Chapter Four

Concluding Remarks

I think Wittgenstein's interpretation of religion as a form of life opens up a new dimension of religion. His position about religion is broadly relevant into two different perspectives. First, he deviates from the classical concept of religion based on the thinking process and thereby introduces a new form of religion based on the analysis of language. Secondly, unlike the previous traditions, he conceives religion at par with the grammar of the language. For Wittgenstein, the foundation of religion is embedded in the grammar of the language. This position of Wittgenstein creates a new dimension of religion. The religion, Wittgenstein invokes, is nameless. He finds religious experience through language. In this regard, he asserts that religion differs from the philosophy of religion. While talking about religion, Wittgenstein rules out the possibility of the philosophy of religion. The main contention of the philosophy of religion is to develop religious theories, religious doctrines. He does not think that religion is a process of thinking. He completely boils down to intellectualism or cognitive account in religion. He vehemently claims that religion is neither a theory nor a doctrine but *a form of life*. Religion is an activity having no end. As he understands religion concerning language, his perception about religion varies in different writings.

This thesis begins with religious inexpressibility concerning his early writings in general and his *TLP* in particular. In his *TLP*, Wittgenstein developed formalistic language. He did it because he had a different philosophical program. Here he understood language about propositional language and reality as the totality of facts. He then asserted that the limits of language determine the limits of the world. Within

the limits of the world, everything can be put into language and what can be put into language would be either true or false. Everything that can be put into language would be treated as a proposition. Every proposition has two senses according to Wittgenstein. Either the proposition expresses something in the form of 'to be the case' or in the form of 'not to be the case'. Thus, whatever can be put into language would be expressible. The facts of the world are expressible in language. Whatever is expressible would be meaningful. Whatever is meaningful must be either true or false. Thus in the *TLP,* Wittgenstein attempted to picture the world (reality) meaningfully. The question of meaningfulness as determined by language is the hallmark of the whole host of semanticists. All semanticists have adhered to the view that the basic function of language is to determine fact. Accordingly, the whole program of semanticists is based on the relationship between language and reality. This demand came from a philosophical background. The main contention of philosophy is clarity and precision. There is no room for speculation in the philosophical assertion. Philosophical decisions must be backed up by authentic argumentation, analysis, interpretation, and clarification of language. Ordinary or natural language cannot fulfill the basic requirement of philosophy because ordinary or natural language by its very nature is vague, ambiguous. Therefore a philosophical demand or requirement is a prerequisite to formulating language in such a manner so that language can adequately picture reality or the facts of the world.

This philosophical requirement of language forces Wittgenstein and many other semanticists to construct language. This is where the relevance of *constructionalism* or *formalism* comes into picture. Wittgenstein from his semantic background reveals that ordinary language is not adequate for showing the relationship between language and reality. Thus, in his *TLP*, Wittgenstein at the very outset talks in favour of

propositional language. As a result of that, he drew the limits of language as well as the limits of the world. He then claims that within the realm of propositional language there is no scope of knowing or describing ethics, religion, aesthetics, and metaphysics. All these lie outside the limits of language and the limits of the world. The language within the limit of the world would be propositional language and the reality of the world is the totality of facts expressed through a proposition. Thus it seems to me that Wittgenstein artificially draws the limits of the world just by way of constructing propositional language. He then claims that what lies outside the limits would be mystical in nature. They are nonsense. For Wittgenstein, any attempt to catch up what lies outside the limits of the world through propositional language would be mystical. Outside the world, nothing can be put into word. Ethics, religion, etc. cannot be put into word. Since they cannot be put into word, they are nonsensical. They cannot be said. Here I have to mention two different senses of value. Within the world, we have propositional value expressed either in terms of being the case or in terms of not being the case. The sense of the world differs from the sense of the proposition. According to Wittgenstein, the sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world, everything is as it is. If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case.

According to Wittgenstein, all that happens and is the case is accidental. What is accidental cannot lie outside the world. Accordingly, what would lie outside the world would be non-accidental. Alternatively, it can be said that what is non-accidental cannot lie within the world. It must lie outside the world. Thus within the world, there are no propositions of ethics (religion). Thus, it would be mystical to talk of propositions of ethics. To talk of propositions of ethics is to talk nonsense. Propositions can express what is 'to be the case' and what is 'not to be the case'.

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Thus, propositions in a sense cannot express anything that is higher. Wittgenstein thus conceives two different types of values, such as higher and lower value. Proposition deals with lower value and it lies within the world. The value of the world is higher than the value of the proposition. Therefore proposition cannot say anything about the higher value. In this sense, if language means propositional language then what is higher cannot be put into words or language. That is why what is higher is nonsensical. What is nonsensical is transcendental, according to Wittgenstein. What is transcendental is the same. In this regard, Wittgenstein asserts that *ethics and aesthetics are the same*. Thus, ethics or religion is not consequential. It would be wrong to seek justification in ethics. The world is one where both happy and unhappy men are living. Of course, the world of a happy man differs from that of the unhappy man. Therefore, at death, the world does not alter but comes to an end. Death is not an event in life, because we do not live to experience death. If there is eternal life, it belongs to those who live in the present. For Wittgenstein, our life has no end just the way in which our visual field has no limits. Thus, Wittgenstein in his *TLP* denies the temporal immortality of the human soul. He denies the possibility of eternal survival after death. Eternal life, if there be any, appears as a riddle before present life. The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time. Thus, there is no possibility that God does reveal himself in the world. In this regard, Wittgenstein remarks that 'it is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.

Thus, for Wittgenstein, to view the world *sub-specie aeterni* is to view the world as a limited whole. *Feeling the world as a limited whole is mystical*. The term *limited whole* is important here. Wittgenstein at the very outset of his *TLP* has limited the world according to his philosophical program. He then attributed it as 'my language and my world'. As it is his language and his world it is limited. Thus in a sense, his

proposed world has created two different sides of the world - the inside as well as the outside of the world. Now, any attempt to know about the outside of the world with the help of the inside of the world (the limited world) would bring mysticism. It is a space of the world where we cannot raise any question and accordingly there is no scope of answering it. As there is no question that can be raised; therefore there is no question to answer. There is no scope of skepticism. Skepticism is irrefutable. Skepticism finds relevance where something *can be put into words*. For Wittgenstein, there are things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what are mystical. Thus the best possible means for Wittgenstein is that 'to say nothing except what can be said'. Thus to understand Wittgenstein proper would eventually recognizes them as nonsensical. It is just like 'throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it'. Thus, one has to transcend the limits of language, i.e., propositions to see the world alright. Wittgenstein ends his *TLP* with the remark: "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence".

What has been revealed so far is that Wittgenstein in his *TLP* took a mystical approach to religion. For him, religious expressions are not expressible by means of propositional language. To reveal the world alright one has to transcend the limits of propositional language. This does not make sense to say that religion can be grasped without language. He was pessimistic about religion only within the realm of propositional language. But being a linguistic philosopher he deals with everything within the language. That is why in his later writings Wittgenstein has changed his philosophical outlook regarding the very nature of language. Now in his *PI* and in other philosophical writings, he talks in favour of natural language. While illuminating the nature of ordinary or natural language, Wittgenstein says that language is rule-following. By the term 'rule', Wittgenstein means the *grammar of*

language. To follow a rule of language is to practice or use language in our community, society, i.e., within *the form of life.* There are many forms of life just as there are many language-games. Religion is just like *one form of life.* This is how Wittgenstein understands religion *as a form of life*.

What then is a form of life? In what sense Wittgenstein understands religion as a form of life? How does a religious form of life differ from other forms of life? Are there any similarities and resemblance among different forms of life? These are the important questions that may be taken care of to understand the genesis of this thesis. We should not forget that religion, for Wittgenstein, is embedded in language. This is the conclusion of Wittgenstein about the locus of religion. In responding to the question of where religion lies, Wittgenstein succinctly claims that religion as such has been embedded in language. Thus one should find the essence of religion just by way of clarifying and analyzing the meaning of language. Here in *PI,* Wittgenstein has introduced the use theory of meaning. Instead of picture theory of meaning that he has introduced in his *TLP,* here he asserts 'don't ask for meaning but simply ask for the use of language'. To understand religion, one has to use religious language within the form of life. To illuminate the concept 'form of life', Wittgenstein brings the metaphor 'language-game'. He then says that within the generic term *Game*, there are many language-games just like within Language, there are as many as different forms of life. For example, we talk of the card game, ball game, the game of cricket, the game of football, the game of rugby, etc, etc. Are these games completely separated from each other? Even though they are named as different games, but there remain some sort of similarities, dissimilarities, crisscross, overlapping something common, something uncommon among different games. But how do we come to know this? We come to know this just by looking at various rules used in the language just like

Language-Games are guided by rules. Now let me compare one game with another game. If we compare the game of football with the game of cricket, we find that there are some similarities and overlapping as per the rules they are governed by. If we compare these two games with other games, we notice the same. That means if we compare three games, such as, G1, G2, G3, we find that there are common rules among these games, but there are some similarities as well as dissimilarities among the games. We notice the same in language as well. Language is rule-following and there are clusters of grammatical rules based on which the members of the community within the forms of life use language. Like various games as mentioned above, there are various language-games. Each language-game is guided by rules. But there we cannot find a single rule that is common in all language-games. Rather we find some sort of similarities as well dissimilarities among various forms of life. Thus, the religious form of life is not detached from other forms of life. Here every forms of life are deeply interconnected with other forms of life. Wittgenstein thus reveals family resemblance among different forms of life. In this regard, Wittgenstein uses the metaphor "family-resemblance".

Wittgenstein conceives religious beliefs as distinctive language-games or forms of life. However, many would criticize this position of Wittgenstein. For them, the philosophical assertions that religious beliefs are distinctive language-games give the misleading impression that these language-games are cut off from all others. Hepburn says, within traditional Christian theology questions about the divine existence cannot be deflected into the question, "Does God play an intelligible role in the language-game?"[139] If religious beliefs are isolated self-sufficient language-games, it becomes difficult to explain why people should cherish religious beliefs in the way they do. On

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[139] Hepburn, R. W., 'From World to God', *Mind,* Vol. LXXII, 1963, P. 41.

this view, religious beliefs seem more like esoteric games having little significance outside the internal formalities of their activities. Critics would say that religious beliefs begin to look like hobbies something with which men occupy themselves at week-ends. The other misgivings involve the suspicion that religious beliefs are being placed outside the reach of any possible criticism. The appeal to the internality of religious criteria of meaningfulness can act as a quasi-justification for what would otherwise be recognized as nonsense.

In his *A Lecture on Ethics*, Wittgenstein finds the distinction between absolute judgments of value and relative judgments of value. He then says that words like 'good', 'important', and 'right' have a relative and absolute use. Unlike relative value, the absolute value is deeply associated with ought. To make this point clear let me explain the example given by Wittgenstein. Suppose, I could play tennis and one of you saw me playing and said 'Well, you play pretty badly,' and suppose I answered 'I know that I am playing badly', but I do not want to play any better,'. All the other man could say would be: 'Ah, then that is all right.' But further suppose I had told one of you a preposterous lie and he came up to me and said, 'You're behaving like a beast' and then I were to say, 'I know I behave badly, but then I don't want to behave any better,' could he then say, 'Ah, then that is all right'? Certainly not; he would say, 'Well, you ought to want to behave better.' Here we have an absolute judgment of value, whereas the first instance was one of a relative judgment. Since religion or religious beliefs are associated with absolute value, religious beliefs are in some sense or other appears as distinctive language-games. Wittgenstein raised the question of whether, concerning religion, the non-believer contradicts the believer when he says that he does not believe what the believer believes. If one man contradicts another, they can be said to share a common understanding, to be playing the same game. For

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example, the man who says that the sun is 90 million miles away from the earth contradicts the man who says that the sun is only 20 million miles away from the earth. The disputants about the distance of the sun from the earth share a common understanding - namely, methods of calculation in astronomy. Here the disputants differ about the fact, but they appeal to the same criteria to settle the disagreement. But what if one man says that handing the ball is a foul and another man says that handling the ball is not a foul? Do they contradict each other? Surely, they are only doing so if they are playing the same game, referring to the same rules. In the light of these examples, what are we say about the man who believes in God and the man who does not? Are they contradicting each other? Wittgenstein shows that they are not. For Wittgenstein, the word 'God' is not the name of a thing. If we say that something exists, it makes sense to think of that something ceasing to exist. But religious believers do not want to say that God might cease to exist. Rather they think that God will exist forever.

I think Wittgenstein's interpretation of religion opens up a new dimension of religion. He not only criticizes conventional religion developed over the past centuries, but at the same time he gives us the direction of future religion as well. In his later writings, he vehemently claims that religion is embedded in the grammar of the language. To believe in God does not make sense to say that God exists. For Wittgenstein the claim that God exists is ridiculous. The question of the existence of God simply does not arise. Because, 'God exists' is not a statement of fact. Rather it is a confession or expression of faith. For Wittgenstein, belief in God is not to be construed as the belief that there is a superhuman being that created the universe, is omnipotent, and so on. Instead, religion is intimately to *a particular way of life.* Religion, Wittgenstein presumes, is an activity. Religion is not a doctrine. The very purpose of religion is not

to construct philosophical theories of religion. Religion is an activity, a way of life, a form of life. The language of religion is confessional rather than speculative. Thus the philosopher's task is to lay bare the peculiar grammar of religious utterance. While illuminating upon Wittgenstein's religion, Winch in his book *The Idea of a Social Science* wants to undermine the idea that the methods of the natural sciences can profitably be applied to the understanding of human and social affairs. Human beings are radically unlike the non-thinking objects of scientific enquiry. I reveal Winch's program of social understanding of religion in Wittgenstein's *PI*. In my sense just as Winch replaces the scientific desire for an explanation of human behavior with the description of the ideas underlying and informing patterns of human behavior, so Wittgenstein consistently rejected both the idea that philosophy should take on the method of the natural sciences. Wittgenstein denies that philosophy should seek to explain phenomena. While understanding and illuminating religion, Wittgenstein completely denies the philosophy of religion. The philosophy of religion is based on religious epistemology. Many contemporary are voicing in favour of religious epistemology. They are doing philosophy of religion. Wittgenstein's understanding of religion is not at all philosophy of religion. It is in no way associated with religious epistemology. For Wittgenstein, religion is based on passion and faith, but not on facts. He conceives ethics and religion as nonsense in his *TLP* mainly for the reason that they cannot be put into language. As they cannot be put into language, they are not expressing the fact of the matter. Therefore, they are nonsense. They are nonsense as they lack factual sense. However, when he conceives religion as a *form of life,* his approach is altogether different. He now finds religion within the sphere of language. He now admits that religion can be put into religious language. This is one important tradition of Wittgenstein from early to later philosophy.

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Thus it seems to me that Wittgenstein is against of religious epistemology. Many would say that Wittgenstein was doing religious epistemology. But my position is that Wittgenstein if he was doing religious epistemology was not doing in the traditional sense of epistemology. He vehemently claims that there is no epistemic foundation in religion. He is equally against religious metaphysics. He was against classical religion based on speculative reason or belief or faith. He admits that religion is based on faith. But his understanding of faith is not based on the existence of God. Traditional religion is based on the faith that God is the ultimate agent of religion. If we go through the history of religion, we find that God holds *the centrality of religion*. Faith in the supernatural object or supernatural deity had been the genesis of religion. Thus, in my sense before the enlightened period or during the Dark Age religion was based on myth-based dogmas. The concept of Taboo, the concept of Mana, the concept of the Stone Age, the idea of Herbert Spencer's Ghost theory of religion were cases in point. Even Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates were talking about religion and sought rational justification of religion, but to me, their rational outlook about religion was based on speculation. During the enlightened period, radical attempts had been made by Hume and others. Having said this, religion cannot be comprehended before Hume without believing in God. Wittgenstein did not believe in the existence of God. For Wittgenstein those who believe in the existence of God and defend them by offering various religious theories are doing religious epistemology. They seek to justify religion based on reason. They talk in favor of rational theology. But there is no relevance of rational theology in religion. Thus, it seems to me that Wittgenstein's position of religion is unique. It is unique in the sense that he offers us a new dimension of religion just by analyzing the grammar or rule of language. He is detached from traditional religion.

He is detached from the religion that has been developed by Hume during the enlightenment period. Hume says that religious assertions are false. If there is a religion it should be either matters of fact or relations of ideas. But religion as such belongs to neither of these groups. Therefore, religious beliefs and religious assertions are meaningless. Wittgenstein does not agree with Hume. Even though Wittgenstein in his *TLP* attributed religious assertions as nonsense, but I do not think what is nonsense is false. Wittgenstein conceives religious assertions as nonsense in the sense that they lack factual sense. Thus, his interpretation of nonsense does not lead us to assume that religious assertions are false. According to Wittgenstein, religious assertions do have important sense, because such assertions help us to determine the value of the world. So they are important nonsense. This is how Wittgenstein differs from Hume. Hume determines everything from the perspective of a radical empiricist outlook. Even he denies the most forceful theory of causation based on necessity. Hume inclines to say that sense experience determines our acceptability of external objects. Wittgenstein deviates from Hume. Hume interprets religion from the outlook of sense experience. Wittgenstein interprets religion from the outlook of the grammar of the language.

I think Wittgenstein also deviates from Kant as well. There is no question of doubt that Kant had been responsible for institutionalized religion from a rational perspective. Kant was craving for rational theology. In fact, Kant was against doing any philosophy that would not be backed up by reason. For Kant, there are various types of reason or rational account. He conceives reason in three different categories, such as, pure, practical, and speculative. He then says that there is no importance of philosophical theories based on speculative reason. Philosophy of religion developed in the Dark Age was full of speculation. However, Kant admits that beyond pure

reason, we should admit the relevance of practical reason in natural theology, ethics, and aesthetics. He developed this idea in his book *The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.* He rules out any faith-based religion. Instead of religion, Kant developed the philosophy of religion based on practical reason. Thus, Kant talked in favour of rational theology altogether. We find the influence of Kant in Wittgenstein's *TLP* in some sense or other. However, Wittgenstein, I think, is deviated from Kant in his later philosophy where he conceives religion as *a form of life.* Unlike Kant, Wittgenstein in his *PI* would acknowledge non-rational theology. For Wittgenstein, religion is based on faith and there is no rational account or rule in faith. For him, there is no scope of intellectualism in religion. The levels of faith and reason are different. Faith deals with higher or absolute value whereas reason deals with facts of the matter. Thus the outcome of the reason is more vulnerable than the outcome of faith. Accordingly, we can say that Wittgenstein gives us a different interpretation of religion and his interpretation of religion is unlike to Kant.

The next point that I need to address here is that whether Wittgenstein has been influenced by logical positivism. Many would say that Wittgenstein was influenced by logical positivists' account of religion. However, I have a different interpretation altogether. I think the religious position of Wittgenstein differs from the logical positivists' interpretation of religion. Logical positivism led by Ayer and others sets out the principle of verification as the criterion of meaningfulness. For them, a sentence would be meaningful if it is completely verifiable employing some observational data. Thus, we find a new form of empiricism extended from Hume. Hume has been regarded as a radical empiricist. Here logical positivism sets out the principle of verification based on empirical evidence or data. I think the impact of logical positivism in some sense or other is prevailing in Wittgenstein's *TLP.*

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Wittgenstein in his *TLP* voices in favour of propositional language and based on such language he eventually recognized ethics and religion as nonsensical. Are the terms 'meaningless' and 'nonsensical' the same? Or are they different? A sentence is meaningless if it is neither true nor false based on observational data. The term 'nonsensical' means 'lack of factual sense'. Wittgenstein then affirmed what is nonsense is important nonsense. Can we say what is meaningless is important meaningless? We do not have a clear view in logical positivism. They determine the criterion of meaningfulness and based on that they declare that religious and metaphysical assertions are meaningless. But I think Wittgenstein's position is different. Even many commentators would say that unlike logical positivists Wittgenstein has high regard for religion. Actually, Wittgenstein asserts religious assertions as nonsense to keep the sanctity of religion per se. It is reflected in his later philosophical writings where he conceives religion as the form of life. Religion, for Wittgenstein, is an integral part of our life. Religion is life, religion is our culture. Religion determines the value of the world. Man can determine the meaning of life just by way of knowing religion as a form of life. Thus, even though at face value Wittgenstein in his early writings has been influenced by logical positivism, but his understanding of religion is something different from logical positivism. He gives honour and dignity to religion because he reveals that religion is dealing with absolute value instead of contingent value.

To speak of religion as a language-game would be to see it as a distinctive universe of discourse, the linguistic component of a particular form of life or way of living. I think Wittgenstein's introduction of the language-game analogy was intended to highlight the diverse range of linguistic phenomena, how speaking is connected with particular activities, and the rule-governed nature of those activities. Accordingly, it

seems to me after Wittgenstein that each of these aspects is to the fore when religion is itself described as a language-game. For Wittgenstein, the rules of religious discourse are found in theology which eventually decides what it makes sense to say to God and about God. In short, theology is the grammar of religious discourse. It is reflected in Wittgenstein's *PI* in which he asserts 'essence is expressed by grammar'. The theology of grammar tells what kind of subject anything is. He then asserts that the idea of theology is that of a rule-making, rule-enforcing discipline. It outlines what is legitimate and illegitimate to say within the language-game of religion. Wittgenstein thus asserts that words without use are dead. Words without use do not bear any sense. What he intends to say here is that understanding practice in religion cannot be achieved purely by an analysis of words and sentences? Instead, it is the activities into which those words are woven that are crucial. In his *Culture and Value,* Wittgenstein asserts that practice gives the words their sense. Accordingly, we can say that characterization of religion as a language-game is, then, meant to bring out precisely that religion is not a system of speculative thought, but is something a person does, a whole way of living.

Another important aspect of form of life or language-game designation serves to stress the *sui genesis* character of religion and its distinctive utterance. In my sense, Wittgenstein's purpose to introduce the game-analogy was to highlight diverse conceptions of logic, truth, rationality, and so on, by showing how these are not a 'direct gift of God', but arise out of social activities in which they have either home and within which they gain their coherence and intelligibility. If religion is indeed a language-game, then two things follow. First, religion cannot be understood without deeply and honestly engaging in the religious life, and secondly, it will be illegitimate to criticize religion according to the standards and objectives of another language-

game. Thus, in a sense, every language-game in some sense or other is distinct from other language-game. Once religion is described as a language-game, it appears to receive certain immunity from criticism, either from the creeping infringement of science or from atheistically-minded theorists who wish to explain it as a way as an illusion, a dream of the human mind, an erroneous hypothesis or whatever. This is not just because to impose alien criteria on an incommensurable universe of discourse and way of life. The designation of a practice or institution as a language-game or a form of life means for Wittgensteinian that practice or institution is a *fait accompli*. It is given which does not admit of explanation. Wittgenstein says that we must bear in mind that language-game is to say something unpredictable in the sense that it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable or unreasonable. It is there like our life. In this regard, he brings the concept of language-game to unearth or unveil the meaning of a form of life. In his *PI*, Wittgenstein remarks "what has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say - *forms of life*.' Thus, our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as 'proto-phenomenon'. That is, where we ought to have said: this language-game is played."

Many contemporary thinkers have claimed that Wittgenstein's position about religion is based on Fideism. Kai Nielsen has termed it as *Wittgenstenian Fideism*. According to religious believers, fideism is a position which holds that 'belief rests on faith rather than on reason, and that an intellectual justification of religion is therefore unnecessary.' I have already stated that Wittgenstein rules out any rational and intellectual justification in religion. Thus, apparently, there is nothing wrong with claiming *Wittgensteinian Fideism* in religion or religious belief. Accordingly, I may claim that Wittgensteinian twist to Fideism is the claim that, qua form of life, religion is *a fait accompli* which neither requires justification nor should fear censure from

non-religious forms of life. As far as *Wittgenstenian Fideism* is concerned, I have a different proposal. Even though Wittgenstein asserts that religion is based on faith where there is no relevance of rational account, but he at the same time does not believe the existence of God as the foundation of religion. I think that a true religious fideist would be one who believes that religion is based on faith about the existence of God and the existence of God is self-evident and one does not require proving it from a rational perspective. Before leaving the issue of Fideism, one other related criticism should be voiced. This concerns the Wittgenstenians' use of the language-game and form of life concepts. Notwithstanding Malcolm's declaration that 'religion is a form of life; it is language embedded in action - what Wittgenstein calls a 'language-game' in no place does Wittgenstein himself refer to religion in such a manner. For Wittgenstein, language-games seem to be quite small-scale units of language-usage that occur in various human contexts. In his *PI,* Wittgenstein notes such examples as 'asking about something, greeting someone, giving orders, reporting an event and so on'. Even he elsewhere speaks of language-game with physical objects and even he conceives mathematics as a whole language-game.

Even though the thesis is marked by the concept of form of life, but a careful study of his book *PI* reflects that Wittgenstein essentially uses the term *a form of life* only in five different places. At one place he asserts that to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life. In other places of his *PI,* Wittgenstein asserts that the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is a part of an activity or a form of life. In another place, he asserts that the agreement in the use of language is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. On another occasion he intends to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life. And finally, he remarked that what has to be accepted, the

given is - so one could say - forms of life. If we go through and surmise the various uses of a form of life after Wittgenstein, it would seem to me that his understanding of religion is deeply rooted in the grammar of the language. He thus reveals that speaking of language is part of an activity or a form of life. I think that just by way of interpreting religion as a form of life, Wittgenstein not only offers us a new dimension of religion but also sets up the future of religion in the real sense of the term. Since religion is embedded in language and there is an isomorphism between religion and culture, therefore any sort of misuse of language would lead us to cultural decline. That is why Wittgenstein has been over-conscious about the misuse of language. In his *Culture and Value* and other writings, Wittgenstein finds religion as culture and value. For Wittgenstein, religion is culture. Thus, a religious language in a sense reflects our culture.

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