

**UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE AS A
FORM OF LIFE: A PHILOSOPHICAL QUEST
AFTER LATER WITTGENSTEIN**

**A Thesis submitted to the University of North Bengal
For the Award of**

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Philosophy

By


Anup Deka

**Under the Supervision of
Professor Kanti Lal Das**

**Department of Philosophy
University of North Bengal
March 2021**

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled “**Understanding Religious Language as a Form of Life: A Philosophical Quest after Later Wittgenstein**” has been prepared by me under the guidance of Prof. (Dr.) Kanti Lal Das, Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal. No part of this thesis has formed the basis of any award or degree previously.

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Anup Deka". The signature is written in a cursive style with a light blue background behind the text.

(Anup Deka)

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

Accredited by NAAC with Grade A

Department of Philosophy
SAP (DRS-III) of UGC



ENLIGHTENMENT TO PERFECTION

☎ : 0353-2580197(O)

E-mail: deptphilosophy1@gmail.com

visit us at : <http://www.nbu.ac.in>

P.O. North Bengal University, Raja Rammohunpur,
Dt. Darjeeling, West Bengal, India, PIN - 734013

Ref. No. :

Date : 23/12/2020

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the PhD Thesis entitled “ UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE AS A FORM OF LIFE: A PHILOSOPHICAL QUEST AFTER LATER WITTGENSTEIN” submitted by Sri Anup Deka in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of PhD in Philosophy is a bona fide work carried by him under my supervision.

The aforesaid thesis has not been submitted previously in part or in full to this or any other university or institution for the award of any degree or diploma.

Signature of the Supervisor


(Professor Kanti Lal Das)

Department of Philosophy,
North Bengal University

Supervisor

Department of Philosophy
University of North Bengal

Urkund Analysis Result

Analysed Document: Anup Deka_Philosophy.pdf (D97050423)
Submitted: 3/3/2021 8:49:00 AM
Submitted By: nbuplg@nbu.ac.in
Significance: 2 %

Sources included in the report:

<https://jeremywisnewski.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/3-2-wisnewski1.pdf>
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ashoka_Tarai/publication/344665061_Recent_Responses_to_the_Philosophy_of_Wittgenstein_Life_and_Language/links/5f87e8c2458515b7cf81f175/Recent-Responses-to-the-Philosophy-of-Wittgenstein-Life-and-Language.pdf
<https://epdf.pub/wittgenstein-and-philosophy-of-religion.html>
https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.105582/2015.105582.Rediscovering-India-Idea-Of-Inexpressible-Vol-24_djvu.txt
<https://www.iep.utm.edu/wittgens/>
<https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/bitstream/11375/13979/1/fulltext.pdf>
https://www.maclester.edu/philosophy/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2016/10/Alexander_Coppins_2015_Thesis.pdf
<https://muse.jhu.edu/article/177245>

Instances where selected sources appear:

32

As
03/03/2021

Supervisor
Department of Philosophy
University of North Bengal

Anup Deka
03/03/2021

ABSTRACT

Philosophers have always had an intense interest in language, particularly in problems of reference and meaning. Contemporary philosophers of language have focused attention on many important domains of human language of which the theological entity at the heart of the controversy is God. One of the key issues for philosophers of religious language is: How can we speak meaningfully of God? What does the word 'God' refer?

It is a general perception that philosophy is all about of the clarification of language. However, the nature of language appears as a contentious issue to the whole host of linguistic philosophers. They have expressed serious reservation regarding the functional aspect of language. In fact, the functional aspect of **religious language** appears as a surprise to the linguistic philosophers. Many linguistic philosophers of semantic persuasion rule out the relevance of religious language in philosophy. For them, due to the mysterious nature of religion, religious language appears as a misnomer and as a result of that it has been rejected as meaningless. The logical positivists' outlook of religious language is a case in point. In fact, in 20th century thought the rejection of metaphysics has been especially marked in the movement of Logical Positivism associated with the philosophers belonging to the Vienna Circle. For them, the main objective of the philosophers is not to design speculative systems or synthesis, or world-views just like the classical metaphysicians, rather to clarify *what we mean and how we mean* by the locutions we use. For them, most of the traditional philosophical problems in the past had arisen from *logico-linguistic* confusions about meaning. Philosophical problems are solved by being *dissolved* and the function of philosophy is wholly *therapeutic* in nature. In this regard, philosophers

should not take any metaphysical or epistemological assumption in order to determine the criterion of meaningfulness. The criterion of meaningfulness for them can be formulated in purely logical terms. Religious language, of course, falls short of fulfilling the criterion of meaningfulness like ethical or moral language and hence be treated as devoid of cognitive significance. Religious propositions, namely, ‘God is all powerful’, ‘God is just’, ‘God is omnipotent and merciful’ are not verifiable in the way in which the propositions of the natural sciences are verifiable. Hence, religious propositions have been rejected as meaningless or non-sense. In reality, religious propositions are vacuous. As they are vacuous, we need not prove them like all metaphysical propositions. As they do not meet the requirements for meaning, they simply do not make sense. However, some later philosophers, namely, Richard Hare, R. B. Braithwaite and others argued that even though religious language lacks descriptive content but they could nevertheless be meaningful. Thus, it seems that religious language still remains as a knotty issue within the sphere of linguistic philosophy.

There is no question of doubt that the presence of religion subsists from the very first day of human appearance. However, over the course of history we have noticed different interpretations of religion. Religion first transformed into theology, then philosophy of religion. Thus, there persists a constant revision of religion over the course of history. In this regard, we have in order the Platonic version of the philosophy of religion and religious language; Aquinas’ philosophy of religion and religious language; Kantian and neo-Kantian view of philosophy of religion and religious language and Wittgenstein and post-Wittgenstein’s view of religion and religious language. Hegel is said to be a *metaphysical reductionist* because he thinks that religion becomes a species of metaphysics. Aquinas’ philosophy of religion

likewise presupposes the possibility of philosophy having a metaphysical or transcendental role. Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophy of religion depends for its validity upon the philosophical adequacy of Kant's 'critical philosophy'. Wittgenstein's view of religious language actually hinges on the therapeutic view of language.

It seems that the outlook of religion and religious beliefs took a new turn from Kant and subsequently it continued in logical positivism, in Wittgenstein down to the contemporary continental movement loosely called *Postmodernism*. However, the main contention of this research proposal is to exemplify our understanding of religious language as a form of life after later Wittgenstein. Even though Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* rules out the possibility of religious language and religious experience by drawing out the limits of language and the limits of the world (reality) but in his *Philosophical Investigations* and *Culture and Value*, Wittgenstein makes so many cryptic remarks in favor of religious language as *a form of life*. In his *Culture and Value*, Wittgenstein says, "An honest religious thinker is like a tightrope walker. He almost looks as though he was walking on nothing but air. His support is the slenderest imaginable. And yet it is possible to work on it."

Wittgenstein distinguishes between religion and superstition by speaking of lower and higher 'forms of expression'. Wittgenstein opines that in religion 'every level of devoutness must have its appropriate form of expression which has no sense at the lower level. In fact, Wittgenstein's view of the meaning of religious utterance is strictly governed by his overall view of the descriptive or therapeutic role of philosophy. For Wittgenstein, to determine the meaning of a religious locution is just like an *ad hoc* task to which the personal history, various practices and behaviors of the speaker are part of the context. Therefore, philosophy may in no way interfere

with the actual use of language; it can in the end describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is. His main objective is to describe carefully the language and *leaves everything as it is*, of course, within the *form of life*. According to Wittgenstein, life can educate us to a belief in God and our experience and thought can force the concept of God on us. For him, there is undoubtedly a great deal of value of conflating religious language in its myriad forms with quasi-scientific language. The task of philosophy of religion in general is a descriptive one. In fact, Wittgenstein's view of the philosophy of religion was compromised by his general theoretical view that philosophy was essentially a descriptive and non-explanatory inquiry. Like many other post-Kantian attempts, Wittgenstein claims that it is possible to engage in the philosophy of religion without the aid of metaphysics. We in fact notice the same in Kant's *Practical Reason* and even in the continental philosophy.

This research proposal thus reveals, after Wittgenstein, that one should not enquire the causal ground of God's existence; rather one's form of life without the aid of metaphysics can educate him to a belief in God just by sharing his life with others through religious language-games.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PREFACE

Religion is all about of human life. The meaning of life is determined by religion. The value of the world is determined by religion. One can find deep association with God by making himself as an honest religious thinker. To be an honest religion thinker, one has to stay in religion. One has to struggle for that. This sort of struggle may create tension among the religious thinkers. To be a wishful thinker of religion, one has to suspend his outlook towards factual world. One has to have a religious faith and one has to take it as a suspension from the factual world. Thus, the relevance of religion is colossal in human life. Religion in fact is sui-genesis in human life. A man cannot survive without religion because religion in the real sense of the term determines the meaning of life. Human's appearance in the world does not make any sense without fulfilling the meaning of life, without knowing the value of the world. Moreover, an honest religious thinker with sound morality finds himself absolutely safe and safety within religion. The main strategy of my research work is to scrutinize the relationship among religion, culture and value. Again, I also want to typify our understanding of religious language as a form of life after Later Wittgenstein. Moreover, here I want to disclose after Later Wittgenstein in what sense and also on the basis of what philosophical ground Wittgenstein anticipates the possibility of having a realm of the divine without metaphysics.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

At the very onset, I feel privilege to express my sincere gratitude and deep sense of appreciation to my beloved supervisor Professor (Dr.) Kanti Lal Das, Department of Philosophy, North Bengal University for his constant encouragement and moral support to complete my thesis within a stipulated period. In spite of his busy academic and administrative responsibility, he has given me sufficient time when needed. I owe my regard to my supervisor.


I also express my deep sense of appreciation to the Head of the Department of Philosophy, Professor (Dr.) Laxmikanta Padhi for his kind sympathy and academic encouragement to complete my thesis. I am equally grateful to the other teachers of the Department of Philosophy for their valuable suggestions, encouragement and advices in completing my thesis duly. I would also like to thank all the no-teaching staffs of the Department of Philosophy for their help, love, care and moral support to write the thesis. I am also grateful to the staffs of the Departmental library and Central library for their co-operation during my work in the libraries.

I must also record special words of thanks to my beloved wife Arpana Roy Deka, my younger brother Deepjyoti Deka and my respected parents. I must express my deep sense of gratitude for their cooperation, encouragement and inspiration to my younger sisters Dhirumani Kalita and Junumani Talukdar, my sister-in-laws Ghanashyam Kalita and Ghanashyam Talukdar, my loving nieces Mrigangi (Mamam), Harshita (Guriya), Prakshita (Pari) and my loving nephew Priyangshu (Ostad) during the completion of this research work. I am happy to confess that I have experienced some

friendship during my research work and also love and care that I have from them will live and last in my memory till the rest of my life. I must salute and appreciate their loving attitude during my research tenure.

Last but not the least; I have given maximum effort to be the best of my capacity and knowledge to make this thesis substantive and flawless. Having said this, if there remains any flaw in this thesis, conceptually on linguistic level, I myself owe the responsibility for this.

I also owe my deep sense of gratitude to UGC for providing me financial assistance in the form of *Rajiv Gandhi National Fellowship for SC Students* (RGNF). Without this financial assistance, it would not have been possible for me to continue this higher study.



(Anup Deka)

General Introduction

There is no question of doubt that every man is in some sense or other is a religious man. A man in the past was survived with religion but not with science. Even today religion in the true sense of the term is far more justifiable than science while leading a meaningful life. The presence of religion was prevailing at the beginning of the human appearance in the world. Science appeared later. Of course, over the centuries religion has been constantly revised with the grace of science. The attitude of religious person over the course of history with the influence of science had been changed radically.

What then is religion and religious experience? Many different definitions have been proposed as per as religion is concerned. In Concise Oxford Dictionary, it is said that religion is “human recognition of a super human controlling power and especially of a personal God and gods entitled to obedience and worship.” I will also note the psychological definition of religion after William James. He says that religion is “the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual man in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the Divine.” Following Talcott and others, we may outline the sociological definition of religion by saying that religion is *a set of beliefs, practices, and institutions which men have evolved in various societies*. Finally, we may also outline the naturalistic definition of religion after Matthew Arnold. For him, religion is ethics - heightened and enkindled, lit up by feelings. According to Herbert Spencer, religion is the recognition that all things are manifestations of a Power which transcends our knowledge. And again

following Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, we may say that religion is humanities' response to the Divine. Religion is a movement; it is a growth of the soul.¹

The term *religion* originated from the Latin word *religare* means *to bind*. Again, the word *dharma* comes from the Sanskrit root word *dhṛ* which means *to hold, to maintain or to preserve*. In the early Vedas and ancient Hinduism, dharma referred to the cosmic law, which created the ordered universe from chaos. Later, it was applied to other contexts, including human behaviors and ways of living that prevent society, family and Nature from descending into chaos. This included the concepts of duty, rights, religion and morally appropriate behavior. Moreover, religion may be defined as a cultural system of designated behaviors and practices, worldviews, texts, sanctified places, prophecies, ethics, or organizations that relates humanity to supernatural, transcendental, or spiritual elements. Thus, religion in the true sense of the term leads us to build a union of mankind in general. According to Comte, *religion embraces the whole of existence, and the history of religion resumes the entire history of human development.*² Thus, the term 'religion' is an umbrella concept comprising religious rites, customs, activities, beliefs, and sentiments, aspirations, of men and of communities. Religion may also be conceived as an aspect of experience comes within the scope of science what may be termed as '*Science of Religion*'. However, the genesis of religion is associated with the interpretation of the nature of reality; of the meaning of the universe in terms of its value for human life. Religion in the true sense does not take the universe on its face value rather it engages to unearth what lies beyond the surface, beyond the veil of visible things. Thus, religious enquiry

¹ Radhakrishnan, Dr. Sarvepalli, *East and West in Religion*, 1993, p. 19.

² Comte, *Positive Policy*, vol. ii, p. 119 by A. S. Pringle-Pattison in *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy*, 1971, p. 137.

eventually leads towards an inexhaustible spiritual resource and power which is deeply rooted and unseen. According to Edward, *religion is a way of life rather than a society*.³

What then is the origin of religion or locus of religion? As the objective of religion is Divine Revelation it was found in Jewish, Christian and Mohammedan theologies. Here, the term 'revelation' has been attributed as Divine Revelation because it was purely an act performed by God. The other view is that of the so called English Deists developed in the 18th century when the idea of revelation had been rejected and the origin of religion was found in the *human reason*. It states that the fundamental truth of religion, such as, the being of God, the immortality of the soul, the authority of the moral law, are nothing but truths of reason established with the certainty of mathematical truths. Accordingly, it can be said that religion has a two-fold origin, namely, reason as the source of pure natural religion and willful deceit on the part of Priests as the source of historical religions. Thus, in a sense, the purest form of religion is the religion of primitive man, before the Priestcraft had commenced its corrupting work. However, natural religion at first appeared as a perfect thing eventually turned into a false and mischievous. This theory was developed by the English Deists, Lord Herbert and then John Toland and in the later part of the 18th century by La Mettrie, D. Alembert, and Voltaire which is now obsolete because of its serious and obvious defect.

Section II

The Origin and Development of Religion

³ Edwards, D. M., *The philosophy of Religion*, Progressive Publishers, 1993, p. 5.

So far I have outlined the nature of religion in brief and also have mentioned various definitions of religion given by philosophers throughout history. Now, let me examine the origin and development of religion.

The first theory of the origin of religion is known as the *Animistic theory* of Tylor. It appeared in Tylor's monumental volumes *Primitive Culture*⁴ where it is shown that at a particular stage of culture, men everywhere attribute a kind of soul to the phenomena of Nature. According to this theory, early men believed that all Nature was alive, possessed innumerable spirits. According to Tylor, it was on the basis of this Animistic theory of the world that religion arose.

After Animistic theory of religion, we come to know about the *Ghost theory* of religion developed by Herbert Spencer. According to this theory, Animism is not the original theory, but rather it is derivative. The origin of religion actually started from the Ghost theory where worship of ghost was prevailing. According to Herbert Spencer, worship is not the expression of a single thought or a single emotion; rather it is the product of complex thoughts - a powerful one streaming from various directions. Following Jevons, we can say that *the worshipper's pride is that his ancestor was a god and no mere mortal*.⁵

After Herbert Spencer's Ghost Theory, we came to know about *Totemism* as the simplest and most primitive religion. According to Edward, a totem is a species of animal or plant, or more rarely a class of inanimate objects, to which a social group (a clan) stands in an intimate and very special relation of friendship or kinship -

⁴ Tylor, E. B., *Primitive Culture*, 1891, 3rd edition.

⁵ Jevons, F. B., *An Introduction to the History of Religion*, 1896, p. 166.

frequently it is thought of as the ancestor of the clan - which provides that social group with its name.⁶ Edward further contends that a totem is surely not a god; rather a totem is a cognate being something which can be respected. A totem thus lacks the relevance of common purpose; rather it is only relevant from sacramental point of view. For Edward, totem is surely not an individual, animal or a plant. The totemistic theory has further been developed by Robertson Smith in his *Religion of the Semites* (1885) and F. B. Jevons in his *Introduction to the History of Religion* (1896). According to Smith, totemism is a sacrificial system and according to Jevons, totemism is “the most primitive form of society.”⁷ However, Jevons contends that even though totemism is the most primitive form of society, but it is not surely and absolutely the earliest stage of religion. Even before this, one may think of a pre-totemistic stage as a kind of religious belief where the nature of religious belief had been comprehended entirely as a matter of conjecture. It was a stage where animals were supposed to be the first external object came to be worshipped and totemism was the first form of that worship. Accordingly, it may be said that during this stage only one object had been worshipped namely the *totem* or *tribal god*. It was continued for a considerable period of time. Even though totemism is a very ancient religious theory, but its universality is very far from being proved.

After totemism, we witness the conception of *Mana* as pre-animistic religion. The term *Mana* has been expressed by different terms in different languages. In some languages it is named *manitou*. In another language, it appeared as *orenda* and in some other languages, it appeared as *wakonda*. *Mana* is an all-pervading super-sensual power operating in unexpected ways. In a sense, *mana* is mysterious or

⁶ Edwards, D. M., *The philosophy of Religion*, Progressive Publishers, 1993, p. 23.

⁷ Jevons, F. B., *An Introduction to the History of Religion*, Op. cit., p. 99.

magical as distinguished from natural quality. *Mana* is more psychical than a physical and indefinite reservoir of energy in the universe on which primitive men banked for good or ill. Further, *Mana* is incalculably self-manifested power reflected through persons and events. To say that a man has *Mana* is to say that he has power in his *Mana*. The success or failure of a man is due to *Mana*, but not his natural strength of arm, weakness of eye etc., etc. A person possessing *Mana* normally gets the assistance from super-natural. In a sense, the concept of totemism is linked with *Mana*. It is said that a totem animal has got power because it has *Mana*.

After *Mana*, there we observe another pre-animistic religion known as 'Taboo'. Many would say that *Mana* and *Taboo* are two categories taken together give us the clue to rudimentary pre-animistic religion. Every super-natural or mysterious power has two aspects - one is positive and the other is negative. *Mana* is associated with the positive aspect and the *Taboo* is associated with the negative aspect. Thus in a sense, *Mana* and *Taboo* are entwined with each other. They are the two sides of the same mysterious or miracle power.

It is important to be noted here that many would claim that religion and magic have a common route. Religion was prior to magic or following Jevons we can say that religious belief was prior to the magical belief and the later was "a degradation or a relapse in the evolution of religion."⁸ Side by side, there we find the contrary view which claims that magic was prior to religion and the later was evolved out of the former. Even, Sir James Frazer said that in the evolution of thought magic has probably preceded religion. As a result of that, it may be assumed that the age of magic actually set up the foundation of the age of religion. Having said that we can

⁸ Ibid, p. 25.

still believe that there underlies a *mutually* irreconcilable attitude between magic and religion. The relationship between magic and religion is just like the relationship between oil and water. They are interrelated, but they will not mix. What we noted here is that there we do not have a monistic interpretation of the relationship between magic and religion. However, I think that magic is closely affiliated to religion perhaps in the sense that magic in the past was thought to be a mysterious power. However, the concept of magic that we are being witnessed in present days is not the sort of concept that people in the past were thought of. The P. C. Sarkar Junior dealing with a sort of magic is purely based on science. If magic is supposed to be a science, then surely religion and magic would altogether be different concepts. But, the concept of magic in the past was not treated as a science and at that time science was not developed. Therefore, our modern experience of the term ‘magic’ has altogether a different perception as compared to the same term anticipated by the ancient people in the past. One thing should be kept in mind that the concept of *Mana*, *Taboo* and *Magic* are altogether related concepts as per as the origin of religion in the light of anthropology is concerned. Among these three concepts, the concept of *Mana* played the central role and the concepts of *Taboo* and *Magic* are secondary concepts conceivable only concerning *Mana*. *Mana* is nothing but a compelling power and the person possessing *Mana* possessing superpower energy which will help him in the battle of life.

SECTION III

The Psychological Origin and Development of Religion

So far I have examined the origin of religion in the light of anthropology. In this section, I do engage myself in reviewing the psychological origin and development of

religion. There is no question of doubt that in the sphere of religious emotion, feeling, sentiment, and passions play important roles. All these concepts are psychological in nature. Thus, the psychological factors are important in accounting for the development of religion. It is further to be noted that while enquiring the origin and development of religion from psychological point of view, one thing should be kept in mind that the origin and development belong together and they are psychologically continuous. Of course, there is a psychological identity in all religious experience. But, the pertinent question that needs to be taken care of at this juncture is to know about the nature of man that constitutes him a religious being.

In response to this perception, it can be said that man has a *religious instinct*. Accordingly, it may be said that man is religious because he has a religious instinct. This property of man actually is capable of addressing the psychological problem of the origin of religion. Of course, man in general to some extent is endowed with a number of **basal** instincts what may be termed as **alternately** the raw material of personality. However, they are small in number. But, they constitute the original outfit with which every man is equipped. The word 'instinct' actually means something inborn, untaught tendency to specify or to identify certain kind of object or situation independent of prior experience. However, our understanding of religion is not a simple kind of impression; rather it is a very complex and diversified product of the co-operation of several instincts having the capacity of 'heterogeneous manifestations.'⁹ Of course, one should not forget the important distinction of the scientific interpretation of instinct from the psychological interpretation of instinct. As far as scientific interpretation is concerned, instinct is innate in man. However, religious interpretation of instinct does not cope-up with the scientific interpretation

⁹ McDougall, W., *Social Psychology* (12th ed.), 1917, p. 89.

of instinct. Religious interpretation of instinct does not hold that instinct is innate in man. Religion is the synthetic organization of the elemental instinct and emotion of our being in the pursuit of ideal ends.

It is equally important to note here that the psychological origin and development of religion does not accept the view that man has a separate *religious faculty*. Rather, it would address that psychology of religion deals with the same 'human stuff' as psychology generally. There is no separate man's psychological nature that can be labeled religious. According to Edward, it is equally wrong to assume that the origin of religion is primarily concerned to one single **elemental** emotion. Of course, emotion plays an important role in religion and religious experience. But, this does not make sense to say that emotion is all about functioning religion. In the past, there was a theory termed as an *old theory* where it was thought that religion ultimately springs from the *emotion of fear*. This theory equally identified religion with superstition. Even in modern times, Hume reverted to the position of earlier thinkers by pre-conceiving fear as the motive to religious activities. But, Hume was careful to think that fear of the gods was tempered by the hope of securing their goodwill. We also observe fear theory in some writings of recent Psychologists, e.g. Ribot. It was thought that a vague terror of the mysterious sources of Nature pervades the life of the savage. According to Edward, "it is thus fear of the evil spirits that leads to actual religious activities."¹⁰ Having said this, we may think that fear is inadequate for accounting religious consciousness in its more developed stages.

After fear theory of Ribot and others, we note another theory which states that religion had its origin in the sense of kinship with the gods rather than in fear of them.

¹⁰ Edwards, D. M., *The philosophy of Religion*, op. cit., p. 35.

This may be conceived as the positive theory developed within the horizon of psychology. According to Edward, it is not a vague fear of unknown powers; rather it is a sort of loving reference for non-gods who are knit to their worshippers by strong bonds of kinship. Thus, the concept of fear should be treated as a favorable doctrine of religion. Even, it was found in the Old Testament in which it states that “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.” And even in the New Testament it was stated that “to worship God acceptably - but with godly fear and awe.”

It is important to be noted here that while talking about the psychological origin and development of religion, one should be careful about the distinction between functional or dynamic psychology and static psychology. Functional psychology is associated with personal self-realization; whereas static psychology studies several aspects of consciousness without referring any personal self-realization. According to Edward, the method of functional psychology is indispensable in the study of religious consciousness. Religion, so to speak, at length, came to its birth amidst the consciousness, emotional rather than ideational of mysterious power affecting human life. Religion is rooted in biological necessity because religion is nothing but the struggle for life. Religion is essentially an eternal going out in search of completeness and wholeness of life. Religion is faith and faith is a way of life. Religion is not something artificially imposed upon man; rather religion has its source deep down in the ultimate.

Man gets fullest satisfaction only in religion and nothing else. Religion raised his life above the mere biological plan, above the struggle for bare existence and in turn gives man higher satisfaction towards achieving the attainment of goodness, beauty, and truth. Religion paves the way to lead a true and pure life, “the life that is life indeed”

and eventually helps one to move towards full self-realization. Religion is potentially spiritual and it is made explicit as man's experience grows and deepens. The ultimate objective of religion is to teach how one gets the path of self-realization through self-sacrifice. Self-realization through self-sacrifice is the law of life.

Like emotion, the feeling is even more important in the psychical origin and development of religion. In the past, the feeling cannot be sharply distinguished from the will. The feeling is the innermost core of personality. Our feeling seems to us to be the deepest and most vivid of our experiences. Thus, in a sense, the development of religion associated with feeling is supposed to be the core of psychical life. Feeling perhaps may be treated as an abstraction having no real existence, but the fact is that in the highest development of religion feeling remains indispensable and central. According to Schleiermacher, the essence of religion is nothing but *soul's feelings of immediate contact and fusion with the infinite*.¹¹ Even many would say that religion is the feeling of Absolute dependence on God. We observe the same philosophical standpoint even in William James' writings. According to William James, *the feeling is the deeper source of religion and that philosophy and theological formulas are secondary products, like translations of a text into another tongue*.¹² Accordingly, we can say that religious experience is nothing but a sort of religious feeling. What then is religious feeling? Some would say that religious feeling is nothing but that of dependence on God. Feeling, in a sense, is determined by the faith in the conservation of values. Religious feeling is developed out of religious emotion. Religious emotion is a complex sentiment comprising awe, wonder, admiration, gratitude, hope, the feeling of dependence, love, sense of comfort and strength, peace, joy etc. According

¹¹ See J. Oman's translation, *Schleiermacher on Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers* (1893).

¹² James, William, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902, p. 431.

to William James, the feeling is private and dumb, and realistically it enables to give an account of itself. Accordingly, its results are mysterious and enigmas. Having said this, it may be assumed that religious feeling in the real sense of the term must pass through the crucible of the will as well as of the intellect. Following Edward, it may be said that religious feeling must be not only thought out but lived out. Religious feeling in some sense or other is translated into action.

If religion is estimated in this way, then religion is supposed to be a kind of activity, a type of behavior. It then should be treated as a form of life where emotion or religious feeling based on religious belief issues in action. According to Edward, religious feeling is a kind of nascent action; it is the response of an organism in a situation. Religion is an inward feeling and it demands outward expression. However, it is psychologically incomplete, because it functions under the pressure of the struggle for life. Religion has also its intellectual as well as its emotional and volitional aspect. Of course, religion is not a product of intellectual, but of the grind of existence “that ever seeks to transform itself into freedom and joy.”¹³ Therefore, it would not be prudent to enquire the origin of religion from pure intellectual curiosity. If religion is evolved in intellectual curiosity then it should not be treated as a religion in the real sense of the term. This point has been raised by Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan in his book *East and West in Religion*. If religion is involved with science or the foundation of religion is based on science then it would be treated as the science of religion. But, according to Dr. Radhakrishnan, the problem with the science of religion is that it does not give us or provide the meaning of life in the real sense of the term. The main objective of religion is to give the meaning of life and the real meaning of life can be comprehended towards achieving authenticate knowledge associated with Divine

¹³ Coe, G. A., *The Psychology of Religion*, 1916, p. 60.

soul. Thus, religion is a movement and upward one. The religious movement gradually leads to higher religion where there emerges *theology* - a religious stage where attempt has been made to interpret religious values in terms of thought. This eventually leads to another stage what may be emerged as the philosophy of religion where the meaning of religious experience has been examined and validated. Thus, in one sense, religious movement leads us towards universal objective truth. It is important to note here that the core of religious experience is *a subjective feeling*. However, this subjective feeling does not hamper gaining universal objective truth. The religious mind always wants a theology.

SECTION IV

The Historical Development of Religion

So far I have developed the origin of religion in the light of anthropology and psychology. In this section, I propose to examine the historical development of religion. It is important to note here that so long we do not have an adequate anthropological history we would no longer in a position of philosophizing about religion. Therefore, it is almost an imperative to know about the whole religious development of mankind in all stages and phases of civilization. Realistically, we cannot understand what religion is without knowing something of what it does. In this regard, we do have the historical evolution of religion. In fact, the stages in religious growth are coordinate with the stages in civilization and culture as a whole. The simplest form of social organization from historical point of view began with tribal religion.

Tribal Religion:

According to Edward, tribal is the rudimentary form of social union. It was exceedingly small and limited social group, just merely an extension of the family. Blood relationship is the one social bond and beyond blood relationship, the surrounding tribes were regarded potential enemies. Even though tribal group was tiny but in a sense it is a very compact body. The group, though small, acts as one body like Wordsworth's *Cloud*; it "moveth altogether if it move at all". Within the liberal group, there is no importance of individuality. Any infringement of tribal custom leads to terrible punishment. Thus, within the tribal group, each individual renders obedience as a matter of course rather than as a matter of personal conviction. Here, men's speech was subject to Nature and there was a deep emotional response to the invisible forces of the world. In fact, the historical development of religion begins with the belief in mysterious unseen power. In this regard, I have already mentioned the insight of *Mana, Taboo, Animism, and Totemism*. Animism develops into Spiritism based on "an awakened consciousness of the superiority of the soul to the body and of its relative independence." Spiritism eventually paved the way for religious spiritualism which asserts "God is a spirit, and whoever worships Him, must worship Him in spirit and in truth. Thus, it leads to a great truth."¹⁴

One should remember that the history of religion is a record of unbroken process that marks progress. In primitive religion, *Fetishism* represents retrogression rather than progression. The term 'fetish' is derived from the Portuguese *feitico*. It means 'a charm'. Fetish is selected not because of its intrinsic value, *but because of the spirit* which is supposed to dwell within it. Initially, fetishes were probably natural objects having supernatural power, but in West Africa, a fetish is not so much found as made by the medicine man or doctor. A fetish is sacred so long it works. However,

¹⁴ Tiele, C. P., *The Science of Religion*, (Gifford Lectures 1896), Vol. I, p. 74.

according to Edward, fetishism, in general, is a very low form of religion having fairly advanced Spiritism for its background, but in a real sense, it is a blind alley. Fetish is more allied to magic than to religion. Edward says that Fetish is retrogressive, debasing, individualistic, and capricious.¹⁵

However, the problem with tribal religion is that it is dominated by fear. Secondly, tribal religion was narrow and exclusive in the extreme, because it refuses the members of other tribes or clans. Having said that it would be true to say that the positive aspect of tribal religion is that it makes for social solidarity with a sense of common obligation. Loyalty to tribal customs is the root out of which the ethical spirit developed. This development eventually in turn helps to formulate of larger group based on wider loyalties in the name of national religion.

National Religion:

National religion, according to Edward, develops out of tribal religion when the group of tribal felt urgency to unite to tackle the fear or danger coming from their counterparts. The religious development thus accompanies the movement from tribal to national life is a sort of movement religiously known as the movement from *Polydaemonism to Polytheism*.¹⁶ The Tribal religion consists of *Polydaemonism*, i.e., the worship of many spirits. When tribal religion throughout historical development turns into national religion, the so-called *Polydaemonism* simultaneously turns into Polytheism where natural spirits eventually transform into anthropomorphized. The worships of many spirits available in tribal religion were gradually elevated to the status of gods in national religion. For example, the Vedic Agni is a fire-god and the

¹⁵ Edwards, D. M., *The philosophy of Religion*, op. cit., p. 61.

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 64.

Persian *Ahura* is a light-god. However, not all the Polytheistic gods were product of anthropomorphizing the spirits of natural objects. Each designated god had mythological stories and these stories about the gods are called *myths*. As a result of that, there emerged mythology which has largely an attempt to give the reason of things. It seeks to explain the origin of religion and the reason for national phenomena. As a result of that, mythology appeared as primitive science or primitive philosophy capable of giving a satisfactory account of intellectual curiosity. The imaginary activity in mythology is spontaneous that would represent the common consciousness of individuals rather than of the individual mind working in isolation.

One should not however confuse mythology with religion. Mythology is only one in religion and it may be designated as the intellectual element of religion. Religion is emotional and practical before it is intellectual. Mythology is a way of thinking, immature speculation of pre-creative imagination. Mythology thus may be treated as early men's poetry and romance and also his science and philosophy. Mythology is closely associated with religion, but in the real sense, it is neither religion nor even the source of religion. According to Edward, worship comes before mythology and there were some development in mythology that was not of religious interest. However, no one can deny the relevance of mythology in religious sphere. Following Plato, we can say that mythology has still great Pedagogic value. Edward reveals two important insights in the development of national religion, namely, the moralization of the gods and the movement in the direction of monotheism.

As far as the moralization of the gods is concerned, it may be said that moral character could not be attributed to the spirits of natural objects; rather it should be bestowed on one who shall judge the world in righteousness and minister judgment to

the peoples in uprightness. It should be bestowed on one who is yet merciful and gracious, longsuffering and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin.¹⁷ This propensity actually leads to the moralization of the god because it is god who alone unites mercy and truth, righteousness and peace, and above all He alone realizes the ideal perfection. However, the pertinent question is: how to reconcile god's alleged perfection of love and goodness with the apparent imperfection of the world vitiated with sin and suffering? To give a suitable answer to this question there appears the relevance of monotheism and as a result of that, the historical development of religion involves the movement in the direction of monotheism. Thus, polytheism eventually turns into monotheism. According to monotheism, there is an element of unity in the world of gods and spirits based on the supremacy of the monarch god. But, the monarch god is not the only God. This type of perception may be called *Monarchianism*. *Monarchianism* then turns into *Henotheism*, according to Max Müller, where devotion concentrates primarily on one particular deity having universal power. It is an attitude of piety rather than of theoretic belief. Henotheism then leads to *Pantheism* admitting multiplicity of gods into the unity of Being or Substance. At this stage, the history of religion was not confined only with the history of the development of beliefs about gods, but also of the acts through which men sought to establish harmonious relations with the gods. This notional shift from beliefs to act actually opens up the development of religion to a greater length. It eventually leads to universal religion. In fact, a tendency in the direction of universal religion is seen within some of the national religions themselves. According to Edward, the insight of national religion is bestowed in the remark: "I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their

¹⁷ D'Alviella's Hibbert Lectures, *Origin and Growth of the Conception of God* (1892), Chap. V.

hearts.” Universal religion is a matter of internal state of mind and heart; it is no longer associated with external ritual. Thus, in a sense, universal religion is already incipiently universal. In the desired sense, Buddhism, Jainism, and Hinduism are treated as universal religion, because each of these religions puts an emphasis on the internal state of mind and heart. The youngest of the universal religion is Islam. In spite of its rigidity, it must be classed with the universal religion in virtue of its missionary zeal.

The Nature of Religion:

It seems from the above observation that religion over the course of history took different interpretations in different religious schools. The concept of religion in *spiritualism* is certainly different from the concept of religion in Materialism. Not only that the conflicts between science and religion appeared over the course of history made an impact to change the nature of religion. It has been stated that when there was no science, there was religion. In the real sense of the term, men born as a religious being and later on he has been acquainted with science. Thus, my understanding of religion is something external, inward, in compared to science which is purely external in nature.

The other important aspect of religion is that it may usually be understood with regard to some unseen force or deity or supernatural power or in the most common sense God. As a religious person, it is a general perception that one has to pray to God. Therefore, religion in some sense or other is associated with invisible power. If we go through *Indian Spiritualism*, we may notice that religion is understood *as a movement* or as a growth. Religion is the spirit of the soul. It is the growth of the soul. Thus religion, from the Indian perspective, is a matter of revelation or self-realization of the

individual soul. If we remember Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, or Vivekananda, or Rabindranath Tagore, we find that each of them emphasizes the inner cultivation of the soul of becoming a truly religious person. Each of them advocated in favour of universal religion. In this regard, Dr. Radhakrishnan was influenced by Rabindranath Tagore. Tagore emphasized on the *Surplus of men*. True religion is nothing but a surplus-value. This surplus value can be accumulated or extracted by an individual if he or she will come to know that he or she is an integral part of God. Tagore has attributed it to the phrase “Nara-Narayana”. We notice the same in Dr. Radhakrishnan as well. According to Dr. Radhakrishnan, true religion (universal religion) is the outcome of intuition not detachable from intellect. According to Dr. Radhakrishnan, it is wrong to presume that intellect is altogether a different concept apart from intuition. Rather, intuition is a higher or superior form of intellect. The real meaning of life can be determined not by intellect, but by intuition.

However, if we compare Eastern religion with Western religion, we find a different nature. Western religion in some sense or other is materialistic in nature. It gives importance on reason instead of faith-based on intuition. Unlike the Eastern religion, Western religion in the past was dominated by Christianity where men are supposed to be the representative of God or the messenger of God involving worldly activities with the wish of God. This sort of religion has appeared as an extreme form of Anthropocentrism where men are supposed to be the measures of all things. Gradually, Western religion has taken the shelter of science and epistemology. In recent times, people are talking about the science of religion or cognitive religion where the nature of religion is determined on the basis of cognition. What I can say at this juncture is that the very nature of religion over the course of history took different interpretations with regard to the cultural development of global communities. Thus,

we do not have a monistic interpretation of religion whether religion is being interpreted externally or internally. If religion is based on cognition or epistemology, then a continuous revision from a cognitive perspective is pre-requisite. On the other hand, if religion is taken into account from spiritual point of view, then it is a pre-requisite to cultivate our soul endlessly. Thus religious practice, in the real sense of the term, is an ongoing process, and upward journey or movement or growth.

My main concern is to analyze and examine Wittgenstein's religious language, religious experience as a form of life. Early Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and his *Lectures on Ethics* inclined to say that religious language is inexpressible. Therefore, in the **First Chapter** of this thesis, I propose to analyze and examine Wittgenstein's outlook of religious language and religious experience and it would be entitled as **Religious Inexpressibility: An Early Wittgenstein's Account**. I think Wittgenstein remains skeptical about religious matters even in his later writings. Thus in a sense, his understanding of religion remains intact even in his later writings. However, in his later philosophy, particularly in his *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein anticipates ordinary or natural language instead of propositional language. Therefore, in his *PI*, he does not talk in favor of *my language and my world*. Instead he says that there is a possibility of religious language and here in his *PI*, Wittgenstein has anticipated various forms of life of which religion is to be treated as a form of life among many different forms of life. Therefore, in the **Second Chapter** of this thesis, I propose to analyze and examine after Wittgenstein in what sense religion and religious experience may be conceived as a form of life and it would be entitled as **Religious Language as a Form of Life**. I think that Wittgenstein's position of religious language and religious experience would be clearer in his subsequent philosophical writings. He took a stringent position about

religious matters in his *TLP*. In his *PI*, though he remains skeptical about religious matters but considers or includes religious issues under the domain of language-game. He was more focused about religious matters in his *Culture and Value* (hence forth CV). Here Wittgenstein understands and interprets religion with regard to culture. In fact, many would say that religion is nothing but culture. The religion of a community as a culture is reflected by means of language. In this regard, I consider Wittgenstein as the pathfinder of this view. Here, Wittgenstein asserts that religion is culture and the value of religion is based on the culture of the community or society. Therefore, in the **Third Chapter** of this thesis, I propose to analyze and examine Wittgenstein's position of religion and religious experience from the perspective of culture and value and it would be entitled as **Religion, Culture, and Value**. In the **Fourth Chapter** of this thesis, I propose to develop the philosophical impact of Wittgenstein on the religious matter and religious experience. I think that Wittgenstein's position about religious matters and religious experience integrated the whole philosophy of religion and religious experience. It also gives a new dimension to the philosophy of religion known as non-God based philosophy of religion. His non-God based philosophy of religion actually sets up the new dimension of the philosophy of religion what may be called the future philosophy of religion. I propose to develop some of the insights of Wittgenstein's philosophy or religious language and religious experience with my own rationale and it would be entitled as **Concluding Remarks**. The thesis will end with a **Selected Bibliography**.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Chapter One

Religious Inexpressibility: An Early Wittgenstein's Account

In the history of linguistic philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein held a unique position, because he had been attributed as early and later Wittgenstein because of his apparent philosophical cultivations. Even though Wittgenstein was a leading proponent of linguistic philosophy who introduced language as a philosophical method throughout his philosophical career and in this regard he had been consistent enough, but the language he adopted or so to speak employed in his early and later stages are different in nature. He had been attributed early and later Wittgenstein because of his different approaches of language. The philosophical problems he anticipated in his early and later philosophy were almost the same but the solutions to such philosophical problems were completely different. In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*,¹⁸ Wittgenstein employed ideal or logical language to deal with the so-called traditional philosophical problems. But, in his *Philosophical Investigations*,¹⁹ he employed ordinary or natural language to deal with the same problem he had anticipated in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Let me explicate the nature of language after early Wittgenstein.

Nature of Language in Early Wittgenstein:

¹⁸ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1974): *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears & B. F. McGuinness, Routledge: London and New York.

¹⁹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1958): *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell.

In the early period, Wittgenstein was a revisionist. Like many other referential Semantists, Wittgenstein said that ordinary or natural language by its very nature is ambiguous and vague. In this regard, he was particularly influenced by Bertrand Russell. He started from the principle of Symbolism and relations and with the help of these concepts he enabled to show *how traditional philosophy and traditional solutions arise out of ignorance of the principle of Symbolism and out of misuse of language.*²⁰ He realized that only by a logically perfect language the principle of Symbolism and the relations can properly be addressed. Wittgenstein anticipated various problems of natural languages, such as, the problem of the intended meaning of the language which becomes a part of psychology; the problem of the relationship between thoughts and words which becomes the problem of epistemology; the problem of identifying criteria of conveying truth rather than falsehood which belongs to logic. Thus, it seems that the problem of language becomes a part of psychology, epistemology and logic as well. Natural language, Wittgenstein opined, is problematic because most questions and propositions have been dealt with by philosophers without knowing or understanding *the logic of our language.*²¹

While anticipating or preconceiving the default of natural language, Wittgenstein talked in favour of logical perfect language. While narrating the nature of the logical perfect language of Wittgenstein, Russell says, “A logically perfect language has rules of syntax which prevent nonsense, and has single symbols which always have a definite and unique meaning.”²² Wittgenstein was not concerned that any language would be logically perfect, rather he was primarily concerned that the function of

²⁰ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1974): *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, introduction by Bertrand Russell, p. ix.

²¹ Ibid, p. xi.

²² Ibid, p. x.

language is to have meaning. Thus, he was concerned about the problem of meaning which he found difficult in natural language because of its ambiguous nature. That is why, Wittgenstein had postulated ideal language which would be particularly relevant for symbolism and relations. For Wittgenstein, the essential function of language is to assert or deny facts.

In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein said that the totality of proposition is language. Thus, his understanding of language is propositional in nature. Wittgenstein had introduced only seven propositions in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* along with some associate sub-clarification of the original propositions.

The seven propositions are as follows:

P1: The world is all that is the case.

P2: What is the case - a fact - is the existence of states of affairs.

P3: A logical picture of facts is a thought.

P4: A thought is a proposition with a sense.

P5: A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.

P6: The general form of a truth-function is $[p, \xi, N(\xi)]$. This is the general form of a proposition.

P7: What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

The above-mentioned propositions are very specific in the sense that they reflect the very nature of language as well as the very nature of reality. These propositions, to me, equally reflect the limit of language, the function of language, and also the limit of the world. He draws the limit of language and the limit of the world because he

desires to cognize the world with the help of a mental picture. He inclines to say that the language he constructed must be structural and as a result of that it can depict the world. As his constructed propositional language can depict the world, anything outside the limit of such language invites mysticism. The point is very simple because if we go outside the limit of language, then we cannot express anything. Everything is inexpressible outside the sphere of language. That is why, Wittgenstein suggests that in such a case it would better to pass over everything into silence. Therefore, Wittgenstein in the seventh proposition says, “what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.”²³

What can be said and what cannot be said:

Based on the limits of language, Wittgenstein comes to know what can be said and what cannot be said. Anything that falls within the limits of language can be said and anything that falls beyond the limit of language cannot be said. What can be said is expressible and what cannot be said is inexpressible. Moreover, what belongs to the limits of language would never be accidental and what lies beyond the limits of language would be accidental. As ethics, religion, aesthetics (Wittgenstein understands all these in the same way) lies beyond the limits of language, they must lie outside the world and would be accidental. Therefore, there is no question of asserting the propositions of ethics, religion, and aesthetics. Ethics, religion and aesthetics express *something higher*, but propositions can express nothing higher. That is why, Wittgenstein says, “So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics. Propositions can express nothing that is higher.”²⁴

²³ Ibid, p. 7.

²⁴ Ibid, Sec. 6.42, p. 71.

It should be kept in mind that Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* considered a religion, ethics and aesthetics in the same way because all these lie beyond the limits of language. As they lie beyond the limits of language, they cannot be put into words. As a result of that, they can be treated as transcendental. Propositions deal with what is to be the case or not to be the case. In this regard, every proposition has two senses, such as either the proposition is to be true (to be the case) or the proposition is to be false (not to be the case). This is all about the proposition. If it happens, then Wittgenstein's *Tractatarian* propositions are no longer associated with value, whether it would be religious value, moral value, or aesthetic value. That is why, Wittgenstein remarked that "if there is any value that this has value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case."²⁵ Wittgenstein continues by saying that what happens is happened accidentally and what lies within the limits of the language must lie non-accidentally.²⁶

Certainly, what is accidental, what lies outside the limits of language, and above all what is primarily associated with values is inexpressible according to early Wittgenstein. As a result of that, we are no longer in a position to speak about them so far they are the subject matter of religious belief, ethical attributes, and aesthetic assertions. Anything that is associated with ethics and religion are part of psychology. The early Wittgenstein completely ignores the relevance of psychology within the limits of language. In this regard, early Wittgenstein held the same position as Frege

²⁵ Ibid, Sec. 6.41, p. 71.

²⁶ Ibid, Sec. 6.421, p. 71.

did. Like Wittgenstein, Frege was an anti-psychologist when he developed the language of logic and mathematics.²⁷

Thus, as far as his understanding of religion is concerned, Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* took a radical version of the notion of religion. He held that religion inevitably leads towards nonsense because religious language does not belong to the limits of language Wittgenstein anticipated in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. The language that has been presented in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is logical, structural, and analyzable into parts and also has the capacity to picture the world in logical space. Neither of these attributes is being fulfilled by religious language. As a matter of fact, we simply stand in a no man's land where we can say anything about religion. This actually makes religious language inexpressible what may alternatively be termed as *nonsense*. Early Wittgenstein merely and certainly drew the limits or so to speak the limitation of language. It specifically asserts that there are limitations upon what language could do in virtue of its very nature. Wittgenstein denies the possibility of *elucidations* of any sort in religious language or religious expression. Even, in his *A Lecture on Ethics*, Wittgenstein defended it. Here, he said that to write or to talk about religion is an attempt *to run against the boundaries of language*. He further continues that his running against the world of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless.²⁸

Religious Inexpressibility in Early Wittgenstein:

²⁷ See "On Sense and Reference", included in *Modern Philosophy of Language*, (ed.) Maria Baghramian, Counterpoint: Washington, 1998, pp. 3-5.

²⁸ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, "A Lecture on Ethics", in James Klagge and Alfred Nordman (eds.), Ludwig Wittgenstein - Philosophical Investigations, 1912-1951, (Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1993), p. 44.

Thus, it seems that religion (ethics/aesthetics) is completely inexpressible in the *Tractatus* and *A Lecture on Ethics*. Wittgenstein has developed why and how religion as such is inexpressible in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. It has already been stated above that Wittgenstein drew the limits of language on the basis of which something can be said meaningfully. While illuminating the metaphor ‘limits of language’ Wittgenstein inclined to say that one may come to know one side of the world just by focusing on the limits of language. At the same time, one cannot be in a position to say something meaningfully regarding the other side of the world. As a result of that, the other side of the world that lies beyond the limit will be simply nonsense.²⁹ It means that, only within the limits of language we are in a position to say something meaningfully. As metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, and above all religion lie on the other side of the limits of language, Wittgenstein drew in the *Tractatus*, and these are simply nonsense. Thus, they cannot be brought under the limits of language. As they lie beyond the limits of language, they had *nothing to say*, according to Wittgenstein. They had nothing to say because *there was nothing to say*.³⁰

The pertinent question that needs to be taken care of at this point is: Why did Wittgenstein assert that metaphysical, ethical, aesthetical, theological, or religious words had nothing to say because there was nothing to say? So far it has been outlined after Wittgenstein that we are entitled to say something meaningfully within the limits of language. Now, we have to know after Wittgenstein what we exactly say meaningfully within the limits of language. I have already outlined after Wittgenstein the nature of language. We have seen that his understanding of language is

²⁹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (Routledge Classics edition, London, 2002), p. 4.

³⁰ DeAngelis, William James, *Ludwig Wittgenstein - A Cultural Point of View*, Ashgate, 2007, p. 102.

propositional or truth-functional. He in his *Tractatus* inclined to say that all meaningful propositions are truth-functions of an elementary or atomic proposition. The distinctive feature of the proposition is that every proposition *invariably* pictures a fact. Accordingly, it can be said that if a proposition is being analyzed into an atomic proposition then surely every atomic proposition pictures an atomic fact. Wittgenstein further contends that every proposition, whether atomic or not, must have two senses - either the proposition is to be true or the proposition is to be false. Wittgenstein equally claims that the truth and falsity of proposition cannot be established a priori. The truth and falsity is a matter of whether it accurately depicts some fact that is in the world. Not only that, by claiming that the world is the totality of facts, Wittgenstein actually wanted to compare language and reality (world) by way of establishing a pictorial relationship between proposition and fact through his celebrated picture theory of meaning. Thus, in a sense, one may say that the truth or falsity of each atomic proposition is an empirical matter in the sense that “an atomic proposition is true if and only if it depicts some facts in the world.”³¹

Even though an atomic proposition depicts some facts in the world and hence it is empirical, but Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* gave more importance to the logical picture. He understood everything concerning logical space. Logical space differs from empirical space in the sense that it goes beyond the empirical space. In empirical space, everything is being determined based on the causal connection and the uniformity of nature. However, in logical space, there are some possible situations that do not match up with a causal connection. According to Wittgenstein, the most important aspect of logical space is that whatever is determined in logical space it is determined in the absolute sense of the term. This so

³¹ Ibid, p. 103.

happens because every possibility or situation is available in logical space and no new situation will arise later on. Thus, there is no point in saying in the absolute sense of the term that a proposition pictures a fact in the world means that the world under consideration would be an empirical world.

According to Wittgenstein, there are just two sorts of truth, namely, necessary truth and contingent truth. Tautologies are a priori necessary truth devoid of factual content and remain consistent with any set of facts. All other truths are contingent, empirical, and a posteriori. Thus, there is no room for metaphysical truths, aesthetic truths, theological truths, or religious truths. Wittgenstein further contends that all necessary truths are empty because they do not say anything in the real sense of the term and all truths of substance are merely factual. Thus, there can be no significant truth beyond empirical truths, according to Wittgenstein. Traditional metaphysics, religion, and theology actually claim to establish trans-empirical truth and hence such truths are impossible, according to *Tractatus*. Ethical and aesthetic truths, Wittgenstein's opines were different in nature because they were traditionally associated with *no matter* what the world is traditionally like. The same is equally true in the case of theological and religious truth because they were traditionally transcended empirical fact. Thus, it may be said after Wittgenstein that truths associated with or arising out of metaphysics, theology, or religion are not truths of the world rather they lie beyond the limits of the world. As they lie beyond the limits of the world, they belong to the higher-order and we are no longer in a position to say anything about them. It would be better for us to pass over in silence.

It seems to me that Wittgenstein of *Tractatus* was particular and adamant to draw the limits of the world based on a certain philosophical outlook. As a result of that, he

was no longer in a position to incorporate truths associated with metaphysics, theology, religion, aesthetics, etc. But, this position of Wittgenstein actually goes against natural theologians who in some sense or other employed factual propositions to undermine religious claims. According to natural theologians, the knowledge of the existence of God is an a posteriori knowledge. If this so happens, then why does Wittgenstein reject all these truths associated with religion, metaphysics, aesthetics, theology, etc.? Of course, Wittgenstein in the later part of his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* had offered an insightful reason or ground of treating religious language in a different outlook, but many natural theologians did not accept Wittgenstein's position of *Tractatus*. Even, many would say that the reason Wittgenstein drew in the *Tractatus* was not at all satisfactory. I think Wittgenstein was extremely right and clear about his clarification of rejecting the language of ethics, religion, theology, and metaphysics from the domain of language of proposition. It has already been stated that Wittgenstein of *Tractatus* was specific as far his understanding of language, understanding of reality (world) and also about the relationship between language and reality is concerned. Being a referential Semantic, Wittgenstein understood language as propositional or truth-functional. He equally understood reality as the totality of facts. His understanding of the relationship between language and reality is representational functioning under the orbit of *pictorial form*. Thus, the relationship between language and reality is structural where there lies an underlying one-to-one correspondence between every element of a proposition with every element of fact. Thus, I may say after Wittgenstein that language is truth-functional, the reality is the totality of facts where a fact makes a proposition as either true or false; and the relationship between language and fact is made possible through pictorial form or pictorial relationship. Based on this

philosophical background, Wittgenstein offered us a very specific criterion expressed by the proposition that one can determine the limit of the world by the limit of the language.

Thus, the limits of language and the limits of the world are absolutely clear to Wittgenstein of *Tractatus*. Now, if language relating to religious matters is being recognized, then certainly such language should be captured within propositions. Because, only propositional language is acceptable to early Wittgenstein and hence propositional language or proposition as such is the highest importance according to early Wittgenstein. As religious language and religious experience were associated with absolute values and dealt with the deepest problems of human life, with the real meaning of life as well as the meaning of the world itself, such matters *could not be put into words*. Wittgenstein in his *A Lecture on Ethics* clearly stated the tendency of *Tractatus* to set aside the issues, such as, what is higher, what is dealt with the problems of life, what is associated with the sense of the world and even God. Of course, he denied these not on the ground that they are not inter-connected; rather on the ground that these things cannot be meaningfully expressed. In this regard, Wittgenstein inclines to say that the sense of the world must lie outside the world and if there is any value which is of value, it then cannot lie in the world.³² He then says that the limits of language by no means deal with value. If there is a sense of value, it cannot lie in the world. It lies outside the world. As it lies outside the world, it is higher. Propositions, so to speak, cannot express anything higher. Propositions are primarily concerned with something to be the case or not to be the case. Propositions picture fact. As a result of that, it can be said after Wittgenstein that the language of a

³² Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, paragraph: 6.41, p. 71.

proposition is completely different from what is higher. What is higher is associated with God. God does not reveal himself in the world. As a result, that God cannot be the part of propositional language because propositional language deals only with logical truths expressible in the form of “to be the case” or “not to be the case” *in logical space*. Wittgenstein further contends that logical and scientific elucidations or questions can be answered without dealings with the problem of life associated with higher values. As a result of that, the problems of life associated with higher values have not been touched at all. The boundary of *Tractatus* has been demarcated based on the limits of language and within this boundary, everything can be expressed meaningfully. Since things associated with religious discourse lie outside the *Tractatarian* boundary, they cannot be expressed meaningfully. Thus, things associated with religious discourse are ultimate values and they remain inexpressible because they are not the part of the world. Wittgenstein, being a religious person, recognized it very well that things associated with religious discourse have powerful tendencies with important consequences and it would impact a lot on human behavior. But, he emphatically in his *Tractatus* condemns all such expressions as nonsensical. Not only that, he equally believed all such things to be perfectly and absolutely hopeless in his *A Lecture on Ethics*.³³ In his *A Lecture on Ethics*, Wittgenstein goes on to say that what is being condemned as nonsense is not only high-minded theology as it is supposed to be but also the attempts of earnest individuals, like him, to express deeply felt religious tendencies.³⁴

In his *A Lecture on Ethics*, Wittgenstein outlines *ethics and religion and their inexpressibility*. It seeks to show that ethics could not sensibly be expressed in

³³ See *A Lecture on Ethics*, p. 38.

³⁴ DeAngelis, William James, *Ludwig Wittgenstein - A Cultural Point of View*, Ashgate, 2007, p. 105.

language. In fact, Wittgenstein very often links the *inexpressibility of ethics and ethical values to the inexpressibility of religion and religious values*. Thus, like ethics, Wittgenstein equally denies the possibility of religious expression and religious language. As per as ethics is concerned, it is primarily associated with values of a certain sort.

Relative and Absolute Values:

Wittgenstein while talking about ethical and religious inexpressibility classifies values with regard to Factual and Absolute. According to Wittgenstein, values associated with ethics and religion is absolute values because such values lie outside the limit of language. On the other hand, factual values are relative because such values are an integral part of the empirical world. When Wittgenstein inclines to say that ethics is the enquiry into *what is good*, he thereby means to say that ethics is the enquiry into *what is valuable*. According to Wittgenstein, the term *what is valuable* is essentially associated with the *meaning of life*. Again, by the term *the meaning of life* Wittgenstein means *what makes life worth living*. The meaning of life, according to Wittgenstein, gives us the direction into the right way of living. In this regard, Wittgenstein says, "... if you look at all these phrases you will get a rough idea as to what it is that Ethics is concerned with."³⁵

According to Wittgenstein, ethics deals with goodness, rightness, etc. which are absolute values. Such values are not expressible in the real sense of the term. In this regard, we may recall G. E. Moore's concept of *Naturalistic Fallacy*. According to Moore, good is non-natural and it is indescribable or inexpressible, according to Wittgenstein. Any attempt to define 'good' leads into a *Naturalistic Fallacy*,

³⁵ See "A Lecture on Ethics", p. 38.

according to Moore. Wittgenstein does not intend to say that absolute values lead to fallacy. Rather, he intends to say that absolute values are values that cannot be expressed by means of language. Initially, Wittgenstein inclined to think that he can sensibly express absolute values, but ultimately he comes to realize that such expression is impossible. In his *A Lecture on Ethics*, Wittgenstein explains or takes note of absolute values seriously, and at the end, he concludes that absolute value is “a chimera”. In this regard, he brings the distinction between *relative and absolute values*. On one hand, Wittgenstein talks about values concerning relative or trivial sense, and on the other hand, he conceives values concerning ethical or absolute sense. When he says, ‘this is a good chair’ he wants to say that the chair serves a certain pre-determined purpose. Here, the word ‘good’ is comprehended in the relative sense. Likewise, when it is said ‘good runner’ or ‘good pianist’, Wittgenstein values ‘good’ in the relative sense. Likewise, when Wittgenstein says ‘right way to Granchester’ he uses ‘right’ in a similar relative sense. Such values, being relative values, are not ethical values. While illuminating the distinction between relative and ethical values, Wittgenstein intends to say this that the right way that ethics can function. Supposing that I could play tennis and one of you saw me playing and said that you play pretty badly here and further suppose that I answered that I know but I don’t want to play any better because I play badly intentionally. Then all the other man could say would it really be the case and if it would be the case that that is all right. But further, suppose I had told a preposterous lie and he came up to me and said that you are behaving like a beast and then in response, I said that I know I behave badly, but then I don’t want to behave any better than that. The point is: could he then say that is all right? Certainly not, rather he would say that you *ought* to want to

behave better. Here we have a judgment of absolute value, whereas the first instance was one of a relative judgment.³⁶

The above passage gives us a vivid idea of relative and absolute values comprehended by Wittgenstein in his *A Lecture on Ethics*. Playing Tennis well is not an absolute value, because playing Tennis well or badly is no longer associated with behaving badly. Even bad Tennis may be “alright” from an ethical perspective. In contrast, behaving well, according to Wittgenstein, is an absolute value because it is an ethical value. It is not ethically acceptable to behave badly. Bad behavior, Wittgenstein opines, is never “alright” from ethical perspective. Wittgenstein then says that relative value or trivial value is associated with factual statements and the absolute value is not associated with factual statement. A statement is factual if it is associated with a fact, i.e. worldly matters. For example, when Wittgenstein says that this man is a good runner, it simply means that he runs a certain number of miles in a certain number of minutes. Here, the term “good” as used in the sentence is associated with the factual value and is used in the relative sense. In this regard, Wittgenstein says that what he wishes to contend is that, although judgments of relative value can be shown to be mere statements of facts, no statement of fact can ever be, or imply, a judgment of absolute value.³⁷

Wittgenstein, in this regard, brings a story to make it clear further the distinction between relative and absolute values. He says that suppose an omniscient person comes to know all the movements of all the bodies in the world dead or alive. He also happens to know all the states of mind of all human beings that ever lived. Further suppose that this omniscient person wrote a big book containing all the information he

³⁶ Ibid, pp. 38-39.

³⁷ Ibid, p. 39.

comes to know about the world. In such a case, surely this book would contain the whole description of the world. The question is: Does this book contain any ethical judgment in the sense of absolute value? Wittgenstein does not think so. He claims that this book contains nothing that we would call an ethical judgment. Rather, he finds comfortable to claim the other way around. For him, this book contains all relative judgments of value and all scientific propositions. But, there are no propositions which in any absolute sense are sublime, important, or trivial.³⁸

Based on the relative and absolute judgment, Wittgenstein conceives two different types of world, such as 'this world' and the world outside 'this world'. He then says that statements belonging to 'this world' are called factual statements and statements that lie beyond 'this world' are called absolute statements. Thus, the nature of statements whether they would be relative or absolute essentially hinges on the very nature of the world. Here, I find a similarity between Wittgenstein and Hume. As an extreme empiricist, Hume denies the relevance of any statement belonging to non-empirical world. In fact, Hume's empiricism does not tolerate any non-empirical entities expressing by means of statements. Very similarly, Wittgenstein classifies the world into two different types as stated above and thereby claimed that anything that lies beyond this world would be absolute. He then includes ethics, religion, aesthetic, etc. in the world belonging to other than 'this world'. Hume was much focused on the distinction between 'is' and 'ought'. Likewise, I find the relevance of is-ought distinction implicitly in Wittgenstein's distinction between relative and absolute statement. According to Wittgenstein, the domain of relative and absolute statement is completely different and one cannot be associated with the other. According to Hume, when we describe or read the description of a murder in detail from physical and

³⁸ Ibid, p. 40.

psychological point of view, our description of the murder is no longer associated with an ethical proposition. Here, the description of murder is very similar to the description of the stone that could be used to build a building. There is no ethics or religion within such a description.

I have already stated that Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* was very clear about the dimension of language as well as the dimension of reality. He asserts that the function of language is to express factual or empirical proposition. Even, if we carefully go through his *A Lecture on Ethics*, we find that he maintains the same position as he does in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. He further contends that ethical statements, unlike factual statement, are necessary. The nature of the ethical and religious statement is completely different from the nature of *is and ought statement*. As ethical and religious statements are non-factual, absolute, and necessary, they are by no means hold the same philosophical position as factual statements. The language, Wittgenstein presumes in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, can express facts or states of affairs. These are all contingent. A mere contingent fact, however, cannot express anything related to ethical necessity. Our words or our language can convey natural meaning and sense and it fails to convey anything other than natural. Since ethics is super-natural, our language associated with facts cannot express anything about ethics or religion. The same is equally true in the case of religious and theological propositions because such propositions are primarily concerned with absolute values. According to Wittgenstein, all meaningful statements are factual statements. No purported statements of absolute value are factual statements. All theological and religious statements being purported statements have absolute value. Therefore, it may be concluded after Wittgenstein that no purported theological and religious statements are meaningful statements.

Whatever expressed is being expressed meaningfully. Since ethical, theological, and religious statements are not expressed meaningfully, they are inexpressible according to Wittgenstein. This is how, Wittgenstein explicitly has interpreted and understood the concept of religious inexpressibility in his celebrated book *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* as well as in his notable article *A Lecture on Ethics*. In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein interpreted religious experience in a very technical sense. It seems to us that religious language and the language of theology are certainly being experienced in some sense or other. Otherwise, the term ‘religious experience’ appears to be otiose. However, Wittgenstein counts religious experience, if there be any, concerning religious inexpressibility. He finds a distinction between expressibility and inexpressibility with regard to the meaning of language, i.e. proposition. According to Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, something is expressible if it is to be meaningful and something to be inexpressible if it is to be meaningless. Thus, to be an experience of something does not make sense to say, after Wittgenstein, that it is expressible. Expressibility is something different from the experience of something. Having said this, Wittgenstein elsewhere in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and *A Lecture on Ethics* hinted that even though religious statements are inexpressible, but religious statements or religious experience would certainly be ‘useful elucidations’.

It has already been stated that Wittgenstein’s position about ethics and religious statements is somehow or other similar to Hume’s position. I have claimed, though loosely, that the dichotomy between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ remains the same to both Wittgenstein and Hume. Having said this, Hume’s interpretation of the ‘is-ought’ dichotomy in some sense or other is skeptical unlike Wittgenstein. Hume, in this regard, offered us a skeptical solution to the ‘is-ought’ problem. This is completely

unlikely in the case of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's interpretation of the 'is-ought' problem is pronounced and vivid at length. He clearly stated the limits of language as well as the limits of the world and then inclined to say that what lies within the limits of language is being expressed by means of 'is-statement' and what lies outside the limits of language is being expressed by means of other than 'is-statement'. What is being expressed, other than 'is-statement', is associated with absolute value. Such statements being absolute are necessary and we cannot say anything about such statements. In this regard, Wittgenstein tells us to remain '... pass over in silence'. Moreover, Hume also differs from Wittgenstein regarding the philosophical position of ethical and religious statements. According to Hume, ethical values have their source in certain kinds of subjective feelings of approval and disapproval. Wittgenstein perhaps does not agree with Hume in this regard. Wittgenstein would like to say that since ethical and theological statements are lying outside the limits of language, we are no longer in a position to access individual subjective feelings with regard to approval or disapproval. Wittgenstein claims that to offer such a solution regarding ethical statements would give birth to skepticism. Therefore, Hume's solution of interpretation would be treated as a 'skeptical solution'. This is so happened because such responses of Hume actually fail to address the source and scope of his problem. In this regard, Wittgenstein says, "Certainly the reading of this description might cause us pain or rage or any other emotion, or we might read about the pain or rage caused by this murder in other people when they heard of it, but there will simply be facts, facts, and facts but no Ethics."³⁹ Wittgenstein's anxiety regarding Hume's interpretation about ethical and religious statements is that Hume in some sense or other mixes emotion and subjective states within the realm of facts. Thus, in

³⁹ Ibid, p. 40.

a sense, his interpretation of ethical and religious statements is made possible within the horizon of the factual domain. Wittgenstein has a strong reservation to think along with the line of Hume. According to Wittgenstein, absolute values by any means cannot be reduced to facts. In Hume's case, absolute values can be measured within the realm of facts.

I think the reflection of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* regarding ethical and religious experience further been reflected in an extended way in his *A Lecture on Ethics*. Like *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein in his *A Lecture on Ethics* confesses the inexpressibility of absolute values. There is no question of doubt that Wittgenstein's position about ethics, aesthetics, and theology has been treated as radical in the sense that it goes against many philosophers who have admitted the relevance of ethics, aesthetics, and theology within the realm of day to day life. Even, it seems to me that Wittgenstein's position about ethics, aesthetics, and religion goes against his own position appeared in his *Philosophical Investigations* and *Culture and Value*. Thus, many would say that Wittgenstein's position about absolute value was contrary to one of his own deepest personal tendencies. In fact, Wittgenstein was extremely adamant regarding his philosophical position developed in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* as well as *A Lecture on Ethics*. In these literatures, Wittgenstein was absolutely convinced that there can be no meaningful talk of absolute values. Although, all the philosophers occasionally attempted to demonstrate that a factual statement can be deduced from an evaluative statement and vice versa, such occasional demonstration does not make sense to assume that one statement of this sort can equally be merged with another. Since absolute value comes from nonsense and factual statements are meaningful, there remains a huge gulf between absolute statement and relative statement. As a result of that, it can be said after Wittgenstein

that religious statements like ethical statements lack sense. Any attempt to express absolute statement or absolute values with regard to a relative statement or relative value would be treated as futile exercise. It was reflected in G. E. Moore as well. According to Moore, what is absolute must be non-natural. What is non-natural cannot be expressed concerning nature. If it does, then there arises a fallacy known as *Naturalistic Fallacy*.

The main question then is: Why does Wittgenstein think that statements related with absolute values lack sense? Wittgenstein's response in this regard is very clear and precise. He thinks that such problem arises out of the misuse of language. One has to know about the legitimate use of language. For Wittgenstein, If I say, 'I wonder at the existence of the world', I involve myself in misusing language because such a statement does not bear any sense. So, whether a sentence expressed has a sense or not actually depends on the legitimate use of language. The sentence 'I wonder at the existence of the world' is a sort of misuse of language and as a result of that, the sentence under consideration does not bear any sense. Whereas the sentence 'I wonder at such and such being the case' has only sense if I can imagine it not to be the case; whereas to say that I wonder at the existence of the world is nonsense because of the fact that here I cannot imagine it non-existing. Wittgenstein says, "One might be tempted to say that what I am wondering at is a tautology, namely that the sky is blue or not blue. But, then it is just nonsense to say that one is wondering at a tautology."⁴⁰ Thus, it seems to us whether a sentence has a sense or not actually hinges on the modalities of the rule of language under which the language of a sentence can get its sense or can lose its sense.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 42.

In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein drew the limits of language. He has outlined the limits of language on the basis of some stringent characteristics of language. The language, Wittgenstein constructed in *Tractatus*, is logical language. It is structural in nature. Such language is propositional and hence always associated with sense or meaning. Thus, language by itself does not bear any sense. However, the language of course gets its sense if it fulfills certain rules and principles set forth. When we talk about religious and ethical expressions, we do not acquire the sense of such expression because a certain characteristic misuse of our language actually runs through all ethical and religious expressions. Wittgenstein termed it as ‘characteristic misuse’ of language shared by ethical and religious expressions. Let me make this point more clearly after Wittgenstein. What does he mean by ‘characteristic misuse’ of ethical and religious expressions? When we use the word ‘right’ in an ethical sense, what we mean is not ‘right’ in the trivial sense. Rather it is something familiar. Likewise, when we say, ‘This is a good fellow’, it does not mean ‘This is a good football player’, even though there may remain some sort of similarity. When someone says, ‘This man’s wife was valuable’, he does not use the term valuable in the same sense just like as ‘Gold is valuable’. But still, there remains some sort of similarity or so to speak some sort of analogy. Wittgenstein, then, denies that ethical talk and religious talk of absolute values would be meaningful in virtue of some similarity to talk of relative value. One cannot have the sense of ethical statements or religious statements by way of comparing them or expounding them with regard to relative values. In this regard, Wittgenstein says that ethical and religious language constantly be using with regard to similes. A simile, Wittgenstein opines, would be a simile for something else. However, the point is that if we describe a fact with regard to a simile, we must also be able to drop the simile and also describe the fact without

it. But, in the case of ethical and religious statements, if we drop the simile and simply state the facts, we find that there are no such facts. According to Wittgenstein, statements of relative value describe facts and hence they are meaningful. On the contrary, statements of ethics being purported statements of absolute value describe no facts. They can be comprehended, only in fictitious way by making a similarity or by making an analogy with the relative statements which are associated with fact. Therefore, Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and also in his *A Lecture on Ethics* consistently maintains that purported ethical statements of absolute values lack factual content. He concludes by saying that in an ethical statement, there are no such facts.

Interestingly, here we find some perceptible inconsistency in Wittgenstein's own view. Initially, Wittgenstein was clear that there remained a distinctive gulf between relative statement and absolute statement. They are not similar. But, in his later writing, we come to know that there is some sort of similarities between ethical and religious language on one hand and propositional language on the other. My point is that - if statement of absolute value comprising religious and ethical language has some sort of similarity to a statement of relative value then there would need to be some similarity between the two forms of expression described. A statement of relative value, according to Wittgenstein, describes facts whereas a purported statement of absolute value does not describe facts. The point is that - if a purported statement of absolute value to be in some way similar or analogous to a statement of relative value then they too would have to describe facts similar to the facts of a factual statement. Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and *A Lecture on Ethics* explicitly denies that purported ethical statement of ethical values is a factual description. Let me examine these issues from another perspective. Factual

statement of relative value and ethical statement of ethical value cannot be analogous, according to Wittgenstein, simply for the fact that the former deals with natural fact whereas the later simply describes nothing of this kind. Based on this perception, Wittgenstein elsewhere draws the conclusion that ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural. But, elsewhere we find something seemingly wrong in Wittgenstein's philosophical writings. We have to avoid this in favour of Wittgenstein by way of explicating his insightful philosophical positions where no philosophical conflict regarding this issue could emerge.

A Transition from Ethical Inexpressibility to Religious Inexpressibility:

I have already stated that Wittgenstein did not make any distinction between ethical language, religious language, and the language of theology. Wittgenstein clearly drew the limits of language and within the limits of language only propositional language has earned the legitimacy in proper. However, outside the limits of language, Wittgenstein suggests us to remain in silence. Anything out of propositional language lies outside the limits of language. I have also stated after Wittgenstein that the very nature of ethical language and the language of religion, as well as theology, would remain the same. So, when we are talking about religious inexpressibility after Wittgenstein, we do not set aside ethical language or the language of theology from the domain of religious language. Having said this, it seems to me that Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* was vocal more about ethical inexpressibility than religious inexpressibility. However, this does not give us any trouble as far as our understanding of religious inexpressibility is concerned. I think that Wittgenstein has categorized both religious and ethical values as absolute values. Even though his A

Lecture on Ethics starts with ethical statements or ethical language but it certainly ends with a consideration of religious expression. Even, Wittgenstein explicitly asserts elsewhere in his *A Lecture on Ethics* and also in some places of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* that what he claims about the impossibility of ethical statements applies in the same way to religious statements. Having said this, there is no point in saying after Wittgenstein that the meaning of ethical statement closely corresponds to the meaning of a religious statement. The only thing I can say after Wittgenstein is that he attempts to tie the two forms together on the basis that they are *nonsense*. In his *Lectures*, Wittgenstein goes on to say that all religious terms seem in this sense to be used as similes or allegorically.⁴¹

Wittgenstein further inclines to say that religious terms, like ethical terms, seem to function as similes. However, I think the position of Wittgenstein is deceptive because we are no longer in a position to know the similarity between ethical statement and religious statement simply because they are lying outside the limits of language according to *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* or they are dealing with absolute values where we cannot enter into it. We at best can say that to do with ethical and religious terms was just to go beyond the world and that is to say beyond significant language. According to Wittgenstein, just talk about Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language.⁴² Wittgenstein further continues that this running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely, hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, and the

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 42.

⁴² Ibid, p. 44.

absolute value can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense.”⁴³

Like the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein equally claims in his *A Lecture on Ethics* that the most important thing in life may be too deep forwards. It is intimately associated with the human tendency, so to speak is deeply involved to express absolute and religious values arising out of human mind. Thus, it seems to me, in a manifold of ways, that Wittgenstein very deliberately and more consciously outlines what should be the nature of language and also the nature of reality. So, when we do engage with religious inexpressibility after Wittgenstein, we should keep in mind that religious language is inexpressible only in the context of the limits of language. This is very important issue to be noted here. There is no point in saying that religious language is inexpressible without referring to the very idea of *limits of language*. If we set aside the concept of limits of language as developed by Wittgenstein then our inquiry about religious inexpressibility seems to be renowned. In such a case, the question - whether religious language is inexpressible or not does not find any valid reason. Thus, my point of contention is that if we stick in early Wittgenstein's documentation of language in the strict sense of the term, then only in this context we can justifiably claim that religious language or the language of a similar category would be inexpressible. Wittgenstein actually did it.

Thus, it seems to me that Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* was extremely optimistic about the language lies within the limits and he was equally pessimistic about the language lies outside the limits. This is how one should try to

⁴³ Ibid, p. 44.

understand the philosophical significance of religious inexpressibility after early Wittgenstein and *A Lecture on Ethics*.

Section II

The Nature of Religious Language in Later Wittgenstein

So far we have seen that Wittgenstein maintains his pessimistic approach about religious language and religious experience in his *A Lecture on Ethics* and also in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. In this section, I propose to discuss religious language and religious experience concerning his *Philosophical Investigations*. Wittgenstein's transition from *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* to *Philosophical Investigations* is radical and it draws the attention of almost all philosophers in some sense or other. The *Philosophical Investigations* of Wittgenstein appears as a revolt against his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. This is quite interesting because, after the completion of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein himself claimed that there is nothing left in philosophy to solve. All tricky traditional philosophical issues were being resolved with the introduction of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. However, his transition from early to later philosophy tells a different story. It states that what has been done in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is based on great philosophical mistakes because the language that has been introduced in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is no longer genuine language. Therefore, the philosophical problems which were claimed to solve in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* by means of language remained unsolved. This innermost feeling had promoted Wittgenstein to engage in further doing philosophy. He started to write *Philosophical Investigations* where the notion of language is diametrically opposite to *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein did not draw *the limits of language* as he did in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. The language of *Philosophical Investigations* is ordinary or natural language. It is also called everyday language. Its distinctive feature is that it is *rule-following*. Following a rule, according to Wittgenstein, is a matter of practice within the society, community, or *forms of life*. It is purely a natural or native language. It does not require any sort of regulation in question. It works as it likes. It is comprehensive in the sense that each member of the society or community can take part in such language; communicate with each other by way of practicing it. Thus, it seems clear that like the *Tractatarian* form of language, Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Investigations* does not intend to draw *the limits of language*. Language, for Wittgenstein, is just like *a tool in a toolbox*. Language has multifarious uses. So, there is no point in saying that language must act following logical structure and pictorial form or pictorial relationship as we witnessed in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

Does it then lead us to assume that by introducing ordinary language in his *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein enables us to overcome his pessimistic approach about religious language and religious experience? Many would say that Wittgenstein remained pessimistic even in the *Philosophical Investigations* regarding religious inexpressibility of language. However, I think this is not to be prudent enough to give a straightforward answer in this regard. It seems to me that in *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein was not so critical about religious language and religious experience. Rather, he concentrates more on the very nature of language from its functional perspective. Even a careful study would reflect that Wittgenstein never addressed questions of God and religion in his *Philosophical Investigations*. However, his interpretation of religious subjects can adequately be noted in his

Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief. He continued to hold that expressions of religious belief are not expressions of factual belief. Early Wittgenstein, as I noted ensured that religious expressions and religious beliefs are nonsensical. However, in *Lectures and Conversations*, no such claim is made and the discussion takes a different turn.

Further, Wittgenstein's later view of language has many different functions. Previously in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein admits that the single business of language is to state fact. Contrary to that, Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* asserts that language consists of a plurality of different language-games. Each requires by its one set of rules that is its own grammar. His early view offered a singular, monolithic, unified view of language; whereas his later view emphasized more on multiplicity and differences. As the nature of language takes a radical shape in his later writing, we find a notable approach of Wittgenstein regarding religious language and religious experience which is a clear-cut deviation from the standpoint Wittgenstein took in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and *A Lecture on Ethics*.

In his *Lectures and Conversations*, Wittgenstein explicitly emphasizes the subtle distinction between factual belief and religious belief. I have already noted after *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* that Wittgenstein made a huge gulf between religious belief and factual belief. But, in *Lectures and Conversations* Wittgenstein either has attempted to minimize the gulf or ruled out his earlier standpoint that religious belief unlike ethical belief, is nonsense. Here, Wittgenstein actually focuses upon the very different ways in which religious belief and factual belief are either justified or grounded. Here, he is no longer in a position to claim that religious beliefs are

nonsense. Rather he intends to say that to interpret religious belief or religious expression as natural expression invites misunderstanding and misapprehension. Wittgenstein maintains that religious belief and religious experience by its very nature are different from factual belief. Therefore, interpreting one with regard to another creates trouble. However, in *Lectures and Conversations*, Wittgenstein gradually is gaining some insight based on which he comes to notice some sort of analogy between religious belief and factual belief, especially scientific belief and their grounds. While outlining the gulf between religious and factual belief, Wittgenstein says us to assume that someone was a believer and said that he believes in the Last Judgment, and in response, I said that I am not so sure. Possibly you would say that there is an enormous gulf between us. If he said that there is a German airplane overhead and in response, I said that possibly that I am not so sure. You had said we were fairly near.⁴⁴ I think the distinction between religious belief and factual belief as noted by Wittgenstein is directly associated with the famous *Is-Ought Dichotomy*. Even though, there may appear some sort of analogy between religious and factual belief but the tendency to think of religious belief as a type of factual belief leads to mistakes and misunderstandings. According to Wittgenstein, this tendency arises out of the function of *surface similarities* between factual and religious discourse. In the case of religious belief, we seek reason or ground in favor of our believing very similar to the case of factual belief. When we say that we believe in God and also say we believe in natural numbers, we use the term ‘belief’ based on ground or reason. Thus, believing in God seeks ground or reason as like as believing of natural numbers seeks ground or reason. Wittgenstein says, “In a religious discourse we use such

⁴⁴ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief* (Berkeley, CA, 1967), p. 54.

expression as: “I believe that so and so will happen,” and use them differently to the way in which we use them in science.”⁴⁵ Having said this, it should be kept in mind that the grounds or reasons associated with religious belief are extremely difficult to be explored. This is not the same we do require in the case of factual belief. Therefore, it would not be prudent to make an analogy between religious belief and factual belief simply on the basis of surface features of similarity between religious discourse and factual discourse. Actually, this is the problem of the grammar of a language. Wittgenstein, like Russell, does not have considerable faith on the surface structure of grammar. There are two levels of grammar of the language, namely, surface structure and deep or logical structure. According to Russell, the surface structure of grammar is superficial in nature and it does not match with the logical structure of grammar. He considers the logical structure of grammar as the faithful structure of grammar of the language. We can find the same even in Noam Chomsky. Chomsky also distinguishes between the phrase structure of grammar and the deep structure of grammar. He then considers the deep structure of grammar as more authentic than the surface or phrase structure of grammar. We notice the same in Wittgenstein as well. According to Wittgenstein, language is so complex that one should not take the surface feature of language as authentic. To take surface feature of discourse as authentic would be a mistake. Thus, even in his *Lectures and Conversations*, Wittgenstein equally maintains his pessimistic approach towards religious belief. However, he gives a little bit room of to accommodate religious language and religious experience within the form of life. Unlike *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, in *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein does not draw any specific limit of language and reality. His interpretation of language in *Philosophical*

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 57.

Investigations encompasses everything and leaves nothing. Thus, whatever the nature of religious belief or religious experience, it is no way dissociated from our society; from our community rather it is an integral part of our form of life. Religious language has its own grammar; it has its own function, own form of life deceptively and interestingly different from other forms. The point is that: Is religious language meaningful or legitimate? Following Wittgenstein, we can answer this question affirmatively. But, at times the answer may be changed from other way around. I think that there is no direct evidence in his later writings where Wittgenstein came to reject his early view about the inexpressibility of religion. However, it is noted that while involving in Personal Conversations with Drury, Wittgenstein explicitly rejected his early view that theology is impossible. Even Drury reports that Wittgenstein at the end of his life characterized his early view as “stupid”.⁴⁶ The early philosophy of Wittgenstein has been marked as “stupid” by Wittgenstein himself because of the very nature of language adopted in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. As the language of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is stupid, there is no point in saying that the boundary Wittgenstein specifically draws in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* remained intact. This is what I am saying here. Till now, I am not sure whether Wittgenstein is optimistic or pessimistic about religious belief and religious language in his *Philosophical Investigations*, but I am sure that he takes an altogether different interpretation of the nature of language. Thus, there is no point in saying after *Philosophical Investigations* that the language of religion or theology lies beyond the limits of language. There is no division of language in *Philosophical Investigations* as per as philosophical legitimacy is concerned. In *Philosophical*

⁴⁶ Drury, M. O. C., “Conversations with Wittgenstein”, in Rush Rhees (ed.), *Ludwig Wittgenstein - Personal Recollections* (Totowa, NJ, 1981), p. 113.

Investigations, Wittgenstein elsewhere confesses the influence of Drury. Drury intimated Wittgenstein about the topic of a class lecture of G. E. Moore when he was appointed as the Professor of Philosophy. In this regard, Moore says that before his Professorship he has never taught the Philosophy of religion to the student. However, as a Professor, he has been asked to teach on the philosophy of religion. In this regard, Drury pointed out Wittgenstein that a Professor of philosophy had no right to keep silent on such an important subject *the Philosophy of Religion*. Wittgenstein was convinced by Drury about the task of Philosophy rested on Professor G. E. Moore. In this regard, Wittgenstein sought a copy of St. Augustine's *Confessions*. Drury immediately gave Wittgenstein a copy of the Loeb edition. After going through this edition Wittgenstein remarks, "You are saying something like St. Augustine says here...I won't refuse to talk to you about God or about religion."⁴⁷ The last line of the above quotation clearly suggests that Wittgenstein was convinced about religious belief and religious language. He was no more to consider religious language and religious belief as nonsense as he did in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and also in his *A Lecture on Ethics*. Thus, I observe a notable transition from early to later Wittgenstein. In *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein gives no room for discussion about religious language and theology; whereas, in his later philosophy, he offers room for religious belief. He thinks that to talk about God or religion is not nonsense. It is possible *to talk sense* about God or religion with people like Drury. He discussed about God and religion with Drury on many occasions. Even, during his thirties and forties, Wittgenstein was deeply been involved to pursue religious subjects, particularly in his *Culture and Value*. In fact, his *Culture and Value* contains many observations about religion, religious conviction, and religious doctrine. I will

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 104.

take a note from *Culture and Value* in the later chapter. At present I am primarily concerned about Wittgenstein's outlook on religious belief and experience with regard to his *Philosophical Investigations*.

Elsewhere in his *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein was generally reluctant to discuss about religion. He was very specific about the discussion of God and religion. He does not think that religion as a form of life is a common man's discussion. Rather he thinks that religious discussions can be fruitful only with the *person or people of substance*. Thus, I can say that Wittgenstein's attitude towards religious expressions even in *Philosophical Investigations* remained one of pessimism is not absolute pessimism. As I have already stated that even though Wittgenstein has reservations to talk about God and religion within the common forum, but at the same time he does not regard religious expressions to be nonsensical. He, in fact, retained a desire to express religious thoughts. However, he was cautious and reluctant to discuss about religion simply because he was convinced that eventually there would be no real or substantive outcome that would arise from religious discussion. He was convinced that even though the religious discussion is not entirely nonsensical but his own attempt at religious expression would go almost entirely misunderstood.

What I want to suggest here is that even though Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations* advocates in favour of ordinary or natural language, but his pessimism about religion *per se* remained intact. Let me clarify this point. Wittgenstein took pessimistic approach in his *Philosophical Investigations* because like *Tractatus* here also he did not accept the conventional view of religion. The conventional view of religion runs with the perception that God exists. So, there must be a religious faith in the existence of God. Without the existence of God, religion or theology would be

untenable. We have seen in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* that by way of outlining the limits of language as well as the limits of the world, Wittgenstein actually denies the possibility of ethics and religion. Here, Wittgenstein in some sense or other was influenced by *Logical Positivism* and by *the Reductionist theory of Carnap*. However Wittgenstein, like Logical Positivism, did not think that religious assertions are meaningless. Rather, he intends to say that we do not have legitimate language through which we can know anything about religious matters. Therefore, we are absolutely hopeless about religion or theology. In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein did not accept the Conventionalists' perception of religion based on the firm faith that God exists. As Wittgenstein here accepts ordinary language which includes everything and leaves nothing, therefore he included religion within the limits of ordinary language. This is an important dimensional change if we compare early and later Wittgenstein about religious language. In *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein holds that there is no religious language whereas in *Philosophical Investigations* he says that there is religious language. Having this dimensional change, Wittgenstein still maintains his pessimistic stance even in *Philosophical Investigations*. Though he admits the possibility of religious language as a form of life, this is interesting and worthy of philosophical consideration. Wittgenstein is pessimistic about religion or theology in the sense that he does not believe in God even though he admits to religious language.

The question immediately arises - what would be the content of religious language? What does religious language actually describe? In this regard, Wittgenstein goes on to say that *there is no existence of God independent of language*. If religion is based on God or the faith in God, then for Wittgenstein, God is nothing but language. The very existence of God is nowhere apart from language. This position of Wittgenstein

is again pessimistic. However his pessimism in *Philosophical Investigations* is somehow different from his pessimism expressed in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. In *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein was pessimistic about the existence of God because there was no language to express God. However in *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein admits religious language among various other language-games, but here he is pessimistic about the independent existence of God apart from language. Language is the constituents of God, nothing else. Wittgenstein is pessimistic about the desire to begin *Philosophical Remarks* with religious dedication. This does not, however, makes sense to say that the dedication would be a misuse of language. Instead, he writes that the dedication would not be correctly understood. His religious dedication may well have had a meaning, but not one that could be grasped by many readers. Wittgenstein's continued pessimism about religious expression may be analogous to the permission he expressed with respect to the arts in the *Philosophical Remarks*. Like Spengler, Wittgenstein believed that artistic expression which had flourished at the high-point of modern culture had all but died out entirely as that culture begun to rigidify into twentieth century civilization. In the west, Architectural possibilities have been exhausted over the periods. Wittgenstein's prefatory remarks explicitly echoed the disappearance of the Earth. This shared permission involves no claim about the absolute impossibility of artistic expression. Rather, Wittgenstein like Spengler explicitly claimed that artistic expression is a characteristic of a time of high culture. Such high culture was died and gave way to civilization. But, civilization did not provide the sort of background against which attempts at artistic expressions could succeed. Religion undergoes the same faith as art as culture decline into civilization. Cultures are essentially religious. Religion slowly withers away in a time of civilization. Therefore, civilizations are

characteristically irreligious. Religious practices lose their life, their vitality, and eventually, their meaning in civilized time - they cannot survive in the final stages of civilized decline. Cultures are essentially religious for Spengler. Spengler believed that the west was advancing towards its decline into civilization in which religion is no longer possible. I think that Wittgenstein in his later period did come to share something like Spengler's view. Having said that religious expression is absolutely impossible, Wittgenstein came to hold the more Spenglerian view that religious expression like artistic expression cannot long endure in a time of civilization.

Thus, it seems to me after Wittgenstein that religious inexpressibility in the early work is seen as an absolute, built-in limitation given the very nature of language. But, in the later work, religious inexpressibility is not absolute. Thus, he addresses a different form of religious inexpressibility of which one is absolute and the other is not absolute. But, within this transition, Wittgenstein maintains consistency about his pessimistic approach to religion. There we notice another tendency in Wittgenstein's later observations about religious language and religion. Wittgenstein expresses in both *Lectures and Conversations* and *Culture and Value* a more or less consistent set of observation about religious language. They indicate that expressions of religious belief *have a different grammar* from expression of factual belief and that, to the extent that one can speak of evidence in connection with the former, it is evidence of a very different sort than those that difficulty operates in the factual realm. They suggest that expressions of religious belief have a hidden motivational function as obscured by similarities in the surface grammar between religious and factual claims.

The question naturally arises at this point: why did Wittgenstein seek to clarify religious usage and its correct grammar if religious expression is not at all

expressible? Wittgenstein in his *Lectures and Conversations* as well as *Culture and Value* addresses the real grammar of a religious language and its proper functions. Having said that, elsewhere Wittgenstein expresses serious reservation about whether the religious discourse is even possible? Thus, it is odd asking how he was able to do both without feeling a tension between the two. Thus, superficially we notice seemingly incompatible tendencies in Wittgenstein's philosophy of religious language and religious experience. When Wittgenstein addresses the *logic of religious discourse* in *Lectures and Conversations* and *Culture and Value*, he certainly treats such discourse as if it is meaningful. On the contrary, Wittgenstein did believe that such discourse is meaningful and unproblematic in the right cultural setting. The analysis of religious language he offers is best viewed as it presupposing that such a cultural setting is in place. In fact, when he wrote or spoke of the real nature of religious discourse, his attitude can be expressed roughly as "in those times and settings when religious discourse is capable of successful doing its job, the grammar of such discourse works something like this..."⁴⁸ I think that Wittgenstein's analysis of the real function of religious discourse presupposed a background against which such discourse can work. Of course, there is no mystery about how Wittgenstein could have some through express reservations about religious expression in his time.

Mysticism and Sense and Nonsense:

By saying that what lies outside the world (i.e. 'my world' in a Wittgensteinian sense) is inexpressible, Wittgenstein both in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and *Notebooks* conceived them as mystical. What is mystical, according to Wittgenstein, cannot be said, they can only be shown. Only fact can be said or can be pictured by

⁴⁸ DeAngelis, William James, *Ludwig Wittgenstein - A Cultural Point of View*, Ashgate, 2007, p. 119.

means of a proposition. A proposition gains its sense from being a linguistic representation of a possible or an actual state of affair. If it does not possess this relation to the world, then that utterance can be neither true nor false and hence can be devoid of any meaning whatsoever. This enables Wittgenstein to dispense with metaphysics - a form of discourse which does not function as a straight forward description of the world, but which attempts to extend beyond *the world of experience*.

I think that Wittgenstein of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* dispensed not just with metaphysics but also with the language of aesthetics, and of ethics and religion. For Wittgenstein, language has sense if its component parts can be connected with reality. We cannot hope to compare, after Wittgenstein, theological propositions with reality in order to ascertain their truth value. Accordingly, it is not that the formula of the Trinity is false, it is entirely meaningless. Thus, in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, I sense a new weapon of criticizing religion. Previous philosophers cast doubt on religion and rejected religion, in most general cases, is false. Hume's position is a case in point. Hume picks apart the arguments intended by theologians to prove the existence of God as *a Divine designer*. Hume shows how such an argument rests on grave errors; the world is nothing like a watch. Having engaged in an assessment of the evidence for and against the truth of religion, Hume concludes that religion is almost certainly false.⁴⁹ However, Wittgenstein's position of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* regarding religion is not similar to Hume. Wittgenstein does not want to say that metaphysics, ethics, and religious utterances are false; rather they

⁴⁹ For Hume's critique of religious belief, see his *Dialogues and Natural History of Religion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). See also J. C. A. Gaskin, *Hume's Philosophy of Religion* (London: Macmillan, 1988).

are mystical and nonsense in some sense or other. In fact, I think that Wittgenstein does not waste time by generating evidences for the falsity of religion as Hume did. Rather Wittgenstein focuses upon *the discourse of religion* and shows how it lacks *pictorial relation* to the world essential for the possession of meaning. Religious language does not even get so far as to be false because of our inability to show how the word 'God' goes proxy for an object in the world. For Wittgenstein, all sentences containing the word 'God' are devoid of sense. The question of falsity about religion simply does not arise. Rather, the term 'senseless' is much more suitable to be used in religion, according to Wittgenstein. Surely, Wittgenstein offers us a radical and original interpretation of religion. It is radical and original in the sense that Wittgenstein conceives religion in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and *Notebook* as nonsense and mystical. In this regard, he differs from Hume who in his *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* writes: If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, whether it contains any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number, or whether it contains any experimental reasoning concerning matters of fact and existence? The simple answer would be negative. For Hume, if it would be the case then just throw it to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.⁵⁰ The insight of Hume's remark is based on the perception that for any assertion to have meaning, it must be rooted in the experience of the senses. Hume's position has further been extended by the whole host of logical positivists of *Vienna Circle*. For them, if a sentence is to be meaningful it had to satisfy the demand of the verification principle. It states that the meaning of a sentence is its method of verification and that a sentence is to be meaningful should

⁵⁰ Hume, David, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 165.

be capable of proof. Very similar to logical positivism, Wittgenstein remarks: If I can never verify the sense of a proposition completely, then I cannot have meant anything by proposition either. Then the proposition signifies nothing whatsoever.⁵¹

A J Ayer in his book *Language, Truth and Logic* talks in favour of a strong sense of verifiability based on conclusive verifiability and that was unworkable in practice. Ayer also talks in favour of weak verifiability. For Ayer, religious assertions are not even in principle verifiable and no sense experience can contribute anything to an inquiry into their truth and falsity. Let me talk about the language of Trinity. How might sense experience verify or even make probable the belief that God is three persons in one being? Would any observation be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood? Here, we are entirely at a loss and we are led to conclude that the language of theology is hopelessly non-informative. In this regard, Ayer says, “The term ‘god’ is a metaphysical term. And if ‘god’ is a metaphysical term, then it cannot even be probable that a god exists. To say that ‘God exists’ is to make a metaphysical utterance that cannot be true or false.”⁵² Wittgenstein shared the positivists’ aggressively anti-religious attitude, but this does not make sense to say that Wittgenstein’s understanding of religious language is similar to logical positivism. While illuminating Wittgenstein’s religious position, Russell attributes Wittgenstein as *militantly atheistic*, being ‘far more terrible with Christians than I am’.⁵³ Hume reads Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* as an all-out attack upon religion, a piece of ferocious criticism, a continuation of the skeptical work initiated by Hume, Voltaire, and Logical Positivism. In his *Notebooks*, Wittgenstein raises so

⁵¹ *Culture and Value*, p. 47.

⁵² Ayer, A. J., *Language, Truth and Logic* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), p. 152.

⁵³ Bertrand Russell, quoted in Ray Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* (London: Vintage, 1991), p. 44.

many queries and questions about religion. In this regard, he goes on to say that God is completely unknown to him because God does not exist. Even though he believes that the world exists, but he does not know anything about the very existence of God and the purpose of life. He is placed in the world like his eye in its visual field. He finds that something about it is problematic which he called its meaning. That means the meaning of the world does not lie in it but outside of it. He then says that the meaning of life is the same as the meaning of the world and to reveal the meaning of life or the meaning of the world is to reveal God. In this sense, the meaning of life is nothing but the meaning of God. One can make a comparison of God to a father just by bring the meaning of life. In his *Notebooks*, Wittgenstein simply asserts that only through prayer one can get a sense of the meaning of life. For Wittgenstein, to pray is to think about the meaning of life.⁵⁴ According to Wittgenstein, the concept of prayer is an emotional will or emotional blathering of a man in a crisis, and in a crisis, even the most irreligious people will offend resort to prayer when faced with death. This does not however make sense to say that prayer is the criteria of religion. Wittgenstein did not mention it in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is primarily concerned with ethical issues revealing its author's obsession with ethical and religious questions. In this regard, Wittgenstein in his *TLP*: 6.432 say that how things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. The very fact is that God does not reveal himself in the world.⁵⁵

By attributing religious language as inexpressible, Wittgenstein thus in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* brings mysticism about what lies outside the limit of his world. In this regard, Wittgenstein read Tagore's mysticism as well. Side by side he also

⁵⁴ *Notebooks*, pp. 72-73.

⁵⁵ See *Clack*, p. 32.

brings the concept of nonsense along with the concept of mysticism. For Wittgenstein, what is mystic would equally be nonsense. Therefore, in this sequel, I propose to analyze and examine Wittgenstein's concepts of mysticism as well as nonsense regarding matters related to ethics, religion, and aesthetics that is in short metaphysics.

It is important to be pointed out here that Wittgenstein's position about religion and religious assertions differs from both David Hume and Logical Positivists. According to Hume, religious assertions and metaphysical assertions are false, because no realities were corresponding to the objects. The existence of God cannot be proved very similar to the existence of the table placed in front of me. Hume shows how such an argument rests on grave errors. The world is not like a watch. The world is probably the product of chance rather than design. Therefore, the belief that God is the architect or the designer of the world is false. A belief in the Christian God would not follow from an acceptance of the designedness of the world in which we live. There is no rational foundation or there is no evidence to prove that God is the designer of the world. For Hume, the argument that God is the designer of the world is based on false religious belief. In this regard, Hume appeals both to the problem of evil, contending that the existence of a loving, all-powerful God is incompatible with the undeniable reality of suffering. The history of religion shows or reflects how it is rooted, not in a rational contemplation of the world, but in fear, ignorance, and superstition. The truth of religion, Hume concludes, is that religion is almost certainly false.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Gaskin, J. C. A., *Hume's Philosophy of Religion*, London: Macmillan, 1988.

I think the critique of religion found in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is not similar to Hume. Wittgenstein does not intend to say that religion is false. Hume says that religion is false. Wittgenstein says that religion is mystical. The question naturally arises - what is false at par with what is mystical? Certainly, I do not think so. To say something is false is to give an assertion; whereas to say something is mystical is not to give an assertion. Instead of saying that religion is false Wittgenstein rather focuses mainly on *religious discourse* and shows how the *discourse of religion* lacks the pictorial relation to the world essential for the possession of meaning. For Wittgenstein, religious language does not even get so far as to be false because of our inability to put them into words. Since religious expressions are inexpressible in the sense that they cannot be put into words, the question of their truth and falsity simply does not arise. For Wittgenstein, to say that religious expressions are false is to ensure that they can be put into words. But, they cannot be put into words. Therefore, they cannot be asserted as false. What Wittgenstein would like to say is that all sentences containing religious matters are devoid of sense. Therefore, Wittgenstein denies Hume's position about asserting religious assertions as false. Instead, he asserts that religious assertions are neither true nor false; they are simply nonsense and mystical in nature.

I think Hume's position is extremely bias towards empiricism. Here, he attacks the status of religious language based on an extreme foundation of empiricism underlying with the principle that any assertion is to be meaningful it must be rooted in the experience of the senses. I think Hume's empiricist position does not match up with Wittgenstein's position of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* even though an empiricist twist in the 1920s in collaboration with Wittgenstein along with the *Vienna Circle* devised a philosophical program which became known as *Logical Positivism*. We

think from an empiricist outlook there underlies a similarity in principle between Wittgenstein, Hume, and *Logical Positivism*. But, their individual approach is somehow or other different from each other. In this sense, Wittgenstein though influenced by Logical Positivism in some sense or other but differs significantly regarding religious and metaphysical assertions from *Logical Positivism*. According to *Logical Positivism*, a sentence is to be literally meaningful it would be either completely verifiable or completely falsifiable by means of some observational data. What is verifiable would be meaningful. What is meaningful would be either true or false. Since religious and metaphysical assertions are in no way verifiable in the real sense of the term, they would be meaningless. Thus, for Hume, metaphysical and religious assertions are false; for *Logical Positivism*, they are meaningless; whereas for Wittgenstein they are mystical or nonsense. Our point is that even though Hume, Wittgenstein, and Logical Positivists in some sense or other influenced by each other while developing their theory, but their individual outlook on religious and metaphysical assertions are different. I have already outlined and exemplified in what sense Wittgenstein differs from Hume. Now, let me say in what sense Wittgenstein equally differs from Logical Positivism. To say that metaphysical and religious assertions are not verifiable is to say that they failed to fulfill the criterion of the principle of verification. The principle of verification of Logical Positivism gives importance to *observational data* along with the line of Hume. That means, on the basis of *observational data* metaphysical and religious assertions cannot be verified. Up to this we find a consistency between *Logical Positivism* and Wittgenstein of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Like *Logical Positivism*, Wittgenstein outlined the limits of language as well as the limits of the world where everything can be put into words and to determine everything either in the form of to be the case or in the form

of not to be the case. But, we note the deviation after that. Logical Positivists hold that metaphysical and religious assertions are meaningless; whereas Wittgenstein holds that they are mystical and senseless. My position is that what is meaningless cannot be equated with what is senseless or what is mysterious. To say that something is meaningless is to say that it does not bear any sense to me; whereas to say something is mysterious does not mean to say that it does not bear any sense to me. In this regard, I can say that what is mysterious is comparatively relevant to me in comparison to what is meaningless. This is how I sense that Wittgenstein of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* differs from Logical Positivism even though Wittgenstein has high regards to Logical Positivism and vice versa.

Wittgenstein further contends that the sense of the proposition or the sense of the meaning on the basis of which the meaningfulness of a sentence is determined does not bear any sense to know about the *value of the world*. The value of the world is altogether a different issue from the sense of the proposition. In this regard, Wittgenstein in his *Culture and Value* (henceforth CV) says, “If I can never verify the sense of a proposition completely, then I cannot have meant anything by the proposition either. Then the proposition signifies nothing whatsoever.”⁵⁷

I think Hume’s radical interpretation about religious and metaphysical assertion has subsequently being reflected in logical positivism, particularly in Ayer’s strong sense of verifiability. Ayer has claimed that a statement is meaningful only if it can conclusively be proven. Of course, Ayer has faced serious challenges from his counterparts and he was eventually forced to modify the principle of verification into strong and weak sense. My contention is that even though Wittgenstein was

⁵⁷ *Culture and Value*, p. 47.

influenced by the *Logical Positivism* and some Logical Positivists, namely, Carnap has been influenced by Wittgenstein, but still I think that Wittgenstein's position about religious and metaphysical statement differs from *Logical Positivism*. Logical Positivists clearly and state forwardly asserted that metaphysical and religious assertions are meaningless in the sense that they cannot be ascertained as either true or false. Wittgenstein does not assert metaphysical and religious assertions as meaningless. Instead, he has attributed such assertion as non-sense. For Wittgenstein, metaphysical and religious assertions are nonsense because they lack factual sense. I think that Logical Positivists based on their principle of verification rule out the possibility of metaphysical and religious statements. Wittgenstein does not deny the possibility of such a statement. Rather Wittgenstein demarcates the world into two different levels and thereby claims that what lies within the world has sense and what lies outside the world has no sense. In this regard, Wittgenstein understands the term *nonsense*.

What Wittgenstein inclines to say here is that non-factual discourse is worthy of philosophical consideration. Wittgenstein is suggesting here that those things which he has banished from the realm of meaningful language are infinitely more important than that which can legitimately be articulated. Wittgenstein is certainly not intent upon through doubt on the reality of the unsayable. For Wittgenstein, what is sayable and what is unsayable are associated with the realm of life. They matter to lead a life either empirical or mundane. In his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein says, "There are indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They *make themselves manifest*. They are what are mystical."⁵⁸ The above quotation of Wittgenstein clearly reflects what he means by the term 'mystical'. Wittgenstein conceives ethical,

⁵⁸ *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 6.522.

aesthetical, and religious matters as ‘mystical’ in the sense that they cannot be put into words. They cannot be expressed, they cannot be verbalized. But, they are worthy, not of ridicule, but of the deepest respect. Here again, Wittgenstein differs from Positivism. Positivism holds that what we can speak about is all that matters in life. Whereas Wittgenstein passionately believes that all that really matters in human life is precisely what, in his view, we must be silent about. The *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* of Wittgenstein attempts to demarcate what can be said from what cannot be said and by way of demarcating; Wittgenstein contra-Positivism asserts that the unsayable alone is important. This is where the distinction between Logical Positivism and Wittgenstein actually hinges on religious and metaphysical assertions. We think Wittgenstein’s injunction to silence is bizarre, in a way that the Positivists’ is not. In this regard, Otto Neurath’s verdict that ‘one must indeed be silent, but not about anything’ makes perfect sense. For Neurath, the religious talk was nonsensical chatter about non-existent entities.⁵⁹ Wittgenstein, on the other hand, has adopted no atheistic mantle, so why he be silent? If the mystical is of the utmost importance, surely we should talk about it like many people do talk about the nature of God or about what is good or beautiful.

Wittgenstein is pointing to a number of factors which make the attempts to talk about such matters a hopeless and undesirable task. It is an undesirable task to Wittgenstein to say about what lies outside the world because Wittgenstein’s remarks on the unknowability of God that God does not reveal himself in the world are reminiscent of what we find in the book *Ecclesiastes*, where it is written: Be not rash with your mouth, nor let your heart be hasty to utter a word before God, for God is in heaven,

⁵⁹ Neurath, Otto, quoted in A. J. Ayer, *Ludwig Wittgenstein* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), p. 32.

and you upon the earth; therefore let your words be few.⁶⁰ Wittgenstein finds a huge gulf between human language and the Divine. Human language determines the sense of proposition but proposition can express nothing higher, which is Divine. Thus, Wittgenstein is cutting off from any human attempt to become familiar with holy things. While talking with Drury, a close friend of him, Wittgenstein says, "... I wouldn't claim to know how God should act."⁶¹ For Wittgenstein, there is a certain human tendency to extend beyond our limits and to talk of things about which we should rightfully be silent and respectful. In fact, we do claim that in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* Wittgenstein through his picture theory of meaning is designed to protect 'what is higher' from the perverting human encroaches of language. Just like Kant famously found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.⁶² Wittgenstein of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* sets a limit to what can be spoken and thought of to respect the *awesome power of the mystical*. For Wittgenstein, ethics including religion and metaphysics are mystical but he at the same time describes ethics as 'the inquiry into the meaning of life'. Thus, what is mystical is important to Wittgenstein because it is useful to determine the meaning of life. Wittgenstein in his *A Lecture on Ethics* and *Notebooks* equates God with the meaning of life. Even though Wittgenstein asserts that all propositions are of equal value, he at the same time inclines to say that there are no propositions which, in any absolute sense, are sublime, important, or trivial. A full description of the world (i.e. my world) thus contains facts, and only facts, but no ethics. This clearly suggests that ethics could not be the subject of scientific inquiry because ethics is not science and science cannot deal with something 'intrinsically sublime and above all other subject

⁶⁰ *Ecclesiastes* 5:2, Revised Standard Version.

⁶¹ Wittgenstein, quoted in Drury, "Conversations with Wittgenstein", p. 107.

⁶² Kant, Immanuel, *The Critique of Pure Reason* (London: Macmillan, 1950), p. 29.

matters'. While illuminating the intrinsic sublime of ethics and the subject matter of ethics which is mystical in nature, Wittgenstein in his *A Lecture on Ethics* remarks: "I can only describe my feeling by the metaphor, that, if a man could write a book on Ethics which really was a book on Ethics, this book would, with an explosion, destroy all the other books in the world. Our words used as we use them in science, are vessels capable only of containing and conveying meaning and sense, *natural* meaning and sense. Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words will only express facts; as a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water and if I were to pour out a gallon over it."⁶³ Here, Wittgenstein intends to say that there underlies a certain human tendency to extend beyond our limits and to talk of things about which we should rightfully be silent and respectful. Knowledge of higher order should be respected by maintaining silence about it. Mysticism arises when people attempt to extend their limits beyond the language and beyond the world in which they speak and live respectfully. In this regard, one may assume that Wittgenstein of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* can be read as a modern *via negativa*. Apparently, it seems that Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* takes a negative standpoint about ethics, aesthetics, and religion by designating them as mystical and nonsense. But, in a real sense, by calling them mystical and nonsense, Wittgenstein actually attempts to preserve them and honour them. I think Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning which holds the central program of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* actually attempts to design a modality to protect and to save *what is higher* from the perverting; all-too-human encroaches of language. Thus, Wittgenstein's proposal of mysticism and silence should not be taken as a negative approach to religion, ethics, and aesthetics. Wittgenstein always respect the awesome power of the mystical even though he

⁶³ *A Lecture on Ethics*, p. 7.

comes to know that such power does not help anymore to determine the sense of the proposition within the limits of his language and the world.

Wittgenstein's *picture theory of meaning* functions within his language and his world and it is primarily concerned to depict the mundane world of facts. For Wittgenstein, a proposition pictures a fact and as a result of that a picture would be treated as a model of reality. Accordingly, we can say after Wittgenstein that *the picture theory of meaning* is absolutely inadequate to handle the *glorious ineffability of the mystical*. The glorious ineffability of the mystical is something that lies outside of the world and it is not part of the word or language. It lies beyond words, beyond the mundane world and it is inexpressible, mystical, and nonsense. But, Wittgenstein is calling it inexpressible and nonsense to make or to draw our *awareness* about it. We are aware of the unknowability of what is higher. For Wittgenstein, what is higher requires deep thinking and absolute concentration. As it lies beyond significant language, it is nonsensical. Therefore, Wittgenstein tells us that any attempt to write or to talk of ethics or religion "was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless."⁶⁴ In this regard, Wittgenstein cites Kierkegaard. In fact, Wittgenstein was influenced by Kierkegaard regarding ethics and religious matter. Wittgenstein seems to think that there is a definite worth in the occasional breaking of *Tractatarian* silence. Even though to say something against the boundaries of language is cognitively hopeless, but running up against something *indicates something*. In this regard, Wittgenstein refers Saint Augustine and remarks in his *Culture and Value*: "What you swine, you want not to talk nonsense! Go ahead and talk nonsense, it does not matter!"⁶⁵ The above remark that

⁶⁴ *A Lecture on Ethics*, pp. 11-12.

⁶⁵ *Culture and Value*, p. 69.

appears in *Culture and Value* clearly suggests in talking of nonsense. It is in one sense a sort of recognition of the unknowability of the divine which lies beyond human knowledge. It also suggests that to talk of nonsense is to talk of important nonsense. In this regard, Clack gives two interpretations of the category of important nonsense, namely, anthropological interpretation and transcendental interpretation. As far as, anthropological interpretation is concerned Wittgenstein's concept of mysticism is not placed what is beyond the world, but rather on human being themselves. In this sense, nonsense is nothing but the product of human desires and religious impulses. In his *A Lecture on Ethics*, Wittgenstein speaks only of a tendency in the human mind which suggests that what he calls the mystical is a creation of the human mind. Simplistically, it can be said that what is mystical is not something independent of the mind, rather it is the mental creation and it is embedded within the language. Thus, from an anthropological point of view what is mystical cannot be a genuinely *transcendent reality*. Wittgenstein further contends that mysticism comes from the non-satisfaction of our wishes by science. Science cannot adequately meet the needs and desires of human beings. Science is purely a domain of intellectualism where the foundation of knowledge is sought from an epistemological and logical point of view. Therefore, if all possible scientific questions are answered, our satisfaction remains unfulfilled. In this regard, Wittgenstein in his *Notebooks 51* as well as in his *TLP 6.52* asserts, the urge towards the mystical comes of the non-satisfaction of our wishes by science. We *feel* that even if all *possible* scientific questions are answered *our problem is still* not touched at all.⁶⁶

What I intend to say here is that mysticism is an integral part of human life. Mysticism is what lies beyond the domain of scientific inquiry or in short in the

⁶⁶ *Notebooks, 51; TLP, 6.52.*

domain of intellectualism. Intellectualism *per se* of scientific inquiry, in general, cannot cover the domain of human cravings and desires. Men always try to go beyond intellectualism to lead a good life, to determine the meaning of life. In this way, men find a sense of God. Wittgenstein equates God with the meaning of life. For Wittgenstein, what is God *is* the meaning of life; the value of life. In his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein tells us that the mystical constitutes a particular way of looking at the world; a particular way of responding to the facts and countered there. For Wittgenstein, the facts only create a problem; but fail to give us a solution. Within intellectualism or within the domain of science factual conflict or conflicts arising out of fact is the hallmark of life. For Wittgenstein, it is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists. Mysticism in the world appears when people attempt to know the world or when people attempts to determine the value of the world out of the cultivation of sheer intellectualism. When people conceive the world as a limited whole, mysticism arises. In this regard, Wittgenstein in his *TLP* 6.45 asserts that to view the world *sub specie aeterni* is to view it as a whole - a limited whole. Wittgenstein then goes on to remark to reveal the world as a limited whole is a sort of mysticism. In his language, feeling the world as a limited whole - it is this that is mystical.⁶⁷

Wittgenstein further contends that what is mystical is nothing but a view of the world *sub specie aeternitatis* i.e. under the aspect of eternity. The problem of mystical is not the problem of the empirical world, in Wittgenstein's sense, my language and my world; rather it would be the problem of eternity or divinity *per se* to conceive the world as a limited whole is a purely self-centered one, a narrow focus. One has to widen one's view so that the entirety of the world is perceived. To detect the real

⁶⁷ *TLP*, 6.45.

meaning of life or to detect the value of the world one has to set aside the view to perceive the world as a limited whole and instead of that to see the world as totality. This is how, Wittgenstein coincides *mystical experience* with *aesthetic experience*. For Wittgenstein, to have mystical experience is to have aesthetic experience. To have aesthetic experience is to have or is to detect the meaning of life. To have the meaning of life is to have the value of the world. All these are integral parts of mysticism. Thus, we think Wittgenstein with the mystical perception enables to perceive the world or enables to capture the world *holistically*. In this sense, Wittgenstein understands the meaning of the phrase *sub specie aeternitatis*. It is a work of art deeply associated with aesthetic vision. It is not something that can be visional in the midst of things rather it is a vision that can be revealed from outside. In his *Notebooks*, Wittgenstein connects aesthetics with mystical and treated it as crucial. Wittgenstein asserts that the mystical perception of different people may be different. Two people may react in varying ways to the world. It may perhaps be the case that one person may achieve the mystical consciousness of the world; another person may fail to see the same thing significantly. In this regard, the clash or conflict between belief and unbelief is not a disagreement over the facts of the world; rather it is more akin to a disagreement over an *aesthetic test*. The point of agreement and disagreement is relevant only in the facts of the world. The disagreement of the facts of the world leads to contradiction or inconsistency based on which logic and epistemology function. But, when we talk about agreement and disagreement or belief and unbelief about aesthetics, there we do not find any contradiction or inconsistency.

Now, I am in a position to claim after Wittgenstein that what is mystical is deeply associated with aesthetic experience. Aesthetic experience is mystical. Aesthetic experience is the existence of the world as such. It takes the world, not as a limited

whole but takes it as an undivided whole. It does not talk in favor of the arrangement of things within a limited whole. Aesthetically, the world exists and the world exists as a miracle. It is a miracle in the sense that here we are nowhere to account for the existence of the world from our intellectual account. In this regard, Wittgenstein in his *Notebooks 86* inclines to say that ‘what exists does exist.’ This sort of assertion or idea is miraculous because it is a sort of self-revelation based on self-assertion. However, what we can say here is that the idea of the world’s miraculous existence is centered on Wittgenstein’s characterization of the mystical. In this direction and keeping this background in mind, Wittgenstein in his *A Lecture on Ethics* effectively encapsulates the meaning of *important nonsense*. By the term ‘important nonsense’, Wittgenstein means something having *absolute value*. In this regard, Wittgenstein in his *A Lecture on Ethics* makes important comments. In this regard, he intends to say that the best way to describe the world is to say that when “I have it *I wonder at the existence of the world.*” And I am then inclined to use such phrases as ‘how extraordinary that anything should exist’ or ‘how extraordinary that the world should exist.’ I will mention another experience straight away which I also know and which others of you might be acquainted with: it is, what one might call, the experience of feeling absolutely safe. I mean the state of mind in which one is inclined to say ‘I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens.’ Now let me consider these experiences, for, I believe, they exhibit the very characteristics I try to get clear about. And there is the first thing I have to say is, that the verbal expression which we give to these experiences is nonsense! If I say ‘I wonder at the existence of the world’ I am misusing language.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ *A Lecture on Ethics*, p. 8.

Mysticism is a sort of wondering. When we have mysticism we wonder of it. We wonder about it because we cannot evaluate it with regard to intellectualism. May be in Dr. Radhakrishnan's sense mysticism is a sort of wonder that may be captured with regard to intuition. Even though mysticism is a sort of wonder but still *we feel safe* or we feel absolutely safe in mysticism. A mystical feeling is a sort of feeling where we are inclined to say that we are safe and nothing can injure us whatever happens. The feeling of safety is absolutely needed to determine the value of the world as well as to determine the meaning of life even though we come to know after Wittgenstein that the verbal expression which we give to this experience is nonsense. It is a sort of misuse of language to look at the world or to look at the existence of the world by means of it. I think the term 'safety' is extremely important to justify the relevance of mysticism associated with aesthetic experience. Wittgenstein was non-committal about the existence and non-existence of the world. What Wittgenstein has said here is that any attempt to know the existence of the world or to know the outside of the world by means of propositional language would invite mysticism. That means propositional language or logical language or in short, the language of science is inadequate to reveal what lies in the world i.e. in the undivided holistic world. Thus, for Wittgenstein, it is equally nonsense to say that we wonder at the existence of the world because we cannot imagine it nonexistent. The question then arises: why is there something rather than nothing? In this regard, it may be felt that the desire to uncover the reason for the existence of the universe is legitimate and not nonsensical. But, Wittgenstein considers it "a certain characteristic misuse of our language runs through *all* ethical and religious expressions."⁶⁹ In this regard, Wittgenstein offers us a dramatic example of how religious concept misuses language by citing the character

⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 9.

of the *scapegoat ritual* appeared in the Sixteenth Chapter of the book *Leviticus*. The scapegoat ritual story asserts that in the practice, a consecrated goat has the sins of the community transferred on to it and is then sent out into the wilderness with the anticipation that taking with it the burden of guilt. Wittgenstein here comments: “The scapegoat, on which one lays one’s sins, and who runs away into the desert with them - a false picture, similar to those that cause errors in philosophy.”⁷⁰ Here, the metaphor of *scapegoat ritual* is linked with the *misuse of our language* inherent in this practice is the representation of sin. The *scapegoat ritual* reveals something deep important namely, the acutely-felt sense of guilt of a community and the desire to be free from the burden. It is a sort of desperate longing result in a thrust against the limits of sense, but, it is nothing to be ridiculed, because ‘it reveals in the starkest of fashions the pains and the anxiety of a human existence.’⁷¹

The anthropological interpretation of the thrust against the limits of language actually highlights the deep human desire that informed religion. However, it does not necessarily posit the presence of anything beyond the world. The anthropological thrust of religion is a purely human desire and tendency. What then is transcendental interpretation of religion? In this regard, we can say that Wittgenstein was fully aware of a higher order of reality and he was stressing the human desire to gain communication with this reality. According to this interpretation, the image of language as *a cage* is to be taken very seriously. It states that there is something beyond the world of their cage is a few cracks in the world through which light occasionally glimmers. I think that the cage analogy is somehow similar to Plato’s

⁷⁰ ‘Philosophy: Sections 86-93 of the so-called “Big Typescript”,’ ed. Heikki Nyman, trans. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue, in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951*.

⁷¹ *Clack*, p. 39.

simile of the cage. The only difference however is that one could educate oneself out of Plato's cage, but there is for Wittgenstein, no escape from the restriction of language and the world. For Wittgenstein, it is not just accidental that we end up talking nonsense; rather we could do no other. There is no denial of the extra-human reality of the mystical. It can be stated on the basis of Engelmann's analogy: "we are marooned on an island, and spend our days obsessively babbling about what is beyond the horizon, something we have never known, nor can ever know - but *is there* nonetheless."⁷²

It thus reflects that what lies beyond the world is mystical and in some sense hopeless. But, still it would be significant because it would determine the meaning of life. For Wittgenstein, to believe in God means to understand the questions about the meaning of life. Thus, the meaning of life is deeply rooted in believing the existence of God. Like God, if there be any cannot be put into words and it lies outside the limits of the world. Therefore, the existence of God is mystical. But, the concept of God is significant because for Wittgenstein, to believe in God is to understand the question about the meaning of life. Wittgenstein in his *Notebooks 74* further asserts that to believe in God is to know that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter. He further contends that "to believe in God means to see that life has a meaning". For Wittgenstein, religious belief is connected with the feeling that facts are not enough; that there is something beyond the factual which is of the greatest significance. The meaning of life is deeply associated with the belief in God. Like God, the meaning is located outside the humdrum order of facts. According to Clack, the connection between God and the meaning of life is in some ways may be comparable to John Macquarrie's paraphrase of the prologue to John Gospel. For Wittgenstein, meaning

⁷² Ibid, p. 40.

and God are virtually identical. Accordingly, to say that God was, in the beginning, is to say that meaning was in the beginning. Life is the drive towards meaning and life has emerged into self-conscious humanity. Meaning signs out through the thread of absurdity, for absurdity has not overwhelmed. Of course, Wittgenstein initiates a radical departure from the Christian concept of God. In fact, Wittgenstein goes further to claim that God provides the answer to the meaning of life and the world. Even he asserts that God *is* the world where the verb *is* as used here in the sense of identity. It also suggests that Wittgenstein's early thought on religion is a form of Pantheism and his conception of God has a simile to Spinoza's famous declaration that "the Universe is God". The Pantheists hold that the world itself is divine and Wittgenstein in his *Notebooks* likewise comments: "How things stand, is God. God is how things stand."⁷³ Here, Wittgenstein pantheistically identifies God with the world and the identification is also found elsewhere in the *Notebooks*. In *Notebooks* Wittgenstein asserts, "*However this may be, at any rate, we are in a certain sense dependent, and what we are dependent on we can call God.*"

In this sense, God would simply be fate, or, what is the same thing: The world - which is independent of our will."⁷⁴

The same has been revealed even in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. In his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* 6.432, Wittgenstein asserts that "God does not reveal himself in the world." This remark of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* regarding God is similar to the remark appears in *Notebooks* in which Wittgenstein asserts that God of Pantheism is the world. For Wittgenstein, since God does not reveal in the world there is no value in the world; that in the world 'no value exists - and if did exists, it

⁷³ *Notebooks*, p. 79.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p. 74.

would have no value'. For Wittgenstein, our religious consciousness stems from a feeling of being dependent on something is certainly reminiscent of Schleiermacher's later account of faith as a feeling of absolute dependence. Religion for Schleiermacher is nothing but a *sense and test for the infinite*.⁷⁵ What is reflected from the above is that for Wittgenstein, the mystical vision linked with religious experience is nothing but *seeing the world as a whole*. In order to have the mystical vision Wittgenstein advises his readers not to burden factual discourse by limiting speech to the world and to find in this limit the object of the mystical vision. For Wittgenstein, if speech is limited to factual discourse then it is not possible to see the world as a whole.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

⁷⁵ Schleiermacher, Friedrich, *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers* (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), p. 39.

Chapter Two

Religious Language as a Form of Life

It has already been stated in the earlier sequels that Wittgenstein takes a different approach of religious language and religious experience in his later writings. As compared to *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein has adopted a different kind of language known as ordinary language in his *Philosophical Investigations*. Here in *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein says that language is rule-following and following a rule is a practice in our society or community or within forms of life. Thus, language is nothing but different forms of life or different language-games that practice in our society. Thus, Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations* anticipates various forms of life or various language-games among which religious language appears as *a form of life* or *a language-game*. Thus, for Wittgenstein, “religious beliefs must be recognized as distinctive language-games.”⁷⁶ These religious language-games are cut off from all other language-games that we practice in our forms of life, according to Ronald Hepburn, John Hick, and Kai Nielsen. In this regard, Hepburn says, “Within traditional Christian theology...questions about the divine existence cannot be deflected into the question, “Does ‘God’ play an intelligible role in the language-game?”⁷⁷ Like Hepburn, Nielsen reveals excessive compartmentalization of moods of social life involved in saying that religious beliefs are distinctive language-games. In this regard, Nielsen says, “religious discourse is not something isolated, sufficient unto itself.”⁷⁸ For Nielsen, religious discourse or religious game is nothing but activities and hence are not

⁷⁶ Phillips, D. Z., *Wittgenstein and Religion*, California, New York, 1993, p. 56.

⁷⁷ Hepburn, R. W., ‘From World to God’, *Mind*, Vol. LXXII, 1963, p. 41.

⁷⁸ Neilsen, K., ‘Wittgensteinian Feideism’, in *Philosophy*, July 1967, p. 207.

isolated. If religious beliefs are isolated, self-sufficient language-game, then it becomes difficult to explain why people should cherish religious beliefs in the way they do. According to Phillips, religious beliefs seem more like esoteric games, enjoyed by the initiates but of little significance outside the internal formalities of their activities. For Phillips, religious beliefs begin to look like hobbies - something with which men occupy themselves at week-ends. Thus, to talk about religious belief as a distinctive language-game has created several misgivings.

Phillips then says that in the face of misgivings that talk of religious beliefs as distinctive language-games may make them appear to be self-contained esoteric games. Many philosophers do not agree with this philosophical standpoint. People must be given reasons why they ought to believe in God. In his *A Lectures on Ethics* Wittgenstein emphasizes the difference between *absolute judgments of value* and *relative judgments of value*. For Wittgenstein, words such as, 'good', 'important', 'right', have a relative and absolute use. For example, if we say that this is a *good* chair, we may be referring to its adequacy in fulfilling certain purposes. If we say it is *important* not to catch a cold, we may be referring to the unpleasant consequences of doing so. If we say that this is the *right* road, we may be referring to the fact that it would get me to my destination if we follow it. Wittgenstein attempts to make it clear with the help of the following remarks:

“Supposing that I could play tennis and one of you saw me playing and said, ‘Well, you play pretty badly’, and suppose I answered, ‘I know I’m playing badly, but I don’t want to play any better’, all the other man could say would be: ‘Ah, then that’s all right’. But suppose I had told one of you a preposterous lie and he came up to me and said, ‘you’re behaving like a beast’, and then I were to say, ‘I know I behave

badly, but then I don't want to behave any better', could he then say, 'Ah, then that's all right' ? Certainly not; he would say, 'Well, you ought to want to behave better'. Here you have an absolute judgment of value, whereas the first instance was one of a relative judgment."⁷⁹

When it is thought that religion is important to believe in God, are they making a relative or an absolute judgment of value? We are told to believe in God because God is the most powerful being. We are told to believe in God because only those who believe in God will flourish in the end. We are told to believe in God because history is in His hand, the final victory is His. All these are founded on relative judgments of value. However, relative judgments are reversible because if it would be the case that belief in God is pointless then historical development goes in one direction rather than another. It is indeed true to say that belief in God is represented as a means to a further end. The end is all-important rather than means. Belief in God has a point only if certain consequences follow. This seems to falsify the absolute character of many believers. They would say that God's divinity cannot be justified by external considerations. Rush Rhees made a similar observation when he compared an absolute judgment of value in morality with a relative judgment of value.

The intension of making such distinction between the relative and absolute value is of course avoiding misgivings about treating religious beliefs as esoteric games. It can lead to an attempt to show why religious beliefs are important which distorts the nature of the values involved in such beliefs. For Wittgenstein, the misgivings about the philosophical characterization of religious beliefs as distinctive games not only lead to attempts to give an external justification of religious values but also to lead

⁷⁹ See Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'A Lecture on Ethics', *Philosophical Review*, January 1965, p. 5.

attempts both by philosophers who are sympathetic and by philosophers who are unsympathetic to religion to show that their conclusions are rich by criteria of rationality which their opponents do or to accept. Unless believers and non-believers use common criteria of rationality, the misgivings about religious beliefs as esoteric games cannot be avoided.

Wittgenstein himself anticipated the question of whether, in relation to religion, the non-believer contradicts the belief when he says that he does not believe what the believer believes.⁸⁰ If one man contradicts another, they can be said to share a common understanding, to be playing the same game. For example, the man who says that the Sun is 90 million miles away from the Earth contradicts the man that the Sun is only 20 million miles away from the Earth. The man who says that there are unicorns contradicts the man who says that there are no unicorns. In these cases, the disputants have participated in a common understanding, namely, the method of calculation in astronomy, used in the case of the distance of the Sun from the earth. Likewise, the disputants about the unicorn share a common understanding, namely, a method of verifying the existence of various kinds of animals. The disputants differ about the facts but they are one in logic, i.e. they appeal the same criteria to settle the disagreement. But, what if one man says that handling the ball is a foul and another says that handling the ball is not a foul? Are they contradicting each other? Surely they would be contradicting each other *only if* they are playing the same game, and also referring to the same rules. In the light of these examples mentioned above, what are we to say about the man who would believe in God and the man who does not? Are they contradicting each other? Are two people, one of whom says that there is a

⁸⁰ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief*, (ed.) Cyril Barrett (Basil Blackwell, 1966).

God and the other of whom says that he does not believe in God, like two people who disagree about the existence of unicorn? Wittgenstein does not think so. For Wittgenstein, the main reason for the difference is that God's reality is not one of a kind. He is not a being among beings. The word 'God' is not the name of a thing. The reality of God thus cannot be assessed by a common measure.

If we say that something exists, it makes sense for us to think of that something ceasing to exist. But, religious believers do not want to say that *God might cease to exist*. For them, God will exist forever. There is no question of ceasing the existence of God. It is meaningless to speak of God's ceasing to exist. According to the theologians, it is a terrible thing not to believe in God. But, if believing in God is to believe in the existence of a thing, one might wonder why it is so terrible to say that the thing in question does not exist. Religious believers *only believe* that God exists is true. That is why, belief in God or faith about God would be treated as the basic and fundamental religious statement from which religious journey is started. Without this basic proposition, there is no relevance to a religious discussion.

It should be noted here that in the case of religious belief, it is said that when they are brought into relation with the relevant criteria of assessment, they are shown to be mistakes, distortions, illusions, or blunders. Thus, there is no scope of assessment or verification about religious faith on God or the existence of God. In matters of empirical fact, one can easily verify or assess them, but it is unlikely in the case of religion. For Wittgenstein, such conclusion arises, partly at least, *from a deep philosophical prejudice*. One characteristic of this philosophical prejudice is the *craving for generality*. That means the use of 'existence' and 'belief' in religion is the same in all contexts. What Wittgenstein shows us in his remark on religious belief is

why there is good reason to note the different uses which 'belief' and 'existence' have, and to resist the craving for generality. Wittgenstein was completely against the plea to a craving for religious generality.

Wittgenstein takes religious belief to be a hypothesis. According to Wittgenstein, like various language-games or like various forms of life there may have various religious beliefs. There is no uniformity or generality among all religious beliefs very similar to that there is no uniformity or generality among all language-games. For Wittgenstein, there is something common, something uncommon, similarities, dissimilarities, and overlapping features among all language-games. If it would be the case then there is no point of invoking religious generality among religious beliefs. In philosophical discussions of religion, nothing can be believed unless there is evidence or grounds for that belief. Of course, where certain religious beliefs are concerned, for example, belief in the authenticity of a holy relic-grounds and evidence for the belief is relevant. But, from this one cannot conclude that it makes sense to ask for the evidence or ground of every religious belief. Wittgenstein adequately considers belief in the *Last Judgment*, what evidence is there for believing in the *Last Judgment*? One could imagine *degrees of belief* concerning it. In such a case, some say that they are sure about it and others say that possibly there will be a *Last Judgment* and some others perhaps do not believe in it. Despite this disagreement, we can say after Wittgenstein, that the disputants are *one in logic*. Regarding *Last Judgment*, those who feel sure that it might occur, and those who think it might possibly occur, and those who do not think it will occur, are all logically on the same level. They are all playing the same game. They are expressing their belief, half-belief, or unbelief in a

particular game or hypothesis. Thus, “religious belief in one sense may be taken to be a hypothesis.”⁸¹

Does it then lead us to assume that religious beliefs would always be hypothesis? Wittgenstein does not think so. Wittgenstein says that the word ‘God’ is amongst the earliest learnt. We learn it through pictures, stories, catechisms, etc. But, Wittgenstein wants us that this does not have the same consequences as with pictures of aunts. Later Wittgenstein illustrates the point as follows:

“Take ‘God created man’. Pictures of Michelangelo showing the creation of the world. In general, there is nothing that explains the meanings of words as well as a picture, and I take it that Michelangelo was as good as anyone can be and did his best and here is the picture of the Deity creating Adam.

If we ever saw this, we certainly wouldn’t think this the Deity. The picture has to be used in an entirely different way if we are to call the man in that queer blanket ‘God’, and so on. You could imagine that religion was taught by means of these pictures.’ This is rather queer...I could show Moore the pictures of a tropical plant. There is a technique of comparison between picture and plant. If I showed him the picture of Michelangelo and said, ‘Of course, I can’t show you the real thing, only the picture’...The absurdity is, I’ve never taught him the technique of using this picture.”⁸² If we carefully go through the insight of the above-stated remarks of Wittgenstein we can outline the difference between a man who does and a man who does not believe in God. For Wittgenstein, the difference is very similar between a

⁸¹ *Wittgenstein and Religion*, by D. Z. Phillips, California, New York, 1993, p. 63.

⁸² Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief*, (ed.) Cyril Barrett (Basil Blackwell, 1966) pp. 59-60.

man who does and a man who does not believe in a picture. The question is of course - what does believing in a picture amount to? Is it like believing in a hypothesis? For Wittgenstein, certainly, it would not be the case. Wittgenstein in this context says, "The whole weight may be in the picture."⁸³ For Wittgenstein, a man's belief in the *Last Judgment* may show itself in a way a man has this belief before his mind when he takes any decision of importance in the way it determines his attitude to his aspirations and failures. While talking of these features of the religious person's belief, Wittgenstein is, according to D. Z. Phillips, is stressing the grammar of belief. As a result of that, he does not involve the weighing of evidence or reasoning to a conclusion. He insists on how religious belief regulates a person's life. What then are we to say of those who do not use the picture while believing in God? Do they contradict those who do? Wittgenstein does not think so. In this regard let me quote Wittgenstein:

Suppose someone is ill and he says: 'This is a punishment,' and I say: 'If I'm ill, I don't think of punishment at all.' If you say, 'Do you believe the opposite?' - You can call it believing the opposite, but it is entirely different from what we would normally call believing the opposite.

I think differently, in a different way. I say different things to myself. I have different pictures.

It is this way: if someone said, 'Wittgenstein, you don't take illness as punishment, so what do you believe?' - I'd say: 'I don't have any thoughts of punishment.'⁸⁴

⁸³ Ibid, p. 72.

⁸⁴ Ibid, p. 55.

Thus, it seems clear from Wittgenstein that those who do not use the picture cannot be compared with those who do not believe in a hypothesis. For Wittgenstein, believing in a picture means putting one trust and faith in it, sacrificing for it, letting it regulate one's life, and so on. Thus, believing in a picture of God is trust on God, faith on God, sacrificing everything to God, and moreover to practice the same in everyday life and regulating the life. To disbelieving in a picture is just the opposite. Wittgenstein brings out the differences between these and disputes over a hypothesis just by saying, 'suppose someone was a believer and said: "I believe in the Last Judgment," and I said: "Well, I'm not so sure. Possibly." You would say that there is an enormous gulf between us. If he said "There is a German airplane overhead," and I said "Possibly. I'm not so sure," you'd say we were fairly near.'⁸⁵

According to Wittgenstein, beliefs, such as belief in the Last Judgment, are not a testable hypothesis, but absolute for believers in so far as they predominate in and determined much of their thinking. The absolute beliefs are the criteria but not the object of assessment. The point is that if there were evidence, this would in fact destroy the whole business. In such a case, the absolute religious beliefs would turn out to be mistakes or blunders. Wittgenstein remarks whether a thing is a blunder or not - it is a blunder in a particular system just as something is a blunder in a particular game and not in another.⁸⁶ Some blunders, Wittgenstein opines, may be fundamental; some others may not. However, what has gone wrong if when asked to go in the same way? Wittgenstein says, 'If you suddenly wrote numbers down on the blackboard, and then said, "Now, I'm going to add," and then said,' "2 and 21 is 13," etc., I'd say:

⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 53.

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 59.

“This is no blunder.”⁸⁷ Here, we cannot say that the person has made a blunder in adding. Here, we can refer to the *category mistakes* of Gilbert Ryle. I think that the concept of blunder may be compared with the *category mistake* of Ryle. To say that the cat is on the mat is not to commit a blunder or in Ryle’s sense not to commit a *category mistake*. But, instead of that ‘to say that Saturday is on the bed’ is to commit a blunder or is to commit a *category mistake*, according to Ryle. In Wittgenstein’s sense, I can say that even though there are various language-games but to use one language-game in place of other would be a blunder even though there remain family resemblances among all language-games.

For Wittgenstein, there are many language-games just like there are many forms of life and among various language-games religious belief is supposed to be a distinctive language-game. As a language-game, religious beliefs are important in the same way as one might show a certain course of action to be prudential. However, one cannot rule out the possibility of absurdities in religious language-game. Such a reaction is strengthened when philosophers talk of language-games as having criteria of intelligibility within them. T. H. McPherson once remarked, “Religion belongs to the sphere of the unsayable, so it is not to be wonder at that in theology there is much nonsense (i.e., many absurdities); this is the natural result of trying to put into words - and to discuss - various kinds of inexpressible “experiences”, and of trying to say things about God.”⁸⁸

While reflecting upon McPherson’s aforesaid remark, Passmore comments that ‘one difficulty with this line of reasoning is that it saves religion only at the cost of leaving

⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 62.

⁸⁸ McPherson, T. H., ‘Religion as the Inexpressible’, in *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, (ed.) A. Flew and A. MacIntyre (SCM Press, 1955), p. 142.

the door open to any sort of transcendental metaphysics.’ As a result of that, religion, according to Passmore, would be treated as superstition and nonsense of the most arrant sort. Passmore further contends that by calling religious belief a distinctive language-game, McPherson commits a philosophical blunder. Within the religious practice, there will be criteria for what can be said and cannot be said. A religious believer may commit blunders within his religion because there are a set of pointless rules those could have internal consistency. People can follow and even fail to follow such pointless rules. In this process, they may make mistake. Therefore, to argue that religious beliefs are distinctive language-games with rules which their adherents may follow or fail to follow does not show that the rules have any point. Thus, one may be a little cautious about the analogy between religious *beliefs and games*. I think that the point of religious beliefs cannot be shown simply by distinguishing between religious beliefs and other features of human existence. In fact, the importance of religion in the human domain cannot be understood simply by distinguishing between religion and other modes of social life. If religion were thought of as cut off from the other modes of social life, it could not have the importance as it has.

In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein thought that all propositions must *have a general form*. Rhees says that although Wittgenstein had given up the idea of ‘all propositions’ in the *Philosophical Investigations*, he was still interested in human language, i.e. ordinary or natural language. Thus, when he says that ‘any language is a family of language-game’ and that any of these might be a complete language by itself, he does not say whether people who might take part in several such games would be speaking the same language. Rhees says, “I find it hard to see on this

view that they would even be speaking a language.”⁸⁹ Rhees’ motive behind this saying would perhaps be the case that Wittgenstein takes it for granted that the same language is being spoken in the different language-games. The problem becomes acute when Wittgenstein says that each language-game could be a complete language-game in itself. Here, Wittgenstein actually wanted to rid us of the supposition that all propositions have a general form. The different language-games do not make up one big game.

Let me explain this further. Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations* asserts that language is rule-following and following a rule is a practice or to follow a rule is to practice language in our form of life. There are different forms of life just like there are different language-games. Every language-game or every form of life is somehow or other differs from another form of life or other language-game. There is no common uniformity or inherent structural isomorphic relationship among all language-games or all forms of life. Rather there are similarities, dissimilarities, something common and something uncommon, overlapping and crisscross relationship among all language-games. Even though different games do not make up a game, yet Wittgenstein wants to say that a language is a family of language-games. Of course, one may think that this is the kind of unity a language has. However, the concept of unity among language-games can be comprehended in two different senses. In one sense, the unity may be comprehended concerning the inherent defining characteristic that is invariably common to all language-games. And in the second sense, the unity among language-games can be comprehended about the concept of family resemblance. In the first sense, the concept of Essentialism is established and it is denied by Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations*. I think that Wittgenstein

⁸⁹ Rhees, R., *Discussions of Wittgenstein* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 253.

conceives the unity among language-games not based on commonness or common properties among language-games, but based on family resemblance among language-games.

In this regard, Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations* brings the concept of builders where Wittgenstein says that the language of orders and responds, one man shouting 'slab' and another bringing one, could be the entire language of a tribe. Rhees says, "I feel that there is something wrong here. The trouble is not to imagine a people with a language of such vocabulary. The trouble is to imagine that they spoke the language only to give this special order on this job and otherwise never spoke at all. I do not think it would be speaking of language."⁹⁰ What Wittgenstein describes, Rhees argues, is more like a game with building stones and the correct methods of reacting to signals than people actually building a house. For Rhees, learning a language cannot be equated with learning what is generally done. It is more to do with what it makes sense to answer or what it makes sense to ask. The expressions used by the builder cannot have their meaning entirely with the job.

Wittgenstein held a therapeutic and anti-scientific concept of philosophy with deep underlying ethico-religious intent. While doing this philosophy of religion, Wittgenstein certainly does not intend to deny logic, metaphysics, epistemology, or semantic analysis. Wittgenstein even does not confuse his philosophy of religion with such disciplines. Wittgenstein anticipates different disciplines of philosophy very similar to his cryptic remark of different *forms of life*. Wittgenstein thought that philosophy itself was bad for human beings since its stance in a way of our coming to grips with our lives. Religion since coming to grip with our life had nothing to do

⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 256.

with philosophy. Logic, epistemology, metaphysics, etc. all are doing serious philosophy by way of developing various theories. Religion, on the other hand, is no longer associated with theories or doctrines; rather religion in Wittgenstein's sense is *an activity*, a therapeutic activity that is deeply associated with the meaning of life or the values of the world which in turn would determine the meaning of life. In a sense, philosophical perplexities are misleading pictures of the workings of our language that are generating our perplexities and we get in philosophical trouble. We catch the philosophical disease. In such a case, we are extremely puzzling as we do not know the way of just like the fly in a fly-bottle does not know how to come out from the bottle. This so happens because we do not have a command or we do not have a sufficiently clear view of the working of our language when we try to think about consciousness, thought, sensations, truth, warrantability, intentionality, and the like. For Wittgenstein, all these are troublesome issues to religion because all these are deeply associated with philosophy and also associated with developing philosophical theories. This idea, of course, Wittgenstein claims is not to provide some general descriptive account of language along with the line of P. F. Strawson or some formal scientific account of the Semantics of our language as presumed by Carnap rather to provide where we are experiencing mental cramps.

In *Philosophical Investigations* (1958), the central work of his later philosophy and most particularly in his last work *On Certainty* (1969), Wittgenstein articulates his methodological changed conception of how to proceed in philosophy and applies it to a range of philosophical problems. Here, Wittgenstein is talking a kind of language known as a natural language which is a historically and culturally contingent *form of life*. Here, we come to have practices in which *words and actions are interwoven*. In this activity, in learning to play this language-game, in different forms of life, we

come to understand words by coming to know they are uses in the *stream of life*, and with this, we come to know how to use words in the course of our various practice - embedded activities. In fact, this is how Wittgenstein has abandoned his earlier formalist account of language developed in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Instead of *Tractatarian* demand of language, now Wittgenstein is talking in favour of a kind of language which is seen as an activity having many different functions, embedding in different practices. This language, for Wittgenstein, is suitable to religion. He conceives religious language as a form of life among various forms of life or a religious game among various games. If someone to understand a word is not sufficient to bring the learner face to face with its putative reference while repeating the word. Wittgenstein put it in an oft-quoted remark from his *Philosophical Investigations*, ‘for a large class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in language.’⁹¹ Thus, I find a methodological shift from Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* to his *Philosophical Investigations*, and this methodological shifting actually reflects the formation and the function of language. In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, the connection between language and reality has been made by picturing the facts of the world by means of language and the whole program is structural and mechanical in nature. Moreover, the discourse of ethics and religion was outside the pictorial relationship between language and reality. However, in his *Philosophical Investigations*, I rather understand one concept by coming to understand their use in our life activities. Here, Wittgenstein understands that concepts are aspects of our *forms of life*. They are not items on us by the world; rather understand a concept is to understand the *use of words* expressing it as they function

⁹¹ Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 43.

in our language and in our lives depending on the particular concept, as part of the varied concepts and the various purposes we have. For Wittgenstein, these varied activities and ways in which we talk form our practices and they build together into our forms of life.

In this regard, Wittgenstein finds the distinction between religious belief and factual belief; between religious form of life and factual form of life. For Wittgenstein, like factual belief, we do not find any sort of assertion or prediction in religious belief or in the religious form of life. When, for example, a religious person says 'I believe that there will be the Last Judgment,' it is a complete mistake according to Wittgenstein. Here, by making this utterance the religious person actually is making a prediction. That is not the use or even anything like the use; it has in religious language-games or religious forms of life. In believing in the Last Judgment, a person is not, Wittgenstein opines, thinking that there will be a certain kind of extra-ordinary event that will occur sometime in the future. Wittgenstein's religious portion, according to Nielsen (1982), 'is not thinking any such thing'.⁹² Here, Wittgenstein's religious portion is not trying to make any kind of prediction at all. Instead, Wittgenstein equates having religious belief with using a certain *religious concept* and having the emotions and attitudes that go with this concept. In this regard, Wittgenstein remarks that *a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference*.⁹³ For Wittgenstein, religious beliefs are no longer associated with any prediction or any sort of assertion, rather religious belief is deeply associated with the meaning of life or the meaning of the world. The meaning of life or the meaning of the world can neither be true nor be false. The question of their truth and falsity

⁹² Nielsen, 1982, pp. 43-44.

⁹³ Wittgenstein, 1980, p. 64.

cannot even meaningfully arise in the case of religious belief. That is why Wittgenstein has rightly pointed out that the sense of the proposition which can be either true or false is no longer associated to determine the meaning of life or the meaning of the world. Religious beliefs, for Wittgenstein, are neither reasonable nor unreasonable. To say that religious beliefs are reasonable or unreasonable is to say either for or against religion. In this way, religious belief can be tested. But, for Wittgenstein, religious belief cannot be tested; cannot be shown to be either true or probably true or false or probably false by evidence or by argument grasped by reason. For Wittgenstein, *those who view like that, he regards as ludicrous.*⁹⁴

Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations* asserts that philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.⁹⁵ While reflecting on this remark, Norman Malcolm in his book *Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?* states that Wittgenstein by making the above remarks actually brings a radical change in our conception of philosophy. According to Malcolm, while claiming that philosophy does not seek to explain anything is certainly not a true description of philosophy as it has been practiced. Many philosophers express their serious concern about doing philosophy without seeking an explanation. For them, doing philosophy without explanation is simply ridiculous. For them, the traditional aim of philosophy has been to seek an explanation as to the essential nature of doing justice, right and wrong, duty, the good, beauty, art, language, rules, thought. Malcolm says, “A philosopher may well ask: What am I supposed to do if not explain?”⁹⁶ However, Malcolm reveals that there is a specific answer of what has been sort above in

⁹⁴ Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 58.

⁹⁵ *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 126.

⁹⁶ Malcolm, Norman, *Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?*, 1994, p. 74.

Wittgenstein's later thinking. Wittgenstein in his later thinking asserts that the task of philosophy is to describe concept. How does one describe a concept? In this regard, Malcolm on behalf of Wittgenstein responds that by describing the use of the word or of "those words that express the concept that is what philosophy should put before us".⁹⁷ Malcolm in this regard intends to say that there is no language - independent access to concept and Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations* has maintained it. In this regard, Malcolm says, 'The description of the use of a word is called by Wittgenstein describing the "language-game" with that word.'⁹⁸ Malcolm thus portrays his faith in Wittgenstein's therapeutic conception of philosophy. In this regard, Malcolm says that it is not the task of philosophy to describe the use of a word in its totality, but only those features of the word that in certain determinate context give rise to philosophical perplexity. According to Nielsen, we assemble reminders to break a certain perplexity where we have mental cramps concerning *the working of our language*. According to Nielsen, describing the use of an expression is called describing the grammar of the expression in Wittgensteinian sense. The point of speaking of language-game is to bring into focus, and clear prominence, the fact that the speaking of a language is part of an activity or a form of life.⁹⁹ While illuminating the remark of Wittgenstein, Malcolm rightly takes this to mean "that is describing the language-game, of some part of the language-game with a word; one is describing how the word is embedded in action and reactions - in human behavior."¹⁰⁰ For Wittgenstein, words have meaning only in the flow of thought and life. Our talk "gets

⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 74.

⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 74.

⁹⁹ *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 23.

¹⁰⁰ Malcolm, Norman, *Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?*, 1994, p. 75.

its sense from the rest of our action.”¹⁰¹ Our language-game as they are in *forms of life* they provide us a place for explanations, for giving reasons, and for justifications inside the framework of this language-game or form of life. However, Malcolm reads Wittgenstein by saying that Wittgenstein here does not admit any explanation or justification for the existence of these forms of language-games themselves.

Language-Games and Forms of Life:

While illuminating the function of language-game, Malcolm links language-games with *forms of life*. In this regard, Malcolm brings the use of *motive*. Malcolm contends that the motive of people is important here. What is highly interesting is that if he does disclose his motive his acknowledgement of it will not be based on any inference from the situation, or from his own behavior or previous actions. Here he tells us his motive without inference.¹⁰² It thus seems that Wittgenstein’s language-game works just by its sheer existence and contingency. This is true not only with the language-game we play with a *motive*, but also with an *intention* or with any other language-game. Here, we have contingency rather than necessity. Reflecting on how Wittgenstein is reasoning and how Wittgenstein thinks we should reason if we would be realistic. We cannot explain why this use of language exists. All we can do here is to describe it - and behold it. In this regard, Malcolm quotes Wittgenstein from *On Certainty*, where Wittgenstein makes a general comment about language-games: You must bear in mind that the language-game is, so to speak, something unforeseeable. I mean it is not based on grounds. Not reasonable (or unreasonable). It stands there like our life.¹⁰³ Malcolm continues that religions, i.e. Judaism, Christianity, Islam,

¹⁰¹ Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 229.

¹⁰² Malcolm, Norman, *Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?*, 1994, p. 76.

¹⁰³ Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 559.

Hinduism, Buddhism, etc. etc., are *all ancient and complex forms of life*. That over time they changed myriad of ways with their distinctive, but purely contingent language-games. However, it should be kept in mind that the Christian religion or Judaism does not use the term *language-game* and Wittgenstein does not refer to these religions in this regard. However, Malcolm reveals that Judaism and Christianity contain language-games embedded in their practices and are not understandable without reference to them. Within these language-games, there can be the *giving of reason, explanation, and justification*, but for the language-game and forms of life themselves; there can be no explanation or justification and no foundation for them either. For Malcolm, they are human activities that are just there and religious forms of life, like other forms of life, are neither reasonable nor unreasonable. In fact, they do not rest on some deeper metaphysical or theological foundations or any kind of grounding theory. They neither have some foundationalist epistemological grounding nor any other kind of grounding nor do they require such grounding, rationalizing, or theorizing.

Religious Forms of Life is Endless:

For Wittgenstein, *they are in order just as they are*. They are just they are, like our lives. There can be internal criticism within religious language-games. Some expressions of faith are less adequate than others, but there can be no intelligible standing outside these forms of life and accessing them. Wittgenstein comes against any sort of justification about religious matters. For Wittgenstein, *justification comes to an end*. A theory based on justification has ended in a certain point. A doctrine based on justification has come to an end. But, religious language-game or religious form of life has no end. Religious form of life or religious language is not a theory, is

not a doctrine, but is an activity having no end-point. As it has no end-point, it has no relevance for justification. It cannot be theorized. This is true for all forms of life including religion. In this regard, Malcolm represents Wittgenstein by saying, ‘Wittgenstein regarded the language-games, and their associated forms of life, as beyond explanation. The inescapable logic of this conception is that the terms *explanation, reason, justification* have a use exclusively *within* the various language-games.¹⁰⁴ Alternatively, it can be said that an explanation is internal to a particular language-game. No explanation arises above our language-game and explains them. This would be a super concept of explanation. Philosophers’ task is not to seek explanation, but to observe and to discuss language-game instead of explaining language-game. We will come to see more clearly the use of the term or of language-games and the role they play in our lives. For Malcolm, the kind of therapeutic philosophy that Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinians, namely, Conant, Diamond, Rhees, and Winch practice enters when we become entangled in our concept - the use of our terms. In this regard, Kai Nielsen remarks, ‘There, in such particular situations, philosophy can, by assembling reminders for a particular purpose, enables us to command a clearer view of our use of these terms and it can dispel our confusions about them. Philosophy, Wittgenstein has it, as do neo-pragmatists as well, cannot explain why anything happens or exists’ and it cannot reveal the essential nature of anything for there are no such essential natures.¹⁰⁵ For Nielsen, we normally can operate with them without difficulties, but we very often fall into confusions, we very often suffer from mental cramps when we try to operate upon them. All of these apply to our religious concepts. Following Wittgenstein, we can say here that when the

¹⁰⁴ Malcolm, Norman, *Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?*, 1994, p. 77.

¹⁰⁵ Nielsen, Kai, p. 244.

engine is not idling; when we work with them - operate with them rather than upon them - we understand them, well enough, if we have been enculturated into such forms of life, but when we think about them, we think about other concept, Wittgenstein opines, we almost irresistibly fall into confusion about them. Therefore, for Wittgenstein, the task of philosophers is to dispel such confusions by providing *in situ* a perspicuous representation of this concept. In this regard, we move about on grammar, in our everyday practice. But, in thinking about what we do with words we not infrequently fall into perplexity. To remove our misconception, Malcolm following Wittgenstein says, there is no theorizing in called for, neither scientific nor philosophical. What is mostly required here is only that *we look carefully at the grammar which is at our command*. In this regard, Wittgenstein's comment is: 'Don't think, but look!'¹⁰⁶

Don't think but look!

I think the aforesaid remark of Wittgenstein gives an insight of his philosophical position of *PI*. From a religious perspective, we can say that the sense of religion cannot be grasped in the process of thinking. Religion is not a matter that can be comprehended through thinking. Thinking is deeply associated with humans' cognition. It is rational and here everything can be justified concerning reason. Based on the rational account, philosophical theories have been developed. For Wittgenstein, the concept of philosophical theory in religion is otiose. Religion is no longer associated with theories. It is not associated with philosophical doctrines as well. Philosophical theories and doctrines are the outcomes of religious thinking. It is an integral part of religious epistemology. Wittgenstein does not think that there is the

¹⁰⁶ *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 66; *Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?*, pp. 79-80.

scope of religious epistemology in religion. His interpretation of religion is nothing but an activity, a way of looking at society, community. To assert that religion is the outcome of the thinking process is to assert that there is a *private mental activity*. Wittgenstein then said that nothing is more wrongheaded than calling meaning a mental activity.¹⁰⁷ That means to think of meaning as some essentially occult state or act inside one's consciousness, radically inaccessible to anyone else is to succumb to the appealing thought that the self is concealed inside the man. Hardly any modern philosophers would suppose that the soul is self-conscious entity lodged in the flesh. Like many of his contemporaries, Wittgenstein equally detected arguments and assumption that fed parasitically on the continuing vitality of the ancient religious myth of the soul. In a lecture given in the early 1930s, he spoke of trying to convince the class of just the opposite of Descartes' emphasize on *I*.¹⁰⁸ For Wittgenstein, the word 'I' was already on the list of words that needed to *be brought back from their metaphysical application to their home in everyday conversation*.¹⁰⁹ From the first-person perspective, it is very easy to generate a sense of oneself as a thinking thing this shows obvious kinship with the representation of the infant Augustine's travails. However, a philosophical account of the self outlines in a textbook easily becomes a topic for analysis and refutation. Accordingly, the Cartesian conception of the 'I' might seem so innocent in a philosophical text that it's most insidious attractions escape notice.

Therefore, just by calling the aforesaid remark, Wittgenstein prefers, for the most part, to leave aside the standard texts, and seldom name his contemporaries when he

¹⁰⁷ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit., paragraph: 693.

¹⁰⁸ Ambrose, Alice (ed.), *Wittgenstein's Lectures Cambridge 1932-1935*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1979, p. 63.

¹⁰⁹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit., paragraph: 116.

follows them. This was not because he had not read them; rather he desired to show how the picture of the self that appears in the standard texts infiltrates reflection far beyond their confines. He strives to examine almost anyone in the Western tradition. In this regard, Wittgenstein asserts, “The simile of ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the mind is pernicious. It is derived from ‘in the head’ when we think of ourselves as looking out from our heads and of thinking as something going on ‘in our head’. But then we forget the picture and go on issuing language derived from it. Similarly, man’s spirit was pictured as his breath, then the picture was forgotten but the language derived from it was retained. We can only safely use language if we consciously remember the picture when we use it.”¹¹⁰ Thus what Wittgenstein intends to say above is that the very inclination to think of meaning or any other mental or spiritual activity that is radically private ‘in our head’ is explicitly related to the ancient religious myth of the soul. This is nothing but a sort of *epistemological solitude* in the phrase used by J. M. Cameron.

However, this epistemological solitude or loneliness to which the soul is mythological condemned reappears explicitly in Wittgenstein’s later writings, particularly in his *PI*. Here Wittgenstein says, “A man’s thinking goes on which his consciousness in a seclusion in comparison with which any physical seclusion is an exhibition to public view.”¹¹¹ Wittgenstein wants to expose the temptation to think of ‘the total solitude of the spirit within itself’. For Wittgenstein, the soul is more secluded than any hermit because it is given to man to converse with himself to total seclusion.

Wittgensteinian Fideism:

¹¹⁰ Ambrose, Alice, (ed.), *Wittgenstein’s Lectures Cambridge 1932-1935*, op. cit., p. 25.

¹¹¹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit., paragraph: 222.

What does *Wittgensteinian Fideism* essentially mean? *Wittgensteinian Fideism* is seen as a position in the philosophy of religion, with associated premises and arguments, a theory that challenges and competes with other theories. Hence it is subject to evaluation. Nielsen explicitly speaks as if what we have here is a new theory in the philosophy of religion and he proceeds to map it by invoking some of the characteristic thought maneuvers of Wittgenstein's work of *PI*. According to *PI*, there is a plurality of distinct forms of life with their associated language-games. Accordingly, to understand these different ways of living and speaking, *we need to look and attend*. What has to be accepted are forms of life. These need no philosophical justification by giving them a foundation. The language-game is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable or unreasonable. It is there like our life.¹¹² Good philosophy is descriptive of these language-games. It does not provide theses, theories, and justifications. Instead it leaves everything as it is. A Wittgensteinian fideist argues that religion is an ancient and ongoing form of life. It works with its own distinctive discourse, practices, and criteria of meaning and rationality. Accordingly, religious life and speech can only be understood and criticized from the inside by someone who has a participant's understanding of this discourse. A philosopher's task is not to criticize or evaluate religious language-games and ways of life in terms of some alien norm, but to describe them where necessary. Thus in a sense, Wittgenstein's fideism is seen as a position in the philosophy of religion with associated premises and arguments, a theory that challenges and compares with other theories. In this regard, it has been comprehended as a subject to evaluation. For Nielsen, to grant the fideist requirement, to start from the inside does not necessarily imply agreement with religious beliefs. More importantly, Wittgenstein's Fideism

¹¹² Ibid, paragraph: 559.

compartmentalizes religion. As a result of that, it fails to notice that it, like other facets of our culture, is open to critique. The critique came from insiders who engage in its practices. However, this objection has been withdrawn partly because of a deepened understanding of Wittgenstein due to the many works relevant to religion. It has been reflected in many writings of Wittgenstein, namely, *On Certainty*, *Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough*, and *Culture and Value*. Having said this Nielsen finds some limitation in Wittgenstein's religion as he thinks that Wittgenstein's philosophical outlook is ethically and politically irresponsible, as its attitude of quietism leads us to a malicious disengagement from the world and in turn robs us of the critical tools to assess our culture and change it for the better. Alternatively, it can be said that a philosophy that leaves everything as it is hinders the struggle for social justice and human flourishing. It is an obstacle to human solidarity.

Unlike many others, Wittgenstein's approach towards religion is innovative. He has given importance to tradition and culture embedded in our language what he termed as *the grammar of the language*. He also emphasizes to circumstances and needs. The aim was to appreciate our forms of life by clarifying concepts and discourse, by devising different methods to tackle problems as they arose for us. It is adequately reflected in his work, especially in his lectures, notes, and conversations with friends and students about religion. His remarks are expressive of an acceptance of, and respect for, the variety of expression in religious life. The imprint of William James is discernable here, as it is in Wittgenstein's rather pragmatic reaction to Drury's regret that he has not lived a religious life, possibly due to Wittgenstein's impact. Wittgenstein said, "I believe it is right to try experiments in religion. To find out, by trying, what helps one and what doesn't ... Now why don't you see if starting the day by going to Mass each morning doesn't help you to begin the day in a good frame of

mind.”¹¹³ Since religion is an activity, experiment and practice in religion is the order of the day. About his Catholic student, Wittgenstein goes on to say that he does not believe what they believe about religion. Religious disagreement is an integral part of the religion because religion is embedded in language and culture. It is the outcome of passion, compassion, faith and it has been cultivated through language and nothing else. Accordingly, the recognition of religious difference plays an important role in religion. There are similarities and differences among various religious forms of life.

Among many Wittgenstein’s fideists, Rush Rhees is the most important one. He approached religious discourse in the light of Wittgenstein’s legacy. His reflections on this issue are expressed in letters to friends, in the discussion, and several addresses to students’ meetings. It is revealed through these contexts that philosophical activity is a real force in life, encountering actual tensions, clarifying them, helping participants to come to grips with them. Very similar to Wittgenstein, Rhees acknowledges religion as the grammar of a language. For Rhees, to talk of the existence of God, we have to give special emphasize on *the grammar of this language*.¹¹⁴ In this regard, Rhees remarks, “‘God exists’ is not a statement of fact. You might also say that it is not in the indicative mood. It is a confession or expression of faith. This is recognized in some way when people say that God’s existence is ‘necessary existence’, as opposed to the ‘contingency’ of what exists as a matter of fact; and when they say that to doubt God’s existence is a sin, as opposed to a mistake about the facts.”¹¹⁵ Wittgenstein holds the same position. For Wittgenstein, to talk of the existence of God independent of language is nonsense. The concept of God if there be any is

¹¹³ Rhees, Rush, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981, p. 179.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 132.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 131-32.

embedded in language. Rhees finds similarities and differences between religious discourse and the language of love. The question of *what God is* could only be answered through *coming to know God* in worship and in religious life. Thus for Rhees, *to know God is to worship him*.¹¹⁶ To say that we could come to know God without knowing that he was the Creator and Father of all things, without knowing his love and forgiveness, is like saying that I might come to know Winston Churchill without knowing that he had a face, hands, body, voice or any of the attributes of a human being. Thus, the fault lies in thinking natural theology as the foundation of the rest of religion. The sense of 'foundation' is badly confused in religion because some people cannot imagine religion or so to speak cannot talk of religion without a religious foundation. For them, the faith on the existence of God is the basis of religious belief that may be taken up as the foundation of religion. Those who hold to a rational theology seem to argue that a man might be brought to a belief in God and also to a belief in the immortality of the soul.

Malcolm like Wittgenstein took anti-foundationalist approach of religion. In this regard, Malcolm argues against the traditional philosophical view that religious belief requires a rational foundation that would justify the religious way of life. According to Malcolm, seeking rational justification for the existence of God would be treated as an artificial construction of philosophy of religion. Religion is a form of life. It is language embedded in action. That is why Wittgenstein calls it a *language-game*. It needs no rational justification.¹¹⁷ The concept of God has a place in the thinking and lives of human beings. Hence, it is presumptuous to think of it as self-contradictory.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, p. 127.

¹¹⁷ Malcolm, Norman, 'The Groundlessness of Belief' in his *Thought and Knowledge*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1977, p. 212.

There cannot be a deep understanding of the concept without an understanding of the phenomena of human life that gives rise to it. Thus, an account of belief must take the distinction between existence and eternity seriously. Thus, the religious value is actually based on removing philosophical scruples that stand in the way of faith. According to Malcolm, at a deeper level, all Wittgensteinian fideists are secular philosophers. Nielsen, for example, writes that *The Concept of Prayer, Faith and Philosophical Enquiry* and *Death and Immortality* amount to a detailed paradigmatic statement of *Wittgensteinian Fideism*. Here Wittgenstein remarks “Speak the old language, but speak it in a way that is appropriate to the new world, without on that account necessarily being in accordance with its taste.”¹¹⁸ Philosophical theism views God as a metaphysical entity, construed as a Being among beings. It is bad philosophy, partly because of its epistemological foundationalism, partly because of its meaning-essentialism, partly because of its scientism - letting one method elbow all the others aside. Thinking of ‘God exists’ as a factual proposition, as making some kind of ontological claim about the furniture of the universe.

Wittgensteinian Fideism is based on the following assumptions:

- (i) The forms of language are the forms of life.
- (ii) What are given are the forms of life.
- (iii) Ordinary language is all right as it is.
- (iv) A philosopher’s task is not to evaluate or criticize language or the forms of life, but to describe them where necessary.
- (v) The different modes of discourse which are distinctive forms of life, all have logic of their own.

¹¹⁸ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Culture and Value*, (ed.) G. H. Von Wright, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980, p. 60.

- (vi) Forms of life taken as a whole are not amenable to criticism. Each mode of discourse is in order as it is, for each has its own criteria and each sets its own norms of intelligibility, reality, and rationality.
- (vii) These general concepts are systematically ambiguous and their exact meaning can only be determined in the context of a determinate way of life.

Based on this, a Wittgensteinian fideist could readily argue that religion is a unique and very ancient form of life with its own distinctive criteria. It is this very form of life that sets its own criteria of coherence, intelligibility. Philosophy thus cannot relevantly criticize religion. Instead, it can only display for us the workings, the style of functioning of religious discourse. Thus to understand religious discourse, one must have a participant's understanding of it.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Chapter Three

Religion, Culture, and Value

If we carefully go through the above sequels, it seems to me that there is a continuous and constant transition of Wittgenstein's outlook of religious language and religious experience. In his *TLP*, Wittgenstein does not find religious language within the language of *TLP*. Here he voiced in favour of propositional language and recognized the propositional language as 'my language'. As there is no legitimate religious language in *TLP*, he revealed ethics and religion as nonsense. He maintained the same in various other writings in his early period. However, when he moved from early to later period, he took a different philosophical approach altogether. In his *PI*, Wittgenstein finds religious language because as a linguistic philosopher, Wittgenstein in his *PI* introduces ordinary or natural language. The distinctive feature of such language is that it includes or accommodates everything and leaves nothing. Ordinary language, according to Wittgenstein, touches upon the stream of life. In his *PI*, Wittgenstein conceives various forms of life of which religion is one form of life. In this regard, he brings the metaphor 'language-game'. For Wittgenstein, there are various language-games, and religion is regarded as one language-game. Thus, like many, Cavell broadly interprets Wittgenstein's *PI* as 'philosophy of Culture.'¹¹⁹ In this regard, Cavell implicitly insists upon important connections between Wittgenstein and Spengler. He reveals Wittgenstein's *PI* as a monumental work that addresses the wayward tendencies of traditional philosophy and intimates the feature of cultural decline. Cavell further contends that Wittgenstein's philosophy of culture is Spenglerian in nature. Wittgenstein in his *PI* characterizes the misuse of language in

¹¹⁹ Cavell, Stanley, "Declining Decline: Wittgenstein as a Philosopher of Culture", *Inquiry*, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 1988, p. 253.

which philosophers typically engage. Wittgenstein finds such misuses of language as departures from correct use. It would then be a cultural loss of human orientation and spirit that is ‘internal to human language and culture.’¹²⁰ In a sense, loss of human orientation is at par with both losses in language and culture. I think that Wittgenstein of *PI* deeply accounts of a loss of orientation of language. Thus, if we carefully read and try to understand Wittgenstein of *PI*, it seems to us that he writes of a loss of orientation in human culture. Cavell reveals at least two different ways through which Wittgenstein of *PI* links disorientation in philosophers’ uses of language with the disorientation of culture. The first link recognizes language itself to be a part of the culture and so sees linguistic disorientation in philosophy to be a form of cultural disorientation. This reminds the point that I stated in the initial part of this sequel. I have claimed that culture is language embedded. Accordingly, disorientation of the uses of language would be disorientation of the culture. This leads to culture deformation or decline of culture. The second link sees Wittgenstein’s account of linguistic disorientation in philosophy to be what Cavell calls a *homologous form of and also an interpretation of* Spengler’s depiction of cultural decline.

Cavell further contends that “the *Investigations* is a work that begins with a sense of the child’s inheritance of language; it is an image of a culture as an inheritance.”¹²¹ I think that Wittgenstein’s representation of a child’s inheritance of language is also a representation of a cultural inheritance. A child’s early experiences in learning the language of a community are also part of that child’s early imitation of its culture. In this regard, it can legitimately be claimed that language is a part of the culture. Wittgenstein uses the words that are so intractably bound up with the forms of human

¹²⁰ Ibid, p. 340.

¹²¹ Ibid, p. 341.

interaction in which they play a role that their functions, their meanings, are inseparable from the relations to those forms. Human language, according to Wittgenstein, is inextricably linked to a form of human life. In this regard, Wittgenstein remarks that *to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life*.¹²² Here we divulge the cultural mode of Wittgenstein. Here, Wittgenstein sees the use of a word concerning rule-governed language-games, social interactions, and a human form of life. All these are the reflection of cultural mode. Thus, we can identify language as a component of culture. If it would be the case, then linguistic deviations would equally be treated as cultural deviations. According to Cavell, Wittgenstein's misuses of language, deviations from the rules governing the uses of words, are also deviations from established cultural norms. Every time Wittgenstein writes of disorientation in human language, i.e., *ipso-facto*, writings of disorientation of human culture. In this sense, we can say that his treatment of philosophy's linguistic contravention, in part, involves cultural decline. Simplistically, we can say that misuses of language or disorientation of language lead to cultural decline or disorientation of culture. Wittgenstein's account of the departures is revealed from the correct uses of words in traditional philosophical misuses of language. For Wittgenstein, every form of life or every language-game determines the function of language. I think Wittgenstein's accounts of philosophical misuses of language are somehow similar or analogous to Spengler's depiction of cultural decline. Alternatively, it can be said that Wittgenstein's connection of philosophical misuses of language bears an important relation to the regularized representations of cultural decline in Spengler.

Departure from Culture is Departure from Home:

¹²² Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit., paragraph: 19.

To know about the departure of language, we have to know beforehand what language is. What is/are the proper use (s) of language? For Wittgenstein, language is rule-following. Following a rule is a practice of it in the society, community, or within the form of life or language-game. Any sort of disorientation of it would be treated as a decline of culture. Thus we can say after Wittgenstein that misuse of language or disorientation of language is the violation of the rule of language in the real sense of the term. In my sense, language is culture. The culture of the community or society is being reflected through language. In this sense, language is our home, because language is culture. We live following our culture. Thus in a sense, culture or language is our home. Therefore, the decline of culture through the disorientation of language actually is a sort of departure from our home. Martin Heidegger once remarked that language is the house of being. The being is nurtured through language. To take care of being, one has to take care of language. Accordingly, losing your culture or language is to losing your home, your originality. Wittgenstein therefore in his *PI*, asks his reader regarding the philosopher's use of certain terms "is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?"¹²³ Wittgenstein describes the everyday uses of words as a 'home'. According to Cavell, Wittgenstein's use of the word *home* is stressed as an indication that he regarded the everyday uses of words metaphorically as a kind of home. Culture constitutes a home, but civilization does not constitute a home. Thus, a people living during a time of civilization lack a home in this profound Spenglerian sense. Wittgenstein's tendency both to characterize correct word usage with that which occurs within or inside of, our natural language-games and also to equate certain philosophical misuses of words with those that take place outside any language-game. Cavell reveals a metaphysical

¹²³ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit., paragraph: 47.

connection here. The philosopher wrongly seeks to do outside what must be done inside, internal to, those language-games. Externalization, for Wittgenstein, constitutes the most elementary transgression of wayward philosophy.

According to Wittgenstein, the philosopher mistakenly uses words outside the language-games. This mistake proceeds on the false assumption that the limitations on proper usage imposed by those language-games may be transcended by special philosophical uses of words. The temptation to think that there is something of philosophical importance that can only be said outside of established language-games. The erroneous idea from a philosophical perspective is that they are useless. They must therefore be abandoned for philosophy to do its work. In the *PI*, Wittgenstein has dismissed it as a delusion. For Wittgenstein, our language-games fix what can be said; outside of them, there is nothing to say. For Wittgenstein, everyday uses of words inside their proper language-games connect importantly with what is shared within a community. The uses of words in language-games are governed by criteria for their application that are common to, which are shared by the community of language users who engage in those language-games. Thus, later Wittgenstein famously claimed that language is essentially social. Here Cavell states explicitly that for Wittgenstein, “speaking outside language games” amounts to “repudiating our shared criteria”¹²⁴ for the correct use of words. Accordingly, we can say that Wittgenstein is a wayward philosopher, who abandons home by using words outside their proper language-games, *ipso-facto*, abandons their shared grammatical rules, and also, in this sense, abandons community. In this regard Cavell remarks, “The *Investigations* is a work that begins with a sense of inheritance, the child’s inheritance of language; it is an image of culture as an inheritance, one that takes place in ... the

¹²⁴ Ibid, p. 325.

conflict of generations... Wittgenstein's holding his book with Augustine's paragraph... sets the sense of inheritance".¹²⁵ Wittgenstein of course did not mention the term *child inheritance*. What Wittgenstein has said clearly and vividly is that the proper uses of words occur inside the language-games of everyday life. Thus, words are properly used in accordance with the grammar of language of the criterion of rule-following. These are accepted and shared by the linguistic community that uses these language-games. For Wittgenstein, language is a rule-governed social activity and the use of language within a community is a natural part of its social fabric. I think that the development of the rules that govern the uses of words in a linguistic community is part of the social history of that community.

Thus, Wittgenstein's account of the departures from the correct uses of words in traditional philosophical misuses of language suggests the following:

- (a) Civilization represents a loss of home. It is the most external, artificial states of which a species of developed humankind is capable.
- (b) People who live in times of civilization lose what was once shared within the culture from which that civilization developed - a sense of community rooted, in part, in shared forms of expression.
- (c) These shared forms, within the context of culture, constitute part of cultural inheritance.
- (d) The shared forms, which help unite the community within a culture, become lost and, in effect, are repudiated in a subsequent time of civilization.

¹²⁵ Ibid, p. 341.

- (e) The people of civilized time, lacking a home, a shared inheritance, a community, become lost, disoriented, and can no longer find their way back to those shared forms of expression which once helped make culture possible.

This clearly suggests that civilization in some sense or other appears as a threat to cultural decline. Wittgenstein's misuses of language are connected with the cultural decline in two different ways. Wittgenstein indeed represents those misuses in such a way as to show that they constitute a form of cultural decline. Moreover, Wittgenstein's account of those misuses functions in the *PI* as an 'interpretation' or a 'homologous form' of a Spenglerian picture of cultural decline. However unlike Spengler, Wittgenstein resists the spirit of cultural decline in his time as he seeks not only to identify the misuses of language but at the same time he straightforwardly correct them owing to combat the cultural decline. Wittgenstein first reveals the misuses of language as instances of cultural declines and then he provides for correcting them as an alternative way for the reversal of one form of cultural decline. Thus, unlike others, Wittgenstein shows us the possibility of a reversal of cultural decline. This clearly suggests that Wittgenstein was very much careful about language, culture, and the value of culture. Cavell thus finds Wittgenstein's *PI* as a philosophy of culture where Wittgenstein intended to represent a cultural decline and also suggests how it can be tackled. Thus, we have to understand the very concept of Wittgenstein's insights of cultural decline within the misuse of language. His attempt to eradicate these misuses embodies a rejection of and also a response to cultural decline. In this regard, Wittgenstein in his *PI* gives due importance to the everyday uses of language. Wittgenstein claims that 'what we do is bring back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.' Here Wittgenstein has played dual role. He not only seeks to identify just how philosophical word usage has gone wrong but also to

use what is thereby learned to gain sufficient ‘command’ of language to re-establish proper usage. Since philosophy’s misuses of language are themselves instances of cultural decline, he is concerned to combat them. Here Wittgenstein writes not only of words used outside the original homes but also of a need to bring them back to those everyday uses which are their natural homes. For Wittgenstein, the ancient task of philosophy to awaken us or bring us to our senses takes the form of returning us to the everyday, the ordinary. Of course, Wittgenstein’s cultural decline is never explicitly presented to us; rather it is manifested in his observations about the proper use of words. Here Wittgenstein emphasizes more on ‘returning us to the ordinary’ to ‘what is natural or what is home’. Wittgenstein in his *PI* makes a dramatic shift what other philosophers did. In this regard, Cavell remarks, “Philosophers before Wittgenstein had found that our lives are distorted or waylaid by illusion. But what other philosophers has found the antidote to illusion in the particular and repeated humility of remembering and tracking the uses of humble words, looking philosophically as it were beneath our feet rather than over our heads?”¹²⁶ The novelty of Wittgenstein is that he interprets religion and religious experience concerning language, i.e., about *the grammar of the language*. For Wittgenstein, religion is embedded in language. There is no religious deity, God, or supernatural entity or entities without and apart from language. Thus we have a different perception of religion in Wittgenstein. There is a forceful theory developed within the realm of linguistic philosophy. It states that language is culture. The language of a community is developed based on the culture of that community. One may come to know the culture of other community just by way of knowing the language of that community. Thus in a sense, language and culture are embedded. We find the same philosophical position in Wittgenstein.

¹²⁶ Cavell, Stanley, “*Declining Culture*”, op. cit., p. 324.

According to Wittgenstein, language is culture or language reflects the culture. A language is a form of life. The culture of a community is reflected through the form of life of that community. Now the question is that every community has its own culture. If language is structured through culture then there are as many as different types of languages within language just as there are many different types of cultures within a language community. That is why Wittgenstein in his *PI*, anticipates various forms of life. He then explains the concepts of different forms of life with the metaphor 'language-games'. In this sequel, I have developed the trio-concepts, such as, language, culture, and value. The main strategy of this sequel is to show in what sense these trio-concepts are deeply engrossed with each other.

Understanding Philosophical Investigations as a Philosophy of Culture:

Based on the above observation, there is nothing wrong to preconceive Wittgenstein's *PI* as a *Philosophy of Culture*. Wittgenstein very often offers philosophical remarks that would serve as the paradigms of cultural decline. In fact, Wittgenstein's many remarks have latent cultural insights. I have already stated that Wittgenstein's discussion of philosophers' misuses of language appears as a symptom of cultural concern. One may sense cultural concern even in his 'private language argument'. Private language argument does not contain home language or the language of society, community. As a result of that private language is not something common and it has not been shared by the member of the society or community. Let me focus on the issue of cultural concern of Wittgenstein concerning his *PI*.

The first form of cultural concern is reflected in the concept of language-game. In this regard Wittgenstein asserts, "The language is meant to serve for communication

between a builder A and an assistant B. A builder with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs, and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose, they use a language consisting of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”. A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such and such a call.”¹²⁷ The speech act held between A and B is clear and simple. Wittgenstein believes that such a conception is possible. He then remarks, “We could imagine that was the whole language of A and B; even the whole language of a tribe.”¹²⁸ While illuminating the aspect of language-game, Wittgenstein writes, “Let us imagine a society in which this is the only system of language.”¹²⁹ We see the same in his *The Brown Book*. Here, he inclines to say that his understanding of language-game is complete and perfect part of the language. It is a complete system of human communication. For him, it is very useful to imagine such a language ‘to be entire system of communication of a tribe in a primitive state of society.’¹³⁰ Many commentators, namely, Rush Rhees, Newton Garver, and others have argued that Wittgenstein’s conception about the view that language-game is to be the entire language of a tribe is misguided. Even Malcolm,¹³¹ a Wittgenstenian, has offered an ingenious, though limited, defense of Wittgenstein’s claim. Whatever the position of the commentators may be, my concern is to view that language-game can be viewed as an analogy for the cultural decline.

In his article, “Wittgenstein’s Builders”, Rhees concludes that language-game instead of describing a complete language actually fails to describe any language at all. Rhees

¹²⁷ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit., paragraph: 2.

¹²⁸ Ibid, paragraph: 16.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *The Brown Book*, Oxford, 1958, p. 77.

¹³¹ Malcolm, Norman, “Language-game” in Georg Henrik Von Wright (ed.) *Wittgensteinian Themes 1978-1989*, Ithaca, NY, 1985.

seems very limited uses of the language-game of Wittgenstein. According to Rhees, the vocabulary of the language-game consists of only four-terms but, rather A and B use those four terms 'only to give these special orders on this job and otherwise never spoke at all'. It is this very strict limitation on the employment of the terms that bothers Rhees. This sort of limited linguistic repertoire is not enough to constitute the speaking of language. Rhees' concern about the limitation of language-game of Wittgenstein would be regarded as a serious limitation because to use anything beyond language-game would be treated as a misuse of language. But I think Rhees perhaps overlooks Wittgenstein's explicit position of *PI*. I think that Wittgenstein specifically allows that the terms of language-game will be used in its teaching of the language-game. It is such teaching where the learner names the objects; that is, he utters the word when the teacher points to the stone and there will be this still simpler exercise: the pupil repeats the words after the teacher. Rhees further contends that there are no provisions in language-game to support a distinction between sense and nonsense. In this regard, he goes on to say that in our language as we speak it there are standards of what is correct and incorrect, and these come in when we say someone has misunderstood. But we do not see how there can be any such standard in the game Wittgenstein has described. Rhees thinks that the builders of language-game have so limited a linguistic repertoire that they do not display enough in the way of word-related interactions to qualify as speakers. In fact, they know what building pieces are called "slab", "block", "pillar" and "beams". They use these terms in an extremely limited manner for doing an extremely limited task. For Rhees, their word-related interactions are too mechanical for that. They look like minorities in the building site. Malcolm thinks that Rhees' observation about Wittgenstein's language-game is acute, but unlike Rhees, Malcolm thinks that there is something in the

background of language-game that makes it possible to view the builders and their helpers in a different light from that in which Rhees notes. For Malcolm, Wittgenstein himself explicitly takes up this issue in his *Zettel*. Here Malcolm cites a passage from *Zettel*: “You are just tacitly assuming that these people think; that they are like people as we know them in that respect; that they do not carry on that language game merely mechanically. For if you imagined them doing that, you yourself would not call it the use of a rudimentary language. What am I to reply to this? Of course, the life of those human beings must indeed be like ours in many respects, and I said nothing about this similarity. But the important thing is that their language, and their thinking too, may be rudimentary, that there is such a thing as “primitive thinking” which is to be described via primitive *behavior*. The surroundings are not the “thinking accompaniment” of speech.”¹³²

Wittgenstein, however, resists the suggestion in his voiced objection that what is missing, what he must tacitly assume, in his description of language-game are ‘thinking accomplishments’. Here Wittgenstein does not admit that he was making the unspoken assumption that those people think in the sense of their being thinking concealed behind the outward behavior. However, Malcolm reveals that what Wittgenstein says here has a bearing on the relevance of Rhees’ criticism. Malcolm rightly identifies Wittgenstein’s answer to the question raised by Rhees. He remarks that *the life of those human beings must be like ours in many respects, and I said nothing about this similarity*.¹³³ Malcolm reveals that the lives of the builders of language-game in many respects like ours. Hence the question of isolation or restriction or limitation in use simply does not arise. In this regard, Malcolm seeks to

¹³² Malcolm, Norman, “*Language Games (2)*”, p. 177.

¹³³ *Ibid*, p. 177.

explicit background detail of Wittgenstein's account of language-game. Rhee criticizes Wittgenstein by saying that the life at the building site seems to be mechanical. Malcolm denies it. He suggests that when there are injuries at the building site, the other workers might show their concern, offer help and sympathize. In many such ways that need not involve words. Here the builders could behave in recognizable human ways. Malcolm says, "Suppose a builder is saying to fit a slab between two other slabs, but it will not go. He expresses frustration in sounds and gestures. After viewing the situation for a while, he proceeds to chip from one end of the slab until it finally fits - whereupon he laughs and claps his hands in satisfaction."¹³⁴ In the aforesaid passage, Malcolm intends to describe what Wittgenstein would think of an example of primitive thought, which does not express in words. For Malcolm, such wordless behavior need not be mechanical. Malcolm insists that the nonverbal behavior of the builders away from the building site could still be like our own behavior in many respects. Their behavior could still be recognized by a human so that we might not feel compelled to describe them as mechanisms. Unlike Rhee, Malcolm suggests that one way in which language-game might provide for both something like the give-and-take questions and answers are also meaningful and interchanges about speakers' meanings on Wittgenstein's tacit assumption that its builders behave as we do in many respects. Thus, the question of sense and nonsense as Rhee reveals in Wittgenstein's language-game simply does not arise. It is not rich enough to support whether a particular use of words constitutes nonsense. Malcolm reveals that the *Zettel's* remarks suggest that the account of the surroundings of the language-game can be enriched in ways that would represent its speakers differently and straightforwardly analogous to conversation. Malcolm's

¹³⁴ Ibid, p. 179.

conclusion that the ensuing exchange presents something analogous to a conversation about the builder's original call seems right. Malcolm thus thinks that one could successfully add enough in the way of details to the *Investigations* extremely sparse account of the lives and interactions of the builders of language-game that their behavior would no longer seem mechanical. What we can say after Wittgenstein is that the life of the builders 'must be like ours in many respects' and that 'there will be a great deal there corresponding to the actions of ordinary human beings'. Thus, one may fairly conclude, Malcolm suggests, that there is no justification for supposing that the workers of game will always work 'mechanically' or that the building sites 'they will look like minorities'.

There is no question of doubt that Wittgenstein's *PI* represents cultural decline along with the line of Spenglerian philosophy of culture. According to Wittgenstein, misuses of language are a violation of the grammar of language and it would be a sort of cultural decline. The grammar of a language or the rule of language represents the genesis of culture. Language is culture and language is rule-following. Therefore violation of the rule of language actually leads to misuse of language. In this sense, it can be said that misuse of language is nothing but a sort of cultural decline. There the crux of the hour is to give a plausible account of how his later philosophical writings address his cultural concerns. What I have claimed is that an account of philosophical misuses of language may constitute one locus of cultural concern. To resist cultural decline through misuses of language, Wittgenstein brings the concept of language-game the function of which is not only to begin the development of a perspicuous representation of human language but also to evoke another Spenglerian reflection of cultural insolvency.

What then causes misuse of language? In this regard, we can say that our artificial demand for civilization causes misuse of language. Modern civilization is really a threat to culture. To be civilized is to be declining of culture. Civilization is characterized by the word *progress*. We are civilized in every passing day actually means we are progressing in every passing day. Progress is its form rather than making progress being one of its features. Progress under the womb of civilization is a sort of construction. Human civilization is the outcome of artificiality. It is the outcome of manmade construction. In the real sense, it is occupied with building in an ever more complicated structure. Here everything is sought with regard to means as an end instead of an end in itself. Thus, civilization is not valuable in itself, rather clarity, perspicuity based on culture are valuable in them. Thus for Wittgenstein, the cultural decline is inevitable with a preoccupation with building, with construction. Civilization represents a corruption of genuine progress. Real progress is deeply embedded in culture rather than civilization. The building has become the dominant activity of civilization, an activity that has been performed unreflectively. Here everything has been judged as a means to an end. It offers and encourages *anthropocentrism, individualism, subjectivism, or in short materialism*. Western society is dominated by civilization and hence it is backed up by materialism in the real sense of the term. For Wittgenstein, genuine progress actually hinges on culture and it would require both that building be done reflectively and construction should not be regarded as an end in itself. For Wittgenstein, a time of real progress would regard the building as a means toward independent ends that are settled upon by the kind of thinking which values clarification itself. Wittgenstein was not against civilization; rather he was against that sort of civilization which distorts the cultural heritage of the community. Thus, in a sense, Wittgenstein's outlook of civilization has

been misrepresented. His primary focus on building itself constitutes something akin to a collective form of heedless behavior. It is blindly unreflective. Wittgenstein further contends that unreflective building is not a real representation of civilization; rather it constitutes its form. Wittgenstein in his *PI* focuses mainly on the *social interactive function of language* reflected in the form of life.

Wittgenstein explicitly invites his reader to compare the truncated language of the builders with our own language by raising the issue of whether either should be thought of as complete. In this regard, he explicitly remarks that to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life. So he is directing us to compare the builders' truncated unreflective form of life with our own. Wittgenstein had emphatically articulated a clear sense in which he felt that the civilization of his time was so truncated. I think the concept of private language is another concern to Wittgenstein which again stands against cultural revival. Wittgenstein denies the possibility of a private language argument. He was concerned about a kind of language that would be public, interactive nature of sensation language, the communal nature of the rules and criteria which fix the meanings of sensation terms, and shared forms of behavior upon which the area of public language actually hinges on. Wittgenstein talks in favor of actual sensation not only because he thinks they are true, but because he hopes they will loosen the hold of what he takes to be a compelling, but false picture of sensation language. According to Wittgenstein, the conception of a language in which an individual refers to his own private sensations, to what is inaccessible to anyone else, is far from a mere flight of fantasy. What I intend to say at this juncture is that the sections of the *Investigations* that discuss private language constitute yet another locus of cultural concern. For Wittgenstein, using language involves following rules. Following rules is essentially a social activity, an activity that cannot be done by an

individual in isolation from a wider linguistic community. Wittgenstein asserts that the actual functioning of our common language in which one can communicate about one's own sensations and those of others depend upon a shared form of life. Thus Wittgenstein's account of our common language of sensations serves as a 'homologous form of' or 'an interpretation of' a Spenglerian image of culture.

Culture and Value:

So far we have seen that Wittgenstein was concerned about cultural decline and he attempted to reveal it through misuses of language. Perhaps he would agree that any sort of misuse of language leads to the demand of civilization. Civilization appears as a threat to cultural decline. That is why he was against the misuse of language. But his understanding of language can be grasped concerning his philosophical writings because he proposed different types of language in his different philosophical writings. In his *TLP*, he developed language from a semantic perspective. However, in his *PI*, he talks of language from a pragmatic perspective. Here, he revealed language as culture in some sense or other. He equally finds religious language as a form of life. In his book *Culture and Value* (henceforth CV), Wittgenstein reveals an entwinement among the trio-concepts, namely, religion, culture, and value. His position about religion would require a far-sighted vision. In this regard, Wittgenstein in his CV remarks, "It is difficult to tell a short-sighted man how to get somewhere. Because you cannot say to him: "Look at that church tower ten miles away and go in that direction."¹³⁵ This clearly suggests that an ordinary man cannot be really a genuinely religious man. For Wittgenstein, there is no religious denomination for which the misuse of metaphysical expression has been responsible. The human gaze

¹³⁵ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Culture and Value*, translated by Peter Winch, The University of Chicago Press, 1977, p. 1e.

has a power of conferring value on things. The world is changing and each morning one has to break through the dead rubble afresh. A new word is like a fresh seed and it is the beauty of language.

Wittgenstein then goes on to say that what is good is divine. The ethics of us is to make a sound inquiry. To say something about divine or supernatural, we need to have the perception of something supernatural. Thus, what is good is divine and what is divine is supernatural. Accordingly, we can say that what is good is outside the space of facts. Propositions are saying about the facts of the world. Accordingly, propositions cannot say anything about what is good. Thus, what is good is valuable. It is a sort of divinity, an inward revelation or cultivation. The earlier culture will become a heap of rubble and finally a heap of ashes, but spirits will however over the ashes. This remark of Wittgenstein is fascinating because within the cultural transformation the spirits will remain the same. We have to retain our cultural spirit and for that, we have to struggle. In this regards, Wittgenstein makes the distinction between a good and a poor architect. A poor architect succumbs to every temptation whereas a good architect would resist it. People at present are voicing in favour of civilization. Civilization is a thought of perception where people think that he has solved the problem of life and feel like telling them that everything is quite easy now. Just by way of perceiving life in this way is itself a big mistake. He can see that he is wrong just by recalling that there was a time when this solution with which he finds comfortable, has not been discovered. However, it must have been possible to live then too and the solution which has now been discovered seems fortuitous concerning how things were then. The same is revealed in logic or philosophy. For Wittgenstein, if there were a solution to the problems of logic/philosophy, we should only need to caution ourselves that there was a time when they had not been solved and even at

that time people must have known how to live and think. Cultural creative is the hallmark of leading a good and valuable life. The meaning of life actually hinges on cultural and religious creativity and consciousness. In this regard, Wittgenstein refers to Engelmann. Nothing could be more remarkable than seeing a man who thinks he is unobserved performing some quite simple everyday activity.

Let us imagine a theatre where the curtain goes up and immediately we see a man alone in a room, walking up and down, lighting a cigarette, sitting down, etc. Thus suddenly we are observing a human being from outside in a way that ordinarily we can never observe ourselves. Referring to Engelmann, Wittgenstein remarks it would be like watching a chapter of biography with our own eyes that would be uncanny and wonderful at the same time. Thus to see something and to see the same thing in the right way would make a different sense. Just to see something perhaps not the same as to see something in a right way. A work of art forces us to see it in the right perspective, but in the absence of art, the object is just a fragment of nature like any other. In this regard Wittgenstein says, “Things are placed right in front of our eyes, not covered by any veil. This is where religion and art part company.”¹³⁶ Art and religion remove the veil of ignorance and helps one to extract truth or good. This would be the achievement of divinity. Wittgenstein is vocal about culture. For Wittgenstein, “A culture is like a big organization which assigns each of its members in a place where he can work in the spirit of the whole; and it is perfectly fair for his power to be measured by the contribution he succeeds in making to the whole enterprise.”¹³⁷ Thus, culture, for Wittgenstein, is essentially needed for the spirit of the whole. It is a sort of creative power, a power of divinity. The present society

¹³⁶ Ibid, p. 6e.

¹³⁷ Ibid, p. 6e.

equipped and habituated with civilization becomes fragmented and the power of an individual man is used up in overcoming opposing forces and frictional resistance. Even though Wittgenstein talks in favour of retaining culture, but at the same time he does not claim that the disappearance of a culture signifies the disappearance of human value. What he intends to say here is that - the disappearance of culture appears as a hindrance to certain means of expressing this value. However, Wittgenstein stated clearly and distinctively that he had no sympathy for the ongoing European civilization and he confessed that he had failed to understand its goal. For Wittgenstein, the so-called civilization is characterized by the word *progress*. Progress is the form of civilization rather than one of its features. It is occupied with building an ever more complicated structure. Here clarity has been sought as a means to an end, but not as an end in itself. Thus, Wittgenstein was no longer interested to construct a building and his way of thinking is different from the scientists. The spirit of the book has to be evident in the book itself and it cannot be described. If a book has been written for just a few readers, it will be clear just from the fact that only a few people understand it. Accordingly, the book must automatically separate those who understand it from those who do not. It is important to be noted here that telling someone something would be pointless if he does not understand it. Wittgenstein says, "If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it unless of course, you want them to admire the room from outside!"¹³⁸ Thus for Wittgenstein, the book has nothing to do with the progressive civilization. The main contention is of course to try to make the spirit explicit. Lacking the spirit is something rotten and it goes against culture. Everything has to be ritualistic but

¹³⁸ Ibid, p. 7e.

sometimes it becomes rotten. Kiss, for example, is a ritual and it is not rotten. Ritual is permissible only to the extent that it is as genuine as a kiss. Therefore, one has to try to make the spirit explicit. Someone may think that music as a primitive art just because it contains a few notes and rhythms. It is an interpretation of music that would be true only at the surface level. But one has to sense that its substance makes it possible and there is a sense in which it is most sophisticated art of all. Thus for Wittgenstein, there are deeper problems that we never get anywhere near, which do not lie in my path or are not part of my world. They are lost as per as Western philosophy is concerned. No one will be there capable of experiencing it. The progress of this culture is just like an epic. It might be said that civilization can only have its epic poets in advance just as a man cannot report his own death when it happens, but only foresee it and describe it as something lying in the future. Accordingly, it might be said that if we want to see an epic description of a whole culture, you will have to look at the works of its greatest figures. Thus, there is nothing wrong in saying that it should only be written in the obscure language of prophecy. For Wittgenstein, modern civilization favours hardness and conflict, but they are not something splendid but a defect. The conflict has to be dissipated because such dissolution eliminates all tensions. My society, my community though small in number, but we believe this circle to be elite of mankind compare to those who are foreign to me.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Chapter Four

Concluding Remarks

I think Wittgenstein's interpretation of religion as a form of life opens up a new dimension of religion. His position about religion is broadly relevant into two different perspectives. First, he deviates from the classical concept of religion based on the thinking process and thereby introduces a new form of religion based on the analysis of language. Secondly, unlike the previous traditions, he conceives religion at par with the grammar of the language. For Wittgenstein, the foundation of religion is embedded in the grammar of the language. This position of Wittgenstein creates a new dimension of religion. The religion, Wittgenstein invokes, is nameless. He finds religious experience through language. In this regard, he asserts that religion differs from the philosophy of religion. While talking about religion, Wittgenstein rules out the possibility of the philosophy of religion. The main contention of the philosophy of religion is to develop religious theories, religious doctrines. He does not think that religion is a process of thinking. He completely boils down to intellectualism or cognitive account in religion. He vehemently claims that religion is neither a theory nor a doctrine but *a form of life*. Religion is an activity having no end. As he understands religion concerning language, his perception about religion varies in different writings.

This thesis begins with religious inexpressibility concerning his early writings in general and his *TLP* in particular. In his *TLP*, Wittgenstein developed formalistic language. He did it because he had a different philosophical program. Here he understood language about propositional language and reality as the totality of facts. He then asserted that the limits of language determine the limits of the world. Within

the limits of the world, everything can be put into language and what can be put into language would be either true or false. Everything that can be put into language would be treated as a proposition. Every proposition has two senses according to Wittgenstein. Either the proposition expresses something in the form of 'to be the case' or in the form of 'not to be the case'. Thus, whatever can be put into language would be expressible. The facts of the world are expressible in language. Whatever is expressible would be meaningful. Whatever is meaningful must be either true or false. Thus in the *TLP*, Wittgenstein attempted to picture the world (reality) meaningfully. The question of meaningfulness as determined by language is the hallmark of the whole host of semanticists. All semanticists have adhered to the view that the basic function of language is to determine fact. Accordingly, the whole program of semanticists is based on the relationship between language and reality. This demand came from a philosophical background. The main contention of philosophy is clarity and precision. There is no room for speculation in the philosophical assertion. Philosophical decisions must be backed up by authentic argumentation, analysis, interpretation, and clarification of language. Ordinary or natural language cannot fulfill the basic requirement of philosophy because ordinary or natural language by its very nature is vague, ambiguous. Therefore a philosophical demand or requirement is a prerequisite to formulating language in such a manner so that language can adequately picture reality or the facts of the world.

This philosophical requirement of language forces Wittgenstein and many other semanticists to construct language. This is where the relevance of *constructionalism* or *formalism* comes into picture. Wittgenstein from his semantic background reveals that ordinary language is not adequate for showing the relationship between language and reality. Thus, in his *TLP*, Wittgenstein at the very outset talks in favour of

propositional language. As a result of that, he drew the limits of language as well as the limits of the world. He then claims that within the realm of propositional language there is no scope of knowing or describing ethics, religion, aesthetics, and metaphysics. All these lie outside the limits of language and the limits of the world. The language within the limit of the world would be propositional language and the reality of the world is the totality of facts expressed through a proposition. Thus it seems to me that Wittgenstein artificially draws the limits of the world just by way of constructing propositional language. He then claims that what lies outside the limits would be mystical in nature. They are nonsense. For Wittgenstein, any attempt to catch up what lies outside the limits of the world through propositional language would be mystical. Outside the world, nothing can be put into word. Ethics, religion, etc. cannot be put into word. Since they cannot be put into word, they are nonsensical. They cannot be said. Here I have to mention two different senses of value. Within the world, we have propositional value expressed either in terms of being the case or in terms of not being the case. The sense of the world differs from the sense of the proposition. According to Wittgenstein, the sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world, everything is as it is. If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case.

According to Wittgenstein, all that happens and is the case is accidental. What is accidental cannot lie outside the world. Accordingly, what would lie outside the world would be non-accidental. Alternatively, it can be said that what is non-accidental cannot lie within the world. It must lie outside the world. Thus within the world, there are no propositions of ethics (religion). Thus, it would be mystical to talk of propositions of ethics. To talk of propositions of ethics is to talk nonsense. Propositions can express what is 'to be the case' and what is 'not to be the case'.

Thus, propositions in a sense cannot express anything that is higher. Wittgenstein thus conceives two different types of values, such as higher and lower value. Proposition deals with lower value and it lies within the world. The value of the world is higher than the value of the proposition. Therefore proposition cannot say anything about the higher value. In this sense, if language means propositional language then what is higher cannot be put into words or language. That is why what is higher is nonsensical. What is nonsensical is transcendental, according to Wittgenstein. What is transcendental is the same. In this regard, Wittgenstein asserts that *ethics and aesthetics are the same*. Thus, ethics or religion is not consequential. It would be wrong to seek justification in ethics. The world is one where both happy and unhappy men are living. Of course, the world of a happy man differs from that of the unhappy man. Therefore, at death, the world does not alter but comes to an end. Death is not an event in life, because we do not live to experience death. If there is eternal life, it belongs to those who live in the present. For Wittgenstein, our life has no end just the way in which our visual field has no limits. Thus, Wittgenstein in his *TLP* denies the temporal immortality of the human soul. He denies the possibility of eternal survival after death. Eternal life, if there be any, appears as a riddle before present life. The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time. Thus, there is no possibility that God does reveal himself in the world. In this regard, Wittgenstein remarks that ‘it is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.

Thus, for Wittgenstein, to view the world *sub-specie aeterni* is to view the world as a limited whole. *Feeling the world as a limited whole is mystical*. The term *limited whole* is important here. Wittgenstein at the very outset of his *TLP* has limited the world according to his philosophical program. He then attributed it as ‘my language and my world’. As it is his language and his world it is limited. Thus in a sense, his

proposed world has created two different sides of the world - the inside as well as the outside of the world. Now, any attempt to know about the outside of the world with the help of the inside of the world (the limited world) would bring mysticism. It is a space of the world where we cannot raise any question and accordingly there is no scope of answering it. As there is no question that can be raised; therefore there is no question to answer. There is no scope of skepticism. Skepticism is irrefutable. Skepticism finds relevance where something *can be put into words*. For Wittgenstein, there are things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what are mystical. Thus the best possible means for Wittgenstein is that 'to say nothing except what can be said'. Thus to understand Wittgenstein proper would eventually recognize them as nonsensical. It is just like 'throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it'. Thus, one has to transcend the limits of language, i.e., propositions to see the world alright. Wittgenstein ends his *TLP* with the remark: "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence".

What has been revealed so far is that Wittgenstein in his *TLP* took a mystical approach to religion. For him, religious expressions are not expressible by means of propositional language. To reveal the world alright one has to transcend the limits of propositional language. This does not make sense to say that religion can be grasped without language. He was pessimistic about religion only within the realm of propositional language. But being a linguistic philosopher he deals with everything within the language. That is why in his later writings Wittgenstein has changed his philosophical outlook regarding the very nature of language. Now in his *PI* and in other philosophical writings, he talks in favour of natural language. While illuminating the nature of ordinary or natural language, Wittgenstein says that language is rule-following. By the term 'rule', Wittgenstein means the *grammar of*

language. To follow a rule of language is to practice or use language in our community, society, i.e., within *the form of life*. There are many forms of life just as there are many language-games. Religion is just like *one form of life*. This is how Wittgenstein understands religion *as a form of life*.

What then is a form of life? In what sense Wittgenstein understands religion as a form of life? How does a religious form of life differ from other forms of life? Are there any similarities and resemblance among different forms of life? These are the important questions that may be taken care of to understand the genesis of this thesis. We should not forget that religion, for Wittgenstein, is embedded in language. This is the conclusion of Wittgenstein about the locus of religion. In responding to the question of where religion lies, Wittgenstein succinctly claims that religion as such has been embedded in language. Thus one should find the essence of religion just by way of clarifying and analyzing the meaning of language. Here in *PI*, Wittgenstein has introduced the use theory of meaning. Instead of picture theory of meaning that he has introduced in his *TLP*, here he asserts 'don't ask for meaning but simply ask for the use of language'. To understand religion, one has to use religious language within the form of life. To illuminate the concept 'form of life', Wittgenstein brings the metaphor 'language-game'. He then says that within the generic term *Game*, there are many language-games just like within Language, there are as many as different forms of life. For example, we talk of the card game, ball game, the game of cricket, the game of football, the game of rugby, etc, etc. Are these games completely separated from each other? Even though they are named as different games, but there remain some sort of similarities, dissimilarities, crisscross, overlapping something common, something uncommon among different games. But how do we come to know this? We come to know this just by looking at various rules used in the language just like

Language-Games are guided by rules. Now let me compare one game with another game. If we compare the game of football with the game of cricket, we find that there are some similarities and overlapping as per the rules they are governed by. If we compare these two games with other games, we notice the same. That means if we compare three games, such as, G1, G2, G3, we find that there are common rules among these games, but there are some similarities as well as dissimilarities among the games. We notice the same in language as well. Language is rule-following and there are clusters of grammatical rules based on which the members of the community within the forms of life use language. Like various games as mentioned above, there are various language-games. Each language-game is guided by rules. But there we cannot find a single rule that is common in all language-games. Rather we find some sort of similarities as well dissimilarities among various forms of life. Thus, the religious form of life is not detached from other forms of life. Here every forms of life are deeply interconnected with other forms of life. Wittgenstein thus reveals family resemblance among different forms of life. In this regard, Wittgenstein uses the metaphor “family-resemblance”.

Wittgenstein conceives religious beliefs as distinctive language-games or forms of life. However, many would criticize this position of Wittgenstein. For them, the philosophical assertions that religious beliefs are distinctive language-games give the misleading impression that these language-games are cut off from all others. Hepburn says, within traditional Christian theology questions about the divine existence cannot be deflected into the question, “Does God play an intelligible role in the language-game?”¹³⁹ If religious beliefs are isolated self-sufficient language-games, it becomes difficult to explain why people should cherish religious beliefs in the way they do. On

¹³⁹ Hepburn, R. W., ‘From World to God’, *Mind*, Vol. LXXII, 1963, P. 41.

this view, religious beliefs seem more like esoteric games having little significance outside the internal formalities of their activities. Critics would say that religious beliefs begin to look like hobbies something with which men occupy themselves at week-ends. The other misgivings involve the suspicion that religious beliefs are being placed outside the reach of any possible criticism. The appeal to the internality of religious criteria of meaningfulness can act as a quasi-justification for what would otherwise be recognized as nonsense.

In his *A Lecture on Ethics*, Wittgenstein finds the distinction between absolute judgments of value and relative judgments of value. He then says that words like 'good', 'important', and 'right' have a relative and absolute use. Unlike relative value, the absolute value is deeply associated with ought. To make this point clear let me explain the example given by Wittgenstein. Suppose, I could play tennis and one of you saw me playing and said 'Well, you play pretty badly,' and suppose I answered 'I know that I am playing badly', but I do not want to play any better,'. All the other man could say would be: 'Ah, then that is all right.' But further suppose I had told one of you a preposterous lie and he came up to me and said, 'You're behaving like a beast' and then I were to say, 'I know I behave badly, but then I don't want to behave any better,' could he then say, 'Ah, then that is all right'? Certainly not; he would say, 'Well, you ought to want to behave better.' Here we have an absolute judgment of value, whereas the first instance was one of a relative judgment. Since religion or religious beliefs are associated with absolute value, religious beliefs are in some sense or other appears as distinctive language-games. Wittgenstein raised the question of whether, concerning religion, the non-believer contradicts the believer when he says that he does not believe what the believer believes. If one man contradicts another, they can be said to share a common understanding, to be playing the same game. For

example, the man who says that the sun is 90 million miles away from the earth contradicts the man who says that the sun is only 20 million miles away from the earth. The disputants about the distance of the sun from the earth share a common understanding - namely, methods of calculation in astronomy. Here the disputants differ about the fact, but they appeal to the same criteria to settle the disagreement. But what if one man says that handling the ball is a foul and another man says that handling the ball is not a foul? Do they contradict each other? Surely, they are only doing so if they are playing the same game, referring to the same rules. In the light of these examples, what are we say about the man who believes in God and the man who does not? Are they contradicting each other? Wittgenstein shows that they are not. For Wittgenstein, the word 'God' is not the name of a thing. If we say that something exists, it makes sense to think of that something ceasing to exist. But religious believers do not want to say that God might cease to exist. Rather they think that God will exist forever.

I think Wittgenstein's interpretation of religion opens up a new dimension of religion. He not only criticizes conventional religion developed over the past centuries, but at the same time he gives us the direction of future religion as well. In his later writings, he vehemently claims that religion is embedded in the grammar of the language. To believe in God does not make sense to say that God exists. For Wittgenstein the claim that God exists is ridiculous. The question of the existence of God simply does not arise. Because, 'God exists' is not a statement of fact. Rather it is a confession or expression of faith. For Wittgenstein, belief in God is not to be construed as the belief that there is a superhuman being that created the universe, is omnipotent, and so on. Instead, religion is intimately to *a particular way of life*. Religion, Wittgenstein presumes, is an activity. Religion is not a doctrine. The very purpose of religion is not

to construct philosophical theories of religion. Religion is an activity, a way of life, a form of life. The language of religion is confessional rather than speculative. Thus the philosopher's task is to lay bare the peculiar grammar of religious utterance. While illuminating upon Wittgenstein's religion, Winch in his book *The Idea of a Social Science* wants to undermine the idea that the methods of the natural sciences can profitably be applied to the understanding of human and social affairs. Human beings are radically unlike the non-thinking objects of scientific enquiry. I reveal Winch's program of social understanding of religion in Wittgenstein's *PI*. In my sense just as Winch replaces the scientific desire for an explanation of human behavior with the description of the ideas underlying and informing patterns of human behavior, so Wittgenstein consistently rejected both the idea that philosophy should take on the method of the natural sciences. Wittgenstein denies that philosophy should seek to explain phenomena. While understanding and illuminating religion, Wittgenstein completely denies the philosophy of religion. The philosophy of religion is based on religious epistemology. Many contemporary are voicing in favour of religious epistemology. They are doing philosophy of religion. Wittgenstein's understanding of religion is not at all philosophy of religion. It is in no way associated with religious epistemology. For Wittgenstein, religion is based on passion and faith, but not on facts. He conceives ethics and religion as nonsense in his *TLP* mainly for the reason that they cannot be put into language. As they cannot be put into language, they are not expressing the fact of the matter. Therefore, they are nonsense. They are nonsense as they lack factual sense. However, when he conceives religion as a *form of life*, his approach is altogether different. He now finds religion within the sphere of language. He now admits that religion can be put into religious language. This is one important tradition of Wittgenstein from early to later philosophy.

Thus it seems to me that Wittgenstein is against of religious epistemology. Many would say that Wittgenstein was doing religious epistemology. But my position is that Wittgenstein if he was doing religious epistemology was not doing in the traditional sense of epistemology. He vehemently claims that there is no epistemic foundation in religion. He is equally against religious metaphysics. He was against classical religion based on speculative reason or belief or faith. He admits that religion is based on faith. But his understanding of faith is not based on the existence of God. Traditional religion is based on the faith that God is the ultimate agent of religion. If we go through the history of religion, we find that God holds *the centrality of religion*. Faith in the supernatural object or supernatural deity had been the genesis of religion. Thus, in my sense before the enlightened period or during the Dark Age religion was based on myth-based dogmas. The concept of Taboo, the concept of Mana, the concept of the Stone Age, the idea of Herbert Spencer's Ghost theory of religion were cases in point. Even Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates were talking about religion and sought rational justification of religion, but to me, their rational outlook about religion was based on speculation. During the enlightened period, radical attempts had been made by Hume and others. Having said this, religion cannot be comprehended before Hume without believing in God. Wittgenstein did not believe in the existence of God. For Wittgenstein those who believe in the existence of God and defend them by offering various religious theories are doing religious epistemology. They seek to justify religion based on reason. They talk in favor of rational theology. But there is no relevance of rational theology in religion. Thus, it seems to me that Wittgenstein's position of religion is unique. It is unique in the sense that he offers us a new dimension of religion just by analyzing the grammar or rule of language. He is detached from traditional religion.

He is detached from the religion that has been developed by Hume during the enlightenment period. Hume says that religious assertions are false. If there is a religion it should be either matters of fact or relations of ideas. But religion as such belongs to neither of these groups. Therefore, religious beliefs and religious assertions are meaningless. Wittgenstein does not agree with Hume. Even though Wittgenstein in his *TLP* attributed religious assertions as nonsense, but I do not think what is nonsense is false. Wittgenstein conceives religious assertions as nonsense in the sense that they lack factual sense. Thus, his interpretation of nonsense does not lead us to assume that religious assertions are false. According to Wittgenstein, religious assertions do have important sense, because such assertions help us to determine the value of the world. So they are important nonsense. This is how Wittgenstein differs from Hume. Hume determines everything from the perspective of a radical empiricist outlook. Even he denies the most forceful theory of causation based on necessity. Hume inclines to say that sense experience determines our acceptability of external objects. Wittgenstein deviates from Hume. Hume interprets religion from the outlook of sense experience. Wittgenstein interprets religion from the outlook of the grammar of the language.

I think Wittgenstein also deviates from Kant as well. There is no question of doubt that Kant had been responsible for institutionalized religion from a rational perspective. Kant was craving for rational theology. In fact, Kant was against doing any philosophy that would not be backed up by reason. For Kant, there are various types of reason or rational account. He conceives reason in three different categories, such as, pure, practical, and speculative. He then says that there is no importance of philosophical theories based on speculative reason. Philosophy of religion developed in the Dark Age was full of speculation. However, Kant admits that beyond pure

reason, we should admit the relevance of practical reason in natural theology, ethics, and aesthetics. He developed this idea in his book *The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. He rules out any faith-based religion. Instead of religion, Kant developed the philosophy of religion based on practical reason. Thus, Kant talked in favour of rational theology altogether. We find the influence of Kant in Wittgenstein's *TLP* in some sense or other. However, Wittgenstein, I think, is deviated from Kant in his later philosophy where he conceives religion as *a form of life*. Unlike Kant, Wittgenstein in his *PI* would acknowledge non-rational theology. For Wittgenstein, religion is based on faith and there is no rational account or rule in faith. For him, there is no scope of intellectualism in religion. The levels of faith and reason are different. Faith deals with higher or absolute value whereas reason deals with facts of the matter. Thus the outcome of the reason is more vulnerable than the outcome of faith. Accordingly, we can say that Wittgenstein gives us a different interpretation of religion and his interpretation of religion is unlike to Kant.

The next point that I need to address here is that whether Wittgenstein has been influenced by logical positivism. Many would say that Wittgenstein was influenced by logical positivists' account of religion. However, I have a different interpretation altogether. I think the religious position of Wittgenstein differs from the logical positivists' interpretation of religion. Logical positivism led by Ayer and others sets out the principle of verification as the criterion of meaningfulness. For them, a sentence would be meaningful if it is completely verifiable employing some observational data. Thus, we find a new form of empiricism extended from Hume. Hume has been regarded as a radical empiricist. Here logical positivism sets out the principle of verification based on empirical evidence or data. I think the impact of logical positivism in some sense or other is prevailing in Wittgenstein's *TLP*.

Wittgenstein in his *TLP* voices in favour of propositional language and based on such language he eventually recognized ethics and religion as nonsensical. Are the terms 'meaningless' and 'nonsensical' the same? Or are they different? A sentence is meaningless if it is neither true nor false based on observational data. The term 'nonsensical' means 'lack of factual sense'. Wittgenstein then affirmed what is nonsense is important nonsense. Can we say what is meaningless is important meaningless? We do not have a clear view in logical positivism. They determine the criterion of meaningfulness and based on that they declare that religious and metaphysical assertions are meaningless. But I think Wittgenstein's position is different. Even many commentators would say that unlike logical positivists Wittgenstein has high regard for religion. Actually, Wittgenstein asserts religious assertions as nonsense to keep the sanctity of religion per se. It is reflected in his later philosophical writings where he conceives religion as the form of life. Religion, for Wittgenstein, is an integral part of our life. Religion is life, religion is our culture. Religion determines the value of the world. Man can determine the meaning of life just by way of knowing religion as a form of life. Thus, even though at face value Wittgenstein in his early writings has been influenced by logical positivism, but his understanding of religion is something different from logical positivism. He gives honour and dignity to religion because he reveals that religion is dealing with absolute value instead of contingent value.

To speak of religion as a language-game would be to see it as a distinctive universe of discourse, the linguistic component of a particular form of life or way of living. I think Wittgenstein's introduction of the language-game analogy was intended to highlight the diverse range of linguistic phenomena, how speaking is connected with particular activities, and the rule-governed nature of those activities. Accordingly, it

seems to me after Wittgenstein that each of these aspects is to the fore when religion is itself described as a language-game. For Wittgenstein, the rules of religious discourse are found in theology which eventually decides what it makes sense to say to God and about God. In short, theology is the grammar of religious discourse. It is reflected in Wittgenstein's *PI* in which he asserts 'essence is expressed by grammar'. The theology of grammar tells what kind of subject anything is. He then asserts that the idea of theology is that of a rule-making, rule-enforcing discipline. It outlines what is legitimate and illegitimate to say within the language-game of religion. Wittgenstein thus asserts that words without use are dead. Words without use do not bear any sense. What he intends to say here is that understanding practice in religion cannot be achieved purely by an analysis of words and sentences? Instead, it is the activities into which those words are woven that are crucial. In his *Culture and Value*, Wittgenstein asserts that practice gives the words their sense. Accordingly, we can say that characterization of religion as a language-game is, then, meant to bring out precisely that religion is not a system of speculative thought, but is something a person does, a whole way of living.

Another important aspect of form of life or language-game designation serves to stress the *sui genesis* character of religion and its distinctive utterance. In my sense, Wittgenstein's purpose to introduce the game-analogy was to highlight diverse conceptions of logic, truth, rationality, and so on, by showing how these are not a 'direct gift of God', but arise out of social activities in which they have either home and within which they gain their coherence and intelligibility. If religion is indeed a language-game, then two things follow. First, religion cannot be understood without deeply and honestly engaging in the religious life, and secondly, it will be illegitimate to criticize religion according to the standards and objectives of another language-

game. Thus, in a sense, every language-game in some sense or other is distinct from other language-game. Once religion is described as a language-game, it appears to receive certain immunity from criticism, either from the creeping infringement of science or from atheistically-minded theorists who wish to explain it as a way as an illusion, a dream of the human mind, an erroneous hypothesis or whatever. This is not just because to impose alien criteria on an incommensurable universe of discourse and way of life. The designation of a practice or institution as a language-game or a form of life means for Wittgensteinian that practice or institution is a *fait accompli*. It is given which does not admit of explanation. Wittgenstein says that we must bear in mind that language-game is to say something unpredictable in the sense that it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable or unreasonable. It is there like our life. In this regard, he brings the concept of language-game to unearthen or unveil the meaning of a form of life. In his *PI*, Wittgenstein remarks “what has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say - *forms of life*.’ Thus, our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as ‘proto-phenomenon’. That is, where we ought to have said: this language-game is played.”

Many contemporary thinkers have claimed that Wittgenstein’s position about religion is based on Fideism. Kai Nielsen has termed it as *Wittgensteinian Fideism*. According to religious believers, fideism is a position which holds that ‘belief rests on faith rather than on reason, and that an intellectual justification of religion is therefore unnecessary.’ I have already stated that Wittgenstein rules out any rational and intellectual justification in religion. Thus, apparently, there is nothing wrong with claiming *Wittgensteinian Fideism* in religion or religious belief. Accordingly, I may claim that Wittgensteinian twist to Fideism is the claim that, qua form of life, religion is a *fait accompli* which neither requires justification nor should fear censure from

non-religious forms of life. As far as *Wittgenstenian Fideism* is concerned, I have a different proposal. Even though Wittgenstein asserts that religion is based on faith where there is no relevance of rational account, but he at the same time does not believe the existence of God as the foundation of religion. I think that a true religious fideist would be one who believes that religion is based on faith about the existence of God and the existence of God is self-evident and one does not require proving it from a rational perspective. Before leaving the issue of Fideism, one other related criticism should be voiced. This concerns the Wittgenstenians' use of the language-game and form of life concepts. Notwithstanding Malcolm's declaration that 'religion is a form of life; it is language embedded in action - what Wittgenstein calls a 'language-game' in no place does Wittgenstein himself refer to religion in such a manner. For Wittgenstein, language-games seem to be quite small-scale units of language-usage that occur in various human contexts. In his *PI*, Wittgenstein notes such examples as 'asking about something, greeting someone, giving orders, reporting an event and so on'. Even he elsewhere speaks of language-game with physical objects and even he conceives mathematics as a whole language-game.

Even though the thesis is marked by the concept of form of life, but a careful study of his book *PI* reflects that Wittgenstein essentially uses the term *a form of life* only in five different places. At one place he asserts that to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life. In other places of his *PI*, Wittgenstein asserts that the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is a part of an activity or a form of life. In another place, he asserts that the agreement in the use of language is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. On another occasion he intends to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life. And finally, he remarked that what has to be accepted, the

given is - so one could say - forms of life. If we go through and surmise the various uses of a form of life after Wittgenstein, it would seem to me that his understanding of religion is deeply rooted in the grammar of the language. He thus reveals that speaking of language is part of an activity or a form of life. I think that just by way of interpreting religion as a form of life, Wittgenstein not only offers us a new dimension of religion but also sets up the future of religion in the real sense of the term. Since religion is embedded in language and there is an isomorphism between religion and culture, therefore any sort of misuse of language would lead us to cultural decline. That is why Wittgenstein has been over-conscious about the misuse of language. In his *Culture and Value* and other writings, Wittgenstein finds religion as culture and value. For Wittgenstein, religion is culture. Thus, a religious language in a sense reflects our culture.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Selected Bibliography

A

Abernethy, George L., and Thomas, A. Langford, (ed.) (1962): *Philosophy of Religion: A book of Readings*, New York: Macmillan.

Agam-Segal, R., & Dain, E., (eds.) (2017): *Wittgenstein's Moral Thought*, London: Routledge.

Agassi, J., (ed.) (2018): *Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: An Attempt at a Critical Rationalist Appraisal*, Springer.

Ahmed, A., (ed.) (2010): *Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: A Critical Guide*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Aldrich, V. C., (1976): "Linguistic Mysticism", *The Monist*, Vol. 59.

Alston, John, (1988): *Philosophy of Language*, Prentice Hall: New Delhi, India.

Alston, W. P., (1964): *Philosophy and Language*, Prentice Hall: New Jersey.

Alston, William, (1967): "Problems of Philosophy of Religion", *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, New York: Macmillan, Vol. 6.

Alston, William, (1987): "Religious Experience as a Ground of Religious Belief" in *Religious Experience and Religious Belief*, (eds.) Joseph Runzo and Craig Ihara, Benham, Md.: University Press of America.

Alston, William, (1991): *Perceiving God*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Alston, William, (1999): 'Taking the Curse off Language-Games' in Paul Helm, (ed.) *Faith and Reason*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Ambrose, A., and M. I. Lazerowitz, (1972): *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophy and Language*, London: Allen & Unwin Ltd.
- Amesbury, Richard, (2003): 'Has Wittgenstein Been Misunderstood by Wittgensteinian Philosophers of Religion?' in *Philosophical Investigations*, Vol. 26.
- Ammerman, Robert R., (ed.) (1965): *Classics of Analytic Philosophy*, Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, Bombay: New Delhi.
- Andrejč, G., (ed.) (2016): *Wittgenstein and Interreligious Disagreement: A Philosophical and Theological Perspective*, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Anscombe, G. E. M., (1959): *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, London: Hutchinson.
- Anscombe, G. E. M., (1971): *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, London: Hutchinson University Library.
- Anscombe, G. E. M., (1991): 'Wittgenstein: Whose Philosopher?' in *Wittgenstein: Centenary Essays*, (ed.) P. Griffiths, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Anscombe, G. E. M., (1996): *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, England: Thoemmes Press.
- Appelqvist, H., (ed.) (2019): *Wittgenstein and the Limits of Language*, Routledge: London.
- Arnsward, U., (2009): *In Search of Meaning: Ludwig Wittgenstein on Ethics*, Karlsruhe: KIT Scientific Publishing.
- Arrington, Robert L., (1978): "Wittgenstein and Phenomenology" in *Philosophy Today*, Vol. 22.
- Arrington, Robert L., and Mark, Addis, (2001): *Wittgenstein and Philosophy of Religion*, London and New York: Routledge.

Ashford, Bruce R., (2007): Wittgenstein's Theologians? A Survey of Ludwig Wittgenstein's impact on Theology, *The Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society*, Vol. 50.

Atkinson, J., (2010): *The Mystical in Wittgenstein's Early Writings*, London: Routledge.

Austin, J. L., (1961): *How To Do Things With Words*, Clarendon Press: Oxford.

Ayer, A. J., (ed.) (1959): *Logical Positivism*, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe.

Ayer, A. J., (ed.) (1965): *The Revolution in Philosophy*, London: Macmillan.

Ayer, A. J., (1968): "Can there be a Private Language?" in *Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations*, (ed.) by G. Pitcher, University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, Indiana.

Ayer, A. J., (1985): *Wittgenstein*, London: Wiedennfield and Nicolson.

Ayer, A. J., (1986): *Ludwig Wittgenstein*, England: Penguin Books.

Ayer, A. J., (1971): *Language, Truth and Logic*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Ayer, A. J., (1982): *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, New York: Random House.

B

Baker, Gordon P., and P. M. S. Hacker, (1980): *Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Volume 1 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Baker, Gordon P., (2004): *Wittgenstein's Method: Neglected Aspects*, edited and introduced by Katherine J. Morris, Oxford: Blackwell.

Baker, Lynne Rudder, (1984): "On the Very Idea of a Form of Life", *Inquiry*, Vol. 27, June 1984.

- Bakhle, S. W., (1987): *Nature and Development of Linguistic Analysis*, Dattsons: Nagpur.
- Balaska, M., (ed.) (2019): *Wittgenstein and Lacan at the Limit: Meaning and Astonishment*, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bambrough, Renford (1960-1961): 'Universals and family Resemblances' in *Aristotelian Society Proceedings*, Renford Bambrough.
- Banerjee, N. V., (1963): *Language, Meaning and Persons*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd.
- Banner, Michael, (1990): *The Justification of Science and the Rationality of Religious Belief*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Barrell, W. & Alken, H. D., (eds.) (1962): *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, Vol. II, New York: Random House.
- Barrett, Cyril, (1991): *Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Barrett, Cyril, (2007): *Wittgenstein: Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, University of California Press.
- Barth, Karl, (1960): *Church Dogmatics*, Vol. 3, Part 2, trans. Harold Knight et al., Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Ltd.
- Bartley, William Warren, (1973): *Wittgenstein*, Philadelphia: Lippincott.
- Baz, A., (2012): *When Words are Called for: A Defense of Ordinary language Philosophy*, Harvard University Press.
- Beaney, Michael, (1996): *Frege: Making Sense*, London: Duckworth.
- Bell, Julian, (1966): "An epistle on the subject of the ethical and aesthetic, beliefs of Herr Ludwig Wittgenstein" in *Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, Copi I. M., & Beard R. W., (eds.), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

- Bell, Richard H., (1969): 'Wittgenstein and Descriptive Theology', *Religious Studies*, Vol. 5.
- Bell, Richard H., (1975): Theology as Grammar: Is God an Object of Understanding? in *Religious Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 3.
- Beth, Savickey, (2017): *Wittgenstein's Investigations – Awakening the Imagination*, Springer.
- Bergmann, G., (1949): "Two Criteria for an Ideal Language", *PS*, Vol. XVI.
- Bergmann, Gustav, (1964): "The Glory and the Misery of Ludwig Wittgenstein" in *Logic and Reality*, Wisconsin University Press.
- Bermon, E., & Narboux, J. P., (eds.) (2019): *Finding One's Way through Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: New Essays*, Springer.
- Bernstein, R. J., (1961): "Wittgenstein's Three Languages," *RM*, Vol. XV, No. 2.
- Barrett, Cyril, (1991): *Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Beliefs*, Oxford U. K. & Cambridge U. S. A.: Blackwell.
- Barth, Karl, (1960): *Church Dogmatics*, Vol. 3, Part-2, trans. Harold Knight et al. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Ltd.
- Bascom, John, (1880) : *Natural Theology*, New York: G. Putnam's Sons.
- Bertocci, Peter, (1951): *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- Bhattacharyya, B., (2014): *Analytic Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, Eastern Book House Publishers.
- Biletzki, Anat, (2003): *(Over) Interpreting Wittgenstein*, Leiden: Kluwer.
- Bindemann, S. L., (1981): *Heidegger and Wittgenstein: The Poetics of Silence*, University Press of America, Lanham.

- Black, Max, (1938-39): "Some Problems Connected with Language," *PAS*, Vol. XXXIX; reprinted as "Wittgenstein's Tractatus" in Black, *Language and Philosophy*, Ethica: Cornell University Press, 1949.
- Black, Max, (1948): "Linguistic Method in Philosophy", *PPR*, Vol. VIII.
- Black, Max, (1949): *Language and Meaning*, Cornell University Press.
- Black, Max, (1949): *Language and Philosophy*, Cornell University Press: New York.
- Black, Max, (1959): "Language and Reality", *PAPA*, Vol. XXXII.
- Black, Max, (1964): *A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, New York.
- Block, Irving, (ed.) (1981): *Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Bloemendaal, P. F., (2006): *Grammars of Faith: A Critical Evaluation of D. Z. Phillips' Philosophy of Religion*, Leuven: Peeters.
- Bloemendaal, P. F., (2010): 'Contemplating Possibilities of Religious Sense: True Belief and Superstition' in Ingolf U. Dalferth and Hartmut von Sass (eds.), *The Contemplative Spirit: D. Z. Phillips on Religion and the Limits of Philosophy*, (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck).
- Bloomfield, L., (1994): *Language*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Bloor, David, (1997): *Wittgenstein's Rules and Institutions*, London: Routledge.
- Bogen, James, (1972): *Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language*, Routledge and Kegan Paul: London.
- Boghossain, Paul A., (2002): 'The Rule-Following Considerations' in *Rule-Following and Meaning*, (ed.) Alexander Miller and Crispin Wright, Chesham: Acumen.
- Bolger, R. K., & Coburn, R. C., (ed.) (2019): *Religious Language, Meaning and Use: The God Who is Not There*, Bloomsbury Publishing.

- Bolger, R. K., & Coburn, R. C., (2019): *Religious Language, Meaning and Use*, Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Bolton, Derek, (1979): *An Approach to Wittgenstein's Philosophy*, The Macmillan Press Ltd.: London and Basing Stoke.
- Bouwsma, O. K., (1972): "A difference between Ryle and Wittgenstein" in *Studies in Philosophy: A Symposium on G. Ryle*, Kolenda K. (ed.) Marsh William, Rice University, Houston: Texas.
- Bouwsma, O. K., (1986): *Wittgenstein: Conversations, 1949-1951*, (ed.) J. Craft and R. Hustwit, Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Bradley, F. H., (1927): *Ethical Studies*, Second edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Brand, Gerd, (1973): *The Central Text of Ludwig Wittgenstein*, Translated and with an introduction by Robert E. Innis, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Braithwaite, R. B., (1923): *Wittgenstein's Logic*, Cambridge Moral Science Club Minutes, University of Cambridge Library.
- Braithwaite, R. B., (1968): 'An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Beliefs' in John Hick (ed.), *The Existence of God*, Macmillan: New York.
- Braver, L., (2014): *Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger*, MIT Press.
- Brightman, E. S., (1940): *A Philosophy of Religion*, New York: Prentice-Hall.
- Britton, Karl, (1999): 'Portrait of a Philosopher' in *Portraits of Wittgenstein*, Vol. 2, (ed.) F. Flowers, Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
- Brockhaus, R., (1991): *Pulling Up the Ladder: The Metaphysical Roots of Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, Chicago and La Salle: Open Court.
- Budd, M., (2013): *Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology*, London: Routledge.

Bunyan, Arthur, (1958): *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. 2, T & T Clark Ltd., Edinburgh.

Burley, Mikel, (2008): 'Phillips and Eternal Life: A Response to Haldane' in *Philosophical Investigations*, Vol. 31.

Burley, Mikel, (2012): 'D. Z. Phillips' Contemplations on Religion and Literature' in *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. 71.

Burley, Mikel, (2012): 'Believing in Reincarnation', *Philosophy*, Vol. 87.

Burley, Mikel, (2012): *Contemplating Religious Forms of Life: Wittgenstein and D. Z. Phillips*, New York: Continuum International Publishing Group.

Burley, Mikel, (2018): *Wittgenstein, Religion and Ethics*, Bloomsbury Publishing.

Burrell, David, (1979): *Aquinas: God and Action*, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

Burrell, David, (1986): *Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas*, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

C

Cahill, Kevin M., (2011): *The Fate of Wonder: Wittgenstein's Critique of Metaphysics and Modernity*, Columbia University Press: New York.

Caird, John, (1980): *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, Glasgow, J. Maclehose and sons.

Canfield, John V., (1981): *Wittgenstein: Language and World*, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

Canfield, John V., (ed.) (1986): *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, Vols. 1–15, New York: Garland Publishers.

- Carnap, Rudolf, (1935): *Philosophy and Logical Syntax*, London: Kegan Paul.
- Carnap, Rudolf, (1937): *The Logical Syntax of Language*, London: Kegan Paul.
- Carnap, Rudolf, (1947): *Meaning and Necessity*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Carnap, Rudolf, (1967): *The Logical Structure of the World. Pseudoproblems in Philosophy*, trans. R. A. George, University of California Press, Berkeley.
- Carnap, Rudolf, (1999): 'Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle' in *Portraits of Wittgenstein*, Vol. 2, (ed.) F. Flowers, Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
- Carroll, Thomas D., (2014): *Wittgenstein within the Philosophy of Religion*, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, UK.
- Cavalier, Robert J., (1980): *Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: A Transcendental Critique of Ethics*, Washington University Press of America.
- Cavell, Stanley, (1969): *Must We Mean What We Say?* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Cavell, Stanley, (1979): *The Claim of Reason*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cavell, Stanley, (1989): 'Declining Decline: Wittgenstein as a Philosopher of Culture' in *This New Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures after Emerson after Wittgenstein*, Albuquerque, NM: Living Batch Press.
- Caws, P., (1965): *The Philosophy of Science*, London: D. Van Nostrand Company Ltd.
- Chandra, Suresh, (2002): *Wittgenstein: New Perspectives*, New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.
- Charlesworth, M. J., (1974): *The Problem of Religious Language*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall.
- Chatterjee, M., (1981): *The Language of Philosophy*, Allied Publishing Private Ltd.

- Chaturvedi, Vibha, (2002): *Wittgenstein's Fideism: Beliefs, Reason and Practice*, New Delhi: Om Publications.
- Child, W., (2011): *Wittgenstein*, New York: Routledge.
- Chill, Kevin M., (2011): *The Fate of Wonder: Wittgenstein's Critique of Metaphysics and Modernity*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Chomsky, N., (1976): *Reflections on Language*, London: Temple Smith.
- Choudhury, R., (1984): *Philosophy of Language*, Capital Publishing House.
- Church, F. Forrester, (1987): *The Essential Tillich: An Anthology of the Writings of Paul Tillich*, New York: Macmillan.
- Cioffi, Frank, (1998): *Wittgenstein on Freud and Frazer*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Clack, Brian R., (1995): D. Z. Phillips, Wittgenstein and Religion, *Religious Studies*, Vol. 31.
- Clack, Brian R., (1999): *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Clack, Brian R., (1999): *Wittgenstein, Frazer and Religion*, London: Macmillan.
- Clack, Brian R., (2004): 'Scapegoat Rituals in Wittgensteinian Perspective' in Kevin Schilbrack (ed.), *Thinking through Rituals: Philosophical Perspectives*, New York: Routledge.
- Charlesworth, Max, (2006): *Philosophy and Religion (From Plato to Postmodernism)*, Oneworld Publications: Oxford, England.
- Choudhury, R., (1984): *Philosophy of Language*, Capital Publishing House.
- Collins, James, (1967): *The Emergence of the Philosophy of Religion*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

- Conant, James, (1993): 'Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and Nonsense' in *The Anxieties of Reason*. In *Pursuits of Reason*, (ed.) T. Cohen, P. Guyer, and H. Putnam, Texas: Texas Tech University Press.
- Conant, James, (2000): 'Elucidation and Nonsense in Frege and Early Wittgenstein' in *The New Wittgenstein*, (ed.) A. Crary, and R. Read, London: Routledge.
- Cook, John W., (1956): "Wittgenstein of Privacy", *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 74.
- Cook, John W., (1983): 'Magic, Witchcraft and Science', *Philosophical Investigations*, Vol. 6.
- Cook, John W., (2000): *Wittgenstein, Empiricism and Language*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Coope Christopher et al. (1971): *A Wittgenstein Workbook*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Copi, I. M., and R. W. Beard, (eds.) (1966): *Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, London: Routledge.
- Copper, D. E., (1973): *Philosophy and the Nature of Language*, London: Longman.
- Cornforth, M. C., (1955): *Science versus Idealism, The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd.
- Cornish, Kimberley, (1998): *The Jew of Linz: Wittgenstein, Hitler, and Their Sacred Battle for the Mind*, London: Century Books.
- Coward, H. G., (1976): "Language as Revelation", *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 3.
- Coward, H. G., (1980): *The Sphota Theory of Language*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Crary, Alice, & Read, Rupert, (eds.) (2000): *The New Wittgenstein*, Routledge: London & New York.
- Crary, Alice, (ed.) (2007): *Wittgenstein and the Moral Life*, Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.

Creegan, Charls L., (1989): *Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard: Religion, Individuality, and Philosophical Method*, London and New York: Routledge.

Crosson, Frederick, (ed.) (1981): *The Autonomy of Religious Belief*, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

Cupitt, Don, (1984): 'A Reply to Rowan Williams', *Modern Theology*, Vol. I.

Cupitt, Don, (1993): 'Anti-Realist Faith' in Joseph Runzo (ed.) *Is God Real?* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Cupitt, Don, (2002): 'Faith Alone' in *Is Nothing Sacred? The Non-Realist Philosophy of Religion: Selected Essays*, New York: Fordham University Press.

D

Daitz, E., (1953): "The Picture Theory of Meaning", *M*, Vol. LXII, No. 246; reprinted in *Essays in Conceptual Analysis*, (ed.) A. Flew, London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1956.

Das, Kanti Lal, (2006): *Philosophical Relevance of Language: A Methodological Reflection*, Northern Book Centre: New Delhi.

Dalferth, Ingolf U., (1988): *Theology and Philosophy*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

David, C. E., (1973): *Philosophy and the Nature of Language*, Langman Group Ltd.

Davis, Brian, (2000): *Philosophy of Religion: A Guide and Anthology*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dawkins, Richard, (2006): *The God Delusion*, London: Bantam Press.

D'Costa, Gavin, (1980): *Theology and Religious Pluralism*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

DeAngelis, William J., (1997): *Ludwig Wittgenstein – A Religious Point of View?* Thoughts on Norman Malcolm's Last Philosophical Project, *Dialogue*, XXXVI.

- DeAngelis, William J., (2007): *Ludwig Wittgenstein – A Cultural Point of View: Philosophy in the Darkness of This Time*, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot.
- Dennett, Daniel, (1978): 'Mechanism and Responsibility' in *Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology*, Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books.
- Dennett, Daniel, (1999): Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Time*, March 1999.
- Devaraja, N. K., (1974): *Philosophy, Religion and Culture*, Motilal Banarsidas, Baranasi: U. P.
- Devitt, Michael, & Kim, Sterenly, (1987): *Language and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy and Language*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Diamond, Cora, (1988): 'Losing Your Concepts', *Ethics*, Vol. 98.
- Diamond, Cora, (1989): 'Rules: Looking in the Right Place' in *Wittgenstein: Attention to Particulars*, (ed.) D. Z. Phillips, and P. Winch.
- Diamond, Cora, (1991): 'Ethics, Imagination and the Method of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*' in *Bilder Der Philosophie*, (ed.) R. Heinrich, and H. Vetter, Vienna and Munich: Oldenburg.
- Diamond, Cora, (1995): *The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Diamond, C., (2019): *Reading Wittgenstein with Anscombe, Going On to Ethics*, Harvard University Press.
- Dilman, Ilham, (1981): *Studies in Language and Reason*, London: Macmillan.
- Dilman, Ilham, (1998): *Language and Reality: Modern Perspectives on Wittgenstein*, Peeters Publishing.
- Does, J. van der, (2011): *Passed over in Silence: On Wittgenstein's Tractatus and its System*, London: College Publications.

Drury, M. O. C., (1967): 'Dublin Lecture on Wittgenstein' in *The Danger of Words: And Writings on Wittgenstein*, (ed.) D. Berman, M. Fitzgerald, and J. Hayes, Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996.

Drury, M. O. C., (1973): Preface and 'Madness and Religion' in *The Danger of Words*, London: Routledge and Kegan paul.

Drury, M. O. C., (1984): 'Conversations with Wittgenstein' in *Recollections of Wittgenstein*, revised edition, (ed.) R. Rhees, New York: Oxford University Press.

Duff, Antony, (1976): 'Must a Good Man be Invulnerable?' *Ethics*, Vol. 86.

Durant, Will, (1935): *The Age of Faith*. Vol. VI of *The Story of Civilization*, New York: Simon & Schuster.

Durkheim, Emile, (1965): *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, New York: The Free Press.

Durrant, Michael, (1971): 'The use of "Pictures" in Religious Belief', *Sophia*, July 1971.

Dwivedi, D. N., (1977): *A Study of Wittgenstein's Philosophy*, Darshan Peeth, 177 Tagore Town, and Allahabad.

E

Edwards, D. L., (ed.) (1963): *The Honest to God Debate*, Student Christian Movement Press: London.

Edwards, Gilbert Harris, (1948): *Wittgenstein Lectures, 1946-1947*, Wren Library, Trinity College, Cambridge.

Edwards, James C., (1982): *Ethics without Philosophy: Wittgenstein and the Moral Life*, Tampa, University Press of Florida.

Edwards, Paul, (1967): *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, New York and London, Collier & Macmillan.

Egan, D., & Reynolds, W., (2013): *Wittgenstein and Heidegger*, London: Routledge.

Egidi, Rosario, (ed.) (1995): *Wittgenstein: Mind and Language*, Kluwer Publishing: Dordrecht/ London/ Boston.

Eilenberger, W., (2020): *Time of the Magicians: The Invention of Modern Thought, 1919-1929*, Penguin Books.

Eliade, Mircea, (1987): *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, Vol. 13, Macmillan Publishing Company: New York.

Elster, Jon, (1989): 'Marx, Functionalism, and Game Theory: The Case for Methodological Individualism' in *Marxist Theory*, (ed.) A. Collinicos, New York: Oxford University Press.

Engel, S. M., (1971): *Wittgenstein's Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague.

Engelmann, Paul, (1967): *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein, with a Memoir*, (ed.) B.

F

F. McGuinness, trans. L. Furtmuller, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Evans-Pritchard, E. E., (1933): 'The Intellectualist (English) Interpretation of Magic' in *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts*, Vol. 1, University of Egypt: Cairo.

Evans-Pritchard, E. E., (1976): *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande*, abridged edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Fann, K. T., (ed.) (1967): *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and his Philosophy*, New York: Delta Books.

- Fann, K. T., (1969): *Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Favrholdt, David, (1967): *An Interpretation and Critique of Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, Humanities Press.
- Feigl, H., & Sellars, W., (eds.) (1949): *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, New York, Appleton-Century Crofts.
- Feleppa, Robert, (1988): 'Convention, Translation and Understanding: Philosophical Problems' in *The Comparative Study of Culture*, Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Finch, Henry, (1977): *Wittgenstein - The Later Philosophy: An Exposition of the 'Philosophical Investigations'*, New Jersey: Humanities Press.
- Findlay, J. N., (1984): *Wittgenstein a Critique*, Routledge and Kegan Paul: Boston.
- Findlay, J. N., (1999): 'My Encounters with Wittgenstein' in *Portraits of Wittgenstein*, Vol. 3, (ed.) F. Flowers, Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
- Flanagan, Owen, Jr., (2011): 'Wittgenstein's Ethical Non-naturalism: An Interpretation of Tractatus 6.4147 and the "Lecture on Ethics"', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 48.
- Flew, Antony, (1971): *An Introduction to Western Philosophy*, Bobbs Merrill Company Ltd.
- Flew, Antony, (1971): 'Review of Death and Immortality' (D. Z. Phillips), *Philosophical Books*, Vol. 12.
- Flowers, F. A., and Ian, Ground, (eds.) (2016): *Portraits of Wittgenstein*, London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Fodor, J. A., (1975): *The Language of Thought*, New York, Crowell & Hassocks, Sussex, Harvester.

Fogelin, Robert J., (1976): *Wittgenstein*, Routledge & Kegan Paul: London & New York (Second edition, 1987).

Fogelin, Robert J., (2009): *Taking Wittgenstein at His Word: A Textual Study*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Fosdick, H. E., (1915): *The Meaning of Prayer*, London: SCM Press.

Fowler, R., (1964): *Understanding Language: An Introduction to Linguistics*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Frazer, James George, (1922): *The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion*, London: Macmillan.

Frege, Gottlob, (1989): 'Briefe an Ludwig Wittgenstein' in *Wittgenstein in Focus*, (ed.) B. McGuinness and R. Haller, Amsterdam: Rodopi, *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, Vol. 33/34.

Frege, Gottlob, (1984): 'On Sense and Meaning' in *Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy*, (ed.) B. F. McGuinness, trans. M. Black, Oxford: Blackwell.

Frege, Gottlob, (2003): Frege's Letters to Wittgenstein on the Tractatus, trans. Richard Henry Schmitt, *The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly* (November 2003).

Friedlander, Eli, (2001): *Signs of Sense: Reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

G

Galloway, George, (1914): *The Philosophy of Religion*, T. and T. Clark Ltd.

Ganguly, Sachindranath, (1967): *Wittgenstein's Tractatus: A Preliminary*, Vishva-Bharati, Santiniketan: Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy.

- Gardiner, Partick, (1963): "*Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein*", Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex.
- Garver, Newton, (1994): *The Complicated Form of Life*, Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company.
- Gasking, D. A. T., and A. C. Jackson, (1999): 'Ludwig Wittgenstein' in *Portraits of Wittgenstein*, Vol. 4, (ed.) F. Flowers, Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
- Geach, Peter, (1969): *God and the Soul*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Geertz, Armin, W., (ed.) (2013): *Origins of Religion, Cognition and Culture*, Acumen Publishing Limited, 4 Saddler Street, Durham.
- Gefwert, Christoffer, (2000): *Wittgenstein on Thought, Language and Philosophy: From Theory to Therapy*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Gellner, E. A., (1960): *Words and Things: A Critical Account of Linguistic Philosophy and a Study of Ideology*, Boston, Beacon Press.
- Genova, Judith, (1995): *Wittgenstein: A Way of Seeing*, Routledge: New York and London.
- Gert, Heather J., (1997): 'Wittgenstein on Description' in *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 88 (3).
- Gibson, Arthur, (2010): 'The Wittgenstein Archive of Francis Skinner' in *Wittgenstein after His Necklass*, (ed.) N. Venturinha, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gibson, John, and Wolfgang, Huemer, (eds.), (2004): *The Literary Wittgenstein*, London: Routledge.
- Gier, Nicholas F., (1980): "Wittgenstein and Forms of Life", *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 16.

- Gilbert, James, (1997): *Redeeming Culture: American Religion in an Age of Science*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gill, Jerry H., (1967): "Wittgenstein on the use of I", *Southern Journal of Philosophy* Vol. 5.
- Gill, Jerry H., (1996): *Wittgenstein and Metaphor*, Humanities Press: New Jersey.
- Gill, Jerry H., (2019): *Wittgenstein's Investigations: An Introductory Guide*; "Knowing How to Go On", Independently published on 18th June, 2019.
- Glock, Hans-Johann, (1996): *A Wittgenstein Dictionary*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Glock, Hans-Johann, (2001): 'Wittgenstein and Reason' in *Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy*, (ed.) J. Klagge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Glock, Hans-Johann, (2001): *Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Glock, Hans-Johann and John Hyman (eds.) (2017): *A Companion to Wittgenstein*, Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley.
- Goldfarb, Warren, (1997): 'Wittgenstein on the Fixity of Meaning' in *Early Analytic Philosophy*, (ed.) W. Tait, Chicago and La Salle: Open Court.
- Goldfarb, Warren, (2002): 'Kripke on Wittgenstein on Rules' in *Rule-Following and Meaning*, (ed.) Alexander Miller and Crispin Wright, Chesham: Acumen.
- Goldstein, Laurence, (1999): *Clear and queer Thinking: Wittgenstein's Development and His Relevance to Modern Thought*, London: Duckworth.
- Gorlée, D. L., (2019): *Wittgenstein's Secret Diaries*, Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Graham, G., (2014): *Wittgenstein and Natural Religion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Grayling, A. C., (1988): *Wittgenstein*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Green, Ronald M., (1978): *Religious Reason – The Rational and Moral Basis of Religious Belief*, Oxford University Press: New York.
- Greenwood, E. B., (1971): “Tolstoy, Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer: Some Connections”, *Encounter*, Vol. 36.
- Grève, S. S., & Mácha, J., (eds.) (2016): *Wittgenstein and the Creativity of Language*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Griffiths, A. P., (1974): “Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer and Ethics” in *Understanding Wittgenstein* (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol. 7), Godfrey Věsey, (ed.) London: Macmillan.
- Griffiths, A. P., (ed.), (1991): *Wittgenstein: Centenary Essays*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gupta, R. K., (2006): *The Science and Philosophy of Spirituality*, B. R. Publishing Corporation: Delhi.
- Gupta, Suman, (1986): *A Critique of Wittgenstein*, Intellectual Publishing House 23: New Delhi.

H

- Hacker, P. M. S., (1971): “Wittgenstein’s Doctrines of the Soul in the Tractatus”, *Kant- Studies*, Vol. 62.
- Hacker, P. M. S., (1972): *Insight and Illusion: Wittgenstein on Philosophy and the Metaphysics of Experience*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hacker, P. M. S., (1996): *Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy*, Oxford: Blackwell.

- Hacker, P. M. S., (1996): *Wittgenstein: Mind and will*, Vol. 4 of *An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations*, Cambridge, MA.: Blackwell.
- Hagberg, G. L., (ed.) (2017): *Wittgenstein on Aesthetic Understanding*, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Haikola, Lars, (1977): *Religion as a Language-Game: A Critical Study with Special Regard to D. Z. Phillips*, GWK Gleerup.
- Haldane, John, (2008): 'Phillips and Eternal Life: A Response to Mikel Burley', *Philosophical Investigations*, Vol. 31.
- Haldane, John, (2010): 'Philosophy, Death and Immortality' in *Reasonable Faith*, London: Routledge.
- Haller, Rudoff, (1988): *Questions on Wittgenstein*, London: Routledge.
- Haller, Rudoff, (1988): 'Was Wittgenstein Influenced by Spengler?' in *Questions on Wittgenstein*, Omaha: University of Nebraska Press.
- Hallett, Garth, (1967): *Wittgenstein's Definition of Meaning as Use*, New York: Fordham University Press.
- Hallett, Garth, (1977): *A Companion to Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations'*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Hamilton, Andy, (2014): *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and On Certainty*, London: Routledge.
- Hamilton, Kelly, (2001): 'Wittgenstein and the Mind's Eye' in *Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy*, (ed.) J. Klagge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hanfling, Oswald, (2002): *Wittgenstein and the Human Form of Life*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Hanfling, Oswald, (2003): *Philosophy and Ordinary Language*, London: Routledge.

- Hardwick, Charles, (1971): *Language and Meaning in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy*, The Hague: Mouton.
- Hardwick, Charles, (1971): *Language Learning in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy*, The Hague: Mouton.
- Hare, R. M., (1952): *The Language of Morals*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hare, R. M., (1992): *Essays on Religion and Education*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Harre, Rom, (2001): Wittgenstein: Science and religion, *Philosophy*, Vol. 76.
- Harries, Karsten, (1967): "Two Conflicting Interpretations of Language in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*", *Kant Studies*, Vol. 59.
- Harrison, Frank, R., (1963): "Notes on Wittgenstein's use of 'das Mystische' " in *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. I.
- Hartnack, Justus, (1965): *Wittgenstein and Modern Philosophy*, London: Methuen.
- Hartnack, Justus, (1976): "Me and My Body": *Essays on Wittgenstein in honour of G. H. von Wright*, (ed.) Hintikka J., North Holland Publishing Company: Amsterdam.
- Hartnack, P. M. S., (1964): *Wittgenstein and Modern Philosophy*, trans. M. Cranston, Methuen & Co. Ltd.
- Hayek, Friedrich A., (1999): 'Remembering My Cousin, Ludwig Wittgenstein' in *Portraits of Wittgenstein*, Vol. I, (ed.) F. Flowers, Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
- Heaton, J. M., (2010): *The Talking Cure: Wittgenstein on Language as Bewitchment and Clarity*, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Heaton, J. M., (2014): *Wittgenstein and Psychotherapy: From Paradox to Wonder*, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Heiner, S., (2017): *Once and for All, The Meaning of Life: Wittgenstein and the Big Question*, One Wheel Press.

- Hick, John, (ed.) (1964): *Faith and the Philosophers*, London: Macmillan.
- Hick, John, (1964): 'Sceptics and Believers' in John Hick (ed.) *Faith and the Philosophers*, London: Macmillan.
- Hick, John, (1973): *God and the Universe of Faiths*, London: Macmillan.
- Hick, John, (1987): *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, New Delhi: Prentice Hall of India.
- Hick, John, (1989): *An Interpretation of Religion*, London: Macmillan and New Haven: Yale University Press.
- High, Dallas, (ed.) (1969): *New Essays in Religious Language*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hilmy, S. Stephen, (1987): *The Later Wittgenstein: The Emergence of a New Philosophical Method*, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Hinman, Laurence M., (1983): "Can a Form of Life Be Wrong?" in *Philosophy: The Journal of the British Institute of Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 58, June 1983.
- Hintikka, M. B., & Hintikka, Jaakko, (1986): *Investigating Wittgenstein*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Hintikka, Jaakko, (2000): *On Wittgenstein*, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Hintikka, Jaakko, (2004): 'Wittgenstein's Demon and His Theory of Mathematics' in *Essays on Wittgenstein and Austrian Philosophy: In Honour of J. C. Nyiri*, (ed.) T. Demeter, New York: Rodopi.
- Hookyaas, R., (1972): *Religion and the Rise of Modern Science*, Scottish Academic Press: Edinburgh.
- Hopkins, James, (1974-75): "Wittgenstein and Physicalism" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, New Series, Vol. LXXV.

Horwich, Paul, (2012): *Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hospers, John, (1997): *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis*, New York and London: Routledge, Fourth Edition.

Hoyt, Christopher, (2007): Wittgenstein and Religious Dogma, *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. 61 (1).

Hudson, Donald W., (1975): *Wittgenstein and Religious Belief*, London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.

Hügel, Friedrich Von, (1921): *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, First Series, New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. and London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd.

Hume, David, (1957): *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, New York: The Liberal Arts Press.

Hunter, J. F. M., (1968): "Forms of Life in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*" in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 5, October 1968.

Hylton, Peter, (1997): 'Functions, Operations and Sense in Wittgenstein's Tractatus' in *Early Analytic Philosophy*, (ed.) W. Tait, Chicago: Open Court.

Hymers, M., (2010): *Wittgenstein and the Practice of Philosophy*, Peterborough: Broadview Press.

I

Iczkovits, Y., (2012): *Wittgenstein's Ethical Thought*, Palgrave Macmillan.

J

- Jaki, S. L., (1978): *The Road of Science and the Ways to God*, Scottish Academic Press: Edinburgh.
- Janik, Allan, and Toulmin, Steven E., (1973): *Wittgenstein's Vienna*, New York: Simon & Shuster, London: George Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Janik, Allan, and Hans, Veigl, (1998): *Wittgenstein in Vienna: A Biographical Excursion through the City and Its History*, New York: Springer Verlag.
- Janik, Allan, (2006): *Assembling Reminders: Studies in the Genesis of Wittgenstein's Concept of Philosophy*, Stockholm: Santerus Academic Press.
- Joergensen, J., (1951): 'The Development of Logical Positivism' in *International Encyclopedia of Unified Sciences*, Vol. 2/9, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- John, Peter, (1988): 'Wittgenstein's Wonderful Life' in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 49 (3) (July-September 1988).
- Johnson, Paul, (1993): *Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner*, London: Routledge.
- Jones, J. R., and Phillips, D. Z., (1970): 'Belief and Loss of Belief' in D. Z. Phillips (ed.) *Faith and Philosophical Enquiry*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Jones, O. R., (ed.) (1971): *The Private Language Argument*, Macmillan/ St. Martins Press.

K

- Kahane, Guy, Edward, Kanterian, and Oskari, Kuusela, (eds.), (2007): *Wittgenstein and His Interpreters*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Katz, Jerrold J., (1971): *Linguistic Philosophy*, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
- Keightley, Alan, (1976): *Wittgenstein, Grammar and God*, London: Epworth Press.
- Kenny, Anthony, (1959): Aquinas and Wittgenstein, *Downside Review*, Vol. 77.

- Kenny, Anthony, (1973): *Wittgenstein*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Kenny, Anthony, (1975): 'In Defense of God' in *The Times Literary Supplement*, February 1975.
- Kenny, Anthony, (1982): 'Wittgenstein on the Nature of Philosophy' in *Wittgenstein and His Times*, (ed.) B. McGuinness, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Kenny, Anthony, (1984): *The Legacy of Wittgenstein*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Kenny, Anthony, (ed.) (1994): *The Wittgenstein*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
- Kenny, Anthony, (ed.) (1994): *The Wittgenstein Reader*, U. S. A.: Basil Blackwell.
- Kenny, Anthony, (2005): 'A Brief History of Wittgenstein Editing' in *Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and His Works*, (ed.) A. Pichler, and S. Saatela, Bergen, Norway: Working Papers of the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen, No. 17.
- Kerr, Fergus, (1986): *Theology after Wittgenstein*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Kindi, Vassiliki, (1998): 'Is Wittgenstein's Resort to Ordinary Language an Appeal to Empirical Facts?' in *Metaphilosophy*, Vol. 29, No. 4.
- King-Farlow, J., and Christensen, W. N., (1972): *Faith and the Life of Reason*, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publication Co.
- King, John, (1984): 'Recollections of Wittgenstein' in *Recollections of Wittgenstein*, Revised edition, (ed.) R. Rhees, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kishik, D., (2011): *Wittgenstein's Form of Life*, New York: Continuum International Publishing Group.
- Klagge, James C., (1989): Wittgenstein and Neuroscience, *Synthese*, Vol. 78 (3) (March, 1989).
- Klagge, James C., (1995): An Unexplored Concept in Wittgenstein, *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, Vol. 12 (4) (October, 1995).

Klagge, James C., (1998): When Are Ideologies Irreconcilable? Case Studies in Diachronic Anthropology, *Philosophical Investigations*, Vol. 21 (3) (July, 1998).

Klagge, James C., (1999): Wittgenstein and Non-Mediative Causality, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 37 (4) (October, 1999).

Klagge, James C., (1999): 'Wittgenstein's Community' in *Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age: Papers of the 22nd International Wittgenstein Symposium*, Vol. VII (1), (ed.) U. Meixner, and P. Simons, Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.

Klagge, James C., (2001): *Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Klagge, James C., (2003): 'The Puzzle of Goethe's Influence on Wittgenstein' in *Goethe and Wittgenstein: Seeing the World's Unity in Its Variety*, (ed.) F. Breithaupt, R. Raatzsch, and B. Kremberg, Wittgenstein-Studien, Vol. 5, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

Klagge, James C., (2003): 'The Wittgenstein Lectures' in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Public and Private Occasions*, (ed.) J. Klagge, and A. Nordmann, Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield.

Klagge, James C., (2005): 'Wittgenstein in Exile' in *Religion and Wittgenstein's Legacy*, (ed.) D. Z. Phillips and Mario von der Ruhr., Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Klagge, James C., (2010): *Wittgenstein in Exile*, Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.

Klein, J. Theodore, (1973): "Wittgenstein's analysis of the use of 'I' in the *Philosophical Investigations*", *Modern Schoolman*, Vol. 51.

Klein, Terrance W., (2003): 'How Things are in the World: Metaphysics and Theology in Wittgenstein and Rahner' in A. Tallon, (ed.) *Marquette Studies in Theology*, Vol. 39. Marquette, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press.

- Klein, Terrance W., (2006): 'Act and potency in Wittgenstein?' in *Heythrop Journal*, Vol. 47 (4).
- Klemke, E. D., (1971): *Essays on Wittgenstein*, University of Illinois.
- Klemke, E. D., (1975): 'Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics' in *Journal of Value Inquiry*, Vol. 9.
- Koethe, John, (1996): *The Continuity of Wittgenstein's Thought*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Kohler, Wolfgang, (1938): *The Place of Value in a World of Facts*, New York: Liveright.
- Korner, S., (1979): 'Ayer on Metaphysics' in Macdonald (ed.), 1979.
- Kripke, Saul, (1982): *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Kung, Guido, (1968): *Ontology and Logistic Analysis of Language*, Humanities Press: New York.
- Kuusela, Oskari, and Marie, McGinn, (eds.) (2011): *The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kuusela, Oskari, (2018): *Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy: Re-examining the Roots and Developments of Analytic philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

L

- Labron, T., (2009): *Wittgenstein and Theology*, London and New York: T & T Clark Ltd.
- Labron, T., (2013): *Wittgenstein's Religious Point of View*, Bloomsbury Publishing.

- Labron, T., (ed.) (2017): *Science and Religion in Wittgenstein's Fly-Bottle*, Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Laugier, S., (2013): *Why We Need Ordinary Language Philosophy?* University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
- Laura, R. S., (1972): 'Positivism and Philosophy of Religion', *Sophia*.
- Lazenby, J. Mark, (2006): *The Early Wittgenstein on Religion*, Continuum Studies in British Philosophy.
- Leaman, Oliver, (ed.) (1998): *The Future of Philosophy*, St. Martin's Press.
- Leavis, F. R., (1984): 'Memories of Wittgenstein' in *Recollections of Wittgenstein*, revised edition, (ed.) R. Rhees, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lee, Desmond, (1999): 'Wittgenstein: 1929-1931' in *Portraits of Wittgenstein*, Vol. 2, (ed.) F. Flowers, Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
- Lewis, David, (1983): 'Scorekeeping in a Language Game' in *Philosophical Papers*, Vol. I, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lewis, H. D., (1965): *Philosophy of Religion*, Teach Yourself Books, The English Universities Press: London.
- Lewis, H. D., (1967): "History of the philosophy of Religion," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, New York: Macmillan, Vol. 6.
- Lewis, P. B., (ed.) (2017): *Wittgenstein, Aesthetics and Philosophy*, London: Routledge.
- Lindbeck, George A., (1984): *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age*, Philadelphia: The Westminster Press.
- Litwack, E. B., (2009): *Wittgenstein and Value: The Quest for Meaning*, Bloomsbury Publishing.

Lubac, Henri de, (1967): *The Mystery of the Supernatural* (second edition.), trans. R. Sheed, New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company.

Luckhardt, C. G., (ed.) (1996): *Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives*, Bristol: Thoemmes.

Lurie, Yuval, (1989): Wittgenstein on Culture and Civilization, *Inquiry*, Vol. 32 (4) (December, 1989).

Lycan, W. G., (2000): *Philosophy of Language*, Routledge: London and New York.

Lycan, W. G., (2001): *Philosophy of Language*, Routledge: London and New York.

M

Macintosh, H. R., (1940): *The Problem of Religious Knowledge*, New York: Harper and Brothers.

Mackie, J. L., (1982): *The Miracle of Theism*, Clarendon Press: Oxford.

Magee, Bryan, (1983): "Schopenhauer's influence on Wittgenstein", *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Malcolm, Norman, (1954): Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 63 (4) (October, 1954).

Malcolm, Norman, (1958): *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Malcolm, Norman, (1964): 'Is it a Religious Belief that "God Exists"?' in J. Hick (ed.), *Faith and the Philosophers*, London: Macmillan.

Malcolm, Norman, (1977): 'The Groundlessness of Belief', in Stuart C. Brown (ed.), *Reason and Religion*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Malcolm, Norman, (1986): *Nothing is Hidden*, Basil Blackwell: Oxford.

Malcolm, Norman, (1993): *Wittgenstein – A Religious Point of View?* (ed.) Peter winch, London: Routledge.

Malcolm, Norman, (1995): 'Wittgenstein and Idealism' in *Wittgensteinian Themes, Essays 1978-1989*, (ed.) G. H. von Wright, Cornell University Press.

Mandik, Pete, (2009): "Picturing, Showing and Solipsism in Wittgenstein's Tractatus" in Martin, Turelea, and George, Lazaroiu, (eds.) *Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy*, Bucharest, Romania.

Manhas, M. S., (2005): '*The Hindu Concept of Religion – A Scientific View*', B. R. Publishing Corporation: Delhi.

Martin, C. (ed.) (2018): *Language, Form(s) of Life, and Logic: Investigations after Wittgenstein*, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter.

Martinich, A. P., (ed.) (1985): *The Philosophy of Language*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Maslow, A., (2017): *A Study in Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, Forgotten Books.

Matar, A., (ed.) (2017): *Understanding Wittgenstein, Understanding Modernism*, London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Mathrani, G. N., (1991): *Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, Ajanta Publications.

Matin, C. B., (1989): *Religious Experience*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Matin, Craig, and McCutcheon, Russell T., with Smith, Leslie Dorrough, (eds.) (2012): *Religious Experience – A Reader*, Sheffield, Equinox Publishing Limited: U. K.

Mavrodes, George, (1970): *Belief in God: A Study in the Epistemology of Religion*, New York: Random House.

- Mavrodes, George, (ed.) (1970): *The Rationality of Belief in God*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- McDonough, Richard, (1994): 'A Note on Frege's and Russell's influence on Wittgenstein's Tractatus', *Russell*, Vol. 14, No. 3.
- McDowell, John, (1998): 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule' in *Mind, Value and Reality*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- McGinn, Colin, (1984): *Wittgenstein on Meaning*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- McGinn, Marie, (1984): *Wittgenstein on Meaning*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- McGinn, Marie, (1997): *Wittgenstein*, Routledge: London and New York.
- McGinn, Marie, (1997): *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations*, London: Routledge, Second revised edition, 2013.
- McGinn, Marie, (2009): *Elucidating the Tractatus*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McGinn, Marie, (2013): *The Routledge Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations*, London and New York: Routledge.
- McGuinness, B. F., (1966): "The Mysticism of the Tractatus", *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 75.
- McGuinness, Brian, (1979): 'Editor's Preface' in *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, (ed.) B. McGuinness, Oxford: Blackwell.
- McGuinness, Brian, (1988): *Wittgenstein, a Life: Young Ludwig (1889–1929)*, Pelican.
- McGuinness, Brian, (2002): *Approaches to Wittgenstein: Collected Papers*, London: Routledge.
- McGuinness, Brian, (2002): In the Shadow of Goethe: Wittgenstein's Intellectual Project, *European Review*, Vol. 10 (4) (October, 2002).

- McManus, D., (2010): *The Enchantment of Words: Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Oxford University Press: U. S. A.
- McNally, Thomas, (2017): *Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Language: The Legacy of the Philosophical Investigations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McPherson, Thomas, (1955): 'Religion as the Inexpressible' in A. G. N. Flew and A. MacIntyre (eds.), *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, London: SCM Press.
- Medina, Jose, (2002): *The Unity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy*, New York: State University of New York Press.
- Menger, Karl, (1999): 'Wittgenstein, Brouwer, and the Circle' in *Portraits of Wittgenstein*, Vol. 2, (ed.) F. Flowers, Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
- Merton, Thomas, (1963): *Life and Holiness*, Garden City, New York: Image Books.
- Mesel, B. D., & Kuusela, O., (eds.) (2019): *Ethics in the Wake of Wittgenstein*, Routledge: London.
- Mesel, B. D., (2020): *The Later Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy*, Springer.
- Mill, J. S., (1875): *Three Essays on Religion*, London: Longmans and Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
- Miller, Alexander, and Crispin, Wright, (eds.), (2002): *Rule-following and Meaning*, CITY: Acumen Publishing.
- Minar, Edward H., (1991): 'Wittgenstein and the "Contingency" of Community', *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 72 (3).
- Mitchell, Basil, (1981): *The Justification of Religious Belief*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Monk, Ray, (1990): *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius*, New York: Macmillan.
- Monk, Ray, (2001): 'Philosophical Biography: The Very Idea' in *Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy*, (ed.) J. Klagge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Moore, A. W., (2011): *The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Moore, G. E., (1959): 'A Defence of Common Sense' in *Philosophical Papers*, New York: Humanities Press.
- Moore, G. E., (1993): 'Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33' in *Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951*, (ed.) J. Klagge and A. Nordmann, Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Morris, Michael, (2008): *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Tractatus*, London: Routledge.
- Mounce, H. O., (1981): *Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Introduction*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle (ed.) (2004): *The Third Wittgenstein: The Post-Investigations Works*, London: Ashgate.
- Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle, and William, H. Brenner, (eds.) (2005): *Readings of Wittgenstein's On Certainty*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mulhall, S., (2008): *Wittgenstein's Private Language: Grammar, Nonsense, and Imagination in Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford University Press: U. S. A.
- Mulhall, S., (2016): *The Great Riddle: Wittgenstein and Nonsense, Theology and Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Muller, A., (1967): *Ontologie in Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, Bouvier, Bonn.
- Munz, V., Puhl, K., & Wang, J., (eds.) (2010): *Language and World 1: Essays on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag.
- Munz, Volker, (2010): 'The Whewell's Court Lectures: A Sketch of a Project' in *Wittgenstein after His Nachlass*, (ed.) N. Venturinha, Basingstoke: Plgrave Macmillan.

N

- Nedo, Michael, (ed.) (1993): *Ludwig Wittgenstein - Wiener Ausgabe, Einfuhrung/Introduction*, New York: Springer Verlag.
- Neuner, J., and Dupuis, J., (eds.) (2001): *The Christian faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church* (Seventh revised and enlarged edition.), New York: Alba House.
- Niele, Russell, (1987): *Wittgenstein: From Mysticism to Ordinary Language*, Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Nielsen, Kai, (1967): 'Wittgensteinian Fideism', *Philosophy*, Vol. 42.
- Nielsen, Kai, (1971): *Contemporary Critiques of Religion*, London: Macmillan.
- Nielsen, Kai, (1975-76): "Religion and the Appeal to Forms of Life", *Agora*, Vol. 3. (Winter/Spring, 1975-1976).
- Nielsen, Kai, (1982): *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, London: Macmillan.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich, (1973): *Beyond Good and Evil*, Pt. VI: 'We Scholars', trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Penguin Classics.
- Nordmann, A., (2005): *Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Introduction*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nozick, Robert, (1981): *Philosophical Explanations*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

O

O'Hear, Anthony, (1984): *Experience, Explanation and Faith: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Oldenquist, Andrew, (1971): "Wittgenstein on Phenomenalism, Skepticism and Criteria", *Essays on Wittgenstein*, (ed.) E. D. Klemke, Urbana, University of Illinois Press.

Ostrow, Matthew B., (2002): *Wittgenstein's Tractatus: A Dialectical Interpretation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

P

Pandey, K. C., (2008): *Perspectives on Wittgenstein's Unsayable*, New Delhi: Readworthy Publications.

Pandey, K. C., (ed.) (2008): *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Ethics and Religion*, Jaipur: Rawat Publications.

Pandey, K. C., (2012): *Religious Beliefs, Superstitions and Wittgenstein*, Readworthy Publications.

Parkinson, G. H. R., (1968): *The Theory of Meaning*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Paterson, Donald, (1990): *Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy*, New York: Harvester.

Patterson, Robert Leet, (1970): *The Philosophy of Religion*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Pears, David, (1971): *Wittgenstein*, London: Fontana/Collins.

Pears, David, (1972): "Wittgenstein's Treatment of Solipsism in the Tractatus", *Critica*, Vol. 6.

Pears, David, (1985): *Wittgenstein*, Fontana: London.

- Pears, David, (1987): *The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy*, Vol. 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Pears, David, (1988): *The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy*, Vol. 2, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Perloff, Marjorie, (1999): *Wittgenstein Ladder: Poetic Language and the Strangeness of the Ordinary*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Perrett, Roy, (ed.) (1989): *Indian Philosophy of Religion*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Peterman, James, (1992): *Philosophy as Therapy: An Interpretation and Defense of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophical Project*, Buffalo: SUNY Press.
- Peterson, Donald, (1990): *Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy: Three Sides of the Mirror*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Pettit, Philip, (1990): 'The Reality of Rule Following', *Mind*, No. 99.
- Phillips, D. Z., (1965): *The Concept of Prayer*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Phillips, D. Z., (ed.) (1967): 'Faith, Scepticism and Religious Understanding', in D. Z. Phillips (ed.), *Religion and Understanding*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Phillips, D. Z., (1970): *Death and Immortality*, London: Macmillan.
- Phillips, D. Z., (1970): *Faith and Philosophical Enquiry*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Phillips, D. Z., (1976): *Religion without Explanation*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Phillips, D. Z., (1977): *Religious Understanding*, London: Basil Blackwell.
- Phillips, D. Z., (1981): 'Belief, Change, and Forms of Life: The Confusions of Externalism and Internalism', in Frederick Crosson (ed.), *The Autonomy of Religious Belief*, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

- Phillips, D. Z., (1983): *Primitive Reasons and the Reasons of the Primitives*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Phillips, D. Z., (1986): *Belief, Change and Forms of Life*, Library of Philosophy and Religion, New York: Humanities Press.
- Phillips, D. Z., and Peter, Winch, (eds.) (1989): *Wittgenstein: Attention to Particulars*, Houndmills: Macmillan.
- Phillips, D. Z., (1993): 'On Really Believing' in Joseph Runzo (ed.), *Is God Real?* New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Phillips, D. Z., (1993): *Wittgenstein and Religion*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Phillips, D. Z., (2000): *Recovering Religious Concepts: Closing Epistemic Divides*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Phillips, D. Z., (2004): *Religion and Friendly Fire: Examining Assumptions in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Phillips, D. Z., (2008): "'God" and Grammar: An Introductory Invitation', in D. Z. Phillips (ed.), *Whose God? Which Tradition? The Nature of Belief in God*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Phillips, D. Z., (2008): 'Wittgenstein, Religion and "First Philosophy"', in D. Z. Phillips and Mario von der Ruhr (eds.), *Religion and the End of Metaphysics*, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Pichler, Alois, and Simo Säätelä (eds.) (2005): *Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and His Works*, Publications from the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen.
- Pinsent, David, (1990): *A Portrait of Wittgenstein as a Young Man: From the Diary of David Hume Pinsent*, (ed.) G. H. von Wright, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Pitcher, George, (1964): *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, London: Prentice Hall.

- Pitcher, George, (ed.) (1968): *Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations*, London: Macmillan.
- Pitkin, Hannah, (1972): *Wittgenstein and Justice: On the Significance of Ludwig Wittgenstein for Social and Political Thought*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Pole, David, (1958): *The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, University of London: Athlone Press.
- Pole, David, (2013): *Review of the Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein by Mauro Dillello*, Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Pradhan, R. C., (1981): *Language and Experience: An Interpretation in the Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, Anu Prakashan: Meerut.
- Pradhan, R. C., (2001): *Recent Developments in Analytic Philosophy*, New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.
- Pradhan, R. C., (ed.) (2001): *Philosophy of Wittgenstein: Indian Responses*, New Delhi: Decent Books.
- Putnam, Hilary, (1975): 'Is Semantics Possible?' in *Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 2, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Putnam, Hilary, (1975): 'The Meaning of "Meaning"' in *Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 2, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Putnam, Hilary, (1994): *Words and Life*, edited with an Introduction by James Conant, Harvard University Press.

Q

Quine, W. V., and J. Ullian, (1978): *The Web of Belief*, Second edition, New York: Random House.

R

Raleigh, T., and Cahill, M. K., (2018): *Wittgenstein and Naturalism*, London: Routledge.

Ramsey, F. P., (1923): Critical Notice: "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", *Mind*, Vol. 32 (128) (October, 1923).

Ramsey, F. P., (1973): Letters by F. P. Ramsey 1923-1924. In *Letters to C. K. Ogden, with Comments on the English Translation of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, (ed.) G. H. von Wright, Oxford: Blackwell.

Ramsey, Ian, (1957): *Religious Language*, SCM Press: London.

Ranade, R. D., (1933): *Mysticism in India*, Albany: State University of New York Press.

Read, R., & Lavery, M. A., (eds.) (2011): *Beyond the Tractatus Wars: The New Wittgenstein Debate*, London: Routledge.

Reck, Erich, (1997): 'Frege's Influence on Wittgenstein: Reversing Metaphysics via the Context Principle' in *Early Analytic Philosophy*, (ed.) W. Tait, Chicago and La Salle: Open Court.

Redpath, Theodore, (1990): *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Student's Memoir*, London: Duckworth.

Reid, Lynette, (1998): 'Wittgenstein's Ladder: The Tractatus and Nonsense', *Philosophical Investigations*, Vol. 21.

- Rhees, Rush, (1965): Some Developments in Wittgenstein's View of Ethics, *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 74 (1) (January, 1965).
- Rhees, Rush, (1969): 'What are Moral Statements Like?' in *Without Answers*, London: Routledge.
- Rhees, Rush, (1970): 'Some Developments in Wittgenstein's View of Ethics' in *Discussions of Wittgenstein*, London: Routledge.
- Rhees, Rush, (1970): 'Wittgenstein's View of Ethics' in *Discussion of Wittgenstein*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Rhees, Rush, (1974): 'Review of W. W. Bartley III, "Wittgenstein"' in *The Human World*, Vol. 14 (February, 1974).
- Rhees, Rush, (1982): 'Wittgenstein on Language and Ritual' in Brian McGuinness (ed.), *Wittgenstein and His Times*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Rhees, Rush, (1984): The Language of Sensedata and Private Experiences - I & II, Notes taken by Rush Rhees of Wittgenstein's Lectures, 1936, *Philosophical Investigations*, Vol. 7.
- Rhees, Rush, (1984): 'Editorial Notes' in *Recollections of Wittgenstein*, revised edition, (ed.) R. Rhees, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rhees, Rush, (2002): Five Topics in Conversations with Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Vol. 25 (1) (January, 2002).
- Rhees, Rush, (2003): *Wittgenstein's On Certainty, There – Like Our Life*, (ed.) Phillips, D. Z., Oxford: Blackwell.
- Richardson, J. T. A., (1976): "The Theory of Criteria", *The Grammar of Justification*, Sussex University Press: London.
- Richmond, James, (1980): 'Religion without Explanation: D. Z. Phillips and Theology', *Theology*, January 1980.

- Rogers, Brian, (2009): 'Wittgenstein's Philosophical Methods in *On Certainty*' in *Language and world: Papers of the 32nd International Wittgenstein Symposium*, (ed.) V. Munz, K. Puhl, and J. Wang. Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
- Rorty, Richard, (1968): *The Linguistic Turn*, Chicago University Press: Chicago.
- Rorty, Richard, (1991): 'Wittgenstein, Heidegger and the Reification of Language' in *Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rosch, Eleanor, and Carolyn, H. Mervis, (1975): Family Resemblance: Studies in the Internal Structure of Categories, *Cognitive Psychology*, Vol. 7.
- Rothhaupt, Josef, (2010): 'Wittgenstein at Work: Creation, Selection and Composition of "Remarks"' in *Wittgenstein after His Nachlass*, (ed.) N. Venturinha, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rowe, William, (1982): "Religious Experience and the Principle of Credulity" in *International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. 13.
- Ruhr, M. von der, & Phillips, D. Z., (eds.) (2017): *Religion and Wittgenstein's Legacy*, London: Routledge.
- Russell, Bertrand, (1912): *The Problems of Philosophy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Russell, Bertrand, (1958): *My Philosophical Development*, New York: Routledge, 1995.
- Russell, Bertrand, (1963): *Mysticism and Logic*, London: Unwin Books.
- Russell, C. A., (ed.) (1973): *Science and Religious Belief*, University of London Press: London.

S

Santianez, N., (2018): *Wittgenstein's Ethics and Modern Warfare*, Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

Sarkar, Dr. Priyambada, (2009): *Wittgenstein and Solipsism*, Progressive Publishers: Kolkata.

Savickey, Beth, (1999): *Wittgenstein's Art of Investigations*, London & New York: Routledge.

Schiller, F. C. S., (1924): *Problems of Belief*, London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Schmidt, William, (1931): *The Origin and Growth of Religion*, London: Methuen and Company.

Schroeder, Severin, (2007): 'The Tightrope Walker', *Ratio*, new series, Vol. 20. Reprinted in John Preston (ed.), *Wittgenstein and Reason*, Malden, MA.: Blackwell.

Schulte, Joachim, (1992): *Wittgenstein*, Albany, New York: SUNY Press.

Schulte, Joachim, (1993): *Experience and Expression: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schulte, Joachim, (2005): 'What is a Work by Wittgenstein?' in *Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and His Works*, (ed.) A. Pichler, and S. Saatela, Bergen, Norway: Working Papers of the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen, No. 17.

Schulte, Joachim, (2014): *Wittgenstein on Certainty and Doubt*, Acumen Publishing.

Scruton, Roger, (1981): *A Short History of Modern Philosophy from Descartes to Wittgenstein*, Routledge: London and New York.

Seabright, Paul, (1987): "Explaining Cultural Divergence: A Wittgensteinian Paradox" in *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 84, January 1987.

- Searle, J. R., (1969): *Speech Acts: An Essay in Philosophy of Language*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Searle, J. R., (ed.) (1971): *The Philosophy of Language*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sengupta, Santosh Chandra, (1978): *Logic of Religious Language*, Calcutta: Prajna.
- Shankar, Stuart, (1993): 'Wittgenstein versus Russell on the Analysis of Mind' in *Russell and Analytic Philosophy*, (ed.) A. Irvine, and G. Wedeking, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Shanker, S. G., (ed.) (1986): *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments*, Vols. 1-5, Beckenham: Croom Helm.
- Sherry, Patrick, (1972): "Is Religion a Form of Life?" in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 9, April 1972.
- Sherry, Patrick, (1977): *Religion, Truth and Language-Games*, London: Macmillan Press.
- Sherry, P. J., (1972): Is Religion a Form of Life? in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 2.
- Sluga, Hans D., and David, G. Stern, (eds.) (1996): *The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smart, H. R., (1957): Language Game, *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 7.
- Smith, Norman Kemp, (1967): 'Is Divine Existence Credible?' in D. Z. Phillips (ed.), *Religion and Understanding*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Smith, Wilfred Cantwell, (1962): *The Meaning and End of Religion*, New York: Harper & Row and London: Sheldon Press.
- Smith, Wilfred Cantwell, (1967): *Questions of Religious Truth*, London: Victor Gollancz Ltd.

- Spengler, Oswald, (1926-1928): *The Decline of the West*, Vols. 1 & 2, trans. C. F. Atkinson, New York: A. Knopf, 1926-1928.
- Stace, Walter, (1960): *Mysticism and Philosophy*, London: The Macmillan Press.
- Stadler, Friedrich, (2001): *The Vienna Circle: Studies in the Origins, Development and Influence of Logical Empiricism*, trans. C. Nielsen, New York: Springer.
- Stenius, Erik, (1960): *Wittgenstein's Tractatus: A Critical Exposition of Its Main Lines of Thought*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Stern, A., (2019): *The Fall of Language*, Harvard University Press.
- Stern, David, (2004): *Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: An Introduction*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Stern, David, (2005): 'How Many Wittgensteins?' in *Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and His Works*, (ed.) A. Pichler, and S. Saatela, Bergen, Norway: Working Papers of the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen, No. 17.
- Stern, D. G., Citron, G., & Rogers, B., (2016): *Moore's Notes on Wittgenstein's Lectures*, Cambridge University Press.
- Sterrett, Susan, (2005): *Wittgenstein Flies a Kite: A Story of Wings and Models of the World*, London: Penguin Books (Pi Press).
- Stokhof, Martin, (2002): *World and Life as One, Ethics and Ontology in Wittgenstein's Early Thought*, California: Stanford University Press.
- Stroll, Avrum, (2002): *Wittgenstein*, Oxford: One World Press.
- Sullivan, Peter, and Michael, Potter, (eds.) (2013): *Wittgenstein's Tractatus: History and Interpretation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sutherland, Stewart R., (1984): *God, Jesus and Belief*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Swinburne, Richard, (1979): *The Existence of God*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Szabados, B., (2009): *Ludwig Wittgenstein on Race Gender and Cultural Identity: Philosophy as a Personal Endeavor*, Edwin Mellor Press: New York.

T

Taliaferro, Charles, (1998): *Contemporary Philosophy of Religion*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Teichmann, R., (ed.) (2018): *Wittgenstein on Thought and Will*, London: Routledge.

Tejedor, C., (2015): *The Early Wittgenstein on Metaphysics, Natural Science, Language and Value*, London: Routledge.

Thomas, Emyr Vaughan, (2001): *Wittgensteinian Values: Philosophy, Religious Beliefs and Descriptivist Methodology*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Tilghman, B. R., (1991): *Wittgenstein, Ethics and Aesthetics: The View from Eternity*, Albany: State University of New York Press.

Tilley, Terrence, W., (2000): 'The Philosophy of Religion and the Concept of Religion: D. Z. Phillips on Religion and Superstition' in *The Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, Vol. 68.

Tolstoy, Leo, (1997): *The Gospel in Brief*, (ed.) F. Flowers, trans. I. Hapgood, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Toulmin, Stephen, (1953/1960): *The Philosophy of Science: An Introduction*, New York: Harper, 1953/1960.

Toynton, Evelyn, (1997): 'The Wittgenstein Controversy', *Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1997.

Trakakis, Nick, (2008): *The End of Philosophy of Religion*, London: Continuum Publishing.

Travis, Charles, (1989): *The Uses of Sense: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Trigg, Roger, (1973): *Reason and Commitment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tweyman, Stanley, (1996): *Hume on Miracles*, England: Thoemmes Press.

Tyler, Peter, (2011): *The Return to the Mystical: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Teresa of Avila and the Christian Mystical Tradition*, London: Continuum Publishing.

V

Vesey, G., (ed.) (1974): *Understanding Wittgenstein*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Von Wright, George Henrik, (1982): 'Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Biographical Sketch' in *Wittgenstein*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Von Wright, George Henrik, (1982): 'The Origin and Composition of the Philosophical Investigations' in *Wittgenstein*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Von Wright, George Henrik, (1982): 'Wittgenstein in Relation to His Times' in *Wittgenstein*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

W

Waismann, Friedrich, (1965): *The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy*, (ed.) R. Harre, trans. Margaret, Paul, New York: St. Martin's Press.

Waismann, Friedrich, (1979): *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, (ed.) B. McGuinness, trans. J. Schulte, and B. McGuinness, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

- Ware, Ben, (2015): *Dialectic of the Ladder: Wittgenstein, the 'Tractatus' and Modernism*, London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Wedberg, A., (1984): *A History of Philosophy (Vol. 3), From Bolzano to Wittgenstein*, Clarendon Press: Oxford.
- Werhane, P. H., (1992): *Skepticism, Rules and Private Language*, Humanities Press.
- Whitehead, A. N., (1930): *Religion in the Making*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Whiting, D., (ed.) (2010): *The Later Wittgenstein on Language*, Palgrave MacMillan.
- Williams, Bernard, (1974): 'Wittgenstein and Idealism' in *Understanding Wittgenstein*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wilson, S., (2018): *New Critical Thinking: What Wittgenstein Offered*, Lexington Books.
- Winch, Peter, (ed.) (1969): *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.
- Winch, Peter, (1972): 'Can a Good Man Be Harmed?' in *Ethics and Action*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.
- Winch, Peter, (1972): 'Ethical Reward and Punishment' in *Ethics and Action*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.
- Winch, Peter, (1972): 'Understanding a Primitive Society' in *Ethics and Action*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.
- Winch, Peter, (1972): 'Wittgenstein's Treatment of the Will' in *Ethics and Action*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.
- Winch, Peter, (1977): 'Meaning and Religious Language' in Stuart C. Brown (ed.), *Reason and Religion*, Ethaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Winch, Peter, (1987): *Trying to Make Sense*, Oxford: Blackwell.

- Winzeler, Robert L., (2008): *Anthropology and Religion: What We Know, Think and Question*, Plymouth: AltaMira Press.
- Wisdom, J., (1953): 'Gods' in *Philosophy and Psychoanalysis*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Wisnewski, J. J., (2007): *Wittgenstein and Ethical Inquiry*, Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Wittgenstein, Hermine, (1984): 'My Brother Ludwig' in *Recollections of Wittgenstein*, revised edition, (ed.) R. Rhees, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1922): *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. C. K. Ogden, and F. P. Ramsey, London: Kegan Paul.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1922): *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears, and B. F. McGuinness, London: Routledge.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1958): *Philosophical Investigations*, (ed.) G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Macmillan Publishing Cos.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1958): *The Blue and Brown Books*, (ed.) R. Rhees, New York: Harper and Row.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1961): *Notebooks 1914-1916*, (ed.) G. H. von Wright, and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1963): *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1965): 'Lecture on Ethics' in *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 74, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1967): *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, (ed.) C. Barrett, University of California Press.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1967): *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein: With a Memoir by Paul Engelmann*, (ed.) B. F. McGuinness, Oxford: Basil Blackwell and Mott.

- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1969): *Philosophical Grammar*, (ed.) R. Rhees, trans. Anthony, Kenny, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1969): *On Certainty*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1969): *The Blue and Brown Books*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Second Edition.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1970): *Zettel*, (ed.) G. E. M. Anscombe, and G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, University of California Press.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1971): 'Remarks on Frazer's "Golden Bough"' in *The Human World*, Vol. 3, No. 2.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1972): *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, (ed.) C. Barrett, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1973): *Letters to C. K. Ogden*, with Comments on the English translation of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, (ed.) G. H. von Wright, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1974): *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears, & B. F. McGuinness, Atlantic Highlands, New York: Humanities Press.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1975): *Philosophical Remarks*, (ed.) R. Rhees, trans. R. Hargreaves, and R. White, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1979): 'Notes on Logic' in *Notebooks: 1914-1916*, Second edition. (ed.) G. H. von Wright, and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1979): *Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 1932-1935*. From the notes of Alice Ambrose and Margaret MacDonald, (ed.) Alice Ambrose, Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1979): *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by Fredrich Waismann*, trans. Joachim, Schulte, and Brian, McGuinness, New York: Barnes and Noble.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1980): *Culture and Value*, (ed.) G. H. von Wright, trans. P. Winch, University of Chicago Press.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1980): *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Vol. 1, (ed.) G. E. M. Anscombe, and G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1980): *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Vol. 2, (ed.) G. H. von Wright, and H. Nyman, trans. C. G. Luckhardt, and M. Aue, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1980): *Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 1930-1932*. (ed.) Desmond, Lee, Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1982): *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Vol. 1, (ed.) G. H. von Wright, and H. Nyman, trans. C. G. Luckhardt, and M. Aue, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1983): *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, (ed.) G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Cambridge: MIT Press.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1989): *Wittgenstein's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology: 1946-1947*, (ed.) P. Geach, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1992): *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology: The Inner and the Outer*, Vol. 2, (ed.) G. H. von Wright, and H. Nyman, trans. C. G. Luckhardt, and M. Aue, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1993): 'A Lecture on Ethics' in *Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951*, (ed.) J. Klagge, and A. Nordmann, Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1993): 'Lectures on Freedom of the Will' in *Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951*, (ed.) J. Klagge, and A. Nordmann, Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1993): 'Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Georg Henrik von Wright' in *Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951*, (ed.) J. Klagge, and A. Nordmann, Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1993): 'Notes for the "Philosophical Lecture"' in *Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951*, (ed.) J. Klagge, and A. Nordmann, Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1993): 'Remarks on Frazer's *Golden Bough*' in *Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951*, (ed.) J. Klagge, and A. Nordmann, Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1993): 'The Language of Sense data and Private Experience' in *Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951*, (ed.) J. Klagge, and A. Nordmann, Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1998): *Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, trans. D. Kolak, Mountain View, CA: Mayfield.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (2003): 'Discussions between Wittgenstein, Waddington, and Thouless: Summer, 1941' in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Public and Private Occasions*, (ed.) J. Klagge, and A. Nordmann, Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, and Friedrich, Waismann, (2003): *The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle*, (ed.) G. Baker, trans. G. Baker et al. New York: Routledge.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (2005): *The Big Typescript, TS*, Vol. 213, (ed.) and trans. C. G. Luckhardt, and M. Aue, Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (2008): *Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents, 1911-1951*. (ed.) B. McGuinness, Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (2009): *Philosophical Investigations*, revised fourth edition. (ed.) P. Hacker, and J. Schulte, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. Hacker, and J. Schulte, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (2009): 'Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment' in *Philosophical Investigations*. revised fourth edition, (ed.) P. Hacker, and J. Schulte, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. Hacker, and J. Schulte, Oxford: Blackwell.

Wohlstetter, Albert, (1936): The Structure of the proposition and the Fact, *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 3 (2) (April, 1936).

Woods, Richard O. P., (1980): *Understanding Mysticism*, New York: Image Books.

Z

Zalabardo, J. L., (2012): *Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy – review by Derek McDougall and by Daniele Mezzadri*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zalabardo, J. L., (2019): *Representation and Reality in Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, Oxford University Press: Oxford.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PUBLICATIONS

Philosophical Papers

JOURNAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY



ENLIGHTENMENT TO PERFECTION

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
SAP, (DRS-III) of UGC

University of North Bengal
Accredited by NAAC with Grade A

**PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS:
JOURNAL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY**

ISSN: - 0976 - 4496

Volume-XIII

March-2017



ENLIGHTENMENT TO PERFECTION

**DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
SAP, (DRS-III) OF UGC
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL
(ACCREDITED 'A' GRADE BY NAAC)
P.O.-NBU, (SILIGURI), DIST.-DARJEELING
WEST BENGAL- 734013, INDIA**

CONTENTS

Ranjana Mukherjee :	Ethical Theory and Ordinary Moral Practice	... 1
Kalyan Kumar Bagchi:	On Interpreting Radhakrishnan, the Interpreter Today	...6
Ashok Madak:	Rajiv Malhotra: A Unique Exponent of the Hindu Worldview...	11
Rakesh Chandra:	Some Reflections on Tenability of Pluralism, Transformation and Trivialization of Religions	...26
Raghunath Ghosh:	The Concept of Matter: a Physics-Philosophy Interphase	...36
Kantilal Das :	Wittgenstein on Philosophy of Silence	... 45
Jyotsna Saha:	Some Reflections on the Meaning of Life:	...58
Balaganapathi Devarakonda:	Role of <i>Guru</i> as an Interpreter of <i>Dharma</i>	... 65
Nirmal Kumar Roy:	Value Education as a Means to Resolve Social Crisis	...74
Amal Kumar Harh:	The Concept of Woman in Indian and Western Tradition	...81
Samar Kumar Mondal:	Aristotle and Kautilya on the Concept of Good Governance and Welfare State	...90
Anirban Mukherjee:	Aspect Perception as a Case of Interpretation	...99
Laxmikanta Padhi:	Bipinchandra's Thought on Hinduism, Tradition and Modernity	...108
Varbi Roy:	Gandhian Perspective of Conflict Resolution	...118
Mamata Kundu :	Sister Nivedita: a Dedicated Soul of Creative Culture	...123
Mukul S. K.:	Anita Desai's Voices in the City: a Discourse of the Postcolonial Modernity	...132
Alok Kumar Khatua:	Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on the Problem of Universals	...143
Reshmee Sarkar:	Fregean Reflection on Thought	...155
Sandipa Ghosh:	Ethical Philosophy of the <i>Gūā</i>	...164
Priyanka Basak and:	Transcending the Concept of Morality from Human to the Post-human	...174
Debika Saha	Indian Perspective of the Philosophy of Voluntary Service	...187
Purnima Das:	Kant's Moral Philosophy: Aims, Methods and Some Core Concepts	...192
Debika Saha	Wittgenstein on Religion and Meaning of Life	...199
Anup Deka:	Ambedkar's Postmodern Vision	...209
Rakhi Debnath and:		
Debika Saha		
Our Contributors		
Notes to the Contributors		
Our Publications		

WITTGENSTEIN ON RELIGION AND MEANING OF LIFE*

ANUP DEKA

Wittgenstein's interpretation of religion opens up a new dimension in philosophy of religion in modern times. He offers us a *non-God based religion*. He understands and interprets religion within *the realm of language*, more specifically, within the sphere of religious language. In his early writings, Wittgenstein has claimed that religion *cannot be put into words or language*. Accordingly, religious statements are mystical and nonsensical. However, in his later writings, Wittgenstein acknowledges religious language as *a form of life or as a language-game*. However, his interpretation about religion remains the same because like his early interpretation, Wittgenstein in his later interpretation does not believe in the existence of God. In this regard, Wittgenstein was influenced by logical positivism. For logical positivism, religious assertions are meaningless and for Wittgenstein, religious assertions are nonsensical. They are nonsensical in the sense that they lack factual sense. Wittgenstein called them important nonsense. However, at the end of his philosophical carrier, Wittgenstein conceives religion with regard to culture and value. Like many other, he asserts that religion is culture. The religion of a community reflects the culture of that community in the real sense of the term. Thus, in a sense the value of life and the value of the world are determined by religion. Religious feeling is a sort of mental feeling through which one can reveal his deep association with God. This feeling gives him comfort and safety. In order to unearth the meaning of life, one has to be a part of religion. Thus, in a sense, religion determines the meaning of life.

Religion determines *the value of the world*. *The value of the world is at par with the meaning of life*. When Wittgenstein in his *TLP* asserted that ethics, religion, aesthetics are nonsense, he did not want to say that they are plain nonsense; rather he wants to say that they are nonsense because they lack factual sense. However, they have sense in other context. They help us to determine the meaning of life; they help us to determine the value of the world. They help us to have a sense of God. Wittgenstein does not believe the existence of God, but he acknowledges that one can

* I am obliged to my supervisor Prof. Kanti Lal Das for his kind guidance for this contribution.

have a sense of God without preconceiving its existence. To think of God is to have a better sense or feeling. One can reveal himself safe while thinking or feeling of God.

For Wittgenstein, culture and value are no longer associated with propositional value he has anticipated in his *TLP*. For Wittgenstein, the sense of the proposition is no way associated with the sense of the world. The sense of the world or the value of the world is higher than the sense of the proposition. Anything higher cannot be comprehended by means of anything lower. Therefore, the sense of the proposition cannot reach up to that. Wittgenstein in his *Culture and Value*¹ thus outlines the relevance of religion with regard to the twin concepts, namely, *culture* and *value*. In this regard, Wittgenstein intends to say that religion is in another sense culture. Or alternatively, it can be said that the culture of a community is reflected through religion. It is associated with *the meaning of life*. The meaning of life is made possible through the association of the value of the world. One can have a sense of the value of the world just by way of revealing the feeling of God. Thus for Wittgenstein, to think of culture and value through religion helps one to reveal his association with God. This sort of religious feeling makes him safe and comfortable. Thus in a sense, religious safety would be treated as absolute safety. The meaning of life cannot be determined without ensuring absolute safety of life.

This position of Wittgenstein is metaphysical in nature. Here we have to engage in self-reflection upon our reactions to the rituals and upon activities within our lives. Here we need to engage in self-reflection of our own which would be profoundly ethical and having religious implications. It would be "a sort of religious experience or feeling where we find ourselves *absolutely safe*."² It would be a stage where the answer to the question cannot be formulated. It means to say that there is something wrong with the question. It is an attempt to get something said that can only be shown. Here Winch takes Wittgenstein's pronouncement of *the feeling of absolute safety* to be one exemplification of 'the ethico-religious idea'. In certain places, it exhibits a depth of self-exploration on Wittgenstein's part comparable to that of many of the manuscript notes that came to be published in his *Culture and*

¹ Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, trans. Peter Winch, University of Chicago Press, 1977.

² Wittgenstein, *A Lecture on Ethics*, op. cit., p.8.

Value. In our sense, the statement concerning absolutely safety is one of the few instances of what Wittgenstein identifies as expressions or judgments of 'absolute value'. While scrutinizing the statements of 'absolute value', Wittgenstein reveals them to be nonsensical in the light of the contemplation of meaningfulness to which he was still in thrall in the time of the lecture. Many would say that Wittgenstein's remark about absolute safety need be allied to a notion of virtuousness as a guarantor of safety in the way that he remarks from Socrates and Kierkegaard. However, we think that unlike the latter, Wittgenstein's remark seems better understood as gesturing towards a standpoint beyond what we ordinarily recognize as virtue and vice altogether, a philosophical standpoint which may be characterized by Wittgenstein in his *TLP* as *mystical*. Thus, we reveal a tendency in the human mind concerning the feeling of absolute safety. In this regard, Wittgenstein says, "We all know what it means in ordinary life to be safe. I am safe in my room, when I cannot be run over by an omnibus. I am safe if I have had whooping cough and cannot therefore get it again. To be safe essentially means that it is physically impossible that certain things should happen to me and therefore it's nonsense to say that I am safe whatever happens ... this is a misuse of the word 'safe.'³ Thus it seems clear that by the term 'safe', Wittgenstein does not mean *physical safe* or someone is safe physically, rather he intends to say *a tendency in the human mind*.

When Wittgenstein describes that what he has said as nonsense, it does not follow that he means there is no point in saying it. Rather what he seems to be getting at is that the words with which he has tried to characterize a certain experience cannot be given what he might want to call it a factual sense. That means they do not express a proposition. He took semantics approach in his early part of his *TLP* where he vehemently claimed that all meaningful utterances must express propositions, which in turn, correspond to facts. Thus, one should be aware that Wittgenstein was inclined to label as nonsense any use of language other than a description of such facts. However, we have seen in his *PI*, where Wittgenstein was to change his mind about this. Here he dispense with his notion of the general form of a proposition in favor of their being innumerable forms or uses of language, with no essential structure. We

³ Wittgenstein, *A Lecture on Ethics*, op. cit., p.9.

have to understand his talk of absolute safety within the context of religious allegory and to classify all such uses of language as ultimately nonsense. Here an attempt has been made to transcend language and the world by *means of language*. For Wittgenstein, they involve in running 'against the boundaries of language, against the walls of our cage; and this, though a natural and respectable human tendency, is perfectly and absolutely nonsense.⁴

We thus think that religious allegories are not instances of nonsense, but as pictures that have a particular use, and hence a sense, within a believer's life. The fact is that such pictures are not propositions devoid of evaluative content. They do not express or describe neutral states of affair in the world. However, this is not the reason for designating them nonsense, rather was merely a reason for denying that there is any point in trying to translate them into non-evaluative. A religious utterance, or an ethical or aesthetic one, can have a point and a use, and hence a sense differs from factual sense, irrespective of whether it expresses anything that the earlier Wittgenstein would have wanted to call a 'fact'. Thus, if Wittgenstein is able to have a sense in *ethico-religious uses of language*, then there seems no obvious reason for being deferred from seeking sense in an *ethico-religious* utterance articulated by Wittgenstein. We think that when Wittgenstein announces his religious feeling of absolute safety, he too is drawing a connection between invulnerability and virtuousness and in fact, unlike Socrates and Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein does not explicitly draw a connection between *safety and virtue*.

Thus, by calling for absolute safety, Wittgenstein has a different experience altogether. In this regard, Winch quotes Wittgenstein, "I will mention another experience straight away which I also know and which others of you might be acquainted with: it is, what one might call, the experience of feeling absolutely safe. I mean the state of mind in which one is inclined to say 'I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens.'⁵ Here Wittgenstein has described his experience of religious allegory, namely, the experience of wondering at the world's existence, what people were referring to when they said that God had created the world and of the existence

⁴ Wittgenstein, *A Lecture on Ethics*, p.12

⁵ *Ibid.*, p.8.

of absolute safety. He says that it has been described by saying that we feel safe in the hands of God. He also added a 'third experience' of guilty feeling. Guilty feeling cannot be approved by God. Thus, in the case of feeling of absolute safety, Wittgenstein is alluding to something wholly unconditional. In this sense, it can be said after Wittgenstein that the feeling of absolute safe is deeply associated with the absolute value that would preserve one's upstanding moral character until the end of his life. Thus, if we take seriously Wittgenstein's use of the term 'absolutely safe' here we should reject the assumption that absolute safety, in Wittgenstein's sense, is based on moral character. Wittgenstein then said that the feeling of absolute safety can be expressed as the feeling that we are safe in the hands of God. To feel safe in the hands of God is to acknowledge that the ultimate power over life and death rests not in one's own hands, but in those of supreme deity. It is to believe in the goodness of creation, where 'goodness' is used not in a relative but in an absolute sense. The feeling at issue here is not a denial of the presence of pain and suffering of the world, but recognition that there is a perspective from where everything without exception, is all right. More succinctly, it would be a sort of feeling that we are all loved.

According to Christ, this world is itself good. There are owes we suffer are as much an expression of God's love as are our joys. God's love for his creation redeems us all. Commenting on this viewpoint as a possible response to the question of why we must undergo the suffering that comes to us as a consequence of natural events, Roy Holland said, "It is not possible for [such suffering] to be seen as God's love. I offer this neither as the answer nor as my answer to the question but cite it as a perspective: one which is not accessible to many but one from which it is possible for suffering to be seen, possible because it has been seen that way, by Julian of Norwich for instance..."⁶ If all shall be well with the world as a whole, by a kind of divine necessity, then it seems to follow that all must be well with oneself, no matter what happens. It must include the condition of one's own moral character among everything else. Everything would be a manifestation of God's love. Wittgenstein says, "What is good is also divine. Queer as it sounds, that sums up my ethics. Only

⁶ Holland, 'On the Form of "The Problem of Evil"', in *Against Empiricism*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980, p.241.

something supernatural can express the Supernatural".⁷ Accordingly, you cannot lead people to what is good, "you can only lead them to some place or other. The good is outside the space of facts."⁸ The earlier culture will become a heap of rubble and finally a heap of ashes, but spirits will hover the ashes. Wittgenstein continues that the difference between a good and a poor architect is that 'the poor architect succumbs to every temptation and the good one resist it.'⁹ People now seeking religious epistemology, religious justification, attempting to develop philosophical theories about religious matters, but it should be kept in mind that there was a time when people lead a good life with the help of religion when there was no question raised for its justification. In this regard Wittgenstein remarks, "If there were a 'solution' to the problem of logic (philosophy) we should only need to caution ourselves that there was a time when they had not been solved (and even at that time people must have known how to live and think)".¹⁰

It would then be treated as *ethical monism* according to which the benevolence of the universe as a whole outstrips the categories of good and evil as used in most everyday ethical discourse. According to Wittgenstein, the goodness of the whole is *paradigmatically mystical one* - none of us can be harmed, irrespective of any features of our character that may be construed as moral flaws from the relative perspective of everyday morality. While reflecting on this issue, McGuinness asserts that "in mysticism the right feeling about the existence of the world (which is the same as to say: about the ultimate nature of reality) leads to an acceptance of the sort of world that there is, so that we cease to ask what the purpose of life or of the world is."¹¹ Citing various texts of Wittgenstein, McGuinness related the experience of feeling absolutely safe. For him, the happy man of the *Notebooks* and the *Tractatus* would need to have the attitude of one with this experience. He would have to feel perfectly content, comparatively free from fear and anxiety of all the misery of this world. "To be indifferent to the facts, to live without fear or hope involves feeling

⁷ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Culture and Value*, translated by Peter Winch, The University of Chicago Press, 1977, p.3e.

⁸ *Ibid.* p.3e.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 3e.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 4e.

¹¹ McGuinness, "The Mysticism of the Tractatus", *Philosophical Review*, 75, 1966, p.315.

safe whatever happens.”¹² If the life as a whole is virtuous, then the life and hence the person, cannot suffer moral harm. In such a case Wittgenstein’s inclination to say “I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens” The other points that needs to be taken care of at this point is that Wittgenstein unlike Socrates and Kierkegaard, is not associating absolute safety with integrity of moral character, rather than associating the feeling of safety with an understanding of oneself as innocent and virtuous, Wittgenstein associates it with the feeling that one is in the hands of God. For Wittgenstein, God is with one and that God’s miraculous creation is to be accepted as *an absolute one*. Of course, it always remains possible that one who has the feeling of absolute safety may lose it. The feeling of absolute safety may not be enduring. However, it would not invalidate the claim that one is absolutely safe. The question of whether one agrees with a statement such as, ‘I feel absolutely safe irrespective of what happens’ is a matter of one’s own religious experience and conviction. It is a matter of the sort of life one is living and is prepared to aspire to. Whether the statement can have sense is irrelevant here. Rather the statement under consideration expresses *an attitude towards life and the world*. It expresses an attitude towards God that is both intelligible and spiritually profound. In expressing this attitude, Wittgenstein is not merely contemplating a religious form of life, *but inhabiting it, exploring it, ‘from the outside’*. Here he is occupying the role of one who sees the world in a particular way - who has a feeling that one might characterize as religious *awe and reverence*. His role here is to play and act as an ‘honest religious thinker’ who reflects upon the role of that religious feeling. This is how one finds himself *absolutely safe and secure* in religion.

Call for honest religious thinking

We thus claim that only an honest religious thinker can find himself safe and secure in religion. Only through honest religious thinking one can become an honest religious thinker. An honest religious thinker can be able to determine the meaning of life; can be able to perceive the real meaning of life. One cannot become an honest religious thinker without sound moral precept. Therefore we need an honest religious thinker. The possibility of honest religious thinking matters the most *to lead a safe*

¹² *Ibid.*, p327.

and secure life. The image of the situation of becoming an honest religious thinker would be reflected in the writings of Tolstoy: "...there is a pillar at my head and the solidity of this slender pillar is beyond doubt, although there is nothing for it to stand on. A rope is hanging very ingeniously, yet simply, from the pillar, and if one lies with the middle of one's body on the rope and looks up there can be no question of falling. This was all clear to me and I was glad and tranquil. It was as if someone were saying to me: 'See that you remember.' And I wake up."¹³ It indicates that religious belief really is a matter of *wishful thinking*. Alternatively, following cynical readers we can say that the absence of any basis for faith is precisely what *the believer is not ignoring*. By looking upwards to heaven, faith is acknowledged to be *an aspiration of love, hope and trust*. For the Christian, this will be *love, hope and trust directed towards God*. By acknowledging this, the believer recognizes that faith is not built on foundations of earth, and hence that looking downwards will never provide the support that is required for faith. According to Thomas, 'the height of wisdom is to set your face towards heaven by despising the world'.¹⁴ The same has been reflected in Wittgenstein as well. Wittgenstein has said that religious faith conceives as *a kind of suspension from above*.

While referring to Christ, Wittgenstein writes of religious belief as a holding fast to redemption, to redeeming love. This can be made possible, Wittgenstein reveals *if you no longer support yourself on this earth but suspend yourself from heaven*. In such a case, everything would be different and there would be no wonder. If you can do, then do what now you cannot do. Wittgenstein remarks, "It is true that someone who is suspended looks like someone who is standing but the interplay of forces within him is nevertheless a quite different one & hence he is able to do quite different things than one who stands."¹⁵ Wittgenstein elsewhere describes 'the honest religious thinker' as being 'like a tightrope walker' upon which the walker stands, the Grund, "is the slenderest imaginable. And yet it really is possible to walk on it."¹⁶

¹³ Tolstoy, *A Confession in A Confession and Other Religious Writings*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987, p79.

¹⁴ Thomas, *The Imitation of Christ*, translated by Ronald Knox and Michael Oakley, London: Burns & Oates, 1959, pp.17-18.

¹⁵ Wittgenstein, Ludwig., *Culture and Value*, op. cit. p.39e.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.84e.

We think that through the image of the tightrope walker, Wittgenstein is depicting the *honest religious thinker*, someone who, while attending the needs of the heart and soul, does not neglect the pull of rational reflection. This actually creates a tension among the religious thinkers. In this regard Wittgenstein reveals that one way of seeing the image would be as embodying an ongoing tension in the life of one who strives to reconcile the passion of faith with the intellecter's desire for grounds or reason other than those of the heart - reasons which might take the form of empirical or theoretical evidence. Wittgenstein was alert of this tension and that is why he strictly adheres towards maintaining religious belief alongside honest self-critical awareness that would lend depth to many of his observations on religious matters. That means the value of religious matters actually hinges on honest religious thinking and it is the most important task of religious thinkers to find out the possibility of honest religious thinking. Wittgenstein with the influence of Tolstoy and Kierkegaard claimed that religious belief should not be conflated with other kinds of belief, especially of a scientific kind because they have different spheres. The tightrope walker feels the ever-present temptation to turn religion into a matter of metaphysical speculation.

The question then is: whether such religious tension can be solved or it would remain unsolved? Schroeder remarks that the tension embodied by Wittgenstein's tightrope walker is psychologically impossible. He doubts that it is possible to hold reason in abeyance in the way that the image suggests - to hold that a religious belief is not likely to be true. In this regard, Schroeder maintains that there is *an unresolved tension in Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion*.¹⁷ We think that the image of the tightrope walker does suggest a tension that has been personified in the honest religious thinker as something impossible. According to Schroeder, a putative honest religious thinker is impossibility and therefore Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion has in internal tension. Therefore, it is necessary to bring out the genuine life in Wittgenstein's contemplations on religion to show where Schroeder's contention is liable to lead us astray.

¹⁷ Schroeder, S., 'The Tightrope Walker', *Ratio*, New Series, 20, 2007, p.442.

On the basis of the above observation, we conclude by saying that in religion culture and value play an all important role to determine the meaning of life. For Wittgenstein, language is culture and the cultural aspect of language determines the meaning of life and also determines the value of life. In this regard, the religious person must be an honest religious thinker. An honest religious thinker must be morally and ethically sound. As a result of that an honest religious thinker always reveals himself safe and secure in religion. Of course, the disappearance of a culture does not signify the disappearance of human value, but simply of certain means of expressing this value. Wittgenstein does not have any sympathy for current European civilization. For Wittgenstein, the current European civilization appears as a threat to culture. Wittgenstein foresees cultural decline within European civilization. Wittgenstein's culture and value give us an insight into his moral intensity and integrity towards determining and weighing the meaning of life. Here he wants to experience the intellectual thrill of thinking in a new and illuminating way. In this regard, Wittgenstein asserts that within the paradigm of culture and value, a religious man always tries to become an honest religious thinker. For that one has to stay within the religious sphere and one has to struggle for it. He has to believe that God is judging him out of his own mouth and he has to bow down his knee before God. This is how can reveal himself safe and secure in life.