

Chapter - III

Section - I A brief account of Heidegger's Philosophy.

HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTION

' With Martin Heidegger, the German philosopher - who began his philosophical career as a student of Husserl, we come across for the first time a formidable exposition of existentialist thought in its distinctly philosophical role'.<sup>1</sup>

Heidegger belongs to the German Phase of Phenomenological movement. He came under the influence of Husserl, the transcendental phenomenologist in his early life. He discussed most of the philosophical topics from the phenomenological point of view. But he gradually deviated from Husserl's way of thinking and developed a philosophy of his own. Later on, he came to be regarded as an existentialist, though he himself did not like the title.

SOURCES :

Heidegger ~~xxxx~~ derives the basic elements of his thought from different sources. From the early Greeks he imbibes an interest in the problem of being as such in its unity and totality. Under the influence of Husserl's phenomenology, he approaches Being inwardly through consciousness.

contd. 74..

He is also influenced by Kierkegaard's insights into subjective existence, particularly the emotional moods of care or concern, dread and awe. His primary debt is to his German predecessors, Kant and Hegel. Heidegger follows Kant in rejecting the view of knowledge as representation. He also follows Kant in concentrating on temporality, and in seeing the domain of time as greater than that of space. His debt to Hegel shows up in his use of the concepts of negation and death. Thus Greek ontology, Kierkegaard's existentialism, Husserl's phenomenology, Kant and Hegel contribute different elements to Heidegger's master plan for an exhaustive philosophy of Being, with which he starts his famous work, ' Sein Und zeit ' ( Being and Time ).

#### HEIDEGGER'S IDEA OF PHILOSOPHY

For Heidegger, the problem of being is of immense importance, it should be considered the starting point of all philosophy. In his book ' what is philosophy ? ', he defines philosophy as the conversation between ' Being ' and the being in an individual man. He says, " we find the answer to the question, what is Philosophy ? not through the historical assertions about the definition of philosophy, but through conversing with that which has been handed down to us as the Being of being " <sup>2</sup>. He maintains that Being and not things which have being is the principal object of philosophical enquiry and that in order to know the real nature of a thing we must have

resort to intuition, and try to grasp it in its givenness. According to him, Philosophy should be practical and theoretical. Philosophy is no philosophy at all. The task of Philosophy is the analysis of 'Being'. But Philosophy is not merely the analysis of Philosophical concepts. His task is to formulate new and new concepts. The new philosophical concepts must explain the concrete world and must not refer to abstract entities unrelated to the world of experience.

According to Heidegger, Philosophy is opposed to common sense ; it attempts to seek out the roots of common sense and display them as unfounded prejudices. Thus Philosophy is not based upon common sense, it is the criticism of common sense.

Heidegger's Philosophy is neither conceptual analysis nor simple ontology. He is trying to get a new language in which to express insights concerning 'Being'. He brings forward his programme for a reconstruction of metaphysics which implies at the same time a destruction of metaphysics in the traditional sense.

contd...76...

PROBLEM OF BEING

Heidegger's charge against the Philosophers is that none before him with the single exception of Aristotle, has considered the problem of 'Being' properly which is the primal object of Philosophical enquiry. His ambition was to be the Aristotle of his time so far as the problem of Being is concerned. There have been moments in which the disclosure of Being has been approached most notably in the German Idealism initiated by Kant, Fichte and Schelling, Culminating in Hegel, but which collapsed in the middle of the 19th Century. Even Nietzsche had fallen from 'Being'. To him, 'Being' is not only an empty word, it is not even a word. Heidegger thinks that the problem of the meaning of Being needs to be taken up afresh, and, in particular the way of approaching the problem needs to be reconsidered.

To ask for the meaning of Being is not to ask a grammatical question. It is to ask what the Being of beings is. We have to settle, therefore, what particular kind of being is to be selected for philosophical analysis as the first step in the search for the meaning of Being. And, according to Heidegger, we must start with the being of the questioner himself i.e. man considered as the being who is capable of raising the problem of Being.

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Now the question to ask, what precisely is Heidegger looking for, what is this problem of Being? It is certainly not the problem of ultimate reality, of transcendent being in the sense of God. For according to Heidegger, God would be a being rather than Being. And it is Being, not beings or a being, with which we are concerned. As to the exact ~~the~~ problem of Heidegger (whether it is a linguistic analysis or a metaphysical one), Frederick Copleston says, "And I suppose that the problem is for Heidegger a linguistic or logical problem up to a certain point. Yet at times he appears to speak about Being as though he were talking about the Absolute or about the Transcendent. And it seems to me .... that he ~~has~~ oscillates between the point of view of a logical analyst and that of a metaphysician without making it really clear with what precise problem he is engaged".<sup>3</sup> Professedly, however, he is concerned with a problem in ontology, which is prior to any problem about God. Before we can even raise the problem of God we must answer the question, what is the Being of beings? And as it is man who raises this problem and who thus has a preliminary idea of Being and stands in a special relation to Being, we should start with an analysis of man as the being who is open to Being.

Heidegger says, "There are some presuppositions and prejudices which are constantly fostering the belief that an enquiry into Being is unnecessary. These presuppositions are:

contd...78.

First, 'Being' is the most universal concept. secondly, the concept of 'Being' is indefinable. Thirdly, it is held that 'Being' is of all concepts the one that is self-evident <sup>4</sup>.

But Heidegger thinks that these presuppositions do not eliminate the question of its meaning. The very fact that we already live in an understanding of Being and that the meaning of Being is still veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise the question again. That is why he undertakes the task of analysing the hidden meaning of 'Being'.

Heidegger's conception of 'Being' is different from Plato's 'Idea of Good', Aristotle's 'Prime Mover', and Hegel's 'Absolute'. Heidegger's 'Being' is also different from Husserl's 'Transcendental ego'. He does not characterize his 'Being' as something ~~divine~~ divine. His 'Being' is simply an ontological entity.

Like all other existentialists, Heidegger makes a sharp distinction between being and existence, and says that existence belongs only to self-conscious individual human being. In general, however, existence is being, but it is not mere being, it is a unique kind of being. Being is of

three kinds namely, the being of man, the being of common objects and the being of tools or instruments. The being of man or the human being is the active self-conscious individual - this is the being proper called 'existence'. The other two kinds of being are improper beings. The being of common objects, as for instance, the being of the lower animals, physical objects and even mathematical objects is not being proper, that is to say, is not existence. The being of the tools or instruments is the 'being for', for instance, the earth is, for the farmer, that which is ploughed by him for growing corn. Thus there is being proper or existence only in the first sense.

According to Copleston, the problem of being for Heidegger is, upto a certain point, a linguistic or logical problem ; yet sometimes he appears to speak about Being as if he was talking about the Absolute or about the Transcendent. On the basis of Vol. 1 of 'Being and time', Heidegger's philosophy may be interpreted in an atheistic sense. It is true that he does not deny the existence of God in so many words. But at first sight he seems to suggest that apart from man himself and the brute impenetrable existence of things, there is nothing, and the way in which the problem of Being is handled by him seems to suggest that for him

contd...80...

Being is necessarily finite and temporal. If this had been the case, the existence of infinite Being, transcending the temporal order, would be ruled out and the problem of God would not be significantly raised in Heidegger's Philosophy. But he strongly protested against the atheistic interpretation of his philosophy. In his "Letter on Humanism" ( Brief Uber den Humanismus ), he says that the existential analysis of man neither affirms nor denies God. Yet this should not be taken as a case of indifferentism. According to Heidegger, the problem of the existence of God can not be raised on the level of thought to which the existential analysis of man belongs ; it can be raised only on the plane of ' The holy '. Modern man is so absorbed in his pre-occupations in the world that he is not open to the plane of the holy, and the idea of God as traditionally interpreted has retreated from his consciousness. But ' the death of God ', in the sense that the Christian notion of God has lost its hold on human minds, does not mean that God is a non-entity. In his own version, Heidegger's philosophy is a waiting for God, for a new manifestation of the Divine.

In his "Letter on Humanism", Heidegger says, " If man, ..... is once again to find himself in the nearness of

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Being, he must first learn to exist in the nameless. He must recognise the seduction of the public, as well as the impotence of the private. Man must, before he speaks, let himself first be claimed himself by Being at the risk of having under this claim little or almost nothing to say. Only in this way will the preciousness of its essence be returned to the word, and to man the dwelling where he can live in the truth of Being ".<sup>5</sup>

According to Heidegger, man is a vehicle for the self-revelation of Being just as for Hegel, individual man is a manifestation of the Absolute spirit. Man's relationship to Being likened to the function of the shepherd in Christianity. " The need is : to preserve the truth of Being no matter what may happen to man and everything that ' is ' ".<sup>6</sup>

The true thinker and the true poet transcend the world of actual existences and tuned their life and thought to the truth of Being and listen, in gratitude to the soundless voice of Being. The preparation for the truth of Being consists not in careful preparing or ' thinking & in any ordinary sense of the word, but in an extra-ordinary sense. As Heidegger says : " Out of long guarded speechlessness and the careful clarification of the field thus cleared, comes

the utterance of the thinker ... Poetry and thinking are most purely alike in their care of the word, ... The thinker utters Being. The poet names what is holy !<sup>7</sup>

Thus Heidegger gives us a theology devoid of God and ~~via~~ ultimately Being becomes a mystery making room for an existential mysticism. The Being-in-general or the Holy is an all-pervading Being or Reality like the Hegelian Absolute or the Upanisadic Brahman or like the universal man (Manab Brahman) of Rabindranath Tagore, which is both transcendent to and emanent in the individual, which permeates through every nerve and vein of the world.

Heidegger studies analyses and described the inner existential aspects ( ' existentialia ' ) of the human individual and suggests also their ontological implications.

Heidegger's word for human being is ' Dasein '. The term ' Dasein ' may be analysed into ' Da ' meaning ' there ' and ' Sein ' meaning ' Being '. Dasein therefore signifies ' Being-there ' Dasein is Being-in-the-world. An individual finds himself there-in-the world. He is related to the whole world in a compelling way ' Vorhandene ', ' Zuhandene ', ' Sorge ' and ' Stimmung ' are four important terms in connection with his relation with the world. Things of the world that just

contd..83.

happen to be there before him are 'Vorhandene', and things that he makes and uses as his tools are 'Zuhandene'. The inner organizing principle that determines his relation to ~~ix~~ things, and to the world as a whole is 'Sorge'. The unique way in which he is related to the world is reflected in his varying mood is 'Stimmung'. Our different moods like anxiety, happiness, boredom, fear, dread etc. express the different ways in which the human Dasein is related and tuned to the world.

By 'Dasein' Heidegger means an existing individual ~~human~~ human being, consciously striving to realize Being, which is nascent in him as possibilities. As because only man can consciously strive to actualise his possibilities, Heidegger attributes existence to human being only. Everything else simply 'is' on earth. Heidegger employs a threefold terminology in an attempt to avoid confusion over the word 'Existenz'. He restricts Dasein to the being exemplified in man. Dasein is not equivalent to man. 'Dasein' is an ontological term. It designates man in respect of his being, and if this kind of being is found elsewhere than in humanity, then the term 'Dasein' could be appropriately applied. For the traditional term 'existentia', he proposes the expression Vorhandenheit, which may be translated

as 'presence-at-hand'. This points to the passive kind of existing, that we have called a mere 'lying around'. It is something that one may come across in the world. The third of Heidegger's terms is Existenz, existence Heidegger attributes existence only to Dasein, and says that the essence of Dasein lies in its existence. He declares, 'the term "existence" (Existenz) as a designation of being, will be allotted solely to Dasein'<sup>8</sup>. This simply means that human reality can not be defined because it is not something given, it is in question. A man is a possibility, he has the power to be. His existence is in his choice of the possibilities which are open to him, and since this choice is never final, once for all, his existence is indeterminate. Nevertheless, the mode of existence of the human being has a structure ; it is being-in-the-world. This being-in-the-world which constitutes human being is the being of a self in its inseparable relations with a not-self, the world of things and other persons in which the self always and necessarily finds itself inserted. There is no separation possible.

Like Dasein, objects or things are constituted by their relations to other things in the world and to an existent of the nature of Dasein ; ' the needle implies the thread, the garment, the sewer, and the wearer. That is to say, the object as tool is constituted by the system

contd. 85...

of relations in which it exists, and refers to an end in Dasein, which is itself constituted by its relations to the system but refers to its own possibilities and not to the system for its meaning<sup>9</sup>. Dasein as possibility and constituted by relations with objects as tools in a serviceable system gives intelligibility to the world as the realization of projects.

To Heidegger, there is no dualism of mind and matter or consciousness and the world as Descartes and Husserl take for granted from the outset, rather than discover it.<sup>9</sup> Heidegger begins by trying to go behind the question posed by Husserl and Descartes. They had asked, "How can consciousness come to know a world outside consciousness?" Husserl had behaved as if it was clear that the investigation of conscious states of mind was one thing, the investigation of consciousness-in-the-world another. But whence this dualism? What makes us dualist? What is the "I" which poses the question "What can I know?" Heidegger names the "I" which asks the cartesian question, he names it in its most primitive mode of being-in-the-world Dasein, literally "being there". What is the mode of being-in-the-world? It is a general movement toward things, reaching out after objects .... we grasp Dasein as being-in-the-world or not at all<sup>10</sup>. Heidegger's Dasein is not separable

cont... 86...

from not-self, the world of things and other persons ; it is an inseparable relation. So, is it not a victory over Cartesian dualism ?

Dasein is distinguished from any other concept in the following way; Firstly, its character is not that of a thing among things. It is to be differentiated from things of objective experience which may be characterised either as presented ~~in~~ before us ("Vorhanden") or as something to be used for our purpose ("Juhanden"). Human existence belongs to neither of the categories. Dasein is marked by an ontological implication.

Secondly, Dasein is in a special relationship with the world and other conscious beings. My personal unique existence is not divorced from the social and cultural situation in which I find myself involved. It is not a self-enclosed being like the windowless monad of Leibnitz. To exist, for the Existentialists, is not merely to be ("Sein"), but to be here and there ( "da-sein"). In otherwards, it is being in a situation.

Dasein is defined as care ("Sorge") or concern ("be Sorge"). All other structures of Dasein are introduced as structures of 'Care' which is a generalised structure of

'concern', 'Concern' stands for some common practical attitudes as distinguished from the theoretical and descriptive knowledge of the Scientist, in careful detached reflection. The practical attitudes regarded as 'Concern' are attitudes like " having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, given something up and letting it to go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining ...."<sup>11</sup>

What characterizes our concern is our finitude and the way in which our being is consumed in the moment to moment passage of time. We do not exist only for the present moment. Human existence is open toward the future. We confront possibility and we are filled with angst. Here Heidegger follows closely Kierkegaard's analysis of dread. I can only overcome angst by facing my existence in its totality, and for human existence that is to face the fact of my own death as the limit of possibility. Both conscience and guilt play their part here, for conscience informs me of what I might be and guilt of what I might have been . I can not escape an inauthentic existence except by continually living as one who knows that he is going to die. I am, therefore, confronted with a decision between the inauthentic and authentic existence.

contd..88....

Heidegger's account of Dasein is thus a blend of the concept of dread and Either/Or. We are no longer faced with choice as the Key to truth ; we are faced with a systematic and argued ontology - or at least with the prologue to such an ontology - in which choice has its place. The ontology is that of The Concept of dread - ~~with~~ without God'.<sup>12</sup>

### The Concept of 'Anxiety'

Here Anxiety is primarily the anxiety for death, and it is a Key-mood of great significance. Heidegger owes much to Kierkegaard's concept of dread . The object of dread in Kierkegaard's sense is ' that indefinite something which is nothing. ' Kierkegaard had analysed the concept of dread in order to penetrate into the deepest layer of human feeling, and Heidegger uses it for the same purpose. An existential analysis of death occupies an important place in Heidegger's philosophy. He thinks that to understand Dasein as a whole we must understand it as " being-towards-death ". Death, says Heidegger is ' a phenomenon of life'.<sup>13</sup> He further says, ' Let the term "dying" stand for that way of Being in which Dasein is towards its death'.<sup>14</sup>

Heidegger develops the concept of man's being-towards-death in the following way. Death is the most private of all possibilities in that it is specifically mine. " Death is the only thing which nobody can do for me ". And man is the only being who knows he has to die. Death is furthermore an " unrelated possibility " in that through it any relation to other Daseins is dissolved. In addition it is an unsurpassable possibility, " the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein "<sup>15</sup>. Man is certain of his death but uncertain as to when it will occur. This constant threat of the possibility of death causes anxiety, in fact it constitutes the experience of 'Care' in its extreme form. Thus death reveals itself as that ' possibility which is one's ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped '<sup>16</sup>. Death is something distinctively impending. It is through the experience of death that an individual becomes conscious of the true nature of his existence and his authentic possibilities. Death is not an event that takes place at a particular point of time. Hence the question what happens after death has no philosophical importance. If death is defined as the end of Dasein, this does not imply any ontological decision whether after death still another Being is possible, either higher or lower, or whether Dasein

contd...90..

lives on or outlasts itself and is immortal. The this-worldly ontological interpretation of death takes precedence over any ontical other-worldly speculation. The existential interpretation of death takes precedence over any biology and ontology of life. But it is also the foundation for any investigation of death which is biographical or historiological, ethnological or psychological. In any typology of dying the concept of death is already presupposed. 'What might be discussed under the topic of a 'metaphysic of death' lies outside the domain of an existential analysis of death', says Heidegger.<sup>17</sup> Anxiety or dread differs from fear in seeming to have no object and no cause, and that is what makes it so profoundly disturbing, it is seldom felt in its intensity and clarity. The decisive character of dread is that it can not be localised and it refuses to be pinned down to anything. It is a possibility which not only has empire over all other possibilities, since it eventually extinguishes them, but which also has a bearing upon them while they remain options, for it reveals their contingency. I see all my possibilities as already annihilated in death, as they will be, like those of others in their turn. In face of death when all the possibilities are annihilated, there are only two alternatives before us : acceptance or distraction. We are free either to choose acceptance of death as the supreme and normative possibility of my existence, or to remain lost in the illusions of everyday life.

It may be asked ; how is the temporality of anxiety related to that of fear ? In answer to this question, Heidegger says : " Anxiety, like fear, has its character formally determined by something in the face of which one is anxious and the something about which one is anxious .... This does not mean that their structural characters are melted away into one another, as if anxiety were anxious neither in the face of anything nor about anything. Their coinciding means rather that the entity by which both these structures are filled in ..... is the same - namely, Dasein <sup>18</sup>. In fact, that in the face of which one has anxiety is not encountered as something definite in the world, it is not anything ready - to - hand or present-at-hand. Environmental entities do not have any involvement in the case of anxiety. We concern ourselves environmentally. Anxiety, however, springs from Dasein itself. When fear assails us, it does so from what is within-the-world. Anxiety arises out of Being-in-the-world as thrown Being-towards-death ".

Anxiety is said to be anxious in the face of ' nothing ' of the world. " Anxiety discloses an insignificance of the world, and this insignificance reveals the nullity of that with which one can concern oneself....." <sup>19</sup>

According to Heidegger, the temporality of anxiety and that of fear are not of the same nature. In the case of anxiety one is brought back to one's  $\beta$  thrownness as something possible that can be repeated, but is not so in the case of fear. As Heidegger says : " The character of having been is constitutive for the state-of-mind of anxiety; and bringing one face to face repeatability is the specific ecstastical mode of this character " <sup>20</sup>. Existentially anxiety means that it can not lose itself in something with which it might be concerned, it is only in fear that it may so happen. Again, according to Heidegger, anxiety merely brings one into the mood for a possible resolution. " Although both fear and anxiety as modes of state of mind are grounded primarily in having been, they each have different sources with regard to their own temporalization in the temporality of care. Anxiety springs from the future of resoluteness, while fear springs from the lost present of which fear is fearfully apprehensive, so that it falls prey to it more than ever. " <sup>21</sup>

' Thus dread which at first in contrast to fear is so vague and meaningless proves the most specific and significant of all emotions, a pitiless pointing to my original situation, an awful anticipation of my personal

choice, a fear of being already cast into the world and a fear for my authenticity in living in the world '22

It is dread, then, that reveals Dasein, the mode of existence of the human being, the sense of the situation and vital attitude in face of it.

The Concept of 'Nothing'.

In theistic Existentialism there is scarcely any reference to nothingness with the exception to Kierkegaard, who in his book 'The Concept of Dread', gives us only a vague idea of nothingness. In his 'What is Metaphysics?' Heidegger deals with the problem of 'Nothing'.

The conceptions of Non-being, Nothing, Death and Dread (Anguish) are intimately connected in Heidegger's Philosophy. Non-being or Nothing is not mere emptiness or the absolute negation of everything. The idea of negation applies properly to particular limited things, but the idea of Non-being applies to the totality of all things. In Dread or Anguish we come face to face with absolute Non-being or Nothing. 'Dread' is a mental state that has got no definite object for its source, and a

contd...94...

person in 'dread' can, therefore, think of nothing definite : so that the entire world slips away from his mind. About nothingness, he says in 'What is metaphysics?', "And this total relegation to the vanishing ~~what-is-in-totality~~ - such being the form in which Nothing crowds round us in dread - is the essence of Nothing, nihilation. Nihilation is neither an annihilation of what is, nor does it spring from negation. Nihilation can not be reckoned in terms of annihilation or negation at all. Nothing nihilates of itself".<sup>23</sup>

But this withdrawal of '~~what-is-in-totality~~' leaves with us not only a positive experience of nothing, but also an experience of pure Being into which all beings and we sink and return as into their own source and enduring home. Heidegger says, "An experience of Being as sometimes 'other' than everything that 'is' comes to us in dread, provided that, we do not from dread of dread shut our eyes to the soundless voice which attunes us to horrors of the abyss".<sup>24</sup>

Nothing is not merely a notional negation, not-anything, and thus the counter concept opposed to Being. It can be experienced and is itself the source of all forms of negation and negativity. Dread is the experience of Nothing. What happens when we come face to face with Nothing ?

' The intelligible world constructed by personal existence,

in which man feels safe and at home, the world of meanings, is nihilated and he is plunged back in to the sheer 'is-ness' of what is, his ship on which he is riding and voyaging disappears in the night and he finds himself in the deep waters and tastes their saltness. This is an experience of brute existence denuded of meanings, .... it uncovers the marvelousness of pure 'is-ness', contingency, which reason covers up, and is therefore a revelation of Being '.

Heidegger coins a verb, 'nichten', 'to nothing' which means the discovery by a human being of his insecurity in this world of ordinary objects, which causes anxiety in him. He uses the word 'nothing' in two senses. The first sense of the word 'nothing' is a man's realization that he arises out of a change which hurls him into the world, and ends in death when he will not exist any more. Death stares us in the face. No one knows when it will occur but everyone knows that it must occur at some point of time. Death is the final end towards which every one is moving. In this sense 'nichts' means 'non-existence' or 'nothingness'.

The second sense of the word 'nothing' is the great alarm that one feels when one experiences a great void, the

abyss, the vacancy which surrounds one. Things of the world recede to the background and lose their attraction and importance, and this is 'nothingness' in the second sense.

The problem of Nothing has been carried further in Heidegger's ' Kant and the problem of Metaphysics ' than in his ' Being and Time '. In the former work, he criticises Kant on two grounds ; first, Kant concentrated too much on the pure perceptive 'I' without considering his position as a human being in the world of things ; and secondly, Kant did not recognize Nothing which is the only possible ground of the analysis of human being. Here Nothing is connected by Heidegger explicitly with the finitude of human beings which essentially move them towards their end in death. In fact the realization of man's finitude was the beginning of his recognition of the concept of Nothing. Man's finitude means that he is mortal, and the realization of the fact of mortality on the part of a man arouses in him the feeling of Nothing.

#### Temporality

The subject of time has always been attractive of Philosophers and trivial to non-philosophers. Heidegger, as a philosopher

contd..96...

gives us an account of his idea of time which is different from the everyday concept. But his theory is not absurd in contrast to the common-sense view of time. We shall see how his theory arose and how it seeks to explain observed phenomena. Like Being, Temporality also receives in his system an ontological status. Temporality is the name of the way in which time exists in human existence. There could ~~not~~ be no 'Concern' if there were no temporality.

The potentiality of Being is latent in human being. The moment human being understands this and becomes conscious of his inevitable death, he feels an urge to actualize his inner possibilities and at the same time ~~he~~ begins to reflect upon himself. Particularly the dread of death pulls him up to authentic existence from inauthentic self-forgetful common existence as one of the many. He then tries to understand who he is, wherefrom his being is, where to the being tends, for whom it is. The human Dasein thus tries to explore its present, past, future and its own inner possibilities which he is free to develop. He freely decides what he proposes to be. According to Heidegger's existential temporality, the latent potentiality of human being is his future, the inauthentic fallen state in which he finds himself thrown is his past and the concrete situation which is presented for realization of potentiality is his present. These three are the elements

contd...97...

of the unitary existential effort - care or concern. So Heidegger thinks that there could be no concern if there were no temporality. Heidegger's human being thinks first of all of the future, then he mentally moves back to the past, and finally comes to be conscious of the present situation. Thus future, past and present are the three modes of temporality that produce time. Heidegger poetically calls these modes ' ecstasies of temporality '. There is a continuity between the three modes of temporality. ' The past originates from the future so as to engender the present'<sup>26</sup>. The successive moments of past, present and future are really nothing but a repetition of 'nows'. Nature as a collection of such present objects connotes no inner existence, no potentiality and therefore, no genuine future, past and present. So Heidegger holds : ' only existent man is historical. Nature has no history'<sup>27</sup>.

The Existential modes of Dasein

Heidegger refers to three existential modes of Dasein, namely, Existenz, Facticity and Fallenness, By (a) Existenz he means that a priori or existential structure of Dasein which stands for a "projection of possibilities". According to him, the freedom of choice and the recognition of this freedom constitute the essence of existence. In each case Dasein has its own possibility and it has 'this possibility' but it is not a property like something present at hand.

As such, it can in its very being, choose itself and never win itself. The implication is that we should not desire any a priori characterization of human projects and values. In the words of Dr.M.K.Bhadra " Heidegger is not so much concerned with freedom of action, as with freedom of choice. In this he opposes Kant who argued for freedom of action, but insisted that human choice was dictated by some rational criteria. Heidegger rejects the rational guidelines and points out that there are no a priori grounds for

making such choice. Again, he is not concerned with specific choices, but only with the most general choices, choices of ultimate evaluative criteria. He thus stresses the point that every life-style is not based upon rational justification, but is always based on personal decision or choice"<sup>28</sup>

(b) Facticity as an existential mode or a structure of Dasein is an elaboration of the definition of Dasein as 'being-in-the-world'. According to Heidegger, Dasein lives in a particular world at a particular time. An individual man's being born of particular parents, in a particular place, on a particular date, and having a particular name rather than another and the like, all are nothing but his facticities. In simple words the facticities of Dasein are just the things and events of a man's life, which could have been otherwise, although they have not been so. One could have been born of other parents in another country. On another date, could have another name- these possibilities were there. So the facts of a man's life are only facticities, not logical necessities. While explaining Heidegger's facticity, Dr.M.K.Bhadra says,

" My entire past is my facticity, for it is a collection of facts which I have not chosen. My bodily structure is also a part of my facticity. I can leave this place, this country, and even this planet, but I am the prisoner of my body. Facticity, for Heidegger, is the set of all these 'givens' which I encounter in my existence".<sup>29</sup> However, the circumstances, the facticities of a man are always determined, just given to him. He is thrown into them ; but the particular ways in which he will confront these circumstances are always undetermined, they depend upon his own choice and action.

(c) When Dasein fails to recognize existence or possibility as one of its existential structures, he has the tendency to neglect his existence. This tendency has been called fallenness by Heidegger. Man is so preoccupied with the petty tasks and problems of everyday life that he has no time for reflection on his existence. Says Dr.M.K.Bhadra," The life of das Mann is easy, as it simply follows the rules of everyday life and does not have to make a decision of his own. Dasein is therefore tempted to remain in the mode of Existenz dictated by das Mann, although it is not 'I' in the in the sense of my own self that "am", but rather the others, whose way is that of das Mann.

This temptation to remain in the state of das Mann  
is the condition of fallenness and it is also the  
foundation of in authenticity"<sup>30</sup>

Beyond Metaphysics ;

Godless Theology

An atheist, in the beginning, Heidegger turned towards  
a kind of theism or spiritualism in his later writings,  
as one who finds the concept of the Holy in his "Letter  
on Humanism". The transition from 'Being and Time' to his  
latest works, is marked by several contrasts.  
The most important of them is a shift from the study  
of the Being of particular entities including human  
being to an attempt to have an acquaintance with Being  
itself. He took poetry as a Kin of Philosophy. As he says,  
"only poetry stands in the same order of philosophy and  
its thinking, though poetry and thought are not the same  
thing"<sup>31</sup>

Again he says, "Thinking is.....poetizing..... the thinking of Being is the fundamental manner of poetizing"<sup>32</sup>. The search for an unmetaphysical language leads him to the poetry, philosophy of the pre-socratics, and the poetry of Holderlin. However the search for an unprejudice language to express Being itself carries Heidegger ultimately away from even those quasi-philosophical enterprises to a kind of Mysticism, in which the philosopher no longer tries to disclose truth, but simply waits patiently and passively for 'The word', of Being itself, not of God. In the words of R.C. Solomon, "The concern for the acility of language to hold discourse about Being to the word' which is spoken by Being to man"<sup>33</sup>. Gradually 'Being' in Heidegger's philosophy takes the place of Christian God and man's relation to Being is liken to that of the shepherd to God in Christian Theology.<sup>6</sup> In his later writings it becomes quite clear 'that Being has taken the place of the traditional transcendent Christian God and man is a vehicle for the self-revelation of Being. Being becomes grossly personified, and man's attitude towards Being is more like worship of God. than the asking

S E C T I O N- II

Elements of Intellect and emotion in Heidegger's  
Philosophy and their relative predominance.

Like Kierkegaard also gives a rational analysis of human existence and the real nature of human being. Heidegger's philosophy is primarily a philosophy of being in the form of a 'human being' or 'existence'. It is an analysis of human existence which brings to light the hidden meaning of 'Being'. He thinks that being and not things which have being is the principal object of Philosophical enquiry and that in order to know the real nature of things we must have resort to intuition and try to grasp it in its givenness. According to him, the task of philosophy is the analysis of 'Being'.

Accordingly, in his analysis of Being, he distinguishes between three sorts of being and thinks that the being of man, as an active self-conscious individual, is human being.

This is being in its proper form and is called 'existence'. I experience myself as existence itself and not as a thing having being by comparing myself with lower animals,

physical objects etc. and by feeling that I am free to choose and decide between alternatives and my freedom consists in the act of choice.

So we see that though Heidegger speaks of intuitive method as a must in Philosophy, yet he openly adopts the analytical method in discovering the hidden meaning of Being which he thinks the principal object of philosophical enquiry. The question is, is it possible for Heidegger to distinguish between three sorts of being without the exercise of intellect? The task of analysis and making distinction, to choose and decide between alternatives, to experience one's own existence etc. presuppose the involvement of intellect or reason.

Heidegger deals the problem of Being from three points of view, and as such three different questions are raised regarding Being. First, there is the question concerned with the conceptual analysis of Being. Secondly, there is the metaphysical question regarding the nature of Being. Thirdly, there is the theological question regarding Being.

In the task of conceptual analysis of Being Heidegger is dealing with concepts. In the conceptual analysis of Being there is actually nothing but a dissection of the concepts in its different meanings and the determination of its uniform

meaning. Here he is attempting to formulate new concepts. To him, the task of Philosophy is to formulate new and new concepts, philosophy is analysis of language and concepts, it is linguistic and conceptualistic. We see that Heidegger's analysis of Being and existence is in accord with his idea of philosophy. Regarding the nature of Being, we are told to know the essence of Being. But to find out the essence of a thing is to find out the common characteristics lying in that class and to point out the similarities and dissimilarities by comparing it with others and then to generalise.

Heidegger says, ' The essence of human being lies in its existence'. According to him, we can experience our existence through ' concern' which connects human being with the world. ' Concern' is our way of raising the question-' What shall I do ? ( or ' What Can I use ? ' or ' Are things for me or against me ?'. Raising of such questions indicate that human being is free to make choice and to make choice and decide between alternatives is not possible without rational thinking .

Regarding the theological question of Being, Heidegger speaks of our finitude and our future state of perfection through self-development which is the final end of

Being. Heidegger's realization of man's imperfection and finiteness, his idea of care or concern, dread, anguish, nothingness etc. are all meant for man in general. From individual experience he comes to the conclusion that human beings experience like him under similar situation. This is nothing but generalization by induction. In fact, in order to realize the real nature of existence and Being, Heidegger has adopted intellectual intuitive method. His direct intuitive knowledge has been systematised by reason or intellect.

Heidegger adopted a novel philosophical method known as the hermeneutical method by the application of which the revelation of significance of Being and the world could be effected. The word 'hermeneutic' means interpreting or explanatory. Thus the hermeneutic method may be taken as a method, explanatory of the significance of Being and the world, "Heidegger uses the expression 'hermeneutic Phenomenology' as the name of a method which can be applied by human beings to themselves, and by means of which they can understand features of their perceptions and thought about the world, which, without this method, they might have neglected, familiar to them though they are. It is by this method that 'Concern' is revealed in its crucial role" <sup>36</sup>.

The application of the hermeneutic method helps a man in understanding the Being and the world. In fact, in Heidegger's Philosophy knowing consists in 'understanding', which again consists in 'intuiting' and 'thinking'. As Heidegger says, "Intuition' and 'Thinking' are both derivatives of understanding.....Even the Phenomenological 'intuition of essences'..... is grounded in existential understanding".<sup>37</sup>

All seeing is grounded primarily in understanding, and 'seeing' is a way of access to entities and to Being. Heidegger uses the word seeing in a very special sense. It is not mere seeing in the ordinary sense" 'Seeing' does not mean just perceiving with the bodily eyes, but neither does it mean non-sensory awareness of something present-at-hand in its presence-in-hand,... It lets entities which are accessible to it be encountered unconcealedly in themselves"<sup>38</sup> Thus Heidegger disfavours pure intuitionism. He is rather an upholder of qualified intuitionism in so far as according to him knowledge consists in understanding involving both intuition and reason or thought. By showing how all sight is grounded primarily in understanding..... we have deprived pure intuition....of its priority, which corresponds noetically to the priority of the present-at-hand in traditional ontology"<sup>39</sup>

Contd..108

In Heidegger's philosophy, there is predominance of intellect and intuition ; still the role of emotion is not negligible. Of course emotion is not so much predominant in his philosophy as it is in Kierkegaard's philosophy, in whom reason was overtaken by passion, passion for truth and divinity. Nevertheless, in Heidegger's philosophy emotion plays an important role in care of reason or intellect. While explaining the nature of Being, he naturally brings in the concept of 'nothing' which can not be understood without the faculty of feeling and emotion being active. In one sense, the awareness of 'nothing' according to him, is the emotional feeling that the whole world with the individual human being concerned may be destroyed or reduced to 'nothing' at any moment. This feeling is comparable to poet Tagore's feeling expressed in a couplet ;

' We shall not remain, brother, none of us,

Nothing at all will endure ;

With that delight (in mind) move on and on

Following the strides of time, <sup>40</sup>

With this feeling of nothingness there is connected the feeling of anxiety and this is another element of emotion in Heidegger's philosophy. The feeling of anxiety consequent upon the feeling of nothingness is a reality that can not be denied but can be superseded by inner strength of mind and the observance of inner discipline. Heidegger's philosophical quest at last brought him to the vantage of the Holy i.e. beyond the comprehension of ordinary thinking, i.e. transcendent to the temporal order.

Thus in Heidegger's philosophy, there is to be found a passage from the knowledge of the finite to that of infinite, from the knowledge of the temporal being to that of the timeless Being, the Being everlasting, and this final knowledge that is intuitive, gives rise to divine passion or emotion in the Dasein concerned to be in tune with the Holy in self-abnegation. This passion towards the universal or absolute Being sounds like a devotee's absolute self-surrender to God, although this is not a passion for the deity but only a philosopher's passion for the absolute truth.

Thus in Heidegger's philosophy, there is to be found a happy intermingling of reason and intuition and of intellect and emotion.

Contd...111