Arjuna, Śri Kṛṣṇa revealed himself in infinite shapes and figures after Arjuna. And what is this 'representation of the whole universe"? It's like a molecular explosion. In this chapter it is stated as: "*divi sūryasahasrasyabhavedyugapadutthitā/ yadibhāḥ sadṛśī sā syādbhāsastasya mahātmanah*"⁹i.e. the splendor of thousands of suns in the sky, everything seems to be torn apart, the whole world is melted, transgression, the huge mouth is like 'black hole', infinite unimaginable power of attraction. The whole animal kingdom is just like a tiny insect, is attracted to that hole and in an instant the whole universe is entering and disappearing.

In Loss Elamas after seeing the first experimental explosion of an atomic bomb, scientist Oppenheimer was panicked and said: "Good, God, the long-haired boys have lost control" and then he said the verse of '*Gītā*':

“If the radiance of thousands suns
Were to burst into the sky
That would be like
The splendor of the mighty one”.¹⁰

He runs and speaks like crazy on the streets of Manhattan, “thousand suns”. It shows that desire also has significance in the case of any scientific discovery.

In the last episode of *Mahābhārata*, where Kṛṣṇa’s last days are described there is also the role of desire. Lord Kṛṣṇa is sitting under a banyan tree in Prābhāsa. There came a hunter behind the leaves quietly. He can’t see the full form of God. He have thrown the arrow to the red feet of *Śrī Kṛṣṇa*, thinking it as the face of deer. The hunter approached God and apologized. The arrow – wounded Lord forbade him to be afraid. He did this according to God’s will. The hunter did not return home with the prey. He hunted God and went to heaven. Who can swallow the whole creation? He Himself was defeated by time. He arranged the last chapter of his life according to His own desire. He had no one to Him, no flower, no garland, no sandal wood, no lamp ----nothing was left with Him. All these happened according to His will [11](#).

These are a number of instances which show that how desire becomes central to human-life.

When there is a debate or curiosity of knowing, the strong desire of it is the pre-condition. Such desire may lead one preceptor’s service or prostration

which is taken as marks of having strong will to know. That is why; in every case desire has got a prominent role. Such rule is applicable in case of scientific and technological discoveries also. Strong will sometimes makes a great change in philosophical or literary creativity. Without strong will one cannot engage oneself to create something in original. In order to do this he must need a strong will coming from within. Strong will leads him to the state of meditation or one pointed concentration leading to a golden philosophical or literary crop. This golden philosophical or literary crop can be treated as a creative one from the standpoint of uniqueness, novelty and originality. It happens so suddenly that people cannot understand with their normal reasoning faculty and hence they try to impose certain mystic elements or metaphysical analysis like “The grace of goddess of learning” (*Sarasvatīkrpā*). This has been referred to by great rhetorician Ānandavardhana in his *Dhvanyāloka*¹².

The above statements prove that for an original creation one needs to have ‘one-pointed concentration’ which is possible only if there is a strong will for it. That is why; each and every cognition or each and every creativity needs a ‘strong will’. All cognitions are the production of strong will. Hence a question may arise: what is the specialty in ‘will -generated cognition’ (*icchājanyajñāna*)? In other words if all cognitions are the results of ‘strong will’ what is the specialty of such cognition.

Though ‘will-generatedness’ (*icchājanyatva*) remains in all types of cognition yet there are certain cases where ‘desire’ is deliberate. Out of curiosity one can ask questions. Though it is true, sometimes without having proper curiosity, desire may arise in our mind. Here ‘desire’ is an artificial one. Though

someone knows the fact that an object is different from another one yet a strong desire may arise to make them or to think them identified. This identification is not out of illusion, but out of strong desire. That is why; it is called 'will-generated' in another manner.

For the above discussion it may follow that 'desire' is compulsory in the attainment of cognition (for knowing something). Once a person has got desire to know, he is inclined to know. This type of will enables us to have apparent as well as in-depth knowledge of the fact or an object. This particular deriving quality can be traced back to all other subjects also apart from philosophy. If I want to know something, I can know it with help of six means of knowing in Indian schools of thought. Hence, desire is the common cause of knowing a particular object. This is called first order desire. But in our epistemology, interestingly we find a second order desire also, which prompts us to rediscover the object already known. This process of rediscovering is not dominated by any compulsion. This sort of will can be defined as 'free-will'. This particular kind of will contains a certain kind inherent power that gives our desire of knowing ideas a spontaneous quality. This second type of cognition is called 'will-generated-cognition' (*icchājanyajñāna*).

The way of doing philosophy has been changed over a period of time. Epistemological quarries, to a certain truth, a need of concrete justification regarding valid knowledge, linguistic clarification-all these give rise to some new methods and concepts. In the field of epistemology, the great contribution of *Navya Naiyāyikas* can't be ignored. *Icchāprajoyajñāna* i.e. cognition arising out of desire has described as one of them. This school of thought has prescribed such concept in order to ascertain truth indirectly which may have following reasons:-

- 1) For self-justification,
- 2) To secure epistemological groundings,
- 3) To strengthen one's own position
- 4) Pointing out defects of others,
- 5) Linguistic clarification.

So, it is clear from the above discussion that freedom of will have an important role in our daily life as well as in epistemic region. Human being should not be considered as only a rational one. This desire is breaking people and creating them in a new. The source of this desire is the person himself. We have to make desire come true in our own strength.

References:

1. Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra: *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, trs by Loknath Chakrabarti, Sanskrit College & University with Mahabodhi, Kolkata, 2019, pp.21-22.
2. Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana *Nyāyasūtra*-1.1.3 and 1.1.24 and *Vātsyāyanabhāṣya* on them. *Nyāyadarśana* of Gotama, Edited by Raghunath Ghosh, New Bharatiya Book Corporation, Delhi, 2003.
3. Rabindranath Tagore: *Sañcayitā*, Viswabharati, 6 Acarya Jagadisachandra Basu Road, Kolkata, 1420(Bengali year), pp 455- 456.
4. *Kenopaniṣad*, 1/1, *Upaniṣad*, Gita Press, Gorakhpur, 2013.
5. Swami Gambhirananda: *Upananiṣada Granthavali*, *Udvodhan Karyalaya*, Kolkata, 2012, pp 17-19.
6. *Ibid*.
7. Sri Sitanath Tattvavhusana: *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣada*, Brahman mission press, Published by Sri Trigunanath Roy, 211, Karnowalish street, Kolkata, 1928, pp 110-130
8. *Śrīmad-bhagavadgītā As it is (Bengali)*: trs by Srimat Bhakticaru Swami, Published by Bhakti Vedanta Book Trust, Harekrishna Land, Juhu, Mumbai, 2019, pp 487-495.
9. *Ibid*

10. Narayan Sannyal: *Viśwasghātak*, pp 45, 68-72, Dey's publishing, Kolkata 2017.
11. Sanjiv Chattapadhyaya: *Śrī kṛiṣṇer Śeṣ Kota Din*, Ananda Publishers, Kolkata, 2019, pp 100-104.
12. Ānandavardhana: *Dhvanyālokaḥ*, 1/6, Bengali Translation by Satya Narayana Chakraborty, SamskritaPustakBhandar, Kolkata, 2011

Chapter-2

Metaphor as Will-generated Cognition:

Reviewing the point of view of *NavyaNyāya* Philosophy, we see that there is also a cognitive aspect to desire something. Such intentional desire is found not only in Navya Nyaya but in addition to this in other traditional treatises like Grammar, *Alamkārśāstra*, *Bhaṭṭikāvya* etc.

In Indian literature metaphors (*rūpaka*) are used in poetry, literature and anytime when someone wants to add some color to their language. In metaphor, a person is compared to an object which is not same with him but having some resemblances. A metaphor is a word that is used to express a particular idea by imagining the similarity between two objects. The main features of metaphor are as follows:

- i) In case of metaphor, we express the feelings of mind by imagining identity between two objects.
- ii) In this case, a common quality between different person or object is imagined. Such similarity is really found with between two objects or sometimes the similarity between them is imagined by the poet. In case of metaphor in the sense of *rūpaka* the poet's intention is to show the absolute identity between *upamāna* (object, say, the moon with which something like face etc. are compared) and *upameya* i.e., the object of comparison i.e., face. Though it is known to the poet that the face and moon (*mukhacandra*) can never be compared yet he cannot resist the temptation of unhiding the difference between them. In this context the difference between two objects which is really there is going to declare

as identical having no difference at all. It is called by Viśvanātha as *anapahnutabhedayoḥ* i.e., un hiding the difference between them. The poet has got two purposes in his mind- un hiding the difference between them and imposition of one’s property to the other. That there is a difference between face and the moon is intentionally un hide and intentional imposition of the characteristic features of face to those of moon. In other words, metaphor remains in the representation of the subject of description, which is not concealed, as identified with another well-known standard (“*Rūpakamrūpitāropādviṣayenirapanhave*”)¹. The subject is an object on which something is superimposed. In the above example, *mukhacandra* (face-moon) face is identified with moon. In this case ‘face’ is a *viṣaya* or subject on which the *candratva* or moonness is superimposed (*āropa*). The term *viṣaya* is otherwise called *upameya* i.e., ‘face’ which is taken as identical with the ‘moon’ which is otherwise called *upamāna*. In such cases the distinction between them is not concealed though there are a lot of similarities. The superimposition of the identification between two objects in spite of non-concealing their difference

(‘*atisāmyādanapahnutabhedayoḥupamānopameyayohabhedāropaḥ*’) is metaphor in the sense of *rūpaka*.²

We may take an example of ‘*pāṣāṇahridaya*’ (stone-heart) where there is super imposition of the property i.e., hardness between two different objects heart and stone. Here the heart has been compared to stone. Heart is to be taken as *upamāna* and stone is *upameya*, heart is considered as subject

(*viṣaya*), on which the hardness of the stone is imposed. On the other hand, stone is the *viṣayā* it is super-imposed on heart. So, according to this example, heart is *upameya* and stone is considered as *upamāna*. The poet hypothesizes a common quality between two different things. The metaphor is the name of the fictional attribute to show their similarity. There is no such tendency of author to try to keep something secret for reader. The super-imposition of one object on another is prior to metaphor. The author of ‘Song of myself’ Walt Whitman has used a strong metaphor. In his own words “grass is the beautiful uncut hair of graves”. Here the poet hypothesizes a common quality between two different things. The concept *upamāna* and *upameya* will be clarified gradually.

Ācārya ViśvanāthaKavirāja in his *Sāhityadarpaṇa* defines *rūpaka* as “*rūpakamrūpitāropoviśayeniraphnave*” i.e without prohibiting the subject called *upameya* if the identity of *upamāna* is imposed on *upameya* is called metaphor. Let us try to explain the term ‘*āropa*’ in this definition.³ An object is placed on another object in such way so that the second one transforms the first into its own form. As a result of this resonance, two alien objects are imagined to be one. For example, “*ādhāriḥṛdayākāśetui pūrṇaśaśīāmār*”. In this example the word ‘*pūrṇaśaśī*’ as superimposed on Indrajit is considered as the cause of imposition of sky (*ākāśāropa*) on heart (*hṛdaya*). To the mother, the son (Indrajit) has to take the form of moon, so that the mother’s heart has taken the form of sky. Because, the son is just like moon to mother.

In metaphor, one expresses his own thought by imagining the unity between two objects. This is how the intention of a writer’s desire is revealed through metaphor. As we have the freedom to create humor in literature, to express one’s

thought individually. The poet does not make an effort to hide anything from the reader. By applying metaphor, a common feature is imposed on the two different things.

Another term we have found in the definition of metaphor as stated above is '*nirapahnave*'. This term carries an important meaning. Without prohibiting the subject called *upameya*, if the identity of *upamāna* is imagined to *upameya* is called as *rūpaka* (metaphor). In case of metaphor, the distinction between *upamāna* and *upameya* is well known, and the author never made an attempt to hide the different nature of these two.

From this we can say, though objectively / by nature *upamāna* and *upameya* are different from each other, similarity the hypothetical imposition of *abheda* to exhibit the extreme similarity between them is known as *rūpaka* (metaphor). In case of metaphor, *upamāna* does not consume *upameya*, rather it obsessed *upameya*. In metaphor, the value of the *upamāna* is much higher.

So, when we analyze metaphor, we can see its three main components – *upamāna*, *upameya* and the common quality. Let us try to understand this concept by showing the following example i.e 'blood-red hibiscus flower'.

- i) ***Upameya***: that which is the matter of comparison. In this example 'blood' and 'hibiscus flower' – the metaphor is created after searching similarities between two different objects. In this case the subject of comparison is 'flower'. So, the flower has to be taken as '*upameya*'.
- ii) ***Upamāna***: The object with which something is compared is *upamāna*. Here flower is compared to blood. For this reason, 'blood' is the second part of *rūpaka*, i.e *upamāna*.

iii) **The common qualities:** It refers to that quality which exists in two different objects and makes each other comparable. The common property 'redness' exists both in 'blood' and 'flower'. This quality is the basis of comparison between 'flower' and 'blood'. So, 'redness' which is the common quality is the third part of metaphor.

From the above discussion we can say although *upamāna-upameya* are different by nature, but to show the excessive similarities (*atisāmyāt*) between them the imposition of identity (*abhedāropa*) is called as metaphor.

Moreover, the term *nirapahnava* inserted in the definition has got a great significance. This term makes metaphor or *rūpaka* as distinct from illusion and *apahnuti*, another *alamkāra* in poetics. In case of *rūpaka* the distinction between *upamāna* and *upamiti*, though awareness is there, is not concealed while in case of illusion the distinction between them is not ascertained (*bhedāgraha*) at all. When there is the cognition of snake in case of rope, there is no cognition of distinction between them. In case of *apahnuti* an object's real character is denied and that of something else is ascribed to it. As for example, if it is said- 'this is not face, but the moon'- *nedam̐mukham̐kintucandraeva*, it is called *apahnuti*, but in case of *rūpaka* no such denial is admitted. As the *viṣayī* ascribes its form (*rūpa*) on the *viṣaya*, it is called *rūpaka*.⁴ Though between face and moon there are opposite properties and though the distinction between them is clearly ascertained, the hypothetical superimposition identity (*kālpanikābhedāropa*) in order to show their excessive similarities.⁴

There are certain cases where both the *upameya* and *upameya* are clearly mentioned while some cases are there where either of them is mentioned and

the other is not. We find such situation in case of implicative (*lākṣaṇika*) and suggestive (*vyāṅgya*) meaning. In such cases *upamāna* is mentioned while *upameya* is assumed. Such assumption varies from person to person. One story from Buddhism may be taken to exemplify such case. Once Buddha says to his disciples at the end of the day- 'The Sun is set' (*gato'stamarkah*), the import of this varies from disciple to disciple. Three disciples have taken the meaning of the metaphor in three ways. Here the sun is the *upamāna* and a particular interpretation given by a disciple is taken as *upameya*. The meaning assigned to the metaphor by a particular disciple is as per the desire of him. A disciple who is religious in nature has assigned the meaning of the sentence-The Sun is set as an indirect instruction of Buddha to go to his residence to perform evening rituals. The second disciple who is a thief interprets it as an indirect order of Buddha to go out for burglary. The third one who is a romantic lover has interpreted the sentence as an instruction of Buddha to go out to meet the ladylove. From this it may be argued that though the metaphor is the same the implicative meaning from this is ambiguous as it has got capability of providing various meanings. Hence it is not always true that metaphor can give us an accurate meaning of a sentence. In the cases of *mukha-candra* and *pāṣaṇa-hṛdaya* the meaning is clear but in the above-mentioned sentence of Buddha the implicative and suggestive meaning has got some aesthetic value which is required for literature. But in our daily communication it creates some problems due to its ambiguous nature. The metaphorical language is normally understood through convention which is called *vṛddhavyavahāra* (verbal usage of the seniors) in most of the cases though not in all cases. If a metaphor is used for the first time or if a metaphor is heard by someone for the first time, the meaning would not be clear due to not having any

convention. Sometimes the ambiguity of language be virtuous and sometimes be vicious after taking the context or situation in view. The ambiguity remaining in metaphor sometimes creates misunderstanding among the people. In the same way, there may be certain cases which cannot be expressed in ordinary language due to the delicacy of the case can be easily expressed in metaphorical language. But one thing should be kept in view that metaphor should match with what is indicated by the metaphor. The metaphor of face and moon is matching with face and the moon and hence it is called a good metaphor. If otherwise, it is called a bad metaphor which may be avoided in communication.⁵

In some cases, the *upameya* is used as *upamāna* in order to show the incomparability (*atulanīyatva*) of an object. Sometimes the object metaphorized is used as a metaphor in order to show an object's incomparability, which may be illustrated as follows. In the cases like Darjeeling is Darjeeling, Uttamkumar is Uttamkumar etc. *upameya* is identical with *upamāna*.⁶ In this context the identification between them is shown which is a kind of artificial intellectual exercise for the purpose of indicating the incomparability of the object. Such usages are also valuable in our day-to-day life.

References:

1. Viśvanātha: *Sāhityadarpaṇa* Chapter-X with Kusumapratima ed by HaridasSiddhantavagisha, 1875 (B.S.)
2. *Kusumapratimā* on Sahityadarpana, Chapter-X, ed by HaridasSiddhantavagisha, 1875 (B.S.)
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Raghunath Ghosh: *Knowledge, Meaning and Intuition (Some Theories in Indian Logic)*, 1st Edition, New Bharatiya Book Corporation, New Delhi, 2000, pp.95-99.
6. Raghunath Ghosh:: *An The Concept of Metaphor and Truth Indian Perspective, Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, and pp 247-257, July 2000.
7. Dr. Bijoya Goswami, *The Metaphor: A Systematic Analysis*, Sanskrita Pustak Bhandar, 38, Bidhan Sarani, Kolkata, 1994.
8. Shyamapada Chakraborty, *Alamkāra Chandrikā*, Indian Associated Publishing House Co. Pvt.Ltd, 8C, Ramanath Majumder Street, Kolkata, 1363(BC).
9. Atindra Majumder, *Chhanda O Alamkāra*, Nyaya Prakash, 206, Bidhan Sarani, Kolkata, 1367(BC).

CHAPTER-3

The Concept of Will-generated Cognition in *NavyaNyāya*:

There are few instances of 'Will-generated Cognition' in *NavyaNyāya* school of thought. Generally, they introduced such concepts entirely free from any sort of determinants. The *Navya Naiyāyikas* admitted the concepts of *Āhāryajñāna*, *Sambandha*, *Pakṣatā*, *Tarka*, *Tātparya* as different forms of will-generated-cognition. In these cases, knowledge is attained through the instrumentality of desire (*icchākaraṇajanyatva*).

Part -1

The Concept of *Āhāryajñāna* in *NavyaNyāya*:

The concept of *āhāryajñāna* (deliberately imposed cognition) has been admitted by the *Navya Naiyāyikas*. In order to give honor of an individual's desire certain philosophical activities start. The *NavyaNyāya* system, which is commonly known as realistic, has prescribed some methods in order to arrive at certain truth, which is purely 'deliberate' (*icchājanya*). A solution to this problem may be offered in the following way. Let us look towards the exact nature of *āhāryajñāna*. Etymological meaning of the term '*āhārya*' is 'that which is capable of being imposed or collected' (*āharaṇīyaitiāhārya*). We can collect some cognition by way of imposing it on another out of our will. The literal meaning of the term '*āhāryajñāna*' can be expressed as deliberately imposed cognition. The word '*āhārya*' was first defined by Mahāmohapādhyāya BhīmācāryaJhalkikār in *Nyāyakoṣa*. '*Āhārya*' means 'artificial', which is super-imposed is artificial and

should be taken as 'āhārya'. The *Naiyāyikas* define *āhāryajñāna* as “*virodhijñānakālīnecchāprajoyajñānatvamāhāryajñānatvam*” or “*vādhakālīnecchājanyam jñānam*”¹; i.e., in spite of knowing impossibility or irrelevance between two objects, one is deliberately thought as otherwise. In this sphere of cognition, knower is aware of the presence of ‘*vādhakajñāna*’ (contradictory knowledge). In spite of this, such imposition has been recognized by the *Navya Naiyāyikas* to honor the freedom of expression of an individual. Such *āhārya*-cognition has not only taken role in epistemological domain, but it is also discussed in *Bhāṭṭikāvya*, *Alamkārasāstra* and Grammar etc. In *Bhāṭṭikāvya* and *Alamkārasāstra* it is introduced for the sake of bringing out aesthetic pleasure, and in Grammar to honor autonomy of will, which is called *vivakṣā*.

The *Āhārya*-cognition is one sort of artificial knowledge as the knower superimposes some distinct features of an object on another one, inspite of the presence of contradictory knowledge due to having stronger sense of desire. We may cite a number of examples to make our understanding regarding such type of cognition.

When someone speaks- ‘The Lake is fiery’ (*hradovanhimān*), it is an instance of *āhārya* type of cognition. As he knows that fire cannot exist in lake, he told this out of his strong desire. All of us know that fire cannot exist in lake. In spite of this, if someone gives the above statement due to his strong desire, it is called *āhāryajñāna*.

This sort of imposition is always due to one’s own desire. Another example can be shown in this regard. Someone deliberately says-” if you are sky, I would have stretched wings under you”², it will be taken as a form of

āhāryajñāna. Though we clearly know the absurdity of this knowledge, the speaker uttered this sentence due to fulfillment of his sweet will. In spite of having no justification of such statement, this sort of cognition is taken as promoter to *pramāṇa*. We deliberately impose 'birdness' to human being, though it shows the impossibility in reality. Such imposition of 'birdness' is known as '*āhārya*' (artificial).

Though the justification of *āhāryajñāna* is not at all tenable, this sort of knowledge is promoter to *pramāṇa*. In spite of having ambiguity in this artificial cognition; it explores true nature of an object indirectly. So in Indian epistemology this artificial cognition has much utility. Henceforth, this cognition is defined as '*pramāṇānugrāhakanatupramāṇam*' i.e., the main purpose of accepting *āhāryajñāna* is to explore the true nature of an object.

The importance of *āhārya* cognition may be realized by showing the following examples. If 'p' is taken as a conclusion to someone and '~p' is my conclusion, we can accept the conclusion of *pūrvapakṣa* for the time being. When we think in such a way, we find a kind of contradiction in our mental state. This contradiction proves indirectly that the conclusion of *pūrvapakṣa*, i.e., 'p' is not correct. It will automatically prove that my conclusion i.e. '~p' is true. In Indian Logic this method is known as '*VipakṣavādhakaTarka*'.

If an opponent having knowledge in the form:—"Smoke can exist without fire", the form of *āhāryajñāna* in *Nyāya*- perspective is as follows —"Had there been smoke without fire, then smoke would not have been produced through fire', which is due to one's instrumentality of desire (*icchājanya*). This sort of statement hints to the conclusion: - 'As smoke is produced through fire and

hence, it exists in fire. Hence, the view of opponent is proved as wrong and the conclusion claimed by him is not correct. As the knowledge is produced out of one's desire so it is taken as *āhāryajñāna* and also it helps to ascertain the conclusion. That's way; *āhāryajñāna* has taken a room In Indian Logic, especially in *NavyaNyāya* system of thought.

Opponents may raise a question on accommodation of the concept of *āhāryajñāna* in *Nyāya* as it lacks *yogyatā*. In spite of having such peculiarity in such type of artificial knowledge in *Nyāya* school of thought, it is an essential one. This is a unique contribution of *NavyaNyāya* in philosophical enterprise to give strength to epistemological structure of knowledge. An effort may be done to understand this fact. If it is uttered that water causes burning, one may raise objection in the form – 'If it is so, the drinking of water would cause a burning sensation'. The burning sensation from water is contradictory in our day-to-day life. The claim of opponent as mentioned above cannot be established. This *āhārya*-cognition sometimes called *aniṣṭāpatti* or *aniṣṭaprasaṅga*³ i.e., the desired one is established by showing inadequacy of the undesired. This kind of mental construction is another form of *āhārya cognition*.

The incorporation of *āhārya*-cognition in *NavyaNyāya* context is mainly to promote an indirect method through which the real nature of an object is revealed. We should keep in our mind that *āhārya*-cognition should not be in conflict with illusion. In case of illusion (*bhramajñāna*) also an object is taken as otherwise, the sensation of an object differs from its own nature. When we have sensation of snakesness in rope, snakesness that is imposed on rope is not to be taken as conscious-imposition. There is no room for intentional imposition of a

knower. An agent has no awareness of such imposition. On the contrary, the adoption of *āhārya*-cognition presupposes the desire of speaker. When someone speaks: "I would have stretched my wings like a crane" – the speaker is, of course, aware of imposition of 'birdness' to him. So an individual's desire has much more importance in such cases of imposition.

This is a unique contribution of *NavyaNyāya* in philosophical enterprise to give strength to epistemological structure of knowledge. *Āhārya*-cognition is produced out of one's own desire (*icchājanya*), at the time when one is aware of the contradictory knowledge (*vādhakajñāna*) through which the desired one is established. So *icchājanyatva* and *vādhakālīnatva* are regarded as two distinct characteristics of *Āhārya*-cognition. It should not be confused with other forms of imaginations such as music, dance, drama, abstract painting etc. In this above-mentioned case, the second feature i.e., *vādhakālīnatva* (contradictoriness) is absent, inspite of having the first one i.e. will-generatedness. These are not admitted as *āhārya*-cognition in Indian Logic. *Āhārya* cognition is obviously one sort of imagination; or it may be said imposition of some features on one another, but all type of imagination should not be taken as artificial cognition. Due to the absence of second feature of *āhāryajñāna* this sort of imaginations suffers from the defect of over-coverage (*avyāptidoṣa*).

In this sphere, we are trying to explore the real nature of an object indirectly, though this sort of artificial cognition has no semantic competency (*yogyatā*).

Hence, the *NavyaNyāya* position of admitting will-generated cognition is much stronger than other system. When we talk of *āhāryajñāna*, it has to be

taken as an artificial cognition on account of three different aspects that – i) whatever is collected from others is taken as artificial, ii) speakers may utter some sentences which really does not exist, inspite of strong will one may speak of absurdity of knowledge, iii) pointing out the defect of opponents.

PART-II

The Concept of Tarka in the light of *Prācīna* and *NavyaNyāya*:

The relevance of the application of such type of *āhāryajñāna* in philosophy, especially in *NavyaNyāya* school of thought is closely associated with the *Nyāya* view of Tarka. The old *Naiyāyikas* have enlisted it as one of the sixteen categories (*padārtha*) following Goutama as he has stated- “*pramāṇa-prameya-samśaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-sidhāntāvayava-tarka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpa-vitaṇḍā-hetvābhāsa-chala-jāti-nigrahasthānānāmtattvajñānānniḥśreyasādhigamaḥ*” (*Sutra--1*)⁴. The old *Naiyāyikas* admitted Tarka as *viśayapariśodhaka-tarka*, whereas Neo-Logicians have incorporated it epistemology as *vyābhicāraśamkānivartaka-tarka*.

Indian Philosophy has regarded *apavarga (niḥśreyasa)* as highest end of life among four different *puruṣārtha* i.e., *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*. As *niḥśreyasa* means the cessation of all suffering, Goutama recognizes sixteen

categories in *Nyāyadarśana* and told that liberation comes through the right cognition (*tattvajñāna*) of those categories. *Tarka* is one of those sixteen categories. When doubt is found in epistemological domain particularly in case of ascertainment of *vyāpti*, *Tarka* removes doubt and act as promoter to *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇānugrāhaka*).

It is known to us that *Tarka* is admitted in Indian Philosophy as a form of invalid cognition (*apramā*) and it is also applied as a logical method for arriving at an objective truth indirectly. Usually, the *Nyāya* thinkers have put different opinions regarding its nature and they (old and new both of them) have accepted its role in generating the valid cognition described as promoter to *pramāṇa*, i.e *pramāṇānugrāhaka*, not *pramāṇa* in itself. First, we will discuss the old *Naiyāyika*'s view regarding the very nature of *Tarka*.

The cognition is, in general, generated in our self is of two types: 1) definite cognition (*niścaya*) which includes *pratyakṣa*, *anumiti*, *upamiti* and *śābdabodha*; 2) invalid cognition (*apramā*) including memory (*smṛti*), doubt (*saśaya*), error (*viparyaya*), and hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*). Doubt of deviation may arise in such following cases: 1) doubt of limiting adjunct (*upādhi-sandeha*) and 2) the absence of the cognition of specific features as well as the presence of the cognition of common properties (*sādhāraṇa-dharma-sahakṛta-viśeṣādarśana*). Second sort of instance gives rise to the doubt of deviation which can be removed by application of *Tarka*. It counters the opponent's view and establishes the true nature of an object indirectly.

Let us start with the old *Nyāya* view by quoting Gautama's definition of *Tarka*. In *Nyāyadarśana*, *Tarka* is defined as: "Avijñātetattve"

rthekāraṇopapattitaḥtattvajñānārthamūhastarkaḥ” (verse 40)⁵ i.e., the knowledge of existence of common properties and absence of specific features generates the doubt about real nature of object. The valid knowledge cannot be attained through *pramāṇa*. In such case *Tarka* removes contradiction and helps to ascertain valid cognition. *Tarka* is applied to reveal the true nature of an object, not in a purely unknown object. Let us explain the above definition of *Tarka* in details. First, we analyze the term ‘*avijñāta*’. If ‘*tattva*’ is not inserted in the definition, it will hint that *Tarka* cannot be applied to an unknown object as there is no question of doubt. Doubt arises where there is contrary knowledge. So, doubt is the prior-condition of *Tarka*. ‘*Tattva*’ is conjoined with ‘*avijñāta*’ and the term ‘*Avijñātetattve*’ points to the fact that an object partially known is not known as it really is known through *Tarka*. The term ‘*Artha*’ indicates an object having an unknown character.

The term ‘*Kāraṇopapattitaḥ*’ is the combination of two terms, i.e. ‘*kāraṇa*’ and ‘*upapatti*’. ‘*Kāraṇa*’ means ‘*pramāṇa*’ and ‘*upapatti*’ means ‘possibility’. Hence, ‘*kāraṇopapattitaḥ*’ denotes that instrumentality of knowledge is applicable in those objects which are partially known. The term ‘*tattvajñānārthamūhastarkaḥ*’ points that to know the real nature of an object is ‘*tattva*’. ‘*Artha*’ means requirements. So, the term ‘*tattvajñānārthamūhastarkaḥ*’ implies the requirement of true knowledge. True knowledge is attained through ‘*pramāṇa*’ but *Tarka* helps to eliminate doubt as a promoter to *pramāṇa*.

The explanation of *Tarka* from the view point of *Prācīna Naiyāyikas* indicates some characteristics of this cognition: 1) *Tarka* is a form of cognition and cognition is regarded as *guṇa-padārtha*. 2) If doubt arises, *Tarka* as helping

condition to *pramāṇa* dissolved the doubt. According to *Nyāya* perspective, *Tarka* is not an independent means of cognition, it is regarded as promoter to *pramāṇa*.

The *Prācīna Naiyāyikas* claim that *Tarka* does not directly give us any cognition of an object; rather it plays a negative role. It actually removes the obstacles. The task of *Tarka* is to eliminate the obstacles, and helps the independent instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). *Tarka* should be regarded as an independent instrument of knowledge. The term '*Avijñātetattve*', indicates universally known and particularly unknown object wherein lies doubt having *tattvajñānā* and only *pramāṇa* could not help to attain true knowledge. When such crisis arises in the domain of knowledge, *Tarka* is a helping condition dissolves doubt and *tattvajñānā* is acquired by applying *pramāṇa*. In this way, *Tarka* acts as a promoter to *pramāṇa* and doubt is considered as earlier than *Tarka*.

Let us try to understand the method of hypothetical reasoning following Vātsyāyana. He says that sometimes we have some opposite features of a same object and we become confused. Suppose a knower desires to know the real nature of self. We have some rough ideas regarding the nature of soul and this is partial knowledge. To know the self perfectly, we face some doubt. We may express our doubt in the form: "whether the soul possesses the features of produced or unproduced characteristics." Now we have to eliminate one of the alternatives. Until and unless the doubt is removed, we cannot know the cognition of soul. If soul possesses the unproduced properties, which is called eternal, the theory of Liberation, law of *karma* is justifiable. If the soul, on the contrary, is taken as possessing the produced features, then the doctrine cannot

be taken place. It will indicate that soul is non-eternal; and as a consequence, theory of Liberation, *karma* will be failure. These basic fundamental doctrines are unalterable. So, the soul cannot possess produced properties. *Tarka* shows the absurdity of taking such properties. Therefore, the remaining alternative, i.e soul possesses eternal properties must be true. *Tarka* indirectly proves the real nature of soul by refuting the opponents. *Tarka* is a helping condition of *pramāṇa*. This type of argumentation of eliminating of doubt is called *Tarka*. Here *Tarka* helps us to remove the doubt, just by eliminating one of the characteristics.

Vātsyāyana describes the process as a promoting to the attainment of true knowledge, but *Tarka* should not be taken as valid knowledge itself. After removing doubt and by eliminating one of the alternatives by applying such method, *pramāṇa* will be applicable to ascertain knowledge.⁶

VācaspatiMiśra holds the same view after supporting Vātsyāyana and both of them state that *Tarka* is nothing but an accessory to the right knowledge (*Tattva*). *Tattvajñānā* means true nature of an object, to know an object as it really is.

According to the *Prācīna Naiyāyikas*, when we possess the knowledge of common property regarding an object, but at the same time there is lack of the knowledge of uncommon property there we have found two alternatives which is entirely different from each other. Until we dissolve one of the alternatives among the two, knowledge cannot be ascertained. This hypothetical reasoning method helps to dissolve one alternative. On the other hand, it confirms the another one. If doubt is not removed by this method, application of independent

instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) will not possible. So, the view point of Vātsyāyana is, of course, justifiable.

But Udayana differs from them in one point. He raises objection against *Tarka* as an eliminator of doubt. He maintains that doubt is not dissolved by *Tarka*; rather doubt is eliminated through some other means. He shows the example of perceiving an object in a long distance with the help of dream light. We may have doubt in the form- “whether it is man or tree”? This doubt cannot be removed by application of reasoning method. Perception helps to remove doubt. In this way, Udayana tries to establish that *Tarka* does not eliminate doubt. If *Tarka* and doubt are antagonistic then *Tarka* helps to remove doubt. But *Tarka* is not logically opposed to doubt in their context. That is why; *Tarka* does not help to remove doubt.

Such observation of Udayana is not accepted at all. Though *Tarka* helps us to remove the doubt, but this is not the only cognition. There is another concept which he has been overlooked, e.g., ‘*parvatovahnimāndhūmāt*’ –in this case there is perceptual knowledge as well as inferential knowledge. In case of doubt “whether it is man or tree” –the cognition of invariable concomitance between hand and feet and the human being is not derived through perception only. Here in lies the necessity of *Tarka*. *Tarka* ascertains to the relation of *Vyāpti* between two and that’s why; this method is an accessory to *pramāṇa*. So, the observation of Udayana is not accepted. The purpose of *Tarka* is to help us to remove our doubt and to know the contrary alternative. So, *Tarka* does not require epistemological justification- this view of Udayana cannot be accepted.

Finally, it could be said following the *Prācīna Naiyāyikas* that *Tarka* as a promoter to *pramāṇa* needs to clarify the nature of an object, though *Tarka* itself is not regarded as independent instrument of knowledge. By applying this hypothetical method, one alternative is eliminated among two contradictory statements regarding an object. The implementation of *pramāṇa* is possible to produce knowledge. If we don't admit *Tarka*, *pramāṇa* cannot be applied. *Tarka* is an accessory to arrive at certain truth indirectly.

Next an attempt is be made to explain NavyaNyāya view regarding the nature of *Tarka*. The neo-logicians differ from the old view-point on account of the fact that the former type of *Tarka* cannot be accepted as a separate one, as it is superfluous. And after criticizing the old-view point Gangeśa has admitted only one sort of *Tarka*, i.e. *vyābhicāraśaṁkānivartaka-tarka* (*Tarka* needs for removing the doubt of deviation existing in *anumāna*). This method can remove the doubt of deviation between *hetu* and *sādhya*. *Tarka* helps us to get the cognition of *Vyāpti*. *Tarka* along with the knowledge of *hetu* and *sādhya*, accompanied by the knowledge of the absence of deviation is the cause of ascertaining *Vyāpti*. Udayana speaks of three conditions, when these conditions are satisfied then the relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* can be established. These conditions are as follows: i) cognition of co-presence between *hetu* and *sādhya* (*sahacāradarśana*); ii) cognition of the absence of deviation (smoke exists, but there is no fire); iii) after satisfaction of these two, application of *Tarka* is needed.

Inspite of having first and second condition the doubt continues to exist; this doubt has to be eliminated. Until and unless the doubt is removed, the relation of *Vyāpti* cannot be established.

In future such type of situation may arise, though there is *hetu* but *sādhya* does not exist. So the scope of doubt is still remaining. To eliminate this doubt *Tarka* is applied to get certainty about invariable concomitance between *hetu* and *sādhya*. When we go through this process, our cognition of *Vyāpti* will be valid. This is how Gangeśa justifies the necessity of incorporation of the method *Tarka* in *NavyaNyāya* epistemology.

Some critiques have raised objections here. If we ponder over the case then it seems that *Tarka* cannot eliminate the doubt in question. They hold that *Tarka* cannot eliminate the doubt under consideration, because of fallacy of ‘Infinite Regress’ (*anavasthā*). So the observation of Gangeśa is not correct at all.

The form of *Vyāpti* is –“where there is deviation of fire, there is the negation of being a product of fire (*yatra yatravahnivyabhicāritvaṃtatratatravahnijanyatvābhāvaḥ*). In this form of *Vyāpti*, the first portion is *Vyāpya* (pervaded) and the last one *Vyāpaka* (pervader). If we take an example of “*yatra dhūmastatravahniḥ*”-i.e., fire is inferred by existence of smoke, smoke (*dhūma*) is pervaded (*vyāpyavattva*) and fire (*vahni*) is pervader (*vyāpakavattva*). Relationship lying between *Vyāpya* and *Vyāpaka* is called *Vyāpti*. Pervader (*vyāpaka*) is established on the basis of cognition of pervaded (*Vyāpya*). The relation of *Vyāpya*- *Vyāpaka* is also found in case of *Tarka*. It may be stated as “if there were no smoke, there would be no fire”. The *Vyāpaka* (the second part of the inference) is deduced by the *Vyāpya* (the first part of the inference). The same type of mechanism is available in *Tarka*. One acute difference between *Tarka* and *anumāna* is – in case of *anumāna* there is the cognition of *Vyāpya*-*Vyāpaka*, none of them actually is *āhāryajñāna*. Whereas, in case of *Tarka*

āhāryajñāna remains in the cognition of *Vyāpya-Vyāpaka* relation. Though both the cognition of *Tarka* and *anumāna* is based on *Vyāpti*, the knowledge of *Vyāpti* is presupposed by *Tarka*. In order to remove doubt remaining in this *Vyāpti*, another *Tarka* will have to be resorted to. In this way, the defect arising from such situation is called 'Infinite Regress' (*anāvasthā*). But this view is not tenable. If we go on doubting, our doubting would be subject to doubt. So, each and every case should be regarded as doubt. *Tarka* only satisfies the formal conditions of inference, not material condition, i.e., why *Tarka* cannot be considered as a form of proper inference.

In *Tarkasaṃgraha* Annambhaṭṭa defines *Tarka* as “*vyāpyāropeṇavyāpakāropaḥ tarkaḥ*”⁷, i.e *Tarka* is an imposition of the pervader with the help of the imposition of the pervaded.

In *Nīlakanṭhaprakāśikā* commentary on *Dīpikā* of *Tarkasaṃgraha* *Tarka* is defined as “*āhāryavyāpyavattvā-bhramajanyaḥāhāryavyāpakavattvā-bhramastarkaḥ*”⁸ i.e. ‘*Tarka* is illusory cognition of the imposition of the pervader which is caused by the illusory cognition of the imposition of the pervaded’. In this definition there is a tendency to interpret the nature of *Tarka* as one of the forms of *āhāryajñāna*. Both the parts of *Tarka*, i.e., antecedent (*āpādaka*) and consequent (*āpādya*) are imaginary. In order to defend *pūrvapakṣa*, we have taken some hypothetical statements which is contrary to our daily-life experience. If someone having doubt whether water quenches thirst, then a hypothetical reasoning may be formed in the following way- ‘If water does not quench thirst, no thirsty person seeks for this’. In our everyday life we have experienced that there is no scope of doubt between water or any type of drink and thirst. So,

there is an entailment relation between two parts of *Tarka*. If the former part (*āpādaka*) is true, another part (*āpādya*) would follow it without giving no effort. This sort of ascription is similar to *āhāryajñāna* and that's why, this method of argumentation is defined as a form of *āhāryajñāna* in *NavyaNyāya* school of thought. In this case, our day-to-day experience acts as a *vādhakajñāna*. Due to having excessive will an individual imagines such hypothetical argument.

Finally it could be said that *Tarka* removes the doubt of deviation and helps to provide us cognition of *Vyāpti*. *Tarka* is definitely a form of *āhāryajñāna*, not the vice-versa.

PART-III

The Concept of *Tātparyā* in *NavyaNyāya*:

The intention of speaker (*tātparyā*) has taken a significant role in *NavyaNyāya* school of thought. The eminent *NavyaNyāya* thinkers like Gangeśa, Viṣvanātha, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Dīnakara, Rāmarudra, Raghunātha Śīromoṇi and also some contemporary thinkers enriched this concept.

Before we are going to discuss the nature of *Tātparyā*, the origin of this concept should be mentioned. The *Navya Naiyāyikas* have admitted four conditions of sentence-meaning for having a successful verbal communication between hearer and speaker. These are-*ākāṅkṣā*, *sannidhi*, *yogyatā*, and *tātparyā*⁹. Among these four, *Tatparyā* can be tankan as an instance of non-compulsive will.

As we know that the relation lying between *pada* and *padārtha* is called *ṽṛtti*. And again *ṽṛtti* is of two types, i.e., *śakti* and *lakṣaṇā* in the attainment of sentence- meaning. To denote the meaning of *pada*, God's intention is final according to the old *Naiyāyikas* whereas, the *Navya Naiyāyikas* have admitted an individual's intention to define the nature of *śakti*. The concept of *tātparyā* has to be understood in the contest of implicative meaning (*lakṣaṇā*) of word. *Lakṣaṇā* does not come into verbal testimony suddenly. It is another form of *ṽṛtti*, which memorizes the word-meaning and applying this verbal communication is possible. *Lakṣaṇā* is an indirect relation between *pada* and *padārtha*. The meaning which is denoted by *śakti* is called primary meaning (*śakyārtha*), i.e., a direct relation between *pada* and *padārtha*. In *Dīpikā* commentary of *Tarkasaṁgraha*, *lakṣaṇā* is defined as “*Lakṣaṇāśakyasambandhaḥ tātparyānupapattita*”¹⁰i.e., to remove *tātparyānupapattita*, the primary meaning of a word has to be replaced by the secondary meaning (*lakṣyārtha*) of the same word. If there is an inconsistency between primary meanings of two words, application of *lakṣaṇā* helps to remove the inconsistency (*lakṣaṇā śakyasambandhaḥ iti*). We take an example of “*yaṣṭhīpraveśaya*”. Stick is the primary meaning of the term ‘*yaṣṭhī*’. The unconscious object cannot be requested. So, the secondary meaning of ‘*yaṣṭhī*’ i.e stick-holder is considered here.

One may raise objection that why should not *anvayānupapatti* be taken as a root- cause of implicative meaning of a word? If it is admitted as root- cause of *lakṣaṇā* some problems may arise. For, an example- “*kākebhyaḥ dadhirakṣyatām*”- suffers from ‘purport-difficulty’ (*tātparyānupapattita*), not ‘syntax-difficulty’ (*anvayānupapatti*). The *śakyārtha* of ‘crow’ is ‘bird’, there is no scope of syntax-difficulty, and rather it has purport-

difficulty. The intention of speaker is curd which should be protected from any type of creature harmful to it. In this example, we admit the *lakṣyārtha* of ‘crow’, not the primary meaning. The primary meaning of ‘crow’ is ‘only birds’. Whereas the secondary meaning of ‘crow’ is ‘any type of creature’ who may damage the curd. It is clear from the above statement that, for understanding the meaning of a sentence ‘consideration of purport’ is to be admitted. Because of this Annambhaṭṭa seems to be in favor of the view that *tātparyānupapattita* should be treated as the origination of *lakṣaṇā* for understanding the meaning of a statement.

Another one of the famous example can be cited here. In the case- “*gangāyāṁghoṣaḥ* “ – the direct meaning of the word ‘*gangā*’ is ‘continuous flow of water’. If we admit the direct meaning of the word ‘*gangā*’, it shows purport-difficulty. Milk-man colony cannot live on ‘continuous flow of water’. So it is better to take the indirect meaning of ‘*gangā*’, i.e. ‘bank of the river *gangā*’. So, the statement means ‘Milk-man–colony lives on the bank of the ‘*gangā*’ and this is surely free from the purport-difficulty. The indirect meaning of the word ‘*gangā*’ is taken into the account for understanding the meaning of the above sentence and the removal of non –reliability of relation between word and it’s direct meaning is the result of *lakṣaṇā*.

The *Prācīna Naiyāyikas* seem to admit *Tātparyā* as an origination of implicative meaning or as a removal of the difficulties between direct and indirect meaning of a word. In *Tarkasaṁgraha ākāṅkṣā*, *sannidhi*, *yogyatā* and *tātparyā* are considerations for understanding of verbal statement. On the contrary, the *Navya Naiyāyikās* considered for having sentence–meaning. The desire of a

speaker in the context of verbal communication is most important one. Especially, in case of ambiguous sentence, the sense intended to be conveyed by the speaker should be realized. It has both epistemic purpose and also significant in our daily life. The intention of speaker should be reflected through sentence, otherwise in spite of fulfillment of other conditions, i.e., *ākāṅkṣā*, *sannidhi*, *yogyatā*, due to lack of *tātparya* sentence–meaning can't be grasped. We may find such ambiguous sentence and we should ponder over the desire of speaker. An ambiguous statement in the form “*nava-kamvalamānaya*”-the word ‘*nava*’ denotes two meaning, i.e., either something ‘new’ or ‘nine a numerical figure’. Which meaning should we take is determined by the desire, as conveyed by the speaker. The desire of speaker plays a significant role for having successful communication.

So, it is clear from the above discussion, an individual's desire is central to any discipline. As a pre-condition of verbal comprehension desire is manifested in the form of sentence. Sentence is an expression of mood of the speaker, either it is uttered or not. Speaker's will is reflected through sentence. Such sort of desire is known as in *NavyaNyāya* discourse. Until and unless we grasp the *tātparya* of sentence, no linguistic communication is possible. Any sort of linguistic problem is generated due to lack of intention of speaker.

Tātparya also plays a significant role in our social–life. We may cite an example of traffic signal, abstract painting, expression of love, showing anger – these are also the instances of intention of speaker not expressed through utterance.

In *NavyaNyāya* discourse, intention of speaker may be defined in two ways. First, *tātparya* is defined as, “*Vakturicchā tātparya*”¹¹ -i.e., the desire of speaker is *tātparya*. One should understand the purpose intended to be conveyed by the speaker. If one says, “*saindhavamānaya* i.e., ‘bring *saindhava*’. The ambiguous term ‘*saindhava*’ occurs in this statement. For the right apprehension of this statement, we must have a clear idea about the intention of speaker. The term ‘*saindhava*’ indicates two different objects -either it will be ‘one type of salt’ or ‘horse, which is found in the land of *Sindhu*’. What type of meaning should be taken by the hearer is entirely dependent on the context of the statement. If the statement is made at the time of meals, one has to take the term ‘*saindhava*’ in the sense of ‘salt’. If it is taken as otherwise, it is exactly unintelligible. When the same statement is uttered at the time of travelling, the term is taken in the sense of ‘horse’. So, in case of, successful communication, the proper understanding of a statement depends on realizing the intention of speaker. That’s why; *tātparyajñāna* is to be admitted as a condition for understanding the meaning of a statement by the *NavyaNaiyāyikas*.

Another definition of *tātparya* is found, which is as follows, “*tat pratitīcchayāuccharitatvam*”¹² i.e., when speaker is desirous to make ourselves understand something and utters a statement, the utterance of statement is taken *astātparyajñāna*. This definition emphasizes on the term ‘*uccharitatvam*’ (utterance). But in our social life, there are a number of instances free from utterance though it will carry a great significance. We may cite an example of traffic signal, the verses of dumb persons, abstract painting etc. When we express our psychological dispositions (like, anger, love), there may not be utterances, though conveying a deep meaning in our life. So, these are the cases having

tātparya, suffers from ‘*uccaritatva*’. If second definition is taken into account,ⁱⁱⁱ these statements will become meaningless. The second definition is suffering from *avyāptidoṣa*. These statements are lack of the feature “*uccaritatva*”, though the desire of a speaker is reflected here. In order to show honor to the desire of speaker, and acceptance of intention of speaker in the context of unuttered statements *tātparya* has been admitted in *NavyaNyāya* school of thought, and the second definition is rejected. And the first definition of *tātparya* is widely accepted. The desire of speaker is *tātparya*, whether it expresses through language or some other expression.

The *NavyaNyāya* admitted four types of sentences through which the desire of the speaker is expressed. These are discussed as follows:

1) Ambiguous sentence: - Let us try to understand the meaning of *tātparyajñāna* in an ambiguous word. If someone utters a sentence ‘*navakambalamānaya*’, it would seem difficult for hearer to realize the exact meaning of the word ‘*navakambalam*’. This word may be used in two different senses, either it express as ‘new blanket’ or “nine number of blanket’. So, in case of successful verbal comprehension, hearer must be aware of the desire of speaker which he has conveyed through the term ‘*navakambalam*’. Which sense of term is to be taken is entirely depends on the circumstances, uttered by the speaker. Another example of ambiguous word has been mentioned above. So, the exact meaning of the term ‘*navakambalam*’ is determined according to a particular context under which the speaker utters the statement.

2) Non-ambiguous sentence: - We use simple words having no dual meaning. This type of statement also has *tātparyajñāna*. For example, if someone says:

'ghaṭamānaya' –i.e., 'bring the jar', the hearer performs an action. Whether a statement is either imperative or portative such as 'don't tell a lie', 'please tell me your name', 'May Heaven help us', 'May God bless you' etc. Apart of epistemic purpose intention of speaker is significant in our social life also. We become very much unable for having successful verbal communication without realizing the desire of the speaker. The desire of speaker is reflected here.

3) Vedic sentence:- As Nyāya philosophy belongs to heterodox system, it regards Veda as eternal and authorless. Vedic injunctions can never be contradicted by any successive/succeeding knowledge. Vedic sentence is valid in itself. If we cite an example of Vedic injunction, such as, "*svorgokāmoyajeta*"- the intention of such Vedic sentence is reflection of desire of God.

4) *Śūkavākya*:- The sentence uttered by a parrot is also taken as another form of knowledge of *Tātparya*. *Śūkavākya* is also containing intention. Some of thinkers seem to claim that God's intention is reflected in *Śūkavākya*. If it is found that a sentence uttered by parrot is *saṁvādī* (contains of truthfulness), we must take an account that God's intention is reflected through bird. Now one may raise question, if sentence as expressed through bird is *visaṁvādī* (contains of falsehood), whose desire would be reflected on that particular case? As we know that. *Nyāya* thinkers admit the concept of God as an auxiliary cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) of the world, so is also regarded as auxiliary cause in case of *Śūkavākya* having truthfulness. Then why should he not be regarded as sufficient cause of *Śūkavākya* which contains falsity? If God is thought as *nimittakāraṇa* of world, He should be remaining same in both of truthfulness or falsity of a cognition. Actually, when parrot uttered a sentence, it does not contain of any

sort of desire. It indicates that in our real life, through a bird, none of an incident is reflected. For example, it can be said that if it is raining outside, the bird can't state the fact by perceiving it's raining. When a bird is trained, he utters a sentence in spite of his habituates. When the sentence as uttered by the parrot is quite similar to factual statement, it would be taken as accidental one. So, the truthfulness or falsity of *Śūkavākya* is a consequent of his trainer, the desire of trainer is reflected here, not God.

So, it may be said that, all knowledge, whether it is Vedic or secular, conveying the desire of a knower. And it is reflected in various forms of knowledge. For having successful communication, the hearer must be aware of the desire of the speaker, either expressed through sentence or some other means.

PART-IV

Concept of *Pakṣatā* in *NavyaNyāya*:

Another instance of epistemic desire is *NavyaNyāya* concept of '*Pakṣatā*' (the property of being a *pakṣa*). *Pakṣatā* is to be understood in the context of *anumāna*, accepted by the *Nyāya* thinkers as a valid source of knowledge among the four *pramāṇas* (perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony). The literal meaning of the term *Pakṣatā* is in which cases inference may be possible. There is disagreement about this. *Siddhi* (confirmation of inferable object) is not regarded as an obstacle in case of perception. But if *Siddhi* is present, *anumiti* is not possible, because the absence of *siddhi* is *Pakṣatā* and

henceforth *Pakṣatā* is not regarded as reason for perception. It is stated here that, though the absence of *siddhi* is *Pakṣatā*, still an qualifier is needed to be added to the *siddhi*, and that adjective is ‘*siṣādhayiṣāviraḥaviśiṣṭatva*’. The term *siṣādhayiṣā* means the desire for inference. *Anumitsā* and *siṣādhayiṣā* are same things. The meaning of the term ‘*viraha*’ is *abhāva* (absence). *Sādhya* must be on *pakṣa* ----such type of certainty is stated as *siddhi*. We have already stated that the absence of *siddhi* is *Pakṣatā*. If *siddhi* is not present but *siṣādhayiṣā* is there, in that case *Pakṣatā* is possible. In other words, it can be stated as if there is the desire for inference, *Pakṣatā* is possible inspite the presence of *siddhi*. If the situation is the *vice versa* i.e. if *siddhi* is there, but there is no *siṣādhayiṣā*, there is no *Pakṣatā*. In *Tarkasaṁgraha* Annambhaṭṭa states that “*Sādhyasiddhiḥ anumitivandhikā*”¹³ i.e., if we have certain knowledge that *Sādhya* is on *pakṣa*, we don’t need any further inference of that *Sādhya* on that *Pakṣa* anymore. If we have certain knowledge of *Sādhya* on *pakṣa* and if there is a strong desire to infer again, then there may be *anumiti* at that *pakṣa*. *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* are of the view that if there is no desire to infer and due to having presence of *siddhi*, the question of *anumiti* doesn’t arise. The term ‘*siddhi*’ refers to what we want to establish. If it is already ascertained, in that case whether we can infer again or not -herein lies the significance of desire or *siṣādhayiṣā*. The product is not originated if there is an obstacle even if the productive material of effect is present. Sometimes it is seen that if a substance is present, the effect is produced even there is an obstacle. In spite of having resistance, the effort is generated in the presence of that substance, the very substance is meant by the word ‘*uttejaka*’ (stimulant). The origination of an effect can’t be confined by the resistant while in the presence of stimulant. In this context *siṣādhayiṣā* should be

taken as 'uttejaka'. Even if there is 'siddhi' (certainty), if the speculator is willing to infer in that case *anumiti* is possible. Desire is important in this case. So our observation is that if there is *siddhi* qualified by *siṣādhayiṣā* (*anumitīcchā*), then it is not a barrier to inference. *Siṣādhayiṣā* is a form of desire.

If there is the lone desire of inferring (*siṣādhayiṣāmātra*), it is not *pakṣatā*, because it has been found that many cases of inferences occur without having desire for them e.g. the existence of cloud is inferred as soon as we hear the roaring without giving any scope of the desire for inference. From this it follows that even the doubt of *Sādhya*, can't give rise to inference, because inference of *sādhya* (cloud in the above-mentioned case) does not depend on the doubt of *sādhya*. From this example it is proved illogical/absurd that *sādhya-samśaya* is considered as *pakṣatā*. When clouds are inferred after hearing the roar of cloud then the doubt of *sādhya* does not exist. So, it would seem clear that absence of *siddhi* (certainty) is the chief characteristic of *pakṣatā*. So, the absence of *siddhi* is not the root cause of *pakṣatā* in all cases. In spite of having certainty, *sādhyanumitīcchā* is often establishing *anumiti*. In "Kārikā" the absence (*viraha*) of the desire to infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*) is conjoined as the qualifier of *siddhi*. In "Sidhānta-muktāvalīpakṣatā", it is stated as the absence of certainty that is accompanied by the absence of the desire to infer.

Viśvanātha shows four fields about *Pakṣatā* in his "Sidhānta-muktāvalī"[14](#). He discusses how the interrelationship of *siddhi* and *siṣādhayiṣā* make *anumiti* possible. These four fields are as follows:

- 1) One is allowed to infer *sādhya*, even though it is already established, because of there is a strong will to infer. Sometimes in case of inference

the presence of an established object acts as an obstacle. We may dissolve that resistance by applying the intensity of desire. 'Desire to infer' is regarded as a stimulant to the inferential knowledge. If there is presence of strong desire, inferential knowledge is made despite the presence or absence of that certain object (*siddhi*).

- 2) *Pakṣatā* lies there where there is no *siddhi* (substantiation of *sādhya*). The existence of desire to infer or absence of it does not matter here.
- 3) If *siddhi* (ascertained object) is there and desire to infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*) is not present, *anumiti* is not possible. So, NavyaNyāya emphasizes on strength of desire. In case of *icchāprajyā-jñāna* it is claimed that will is not determined by necessity. Due to presence of this will, after established an object by applying among any sort of *pramāṇa*, other *pramāṇa* on the same subject may also apply.

In this case, the presence of *siddhi* acts as an obstacle to infer. So this barrier is removed through desire and the implementation of another instrument of knowledge helps to re-establish it.

- 4) If there is a strong desire to infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*), there is *pakṣatā*. Whether *siddhi* remains here or does not remain is out of the question. *Pakṣatā* is not possible there where there is *siddhi* but having no desire to infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*). In the last alternative alone there is the presence of *siddhi* (non- absence- *siddhyābhāva*), which is endowed with the absence of the desire of inference ('*siṣādhayiṣāviraha - viśiṣṭa- siddhiḥ*'). If an object is already established and there is the absence of the desire of inference ('*siṣādhayiṣāviraha - viśiṣṭa- siddhiḥ*'), there is no *pakṣatā*.

An object is bearing the characteristics of *pakṣatā* as shown above is a *pakṣa (tadvānpakṣaḥ)*.

Thus among the four alternatives as mentioned by Viśvanātha in first and third alternatives impotence of desire lies there. '*Siṣādhayīṣāviraha - viśiṣṭa-siddhiḥ*'----- Annambhaṭṭa explains this matter with an example. The absence of the gem (*candrakāntamaṇi*) is considered as cause to fire, similarly '*siṣādhayīṣāvirahaviśiṣṭa- siddhyabhāva*' is regarded as cause to inferential knowledge. Burning occurs when the hand connects with the fire. But if first gem is in front, even if there is a fire, there is no burning. Then the burning capacity of fire is destroyed. So, the *candrakāntamaṇi* is regarded as resistance to fire. When another gem (*sūryakāntamaṇi*) is brought up in the presence of first gem (*candrakāntamaṇi*), then the burning process is not interrupted. Hence, the second gem (*sūryakāntamaṇi*) is treated as stimulant (*uttejaka*). Where the fire is connected to hand, and also there is absence of *candrakāntamaṇi*, whether *sūryakāntamaṇi* is or does not remain there, still there will be cremation. If there is *sūryakāntamaṇi*, it will burn even if there is *candrakāntamaṇi* or not-- it doesn't matter. If both of the gems are present there, it will burn. If *candrakāntamaṇi* only remains there, but *sūryakāntamaṇi* does not remain, then there will be no cremation. In the same manner, *sūryakāntamaṇi* is compared to *siṣādhayīṣā (uttejaka)*, and on the contrary *candrakāntamaṇi* is be taken as *siddhi (prativandhaka)*. Similarly, (*uttejaka*) i.e., the absence of desire to infer, acts as a stimulant (absence of *siddhi*) to cause of *anumiti*.

So, the importance of desire has shown here. Desire acts as a necessary factor in the attainment of inferential knowledge. The same subject can be known

through different way. Only necessity does not control the implementation of desire. Cogniser sometimes have strong will to know the object repeatedly by applying various instrument of knowledge. This sort of cognition, produced out of one's epistemic desire is known as *icchāprayojya-jñāna*. In *NavyaNyāya* school of thought there is a room for such form of cognition.

References:

1. MahāmohapadhyāyaBhīmācāryaJhalkikar (ed), *Nyāyakoṣa*, Bhandarker Oriental Research Institute, Pune, 1928, p.136
2. Raghunath Ghosh: *Knowledge Meaning and Intuition*, New Bharatiya Book Corporation, Delhi, 2000, p 141
3. Ibid, p 143
4. Pandit PhanibhusanTarkavagish (ed), *Nyāyadarśana (Goutamasūtra) Vātsyānabhāṣya*, 1st Part, 1328(Bengali year), Kolkata, p-19-21
5. Ibid, p 304 -306
6. Ibid, p 308
7. Sri Narayan Chandra Goswami, *Tarkasamgrahaḥ*, Sanskrit PustakBhandar,Kolkata, 1413 (Bengali year), p 587-588
8. Gopinath Bhattayacarya, *Tarkasamgraha-Dīpikā on Tarkasamgraha*, Progressive Publisher, Kolkata, p 350-352
9. Dr. Anamika Roy Choudhury, *Vaṣāparicchedaḥ (siddhāntamuktāvalīśahitaḥ)*, Sanskrit PustakBhandar,Kolkata, 2004, p 350-354
10. Gopinath Bhattayacarya, *Tarkasamgraha-Dīpikā on Tarkasamgraha*, Progressive Publisher, Kolkata, p 293-295
11. Panchanan Bhattacharya (ed) , *Bhāṣāparicheda* with *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*,Kārikā no.84, Sanskrit PustakBhandar, Kolkata,1374 (BS), pp.488-468

12. Ibid

13. Sri Narayan Chandra Goswami, *Tarkasamgrahaḥ*, Sanskrit PustakBhandar, Kolkata, 1413 (Bengali year), p 368

14. *Vaṣāparicchedaḥ (siddhāntamuktāvalīśahitaḥ)*, Dr. Anamika Roy Choudhury, Sanskrit PustakBhandar, Kolkata, p 199-204

Chapter-4

Some Critical Evaluative Remarks and NavyaNyāya Defense:

In this work an effort has been made to show how 'will-generated cognition' acts in a philosophical activity. The term 'will-generated cognition' (*'icchā-prayojya-jñāna'*) means 'cognition generated through the desire of an individual which is not determined by any compulsion'. Our will may have some determinants which may act as promoters to do some activities. At the same time it may be admitted that there are certain philosophical activities which are prompted by the will of an individual having no determinants at all. In this case, an individual's will alone is honoured in getting certain cognition, but not other factors. Sometimes an individual has no alternatives than to desire something in a particular situation, which I would like to call as 'situational will', i.e. will having some determinants. In case of pure 'will-generated cognition' (*icchā-prayojya-jñāna*) philosophical activity starts with the 'pure desire' or 'sweet will'. The role of such will has been admitted in Navya Nyāya and other systems of Philosophy. If a family faces some difficulty for maintaining his family, I may have some pious desire to help the family financially or otherwise. This is also a kind of will-generated cognition and action which is due to some moral compulsion in us. If an individual meets a road-accident, it is our moral compulsion to help the helpless person in many ways i.e., taking him to hospital, providing medicines etc. All

these actions are obviously will-generated being prompted by moral compulsion. This type of will-generated action is performed by all the sections of philosophers. But the NavyaNaiyāyikas have some specialties of their own, which needs a great attention of the scholars. Such type of desire-generated cognition is free without any moral compulsion or without any situational compulsion or without any illusory cognition. In this connection the following problems can be raised:

First, though the *āhārya*- type of cognition belongs to the category of wrong cognition (*apramā*), does it not have any positive effect in the field of philosophical enterprise? Though such cognition is purely a product of an individual's will (*icchājanyā*), is it arbitrary or purpose-oriented? If the former, it cannot be philosophically viable. If latter, it cannot be taken as "generated by free will". The concept of *āhārya*-cognition (deliberately imposed cognition) has been admitted in *NavyaNyāya*, which has already been discussed earlier. In order to give honour of an individual's desire certain philosophical activities start. The Navya Nyāya system, which is commonly known as realistic method school, has prescribed some methods in order to arrive at certain truth, which is purely 'deliberate' (*ichhājanya*). Among these *āhārya-jñāna* may serve as a means of knowing something indirectly. A problem may be raised how one can think of 'knowledge produced through desire' (*icchājanyajñāna*). A solution to this problem may be offered in the following way. Let us look towards the exact nature of *āhāryajñāna*. The knowledge, which is conduced out of one's own desire at the time when there is the contrary knowledge, is called *āhāryajñāna(virodha-jñāna-kālīnechhā-prayojya)*.¹In order to justify the position of *NavyaNyāya* we can give another interpretation of such *āhārya* cognition, which is as follows. The word '*āhārya*' means 'artificial', which is found in the

Bhaṭṭikāvya where the ladies are described as *āhārya-śobhārahitairamāyaiḥ* (that is, free from artificial beauty). From this, it follows that the word ‘*anāhārya*’ means ‘natural’ which is expressed by the term ‘*amāyaiḥ*’. The *āhārya* knowledge has to be taken as an artificial knowledge on account of the fact that between two objects an object is *deliberately* thought as otherwise in spite of knowing the distinct character or real nature of these two objects.

Those who are self-realized can alone capture Truth (*satya*) in life, the definition of which is given by Śankara as follows: ‘*Satyamityamāyitā kāyamanovākyeṣu akauṭilyam*’ (*Sankarabhāṣya* on *Kenopaniṣad* Mantra no.4/5) That is, ‘adoption of truthfulness’ means ‘adoption of non-artificiality or naturality’ (*amāyitā*). An individual who is simple or non-crooked in speech, mind and action is called non-artificial or truthful or natural. In fact, a person having one to one correspondence between what he possesses in mental world, what he speaks and what he performs is considered as a truthful one. In the present day society a person is normally found to play hide and seek between the content of thinking and that speaking. An individual normally loves to speak something what he does not think or he prefers to act something what is not thought or spoken by him. It is a kind of hypocrisy which is called crookedness (*vakratā*) in a different way. If someone adopts non-crookedness in speech, mind and action, he is called true to himself, which is otherwise called *anāhārya* situation.. Such person is the locus of Truth which is, again, the abode of *Brahman* (“*tasyāyatanaṁ satyam*”). The term ‘*amāyika*’ means non-artificial or natural or simple. When an artificial means of knowing is adopted, it is called *āhāryajñāna*, which has got an indirect bearing of proving an object. Not only this the crooked type of saying which is called *vakrokti* has got some ornamental value in literature and hence it is taken as a kind of rhetoric or *alamkāra* due to having its suggesting or beautifying factor. The natural

way of speaking is called in literature as *svabhāvokti* as opposed to *vakrokti*. In the like manner, the artificial way of saying in logic has got an indirect bearing due to having its value to prove the otherwise.

Rāmānuja in his philosophy argues that when an individual says something which is true, loving and beneficial to others, acts to protect and relieve others with his body and thinks others welfare, benevolence and compassion through mind with due surrender to Lord, he is described as someone engaged in *bhajans* towards Lord.²It is told that a human being can feel for integrity for the society and social beings if he attains truth or abode of simplicity which is equivalent to the attainment of Brahman.

Another point has to be added in this connection. The term *amāyika* is the negation of *māyikatā* which, again, comes from the word *māyā*. It (*māyā*) has been described as ‘artificial form’. When it is called *māyāvana* (artificial forest), *māyākrandana* (artificial weeping), *māyāmṛga* (artificial deer), it is taken in an artificial sense. Magic is also called *māyā* and hence a magician is called *māyāvī* capable exhibiting artificial or illusory performances. From this it is to be taken that an individual free from artificiality is called *amāyika* or simple. In the level of epistemology there is a sort of artificially designed knowledge called *āhāryajñāna* which is described as will-generated cognition.

In these cases, one’s strong desire of thinking an object as otherwise acts as an instrument (*icchājanya*). It is to be borne in mind that the Navya Naiyāyikas have given much importance to *vivakṣā*(i.e. will to say). Let us cite some cases where the knowledge produced through the instrumentality of desire (*icchājanya*) is found. One is allowed to say ‘*sthālīpacati*’(‘The clay-pot cooks’) with the nominative case ending to the pot instead of the correct expression ‘*sthālyāpacati*’(cooking with clay pot) with the instrumental case ending with the

word *sthālī* if one so desire. Someone may also use locative case-ending with '*sthālī*' i.e., *sthālyāmpacati* (cooking in the clay pot), if he desires so. Though these usages are grammatically incorrect yet the grammarians have given the individual beings to exercise their strong intention which is afterwards justified by adding a *sūtra*- '*Vivakṣāvaśātkārakāṇibhavanti*' (i.e., the usage of the case-endings is said to be taken as liberal depending on the desire of the individual).³ Moreover, there are certain usages in Sanskrit which, though grammatically incorrect, are honoured as usages of the seers or *ārṣa-prayoga*. If a great poet or saintly man uses some grammatically incorrect words to fulfill his strong desire or to fulfill a particular *chanda*, it is permitted in literature. Just as the transformed Vālmīki from Ratnākara spontaneously composed the primordial or maiden *śloka* which goes as follows-'*Māniṣādātvamagamaḥpratiṣṭhāmsāśvatīḥsamāḥ*'. In this part of the *śloka* the actual correct grammatical form is '*tvam̐gamaḥ*' but not '*tvamagamaḥ*' as used by Vālmīki as two grammatical rules, i.e., '*māni lung*' and '*namānyoge*' are not applied here. This incorrectness of the word is ignored by the poetic world by taking the usage as done by the seer-poet (*ārṣa-prayoga*). This freedom of expression is given not only in *NavyaNyāya* but grammatical literature also.

Apart from these there are a few cases where the knowledge attained through the instrumentality of desire (*icchājanya*) as in case of *pakṣatā*, though it is not absolutely necessary for logical point of view. If an individual bears a strong desire to infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*), he can infer in spite of having *siddhi* (*siṣādhayiṣāsattve'numitirbhavatyeva*).⁴ It is permissible as the Naiyāyikas believe in the theory of *pramāṇasaṃplava* (i.e., capable of applying various *pramāṇas*) to ascertain a single object. According to this theory, 'fire' which is perceived can be

inferred if someone possesses such desire. That a cloth is completely different from a jar is completely known from the perception and hence there is not at all any necessity to infer a cloth as distinct from a jar. In spite of this one is found to infer: 'It (i.e., a cloth) is endowed with the mutual absence of a jar, as it has got clothness' (*ghaṭānyonyābhāvavānpraṭatvāt*). All these cases are supportable as an individual desires to do so and hence the role of *icchājanyatva* in the attainment of knowledge cannot be denied. In fact, in our philosophy the desire of an individual being is strictly honored and hence such type of cognition has found an entry in Indian logic. But it should be clearly borne in mind that all *icchājanya-*inferences are not *āhārya*. The *icchājanyajñāna* as found in the case of *rūpaka* and *tarka* are the instances of *āhāryajñāna*. From the above mentioned cases it is proved that desire may act as the instrument of knowledge i.e. which is called *icchājanyajñāna*.

The *Navya Naiyāyikas* are called as *sambandhins* by the contemporary thinkers on account of the fact that they have put maximum importance on the phenomenon of *sambandha* or relation particularly in the field of philosophical discussions. To Dharmakīrti, a Buddhist logician, does not admit relation as a category of real on account of the fact that it is nothing but mental ascription (*kalpanā*) which has got a secondary status as a *pramāṇa*. To him any type of mental product has nothing to do with reality and language is nothing but something expressed through it. This entity is nothing but the product of mind or mental ascription. But the *Navya Naiyāyikas* do not believe in such type of dichotomy- real world and mental world. Whatever exists can be expressed through language and hence mental ascription does not have any secondary status as envisaged by the Buddhists. Any philosophical analysis is linguistic and

hence to establish something with the help of language is to adopt certain relation. Many contradictions involved in linguistic usage can be resolved if some relation is kept in view. Any determinate expression (*savikalpakajñāna*) is called 'relational' as it involves a relation. Without relation no language can express an object, because in linguistic usage there is an expressed-expresser-relationship (*vācya-vācaka-sambandha*). If a relation is taken into account, one might say the apparent contradictory statements like- 'I exist in this room and simultaneously I do not exist in the same room'. It is a clear case of contradiction, which can easily be removed by taking a relation in one case and another relation in other case. It can be interpreted in the following way. One can exist in a particular room if his existence is taken through the relation of contact or *saṁyoga* while one can say that he does not exist in the same room if his non-existence is taken through the relation of *samavāya*. An individual may remain in a locus i.e., room as there is a relation of contact between him and the room. The existence may come to an end at any time due to the temporality of such relation. But inherence or *samavāya* is an inseparable relation (*ayutasiddhasambandha*) having some permanent character and hence an individual cannot stay in a room permanently which suggests his non-existence there in view of such particular relation. The NavyaNaiyāyikas have admitted the existence and absence of existence of the contact of monkey (*kapisam̐yoga*) in the same tree through insertion of another relation called *avachhedakatā* (being limited by some limiter). The monkey-contact (*kapisam̐yoga*) remains in the tree in so far as the base of the tree is concerned (*mūlāvachhedena*). At the same time the monkey-contact (*kapisam̐yoga*) does not exist in the same tree in so far as the branches of the tree (*śākhāvachhedena*) is concerned.⁵In the same way it can be said that an individual

exists in a room so far as the eastern side of the room is concerned (*pūrvadiśāvachhinna*) while he does not exist in the same room if the space is limited by the northern side of the room is concerned (*uttaradiśāvachhinna*). Our cognition needs such relation as operator to understand the proper meaning of certain expressions. To the *Navya Naiyāyikas* any standpoint of understanding can be taken as separate relation and hence the relation cannot be *seen* but *realized* through our independent intellect and desire, which can discover the relation.

Our day-to-day behavior through verbal communication depends on the determinate cognition (*savikalpakajñāna*) of an object which reveals a structure of qualified-qualifier-type. Knowledge is of two types: relational and non-relational. In Western Logic the relational cognition is expressed as 'aRb', which signifies relation combining two relata. In this context 'R' stands for 'Relation', 'a' stands for relatum1 and 'b' stands for relatum2. Relatum1 is called qualificand and relatum2 for qualifier. When the qualifier, the qualificand and their relation is not apprehended (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sambandhānavagāhī*), it is called cognition of non-relational type (*nirvikalpaka*). In the relational knowledge the qualificand, qualifier and their relation are properly grasped as contents (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sambandhāvagāhī*).⁶ It is otherwise called *savikalpaka* or determinate one, as it is revealed through the combining factor or relation. *Nirvikalpaka* is the cognition of the existence of a thing in its true form while *savikalpaka* is the real cognition of its characteristic factor. The existence of determinate knowledge (*savikalpakajñāna*) is inferred with the help of syllogistic argument in the form: 'A piece of relational cognition apprehends the relation between qualifier and qualificand, as it is a case of relational knowledge, just as we find a relational

cognition in the case – ‘a man possessing a stick’ (*viśiṣṭa-buddhiḥviśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sambandha-viśayāviśiṣṭabuddhitvātdaṇḍīpuruṣaitiviśiṣṭabuddhivat*).⁷ Just as in order to know the meaning of the sentence- ‘*daṇḍīpuruṣaḥ*’ (a man possessing a stick) the meaning of *daṇḍa* or stick) is to be understood in the initial level, the cognition of relational nature depends on the relation between qualificand (*viśeṣya*) and qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). Hence such comprehensive cognition is not possible without the insertion of relation. In other words, unless relation is admitted as a category of real, a cognition cannot be verbally communicated in *lokavyavahāra* (day-day-usage), because this relation (*saṃsarga*) abides in two-*viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa*as known from the preliminary definition of it- ‘*dviṣṭhaḥsambandhaḥ*’. Each and every determinate knowledge is manifested to us as such through the medium of relation or *saṃsarga* (*saṃsargamaryādāyābhāsate*). The NavyaNaiyāyikas believe in the theory of *saṃsargamaryādāvāda* i.e., a theory where two or three relata are conjoined with the help of relation and manifested.

There is another way to understand the *savikalpaka* or determinate cognition. When the content of knowledge can be made distinct from other objects, this knowledge is called *savikalpaka* or determinate. When a jar, for example, is in contact with the eye, the knowledge of it can be called a determinate one if and only if it can be distinguished from other objects like cloth, chair, table etc. Otherwise, it would be regarded as an indeterminate one. An object possessing three characteristics like qualificand, qualifier and their relation, it cannot be known as differentiated from others due to having some apprehensive features. Such type of knowledge is not possible if one is not aware of the possession of an entity with the universal (*sāmānya*) existing in all the

members belonging to the particular class. An individual becomes aware of the entity called 'jar' which is different from 'pot' etc. with the help of relation That which cannot be expressed verbally is called indeterminate, the existence of which is inferred with the help of some sign or *hetu*. Hence, the determinate knowledge capable of being verbally expressed is relational as it apprehends the relation between at least two relata.

In so far as a clear knowledge of this world is concerned, it really exists according to the principle *-jñānādhīnāvastusattā* (i.e., the existence of an object depends on its knowledge). If there is knowledge, there must have been some content, because knowledge presupposes 'knowledge of something'. That is to say, the existence of an object depends on its cognition which has got again some content.

The *AdvaitaVedānta* system of philosophy admits two-tier knowledge- having some content (*saviṣayaka*) and having no content (*aviṣayaka* or *nirviṣayaka*). The former refers to the 'knowledge of something' which is found in our empirical world (*vyavahārika*-level) while the latter refers to Pure Knowledge having no content (*aviṣayaka*) which is nothing but Brahman available in the transcendental level called *pāramārthikasattā*. In this connection it may be mentioned that Brahman is not the content of knowledge, but knowledge itself. It is accepted that there is a knowledge which is not actually knowledge of ...', it is to be taken as Pure Knowledge which is no other than the essence of Brahman itself as per the Śruti. '*SatyamJñānāmanantam Brahma*' (i.e. Brahman is Truth, Knowledge and Infinite). To distinguish such knowledge (*aviṣayaka-jñāna*) from the ordinary one (*saviṣayaka*) DharmarājaAdhvarīndra has incorporated the term

‘*arthaviṣayakamjñānam* (i. e. the knowledge having some object as its content). In the definition of valid cognition which runs as follows : *pramātvamanadhigatāvādhitārthaviṣayakajñānatvam*⁸ i.e. valid cognition is a cognition having some object as its content which is not contradicted by the latter cognition and unacquired, Dharmaraja Adhvarīndra has incorporated the term *arthaviṣayaka* as the adjunct of cognition in order to show that he is dealing with the definition of *pramā* (valid cognition) in phenomenal and epistemic level, but not knowledge in the transcendental level where there is substantially no knowledge of something (*saviṣayaka*). This is very much consistent to the Advaitins as they believe in a kind of cognition having no content (*aviṣayaka*). As the phenomenal world is known to us, it has become the content (*viṣaya*) of our knowledge. When a jar is known, the jar forms the content of our knowledge. For this reason, a jar is really understood as the object of knowledge and also is known as distinct from non-jar. How is it considered to be distinct? There are some properties which exclusively exist in a jar, but not in other objects. This property is ‘jarness’ existing in an individual jar. If there is any distinct knowledge whose object is capable of being expressed, its content is said to have characterized by a property (*dharma*) and this property distinguishes the object (*dharmin*) from the rest. That is why; the property or *dharma* is called a distinguisher (*bhedaka*) which is otherwise called ‘differential element’ (*itaravyāvarttaka*) from other objects, which is substantiated through the definition- ‘*bhedakamviśeṣaṇam. Bhedamtuitaravyāvarttakam*’. In this way the NavyaNaiyāyikas have pointed out that each and every object which is known must abide in the relation between *dharma* and *dharmin* (*dharmadharmibhāvaḥ*).

Since relation binds one with another, the basic characteristic of relation is that which rests on two entities (*dviṣṭhaḥsambandhaḥ*). When one hand is connected with another, the relation called contact (*saṁyoga*) rests on both the hands. If blue colour is found in a cloth, the relation called inherence (*samavāya*) remains in both blue colour and cloth as told earlier.

Relation (*sambandha*) is a kind of conjoining factor (*sannikarṣa*) which serves the purpose of determining the property of being qualificand and qualifier between two objects completely different from each other (*sambandhaḥsannikarṣaḥsa ca vibhinnayarvastunorviśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāvapravyayaḥ*).⁹ In this case *sambandha* or relation is the main factor through which two isolated things are related in the form of qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and qualificand(*viśeṣya*). Had there been no relation, such description would not have been possible at all.

Some of the philosophers belonging to *NavyaNyāya* school are of the opinion that *sambandha* is a special means of knowing a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭa-pratītiḥ*) or the determinant of a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭadhīḥ*). Something through which a qualified cognition is conceived of as content is called a relation (*viśiṣṭadhī-niyāmakasyaivatathātvāt*). In other words, a relation is that which possess the capability of providing or generating a qualified cognition. In fact, relation only has got capacity of generating *viśiṣṭapratyaya* which is the only function of it. The term *viśiṣṭapratyaya* means the knowledge of a set of objects which are qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) qualificand (*viśeṣya*) and their relation (*sambandha* or *saṁsarga*).

The above-mentioned definition of *sambandha* is reformulated by Jagadīśa in a very precise manner. The definition runs as follows: *Viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇatvānya-viśiṣṭa-dhī-viśayatvam*.¹⁰ That is, *sambandha* contains contentness (*viśayatā*) qualified by the difference of qualificandness (*viśeṣyānyatva*) and qualificierness (*viśeṣaṇānyatva*) of a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭadhī*). The contentness or *viśayatā* of three types: *viśayatā* remaining in qualificandness (*viśeṣyatā-niṣṭha-viśayatā*), *viśayatā* remaining in qualificierness (*viśeṣaṇatā-niṣṭha-viśayatā*). The *viśayatā* existing in *sambandha* which is different from the *viśayatā* existing in *viśeṣyatā* and *viśeṣaṇatā* is called *sambandha* or *saṁsarga*. In this context relation is defined in terms of *viśayatā* with the help of the method of residue (*pariśeṣa*). Something which comes to our awareness must have some contentness (*viśayatā*) which may be either of the three already mentioned. *Sambandha* is also capable of being understood and it must have some *viśayatā* which is different from *viśeṣaṇatā* and *viśeṣyatā*. Each and every piece of knowledge is endowed with the property called *viśayatā* or contentness. The *viśayatā* existing other than these two must exist in *sambandha* or *saṁsarga*. In the piece of the relational knowledge (*viśiṣṭadhīḥ*) in the form: ‘*gandhavatīpṛthivī*’ (i.e., the earth is full of smell) there are three things that have become the content of knowledge viz. *pṛthivī* or earth as *viśeṣya*, *gandha* or smell as *viśeṣaṇa* and the relation in the form of *samavāya*(inherence) existing between them. Among these three *viśeṣyatā* existing in earth (*pṛthivī-niṣṭha-viśayatā*) is in the form of *viśeṣyatā*, the contentness existing in smell (*gandha-niṣṭha-viśayatā*) is in the form of *viśeṣaṇatā*. The contentness existing in inherence (*samavāya-niṣṭha-viśayatā*). Here in lies the *sambandha*. What relation is to be admitted in a

particular case depends on the desire of an individual. Relation is the criterion through our intention is expressed, which can be explained in the following way.

Relation is perceived with the help of sense-organs in some cases and in some it is beyond the reach of the sense-perception (*atīndriyasambandha*). If the relation is taken in the sense of determinator (*niyāmaka*) of the qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭa-dhī-niyāmaka*) but not in the sense of *janakatā* (generating factor), it cannot cover the second category of relation i.e., *atīndriyasambandha* (super-sensual relation) leading to the defect of under-coverage (*avyāpti*), which is not at desirable. Apart from this, the term cause cannot provide us with the accurate meaning leading to the state of ambiguity. The cause may sometimes mean a cause connected with the generation of result (*phalopodhāyaka*) or sometimes it means something having essential potentiality of being a cause (*svarūpayogya*). The said problem may be avoided if the determining factor of qualificative cognition (*viśiṣṭadhīniyāmaka*) is taken in the same sense of being the object of cognition. Gadadhara's suggestion may be explained in the following manner- "x is a relation of y if x is the object of the cognition of something z as qualified by y and at the same time x is not z. (Literally, relation hood with respect to y is that contentness of a cognition which is conditioned by the qualierness in y and at the same time is different from the qualificandness of that cognition).¹¹

Gadādhara finally has arrived at the decision by pointing out a new definition, according to which relation is defined in terms of two key terms- adjunct (*pratiyogī*) or subjunct (*anuyogī*). The relationship with a jar is a specific property of having a ground as its subjunct. A particular type of absenteness

existing in an absence of an absence is a property of being a particular relation. In the same way, a particular type of subjunctness (*anuyogitāviśeṣa*) of a subjunct is a property of being a particular relation.

Western thinkers have divided relation into (a) monadic, dyadic, triadic etc. (b) into symmetrical, asymmetrical etc. This has been done by them for the schematizations of the mathematical logic. Indian thinkers are not directly interested in formal logic. The outlook of them is confined to empiricist and positivistic world as far as possible. Hence regarding monadic relations like 'A is identical with itself', the Indian philosophers reformulate the statement as 'A has its identity' or simply as 'A's identity'. Had there been really any difference, it would have been nothing but verbal. The linguistic usage puts forth an object as different though it is actually not. Language can create many things through its expression like relation etc.

Relation, according to the West, may be dyadic, triadic etc. in accordance with the terms they contain. The dyadic relation is that which exists between two really 'different' objects but not the same object ascribing as two as in the case of identity. When one object simultaneously comes in contact with two or more substances, the contact is called triadic one. Regarding this triadic relation or relation occurring in three or more terms the Naiyāyikas prefer to reduce them to the dyadic relation of known type to honor the definition- '*dviṣṭhaḥsambandhaḥ*' (i.e., that abiding in two is relation). When A comes in contact with C through B simultaneously, the Western logicians accept a triadic relation there. But the Indians interpret this case as follows. A and B simultaneously and directly connected with C, or A simultaneously with B or C.

The *NavyaNaiyāyikas* will explain the former case in the following way. A and B are the adjuncts of the relation (*saṃsargapratiyogī*) and C is the subjunct (*anuyogī*). In the latter case A is the subjunct (*anuyogī*) and B and C are the adjuncts. Otherwise, there would be no end of such complications like multiterm relations. What would be adjunct or subjunct would be determined by an agent through his own will.

Let us consider the following triadic relation – *saṃyogajasam̐yoga* to explain the above statement. When it is seen that our body is in connection with a pen which is again connected with a table, there is a triadic relation called *saṃyogajasam̐yoga* (the contact generated through contact). The first contact (*saṃyoga*) remaining in between body and a pen gives rise to another contact existing between the pen and the table. All these triadic relations are called by the *NavyaNaiyāyikas* as *paramparāsambandha* i.e., indirect relation.¹²

Moreover, it is relation which gives us precise and accurate cognition. When it is said – ‘The Mountain possesses fire’ (*parvatovahnimān*), the existence of fire in the mountain is known through the relation of contact (*saṃyoga*). From this, it follows that through the relation called inherence (*samavāya*) the fire cannot remain on the mountain. It is the relation through which an object is apprehended as existing or as non-existing in certain locus.

Considering relation as a mental product or will-generated Professor B.K. Matilal has taken every relation as direction. He observes: “As a general rule, every relation can be said to have a ‘direction’ such that it may be taken as pointing from one relation to the other, but when we express a relation simply as a relation between x and y, we do not specify whether it is (a) a relation of x and y

or (b) a relation of y to x. It is evident that the relation involved in (a) is not in general the same as that involved in (b). Hence to express a relation adequately. It is necessary to specify its so-called 'direction'. For that purpose, Nyaya draws a distinction between the two relata, so that whatever specific descriptions of the two relata are given, one can easily identify the relation concerned. In other words, to give the condition for the identification of a relation, we should not only mention the two relata but also indicate the 'way' in which they are related. To do so the Naiyāyikas follow this procedure. If a relation is described as the relation of x to y 'the relatum x is called the *pratiyogin* (adjunct) and the relatum y is called the *anuyogin* (subjunct) of the relation in question. In ordinary, Sanskrit, the genitive case-ending (*ṣaṣṭhī*) usually marks off the adjunct and the locative case-ending (*adhikaraṇa*) the subjunct."¹³

Though relation exists in two relata as found in the contact between vessel and jujube, an object remains in another object through another relation. Through the relation of contact (*saṁyoga*) the jujube fruit remains in the locus i.e., vessel, but not the *vice-versa*, i.e., the locus i.e., vessel does not remain in jujube fruit. In the same way, it can be said that a jar remains on the ground, but not ground on the jar. There are two objects in a relation – adjunct or *pratiyogī* and subjunct or *anuyogī*. An object taken as a *pratiyogī* through certain relation may remain in its locus through the same relation. In the present case of contact between vessel and jujube fruit, jujube fruit remains in a vessel as the former is *pratiyogī* and the latter is *anuyogī*. In a relation between attribute (*dharma*) and the possessor of the same (*dharmī*) is *anuyogī*. Hence, the attribute remains in the possessor of the same, but not the *vice-versa*. Relation is to be invented among the things existing in this world. Without accepting this no *savikalpaka*

knowledge is possible and hence it occupies an important place in verbal understanding and day to day behaviour.

The Naiyāyikas admit that more than one *pramāṇa* can be applied to know a single object, which is called the theory of *pramāṇasamplava*. The nature of an object is not a factor for applying *pramāṇa*. As for example, 'fire' can be known through perception, inference or verbal testimony. But so far as the Buddhist view is concerned, a particular nature of an object determines the particular means of knowing (*pramāṇa*) through which alone it is revealed. An object having a unique characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) is revealed by perception alone. A *svalakṣaṇa* –entity cannot be revealed by inference and in the same way the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*-entity can be known by inference alone, but not capable of being known by perception. This metaphysical presupposition leads them to admit the system of *pramāṇavyavasthā*. On the basis of the above-mentioned arguments, we may come to the conclusion that Indian Epistemology is always vitiated by will-generated cognition.¹⁴

Pakṣatā (the property of being a *pakṣa*) is the absence of *siddhi* (confirmation of the inferable object), which is endowed with the absence of the desire of inferring (*siṣādhayiṣāvirahaviśiṣtasiddhyabhāva*).¹⁵ In this case the term '*siṣādhayiṣā*' means the desire of inference. Viśvanātha has shown different cases where *pakṣatā* is possible. If there is a lone desire or inferring (*siṣādhyaṣāmātra*), it is not *pakṣatā*, because it has been found that many cases of inferences occur without having desire of them e.g. the existence of cloud is inferred as soon as we here the roaring without giving any scope of the desire for inference. From this it follows that even the doubt of *sādhya*, cannot give rise to

inference, because inference of *sādhya* (cloud in the above mentioned case) does not depend on the doubt of *sādhya*. Secondly, one is allowed to infer the *sādhya*, even though it is already established (*siddhi*), provided the inferrer possesses a strong desire to do so (*siṣādhayiṣā*). Thirdly, *pakṣatā* lies there where there is no *siddhi* (substantiation of *sādhya*). The existence of desire to infer or absence of it does not matter here. Fourthly, if there is a strong desire of infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*), there is *pakṣata*. Whether *siddhi* remains or does not remain is out of the question. *Pakṣatā* is not possible there where there is *siddhi* but no desire to infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*). In the last alternative alone there is the presence of *siddhi* (not absence- *siddhyabhāva*), which is endowed with the absence of the desire of inference (*siṣādhayiṣāviraha - viśiṣṭa –siddhiḥ*). If an object is already established and there is the absence of the desire of inference (*siṣādhayiṣāviraha - viśiṣṭa –siddhiḥ*), there is no *pakṣatā*. An object bearing the characteristics of *pakṣatā* as shown above is a *pakṣa* (*tadvān pakṣaḥ*).

Tarka is a kind of hypothetical argument. Both the parts of *Tarka* are full of imaginary thought. If smoke were endowed with doubt of deviation of fire, it would not be caused by fire. If the first part is true, the second part would also be true. But it is known through experience that the second part is not true in so far as we do not get any smoke, which is not caused by fire. From the falsity of the second half, (i.e. smoke is deviated from fire) is determined. In our everyday life also we remove doubt in respect of something after following this method of argumentation. From the knowledge of consequence the idea of an antecedent is revealed. *Tarka*, being a kind of mental construction, is useful for removing doubt and hence *Tarka*, though invalid (in the sense of not being a source of valid cognition) is the promoter of the *Pramāṇas*. This *Tarka* is otherwise known as

Āpatti i.e. the introduction of the undesired through which the desire is established. It is also a kind of indirect method through which the truth is ascertained. If the negation of P is proved as absurd, it would automatically follow that P is true. For these various reasons much importance has laid on this method in *Navya Nyāya*.¹⁶

Secondly, the 'deliberately imposed cognition' (*icchājanya-jñāna*) is also available in the case of metaphor in the sense of *rūpaka* e.g., moon-face (*mukha-candra*), man-lion (*puruṣa-simha*) etc.¹⁷ What are the points of difference between pure *āhārya*-cognition and *āhāryatva* remaining in metaphors? Though there are will –generated factors in both types of expression, is there any difference? In response to this, the *NavyaNaiyāyikas* might say that pure *āhārya*-cognition is wider than that existing in the metaphor or *rūpaka*. The former is admitted in many cases or may be in all cases. If somebody wrongly says that this is a piece of jar, one can refute this with the help of *āhārya*-cognition which is the following type. Had it been a pot, it would be able to fetch water etc. As the object concerned is not able to do such work, it would not be taken as a pot. If it is asked why a jar is not identical with a cloth, the answer would be as follows. Had a jar been identical with a cloth, the purpose of a cloth would have been served by a jar. As such thing is an absurd one, a jar is not identical with a cloth. In this way, the *NavyaNaiyāyikas* can prove that each and every entity is different from the other by applying such type of *āhārya*-cognition. In this way, one may say what is normally impossible. By showing the impossibility of such incident it indirectly hints the possibility of the opposite. If it is said, for example, that had a human being a bird, he would have gone from one city to another by flying, it shows directly the impossibility of the matter. It indirectly gives us a message that

the opposite standpoint i.e., human being cannot be a bird leading to another to the impossibility of flying from one place to another is to be taken as true. There are so many ways or methods in Indian Philosophy to refute the views of the opponents. The application of *āhārya*-cognition is most honorable way to refute the opponents. Normally the proponents are found to pass judgment about the opponents' view with the phrases like '*tanmandam*' (i.e., the opponent's view is not up to the mark), '*tacchuchham*' (i.e., the opponent's view is not having any worth), '*tadayuktam*' (i.e., the opponent's view is improper), '*maivam*' (i.e., the opponent's view is not so as narrated), '*namantavyam*' (the view is not to be commented as such) etc. Though all the comments are with regard to the opponent's view yet there is a subtle distinction among the terms '*manda*', '*tuchha*', and '*ayukta* *namantavya*' etc. The term '*manda*' only indicates a sort of sympathy to the view while the remaining words lack the same. The later does not only have sympathy to the opponent, but it indicates the out and out rejection of the view. Hence the view of KD can be taken as partially correct in the sense that sometimes sympathy is shown to the opponent and sometimes rigidity. The attitude of sympathy is evidenced from quoting even the opponent's view if any argument comes in favour of the proponent. As for example, Sāṃkhya has referred to the opponent's view i.e., the Cārvāka's view while substantiating his view of regarding the origination of the world called *Pradhāna-kāraṇatā-vāda* as endorsed by Śankara in his *bhāṣya*. Sāṃkhya argues that if body is perceived, the inclination etc is also perceived. If body is not seen, the inclination etc. is not seen. From this it is proved that inclination is possible in the unconscious body, which has been endorsed by the Cārvākas also.²³The application of *āhārya*-cognition is most honourable way to show regards to the opponent. Initially it is

taken for granted the opponent's view and afterwards it is refuted by way of showing its absurdity and contraction. This is, I think, most honourable way of refuting the opponents.

In case of metaphor or *rūpaka* there is an *āhārya*-cognition which can only be applied in case of comparison of something with something else, but not in other cases as shown above. In the case of *mukha-candra* (moon-like face) there is an imposition of face on the moon though it is completely known to him that face can never a moon. Though there are so many dissimilarities between face and the moon due to having black spots and round-shaped size in the moon yet there is at least one point of similarity which is glamour or *lāvaṇya* which exists both in the moon and face. Such type of *āhārya*-cognition or superimposed cognition is less wide in the sense that it can be used only in the case of metaphor where there is partial similarity between the object in the form of metaphor (*upamāna*) and the object metaphorized (*upameya*). For this reason, it is admitted by the *NavyaNaiyāyikas* that though the object metaphorized (*upameya*) is different from the metaphorical object yet there is a similarity between them ('*Tadbhinnatve sati tadgatobhūyodharmavattvam*'). That is why, the *āhārya*-cognition remaining in metaphor can also be given a great importance.

Thirdly, one could raise a question whether the application of the collocation of *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇa-saṃplava*) is mere a redundant process? If an object is known through one means of knowing, is it not true that the application of other means to know the same is the adoption of *gaurava* which is taken to be a defect? Is there any argument against *pramāṇa-vyavasthā*? In response to the

problem, it may be said that it is true that to know an object with the help of more than one means of knowing (*pramāṇa-s*) leads to the defect called *gaurava* or logical cumbrousness. If something is known through one *pramāṇa*, what is the reason of applying more than one? The theory of *pramāṇa-samplava* (conglomeration of sources of knowing) is admitted by the *Naiyāyikas* to prove that our specific knowledge may come from more than one sources. Though there is no necessity to apply more than one source to know an object yet it is allowed by the *Naiyāyikas* if someone *desires* so or if someone has got over confirmation of the existence of an object. If an individual is strongly desirous to infer which is technically *siṣadhayiṣā* (will to infer), he can do so and hence *siddhi* or establishment of an object is not at all taken as a bar. Even after inference he is not satisfied with the cognition, he may take help of a reliable source or *āptavacana* to be over confirmed about the object of knowing. There is another justification for the same. To the Buddhists the nature of objects is of two types- uniquely particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and universally particular (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). If the former is taken into account, it is momentary (*kṣaṇika*) and causally efficacious (*arthakriyākārī*). Hence there is only one way to grasp it, i.e., perception. For, the Buddhists perceptual cognition lies in that which is free from mental ascription (*kalpanāpoḍha*) and non-erroneous (*abhrānta*). The definition goes- '*Tatralpanāpoḍhamabhrāntampratyakṣam*'. If this definition is taken for granted, the *svalakṣaṇa* character of an object which is momentary is to be grasped by perception alone giving no scope of other *pramāṇa-s*. It is the nature of an object which determines the applicability of a *pramāṇa*. A cognition conjoined with mental ascription and non-momentary known as *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* can be known only through inference due to not having any scope of

perception.¹⁸ To them non-conceptual object is known through perception alone while conceptual entity is grasped through inference as determined by the nature of an object. That is why; the Buddhists believe in the applicability of a single *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇa-vyavasthā*) to know a particular object. To *Nyāya* *pramāṇa* is not determined by the nature of object. The existence of fire in the mountain can be known through inference, verbal testimony and perception to become over sure about the object. Though there might be the probability of *gaurava* yet it is not to be taken as a vicious one, but virtuous called *phala-mukha-gaurava* (i.e., cumbrousness leading to the attainment of good result). Satisfaction or fulfillment of desire is provided to the knower, which is very much essential in the epistemology of the *Naiyāyikas* as well as *NavyaNaiyāyikas*.

Fourthly, what are the points of difference between the autonomy of will as adopted by the grammarians and that adopted by the *Navya Naiyāyikas*? It is well said by the grammarians that one can use any *kāraka* to honour his own personal sweet will (*vivakṣāvaśāt-kārakāṇi bhavanti*). Can such 'sweetwill' persist in the theories of *NavyaNyāya*? In reply, it can be said that the grammarians have admitted the sweet will or *vivakṣā* of an individual in so far as the grammatical constructions are concerned. Grammar has formulated some rules for making a word or sentence grammatically well-formed. These rules are mostly compulsory to all for making linguistic structure but the grammarians have made certain exceptions for the poets, saints, seers and strong desire-holders to do something which is deviated from the rules of grammar. For showing honour to the seers or seer like poets grammarians grant them to exercise their will to put language in a different manner as the cases shown earlier. This is due to maintenance of *chanda* and sentence or word of a *mantra*. Sri Aurobindo was asked a question by

his disciple why he has used same line twice in the epic *Sāvitrī*. His answer was very much natural and fantastic. He said that he has not chosen the term intentionally, but the truth revealed to him in that language. In these cases, the seers desire is also guided by Divinity as told in the *Kenopaniṣad*- ‘*yad vācānabhyuditamīyena vāgabhyudyate*’ i.e., that which is not disclosed by language but language is disclosed by him). Considering these aspects Pāṇini has admitted some usages as *ārṣaprayoga* where deliberately done grammatical mistakes are justified. In *NavyaNyāya* the liberty of an individual is given in so far as his will is concerned. This liberty is theoretical, expressional or will-generated but not grammatical. They do not want to distort grammatical rules but express a theory as per desire of their own. Hence liberty promoted by both the schools is the same.

Fifthly, the intention of a speaker (*tātparya*) is admitted by the Navya Naiyāyikas as one of the conditions of verbal apprehension (*śābdabodha*). The word ‘*tātparyā*’ is defined as ‘*vakturicchā*’ i.e., ‘intention of the speaker’ which is almost similar to the notion of *vivakṣā* defined by the grammarians as ‘*vaktum icchā*’ (‘will to say’). Is the concept of *vivakṣā* identical with that of *tātparyā*? Can any word be intended as having any meaning? Is there any role of relation (*sambandha*) and limiter (*avacchedaka*) in expressing our sweet will? In response to the above problem, the *NavyaNaiyāyikas* might say that, though *vivakṣā* or *tātparya* is same to some extent. Grammarians admit *vivakṣā* in formation of certain grammatical words and meanings. If the speaker has got desire to express something which is not allowed by grammatical rules, it is called *vivakṣā* just as in the cases of application of *kāraka*-s and some specific rules like *nipātanēsiddha* etc. But so far as *tātparya* is concerned, it is also the desire of the speaker not

only applicable to the above-mentioned *kāraka* etc. but also in ambiguous sentences like *saidhamānaya* etc. That is, in this context the term ‘*saindhava*’ may mean both ‘salt’ and ‘horse’. The intention of the speaker is not clear to us and hence the intention of the speaker is to be taken into account after considering the context (*prakaraṇa*). Such ambiguity may remain in other Vedic and non-Vedic usages. The grammarians’ intention is to see the necessity of a term for the completion of *chanda* which is called *pādapūraṇa*. For the sake of *chanda* and *alamkāra* some concession of the will of the speaker is granted. Such will is *vivakṣā* but the intention of the speaker to disambiguate a statement or to express the inner significance of a statement is called *tātparya*. In other words, a particular *Mahāvākya* like *Tattvamasī* etc. is uttered by the seer to intend for certain implicative meaning like the similarity between ‘*Brahman*’ (*Tat*) and ‘an individual’ (*tvam*) in so far as their essential identity (*svarūpa-tādātmya*), but not an absolute one, is concerned. In this context all the Vedic statements are having special intention of the seer which is called *tātparya*. The same *tātparya* has to be admitted in the case *lakṣaṇā* or implicative meaning as found in the usage-‘*gangāyāmghoṣaḥ*’ etc. In both the cases the root is will-generated cognition. In such cases certain terms or sentences are uttered to intend some special thing and hence *tātparya* is called *tatpratīchhayāuccaritatvam* (i.e., to utter something after keeping an intention to refer something).

Sixthly, a problem may be raised by the opponents if any kind of will-generated cognition is allowed in NavyaNyāya or not. So far, we have seen that will-generated cognitions are admitted only if they are efficacious to uphold the truth. In case of *Tarka* it shown that such will-generated cognition is very much essential to prove indirectly the truth with help of absurdity and contradiction.

When someone is comparing the face of the heroine with moon, it is the product of great desire of the poet. A poet's will is such that he has full freedom to exercise it. The term *mukhacandra* may be used to fulfill his multifarious desires. One meaning may be assigned to the above-mentioned term as per the particular desire of the poet. It may mean the face and moon are considered to be absolutely identical (*rūpaka*), the same term may also mean that the face is like the moon (*mukhaṁcandraiva*) where we find *upamā*, again the term signifies that the face is as if moon which is *utprekṣā*, sometimes it is thought that the face is so beautiful that hundreds of autumnal moon are lying in her feet (e.g., *ke bale śāradaśaśī se mukhertulā/padanakhe pareāchetārkatagulā//*) i.e., who is telling that the autumnal moon is comparable to her face? Hundreds of such moons are lying on her feet, which indicate the superiority of the object metaphorized (*upameya*) and hence it may be an instance of *vyatireka*. The single term *mukhacandra* may be interpreted in various ways considering the desire of a poet. For the poets or literary beautification such will-generated cognition is permissible. But if some one's will is whimsical or having no intention to prove indirectly the truth or other purposes as shown above, it may not be taken for granted. Will-generated cognition which is a healthy one constitutes a good part of philosophy while will which is unhealthy having no efficacy for in philosophical methodology is not to be considered for philosophical exercise.

Lastly, some of relations admitted by the *NavyaNaiyāyikas* are related to the indicator dependent on the desire of an individual. In the case of *nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāva* relation it is the desire of an individual which indicates what would be determinator (*nirūpaka*) and determined (*nirūpya*) between two relata. A problem may be raised of the following type. Between son and father there is

the above-mentioned relation but it is not understood by us what the determinator (*nirūpaka*) and the determined (*nirūpya*) is. It depends on the intention of the speaker leading to no fixed rule in this matter. If an individual thinks the son is the determinator (*nirūpaka*) of the father which is determined (*nirūpya*), it is taken for granted. If the case is otherwise, i.e., father and son are taken as determinator and determined respectively, it is equally acceptable. Such is the case between teacher (*śikṣaka*) and student (*chātra*), preceptor (*guru*) and disciple (*śiṣya*) etc.

References:

1. *Nyayakosa*, ed by Mahamahopadhyaya Bhimacarya Jhalkikar, Bhandergar Oriental Research Institute, 1928, p.136.
2. Sāyana Mādhava: *Sarvadarśanasamgraha, Purnaprajñadarśana*, Satyajyoti Chakraborty (Trs) (1383 BS):, Sahityasri, Kolkata p.43.
3. *A Higher Sanskrit grammar and composition*, by Dr. Lahiri & Sastri, Calcutta, 179, 1971.
728 'Vivakṣāvaśātkārahāṇibhavanti', *A Higher Sanskrit grammar and composition*, by Lahiri and 729 Sastri, 137, 1971.
4. *Bhāṣāparichheda* with *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on Kārikā no.70.
5. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on *Bhāṣāparichheda*, Kārikā No.69.
6. *Dīpikā* on *Tarkasamgraha*, Chowkhamba with seven commentaries, edited by Satkari Sharma Bangiya, p18, 1974.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Pratyakṣapaichheda, p.10 edited by Panchanan Bhattacharya, 1377 (BS)
9. Kalipada Tarkacharya: *Navya-Nyāya-Bhāṣā-pradīpaḥ*, Sanskrit College, Kolkata, p.23, 1973. Henceforth, *Navya-Nyāya-Bhāṣā-Pradīpaḥ*.
10. *Ibid.*
11. B.K. Matilal: *Navya Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, Harvard Oriental Series No. 46, p.36, 1968.
- 12., *Navya-Nyāya-Bhāṣā-Pradīpaḥ*, p.13

13. B.K. Matilal: *Navya Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, Harvard Oriental Series No. 46, pp.32-33., 1968.
14. *Nyāyamañjarī*, ed by Surya Narayana Sukla (Part-I), Chowkhamba, Delhi, p.33, Kashi Sanskrit Series 106, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, 1971
15. *Bhāṣāparichheda* with *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on Kārikā no.70.
16. *Nīlakanṭhaprakāśikā on Dīpikā on Tarkasaṃgraha*, Chowkhamba with seven commentaries, edited by Satkari Sharma, Bangiya, p. 379, 1974.
17. *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Chapter-X, Edited by Haridas Siddhāntavāgīśa, p.630, 1875.
18. Vinītadeva: *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, English Translation by Mrinalkanti Ganguly, Indian Studies-Past and Present, Calcutta, 1971.

Bibliography:

1. Viswanath, *Bhāṣāpariccheda* with *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, Bengali translation and elucidation by Panchanan Bhattacharya, Kolkata, 1377(BC).
2. Bimal Krishna Motilal: *The Word and the World*, Oxford University Press, 1990.
3. D.C. Guha: *The Navya Nyāya System of Logic*, Motilal Banarasidas, New Delhi.
4. *Tattvacintāmaṇi* with Mathuri (*Anumānakhaṇḍa*) Ed. By Kamakhyanatn
5. Tarkavagisa, Asiatic Society, Kolkata: *Tarkasaṃgraha* with *Dīpikā*, with seven commentaries, Ed. By Satkari Sharma, BangiyaChowkhamba, 1976.
6. Raghunath Ghosh: *The Justification of Inference of Navya Nyāya Approach*, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Delhi, 1990.
7. Raghunath Ghosh: *Relation as Real: A Critique of Dharmakīrti*, Satguru Prakashan, Delhi, 2002.
8. Manjulika Ghosh and Bhaswati Bhattacharya Chakraborti (Ed): *Śabdapramāṇa in Indian Philosophy*, NBU Studies in Philosophy-7, Northern Book Center, New Delhi, 2006.
9. Ujjla Jha, *A Primer of NavyaNyāya language and Methodology*, The Asiatic Society, 1 Park Street, Kolkata, 2010.
10. Dr. Anamika Roy Choudhury, *Bhāṣāpariccheda* with *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, Sanskrita Pustak Bhandar, 38, Bidhan Sarani, Kolkata, 2004.
11. Sri Narayan Chandra Goswami, *Tarkasaṃgrah (satīkah)*, Sanskrita Pustak Bhandar, 38, Bidhan Sarani, Kolkata, 1413(BC).

12. *Tarkasamgraha-Dīpikā on Tarkasamgraha* by Annambhaṭṭa, Translated and elicited by Gopinath Bhattacharya, Progressive Publishers, 37A, College Street, Kolkata, 2003.
13. Satish Chandra Chatterjee, *The Nyāya Theory Of Knowledge*, University of Calcutta, 1978.
14. *Essays on the Philosophical Perspective of Raghunath Ghosh (along with his responses)*, Edited by Jhadeswar Ghosh, Levant Books, 27C Creek Row, Kolkata, 2020.
15. Dr. Bijoya Goswami, *The Metaphor: A Systematic Analysis*, Sanskrita Pustak Bhandar, 38, Bidhan Sarani, Kolkata, 1994.
16. Annambhaṭṭa, *Tarkasamgraha O Tarkasamgraha-Dīpikā*, Dipak Kumar Bagchi, Mitram, 37A, College Street, 2016.
17. Annambhaṭṭa, *Tarkasamgraha O Tarkasamgraha-Dīpikā*, Arabinda Basu, Mitram, 37A, College Street, 2010.
18. Swami Lokeswaranda, *Vāratīya Saṁskritir Rūprekhā*, Ramkrishna Mission Lokasikha Parsad, Narendrapur, Kolkata, 2003.
19. Swami Lokeswaranda, *Upaniṣada (vol.2)*, Ananda publishers, Kolkata, 2014 .
20. Pandit Sri Fanibhusan Tarkavagisha, *Nyāya Darśana (Gautama sūtra) Vātsyān bhāṣya (vol. 1)*, Bangiya Sahitya Parisad Mandir, Kolkata, 1324(BC).
21. Sri Rajendranath Ghosh, *NavyaNyāya*, Sahitya Accademy, New Delhi, 1962.

22. Shyamapada Chakraborty, *Alamkāra Chandrikā*, Indian Associated Publishing House Co. Pvt.Ltd, 8C, Ramanath Majumder Street, Kolkata, 1363(BC).
23. Atindra Majumder, *Chhanda O Alamkāra*, Nyaya Prakash, 206, Bidhan Sarani, Kolkata, 1367(BC).
24. Jibendra Sinha Roy, *Bānglā Alamkāra*, Modern Book Agency Pvt.Ltd. 10, Bankim Chatterjee Street, Kolkata, 1958.
25. Swami Virupakshananda, *Sāmkhya Kārikā of Tīswara Kṛṣṇa (with the Tattva Kaumadī of Śrī Vācaspati Miśra)*, , Sri Ramkrishna Math, Madras, 1995.
26. Umesh Chandra Vidyalamkara, *Sāmkhya-Darśana*, 77, Raja Nava Krishna Street, kolkata, 1328(BC).
27. Rabindra Nath Tagore, *Śāntiniketana* Viswabharati, 6, Acarya Jagadisha Basu Road, Kolkata, 1404(BC).
28. Rabindra Nath Tagore, *Swaravitān 12(Tāśer Deśa)*, Viswabharati, 6, Acarya Jagadisha Basu Road, Kolkata,1416(BC).
29. Vinītadeva: *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, English Translation by Mrinalkanti Ganguly, Indian Studies-Past and Present, Calcutta, 1971
30. *Nyāyamañjarī*, ed by Surya Narayana Sukla (Part-I), Chowkhamba, Delhi, Kashi Sanskrit Series 106, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, 1971.
31. *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Chapter-X, Edited by Haridas Siddhāntavāgīśa, 1875.
32. Raghunath Ghosh: *Knowledge, Meaning and Intuition (Some Theories in Indian Logic)*, 1st Edition, New Bharatiya Book Corporation, New Delhi, 2000, pp.95-99.

33. Raghunath Ghosh:: *An The Concept of Metaphor and Truth Indian Perspective*, *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, and pp 247-257, July 2000.
34. Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana *Nyāyasūtra-1.2* , pp42-44 *Vātsyāyanabhāṣya* on them. *Nyāyadarśana* of Gotama, Edited by Raghunath Ghosh, New Bharatiya Book Corporation, Delhi, 2003
35. Rabindranath Tagore: *Sañcayitā*, Viswabharati, 6 Acarya Jagadisachandra Basu Road, Kolkata, 1420(Bengali year),
36. Swami Gambhirananda: *Upaniṣada Granthavali*, *Udvodhan Karyalaya*, *Kolkata, 2012*,
37. Sri Sitanath Tattvavhusana: *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣada*, Brahman mission press, Published by Sri Trigunanath Roy, 211, Karnowalish street, Kolkata, 1928,
38. *Śrīmad-bhagavadgītā As it is (Bengali)*: trs by Srimat Bhakticaru Swami, Published by Bhakti Vedanta Book Trust, Harekrishna Land, Juhu, Mumbai, 2019,
39. Narayan Sannyal: *Viśwasghātak*, Dey's publishing, Kolkata 2017.
40. *Ānandavardhana: Dhvanyāloka*, 1/6, Bengali Translation by Satya Narayana Chakraborty, SamskritaPustakBhandar, Kolkata, 2011
41. Sanjiv Chattapadhyaya: *Śrī kṛṣṇer Śeṣ Kota Din*, Ananda Publishers, Kolkata, 2019,
42. Mukhopadhaya Tarkatirthanath, Sri Gopal Chandra (ed), *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, Burdwan University, 1985.
43. Udayan, *Nyāyakusumānjali*, Benaras, 1912.
44. *Nyāyavindu* (Dharmakīrti), pratyakṣa chapter.

45. *Śabdārtha Bicār*, ed. Raghunath Ghosh and Bhaswati Bhattacharya Chakraborti, North Bengal University, Allied Publishers pvt. Ltd, 2005.
46. Viswanath Kaviraj, *Sāhitya Darpan, (Chapter 10)*, Krsnamohana Sastri (ed), CSS, Benaras, 1955.
47. Raghunath Ghosh, *Knowledge, Meaning and Intuition: Some Theories in Indian logic*, New Bharatiya Book Corporation, Delhi, 2000.
48. D.C Guha, *NavyaNyāya System of Logic*, Benaras, 1968.
49. Amartya Sen, *The Argumentative Indian*, Penguin Books Ltd. 2006.

**PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS
JOURNAL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY**

ISSN: - 0976 - 4496

**SPECIAL ISSUE IN HONOUR OF
PROF. RAGHUNATH GHOSH**

**Volume-X
March-2014**



**DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL
SILIGURI, DIST.-DARJEELING
WEST BENGAL- 734013, INDIA**

CONTENTS

- Jagat Pal: The Ontological Status of Entities in *Advaita* Metaphysics:1
Some Critical Reflections
- Subirranjan Bhattacharya: Kant on the Immortality of the Soul7
- Dilip Kumar Mohanta :Nagarjuna's *Madhyamā Pratipad*13
- Nirmalya Narayan Chakraborty: Psychologism, Necessity and Indian Logic...23
- Kantilal Das: Paradigm of Cross- Cultural Communication...33
- Koushik Joardar : Why Should We Act Morally?...52
- Ram C. Majhi: Physician's Obligation to Honour the Right to Die....62
- Manjulika Ghosh: Painted Veil: The Art of Rabindranath Tagore ...68
- Debika Saha: A Just World: Myth or Reality...76
- Nirmal Kumar Roy: Is *Upamāna* a *Pramāna*? : Some Observations ...81
- Sanghamitra Dasgupta: The Teachings of the Buddha and the Feeling of ...89
Ecospheric Belonging
- D. Balaganapathi: Reading the Histories of Indian Philosophy: Some Reflections ...95
- Saswati Chakraborty: Creation of *Rasa* or Aesthetic Experience: ...110
The Aim of Indian Art
- Ngaleknao Ramthing: Conflicts of Interests in Business....121
- Smita Sirker: How Is Our Rationality Situated? ...141
- Bimal Chandra Pal: Russell and Vivekananda on the Role of Education
in Social Reconstruction ...155
- Laxmikanta Padhi: Practical Vedanta and its Ethical Mission ... 164
- Swagata Ghosh: Spirit of Man: Reflections on Sri Aurobindo and173
Tagore's Views
- Samar Kumar Mandal: Vivekananda on the Genesis and Control of Violence...185
- Purbayan Jha: Death, Temporality and Individuality: An Existential Outlook...194
- Ranjit Kumar Barman: *Dharma* in the Sense of Morality: An Analysis...200
- Sushabhan Deb Barman: Religious Experience and Communication...211
- Bhaswati De: Female Infanticide is an Infantilism in our Society...214
- Juhi Routh: The Free-will Debate...221
- Anup Kumar Das: Kant on the Nature of Aesthetic Judgement...227
- Sutapa Goswami: The Cartesian Human Being233
- Indrani Choudhury: *The Concept of Sāmānyalakṣaṇā Pratyāsatti* in *Navyanyāya*...238
- Our Contributors
- Notes to the Contributors
- Our Publications

THE CONCEPT OF *SĀMĀNYALAKṢAṆA PRATYĀSATTI*
IN *NAVYA NYĀYA**
INDRANI CHOUDHURY

The present paper deals with the concept of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* as a super-normal means of knowing with special reference to Navya Nyaya. It is one among the three types of super-normal connection technically called *pratyāsatti* or *alaukika sannikarṣa*. The term *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* may be explained as something whose essential character is universal or *sāmānya*. In other words, it is a kind of connection, which is in the form of universal (*sāmānya*). When our eyes are conjoined with smoke, we acquire the cognition of smoke in which the chief qualifier (*prakāra*) is smokeness (*dhūmatva*). By virtue of being a qualified cognition (*jñāna viśiṣṭa*) the smoke which is a qualificand (*viśeṣya*) is having its chief qualifier (*prakāra*) i.e. smokeness. Through this universal smokeness (*dhūmatva*) which serves here as a supernormal contact, the cognition of all smokes is attained. The contact of our sense organ with the object is normal (*laukika*). The universal i.e. *dhūmatva* which has become a qualifier to the knowledge of the object i.e. *dhūma* which is a qualificand serves as the supernormal connection called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa (dhūmatvam pratyāsatti)*. Due to the acceptance of such *pratyāsatti* the problem of induction, which arises in connection with inference, can easily be solved. This provides certainty about the future prediction that all smokes existing in different space (*deśāntarīya*) and time (*kālāntarīya*) will be associated with fire. In other words, though we have not been presented with all smoky things, we are in a position to assert a true judgement about that class. Since whatever inference provides us is grounded on relation between two universals-smokeness and fireness. The Naiyayikas claim that we see the newly observed instances of a smoky thing as possessing fire, though the basis of our perception lies in the previously ascertained inference about the universals.

In this context the term '*lakṣaṇa*' means '*svarūpa*' or nature. The connection in which universal becomes the nature of the object is called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*.¹ If this definition is admitted, each and every person would have cognition of all smokes through the connection of smokeness which is eternal and remains through inherence (*samavāya*) in all smokes. From smokeness we can get the knowledge of all smokes, had it been taken as a form of our cognition. In the practical life it does not always

happen due to fact that one attains a particular knowledge of an object from a particular universal. In fact, there is an object i.e., smoke connected with our sense-organ which is taken as a *viśeṣya* or qualificand and there is universal 'smokeness' as a qualifier. Keeping this thing in view the Navya Naiyayikas have proposed a different type of definition of the same which runs as follows. The word '*sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*' means the universal becoming a qualifier of a cognition where the object connected with sense-organ becomes a qualificand (*indriya-sambaddha-viśeṣyaka-jñānaprakāribhūta*)² In the context of knowledge of a particular smoke the smoke has become a qualificand connected with sense-organ. In such smoke the universal 'smokeness' inheres as a qualifier (*prakāribhūta*). In fact, 'smokeness' is to be known as a qualifier and 'smoke' as a qualificand in a cognition which is taken as a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*). All individual manifestations of smoke existing in past, present and future can be perceived with the help of super-normal connection through smokeness existing in a particular smoke.³ Without the acceptance of this type of *sannikarṣa* the doubt regarding the invariable connection with fire which is beyond the reach of sense-organs cannot be explained. When a particular smoke, a particular fire and their co-existence are known, the corresponding universals of them like smokeness and fireness are known simultaneously. Through the universals all individuals having these universals become the object of knowledge.⁴

When someone is going to ascertain *vyāpti* between smoke and fire, he might have doubt in the following form: 'Whether all cases of smoke are cases of fire'. This doubt does not arise at all in the observed case of *vyāpti*. But it may arise concerning all cases of smoke and fire existing in different place and time that are beyond the range of sense-organ.⁵ Any type of doubt presupposes the knowledge of the object. Hence in order to justify doubt in the previous form (i.e., whether all cases of smoke are cases of fire), the prior knowledge of all cases of smoke is essential. This is possible through universal i.e., smokeness in this case. This is another need for admitting *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* as a form of connection, which ultimately assists in ascertaining *vyāpti*.

From the above standpoint of the Navya Naiyayikas one could raise the following questions. First, the case mentioned by the Navya Naiyayikas may be

justified with the help of an ordinary contact called *samyukta-samavāya* (conjoined inherence) in which ‘smokeness’ in smoke is apprehended directly. What is the utility of admitting *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* as a super-normal connection? In reply, the Navya Nyaiyayikas may defend themselves by pointing out the fact that when a particular smoke is known through smokeness both are connected with our sense-organs. But in the case of knowing smoke remaining in different time and space as having smokeness is not connected with our sense-organs. Hence, through the universals only the relation between smoke and fire existing in different time and space which is not in proximity of the sense-organs can easily be known, because any type of ordinary perception fails to reveal such truth.

Secondly, the Buddhists do not believe in universal which is eternal and inhered with many (*nityatve sati aneka-samavetatva*). The above-mentioned case of *vyāpti* may easily be explained with the help the rule of cause-effect relation technically called *tadutpatti*. A relation of invariable concomitance can be established between smoke and fire remaining in different space and time with the help of causality, but not through universal. The trust on causality may empower us to tell that if smoke as an effect remains in future fire as cause also will remain without taking help of the universal. In reply, the Navya Naiyayikas might argue that though ‘smoke’ has been taken as an effect caused by fire, all smokes and fires in the womb of future can be known through universal ‘smokeness’ and ‘fireness’ only, but not through causeness and effectness. It should also be kept in mind that the smokeness is to be taken as universal or *sāmānya* binding all individuals of the same class being eternal, but the properties called causeness (*kāraṇatā*) or effectness (*kāryatā*) are limiting adjuncts (*upādhi-s*) and hence they, being acquired properties, can bind others of the same class temporarily but not eternally (*nityatayā*). For this reason for attaining a connection between two things remaining in different space and time these *upādhi-s* are inadequate.

Lastly, in the context cited earlier ‘smoke’ (*dhūma*) may have at least three limiting adjuncts (*avachhedaka-s*)-‘smokeness’ (*dhūmatva*), ‘pervadedness’ (*vyāpyatva*) and ‘effectness’ (*kāryatva*). Among these only smoke limited by smokeness (*dhūmatvāvachhinna dhūma*) may be the super-normal connector of apprehending all cases of smoke remaining in different space and time due to its

eternal character , but other limiters, being inherited properties and non-eternal in character can bind only non-eternal things, i.e., smokes limited by the property of effectness (*kāryatāvachhedakāvachhina kārya* i.e., *dhūma*). If smoke remains as a *kārya* or effect then effectness may be a connector of all smokes having property of effectness, which is not taken as smoke-in-general (*dhūmasāmānya*) and hence universal or *sāmānya* is essential for having all smokes as a super-normal connection. For the Buddhists such problems do not arise due to the fact that the very notion of inference in Buddhism is completely different from that of the Naiyayikas. To them any determinate cognition which is associated with mental ascriptions or description called *kalpanā* is inference, which is determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) in Nyaya. Hence the concept of universal (*sāmānya*) and having connection with all individuals remaining different space and time with this is not admitted by them. Under this circumstance the relation of identity (*tādātmya*) and causality (*tadutpatti*) may act as relation between smoke and fire, which is true in the phenomenon level (*samvṛti-sat*), but not ultimately (*paramārtha-sat*)⁶. But the Navya Naiyayikas, being realists, do not believe in such dichotomy and hence for them *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is needed as a form super-normal connection (*alaukika sannikarṣa* or *pratyāsatti*).

References:

1. “*Sāmānyam lakṣaṇam yasya ityarthah*” *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on verse-63.
2. *Ibid.*
3. “*Tatra dhūmatvena sannikarṣeṇa dhūmā ityevam rūpam sakaladhūmaviśayakam jñānam jāyate.*” *Ibid.*
4. “*Vyāptigrahaśca sāmānyalakṣaṇa-pratyāsattiyā sakaladhūmādi-viśayakah.*” *Tattvacintāmaṇi* with *Māthurī (sāmānyalakṣaṇa-prakarāṇa)*, edited by Kamakhyanath Tarkavagisha, Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1962, p.200. Henceforth, *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.
5. “*Manmate tu sakaladhūmopasthitau kālāntarīya-deśāntarīya-dhūme vahnivyāpyatva-sandehah sambhavati.*” *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on Verse no.63
6. “*Prasiddhadhūme vahnisambandhāvagamāt kālāntarīya-deśāntarīya-dhūmasya mānābhāvenājñānāt. Sāmānyena tu sakaladhūmopasthitau dhūmāntare viśeṣādarśane samśayo yujyate.*” *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, p.200
7. Sayanamadhava: *Sarvadarśana-samgraha*, Bengali trs by Satyajyoti Chakraboty, Sahityasri, Kalikata, 1996, pp.16-31.
8. Raghunath Ghosh: *Relation as Real: A Critique of Dharmakirti*, Satguru, Delhi, 2001, pp. 70-80.