

## NATURE OF SELF -AWARENESS : PRIVACY AND BEYOND

SANCHAYAITA SEN

*In this paper I have made an attempt to discuss whether the privacy of self-awareness is admissible or not. The paper contains two main sections. In **Section 1**, I have discussed some plausible accounts about the nature of self-awareness where different layers of self are being accepted. I have specifically discussed two views. At first, I have put forward the general viewpoint of the phenomenologists showcasing how they differentiate between pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness. In the context of discussing the differences between these two kinds of self-awareness, I have also tried to briefly discuss about the notion of immediacy of self-awareness. After that I have discussed how Kristina Musholt claims that self-awareness has two stages, namely implicit and explicit. In order to establish her view, Musholt has used some arguments from cognitive science, which I have tried to briefly state here. Then I have tried to establish that we can accept two different layers of self-awareness. The first layer is named pre-reflective self-awareness by the phenomenologists and implicit self-awareness by Musholt. Although pre-reflective self-awareness and implicit self-awareness are not identical by nature but I believe that these two share the common sort of privacy. And then, we can admit another layer of self-awareness that is called reflective self-awareness by the phenomenologists. And if we go by Musholt's view it is called explicit self-awareness. I think both, reflective self-awareness and explicit self-awareness have the same kind of lack of privacy, meaning, they both are communicable. On the basis of these two viewpoints, in **Section 2** I have tried to discuss that there is a fragmentation in the structure of self-awareness. On one hand, there is a fundamental part of self-awareness that is private and only accessible to the subject, hence we should not completely abandon the notion of privacy of self-awareness, and on the other hand there is another complex layer of self-awareness which is not private. And in the last part of the Section 2, I have tried to provide an answer to these two questions: Why do we still need to retain the private self-awareness? Why do we need to admit another kind of self-awareness that is not private and comparatively more meaty than the other form of self-awareness?*

**(Keywords – Self-awareness, immediacy, privacy, communicability, layers of self)**

### **Nature of Self - Awareness : Privacy and Beyond**

Self and self-awareness are probably two of the most familiar phenomena to us. They are treated as the hallmark of our mental lives. Self-awareness is also very often characterised by privacy because traditionally it is believed that what is presented to a subject in self-awareness is accessible to the subject only. But, is self-awareness really as private as it seems? Can we explain the nature of self-awareness without accepting a communication with other subjects? Can there at all be an explicit and distinct self-knowledge if an individual is absolutely detached from any sort of social interaction? A bit of reflection would suggest a negative answer to these questions. Even before getting into any deep philosophical analysis, at least from a common man's perspective we can say that social interactions and communication do play a very important role in how we see ourselves. In this article, I would endorse

the same point of view along with some philosophical arguments. But, the discussion does not end here. If we admit that complex social interactions constitute our self-awareness, then another very important question arises that is, does this account of self-knowledge completely lambast the traditional Cartesian theory of a private self? And, if it does, then can that be done on a solid logical ground? In other words, the question can be put like this: Can we completely dismiss Cartesian theory of a private self and still provide both philosophically and pragmatically sound theory of self and self-awareness? I assume that it is not very easy to completely abandon the notion of privacy in our understanding of self. So, a better way to deal with this problem is to admit different kinds of self-awareness, and claim that there is one minimal layer of self-awareness that is and will always be private in every sense. However, the privacy factor does not exhaust the nature of self and self-knowledge. There is another layer of self-awareness which is way more complex and it is a product of public communication, social interaction and is recognition of perspectival differences. So, the second kind of self-awareness is not private.<sup>1</sup>

In this article I will try to articulate some arguments from both the perspectives of phenomenology and cognitive science, to establish that it is philosophically and pragmatically convenient for us to accept two sorts of, rather two layers of self-awareness. One is similar to the notion of Cartesian ego, and the other is a more meaty self-awareness which is not essentially private in the strict sense of the term, because it is built up by means of social interaction, consequentially it is going to be publically accessible as well.

## **SECTION 1**

### **A. Different ways of looking at Self-awareness :**

The term 'self-awareness' can be little ambiguous, as there can be more than one way of getting acquainted with the self. Most phenomenologists will agree that there are two layers of self-awareness, namely, pre-reflective and reflective (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008). The former is a minimal form of self-awareness that is known to be the basic structural feature of conscious experiences. Experiences happen for the subject in the most immediate way. Now, one might ask, what is this immediacy? What is it constituted of? Do we call it immediate because we have a private access to this experience? Or, it is immediate because we have authority over it? Or, this immediacy just refers to a peculiar access to the experience. I believe that the incorrigible nature of self-

---

<sup>1</sup> However, there are views where philosophers have accepted more than two layers of self-awareness.

awareness stems from the immediacy of self-awareness. The immediacy provides an authority to the owner of the experience and I think that it is the authoritativeness of self-awareness which brings in the incorrigibility factor and not the peculiar access associated with self-awareness. It is a well-known philosophical conviction that due to this immediacy, those experiences are marked as my own experience. This immediate self-awareness has a first personal givenness. This is usually named as 'pre-reflective' self-awareness. In contrast to this, we can admit a second type of self-awareness that is reflective and second order consciousness. Pre reflective self-awareness is not a second order mental state. It is to be understood as the most primary and basic form of consciousness, and it is the most intrinsic feature of consciousness. It is not thematic, subjects are not attentive towards it, and neither can they voluntarily bring about this intrinsic form of consciousness. It is unspoken, non-observational, non-propositional, non-objectifying. It is never directed towards anything. And, most importantly we should not confuse it with any introspective awareness of ourselves. If I voluntarily wish to become aware of it or want to reflect upon it, I can, but this awareness was, is and always will be there prior to any necessary reflection upon it. Thus, it is called 'Pre reflective self-awareness'. It has a non-relational dimension as it is not apprehended in relation to any object.

In contrast to pre reflective self-awareness, reflective self-awareness is explicit, conceptual, propositional, clearly stated and relational. This sort of self-awareness has directedness, and it also takes lower order consciousness as its theme for attention. I can at any time be cognitively aware of this self-awareness, and turn my experience as an object of my consciousness. This form of consciousness is relational in the sense that it occurs with conscious temporal dimension. It also involves self fission<sup>2</sup> on the basis of the variety of experiences. In reflective self-awareness we can distinguish between our reflective awareness and the experience reflected on. So, there is a possible dichotomy between the reflecting experience and the experience reflected on. The reflecting experience takes the experience that is reflected upon as its object of reflection.<sup>3</sup>

Now, one might wonder that if the pre-reflective self-awareness is non-observational, non-relational and non-intentional, moreover subjects are never naturally attentive towards it; then where does this 'mine-ness' of the pre-

---

<sup>2</sup> Fission refers to a kind of division of the self.

<sup>3</sup> The whole distinction has been elaborately discussed by Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi in their book *The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive science*

reflective awareness come from? How is this pre-reflective awareness marked as someone's own experience? For, as per the definition of pre-reflective awareness, to hold the mine-ness of experiences or to be aware that a particular experience is mine, a subject needs to reach a second order conscious state where he becomes aware that he is the experiencer. Hence, it might seem more convenient for us to claim that the reflective self-awareness is infallibly marked as mine. But, how can we say that the pre-reflective self-awareness is also marked as 'mine'? One plausible answer to this can be that, the mine-ness of pre-reflective consciousness cannot be proven experientially but it can be proven logically. The logic behind it is very simple, i.e, if an experience is taking place there must be someone who is experiencing it, and in case of pre-reflective awareness, there is no other subject relevant and related to the context who can be possibly held to be the subject of that experience other than the subject himself. On a similar note, it can also be said that an experience can be immediately presented to only one subject and that has to be the same person whose experience is being presented. Another subject cannot get an immediate access to somebody else's pre-reflective awareness. Hence, although the sense of 'I' or the mine-ness of the pre-reflective self-awareness may not be present experientially in a substantial way, but there can be provided a credible logical alternative for accepting the mine-ness of pre-reflective awareness. The pre-reflective self-awareness admitted by the phenomenologists is first-personal and private. But the reflective awareness on the contrary is linguistically presentable. It is not completely first personal and egocentric as it occasions an inner pluralization in the sense that it involves self-distantiation. Husserl (1973) has suggested that the reflective self-awareness is accentuated as it discloses, disentangles, explicates and articulates all the components and structures of our lived experiences which were otherwise implicitly contained in us. Reflective self-awareness offers us conceptual articulation of our experiences. The phenomenologists also claim that every conscious experience entails a minimal, pre-reflective self-consciousness (e.g. Zahavi 2005). So, they have distinguished between reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness.

While talking about these two kinds of self-awareness let me discuss Jose Luis Bermudez's take on self-awareness. Bermudez explains in his text called *The Paradox of self-consciousness*(2017) that when an individual is cognitively competent enough to have self-conscious thoughts and she is using the first person pronoun 'I' to refer to those thoughts as her own, there must be a set of capacities which is common to both the competencies, i.e, forming self-conscious thoughts and using self-referential language. Now the question

arises, how is this ability to think 'I'-thoughts to be explained? 'I'-thoughts are said to be dependent on a specific kind of evidence base, namely on information about the subject that is immediately accessible to the subject. These types of information include information about occurring mental and bodily states. For example, perception and proprioception, both of which provide the subject with non-conceptual, first-personal content. Perception is defined as something that provides the perceiver not just with information about the environment, but necessarily, also with the information about the perceiving subject. Proprioception provides the organism with information regarding the state of the body, such as its position in space, or its balance. Hence, it is argued that the content of perception and proprioception provides the subject with information that is about itself. In addition to that, this information is thought to be immune to error through misidentification. And, according to Bermudez, both perception and proprioception can be treated as the most basic and non-conceptual form of self-awareness and 'I'-thoughts.

Moving on to Kristina Musholt's discussion of self-awareness where we must note in the beginning that she has significantly differed with Bermudez's view in her opinion on this topic. Musholt preferred to distinguish consciousness from self-consciousness. We should not misinterpret that what is pre-reflective consciousness for the phenomenologists must be consciousness for Musholt, as she has clearly mentioned that she has no intention of rephrasing the pre-reflecting awareness as 'consciousness'. Musholt further distinguishes between implicit self related information and explicit self related information. She upholds that, both perception and proprioception provide the organism with implicit self-related information. She also claims that only the explicit self related information can provide the subject with thoughts that are known by the subject to be about itself. Hence, only the explicit self related information qualifies as self-awareness. In the context of discussing the notion of implicit and explicit self related information she brings in the notion of 'fact' and, following Dienes and Perner (1999), she quotes in her article named "Self-awareness and intersubjectivity".

"fact is explicitly represented if there is an expression (mental or otherwise) whose meaning is just that fact; in other words, there is an internal state whose function is to indicate that fact". (Dienes and Perner 1999)

This means that a fact is represented explicitly when the mental state contains an element that directly refers to the fact in question. In contrast, a fact or state of affairs will be called implicit when the mental state in question does not embrace an element that directly refers to this fact, but this fact is

conveyed only as a part of the related function of the mental state. Now, Musholt upholds that, Bermudez is correct in pointing out that perception always takes place from a specific egocentric perspective and hence it is necessarily self-related. He has also correctly pointed out that proprioception gives the subject some information regarding its bodily states. However, this does not necessarily imply that the information is also explicitly represented as being about the subject. Rather, because perception always occurs from a unique ego-centric perspective, and because proprioception always gives information about a subject's bodily states, in these two cases self is in fact not explicitly represented. For, there is no need for the organism to keep track of the subject of its perceptual and proprioceptive states. These states can take place even without referring to the subject in question, explicitly. Musholt has argued elsewhere that the self should be understood as an 'unarticulated constituent' (Perry, 2000) of perception and proprioception. These states can occur and be unrecorded. The information that is given by perception and proprioception is implicitly self-related only because it is a part of the function of perception and proprioception to provide information that is related to the subject. That information can be used for the guidance of intentional action. But this must be differentiated from explicit self-representation where the information is explicitly represented as being about the subject. In other words, we need to distinguish between being in a particular perceptual or bodily state and explicitly ascribing this state to a subject. It is one thing to be conscious and another thing to be self-conscious, the former is implicitly done but the latter is essentially explicit. The explicit representation of the subject of my perception, i.e, myself, comes into play when I compare my own perception and my egocentric perspective with that of another subject. For example, I can see a my phone on the table beside my laptop, but someone else cannot, because his visual access to my phone is blocked by some other object that is located between my phone and the person. Now, once I realize that this is the case, I might come to the explicit thought that I can see the phone and she cannot. This at once provides me with an understanding of a certain mental state being mine and not anybody else's. Here is when my self-representation becomes explicit and qualifies as self-awareness. Hence, according to Musholt, explicit self-representation or the real self-awareness comes into play when the organism is aware of the fact that there are other individuals with mental and bodily states similar to ours, and when it begins to contrast them with its own. I think that there is a simple insight that comes out here, that is,if there is only one subject in the entire world then there is no need for the subject to recognise her awareness as 'her awareness'.

Now, more interestingly Musholt has talked about different stages of building self-awareness, and tried to show that the self-awareness gradually grows from implicit to explicit forms, through different stages. She says that if I want to recognise that other beings have bodily and mental states like me, and I must contrast these with my own, at first I need to be in a position to recognize the similarity between me and others. I must have the ability to match the information I receive about others, from a third person perspective, with the information I receive about myself, from the first person ego-centric perspective (Barresi & Moore 1996). A first requirement for this recognition is that conspecifics must be recognized as such. According to an empirical survey, in human beings, there are a number of inborn mechanisms that certify that infants identify members of their own species. For instance, neonates attend to stimuli with face-like arrangements of elements (Johnson & Morton 1991). Moreover, already at the time of birth, infants can favourably attend to human speech over other auditory input. By 4 days they are able to discriminate components of their mother tongue from those of other languages (Mehler, 1988). Also, infants can distinguish animate from inanimate movement and young children use potential movements as the basis for discriminating between photos of animates and in-animates (Massey & Gelman 1988). This shows us that humans have innate attentional preferential factors that cause them to treat conspecifics as individual subjects and not as inanimate objects. Empirical evidence also suggests that in humans some such matching mechanism do exist in very early stages, and might even be innate, such that

“infants, even newborns, are capable of apprehending the equivalence between body transformations they see and the ones they feel themselves perform” (Meltzoff 1990).

However, Musholt says that at very early stages of social interaction, infants does not have an explicit representation of a self-other matching, or a self-other binary distinction. The content of representations at these stages is definitely non-conceptual and implicit, and it does not need any explicit distinction between self and other, neither any explicit depiction of an intentional relation. In this stage, there is no differentiation between self and other whatsoever. Studies of early infant imitation are similar to the phenomenon of emotional contact, where the perception of an emotional expression by another subject causes the experience of that same emotion in oneself, and thus there is no differentiation between the other's emotion and one's own. Because there is no self-other distinction at this level and hence no awareness of other subjects as such. Social interactions and the

representations allied with infants get to a new quality from about the age of 9 to 12 months. At this age, infants enter into situations of shared attention and intentionality. Within the developmental literature, these are called forms of “secondary inter-subjectivity”, in contrast to the so-called forms of “primary inter-subjectivity” (Trevvarthen 1979). At this stage, infants start synchronizing their object-directed behaviour with their person-directed behaviour, that is, they move from purely dyadic forms of interaction to triadic forms of interaction. In other words, they begin to engage in shared intentional relations. For instance, they will follow the gaze or the specific gestures of another person to an object of interest, and exhibit “shared attention” towards that object (Tomasello et al. 2005). This also proposes an implicit understanding of others as perceivers. Moreover, infants at this age will start developing social referencing, such as receiving emotional information from their caregivers to control their own behaviour in situations that are perceived as intimidating (e.g. Feinman 1982). Children at this age will also begin to display communicative signals, such as pointing gestures (Bates 1979). However, neither shared attention, nor social referencing, nor the ability to pointing imply the explicit attribution of mental states to others, for they do not require the distinction between propositional attitudes and propositional contents. That is to say that children at this age do not understand mental representations as such, so they are not able to understand, for instance, that mental states can misrepresent.

According to Musholt when children pass the famous false belief tasks, which is usually the case at around 4 years of age, at this stage, they become able to explicitly represent belief states as states they are able to differentiate other people’s beliefs from one’s own beliefs. At this level, children possess a theory of mind that is explicitly represented. This is further supported by the strong connection between linguistic abilities and the understanding of beliefs and folk psychology (P. A. de Villiers 2005; Zlatev 2008). Once the child has acquired the appropriate linguistic skills that facilitate explicit theory-of-mind reasoning, it can also begin to engage in inner speech. It is believed that inner speech plays an important role for explicit self-awareness, in the sense of explicit self-reflection. According to Morin, inner speech initiates socially caused practice of talking and reflection upon oneself into an inner experience. As Morin points out, this idea was already expressed by Mead (1912/1964), who argued that inner speech in early childhood serves to make young speakers aware of themselves and their separate existence through an internalization of others’ perspectives on oneself. So, inner speech would replicate social feedback and changes in perspectives, thereby internalizing it. Moreover, inner speech is thought to facilitate the conceptualization and

labelling of self-related aspects, thus interpreting these aspects more differentiated (Morin 2005). The relation between language acquisition and the development of self-concept is also emphasized by Baker. (Baker 2012)

As we can see, a number of social cognitive skills and forms of inter-subjective are undoubtedly in place before the beginning of linguistic abilities, and are arguably necessary requirements for the development of language. Nonetheless, linguistic abilities seem to be necessary to develop a full-fledged theory of mind as well.

The model Musholt proposed, assumes that the more basic forms of social cognition are retained, such that social cognitive skills become gradually enriched and more complex as implicit information is re-described into a more explicit format. In other words, we have various ways of understanding and interacting with others, some of which are based on implicit information about the mental states of others, others based on explicit representation.

### **B. Different Layers of Self-Awareness from various perspectives**

So, we can see that self-awareness involves a kind of division or fragmentation within it. There are different layers of self-knowledge.

According to Musholt's proposed model, one type of self-awareness is implicit the other one is explicit. Here the former does not involve substantial perspectival differentiation where the explicit self-awareness has it. The explicit self-awareness is comparatively a lot more substantial and complex as it requires social interaction (which by nature is cognitively complex), awareness of other minds and other subjects. But implicit self-awareness does not involve any of these features, because it is the simplest form of self-awareness as it does not involve any awareness of other minds or any perspectival differentiation.

On a similar note, we have seen phenomenologists talking about two sorts of self-awareness, namely, pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness. And, we have already known how they have differentiated between these two. On the basis of those differences in the phenomenological view also, we are getting to know about two different layers of self-awareness, one is basic and intrinsic and the other is thematic and relational and evaluative. I feel that this whole discussion of different layers of self hints upon that one part of the self is exclusively constituted for the subject, and it is only get represented to the subject. It is not propositional, so it cannot get expressed linguistically. It is intrinsic and rudimentary. It is private in the sense that the subject cannot

express it through complex linguistic tool because it is not something to be articulated by language. Rather it is something to be felt. This self-awareness is equivalent to the mode being of the subject. It is the implicit conscious mode of being that can only be experienced by the subject himself. But, on contrary to this there is another form of self-awareness. That self-awareness is conceptual, explicit. It is that self-awareness which gets constituted involving third person perspective. Here I evaluate myself, I try to understand what I am and how I am for others. The concepts that I apply in this sort of self-awareness are not only constituted within the subject, there are mostly constructed socially. And this is the self-awareness that is not only accessible by the subject only, it is also expressible through language. The information that constitute this self-awareness, are the information about me that other subjects can also have an access to. Things that I know and believe about myself in my explicit self-awareness can also be known by other people as those information are conceptual and propositional.

## **SECTION 2**

### **A. Discussion of Privacy and Beyond**

If we solely subscribe to the Cartesian notion of self, and claim that the self or the soul is the inner most private entity, then mental contents like our thoughts, feelings, emotions, ideas become extremely concealed. They can only be known through introspection, which is again a method to be used only by own self. Then subjectivity is said to be something in which no external elements like public language, third person perspective can have any contribution to in revealing it. In other words, in Cartesian philosophy subjectivity of an individual is impossible to be communicated with other people. Even if we try to express it through interpersonal communication, there is no dependable and definite way of doing it. Whether the subjectivity is being expressed correctly or not cannot be verified in any way. The truest state of mind of that subject remains inside him. But the questions arise:

- Can we admit this amount of privacy of self and self-awareness on logical grounds? Do we still need to retain the private self-awareness?
- Can we not admit another form of self-awareness which is probably not private, rather both constituted and accessible within the repertoire of other individuals? Why do we need the more meaty self-awareness?

Musholt has argued that explicit self-representation which she thinks is the self-awareness in the strict sense of the term, requires the awareness of other subjects and of their similarity to oneself. In this kind of self-awareness one can contrast one's own bodily and mental states with those of others. This awareness develops over the course of an increasingly complex perspectival differentiation and inter-subjective interaction, where I believe language plays an important role. In this explicit self-knowledge, information about self and other which is implicit in early forms of social interaction gets qualified into an explicit format. Hence, there is a gradual transition from implicit to explicit forms of self- and other-representation that leads to an increasingly complex array of social cognitive abilities and, consequently to a development of a clear and distinct self-concept. We can now see how we move from the implicit self-related information in perception and bodily forms of self-awareness to an explicit representation of oneself as a subject among other subjects. In the transition from implicit self-knowledge to explicit self-knowledge there is a crucial role of the embodied inter-subjectivity, which sets a mechanism that allows the matching of first and third person information. I think from Musholt's account we can assume that there is a clear function of communication with other subjects that come into play when an individual tries to constitute an explicit form of self-awareness.

Let me now go to the discussion of the reflective self-awareness admitted vastly in the discourses of phenomenology. Reflective self-awareness has been defined as explicit, conceptual, propositional, clearly stated and relational. It has directedness, and it also takes lower order consciousness as its theme for attention. I can at any time be cognitively aware of this self-awareness. This form of consciousness is taken to be relational in the sense that it occurs with conscious temporal dimension, a dimension where other subjects have very important role to play when the change of perspectives is taking place. Now, I would also like to bring the notion of agency in this context. The sense of agency may be seen as a second order reflective self-knowledge. Agency is dependent on an individual's reflective consciousness, and on an individual's capacity to see himself as responsible for an action from a third person perspective. The kind of conscious knowledge is involved in the sense of agency is very high order, and I would like to say that Musholt's explicit self-representation would incorporate the factor of agency as well. Especially in the attribution sense of agency where I am asked to provide reason behind my actions, the self-knowledge involved in there is an explicit sort of self-knowledge. (Zahavi and Gallagher 2008). Now, Both Musholt's notion of explicit self-awareness and reflective higher order self-awareness involving

agency are apprehended in terms of third person perspectives or alter egos. Moreover, in the constitution of the explicit self-representation and the reflective self-awareness as agent, communication, interaction with other subjects and complex cognitive and linguistic processes are taken to be crucial elements. In other words, they are both constituted in a process where embodied inter-subjective is involved, and they are also expressed and developed in the course of time through embodied inter-subjective interaction. So, at least the higher order explicit self-knowledge does not happen to be a private cocooned self as described in the Cartesian theory. But, I think we cannot claim the same in case of minimal, implicit, pre-reflective self-knowledge. At least, the views that are discussed in this article indicate that the pre-reflective, also the implicit self-representation do not necessarily involve embodied inter-subjective communication. Hence, I think, the Cartesian notion of self that is extremely private and only accessible to the subject himself is admissible only in the context where we are talking about the pre-reflective level of self-awareness. As Musholt has denied to call it pre-reflective awareness, and preferred to call it just 'being conscious', I would say that what she is naming the minimal, implicit, basic form of consciousness can be seen as a self-representation that is private and non-sharable. So, the implicit self-representation about which we get to know in Musholt's view is something that fits into the Cartesian account of self-awareness.

### **B. Answering the previously mentioned questions in context of what has been said in this paper**

#### **Q. Do we still need to retain the concept of private self-awareness?**

Yes. We cannot completely dismiss Cartesian theory of a private self as it will not be a credible theory of self-awareness neither philosophically nor pragmatically. We can definitely accept another form of self-awareness that is not private. We can think of a notion of subjectivity whose components are communicable, socially construed. In fact that communicable subjectivity is something with which other individuals get acquainted with. For others, that subject is a person's social identity. But, we must admit that the subject that gets showcased in the society and gets revealed does exhaust our subjectivity. There are lots of other elements in mental repertoire which only gets revealed to one's own self only. That part of the subject remains private. The individual will always have an authoritativeness over it. It does not imply any incorrigibility of self-knowledge. What I know about myself may be wrong, but I do have an authority over it and peculiar access to it. I as an individual may intentionally keep certain part of myself hidden from the public eye. And,

the same privacy can come to pass involuntarily as well. But, the possibility of a privacy of the self remains intact. So, the Cartesian notion of private self is not to be given up completely, neither to be accepted entirely. The Cartesian notion of privacy of self is applicable only to one part of the self or rather to a layer of the self. When an individual experiences something, it may be about herself or about the world, we must admit that there is a subjective character of that experience. And that subjective aspect represents the state of affair exclusively as appeared to the agent engaged with the experience. This aspect reveals what it is like for her to experience it. Here the point of view of the agent is of cardinal importance which is not shared by anyone else. This aspect of self-awareness remains private as the Cartesians uphold.

**Q. Why do we need to admit a different kind of self-awareness that is more meaty than the other kind?**

Just as the private, non-sharable, non-communicable self-awareness is not to be abandoned completely, a sharable and communicable notion of self-awareness also should not be abandoned completely. We need to accept a meaty version of self-awareness. This form of self-awareness is the one which basically forms our social identity. This self-awareness is not private. People get to know me by this part of the self. This part of self-awareness makes me what I am to other people. With the help of this, we explain the notion of agency. This self-awareness is relational, it is not one – dimensional as it does not only involves the subject but also involves other people both in the constituting aspect and in expressional aspect. This is that substantial self-awareness that introduces me to other's perspective as a specific individual. This layer of self-awareness is not private and it is accessible. It is that identity of the self which keeps evolving over the years. A fundamental component of this self-awareness is how others see me as an individual. And, this is how I would like to subscribe to the view of two layers of self-awareness.

Bibliography:

- Barresi, John & Moore, Chris 1996: "Intentional Relations and Social Understanding." *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 19, 107-154
- Bates, Elizabeth 1979: *The Emergence of Symbols: Cognition and Communication in Infancy*. New York: Academic Press.
- Bermúdez, José L. 1998: *The Paradox of Self-consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Bermúdez, José L. 2017, *Understanding 'I'*. Oxford University Press.
- de Villiers, Peter A. 2005: "The Role of Language in Theory-of-mind Development: What Deaf Children Tell Us." Janet W. Astington and Jodie A. Baird (Eds). *Why Language Matters for Theory of Mind*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 266–297.
- Dienes, Zoltan & Perner, Josef 1999: "A Theory of Implicit and Explicit Knowledge." *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 22, 735-808.

- Feinman, Saul 1982: "Social Referencing in Infancy." *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly* 28, 445–470.
- Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan, 2008 (Eds), *The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive science*, Routledge.
- Johnson, Mark H. & Morton, John 1991: *Biology and Cognitive Development: The Case of Face Recognition*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Massey, Christine M. & Gelman, Rochel 1988: "Preschooler's Ability to Decide Whether a Photographed Unfamiliar Object Can Move Itself." *Developmental Psychology* 24, 307–317.
- Mehler, Jacques, Jusczyk, Peter & Lambertz-Nilofar, G., 1988: "A Precursor of Language Acquisition in Young Infants." *Cognition*, 29, 143–178.
- Morin, Alain 2005: "Possible Links Between Self-Awareness and Inner Speech: Theoretical Background, Underlying Mechanisms, and Empirical Evidence." *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 12, 15–134.
- Musholt, Kristina (2012) Self-consciousness and Intersubjectivity. *Grazer philosophische Studien*, 84
- Perry, John 2000. *The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays*. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
- Tomasello, Michael et al., 2005. "Understanding and Sharing Intentions: The Origins of Cultural Cognition." *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 28, 675–691.
- Trevarthen, Colwyn 1979: "Communication and Cooperation in Early Infancy: A Description of Primary Intersubjectivity.". Margaret Bullowa(Eds). *The Beginning of Interpersonal Communication*, 321–347.
- Zahavi, Dan 2005: *Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-person*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Zlatev, Jordan 2008: "The Co-evolution of Inter-subjective and Bodily Mimesis." Jordan Zlatev, Timothy P. Racine, Chris Sinha and Esaltonen(Eds). *The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 215–244.