

ĀNVĪKṢIKĪ VIDYĀ: AN ENQUIRY INTO ITS NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT

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In many pieces of ancient Indian literature, we come across the concept of ānvīkṣikī vidyā. As exact nature of this vidyā was not clearly specified by its proponents, many scholars thought that enquiry into its nature is worth pursuing. In this article I tried to state some scholars' views about the nature and development of this vidyā and with an analysis of mine.

Some Key words: ānvīkṣikī, vidyā, vijigīṣu, daṇḍanīti, darśana, Lokāyata, Parāvidyā, rājarṣi, saptānga, Ātma-vidyā, tarka, jalpa, vitndā, dharmaprabartaka.

Kauṭilya in his *Arthśāstra* while talking about the training of a prince prescribed four types of *vidyās*. In the second *adhyāya* of *Prakraṇa* one entitled “विद्यासमुद्देशः आन्वीक्षिकीस्थापना” (*Vidyāsamuddeśa: Ānvīkṣikīsthāpanā*) he mentions four *vidyās* and says:

“आन्वीक्षिकी त्रयी वार्ता दण्डनीतिश्चेति विद्याः।”ⁱ

From this statement, we can say that *ānvīkṣikī*, *trayī*, *vārtā* and *daṇḍanīti* are the four *vidyās* admitted by him. He was well aware that other lawmakers before him were not unanimous about the number of *vidyās*. Hence, in the next three *ślokas* he mentions the view of Manu, Bṛhaspati and Uśanas and clearly enunciates his disagreement with them. For example, Manu recognized only three *vidyās* barring *ānvīkṣikī*. Bṛhaspati accepted only two—*vārtā* and *daṇḍanīti*. Uśanas admitted only one *vidyā*, i. e. *daṇḍanīti* as for him it is from *daṇḍanīti* that all other sciences originate and wind-up. The sequence in which he puts these *vidyās* and some other statements of him makes us feel that he gives primacy to the first *vidyā*, i. e. *ānvīkṣikī*. Not only this further in order to convey its essentiality he firmly asserts that four and only four *vidyās* are there. It will be neither more, nor less. His statement “चतस्र एव विद्या इति कौटिल्यः।” ताभिर्धर्मार्थी यद् विद्यात्तद् विद्यानां विद्यात्वम् ।ⁱⁱ makes it clear that *four and only four* are the sciences acceptable to him. This assertion is full of implications. For example, to him, the number of *vidyās* can neither be less nor be more. Kauṭilya in fact in repudiating his predecessors' view about the requirement of *vidyās* for a would-be king conveyed a number of

messages. First, he emphatically said that *ānvīkṣikī* is an independent branch and not a sub-branch of any other *vidyā* that someone might argue. In order to qualify a branch as *vidyā*, it needs to impart the knowledge of *dharma* (righteousness) and *artha* (wealth). That is why knowledge of grammar, astronomy etc. did not qualify as independent branches of *vidyā* as they did not fulfil these requirements. Deviating from Manu (for Manu considered it a section of Vedas), Kauṭilya not only accorded *ānvīkṣikī* the status of an independent branch, rather he considered it as a prerequisite for making other *vidyās* meaningful. Moreover, teachers who taught *Vedas* were not qualified to teach *ānvīkṣikī*. Thus, he took every care to grant it an autonomous status. Again, to place it at its rightful position he described it as a lamp that illumines the other three *vidyās*. It is the *upāya*, i. e. means, for all activities and *āśraya* for all *dharmas*.

In the present venture, I intend to explore what is meant by *ānvīkṣikī*, why it is considered as central and how the concept has evolved at later period. The concept of *trayī* and *vārtā* are not very problematic as Kauṭilya has mentioned what falls under these rubrics.

Before we come to discuss what is meant by *ānvīkṣikī* we need to know why a prince or a would-be ruler needs *vidyās* of the above sorts. A naïve answer may be like this. In a monarchical system, and it was the order in Kauṭilya's system, a king occupies the central position around which everything turns. The idea of separation of powers was alien in his system. Being so, i. e. being the central figure in the entire ruling dispensation, the king needs to be an extraordinary person having supernormal capabilities. He is supposed to have certain qualities which are unparallel with ordinary subjects in every respect. His king is almost all-powerful in his territory. Moreover, his conceived king is a *vijīgīsu* ruler, i. e. he is not supposed to remain content with what he has at the time of enthronement. He needs to preserve it very carefully, augment it and distribute it among the deserving subjects. Again, as he is the dispenser of *daṇḍanīti*, he should have insight and wisdom for using *daṇḍa* following fitting *nīti*. Kauṭilya's view about the application of *daṇḍanīti* is very rigid as it should neither be more nor be less; in other words, it should never be disproportionate. This prescription is a key point as on it depends so many things or to say the entire justice system from which stems many other things. In other words, *daṇḍa* is required to be administered only after precise reasoning. Such rigorous reasoning assures the rise in central human needs such as *artha*, *dharma* and

kāma. However, the moot question is: How this skill in reasoning is to be attained? Herein lies the relevance of *ānvīkṣikī*.

We find a number of accounts of what constitutes *ānvīkṣikī*. It is translated as dialectic, philosophy, critical inquiry, logic etc. In the *Arthśāstra* Kauṭilya brings under this the philosophical systems of Sāṅkhya, Yoga and the materialist school known as the *Lokāyata*. Hence, there is a proneness to translate it as 'philosophy' or 'logical reasoning' etc. However, such transliteration is fraught with risks as any attempt to understand Indian philosophy, whose exact phraseology is '*darśana*', by analogues used in the West is bound to mislead or convey a wrong sense. In spite of this vulnerableness, many scholars used these terms interchangeably. Wilhelm Halbfass in his *India and Europe: An Essay in Philosophical Understanding* elaborately shows the distinction between *darśana*, philosophy and *ānvīkṣikī* about which we shall talk later. Another issue is that some scholars issued conjunctions like 'or', 'and' etc. without much caution. For example, Hanna Hnatovska in his 'The image of Philosophy in Indian Culture: Etymology and Untranslatability of Terms'ⁱⁱⁱ used *ānvīkṣikī* and philosophy and sometimes *ānvīkṣikī* or philosophy. Such use of conjunctive words is susceptible to various interpretations.

Moreover, '*darśana*' refers to a study that has some fundamental differences with the Western concept of philosophy. *Darśana* comes from tradition. Its source is what has been taught in the past by the *seers*. We have inherited it as our ethos and is related to our religious practice. But the Western concept of philosophy is secular in nature and an open-ended process. By application of reason, any question may be raised there. It has methodological implications whereas methodology is not so important in *darśana* as such though later on some methodology has crept into it.

The inclusion of *Lokāyata* in the list of *ānvīkṣikī* prompted the scholar to find the rationale behind this. There might be a proneness to think that it is due to the materialistic tendency of the *Lokāyata* thinkers that Kauṭilya included it in the list as he also gave central importance to *artha puruṣārtha*. However, the context makes it clear that Kauṭilya did not intend this. Actually, materialism was attached with Cārvākas, the epithet which was evolved at a later period, and chronologically *Lokāyatas* preceded them (i. e. Cārvākas). There are scholars (e. g. T. W. Rhys Davids) who hold that rendering *Lokāyata* as materialism does not

match the context in the Pali sources. Rudolf Otto Franke rendered *Lokāyatam* as a “logically proven explanation of nature.”^{iv} R. Bhattacharya holds that in the olden days ‘*lokāyata*’ signified logic or more precisely ‘the art of disputation.’ It did not denote something anti-Vedic. *Lokāyata* “was studied as a *secular* subject, on a par with two other systems of philosophy, viz. Saṃkhya and Yoga...” He supports his contention quoting from Paul Haker who held that “*ānvīkṣikī* consists in examining by reason, i. e. reasoning and reflexion ... and is practiced in all sciences... the future king requires instruction in logical thinking and he can find it principally in each of three systems.”^v After long deliberation, Bhattacharya concludes that inclusion of *Lokāyata* in the *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* by Kauṭilya actually meant a philosophical system founded on logic which is antithetical to those philosophical systems which are merely grounded on scriptures. N. C. Bandopadhyaya in discussing the reason for the inclusion of *Lokāyata* under *ānvīkṣikī* held that Kauṭilya “was a believer in material joys and aspirations, yet he did not go to extremes. His ideal was a compromise or a moderate synthesis of the two extreme views of life and its aims.”^{vi} P. V. Kane too subscribes to the view that the meaning of *lokāyata* may have changed with the passage of time.

Another problem with the *vidyā* under discussion is that sometimes the terminology *ānvīkṣikī* seems to be consisting of a single unit and sometimes it seems to be the conjunction of two components—‘*anu*’ and ‘*īkṣaṇa*’. The explanation that it is a combination of two words was given in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*. Monier-Williams, a professor of Sanskrit at Oxford University, in his *Sanskrit English Dictionary* gave a long list of the meaning of ‘*anu*’ enumerating its four sorts of use. These are: when used as a prefix to a verb or noun it means ‘after, along, alongside, lengthwise, near to, under, subordinate to, with’;^{vii} when it is affixed before a noun and mainly before adverbial compounds it means ‘according to, severally, each by each, orderly, methodically, one after another, repeatedly’;^{viii} when used as a preposition with accusative it means ‘after, along, over, near to, through, to, towards, at, according to, in order, agreeably to, in regard to, inferior to’^{ix} and as a separable adverb it means ‘after, afterwards, thereupon, again, further, then, next.’^x He also renders ‘*īkṣaṇa*’ thus: ‘a look, view, aspect, sight, regarding, looking after, caring for.’^{xi}

Vātsyāna, the commentator of *Nyāyasūtra*, identified *nyāyavidyā* with *ānvīkṣikī*. By *nyāyavidyā*, he meant the technique or the art of argument. Karl

Potter translates the term as ‘investigation.’ We have seen previously that sometimes it has been translated as ‘philosophy’. Interestingly Hanna Hnatovska shows beautifully the problem of translating some of the key terms used in Indian philosophy. Out of these terms, *ānvīkṣikī* is one such a term.

Thus, it becomes clear that *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* has been a matter of discussion since ancient time and the investigation into its nature is very intriguing and is still on in the present philosophical discussion. What is more interesting is that the inclusion of *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga* and *Lokāyata* within its ambit generated more curiosity as they belong to different poles. It is so as *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* are orthodox systems and espouse a type of philosophy which is completely different from *Lokāyata* which is a heterodox system and known for its extreme espousal of materialism, empiricism, hedonism and of course a strong believer in *Vāda*. A thorough scrutiny of Kauṭilya’s view in his entire *Śāstra* make us feel that his endeavour was to accommodate both of these lines of thinking. To put it differently, we can say that on the one hand, he wanted to give due importance to Vedic thinking and on the other he was eager to make room for argument and counter-arguments thus not leaving everything to fate but rather bringing reason and human endeavour at the centre of every venture. Thus, we find him asking his king to follow the *varṇāśrama dharma* and on the other, he was very rigid against the adoption of the renunciatory view of Buddhism for common citizens. Again, his king, on the one hand, was *rājarṣi* and, on the other, *vijigīṣu*. We need to remember that Kauṭilya was struggling hard to retain and strengthen a kingdom that he so assiduously had established. For making his king *Cakrabartīn* he needed to make him sagacious. Many scholars are of the opinion that all the pieces of training prescribed by Kauṭilya are means for becoming a good king. A thriving governance does not result solely from the regular working of state machinery. It depends “to a great extent on the specific initiatives undertaken by the king, on his ability to see these initiatives successfully completed, and on his success in effectively policing his officials and subjects.”^{xii} Kauṭilya’s king has been instructed to ensure the physical, spiritual and emotional well-being of his subjects. In order to go beyond realpolitik; his prescribed teaching arms him to take care of the all-round wellness of his subjects.

From the rendering of Monier-Williams, which we have stated above, and from other related entries it is reasonable to posit that *ānvīkṣikī* is somehow

related to *seeing*. It has a special type of semantical import. A king is required to have some extraordinary qualities. He is required to have sound knowledge of sacred literature; he needs to examine the case he perceived and then apply his reason while making a judgement so that it is well-reasoned as well as supported by well-established custom. Making such judicious judgement is important as it provides the foundational structure of other activities.

We can support our affirmation also from his *saptāṅga* theory where he placed King in first and foremost position and this central position was required as all other *aṅgas* revolve around him. A king without extraordinary wisdom and practical knowledge is unlikely to succeed and hence wisdom of Indian philosophical systems will equip him to discharge such onerous responsibility.

Mahāmahopādhyaya Satis Chandra Vidyabhusan in his *A History of Indian Logic* gives an elaborate account of its (*ānvīkṣikī vidyā*'s) origin. Translating it as 'the science of enquiry' he traces its origin sometime around 650 B. C. Having surveyed ancient literature, he shows how this *vidyā* gradually grew into an art of debate. The development of the notion of soul in *Upaniṣadas* is a turning point and knowledge required for its knowledge has been called *Ātma-vidyā*. This knowledge of *Ātma-vidyā* at a subsequent stage came to be known as *ānvīkṣikī*. We get support of this view in *Manu Samhitā* and Kamandaka's *Nītisāra*. However, Mahāmahopādhyaya finds a subtle distinction between *Ātma-vidyā* and *ānvīkṣikī*. "The distinction between *Ātma-vidyā* and *ānvīkṣikī* lay in this, that while the former embodied certain dogmatic assertions about the nature of the soul, the latter contained reasons supporting those assertions. *Ānvīkṣikī* dealt in fact with two subjects, viz *ātma*, soul, and *hetu*, theory of reasons."^{xiii} From this view, it becomes clear that it is the process of ratiocination that distinguishes *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* from sheer *Ātma-vidyā*. This process of ratiocination has been in use in each system that Kauṭilya mentioned in his *ānvīkṣikī vidyā*—Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata. It might arise in our mind how these diametrically opposing schools applied this process. It might have happened that each of these systems supported their stand with rational arguments not merely invoking authoritative sources. M. V. Krishna Rao is of the opinion that as, for Kauṭilya, all the systems mentioned under *ānvīkṣikī* and the *vidyā* itself were appertained to religion and law as he stated in chapter one of Book III, he wanted to found the secular body of law based "partly on custom and partly on authority of the various

texts.... Secular law existed side by side with sacred law.”^{xiv} V. Nagrajan, taking clues from the *Arthśāstra*, analyses the reason of inclusion of three systems under *ānvīkṣikī* thus: “Sāṅkhya provides the necessary training in the logical and analytical approaches required to cull what is *dharma* and *adharmā*, according to the Vedas, *artha* and *anartha*, according to *Vārta*, *nāya* and *anāya*, *bala* and *abala* according to *Daṇḍanīti*. Yoga provides the training needed to maintain equipoise in weal and woe alike... *Lokāyata* gives proficiency in awareness (*prajñā*), speech or utterance (*vākya*) and action (*kriyā*). Understood so, *Lokāyata* is not materialism. It is training in social awareness and socialisation. The three subjects included in *Ānvīkṣikī* have each a purpose and role to serve in mastering the other three disciplines and in regulating of life itself.”^{xv} Some other scholars explained it in a bit different way. Whatever intention Kauṭilya might have, it is true that gradually this process of ratiocination talked about under *ānvīkṣikī*, began to take some well-defined shape and thus emerged as a distinct branch. We may also assume that with this the methodology of *tarka*, *vāda* etc. started to come into being. Thus we find *Ātma-vidyā* gently making room for *hetu-vidyā*.

Out of the two components of *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* (i. e. *Ātma-vidyā* and *hetu vidyā*), *Ātma-vidyā*, the science of knowing soul, gradually evolved into *Darśana* sometime around 1st century B. C. However, independent reasoning gave shape to a branch called logic or *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* and Mahāmahopādhyaya attributes this credit largely to Medhātithi Gautama who did it circa 550 B. C. If this timeline is presumed to be true, it is evident that Kauṭilya came at a much later period. Being engaged with university teaching he was well-versed with *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* and thought this *vidyā* imperative for a ruler. For Vidyabhusan the *Arthśāstrkāra* “characterized the *ānvīkṣikī* (evidently logic) as a highly useful science which furnished people with reasons for the estimation of their strength and weaknesses, kept their intellect unperturbed in prosperity and adversity, and infused into their intelligence, speech and action, subtlety and power.”^{xvi} This capability equipped the ruler with the much-required ability in the art of debate/discussion which in turn enabled him to handle judiciously social and political issues.

Among the prominent teachers of *ānvīkṣikī vidyā*, as Mahāmahopādhyaya mentions, were *Lokāyatas*, *Kapil*, *Dattātreya*, a sage called *Punarvasu Ātreya*, a women ascetic named *Sulabhā*, a fierce debator *Aṣṭāvakra*, *Medhātithi Gautama*, etc. They addressed different sides of the *ānvīkṣikī vidyā*—some developed the

science of *Ātma-vidyā* which gradually came to be known as *Darśana* and some gave shape to *hetu-vidyā* or *tarka-vidyā*, i. e. the logical side of *ānvīkṣikī*. There were also successive generations that facilitated the development of this into a full-fledged *vidyā*. Hence, we get its reference in the *Manusmṛhitā*, in the *Mahābhārata*, in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and many other works of literature of that time. However, it was Medhātithi Gautama (whose timing, as we have stated, was tentatively circa 550 B. C.) who developed and gave a shape to the science of reasoning. This methodology of reasoning facilitated debates of learned persons in councils that existed under various names such as *sabhā*, *saṃiti* etc. We have reasons to believe that it is during such debates that technical terms were coined and given special senses to facilitate healthy and meaningful debate. In order to distinguish between meaningful debate and mere wrangling terminologies such as *tarka*, *vāda*, *jalpa*, *viṭaṇḍā* etc. were coined.

The art of reasoning thus developed was known to Kauṭilya. He in the *Arthaśāstra*'s last chapter under the heading *Tantra-yukti* (in the fifteenth *Adhikaraṇa*) enumerated thirty-two terms which, to his mind, will be helpful in determining the fuller meaning of *Arthaśāstra*.

As the Medhātithi Gautama's writing is not available we need to rely on some other sources such as *Carak-saṃhitā* for chief tenets of *ānvīkṣikī*. *Carak-saṃhitā* mentions three chief tenets of *ānvīkṣikī*. These, as Mahāmahopādhyaya Satis Chandra Vidyabhusan mentioned, are^{xvii}:

- *Kāryābhinivṛtti*
- *Parīksā*
- *Vāda-vidhi*

The first tenet refers to the “aggregate of resources for the accomplishment of an action”, the second one lays down the criterion of examination and the third one stipulated the procedure of debate. There is debate about the existence and necessity of the first two tenets of the *ānvīkṣikī*. It has been argued by some scholars that *Kāryābhinivṛtti* was not part of the *ānvīkṣikī* of the Medhātithi Gautama. The second one has also been considered as otiose. It is the third component, i. e. *vāda-vidhi* that has been considered as most important. However, a study of the components *kāryābhinivṛtti* and *parīksā* make us feel that we should not overlook the importance of these two tenets. A study of the components given in the *Carak-saṃhitā* and listed by Mahāmahopādhyaya

Vidyabhusan makes us feel that when Kauṭilya prescribed this *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* for a prince he had in his mind all the components of these three canons. Hence, he placed it at the first position describing it as the lamp of all *vidyās* ‘the resources of all actions and the shelter of all virtues.’

The science of reasoning (i. e. *ānvīkṣikī*) has utility in practical life besides in the domain of knowledge as it helps to sharpen, refine the arguments and rectify the misbelieves. Reasoning or debate may be congenial or hostile. It is the former one that has been hailed. Engaging in the hostile debate was discouraged as it did not serve any meaningful purpose. Thus, *ānvīkṣikī* became an established procedure to test the validity of Vedic injunctions or prohibitions. However, we come across instances who did not like this *ānvīkṣikī vidyā*. For example, Manu gave primacy to Vedic and such other teachings and admonished those who using *ānvīkṣikī* challenged those teachings. On the other hand, there were teachers who held this procedure in high esteem as, for them, it was an effective tool for ascertaining truths. As an instance, we can cite the example of Gautam-dharma-sūtra. There he recommended knowledge of *ānvīkṣikī* for a king as it had immense efficacy for administering justice. Thus, we find that in spite of doubt and opposition to *ānvīkṣikī* still its utility in administration was recognized by the *Arthśāstrakāra*.

Before we go for further explanation of some other scholars’ views it is interesting to note that such conception of training of a king is found in ancient Greece in Plato’s system too. Plato in his *The Republic* also conceives of a state which will be ruled by a king who has certain unique qualities and is specially trained. His king is popularly known as philosopher-king. As we do not have an exact record of timings of either Plato or Kauṭilya, we cannot ascertain from any record whether they have influenced each other or is it a mere coincidental factor that some prevailing situations of their time have compelled both these great thinkers to espouse a type of kingship which in certain respects is akin. A careful study of the writings of both these thinkers though points to certain similarities we should not overlook dissimilarities too. Plato's ideal society never arrived at the stage of implementation and even some contemporary thinkers, e. g. Sir Karl Popper raised questions about its implementability. In spite of such criticisms, we can say that it has shown the path to philosophers to think in a way that ushered the path of political philosophy. Kauṭilya bore different mettle. As a staunch political realist, as he is sometimes described, he could foresee what is viable and

what is not. Hence, he prescribed a political system very realistically and while doing that he very craftily infused in the system its ideological basis so that the system becomes durable. Most probably it is this foresight of him that prompted him to consider the necessity of training a prince.

Turning back to the concept of *Ānvīkṣikī* we may say, as many scholars are quick to point out, that it has methodological implications whereas philosophy may not have this implication. In spite of this clear difference, some scholars have rendered *ānvīkṣikī* as philosophy. There is a long and interesting debate between scholars whether the western practice of divorcing theology from philosophy be applied to Indian systems. Paul Haker, whose writing on this issue has attracted wide attention, was against equating *ānvīkṣikī* with philosophy. *Arthśāstrakāra* merely saying that “सांख्यं योगो लोकायतं चेत्यान्वीक्षिकी।”^{xviii} (“*sāṃkhyam yogo lokāyatam ca-ity ānvīkṣikī*”) included under this rubric three systems of thought that we have mentioned previously. However, his two brief accounts thereafter help us to draw some conclusions:

धर्मधर्मौ त्रय्यामर्थानर्थौ वार्त्तायां नयापनयौ दण्डनीत्यां बलाबले चैतासां हेतुभिरन्वीक्षमाणा
लोकस्योपकरोति व्यसनेः अभ्युदये च बुद्धिमवस्थापयति प्रज्ञावाक्यक्रियावैशारद्यं च करोति ।^{xix}

*Dharmādharmautrāyām arthānarthau vārttāyām nayānayau daṇḍanītyām
balābale caetāsām hetubhir anvīkṣamāṇā*^{xx}

Śāmaśāstri translated this statement in his own way but Paul Haker’s rendering makes the issue clearer. He says: “The investigative science *investigates with reasons* what is right and wrong in the field of Vedic knowledge, what is advantageous and disadvantageous in the science of material acquisitions, and appropriate or inappropriate in the science of government, and moreover, the strength and weaknesses of these (three science) ...”^{xxi} This italicized part, i. e., ‘investigates with reason’ forms the core.

Ganeri renders it thus: “Investigating by means of reason, good and evil in the Vedic religion, profit and loss in the field of trade and agriculture, and prudent and imprudent policy in political administration, as well as their relative strengths and weaknesses, the study of critical inquiry (*ānvīkṣikī*) confers benefit on people, keeps their minds steady in adversity and in prosperity, and produces adeptness of understanding, speech and action.”^{xxii}

A careful study of the statement we have quoted from the *Arthśāstra* make us feel that, for Kauṭilya, *ānvīkṣikī* is like the thread of a garland where other

vidyās are adorned as flowers. Without it, all other *vidyās* will lose their shines. Hence, it forms the central core. It is this paramourcy that prompted him to write

प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानामुपायः सर्वकर्मणाम् ।

आश्रयः सर्वधर्माणां शाश्वदान्वीक्षिकी मता ^{xxiii}

(*pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām, upāyaḥ sarvakarmaṇām/
āśrayaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṃ śāśvad ānvīkṣikī matā*)

which Haker construed as this “investigative science has always been considered as a source of light for all sciences, and instrument for all activities, a foundation for all religious and social duties.”^{xxiv}

These two excerpts give us some inkling about the *vidyā* in question. All the *vidyās* mentioned by the *Arthśāstrakāra* are not to be placed horizontally but rather vertically thereby giving supreme importance to *ānvīkṣikī* as this *vidyā* imparts glory to other *vidyās* and make all work purposeful or meaningful. We can say that it supplies methodology to other *vidyās* for their *right* use. Lack of knowledge of *ānvīkṣikī* will take away worth from *trayī*, *vārtā* and *daṇḍanīti*.

Later on, Vātsyāyana and other Naiyāyikas developed this science which gave proper place to reason as well as to Vedic-Upaniṣadic tradition. In order to differentiate Nyāya from other systems, Naiyāyikas hold that their system reassesses what has been comprehended from tradition as well as sense impressions. This process involves reasoning and logical argument. And this is definitely a methodological issue. However, reasoning and logical argument though definitely an advancement from tradition it had limits too as it was not unrestrained. It had to pay attention to what has been received from impressions and traditions. The prefix ‘*anu*’ means, according to Monier-Williams, after, along, alongside’ lengthwise, near to, under, subordinate to, with, etc. Adopting this series of meanings, we can well draw the conclusion that the reflector had a choice in reasoning, but it was not unlimited. It needs to be compatible with impressions and traditions or at least it required that the investigator should be neutral-minded. Even *manana* which follows *śrabana* implies that methodology of reflection or reevaluation is an important component. But we get the impression that *Arthśāstrakāra* paid the least attention to this compatibility.

Halbfass similarly holds that Kauṭilya “focuses on the ‘neutral’ methodological aspect of the ‘investigative science,’ on the applicability and usefulness of *ānvīkṣikī* for other sciences which play a role in the education of the

prince and in the successful conduct of government and administration. ... Kauṭilya is not interested in discussing the soteriological relevance of *ānvīkṣikī*, or its compatibility with the Vedic *ātmavidyā*. His primary concern with methodology is also illustrated by his list of schools of thought in which he finds *ānvīkṣikī* exemplified.”^{xxv} *Sāṅkhya* system was compatible with the Vedic system but it also systematized it with reasoning. What is interesting about Kauṭilya’s mentioning of yoga is that some scholars, for example, Halbfass, are of the opinion that it does not represent Patañjali’s Yoga order. Rather it hints at Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. Halbfass supports his argument by taking the root ‘*yuj-*’ which “accounts for the word *yukti*, 'reasoning'.” Therefore, he argues that yoga sometimes alluded to the application of reasoning. In order to substantiate his claim, he takes the help of commentator Vātsyāyana’s view and from sources of the Jainas. G. C. Pandey taking a clue from Phanibhusan Tarkavāgīsa’s Bengali translation of *Nyāyasūtras* also held an opinion that deviates from common understanding. He writes: “*Yoga* could have meant the Yoga philosophy or any spiritual philosophy stressing the action (*Kriyāvāda*) or a philosophy like the *Vaiśeṣika* seeking to explain the universe as compounded out of simpler original elements.”^{xxvi} We can distinguish between Yoga as a school of thought and yoga as a tradition. Patañjali was the founder of the former one but who was the founder of the later one is not known as we do not have recorded historical dates and get a number of opinions. We can well surmise that the term ‘yoga’ denoted practising resolute self-disciplining. Whereas *Sāṅkhya* puts a premium on a precise understanding of the fundamental principles underlying behind apparent reality, to achieve that one needed rigorous disciplining. From some ancient sources, we come to know that Hiraṇygarbha was the original exponent of Yoga philosophy and he taught this systematic procedure to some Ṛṣis who in turn taught it to later generations. Who is Hiraṇygarbha is then an inquisitive mind will be eager to know. In some source, it is held that the omnipresent creator is Hiraṇygarbha and some source tells us that Ṛṣi Kapil was Hiraṇygarbha. As what is meant by Yoga is an unsettled issue, we can attempt from a different route to understand Kauṭilya’s intent. He had some definite idea about the requirement of some qualities of a king. In order to attain these qualities, a king had to exercise restraint and also perhaps modifications of the mind. It was to be done not for any personal gain but for a greater objective of his subjects and his kingdom with a spirit of renunciation. Whatever Kauṭilya meant by Yoga, we can well surmise

that he had this supernormal capacity of a prince in mind. *Lokāyata's* methodology was out and out reasoning. They were non-conformists in nature and hence tried to convince people by means of their sharp reasoning that only human endeavour can change our life. Hence instead of relying on fate only, we need to pin our hopes on the reason primarily.

The process of ratiocination or application of reason thus developed began to face a constant challenge from different quarters. Some appreciated this process of reasoning some deprecated it. In this battle, we find the development of many terms such as *tarka*, *jalpa*, *vitndā*, etc. to distinguish between valid reasoning and mere wrangling or what has been termed *suṣktarka*. The concept of *ānvīkṣikī* and effort to determine its very nature definitely helped in this development. Not that only orthodox systems contributed to this development. Even heterodox systems such as Jainas and Buddhists helped, on the one hand, to extricate reasoning from the Vedic line of thinking, on the other hand, prescribed for its limited use. This investigative tendency facilitated the secularization of thinking and created a balance between this-worldly and other-worldly desires and debates. This also did not allow to develop reasoning as an independent autonomous as well as an unchecked zone. The greatest challenges posed to this development was Bhartṛhari, Śāṅkara, Śrīharṣa. Jonardan Ganeri puts it succinctly thus: “Reason is the instrument of all philosophers, but conceptions of the nature and function of reason vary along with varying ideas about the work for which reason is properly employed.... Reason unchecked was seen as a threat to the stability of Brahminical social order, as the tool of heretics and troublemakers. But the epic horror of pure reason was a disdain not for reason itself, but only for its capricious use, to undermine the belief rather than to support it, to criticize and not to defend it. Philosophy in India ... flourished in the space this distinction affords.”^{xxvii}

We need to remember that *Arthśāstra* is not a manual that furnishes us a readymade solution to any particular set of problem and perhaps no *śāstra* can do this. Rather it intends to supply us method so that it can be applied to any problem that a king may encounter in running his administration. The method of *ānvīkṣikī* equips the ruler for a dispassionate analysis of the problem and find out its best possible available solution. Thus, *ānvīkṣikī* arms the king for right analysis of a situation which helps him to combat the problem productively. However, it has also been pointed out that mastering *ānvīkṣikī* is a time-consuming matter as it has been

opined by some that it takes twelve years. Therefore, the method has been subjected to criticism in *Hitopadeśa* and *Pañcatantra*. It has been held that if someone takes recourse to *nīti* of *Nītiśāstras*, which is an alternative method, it will take only six months. Therefore, it is a shorter route.

But we need to remember that *Nītiśāstras* were later development and hence the importance of the science of reasoning as given in the *Arthśāstra* is not diminished by the alternative views of *Nītiśāstras*. *Ānvīkṣikī* works as an aid in the accomplishment of all actions and discharging king's duties. As it is the case, knowledge of *ānvīkṣikī* plays a vital role in political actions and commitments. It is interesting to note that Śukrāchārya in his *Nītiśāstra* includes logic and Vedānta^{xxviii} in *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* though we don't find reference of Vedānta in *Arthśāstra* under *ānvīkṣikī*. In fact, acceptance of methodology of *manan* may be a reason for its (Vedānta's) inclusion under *ānvīkṣikī* by the *Nītiśāstrakāra*.

One related debate about which many scholars paid a fair amount of attention is that though Kauṭilya espoused strong political realism (and even Roger Boesche called him “the first great political realist”^{xxix}) but his view about *ānvīkṣikī* gave rise to deliberation as to, for him, politics is an end to itself or it has some transcendent purpose. The prominent place he accorded to Sāṅkhya and Yoga in his *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* and also a careful reading of the *Arthśāstra* (e. g., when he says that army be motivated by the assurance that fighting in battle with courage will take them in heaven) force us to think that, for Kauṭilya, politics has other-worldly aim too. The rationale behind such a view is that both these schools believed in liberation. Acceptance of their teachings entails that a king cannot ignore this goal. V. P. Varma also supports such a view.^{xxx} Our stand gets support from Somadeva Suri's *Nītivākyamitram* too.

We can look at the issue from a different angle. Indian systems by and large agreed that knowledge of truth is the key for securing Mokṣa. For achieving this state and also to comprehend the nature of this world and the mystery behind all, the reasoning is an effective tool. If we fail to grasp the intricacies of the material aspect of reality, we will not be moral beings. It can be grasped by the application of our reasoning capacity. Thus, reasoning or logic is the foundation of the understanding material world which in turn helps us to attain *Parāvidyā*, what we previously called *Atmajñāna*. Perhaps it is for this reason that logic has been termed the science of all other sciences. In the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*

Madhava Ācārya underscoring the imperative of this science holds that *ānvīkṣikī* has a number of components and taken together it works as the lamp for all other sciences, “the means of aiding all actions,” and also the ultimate tribunal for the performance of any religious duty.

Another necessity of *ānvīkṣikī vidyā*, as it becomes evident from Kauṭilya’s *śāstra*, is that exercising self-control by a king is the leitmotif in Kauṭilya’s system and it forms the chief aim of all branches of knowledge that a prince is required to master. In order to become *rājarsi*, who is a king but as wise as sage, he needs to abandon six temptations. These temptations are enemy-like and have the potentiality to destroy the kingdom. These are lust, anger, greed, conceit, arrogance and impetuosity. M. V. Krishna Rao supporting this view holds that the chief aim of a king’s “education was to control of the organs of sense...and who has not his organs of sense under control will soon perish, although he possesses the whole earth...”^{xxxix} Kauṭilya foresaw that ignorance and indiscipline on the part of a king are twin sources of maladies for a state. Hence in order to remove these twin causes, he prescribed four types of teaching out of which he considered *ānvīkṣikī* is the “foundation of all sciences, for it sharpens the mind and makes it fit for thinking, speaking and acting correctly and properly in all conditions of life. Philosophy helps the prince to discern according to the *Veda* what is right or wrong, what is useful and what is useless in economics, and what are right and false methods in politics.”^{xxxix} In Book III he even goes on to assert that when sacred laws are not in agreement with rational laws, there will prevail rational law. He writes

शास्त्रं विप्रतिपद्येत धर्मे न्यायेन केनचित् ।
न्यायस्तत्र प्रमाणं स्यात्तत्र पाठो हि नश्यति ।^{xxxix}

Thus, we find the *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* was idealised and exalted. *Ānvīkṣikī vidyā* along with other three *vidyās* when mastered properly make the Kauṭilya’s king enlightened and he acquires some supernormal qualities —*ābhigāmik guṇa*, *prajñā guṇa*, *utsāha guṇa* and *ātmasampat*— that a king is required to have. Such qualities prepare the king to become *dharmaprabartaka*, *vijigīṣu*, and *chakrabartīn*. The deliberation of the contemporary scholars brought enough clarity about these *vidyās* in general and the *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* in particular. Further deliberation, we can hope, will add shine to it.

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