

Chapter Three

Religion, Culture, and Value

If we carefully go through the above sequels, it seems to me that there is a continuous and constant transition of Wittgenstein's outlook of religious language and religious experience. In his *TLP*, Wittgenstein does not find religious language within the language of *TLP*. Here he voiced in favour of propositional language and recognized the propositional language as 'my language'. As there is no legitimate religious language in *TLP*, he revealed ethics and religion as nonsense. He maintained the same in various other writings in his early period. However, when he moved from early to later period, he took a different philosophical approach altogether. In his *PI*, Wittgenstein finds religious language because as a linguistic philosopher, Wittgenstein in his *PI* introduces ordinary or natural language. The distinctive feature of such language is that it includes or accommodates everything and leaves nothing. Ordinary language, according to Wittgenstein, touches upon the stream of life. In his *PI*, Wittgenstein conceives various forms of life of which religion is one form of life. In this regard, he brings the metaphor 'language-game'. For Wittgenstein, there are various language-games, and religion is regarded as one language-game. Thus, like many, Cavell broadly interprets Wittgenstein's *PI* as 'philosophy of Culture.'¹¹⁹ In this regard, Cavell implicitly insists upon important connections between Wittgenstein and Spengler. He reveals Wittgenstein's *PI* as a monumental work that addresses the wayward tendencies of traditional philosophy and intimates the feature of cultural decline. Cavell further contends that Wittgenstein's philosophy of culture is Spenglerian in nature. Wittgenstein in his *PI* characterizes the misuse of language in

¹¹⁹ Cavell, Stanley, "Declining Decline: Wittgenstein as a Philosopher of Culture", *Inquiry*, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 1988, p. 253.

which philosophers typically engage. Wittgenstein finds such misuses of language as departures from correct use. It would then be a cultural loss of human orientation and spirit that is ‘internal to human language and culture.’¹²⁰ In a sense, loss of human orientation is at par with both losses in language and culture. I think that Wittgenstein of *PI* deeply accounts of a loss of orientation of language. Thus, if we carefully read and try to understand Wittgenstein of *PI*, it seems to us that he writes of a loss of orientation in human culture. Cavell reveals at least two different ways through which Wittgenstein of *PI* links disorientation in philosophers’ uses of language with the disorientation of culture. The first link recognizes language itself to be a part of the culture and so sees linguistic disorientation in philosophy to be a form of cultural disorientation. This reminds the point that I stated in the initial part of this sequel. I have claimed that culture is language embedded. Accordingly, disorientation of the uses of language would be disorientation of the culture. This leads to culture deformation or decline of culture. The second link sees Wittgenstein’s account of linguistic disorientation in philosophy to be what Cavell calls a *homologous form of and also an interpretation of* Spengler’s depiction of cultural decline.

Cavell further contends that “the *Investigations* is a work that begins with a sense of the child’s inheritance of language; it is an image of a culture as an inheritance.”¹²¹ I think that Wittgenstein’s representation of a child’s inheritance of language is also a representation of a cultural inheritance. A child’s early experiences in learning the language of a community are also part of that child’s early imitation of its culture. In this regard, it can legitimately be claimed that language is a part of the culture. Wittgenstein uses the words that are so intractably bound up with the forms of human

¹²⁰ Ibid, p. 340.

¹²¹ Ibid, p. 341.

interaction in which they play a role that their functions, their meanings, are inseparable from the relations to those forms. Human language, according to Wittgenstein, is inextricably linked to a form of human life. In this regard, Wittgenstein remarks that *to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life*.¹²² Here we divulge the cultural mode of Wittgenstein. Here, Wittgenstein sees the use of a word concerning rule-governed language-games, social interactions, and a human form of life. All these are the reflection of cultural mode. Thus, we can identify language as a component of culture. If it would be the case, then linguistic deviations would equally be treated as cultural deviations. According to Cavell, Wittgenstein's misuses of language, deviations from the rules governing the uses of words, are also deviations from established cultural norms. Every time Wittgenstein writes of disorientation in human language, i.e., *ipso-facto*, writings of disorientation of human culture. In this sense, we can say that his treatment of philosophy's linguistic contravention, in part, involves cultural decline. Simplistically, we can say that misuses of language or disorientation of language lead to cultural decline or disorientation of culture. Wittgenstein's account of the departures is revealed from the correct uses of words in traditional philosophical misuses of language. For Wittgenstein, every form of life or every language-game determines the function of language. I think Wittgenstein's accounts of philosophical misuses of language are somehow similar or analogous to Spengler's depiction of cultural decline. Alternatively, it can be said that Wittgenstein's connection of philosophical misuses of language bears an important relation to the regularized representations of cultural decline in Spengler.

Departure from Culture is Departure from Home:

¹²² Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit., paragraph: 19.

To know about the departure of language, we have to know beforehand what language is. What is/are the proper use (s) of language? For Wittgenstein, language is rule-following. Following a rule is a practice of it in the society, community, or within the form of life or language-game. Any sort of disorientation of it would be treated as a decline of culture. Thus we can say after Wittgenstein that misuse of language or disorientation of language is the violation of the rule of language in the real sense of the term. In my sense, language is culture. The culture of the community or society is being reflected through language. In this sense, language is our home, because language is culture. We live following our culture. Thus in a sense, culture or language is our home. Therefore, the decline of culture through the disorientation of language actually is a sort of departure from our home. Martin Heidegger once remarked that language is the house of being. The being is nurtured through language. To take care of being, one has to take care of language. Accordingly, losing your culture or language is to losing your home, your originality. Wittgenstein therefore in his *PI*, asks his reader regarding the philosopher's use of certain terms "is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?"¹²³ Wittgenstein describes the everyday uses of words as a 'home'. According to Cavell, Wittgenstein's use of the word *home* is stressed as an indication that he regarded the everyday uses of words metaphorically as a kind of home. Culture constitutes a home, but civilization does not constitute a home. Thus, a people living during a time of civilization lack a home in this profound Spenglerian sense. Wittgenstein's tendency both to characterize correct word usage with that which occurs within or inside of, our natural language-games and also to equate certain philosophical misuses of words with those that take place outside any language-game. Cavell reveals a metaphysical

¹²³ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit., paragraph: 47.

connection here. The philosopher wrongly seeks to do outside what must be done inside, internal to, those language-games. Externalization, for Wittgenstein, constitutes the most elementary transgression of wayward philosophy.

According to Wittgenstein, the philosopher mistakenly uses words outside the language-games. This mistake proceeds on the false assumption that the limitations on proper usage imposed by those language-games may be transcended by special philosophical uses of words. The temptation to think that there is something of philosophical importance that can only be said outside of established language-games. The erroneous idea from a philosophical perspective is that they are useless. They must therefore be abandoned for philosophy to do its work. In the *PI*, Wittgenstein has dismissed it as a delusion. For Wittgenstein, our language-games fix what can be said; outside of them, there is nothing to say. For Wittgenstein, everyday uses of words inside their proper language-games connect importantly with what is shared within a community. The uses of words in language-games are governed by criteria for their application that are common to, which are shared by the community of language users who engage in those language-games. Thus, later Wittgenstein famously claimed that language is essentially social. Here Cavell states explicitly that for Wittgenstein, “speaking outside language games” amounts to “repudiating our shared criteria”¹²⁴ for the correct use of words. Accordingly, we can say that Wittgenstein is a wayward philosopher, who abandons home by using words outside their proper language-games, *ipso-facto*, abandons their shared grammatical rules, and also, in this sense, abandons community. In this regard Cavell remarks, “The *Investigations* is a work that begins with a sense of inheritance, the child’s inheritance of language; it is an image of culture as an inheritance, one that takes place in ... the

¹²⁴ Ibid, p. 325.

conflict of generations... Wittgenstein's holding his book with Augustine's paragraph... sets the sense of inheritance".¹²⁵ Wittgenstein of course did not mention the term *child inheritance*. What Wittgenstein has said clearly and vividly is that the proper uses of words occur inside the language-games of everyday life. Thus, words are properly used in accordance with the grammar of language of the criterion of rule-following. These are accepted and shared by the linguistic community that uses these language-games. For Wittgenstein, language is a rule-governed social activity and the use of language within a community is a natural part of its social fabric. I think that the development of the rules that govern the uses of words in a linguistic community is part of the social history of that community.

Thus, Wittgenstein's account of the departures from the correct uses of words in traditional philosophical misuses of language suggests the following:

- (a) Civilization represents a loss of home. It is the most external, artificial states of which a species of developed humankind is capable.
- (b) People who live in times of civilization lose what was once shared within the culture from which that civilization developed - a sense of community rooted, in part, in shared forms of expression.
- (c) These shared forms, within the context of culture, constitute part of cultural inheritance.
- (d) The shared forms, which help unite the community within a culture, become lost and, in effect, are repudiated in a subsequent time of civilization.

¹²⁵ Ibid, p. 341.

- (e) The people of civilized time, lacking a home, a shared inheritance, a community, become lost, disoriented, and can no longer find their way back to those shared forms of expression which once helped make culture possible.

This clearly suggests that civilization in some sense or other appears as a threat to cultural decline. Wittgenstein's misuses of language are connected with the cultural decline in two different ways. Wittgenstein indeed represents those misuses in such a way as to show that they constitute a form of cultural decline. Moreover, Wittgenstein's account of those misuses functions in the *PI* as an 'interpretation' or a 'homologous form' of a Spenglerian picture of cultural decline. However unlike Spengler, Wittgenstein resists the spirit of cultural decline in his time as he seeks not only to identify the misuses of language but at the same time he straightforwardly correct them owing to combat the cultural decline. Wittgenstein first reveals the misuses of language as instances of cultural declines and then he provides for correcting them as an alternative way for the reversal of one form of cultural decline. Thus, unlike others, Wittgenstein shows us the possibility of a reversal of cultural decline. This clearly suggests that Wittgenstein was very much careful about language, culture, and the value of culture. Cavell thus finds Wittgenstein's *PI* as a philosophy of culture where Wittgenstein intended to represent a cultural decline and also suggests how it can be tackled. Thus, we have to understand the very concept of Wittgenstein's insights of cultural decline within the misuse of language. His attempt to eradicate these misuses embodies a rejection of and also a response to cultural decline. In this regard, Wittgenstein in his *PI* gives due importance to the everyday uses of language. Wittgenstein claims that 'what we do is bring back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.' Here Wittgenstein has played dual role. He not only seeks to identify just how philosophical word usage has gone wrong but also to

use what is thereby learned to gain sufficient ‘command’ of language to re-establish proper usage. Since philosophy’s misuses of language are themselves instances of cultural decline, he is concerned to combat them. Here Wittgenstein writes not only of words used outside the original homes but also of a need to bring them back to those everyday uses which are their natural homes. For Wittgenstein, the ancient task of philosophy to awaken us or bring us to our senses takes the form of returning us to the everyday, the ordinary. Of course, Wittgenstein’s cultural decline is never explicitly presented to us; rather it is manifested in his observations about the proper use of words. Here Wittgenstein emphasizes more on ‘returning us to the ordinary’ to ‘what is natural or what is home’. Wittgenstein in his *PI* makes a dramatic shift what other philosophers did. In this regard, Cavell remarks, “Philosophers before Wittgenstein had found that our lives are distorted or waylaid by illusion. But what other philosophers has found the antidote to illusion in the particular and repeated humility of remembering and tracking the uses of humble words, looking philosophically as it were beneath our feet rather than over our heads?”¹²⁶ The novelty of Wittgenstein is that he interprets religion and religious experience concerning language, i.e., about *the grammar of the language*. For Wittgenstein, religion is embedded in language. There is no religious deity, God, or supernatural entity or entities without and apart from language. Thus we have a different perception of religion in Wittgenstein. There is a forceful theory developed within the realm of linguistic philosophy. It states that language is culture. The language of a community is developed based on the culture of that community. One may come to know the culture of other community just by way of knowing the language of that community. Thus in a sense, language and culture are embedded. We find the same philosophical position in Wittgenstein.

¹²⁶ Cavell, Stanley, “*Declining Culture*”, op. cit., p. 324.

According to Wittgenstein, language is culture or language reflects the culture. A language is a form of life. The culture of a community is reflected through the form of life of that community. Now the question is that every community has its own culture. If language is structured through culture then there are as many as different types of languages within language just as there are many different types of cultures within a language community. That is why Wittgenstein in his *PI*, anticipates various forms of life. He then explains the concepts of different forms of life with the metaphor 'language-games'. In this sequel, I have developed the trio-concepts, such as, language, culture, and value. The main strategy of this sequel is to show in what sense these trio-concepts are deeply engrossed with each other.

Understanding Philosophical Investigations as a Philosophy of Culture:

Based on the above observation, there is nothing wrong to preconceive Wittgenstein's *PI* as a *Philosophy of Culture*. Wittgenstein very often offers philosophical remarks that would serve as the paradigms of cultural decline. In fact, Wittgenstein's many remarks have latent cultural insights. I have already stated that Wittgenstein's discussion of philosophers' misuses of language appears as a symptom of cultural concern. One may sense cultural concern even in his 'private language argument'. Private language argument does not contain home language or the language of society, community. As a result of that private language is not something common and it has not been shared by the member of the society or community. Let me focus on the issue of cultural concern of Wittgenstein concerning his *PI*.

The first form of cultural concern is reflected in the concept of language-game. In this regard Wittgenstein asserts, "The language is meant to serve for communication

between a builder A and an assistant B. A builder with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs, and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose, they use a language consisting of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”. A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such and such a call.”¹²⁷ The speech act held between A and B is clear and simple. Wittgenstein believes that such a conception is possible. He then remarks, “We could imagine that was the whole language of A and B; even the whole language of a tribe.”¹²⁸ While illuminating the aspect of language-game, Wittgenstein writes, “Let us imagine a society in which this is the only system of language.”¹²⁹ We see the same in his *The Brown Book*. Here, he inclines to say that his understanding of language-game is complete and perfect part of the language. It is a complete system of human communication. For him, it is very useful to imagine such a language ‘to be entire system of communication of a tribe in a primitive state of society.’¹³⁰ Many commentators, namely, Rush Rhees, Newton Garver, and others have argued that Wittgenstein’s conception about the view that language-game is to be the entire language of a tribe is misguided. Even Malcolm,¹³¹ a Wittgenstenian, has offered an ingenious, though limited, defense of Wittgenstein’s claim. Whatever the position of the commentators may be, my concern is to view that language-game can be viewed as an analogy for the cultural decline.

In his article, “Wittgenstein’s Builders”, Rhees concludes that language-game instead of describing a complete language actually fails to describe any language at all. Rhees

¹²⁷ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit., paragraph: 2.

¹²⁸ Ibid, paragraph: 16.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *The Brown Book*, Oxford, 1958, p. 77.

¹³¹ Malcolm, Norman, “Language-game” in Georg Henrik Von Wright (ed.) *Wittgensteinian Themes 1978-1989*, Ithaca, NY, 1985.

seems very limited uses of the language-game of Wittgenstein. According to Rhees, the vocabulary of the language-game consists of only four-terms but, rather A and B use those four terms 'only to give these special orders on this job and otherwise never spoke at all'. It is this very strict limitation on the employment of the terms that bothers Rhees. This sort of limited linguistic repertoire is not enough to constitute the speaking of language. Rhees' concern about the limitation of language-game of Wittgenstein would be regarded as a serious limitation because to use anything beyond language-game would be treated as a misuse of language. But I think Rhees perhaps overlooks Wittgenstein's explicit position of *PI*. I think that Wittgenstein specifically allows that the terms of language-game will be used in its teaching of the language-game. It is such teaching where the learner names the objects; that is, he utters the word when the teacher points to the stone and there will be this still simpler exercise: the pupil repeats the words after the teacher. Rhees further contends that there are no provisions in language-game to support a distinction between sense and nonsense. In this regard, he goes on to say that in our language as we speak it there are standards of what is correct and incorrect, and these come in when we say someone has misunderstood. But we do not see how there can be any such standard in the game Wittgenstein has described. Rhees thinks that the builders of language-game have so limited a linguistic repertoire that they do not display enough in the way of word-related interactions to qualify as speakers. In fact, they know what building pieces are called "slab", "block", "pillar" and "beams". They use these terms in an extremely limited manner for doing an extremely limited task. For Rhees, their word-related interactions are too mechanical for that. They look like minorities in the building site. Malcolm thinks that Rhees' observation about Wittgenstein's language-game is acute, but unlike Rhees, Malcolm thinks that there is something in the

background of language-game that makes it possible to view the builders and their helpers in a different light from that in which Rhees notes. For Malcolm, Wittgenstein himself explicitly takes up this issue in his *Zettel*. Here Malcolm cites a passage from *Zettel*: “You are just tacitly assuming that these people think; that they are like people as we know them in that respect; that they do not carry on that language game merely mechanically. For if you imagined them doing that, you yourself would not call it the use of a rudimentary language. What am I to reply to this? Of course, the life of those human beings must indeed be like ours in many respects, and I said nothing about this similarity. But the important thing is that their language, and their thinking too, may be rudimentary, that there is such a thing as “primitive thinking” which is to be described via primitive *behavior*. The surroundings are not the “thinking accompaniment” of speech.”¹³²

Wittgenstein, however, resists the suggestion in his voiced objection that what is missing, what he must tacitly assume, in his description of language-game are ‘thinking accomplishments’. Here Wittgenstein does not admit that he was making the unspoken assumption that those people think in the sense of their being thinking concealed behind the outward behavior. However, Malcolm reveals that what Wittgenstein says here has a bearing on the relevance of Rhees’ criticism. Malcolm rightly identifies Wittgenstein’s answer to the question raised by Rhees. He remarks that *the life of those human beings must be like ours in many respects, and I said nothing about this similarity*.¹³³ Malcolm reveals that the lives of the builders of language-game in many respects like ours. Hence the question of isolation or restriction or limitation in use simply does not arise. In this regard, Malcolm seeks to

¹³² Malcolm, Norman, “*Language Games (2)*”, p. 177.

¹³³ *Ibid*, p. 177.

explicit background detail of Wittgenstein's account of language-game. Rhee criticizes Wittgenstein by saying that the life at the building site seems to be mechanical. Malcolm denies it. He suggests that when there are injuries at the building site, the other workers might show their concern, offer help and sympathize. In many such ways that need not involve words. Here the builders could behave in recognizable human ways. Malcolm says, "Suppose a builder is saying to fit a slab between two other slabs, but it will not go. He expresses frustration in sounds and gestures. After viewing the situation for a while, he proceeds to chip from one end of the slab until it finally fits - whereupon he laughs and claps his hands in satisfaction."¹³⁴ In the aforesaid passage, Malcolm intends to describe what Wittgenstein would think of an example of primitive thought, which does not express in words. For Malcolm, such wordless behavior need not be mechanical. Malcolm insists that the nonverbal behavior of the builders away from the building site could still be like our own behavior in many respects. Their behavior could still be recognized by a human so that we might not feel compelled to describe them as mechanisms. Unlike Rhee, Malcolm suggests that one way in which language-game might provide for both something like the give-and-take questions and answers are also meaningful and interchanges about speakers' meanings on Wittgenstein's tacit assumption that its builders behave as we do in many respects. Thus, the question of sense and nonsense as Rhee reveals in Wittgenstein's language-game simply does not arise. It is not rich enough to support whether a particular use of words constitutes nonsense. Malcolm reveals that the *Zettel's* remarks suggest that the account of the surroundings of the language-game can be enriched in ways that would represent its speakers differently and straightforwardly analogous to conversation. Malcolm's

¹³⁴ Ibid, p. 179.

conclusion that the ensuing exchange presents something analogous to a conversation about the builder's original call seems right. Malcolm thus thinks that one could successfully add enough in the way of details to the *Investigations* extremely sparse account of the lives and interactions of the builders of language-game that their behavior would no longer seem mechanical. What we can say after Wittgenstein is that the life of the builders 'must be like ours in many respects' and that 'there will be a great deal there corresponding to the actions of ordinary human beings'. Thus, one may fairly conclude, Malcolm suggests, that there is no justification for supposing that the workers of game will always work 'mechanically' or that the building sites 'they will look like minorities'.

There is no question of doubt that Wittgenstein's *PI* represents cultural decline along with the line of Spenglerian philosophy of culture. According to Wittgenstein, misuses of language are a violation of the grammar of language and it would be a sort of cultural decline. The grammar of a language or the rule of language represents the genesis of culture. Language is culture and language is rule-following. Therefore violation of the rule of language actually leads to misuse of language. In this sense, it can be said that misuse of language is nothing but a sort of cultural decline. There the crux of the hour is to give a plausible account of how his later philosophical writings address his cultural concerns. What I have claimed is that an account of philosophical misuses of language may constitute one locus of cultural concern. To resist cultural decline through misuses of language, Wittgenstein brings the concept of language-game the function of which is not only to begin the development of a perspicuous representation of human language but also to evoke another Spenglerian reflection of cultural insolvency.

What then causes misuse of language? In this regard, we can say that our artificial demand for civilization causes misuse of language. Modern civilization is really a threat to culture. To be civilized is to be declining of culture. Civilization is characterized by the word *progress*. We are civilized in every passing day actually means we are progressing in every passing day. Progress is its form rather than making progress being one of its features. Progress under the womb of civilization is a sort of construction. Human civilization is the outcome of artificiality. It is the outcome of manmade construction. In the real sense, it is occupied with building in an ever more complicated structure. Here everything is sought with regard to means as an end instead of an end in itself. Thus, civilization is not valuable in itself, rather clarity, perspicuity based on culture are valuable in them. Thus for Wittgenstein, the cultural decline is inevitable with a preoccupation with building, with construction. Civilization represents a corruption of genuine progress. Real progress is deeply embedded in culture rather than civilization. The building has become the dominant activity of civilization, an activity that has been performed unreflectively. Here everything has been judged as a means to an end. It offers and encourages *anthropocentrism, individualism, subjectivism, or in short materialism*. Western society is dominated by civilization and hence it is backed up by materialism in the real sense of the term. For Wittgenstein, genuine progress actually hinges on culture and it would require both that building be done reflectively and construction should not be regarded as an end in itself. For Wittgenstein, a time of real progress would regard the building as a means toward independent ends that are settled upon by the kind of thinking which values clarification itself. Wittgenstein was not against civilization; rather he was against that sort of civilization which distorts the cultural heritage of the community. Thus, in a sense, Wittgenstein's outlook of civilization has

been misrepresented. His primary focus on building itself constitutes something akin to a collective form of heedless behavior. It is blindly unreflective. Wittgenstein further contends that unreflective building is not a real representation of civilization; rather it constitutes its form. Wittgenstein in his *PI* focuses mainly on the *social interactive function of language* reflected in the form of life.

Wittgenstein explicitly invites his reader to compare the truncated language of the builders with our own language by raising the issue of whether either should be thought of as complete. In this regard, he explicitly remarks that to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life. So he is directing us to compare the builders' truncated unreflective form of life with our own. Wittgenstein had emphatically articulated a clear sense in which he felt that the civilization of his time was so truncated. I think the concept of private language is another concern to Wittgenstein which again stands against cultural revival. Wittgenstein denies the possibility of a private language argument. He was concerned about a kind of language that would be public, interactive nature of sensation language, the communal nature of the rules and criteria which fix the meanings of sensation terms, and shared forms of behavior upon which the area of public language actually hinges on. Wittgenstein talks in favor of actual sensation not only because he thinks they are true, but because he hopes they will loosen the hold of what he takes to be a compelling, but false picture of sensation language. According to Wittgenstein, the conception of a language in which an individual refers to his own private sensations, to what is inaccessible to anyone else, is far from a mere flight of fantasy. What I intend to say at this juncture is that the sections of the *Investigations* that discuss private language constitute yet another locus of cultural concern. For Wittgenstein, using language involves following rules. Following rules is essentially a social activity, an activity that cannot be done by an

individual in isolation from a wider linguistic community. Wittgenstein asserts that the actual functioning of our common language in which one can communicate about one's own sensations and those of others depend upon a shared form of life. Thus Wittgenstein's account of our common language of sensations serves as a 'homologous form of' or 'an interpretation of' a Spenglerian image of culture.

Culture and Value:

So far we have seen that Wittgenstein was concerned about cultural decline and he attempted to reveal it through misuses of language. Perhaps he would agree that any sort of misuse of language leads to the demand of civilization. Civilization appears as a threat to cultural decline. That is why he was against the misuse of language. But his understanding of language can be grasped concerning his philosophical writings because he proposed different types of language in his different philosophical writings. In his *TLP*, he developed language from a semantic perspective. However, in his *PI*, he talks of language from a pragmatic perspective. Here, he revealed language as culture in some sense or other. He equally finds religious language as a form of life. In his book *Culture and Value* (henceforth CV), Wittgenstein reveals an entwinement among the trio-concepts, namely, religion, culture, and value. His position about religion would require a far-sighted vision. In this regard, Wittgenstein in his CV remarks, "It is difficult to tell a short-sighted man how to get somewhere. Because you cannot say to him: "Look at that church tower ten miles away and go in that direction."¹³⁵ This clearly suggests that an ordinary man cannot be really a genuinely religious man. For Wittgenstein, there is no religious denomination for which the misuse of metaphysical expression has been responsible. The human gaze

¹³⁵ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Culture and Value*, translated by Peter Winch, The University of Chicago Press, 1977, p. 1e.

has a power of conferring value on things. The world is changing and each morning one has to break through the dead rubble afresh. A new word is like a fresh seed and it is the beauty of language.

Wittgenstein then goes on to say that what is good is divine. The ethics of us is to make a sound inquiry. To say something about divine or supernatural, we need to have the perception of something supernatural. Thus, what is good is divine and what is divine is supernatural. Accordingly, we can say that what is good is outside the space of facts. Propositions are saying about the facts of the world. Accordingly, propositions cannot say anything about what is good. Thus, what is good is valuable. It is a sort of divinity, an inward revelation or cultivation. The earlier culture will become a heap of rubble and finally a heap of ashes, but spirits will however over the ashes. This remark of Wittgenstein is fascinating because within the cultural transformation the spirits will remain the same. We have to retain our cultural spirit and for that, we have to struggle. In this regards, Wittgenstein makes the distinction between a good and a poor architect. A poor architect succumbs to every temptation whereas a good architect would resist it. People at present are voicing in favour of civilization. Civilization is a thought of perception where people think that he has solved the problem of life and feel like telling them that everything is quite easy now. Just by way of perceiving life in this way is itself a big mistake. He can see that he is wrong just by recalling that there was a time when this solution with which he finds comfortable, has not been discovered. However, it must have been possible to live then too and the solution which has now been discovered seems fortuitous concerning how things were then. The same is revealed in logic or philosophy. For Wittgenstein, if there were a solution to the problems of logic/philosophy, we should only need to caution ourselves that there was a time when they had not been solved and even at

that time people must have known how to live and think. Cultural creative is the hallmark of leading a good and valuable life. The meaning of life actually hinges on cultural and religious creativity and consciousness. In this regard, Wittgenstein refers to Engelmann. Nothing could be more remarkable than seeing a man who thinks he is unobserved performing some quite simple everyday activity.

Let us imagine a theatre where the curtain goes up and immediately we see a man alone in a room, walking up and down, lighting a cigarette, sitting down, etc. Thus suddenly we are observing a human being from outside in a way that ordinarily we can never observe ourselves. Referring to Engelmann, Wittgenstein remarks it would be like watching a chapter of biography with our own eyes that would be uncanny and wonderful at the same time. Thus to see something and to see the same thing in the right way would make a different sense. Just to see something perhaps not the same as to see something in a right way. A work of art forces us to see it in the right perspective, but in the absence of art, the object is just a fragment of nature like any other. In this regard Wittgenstein says, “Things are placed right in front of our eyes, not covered by any veil. This is where religion and art part company.”¹³⁶ Art and religion remove the veil of ignorance and helps one to extract truth or good. This would be the achievement of divinity. Wittgenstein is vocal about culture. For Wittgenstein, “A culture is like a big organization which assigns each of its members in a place where he can work in the spirit of the whole; and it is perfectly fair for his power to be measured by the contribution he succeeds in making to the whole enterprise.”¹³⁷ Thus, culture, for Wittgenstein, is essentially needed for the spirit of the whole. It is a sort of creative power, a power of divinity. The present society

¹³⁶ Ibid, p. 6e.

¹³⁷ Ibid, p. 6e.

equipped and habituated with civilization becomes fragmented and the power of an individual man is used up in overcoming opposing forces and frictional resistance. Even though Wittgenstein talks in favour of retaining culture, but at the same time he does not claim that the disappearance of a culture signifies the disappearance of human value. What he intends to say here is that - the disappearance of culture appears as a hindrance to certain means of expressing this value. However, Wittgenstein stated clearly and distinctively that he had no sympathy for the ongoing European civilization and he confessed that he had failed to understand its goal. For Wittgenstein, the so-called civilization is characterized by the word *progress*. Progress is the form of civilization rather than one of its features. It is occupied with building an ever more complicated structure. Here clarity has been sought as a means to an end, but not as an end in itself. Thus, Wittgenstein was no longer interested to construct a building and his way of thinking is different from the scientists. The spirit of the book has to be evident in the book itself and it cannot be described. If a book has been written for just a few readers, it will be clear just from the fact that only a few people understand it. Accordingly, the book must automatically separate those who understand it from those who do not. It is important to be noted here that telling someone something would be pointless if he does not understand it. Wittgenstein says, "If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it unless of course, you want them to admire the room from outside!"¹³⁸ Thus for Wittgenstein, the book has nothing to do with the progressive civilization. The main contention is of course to try to make the spirit explicit. Lacking the spirit is something rotten and it goes against culture. Everything has to be ritualistic but

¹³⁸ Ibid, p. 7e.

sometimes it becomes rotten. Kiss, for example, is a ritual and it is not rotten. Ritual is permissible only to the extent that it is as genuine as a kiss. Therefore, one has to try to make the spirit explicit. Someone may think that music as a primitive art just because it contains a few notes and rhythms. It is an interpretation of music that would be true only at the surface level. But one has to sense that its substance makes it possible and there is a sense in which it is most sophisticated art of all. Thus for Wittgenstein, there are deeper problems that we never get anywhere near, which do not lie in my path or are not part of my world. They are lost as per as Western philosophy is concerned. No one will be there capable of experiencing it. The progress of this culture is just like an epic. It might be said that civilization can only have its epic poets in advance just as a man cannot report his own death when it happens, but only foresee it and describe it as something lying in the future. Accordingly, it might be said that if we want to see an epic description of a whole culture, you will have to look at the works of its greatest figures. Thus, there is nothing wrong in saying that it should only be written in the obscure language of prophecy. For Wittgenstein, modern civilization favours hardness and conflict, but they are not something splendid but a defect. The conflict has to be dissipated because such dissolution eliminates all tensions. My society, my community though small in number, but we believe this circle to be elite of mankind compare to those who are foreign to me.

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