

## CHAPTER – 5

### LOCKE – 1

#### Locke's theory of Education

We shall be concerned in this chapter with the educational implications of Locke's general epistemology. According to Locke at the time of our birth our mind remains like a blank slate or *tabula rasa*. Nothing innate or inborn can be admitted that are responsible for our learning or education. Locke's theory of knowledge, naturally, will be the contrary to the Rationalists' theory, pro of Plato's in particular.

Locke was really the first philosopher to devote his main work to an enquiry into human understanding, its scope and its limits. In his 'Epistle to the Reader', prefaced to the Essay, Locke says that he considered it necessary to enquire, with what objects are our understanding fitted to deal, or with what objects are they not fitted to deal. If we confine our attention to matters which fall within the scope of the human intellect, we should make progress in knowledge, and less occasion would be given for scepticism.

But it may be asked how can we distinguish between the objects with which the mind is capable of dealing and those with which it is incapable of dealing without passing beyond the scope of the mind?

In his epistemology Locke used the word 'idea' frequently. To him we receive ideas from various sources. He defines an idea as whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking'. So, ideas are the objects of the mind. And the mind is fitted to deal with all its ideas. In his introduction to the Essay Locke says that his purpose is 'to inquire into the origin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge; together with the grounds and degrees of

belief, opinion, and assent'. He thus makes no clear distinction between the psychological question concerning the origin of our ideas and epistemological questions such as the nature of certain knowledge and the sufficient grounds for 'opinion'. But the first point of the method of inquiry which Locke then gives is to inquire into the origin of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways, whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.

The first and second books of the *Essay* cover the inquiry into our ideas. In the first book Locke argues against the theory of innate ideas, while in the second he gives his own theories about our ideas, their origin and nature. But, as one might expect when an idea is defined as whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks, discussion of ideas is sometimes discussion of our ideas of things and sometimes of the things of which we have ideas.

Locke has disposed of the doctrine of innate ideas. According to the supporters of this doctrine the learners must have something in his or her mind from the very beginning that actively take part to be incorporated with our experiences gained through our senses. These innate ideas are clear and distinct, they are universal, primary and essential part of our knowledge as forwarded by the rationalists like Plato, Descartes and others. While criticizing innate ideas, Locke understands the doctrine that there are in the understanding certain innate principles; some primary notions, characters, as it were stamped upon the mind of man, which the soul receives in its very first being; and brings into the world with it. Some of these principles are speculative and others are practical, that is to say, general moral, principles.

The most important argument, according to Locke, which is customarily forwarded in favour of this theory is of the universal consent of this idea. All men agree about the validity of certain speculative and practical principles, so it must be admitted that these principles are originally imprinted on men's minds and that they brought them into the world with them 'as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent faculties'.

To refute this theory Locke argues in the first place that if the agreement of all mankind about the truth of these principles can be explained without introducing the hypothesis of innate ideas, then the hypothesis is superfluous. Of course, Locke was convinced that the origin of all our ideas can easily be explained without postulating innate ideas. So, the theory of innate ideas can, simply, be excluded.

Secondly, Locke argues that the claim of innate ideas as being of universal consent is simply worthless. Because in the minds of children and idiots, we never find the knowledge of the principle of contradiction. But, if this principle, (it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be) is supposed to be innate, it has to be known by every man. No proposition can be said to be in the mind, which is never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. The general principles of the speculative order are 'seldom mentioned in the huts of Indians, much less are they to be found in the thoughts of children, or any impression of them on the minds of naturals. As for the practical of moral principles, 'it will be hard to instance any one moral rule, which can pretend to so general and ready an assent as to be so manifest a truth. The general principles of justice seems to be the most generally received. But it is difficult to believe that those who habitually infringe these rules have received them at birth as innate principles. We have, indeed, natural tendencies; but natural tendencies are not the same thing as innate

principles. If moral principles were really innate, we should not find those differences in moral outlook and practice in different societies or even within two men of the same society which we do in fact find. So, actually, Locke is making two points in this argument: (i) the universal employment of innate ideas to all men and (ii) the employment and implementation of these ideas in the same manner.

These principles may be innate in the sense that they are apprehended when people come to the use of reason. They may even be innate simply in the sense that if and when a man comes to understand the meaning of the relevant terms, he necessarily sees the truth of the proposition in question.

If to apprehend the truth of a principle with the use of reason means apprehending its truth when one reaches a certain determinate age, Locke did not believe that there are any such principles. As for the second view, Locke did not deny that there are principles of this kind, but he refused to admit them as 'innate'. If immediate assent to a proposition once the terms are understood is a certain sign that the proposition is an innate principle, people 'will find themselves plentifully stored with innate principles'. Moreover, the fact that the meanings of the terms have to be learned and that we have to acquire the relevant ideas is a sure sign that the propositions in question are not in fact innate.

So, if we take the word 'innate' in the explicit sense, Locke objects that all the available evidence goes to show that there are no explicitly innate principles. If it is taken in an implicit or virtual sense then Locke argues that it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a principle imprinted on the understanding implicitly; unless it be this, that the mind is capable of understanding and assenting firmly to such propositions. And

nobody denies that the mind is capable of understanding and assenting firmly to such proposition. It is useless, then, to call them innate.

After disposing of the doctrine of innate ideas in the first book of *Essay*, Locke described, in the second book, the way through which man receives his ideas, knowledge and learning. According to him it is experience upon which all these are founded. Experience has two faculties: sensation and reflection. Our senses do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things. External objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. This takes place through sensation. The other source of ideas is the perception of the operations of our own minds, such as thinking, doubting and willing. The ideas, this source of reflection, afford being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. All our ideas, as these are the simple units of our knowledge, come from one or other of these sources.

Locke was very much ambiguous while using the term 'idea'. He frequently, for example, speaks of our ideas of sensible qualities, while at other times the sensible qualities are spoken of as ideas. Further, he uses the term 'idea' not only for sense-data but also for concepts and universal ideas.

However, Locke's general principle is that all our ideas are grounded in experience. But this should not be taken to mean that Locke invented it. St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century maintained that all our natural ideas and knowledge are grounded in experience, and that there are no innate ideas. Moreover, Aquinas admitted sense-perception and introspection or reflection as 'formations' of ideas, though he subordinated the later to the former, in the sense that attention is directed first to external material objects.

Locke made a distinction between simple and complex ideas. And while the mind receives the former passively, it exercises an activity in the production of the later. Coldness and hardness of a piece of ice are examples of simple ideas. Each of these ideas comes to us through one sense only. But there are other ideas which we received by more than one sense, such as ideas of space or extension. For these make perceivable impressions, both on the eyes and touch; and we can receive and convey into our minds the ideas of the extension, figure both by seeing and feeling. Both these classes of simple ideas are ideas of sensation. But there are also simple ideas of reflection. They are ideas of perception or thinking, and volition or willing. Further, there are other simple ideas 'which convey themselves into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection, such as ideas of pleasure and delight. All these ideas are passively received and if they are once received by the mind they cannot be altered or destroyed or substituted for new ones at will.

On the other hand, the mind can actively frame complex ideas, using simple ideas as its material. A man can combine voluntarily the data of sensation and reflection to form new ideas. Ideas of beauty, gratitude etc. are complex ideas. Complex ideas are divided into ideas of modes, substance and relation. Moreover, Locke makes a distinction between qualities. Some qualities are inseparable from a body, whatever changes it undergoes. Solidity, extension, figure and mobility are examples of primary qualities. Besides, there are also secondary qualities. They are nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities. Such are colour taste, sound etc. Locke also mentions tertiary qualities, namely, the powers in bodies of producing, not ideas in us, but changes of bulk, figure, texture and motion in other bodies, so that the latter operate on our senses in a different way from the way in which they previously operated.

Locke supposes that in the production of our ideas both of primary and of secondary qualities 'insensible particles' or 'imperceptible bodies' emanate from objects and act on our senses. But there is this great difference between our ideas of primary and those of secondary qualities. The former are resemblance of bodies, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance to them at all. They are only a power to produce sensations in us.

A difficulty arises on Locke's premises from the fact that for him an idea is 'the immediate object of perception, thought or understanding. We do not know things immediately but medially, but means of ideas. And these ideas are regarded as representing things, as signs of them. Ideas of primary qualities really resemble things; ideas of secondary qualities do not. But if what we know immediately are ideas, how can we ever know whether these ideas do or do not resemble things? For if we know only ideas immediately, we are in no position to compare ideas with things and ascertain whether the former resemble the latter or not or even to establish whether there are any things other than ideas.

Locke was not unaware of this difficulty. To him when we observe constantly recurring collections of simple ideas, which are conveyed to us without choice on our part, it is at least highly probable that there are external things which cause these ideas, at least during the time when the latter are being passively received by our minds.

So, there are collections or clusters of qualities or 'ideas'. The mind supplies the ideas of a substratum or support in which the primary qualities inhere and which has the power of producing in us, by means of the primary qualities, simple ideas of secondary qualities. The general idea of substance is nothing but the supposed but unknown

support of those qualities we find existing without something to support them. And to say that the general idea of substance is the idea of unknown substratum is to say that the only characteristic note of the idea in our kinds is that of supporting accidents; that is, of being the substratum in which the primary qualities inhere and which possesses the power of causing simple ideas in us. It is not to say that substance is a mere figment of the imagination.

Locke denoted the third book of the *Essay* to the subject of words or language, as ideas and words are clearly closely connected, and our knowledge as he puts it, consists in propositions.

God made man a social being by nature. And language was to be 'the great instrument and common tie of society'. Language consists of words, and words are signs of ideas. The use of words is to be sensible marks of ideas, and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate signification. It is true that we take our words to be signs of ideas in other men's minds as well of ideas in our own minds, when, that is to say, we and they are speaking a common language, and we often suppose words to stand for things. None the less a man's words signify primarily and immediately the ideas in his own mind. Words can, of course, be used without meaning. A child can learn and use a word in parrot-fashion, without having the idea which is normally signified by it. But in this case the word is nothing but a non-significant noise.

Ideas, according to Locke, are the immediate objects of thought; and ideas, or some of them rather, stand for things or are signs of things. But ideas are private. And to communicate our ideas to others and to learn others' ideas we stand in need of 'sensible' and public signs. This need is fulfilled by words. But there is this difference between ideas, which are signs of things, and words. Those ideas which signify things or

represent things are natural signs. Some of them at least, that is to say, are produced by things, though others are mental constructions. Words, however, are all conventional signs: their signification is fixed by choice or convention. It is clear that Locke assumed that thought in itself is really distinct from the use of words and symbols, and that the possibility of expressing the same thought in different linguistic forms and in different languages is a proof of this distinction.

Besides words which are names of ideas in the mind there are a great many others that are made use of to signify the connection that the mind gives to ideas or propositions, one with another. The mind needs not only signs of the ideas 'before it' but also signs to show or intimate some action of its own in relation to these ideas.

Although Locke does not give any thorough explanation of his theory of signification, he saw clearly enough that to say that words are signs of ideas and that language, composed of conventional signs, is a means of communicating ideas, constitutes an over-simplification. To make words serviceable to the end of communication, it is necessary that they excite in the hearer exactly the same idea they stand for in the mind of the speaker. But this end is not always attained. For example, a word may stand for a very complex idea; and in this case it is very difficult to ensure that the word always stands for precisely the same idea in common use. The meaning of a word such as 'murder' depends simply on choice. And although 'common use regulates the meaning of words pretty well for common conversation', there is no recognized authority which can determine the precise meaning of such words. Hence it is one thing to say that names stand for ideas and another thing to say precisely for what ideas they stand.

The 'imperfection' of language is scarcely avoidable. But there is also such a thing as an avoidable 'abuse' of words. In the first place, men not infrequently coin words which do not stand for any clear and distinct ideas. Secondly, words are often abused in controversy through being used by the same man in different senses. Another abuse consists in taking words for things and supposing that the structure of reality must correspond to one's ways of talking about it. Locke also mentions figurative speech as one abuse of language. His point is that 'eloquence' and rhetoric are used to move the passions and mislead the judgement, as indeed they not infrequently are; and he is too much of a rationalist to attempt to distinguish clearly between the proper and improper use of emotive and evocative language.

The misuse of words is thus a prolific source of error, and Locke evidently considered this a subject of considerable importance. The consideration, then, of ideas and words as the great instruments of knowledge makes no despicable part of their contemplation who would take a view of human knowledge in the whole extent of it. And perhaps if they were distinctly weighted and duly considered, they would afford us another sort of logic and critic than what we have been hitherto acquainted with. But it is only in very recent times that Locke's suggestion has been taken with any great seriousness.

As general terms play such a prominent part in discourse, it is necessary to pay special attention to their origin, meaning and use. If, for example, a man was unable to refer to cows in general but had to have a proper name for every particular cow which he had seen, the names would have no meaning for another man who was un-acquainted with these particular animals. But although it is obviously necessary that there should be general names, the question arises how we come to have them.

Locke replies that words become general by being made signs of general ideas, and that general ideas are formed by abstraction. 'Ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of time and place and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. A child, let us suppose, is acquainted first of all with one man. It later become acquainted with other men. And it frames an idea of the common characteristics, leaving out the characteristics peculiar to this or that individual. It thus comes to have a general idea, which is itself signified by the general terms 'man'. And with the growth of experience can go on to form other wider and more abstract ideas, each of which will be signified by a general term.

It follows that universality and generality are not attributes of things, which are all individual or particular. Any idea or any word is particular; it is particular idea or particular word. But what we call general or universal words and ideas are universal in their signification. That is to say, a universal or general idea signifies a sort of thing, like cow or sheep or man; and the general term stands for the idea as signifying a sort of thing.

To say, however, that universality belongs only to words and ideas is not to say that there is no objective foundation for the universal idea. But it is the mind which observes these likeness among particular things and uses them as the occasion to form general idea. And when a general idea has been formed, say the idea of gold, a particular thing is said to be or not to be gold in so far as it conforms or does not conform to this idea.

Locke does not say that the general idea is an image; nor does he say that it is composed of mutually inconsistent or incompatible ideas. He says that it is composed of 'parts' of different and inconsistent ideas. That is to say, the mind omits the qualities

peculiar to this or that kind of triangle and puts together the common characteristics of different kinds of triangle to form the general idea of triangularly. Abstraction is thus depicted as a process of elimination or leaving out and of putting together what remains, the common characteristics.

It is important not to understand the word 'abstraction' in the present context as meaning the abstraction of the 'real essence of a thing. Locke distinguishes two senses of the term 'real essence'. The one is of those who, using the word essence for they know not what, suppose a certain number of those essences, according to which all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and so become of this or that species. This theory is, says Locke, an untenable hypothesis. For the theory presupposes fixed and stable specific essences, and it cannot explain the fact of borderline cases and of variations in type. In other words, it is incompatible with the available empirical data. The other and more rational opinion about real essences is of those who look on all natural things to have a real but unknown constitution of their insensible parts, from which flow those sensible qualities which serve us to distinguish them one from another, according as we have occasion to rank them into sorts under common denominations. But though this opinion is 'more rational', there can obviously be no question of abstracting unknown essences. Every collection of simple ideas depends on some 'real constitution' of a thing; but this real constitution is unknown to us. Hence it cannot be abstracted.

From real essences Locke distinguishes nominal essences. We are accustomed to decide whether a given thing is gold or not by observing whether it possesses those common characteristics, possession of which is regarded as necessary and sufficient for a thing to be classed as gold. And the complex idea of these characteristics is the

nominal essence of gold. It is the nominal essence, therefore, which is abstracted by leaving out characteristics peculiar to individual things as individuals and retaining their common characteristics.

Locke adds that in the case of simple ideas and modes the real and nominal essences are the same. But in the case of substances they are different. The nominal essence of gold is the abstract idea of the observable characteristics common to the things which are classed as gold; but its real essence, or substance, is the real constitution of its insensible parts, on which depend all those properties of colour, weight, fixedness, etc., which are to be found in it. Locke's way of speaking is certainly open to criticism. For in the case of the universal idea of triangularity it is inappropriate to speak about 'real essence' at all, if the latter is defined as the real but unknown constitution of the insensible parts of a material substance. But this general meaning is sufficiently clear, namely, that in the case of material substances it makes sense to speak of a real essence distinct from the nominal essence or abstract idea, whereas in the case of triangularity it does not.

## LOCKE – 2

### **LOCKE : the advocate of the Disciplinary Conception of Education.**

Locke's pedagogical views are set forth in his small but important book *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* which was published in 1693, three years after the publication of the *Essay* (1690), and which went through three editions in the next few years. Two large questions were pursued by Locke in his intellectual life. How can human beings know anything ? And how should they try to live ? We may say that Locke's views on education is one of his responses to the later question. It shows an unsentimental view of a child's development, both intellectually and morally and casts light on what Locke meant by 'education – an upbringing, and not merely teaching'.

Locke has been considered the most influential of all English writers on education. Public schools, but he noted that so long as the history of education contains to be written, in England, the only Englishman celebrated in it will be not the great schoolmaster, that is Mathew Arnold but the great philosopher John Locke.

On the continent Locke has been regarded as one of the first advocates of physical education and physical well-being of the child. His medical studies combined with the fact that he frequently suffered from ill health impressed upon him the importance of sound physical health. So Locke gave physical education the first place in his theory of education. This is evident in the very opening lines of his monumental work 'Some Thoughts Concerning Education' : "A sound mind in a sound body is a short but full description of a happy state in this world; he that has these two, has little more to wish for; and he that he wants either of them, will be but little the better for any thing else".<sup>\*1</sup>

Locke cannot be regarded as a 'man of the study'. He wrote many books on Politics, Economics, Psychology, Philosophy and Education. Of these writings, *Some Thoughts concerning Education* deals mainly with educational principles and problems. In fact, Locke tutored several children with marked success and wrote a series of letters to many of his friends, who had asked his advice as to the best way of bringing up and educating his young son. These letters appeared later on in the form of this treatise and the theme of the book pertains to the 'upbringing of a gentleman's son under a tutor'. Robert Ulich commented that the great influences of Locke's *Thoughts* springs from the fact that they expressed exactly that which the best members of the English ruling class wished their children to become : gentlemen with respect for moral standards, religion, and convention, with balanced judgment and good common sense, with knowledge helpful for a practical life and decent forms of leisure, and a strong sense of independence as far as their own class was concerned.

John Locke was a versatile genius, a distinguished psychologist and a physician. Finally he served as a private tutor for a considerable number of years, and as such he had ample opportunities to study the reactions of the child to educative process. The rich and varied experience that he gathered while tutoring a 'gentleman's son' took shape in the form of his famous treatise *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*. The versatility of Locke's genius combined with the fact that his writings are full of many inconsistencies, contradictions and compromises, leads the writers on education to draw very different conclusions about his exact views.

Some writers called Locke a Social Realist. This view is warranted by the fact that Locke wanted for the child a type of practical education and that he laid emphasis on 'travel' and the study of history, geography, modern languages etc. Others again have

classified him as a Sense Realist because, according to Locke, the materials of knowledge come to us through the senses and by contact with the actual things or objects. Some other writers have put Locke in the category of Naturalists because he laid stress upon the 'natural curiosity' of children in the matter of their intellectual development; physical education was of primary importance; and he preached the doctrine of discipline by natural consequences. But from a perusal of the *Conduct of the Understanding* conclusion can be drawn that Locke was an advocate of the Disciplinary Conception of education as education, to him, was rigid discipline.

Discipline, in Locke's conception, consists in the formation of habits which include the building up of physical habits, moral habits and intellectual habits, corresponding to his theories of three kinds of education, namely, physical education, moral education and intellectual education. Locke remarked in his *Thoughts* that the great mistake he had observed in people's breeding their children had been, that that had not been taken care enough of in its due reason; that the mind had not been made obedient to discipline when at first it was tender, most easy to be bowed.

Locke believed that corporal punishment was a 'sign of failure' on the part of the teacher. Discipline, according to him, must not be based on force or threat of punishment. The teacher should teach through his own example and by way of suggestion. Locke said that beating is the worst and therefore the last means to be used in the correction of children and that only in cases of extremity, after all gentle ways have been tried and proved unsuccessful.

Education, for Locke, is not regarded as a State concern but a 'parental duty'. The child, according to him, should be stimulated by example and ruled by habit. He

holds that a man's proper business is to seek happiness and avoid misery. By 'happiness' Locke meant health, reputation, knowledge and wisdom, doing good to others, and so on. As the strength of the body lies chiefly in being able to endure hardship, so also does that of the mind. And the great principle and foundation of all virtue is placed in this, that a man is able to deny himself his own desires cross his inclinations, and purely follow what reason directs as best, though appetite leans the other way. The ability to reason originates early in life and should be cultivated from the very first. But although early, it develops slowly and therefore children must for a considerable time be directed by adults. Before the child can be permitted to make his own choices, at least in difficult cases and on weighty occasions, he must be conditioned to make the right choices.

Locke's advocacy of the disciplinary conception of education is evident from the fact that while speaking of 'moral education' he made character the end of education. And that end, according to him, could be obtained by the formation of good habits through a long 'discipline of the desires'.

Locke's may be regarded as the fore-runner of the child-study movement in education. The teacher, according to him, should study well the children's natures and aptitudes, should observe what their native stock is, how it may be improved, and what it is for; he should consider also what they want. For in many cases all that we can do is to make the best of what nature has given, to prevent the views and faults to which such a constitution is inclined, and give it all advantage it is capable of.

Elsewhere Locke has stressed the fact of individual differences among children. Each man's mind has some peculiarity as well as his face, that distinguishes him from all others; and there are possibly scarce two children who can be conducted by exactly

the same method. This should be taken notice of in the matter of bringing them up or educating them. Their contents or subjects of study and even their methods are to be different and rather ideal to each individual children so that he can get a chance to express his inner dispositions or tendencies.

It is presumed in Locke's *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* that the pupil taught stands for an individual child. Perhaps the idea is that education ought to be adapted to the individuating characteristics of the child – something Plato would vehemently reject. The teacher is someone who writes on a black sheet. This will be perfectly in line with Locke's empiricist stand point. Yet, Locke also thinks that the aim of education is to develop the child's capacities in a natural way, thereby creating the impression that the child's mind is not really a *tabula rasa*, but has inner dispositions to be developed. The aim of education is not to "install anything into the pupil but to develop his capacities in a natural way .... as if the teacher is one who moulds a piece of wax." \*2 So, Locke's direct and uncompromised answer to the question, 'how do we learn'? 'In a word, from experience', will not suffice, so far as education of the child is concerned.

Locke has his theory of 'formal discipline' or, 'mental discipline' in education. This doctrine included various subjects in the curriculum not so much for their content value but for the mental training resulting and also for exercising the different faculties of the mind. The theory maintained that the power developed in any faculty by study of a particular school subject can be used equally well in any other subject to meet any other experience of life. This view leads to the psychological doctrine of 'transfer of training' as a corollary, which implies the improvement in mental or motor function

without direct training, but through some other device, of course, having some close relation with it.

In history of Education a question may often be raised that whether Locke can be regarded as an upholder of the doctrine of formal training. Actually Locke cannot be saddled with the responsibility for initiating the doctrine or for introducing the term. The question then resolves itself into whether he upholds the doctrine with his remark in regard to his moral training. From the statement of Locke it seems plain to us that the principle of all virtues and excellence lies in the power of denying ourselves the satisfaction of our own desires, might seem to justify us in ascribing to him the disciplinary conception of education, but it is in the intellectual sphere that a decision must be taken.

Locke held that the power of training and education can be secured by the young gentlemen only through a private tutor who should himself be well-bred, understanding the ways of 'Carriage' and 'Measures of Civility' in all the 'Variety of Persons Times, and Places', and keep his 'Pupil', as much as his 'Age' requires, constantly to observation of them. The studies which the tutor sets him upon, are but as it were the exercise of his faculties and employment of his time, to keep him from sauntering and idleness, to teach him application and accustom him to take pains, and to give him some little taste of what his own industry must perfect.

Formal training is nevertheless inconsistent with Locke's general empiricist philosophy. It implies the existence of mental faculties. Locke is usually cited as a critic of the faculty hypothesis in psychology, more especially in regard to memory. Memory is so necessary to all parts and conditions of life, and so little can be done without it. that

we are not to fear it should grow dull and useless for want of exercise, if exercise would make it grow stronger.

While speaking of the aims of education Locke mentioned four qualities as necessary for building ideal type personality. They are : virtue, wisdom, breeding and learning. It is virtue or direct virtue which is hard and value part to be aimed at in education. All other considerations and accomplishments should give way and be postponed to virtue. A tutor should try to give the pupil the taste of it and unless pupil gets a true relish of it, and his pleasure in it the attempt of the tutor should continue. Wisdom is beyond the reach of children since it implies natural good temper, application of mind and experience. Breeding is largely a matter of right company. Its aim is to secure 'a carriage suitable to his rank', and not to think meanly of others'. Locke puts learning as the least part of education and so he puts it in the list of four qualities.

In his educational theory, Locke discussed Physical Education, Moral Education and Intellectual Education. According to Locke, good health is an essential prerequisite to the attainment of the four different aims of education such as virtue, wisdom, breeding and learning. A hardening process in Locke's disciplinary theory is involved. Plenty of open air, exercise and sleep, plain diet, no wine or strong drink, not too warm and strait clothing, especially the head and feet kept cold, and the feet often used to cold water and exposed to wet are necessary to maintain a good physic.

The all-absorbing aim of education with Locke is virtue. The child must cultivate good breeding and manners. Locke attached greater importance to moral training than to intellectual education imparted by parents at home and teachers in schools. According to him, moral influences can alone control the impulsive and wayward behaviour of the youth. So, the cultivation of virtue, in Locke's opinion, is much more important than

knowledge. The first lesson that the pupils must learn is that they are not to have anything because it pleases them but because it is thought 'good' for them. The aim of moral education, according to Locke, is to form in the child certain moral habits, such as, obedience to superiors, humility, submission to authority, and so on.

Surprisingly, given the numerous illiberal elements in his thinking, a recognizably liberal view is available in John Locke's educational thinking. If Locke's puritanical moralism could somehow be excised from 'Some Thoughts Concerning Education', the work would be liberal in a strong sense.

Locke sees moral education as a fundamental part of a person's development, but nowhere in any of his educational writings do we find a discussion of teaching a child to be a citizen or a participant in politics. All virtues to be learned are private or social, not political. Since 'direct virtue', according to Locke, is the hard and valuable part to be aimed at in education, it is dangerous to entrust this 'valuable part' of education to the schools or other political institutions. This is the most attractive part of Locke's educational thinking.

This is why the work, that is, Locke's writing on education arouses the animus of civil educationists such as R.M. Battistoni, in his 'Public Schools and the Education of Democratic Citizen', published from 'Jackson: University Press of Mississippi' in the year 1985 and Thomas Pangle in his book 'The Ennobling of Democracy', published from 'John Hopkin's University Press, Baltimore MD', in the year 1992. The work is praised for its rationalist moralism by Nathan Tarcov in his book, 'Locke's Education for Liberty', published from Chicago University Press' in the year 1984 and Roger Smith in his book, 'Liberalism and American Constitutional Law', published from 'Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press' in the year 1986.

Book-learning with Locke does not begin early, and it occupies a place of subsidiary importance. In his opinion, the function of the tutor is not so much to teach the pupil all that is knowable as to instill in him a love and esteem of knowledge. Hence the emphasis is actually on the building up of intellectual habits rather than on the accumulation of knowledge and information. Locke believed that proper exercise of his comprehensive program of studies including some six groups of subject will make the child intellectually rich. Groups of subjects are as follows : (1) Reading, Writing and Drawing, (2) French (to be learnt orally as soon he can speak English), Latin and English (to be studied throughout), (3) Geography, Chronology and History, especially Roman History, (4) Ethics, from a study of the Bible, (5) the Art of Speaking and writing English, and (6) Dancing, Music, Horseback Riding, Fencing and Wrestling.

To complete his curriculum Locke, unmindful perhaps of his previous warning regarding the extent of human knowledge and the limitation of the pupil's mind, adds arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, ethics, law, natural philosophy. One more addition, which Locke recognizes will evoke astonishment, in his recommendation of a trade. After that Locke did not expect to meet the same opposition in advocating that a young gentlemen should learn to keep accounts through it will not help him to acquire an estate but certainly it will help him to preserve the estate if he has his own. Locke finally recommended to complete all education by travel or grand tour. This is, indeed, very much useful in life as it completes the gentlemen. Isaac Watts, Locke's disciple, in his *The Improvement of The Mind* (1741) advised the teacher to take his pupils 'to see the fields, the woods, the rivers, the dwellings, towers and cities distant from their own dwellings'. From their travels they are to 'bring home treasures of useful knowledge'.<sup>\*3</sup>

In prescribing this educational programme Locke wanted to produce a refined gentleman's son with polished taste and behaviour and with a wide variety of knowledge, - to educate one particular pupil who would be 'a prospective member of the English gentry'. Moreover, Locke did not propose the course as a variety or stock of knowledge but as a variety and freedom of thinking – as an increase in the powers and activities of the mind and not as an enlargement of its possessions.

Locke recognizes the importance of method in education. Order and constancy are said to make the great difference between one man and another. This clears much in a learner's way, helps him so much on in it, and makes him to go so easy and so far in any enquiry. The governor of the pupil should take pains to make him sensible of this, accustom him to order, and teach him method in all the applications of his thoughts; show him wherein it lies and the advantages of it; acquaint him with the several sorts of it either from general to particulars, or from particulars to what is more general, exercise him in both of them, and make him see in what cases each different method is most proper and to what ends it best serves. The method of acquiring this knowledge was through reasoning or by observing the connection of ideas and by following them in train; and to Locke nothing could do it better than Mathematics which must be taught to everybody not so much to make him a mathematician as to make him a reasonable creature.

Locke anticipated the play-way in education, children should not have anything like work, or serious, laid on them; neither their minds nor their bodies will bear it. A condition of realizing this fortunate state of affairs is that the task should be begun at the psychological moment, when the pupil is in the right mood for it. It should not be prolonged till exhaustion or aversion sets in. In the course of the task masters and

teachers should raise no difficulties to their scholars but on the contrary should smooth their way and readily help them forwards where they find them stop. As constant attention is one of the hardest tasks than can be required of children, the great skill of a teacher is to get and keep the attention of his scholar; whilst he has that, he is sure to advance as fast as the learner's abilities will carry him. To attain this he should make the child comprehend the usefulness of what he teaches him, and let him see by what he has learnt that he can do something which he could not do before, something which gives him some power and real advantage above others who are ignorant of it. To this he should add sweetness in all his instructions, and by a certain tenderness in his whole carriage make the child sensible that he loves him and designs nothing but his good, the only way to beget love in the child which will make him hearken to his lessons and relish what he teaches him.

Locke was certainly right in main-training that the physical education of the child is of primary importance in any scheme of education. He was also right in upholding a high standard of moral education and in insisting on the pupil's mastery of rudiments of various branches of knowledge. He was not satisfied by enabling the pupils merely to know things but he wanted them to modify their entire social and moral outlook, behaviour and conduct in the best possible manner and act up to the ideals by following them in their own lives and examples. The strengthening of mental powers by exercise and by the formation of useful habits was emphasized by him as more important than the mere acquisition of knowledge. Locke said that a man must be a philosopher indeed if he can spend his life in teaching boys, and yet always think more about what they will be and what they will do when their schooling is over than what they will know.

Locke made a distinction between education and instruction. Education, he held, is much wider than instruction. Instruction is merely intellectual education and aims at a partial development of the child, while education aims at an all-round or balanced development of the individual, physical, moral and intellectual.

Locke's educational philosophy is greatly influenced by the English national system of education. The English Public Schools owe their insistence on their programme of health education, social and moral education and practical training to Locke's educational theories. He was the forerunner in the Rationalistic Movement known as the Enlightenment which sprang up in France and was nourished under the leadership of Voltaire. But the system of private or home education as forwarded by Locke is new to the world of education, though it is neither feasible nor desirable. So state can afford the private education of individuals as the role of the social interactive factor for education cannot be denied.

Although the *Thoughts* was directed to the upbringing of an ordinary gentleman's son, Locke was prepared to advise on the education of the youngman's sisters or women. In a covering letter attached to a fair copy of the early draft of the *Thoughts* sent in 1684 to his friend, Edward Clarke, Locke evidently contemplated dealing with the education of girls, the last sentence running : 'Be therefore both you and your lady as severe as may be in examining these rules, doubt as much as you can of everyone of them, and when upon a scrupulous review we have settled this part and supplied what possibly you may find wanting, I shall be ready to take my mind as fully to Madame concerning her daughters, if she continues to be of the mind that may be worth her patience to hear it'. And in the *Thoughts* he explains : 'I have said he here because the principal aim of my discourse is how a young gentlemen should be brought

up from his infancy, which in all things will not so perfectly suit the education of daughters though where the difference of sex requires different treatment, it will be no hard matter to distinguish'. \*4

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  3. Passmore, J : The Philosophy of Teaching, (Duckworth, London, 1980) P.82
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