

THE NOTION OF LIFE-WORLD IN HUSSERL'S CRISIS: AN OVERVIEW

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Phenomenology, which started as a movement is mostly identified with the name of Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl. Many famous thinkers were influenced by Husserl's thoughts. These thinkers are Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Derrida, Paul Ricœur and others. Husserl's books, Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy and Cartesian Meditations, are both subtitled 'An introduction to phenomenology'. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology is one of the most complicated works of Husserl. The book Crisis also serves as an introduction to phenomenology. However, Husserl's final significant book, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology is unquestionably a different introduction to his phenomenology. One of the fundamental notions in Husserl's phenomenology is known as the concept of 'Lebenswelt', which means 'life-world'. In his book Crisis, Husserl elaborates on the concept of the life-world. The main goal of this paper is to comprehend the Husserlian interpretation of the notion of the life-world and its connectedness with the transcendental phenomenological project. This paper affords particular focus to the life-world, the epochē of objective science and transcendental reduction. This paper also offers a systematic interpretation of the relationship between the epochē of objective science and transcendental reduction. Husserl's phenomenology's major themes include - the structure of intentionality, natural world thesis, method of reduction, transcendental subjectivity, empathy, embodiment, time-consciousness, the notion of historicity, and intersubjectivity. In general, one does not provide a comprehensive interpretation of the idea of the life-world and its relationship with the transcendental project. This is why the main question we would like to answer in this paper is: Is life-world phenomenology compatible with transcendental phenomenology?

Keywords: Life-world, Pre-scientific World, Mathematization of Nature, Epochē, Transcendental Reduction, Transcendental Consciousness, Transcendental Subjectivity, Transcendental Intersubjectivity.

Husserl's New Concept of the World: The Life-world

Husserl initially developed the idea of the world in *Ideas I* and *Ideas II*. But in his later works, Husserl promoted a new concept of the world. In the *Crisis* text, for example, he came up with a new way to think about the world, which he calls the 'life-world.' Husserl wished to firmly establish the concept of life-world on the philosophical map. As a result, he realized that his former version of the naturalistic conception of the world needed to be replaced with a more basic concept of the life-world. The notion of the life-world is different from *Ideas I*'s version of the world. When phenomenology was developed in *Ideas I*, the emphasis was on the natural attitude and the natural world thesis. We have also seen that his book *Ideas I* introduced the method of epochē and reduction, and through these methods, we can access transcendental phenomenology. It is true

that the phrase ‘life-world’ has been used in earlier investigations. But his *Crisis* text presents the novelty of the theory of the life-world. In his book, *Crisis*, Husserl popularized the idea of the life-world as a contrast to the scientific world. Husserl addresses the notion of the life-world in his *Crisis* from a consideration of science. Now let us examine how new the notion of the life-world is. In *Ideas I*, Husserl provided an account of the naturally experienced world as it is perceived by the human consciousness and he also defines ‘world’ as a ‘collective scope of potential inquiries’. However, in the early nineteen-thirties, he began to ground his phenomenology on the life-world to keep room for human communities, cultural dimensions, cultural establishments, transcendental inter-subjectivity, environing-world, living things, and renewal of humanity.

A crude and rudimentary version of the concept of the life-world was already there in 1913’s *Ideas I*. In this context, the phrase ‘natural world’ employed there should not be confused with the notion of ‘life-world’ as described in the ‘*Crisis*’ text. It has been pointed by David Carr,

“The strange fact about the Kant-critique in the *Crisis* is that while Husserl takes Kant to task for not recognizing the significance of the liveworld, this is the first time, in Husserl’s own writings, that the life-world is accorded this significance. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Husserl’s Kant-critique is really a Husserl-critique in disguise, that the inadequate concept of transcendental philosophy that is criticized here is not Kant’s but that of the earlier Husserl. It is true that Husserl had not made the mistake of identifying the world with the entities of natural science alone.”¹

It goes without saying that Husserl’s criticism of Kant is, in reality, a critique of his own prior views on the subject, which is what he was attempting to demonstrate in Part-III A of the *Crisis* text. First of all, Husserl criticizes Kant for assuming that the world is a scientific world. And secondly, Kant did not distinguish between the world of science and the life-world. Husserl argued that Kant failed to make a clear distinction between Newtonian science’s geometrical and mathematical constructions and the everyday life-world. Kant identified the world of ordinary experience with the Newtonian world. As a result, Kant had

¹ David Carr, *Interpreting Husserl: Critical and Comparative Studies*, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 88.

neglected and overlooked the importance of the life-world. Moreover, Kant ignored the historical, intersubjective level of the constitution in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. Thirdly, Kant does not have any conception of the structure of the life-world. Kant only focused on the *a priori* of scientific discovery. In his book *Crisis*, Husserl proposes a new distinction that is not found in any of his other publications. This book introduces the distinction between objective-logical *a priori* and the *a priori* of the life-world. According to Husserl, the life-world has its own *a priori* structure. The *a priori* of the life-world includes pre-mathematical, subjective-relative, pre-scientific, pre-theoretical, pre-logical, causality, lived-space, lived-time, horizontal character, etc. On the other hand, objective-logical *a priori* includes gravity, force, motion, resistance, etc. The *a priori* of the life-world is the ultimate basis of meaning for any other *a priori* in the objective sciences. The idealization of the life-world produces the objective-logical *a priori*.

In his work, *Crisis*, Husserl uses many terms to describe the life-world, including ‘pre-given surrounding world’, ‘a realm of subjective phenomena’, ‘pre-scientific world’, ‘pre-theoretical world’, ‘world of everyday experience’, ‘historical world’, ‘cultural world’, ‘the intuitively given surrounding world’, ‘universal life-world *a priori*’, ‘pre-scientific experimental life’, ‘pre-reflective experience’, ‘intersubjective world’, ‘lived experience’, and so forth. Commentators claim that many ambiguities may be found in the notion of the life-world. If we follow Husserl’s *Crisis* text and investigate what he says there, we will realize that he has meant several things by the word ‘life-world.’ As Dermot Moran writes,

“The term ‘life-world’ is introduced to supplement—or indeed sometimes replace— other conceptions, including the ‘natural world’ (*die natürliche Welt*), ‘the intuitively given surrounding world’ (*die anschauliche Umwelt*, *Crisis* § 9a; § 59), the ‘straightforwardly intuited world’ (*Crisis* § 33), the ‘taken-for-granted, pre-given world of experience, the world of natural life’ (C 204; K 208), the ‘environment’ (*Umgebung*), the ‘world of experience’ (*Erfahrungswelt*, *Erlebnisswelt*), the world of culture (*Kulturwelt*, Hua IX 113), ‘world-life’ (*Weltleben*), the ‘human world’, and so on. The primary meaning of the life-world is, for Husserl, the ‘world of everyday

experience' (*Alltagswelt*) or the 'pregiven' surrounding world (C 47; K 47)."²

To say the truth Husserl reconstructed the concept of the world in his *Crisis*. According to Husserl, real explanations of the life-world are essentially designed to contrast with the scientist's mathematized world. We can argue that his analysis of the life-world is concerned with the historicity of scientific ideas in a way that goes beyond his previous investigations of the world. In other words, Husserl's depiction of the life-world asserts an interest in the historicity of scientific ideas that extends beyond his previous investigations of the world. In his earlier works, namely, *Ideas I*, *Cartesian Meditations*, and *Formal and Transcendental Logic* Husserl did not develop the ontology of the life-world or mundane phenomenology of the world. The ontology of the life-world should not be confused with Husserl's earlier concept of the world. In his book *Crisis*, Husserl speaks repeatedly of the phenomenon of the 'pre-theoretical' of the life-world. Moreover, in his *Crisis* Husserl distinguished between the world of science and the pre-scientific life-world. Husserl also distinguished between life-world *a priori* and objective-logical *a priori*. Thus, we find that the life-world theme goes beyond his earlier concept of the world.

The World of Sciences and the Life-World:

In his *Crisis of European Sciences*, Husserl presents the life-world as the forgotten meaning foundation of natural sciences. As a result, Husserl wants to return to the world of the pre-scientific and pre-theoretical experience. The life-world is often regarded as the basis for all sciences, as a source of meaning-giving foundation for all sciences. This life-world has been forgotten by modern science because of its formalized character. The return to the life-world is a return to the pre-scientific experience. Scientific thoughts seek to conceal this world. The life-world is pre-given to all scientific theories. It is the field of all human acts. All science legitimizes its logical meaning by its explicit relation to the life-world. Sciences are in crisis because they have lost all connection with their roots and with their fundamental purpose. The practices of sciences are also rooted in the life-world. As a consequence of scientific ideas being imposed on the life-world,

² Dermot Moran, *Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction*, (Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 2012), 226-226-227.

we have lost sight of the concept of the life-world. It is essential to note, however, that Husserl is not condemning science. Then, just which element of science does Husserl want to denounce? These points are of course not unrelated. Needless to say, the sciences perform a process of abstract objectivization and pure technicalization, and as a result, they apply these methods to the life-world and mathematicalize the very essence of the life-world.

The concept of the life-world refers to the pre-theoretical world. In other words, the life-world is pre-scientific and pre-mathematical. Life-world is the world that is always given in advance and we do not question its evidence in our daily lives. The life-world is the opposite pole of the 'objective world' of the sciences. The life-world, according to Husserl, is the ultimate framework and horizon of human experience, which also encompasses the scientific conception of the world. The life-world also includes the historical, cultural, and social aspects. It is a dynamic historical horizon for human activity. Life-world is a realm of subjective phenomena. The 'life-world refers to the world that is open to everyone, the world that is fundamentally communal, the world for others. According to Husserl, the life-world is the immediately perceived world. Life-world is "the constant ground of validity"³, "the source of self-evidence"⁴ "the original ground of all theoretical and practical activities"⁵, and that which "constantly exists for us"⁶. From what has been discussed so far, it has already emerged that Husserl has both a 'narrow' and 'broad' conception of the life-world. The narrow sense of the life-world excludes the scientific world of ideal objects. On the other hand, the broad sense of the life-world encompasses the scientific world of ideal objects. Life-world is an umbrella term that encompasses the pre-scientific world as well as the social and cultural worlds. Thus, we find that the word 'life-world' has several meanings. Now we have to face some important and puzzling features of Husserl's notion of the life-world. For example:

- Life-world is pre-scientific, but it also includes the theories of sciences as cultural facts.⁷

³ Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, Trans. David Carr, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 122.

⁴ Ibid.,127.

⁵ Ibid.,49.

⁶ Ibid.,113.

⁷ Ibid.,130.

- Life-world is pre-theoretical, but it also includes all theoretical and practical activity.⁸
- Life-world is the theme of a non-transcendental ontology or a mundane phenomenology⁹, but it is also a theme of transcendental phenomenology.¹⁰
- Although Husserl talks of different life-worlds for different historical groups, he also maintains that the concept of plurality does not make sense when applied to it.¹¹

In this regard, it is necessary to mention here that Husserl's conception of the life-world performs three distinct tasks. First of all, it provides the grounding function to the natural sciences. The life-world should be regarded as opposed to objective sciences. In this sense, the life-world is the pre-scientific, pre-logical, and pre-theoretical world. Secondly, the life-world provides the guiding function to transcendental phenomenology. In other words, it serves as the royal road into transcendental phenomenology or the notion of life-world provides a new way into the transcendental phenomenology. And thirdly, the notion of the life-world also provides the uniting function. To put it simply, the life-world encompasses different historical worlds. In this regard, the life-world is conceived as a universal field.

The book *Crisis* by Edmund Husserl takes a new approach to transcendental phenomenology. The *Crisis* is a significant departure from earlier introductions to phenomenology. Unlike earlier introductions to phenomenology, which started with a description of the transcendental phenomenological methods without any historical analysis, Husserl's *Crisis* does not start with these methods. The significance of Husserl's *Crisis* text is that Husserl's so-called 'turn' to history can be found explicitly in this book. Husserl's *Crisis* text gives a long analysis of modern Galilean science and modern philosophy. What relevance does this new historical reflection have? It is worth noting that the book *Crisis* differs from Husserl's previous writings in that it includes historical and critical reflections that are integral to the study of phenomenology itself. In his book, *Crisis* Husserl demonstrates that the emergence of scientific objectivism marked the starting of the crisis of European sciences. Through the process of historical reflection,

⁸ Ibid.,130.

⁹ Ibid.,142.

¹⁰ Ibid.,148.

¹¹ Ibid.,143.

Husserl demonstrates that positivist sciences have forgotten their ground. These sciences do not question the foundations of their methodical activities. We may analyze the origins of the crisis of sciences by looking at Husserl's remarkable description of modern contemporary science and Galileo's involvement in it. It goes without saying that the emergence of the concept of the life-world in the *Crisis* demands the requirement of historical reflections. Galileo, according to Husserl, is a key person in the process of the mathematization of nature. According to Galileo, the world is a mathematical manifold. To put it simply, life-world is a book expressed in mathematical symbols. Through the process of idealization, technicalization, and mathematization objective science dresses up the whole life-world. In this way, natural science changes the very conception of the life-world. We saw that Galileo contributed to the sciences of motion, astronomy, etc. But for Husserl, at the same time, he also hides our subjective contributions and focused only on objectivism. Galileo was so preoccupied with the concepts of technicalization, idealization, and mathematization that he forgot about the concept of the life-world. The life-world is the ground on which Galileo carried out the operation of mathematical idealization. Through the historical-teleological analyses, we understand that how Galileo mathematized our human nature and this mathematical method is used in a very technical way. As a result, the sciences consciously have lost their meaning for human life. Science, without a doubt, transcends the life-world. As a consequence, the connection between the life-world and the scientific world has remained largely unnoticed.

Epochē of Objective Science:

Disconnection of scientific interests is a fundamental aspect of the 'epochē of objective science.' Husserl meticulously articulated the fact that scientific praxis evolves in the life-world. There is a notable difference between the *Crisis* and the earlier works. In *Ideas, I*, for example, Husserl proposes to phenomenological epochē the natural world. With this phenomenological epochē, we hold in abeyance the question concerning the existence of the world. But in his *Crisis*, he proposes to epochē the world of sciences, which he called the 'epochē of objective science.' Instead of bracketing the whole world, he holds in abeyance the questions concerning the real determination of the abstract world of science as a means to unearth the life-world. This indicates a new aspect of Husserl's *Crisis* text. Under the epochē of objective science, we refrain from following the theoretical guidance of science; we suspend the theories of science and take them

out of action. All kinds of scientific induction find their base in the life-world via the process of the 'epochē of objective science.' With the help of this first step we can grasp the life-world as it is, and we are also able to experience our historical-cultural reality. If we want to view the life-world, then we need to get rid of the objectivist bias of the sciences. As Husserl points out in the *Crisis*, this first reduction must apply to the field of objective natural sciences and their methods. This first, step lies in "an epochē in regard to all objective theoretical interests, all aims and activities belonging to us as objective scientists or even simply as [ordinary] people desirous of [this kind of] knowledge."¹²

While performing the first step we set aside the objective-scientific opinions and cognition. The phenomenologist can only confront the life-world after completing the epochē of the objective science. As a result, the world will not be understood as a conglomerate of entities reducible to atomic or subatomic particles, arrays of chemical elements and molecules, point or distributed masses with coordinates in a three-dimensional Cartesian plane, and so on. First and foremost, the notion that objectivistic, formal, and mathematical science is the only valid discourse should be set aside. For too long, we have taken science for granted. We can only evaluate a world without science through the epochē of objective science. The scientific world threatens to hide the life-world. The scientific world conceals the life-world. It is only after performing the epochē of objective science we can evaluate the life-world. As a result, returning to the life-world may assist in the process of disabling the objectivistic inclination of sciences to some level. The fact that we have put a bracket around the concept of objective science does not imply that we desire to live in a world where there is no objective science. In other words, bracketing the notion of objective science does not indicate that we want to live in a world without objective science. In this regard Husserl writes in the *Crisis*: "Within this epochē, however, neither the sciences nor the scientists have disappeared for us who practice the epochē."¹³ As a cultural fact of the life-world objective science continues to exist in the life-world. We have no intention of abandoning our conceptions of objective sciences. However, the foregoing interpretations may give the mistaken impression that Husserl does not believe in the validity of science and that he is developing a *Lebensphilosophie*. As we have seen, Husserl's concern with the European crisis was what prompted him to begin his investigation into the nature of the life-world. Nevertheless, as we will see, his

¹² Ibid.,135

¹³ Ibid.,136.

ultimate purpose was not to dwell in such an analysis, but rather to carry it out and then return to its foundation and source. To say the truth, Husserl had seen the legitimacy of the life-world from the standpoint of transcendental reduction.

Transcendental Reduction:

As we have seen in the previous section, the epochē of objective science is not enough to understand the goal of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, because this does not tell us the true meaning of the achievements of positive science. Rather, it only re-discovers or re-establishes the proper notion of science. Husserl's commentators have significantly divergent views on the nature of the life-world. Merleau-Ponty and other existentialist thinkers hold that Husserl renounced his transcendental project in favour of the life-world. Here, we will show that such an explanation is a little too simplistic. In this regard David Carr writes that: "Those who claim that in the *Crisis* Husserl makes a conscious and explicit break with the idealistic or transcendental aspects of his phenomenology have surely not read the *Crisis* carefully and are probably basing their opinion on certain remarks by Merleau-Ponty."¹⁴ Husserl's ultimate stance was that the life-world is a result of the transcendental constitution. Husserl clearly indicates that the life-world is not instantly accessible since everyone is shaped by his or her cultural context. Moreover, the scientific interpretation of the world fascinates the western person. In other words, the scientific understanding of the world has a strong impact on Western man in particular. Consequently, historical reflection and the epochē of objective science are required to unveil the life-world. After we have completed these processes, we will be in a position to investigate the ontology of the life-world. We might clarify "the a priori of the life-world"¹⁵ and develop "the ontology of the life-world"¹⁶ after performing the life-worldly reduction. According to Husserl, this is also a kind of phenomenology. Husserl refers to this kind of phenomenology as mundane phenomenology. As he neared the end of his life, Husserl came to feel that mundane phenomenology of the life-world is a crucial preparatory step for transcendental phenomenology. Dermot Moran writes, "The aim of transcendental phenomenology is, as Husserl always

¹⁴ David Carr, *Phenomenology and the Problem of History: A Study of Husserl's Transcendental Philosophy* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), xxii.

¹⁵ Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, Trans. David Carr, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 137.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 173.

insists, to disrupt the natural flow of our spontaneous living in the world with all its habitualities, beliefs, acceptances, and to experience what that brings to light; namely, the interwoven character of our constituting activities through which we give ‘sense and being’ (Sinn und Sein) to our world and everything in it.”¹⁷

Husserl believed that it is only after the investigations of ‘mundane’ phenomenology have been carried out that the transcendental reduction may be given a good foundation and an appropriate guideline. As a result, the path Husserl undertakes in the *Crisis* text may be characterized as follows. By way of historical reflection and epochē of objective science, we must first return from the world of culture and science to the original life-world. The life-worldly reduction is the process of returning to the life-world and completing the epochē of the objective sciences. Husserl is not just interested in mundane phenomenology or life-world phenomenology. Moreover, Husserl is also interested in discovering the constituting achievements that make possible the life-world. There’s no other way to achieve it except by using the method of transcendental reduction. We must perform the transcendental reduction to trace back the constituting achievements that enable the life-world. The transcendental reduction will take us further back from the structures of the life-world to the transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity. In other words, we get transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity as the ‘ultimate ground’ that constitutes the life-world if we enquire back from the pre-given life-world to its constituting accomplishments via transcendental reduction. The epochē of objective science, according to Husserl, is the first step toward transcendental reduction. In this way, we find that Husserl had posited the necessity of operating a transcendental reduction. Husserl did not have any doubts about the role of transcendental reduction, even though there has been a lot of attention paid to the notion of the life-world. Transcendental reduction gives a ‘total change of the natural attitude of life’ (*Crisis* § 39). After transcendental reduction is complete, it is possible to see that “the life-world is something derivative that has its constitutive origin in the transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity.”¹⁸ This reduction allows for “the discovery and

¹⁷ Dermot Moran, “Everydayness, Historicity and the World of Science: Husserl’s Life-World Reconsidered”, in *The Phenomenological Critique of Mathematisation and the Question of Responsibility: Formalisation and the Life-World*, (Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V. 2015), 120.

¹⁸ Lee Nam-in, “Husserl’s Phenomenology and Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception” in *Phenomenology 2010, Volume 1: Selected Essays from Asia and Pacific. Phenomenology in Dialogue with East Asian Tradition*, ed. YU Chung-Chi, (Zeta Books, 2010), 168.

examination of the transcendental correlation between world and world-consciousness.”¹⁹ We are using the terms transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity because, in the earlier works, Husserl initiates the transcendental reduction inwardly, that is, transcendental reduction leads only to transcendental subjectivity. But in the *Crisis* he initially focuses the transcendental reduction outwardly, that is, transcendental reduction leads not only to transcendental subjectivity but also to transcendental intersubjectivity. To quote Dan Zahavi: “Husserl’s recurrent point is that a sufficiently radical carrying out of the transcendental reduction leads not only to subjectivity, but also to intersubjectivity.”²⁰ As a consequence, the original idea of transcendental subjectivity has been enlarged into two primary dimensions: transcendental subjectivity and transcendental intersubjectivity.

Conclusion:

In his book *Crisis*, Husserl had used terminology such as *Dasein*, *Existenz*, the pre-scientific world, the meaning or meaninglessness of the whole of human existence, everyday life-world, the surrounding world of ordinary life, philosophy of existence, and so on. The combination of all of these terms may create the impression that Husserl is advancing towards existential phenomenology. It is well known that Nazism was gaining prominence at the time when Husserl wrote his book *Crisis*. Moreover, Husserl wrote his book *Crisis* just prior to the Second World War. Nazi ideologues insulted, attacked, and mocked him for his ‘Jewish Religion.’ Some scholars are of the opinion that, Husserlian phenomenology, especially in its final phases of development, was based on the catastrophic reality of the Nazis, and as a result, Husserl based his phenomenology on an understanding of the existentialism of the life-world. This type of interpretation reflects only a partial reading of Husserl’s *Crisis* text. Husserl’s life-world phenomenology does not allow for the conclusion that it is only an attempt to respond to a particular historical circumstance. Life-world ontology is an idea that

¹⁹ Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, Trans. David Carr, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970). 151.

²⁰ Dan Zahavi, “Husserl’s Intersubjective Transformation of Transcendental Philosophy”, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 27, no. 3 (1996): 235.

Husserl develops in the *Crisis* text. Although Husserl devotes much of his *Crisis* text to the idea of an ontology of the life-world, it is not correct to believe that he is only formulating the notion of an ontology of the life-world in his *Crisis* text. Husserl, on the other hand, has a different intention in mind. As a result, any assertion that Husserl's investigation of the life-world represents a split with his transcendental project is incorrect. The goal of *Crisis*, like with a lot of his previous works, is to offer us with an introduction to transcendental phenomenology. The life-world is regarded as a universal basis of all entities in the transcendental attitude, and it is something constituted by transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity. According to Husserl, the life-world is co-constituted by transcendental subjectivity and transcendental intersubjectivity. In the transcendental attitude, the life-world is unimaginable unless it is considered in connection to the transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity. The life-world is constituted by transcendental subjectivities or transcendentially working consciousness. Husserl saw that our life-world is clothed up by objectivism, in other words, life in the life-world has been covered up by objectivism or naturalism. Our natural attitude is naturalistic because it is so much influenced by the sciences. So there is a real need to rediscover the life-world. This mundane phenomenology acts as a stepping stone to transcendental phenomenology. Husserlian so-called transcendental phenomenology aims to make the life-world intelligible. Two things are made possible by the epochē of objective science and transcendental reduction: first, through the epochē of objective science, we gain access to the pre-scientific life-world; and second, through transcendental reduction, we grasp transcendental consciousness as the ground of the life-world. For Husserl, transcendental consciousness is the constitutional ground of all worldly experience. So, it could be remarked that historical reflection, epochē of objective science, and transcendental reduction provide the basis for transcendental phenomenology.

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