

**INTELLECT AND EMOTION
IN
EXISTENTIALISM**

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P R E F A C E

This is a thoroughly revised version of the thesis formerly submitted for the Ph.D. Degree of Rabindra Bharati University. The revision has been done strictly in accordance with the suggestion of one of the adjudicators of the thesis, who advised it.

The purpose of the present thesis is a critical survey of Existentialism with special reference to some prominent existentialists like Soren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre with a view to finding out the place of intellect or reason in Existentialism which generally passes for a kind of anti-intellectualistic or anti-rationalistic emotionalism, and thus to make a reassessment of the intellect/emotion controversy in Existentialism from an objective stand point. And we think that this will be a new approach to the study of Existentialism, which generally follows only the beaten track.

In the understanding of my subject I was much inspired by the scholarly expositions of my guide and teacher Dr. Sunil Kumar Das, M.A., Ph.D., D.Litt., Department of philosophy, Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta, whose encouragement and suggestions helped me much in the successful completion of my thesis.

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C H A P T E R - I

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Section-I Philosophy and Psychology as interrelated disciplines

As to the origin of Existentialism, Mary Warnock writes, " We may be content to use the term ' Existentialism' to cover a kind of philosophical activity which flourished on the continent especially in the 1940s and 1950s, which can be shown to have certain common interests, common ancestry and common presuppositions, and which is now sufficiently clearly a matter of history to make a general survey worth undertaking. " ¹ But as a matter of fact Existentialism had its origin long before, as it was founded by the Danish Philosopher Søren Kierkegaard who was born in 1813 and died in 1855. It seems that Warnock here refers to the origin of Phenomenological Existentialism, that is, generally regarded as the proper type of Existentialism as enunciated by Philosophers like Heidegger (1889- 1976) and Sartre (1905 - 1980). It is generally accepted that Kierkegaard is the real founder of the Existentialist movement while Nietzsche (1844-1900) may be regarded as the founder of the atheistic trend of Existentialist thought. The existentialists, like the Analytical philosophers and Logical Positivists wanted to add something new to the domain of Philosophy,

and have expressed many views on the nature of the world and human life ; such as, being, freedom, God, human being and its relation with other beings in the world, death, dread (anguish), nausea, abandonment, sexuality etc. of which some are Philosophical and some Psychological. In existentialism, we see Philosophy and Psychology to have their place side by side , and from this it seems that the existentialists do not belong to that group who think that Psychology can and ought to be studied in complete separation from Philosophy. They took philosophy and psychology as inter-related disciplines and for this reason, they did not leave aside psychology while discussing their philosophical views.

Now it is necessary to consider whether Philosophy and Psychology are inter-related disciplines or not. There was also a time when Psychology was looked upon merely as a branch of philosophy. The relation between Philosophy and Psychology, then, was looked upon as the same as between Philosophy and its other branches. But modern Psychologists put forward the claim that Psychology should be treated separately from Philosophy. Before entering into the arguments of the modern Psychologists in support of their view, let us first see what Psychology means. The word 'Psychology ' has been derived from the Greek words 'psyche', which means the soul, and 'Logos' referring to Science. So the derivative

meaning of the word 'Psychology' is the Science of the Soul. Taking this sense into consideration, the ancient Philosophers discussed the nature of soul, the relation of soul and matter, God and his relation to soul, immortality of soul, re-birth, relation of body with soul etc. and brought all these under the subject matter of Psychology. They defined psychology as the Science of the soul. Ancient Greek Philosophers like plato and Aristotle admitted the existence of soul, though they differed about the nature of soul. ² Even the modern Psychologists like Stout, ³ Mc. Dougall ⁴ etc. think that though the question whether there is some separate mental entity besides the mental processes, is not the question of psychology, yet we must admit the hypothesis of mind in order to make psychology possible. We can easily imagine mind and body as separate entities, but in reality they are inseparable. It is absurd to think of the acting human body without the existence of mind in it, or the existence of mind minus body. The term ' Psychology ' also refers to 'mind ' as the subject-matter of Psychology. 'Psychology' without ' Psyche ' is meaningless. Though the mind or soul is not sensible, yet we can know mind through its activities, i.e. thinking, feeling and willing. So we can say that Psychology is the study of the mental processes or of the processes of the mind which thinks and feels through the via-media of body and

tries to achieve some end. Now the question is : are Philosophy and Psychology inter-related disciplines ?

Modern Psychologists answer negatively. They opine that Psychology can be studied as a branch of natural science and they claim to place it by the side of Physics, Chemistry, Botany etc. They also think that the relation between Philosophy and Psychology is exactly the same as that of Philosophy to these other sciences. According to them, Psychology as a natural science should deal with with study of mental processes only with a view to discovering the laws of their combination and development and should not make use of any explanatory hypothesis regarding the ultimate nature of these processes or of mind. To discuss about the ultimate nature of soul or mind is the task of Philosophy, not of Psychology. Philosophy must not dictate to Psychology with regard to its method, aim and content.

This attitude of the majority of modern Psychologists has its stand on the following grounds :

FIRSTLY , they argue that if with the help of the data supplied by observation and experiment, it is possible to lay down with accuracy and precision the universal laws underlying phenomena in all departments of the physical world, there is no reason why such laws can not also be formulated with regard to the activities

of living organisms, mental states and processes. The introduction of experimental methods in Psychology with brilliant success has added strength to the demand that Psychology should be completely separated from Philosophy.

SECONDLY , the increasing knowledge of the structure of the nervous system including the brain and of the functions performed by its different parts has led to the discovery of a close relationship between mental life and its Physiological basis. As a result, it has been possible to study mental processes in close co-relation to Physiological processes with the help of the exact methods employed in Science: It is, therefore, contended that a Psychologist can be completely indifferent to questions concerning the ultimate nature of mind and mind-body relation which may be reserved for the metaphysician. In this connection, we may refer to Swāmi Abhedānanda's view about modern Psychology. Swāmi Abhedānanda, in his book, ' True Psychology', says that modern Psychology (western) teaches Psychology, " not in the sense of science of the psyche or soul, but in the sense of Physiological origin and ordering of the mind." According to him, modern psychology is not true psychology, " True Psychology recognizes the existence of body, mind and soul. But the modern Physiological Psychology admits the existence of body only and nothing else"⁵

Now before considering the arguments of the modern Psychologists it is necessary to discuss the relationship between Philosophy and other branches of natural science .

Metaphysics is an enquiry into the ultimate nature of the universe as a whole. A science deals with a particular section of the universe. A Scientist does not enter into the facts belonging to the other fields of enquiry. It is not his business to determine the ultimate nature of the universe as a whole. Again, every science has its special methods for the purpose of carrying on its investigations. So long as a science confines its investigations strictly within its own limits, the necessity of examining the ultimate validity of the assumptions which it makes does not arise. But there arises a stage in the development of every science when such an examination has to be undertaken, and it can be undertaken only by metaphysics. When it is found that the categories used in one science come in conflict with those made in another, there arise some problems which necessarily lead to some metaphysical questions. Hence it is quite clear that the different branches of natural science can not be altogether separated from metaphysics. They must be related to the latter.

Psychologists also find it necessary to make certain assumptions regarding the subject-matter of their study. Thus

the Faculty Psychologists believe that the various forms of experiences which a person has are nothing but the activities performed by different faculties belonging to the soul.

The Associationists like Hume, Berkeley, Mill, Bain etc assume that mind is nothing but a stream of ideas and all mental life is to be explained by reference to the action of ideas on one another.

According to the Neo-realists like Holt, Margin, Perry, Russell, Alexander etc. ideas, thoughts, perceptions etc. of which mind is supposed to be composed and which are regarded as bits of consciousness, are identical with the objects of the physical world.

Again, the Behaviourists like Watson deny the necessity of using such term as 'mind', 'consciousness' or any term which refers to mind or Consciousness. To them mind is nothing but the sum-total of the re-actions made by nervous system in response to stimuli operating on it. They try to explain all the behaviours of human being with the formula, $S \rightarrow R$ (stimulus \rightarrow Response). According to Watson, '.....The time seems to have come when Psychology must discard all reference to consciousness, when

it need no longer delude itself into thinking that it is making mental states the object of observation'. .

He goes further and says, 'It is possible to write a psychology, to define it as the "Science of behaviour", and never go back on the definition : never to use the terms consciousness, mental states, mind, will, imagery and the like It can be done in terms of stimulus and response, in terms of habit formation and the like.....'⁶ It is metaphysics which can examine these hypotheses or notions concerning mind and to test the ultimate validity of these assumptions made in connection with its nature and activities. Psychology must also, therefore, be related to metaphysics.

That Psychology can not be separated from Philosophy becomes evident, when we consider the nature of meaning. The essential nature of consciousness consists in referring to or meaning something. A conscious process is not merely something that simply occurs, but points to something outside it. It is because our thought processes have meanings that there is for us a common objective world. If there were no consciousness there would be no such thing as meaning. Thus Psychology as the Science of consciousness and Philosophy having meaning as its

subject-matter are inseparably related.

Thinking is a mental process. A Psychologist can only give us a causal explanation of why we actually think as we do. When we think, we feel that the movement of thought is impelled by an immanent necessity. Psychology which claims to be a merely descriptive science gives us an account of thought which must be defective since it does not take this aspect of thinking process into account. So Psychology can never be thought of as an experimental natural science in the strict sense unless the particular metaphysical hypothesis with regard to the nature of mind is true, and in making that admission he implicitly becomes a metaphysician.

Thus psychology is dependent upon philosophy in a special sense. Philosophy must have the right to undertake a critical examination of the methods employed in Psychological investigations, to point out the limitations under which they are to work.

But if Psychology is dependent upon Philosophy from one point of view, Philosophy also is dependent upon Psychology from another point of view. It we are to have knowledge of reality at all, we must depend upon experience and that experience must be as broadbased as possible. Mental states and processes are

not merely important in themselves but they are also important, because it is only through them that we can come into contact with the external world. When we try to understand the meanings of space, time, matter, causality etc, we find that a particular mental process is essential by which they come to be known. Psychology studies these processes and an accurate study of these processes throw much light on the ultimate nature of mind.

Man is endowed with the power of thinking. With the help of this thinking faculty, he tries to evaluate the objective validity of the ideals of truth, morality and beauty. The way in which we actually think or act or feel, is, in most cases, influenced by these ideals, and accordingly, there grows up the philosophy of Logic, the philosophy of Ethics or the Philosophy of Aesthetics or the philosophy of Art. Now Psychology as a science studies the mental processes like thinking, feeling and willing. An accurate study of these processes enriches philosophy by giving important data or materials, and with the help of these materials the onward march of philosophy continues in different directions.

We can therefore, say that Philosophy also is dependant upon psychology for much of its materials. So

Philosophy and Psychology are inter-related disciplines.

But we should not forget that while philosophy has to build

on Psychology and the results of Psychological research,

it must necessarily pass beyond psychology.

Section-II Claims of Intellect and Intuition as
a source of knowledge of Reality.

Metaphysics, which is an integral part of Philosophy starts with the reflective distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality'. The distinction between things as they appear to us and things as they are in themselves, between 'phenomena' and 'noumena' seems inevitable. Since reality may be different from what it appears to be, the question that naturally agitates our mind is : have we no means of knowing reality or is the knowledge of 'Things-in-themselves', i.e. super-sensuous noumena possible ?

In answer to this question we are to discuss first the different sources of knowledge and then to judge the legitimacy of their claims as the sources of the knowledge of reality.

The different theories of the sources of knowledge are Empiricism, Rationalism, Criticism, Intuitionism etc.

Taken strictly, Empiricism is the theory which holds that all human knowledge comes from sense-experience. There are no innate ideas in our mind, and that whatever can not be verified by sense experience is unreal. To the empiricists

the method of philosophy is inductive. With the help of generalisation from particular facts of experience we get the knowledge of universal truths, even the law of causation, the law of Identity, the law of contradiction etc. The materials of knowledge are sensations and reflections. From sensation we get the knowledge of the external world and by reflection we get the knowledge of our different mental states. The Empiricists admit that sense-experience can not give us the knowledge of general concept and universal truth. It is through generalisation from particular observed facts that we get the knowledge of them. Hence, if philosophy is to give us true knowledge about facts, it must be based on sense-experience.

In the history of western Philosophy the Sophists like Protagoras, Gorgeas etc. of ancient Greece are called Empiricists, and as modern Empiricists the names of Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, Hume etc. are note-worthy.

Philosophers like Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz etc. regard reason as the source of knowledge. They are called Rationalists because they accept reason instead of experience as the source of Philosophical knowledge. Both the Empiricists and the Rationalists are opposed to authority.

in the sphere of philosophical study. For both, the aim of philosophy is the attainment of a system of universal and necessary principles which are logically inter-related. But while the empiricists believe that philosophy can attain its object with the help of sense-experience only, the Rationalists deny this and hold that Philosophy must be based on thought or reason alone. Hence if philosophy is to give us certain and universal knowledge, it must be based on such principles as are self-evident and are absolutely certain. Thought or reason has in it some such self-evident and necessary principles. These are natural to or inherent in reason. They are innate or apriori truths which lie implicit in the mind from our birth and prior to all experience. Philosophy must start from such self-evident and a priori truths, and pass from these to others which necessarily follow from them. So the method of Philosophy is deductive.

The difficulties of Empiricism and Rationalism led Kant, the great German Philosopher, to formulate another theory, namely ' Criticism'. This method tries to find out by analysis the conditions which make knowledge possible. True knowledge consists of two characteristics-

universality and necessity. But from experience we never get necessity and universality. According to Kant, there are some apriori elements of human knowledge and these elements are true of all minds. Space, time, causality, substantiality etc. are such forms and ideas or categories which govern all knowledge because they are inherent in the mind of all rational beings like us. The Characteristics of true knowledge universality and necessity, can only be explained with the help of these apriori elements.

According to Kant, knowledge is a joint product of experience and reason. Experiences supply the data or materials of knowledge in the form of sensations. These are interpreted by the mind through the application of the apriori forms and categories of space, time, substance, causality etc. It is in this way that we get the knowledge of the external world existing in space and time. But the world which we know can not be regarded as real in the strict sense. It is rather a world which we construct out of the materials supplied by sensations and by application of the form and categories supplied by mind. That is why, Kant says, 'Understanding makes

Nature' ⁷

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What we know is not reality as it is in-itself, but as it appears through our senses and the categories of our mind or understanding. We can not know anything except through sense-intuition and the categories. Therefore, according to this theory, we can never know Reality or things-in-themselves, although the reason in us may be under the necessity of thinking of them. Our knowledge is limited to the world of phenomena or appearances and Reality remains for us 'unknown and unknowable'.⁸ Beyond phenomena there are, no doubt, the noumena as the sources of sensation. But neither Science nor Philosophy enables us to know what they are.

Henry Bergson, the famous French Philosopher, advocates Intuitionism as a theory of the source of Philosophical knowledge. He maintains that the veil between our mind and Reality which is supposed to keep them apart for all times is of our own making. Our failure to get a glimpse of the nature of Reality is the dependence of Philosophers on the traditional methods of Philosophizing.

Bergson is essentially an anti-intellectualist. He holds that conceptual knowledge can never give us an insight

into the nature of Reality. Concepts are only substitutes for immediacy. However clear, definite and precise the concepts may be, like most substitutes they fall short of their originals. If we depend solely or mainly on concepts for our knowledge of the real nature of the world, we are bound to be disappointed. Does it mean that we have to adopt an agnostic attitude towards Reality and declare that it is unknowable ? Not necessarily, says Bergson. There is another way of coming into contact with Reality, and it is directly or immediately apprehending Reality as it is in-itself. This is the famous Bergsonian method of Intuition. By 'Intuition' Bergson understands 'A kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible'.⁹ It is an act which we perform frequently. For example, when we plunge ourselves in the depths of our own experience, we feel ourselves most intimately within our own life, that is to say, we intuit ourselves. When I intuit myself in this way I get a direct or immediate insight into myself.

The barrier between 'I' as the knower and 'me' as the known

disappears, and the two become one. This direct insight into myself is not mediated by intellectual categories. This can not be even called knowledge because there is no distinction between subject and object, between subject and predicate, between substance and attributes, cause and effect etc. Bergson thinks that by constant practice and concentration of effort we can perform this act of intuition and apply it to the so-called external world also. It is possible to have a direct and immediate apprehension i.e. intuition of the external world just as it is possible to have such an apprehension of our self. The dynamic reality which appears to us as a world of finite things with fixed boundary lines is called 'Elan Vital' or the ceaseless flux of life by Bergson. Therefore, it is not by thought that cuts up the moving flow of Reality into static concepts and ideas, but only by sinking deep into our inmost being, and by being one with it, we shall have an immediate experience of this basic flow of life within us. Without this "intellectual sympathy" we can have no metaphysical knowledge in the true sense.

Intuition is a power of consciousness near and more intimate to the knowledge by identity. It, however, is likely to be misinterpreted and mixed with other mental elements. There are various types of Intuition proper to different levels, vital, physical and mental. Bergson's intuition is typical of vital level. Bergson says, " By intuition I mean instinct that becomes disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and enlarging it indefinitely".¹⁰

For the ancient Indian thinkers Philosophy is a direct experience or realization of absolute truth and Reality (Darśana) and not merely a matter of intellectual understanding of or theoretical speculation about truth and Reality. They think that philosophy must be based on the experiences of the self within and the world outside us. These experiences may be either the normal experiences of ordinary men or the intuitive experiences of saints, seers and prophets.

Among the Indian systems of Philosophy the Cārvāka, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya take ordinary experience as the

basis of philosophy. But the systems like the Bauddha, the Jaina, the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta hold that from ordinary experience we can not form any correct idea of ultimate reality. In these matters we must depend on the intuitions of seers and saints who have a direct realization of such things and whose experiences have been preserved for us in the scriptures. Hence, study of these scriptures (Śravana) initiates a student of Philosophy to the search of ultimate truth.

The second step in Philosophical study, according to the ancient Indian Philosophers, is reasoning or rational understanding (manana). Here it is advised to examine thoroughly all experiences including the teachings of the scriptures and see for oneself whether there is any contradiction in the teachings of the scriptures. A rational and critical study of all experiences is thus necessary for the attainment of philosophical knowledge.

But the realization of Philosophical truths does not come by way of reasoning alone. By means of criticism and reasoning we can find out the errors in our experiences,

and in the ideas and concepts based on them. But by mere reasoning we can neither know the truth nor realize it. For the realization of philosophical truths all Indian thinkers, excepting the Cārvākas, recommend moral purification, contemplation (nididhyāsana) and concentration (Yoga) as the necessary means. To them, these constitute the most important part of the method of philosophy. All proofs that have so far been given by philosophers in support of the truths of Philosophy like God, self, immortality, freedom etc. leave us as unconvinced as ever. What is necessary is a direct experience of these truths. And this must be attained by constant contemplation of these truths. The truths of philosophy can not be verified in sense-experience, nor can we prove them scientifically. The only way in which they can be known by us is rational reflection on and constant contemplation of them. K.C. Bhattacharyya has truly said, 'Metaphysics, or more generally, philosophy, is not only actual knowledge, but is not even literal thought; and yet its contents are contemplated as true in the faith that is only by such contemplation that absolute truth can be known'.¹¹

S E C T I O N- III

A combined approach as found in Bergson
and in Existentialism.

Intellect and intuition, as faculties of knowledge, cannot be discarded outright. In Indian Philosophy, we see that the necessity of both intellect and intuition has been strongly recommended as a combined method of knowing the Reality. The necessity of both has been admitted also by Dr.S.Radhakrishnan when he says,"..... no intuitive experience can be the basis of a philosophical truth unless intellect endorses it, and that it is only if we make intuition intellectual that there is any chance of communicating our intuitions to others"¹². In Bergsonian Philosophy also we see that his 'intellectual sympathy' does not exclude intellect as a faculty of knowledge, though he is the Chief exponent of Intuitionism. The introduction of Intuitionism in his philosophy is no doubt the starting point of a revolution in an age of apotheosis of reason and it is by this method that he wins a credit no less than any great thinker of the world. Bergson defines intuition as " a kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself

within the object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible"¹³. This definition makes intuition a fabrication of intelligence, a part and parcel of it. Here intuition is confined to the intellectual domain. His other definitions of intuition as 'intellectual expansion' or 'intellectual auscultation' also prove that he desires to distinguish intellect and intuition not as separate faculties of knowledge but distinct within the same faculty. In one of his books he also tells us about the co-operation between faith and reason, intuition and intellect. As he remarks, "dialectic is necessary to put intuition to the proof, necessary also in order that intuition should break into concepts and so be propagated to other men"¹⁴. From this remark it is clear that he admits the co-operation of intellect and intuition though their functions are different the one theoretical and the other practical. Intuition has nothing to do with material problems, so it is non-practical, whereas intelligence is practical in the sense that intelligence is constituted to act mechanically on matter which has no access to the problems of life. The flow of life is the flow of intuition and the inverted flow resulting in the production

of matter is tackled by practical intelligence. So we see that Bergson admits intuition and intelligence as the two faculties of knowledge, one giving us the knowledge of the flow of life and the other affording us the knowledge of matter. Bergson thinks that intelligence occupies an intermediate status keeping instinct on one side and intuition on the other. Intelligence, he says, is the "only road leading from the infra-intellectual to the supra-intellectual"¹⁵ That is to say, instinctive knowledge may be developed into intuitive one and the path of progress runs through the reign of intelligence.

We, therefore, see that though anti-intellectualist, Bergson is not true to his Intuitionism of which he is so eloquent. In fact, Bergson knew that without reason or intellect no intuitive philosophy is possible. That is why, this truth finds its expression in his definition of 'Intuition' where he says, it is a kind of 'Intellectual sympathy'. So, it is clear that Bergson's Intuitionism is not pure Intuitionism, rather it is a combined method of intellect and Intuition.

This combined approach is found in Existentialism also .

Existentialism is generally supposed to be the Philosophy of emotions and actions. But it is also a philosophy of intellect or reason, because an analysis of human existence and emotional attitudes to life and society as undertaken by the Existentialists, is not possible without the exercise of the intellectual or rational faculty. However, the Existentialists make use of reason for explaining what they understand by existence ; but that is a part of philosophical activity, and they do not hold that reason is necessarily a source of knowledge.

The Existentialists have expressed their views regarding human being, its relation with other beings in the world, freedom of will, causation, the nature of the world as a whole, existence etc. They give arguments in support of their views and try to refute the theories held by others and are thus not quite faithful to their creed of irrationalism. At the same time they put forward the claim that their fundamental doctrines are based on intuition or direct insight. Besides, being confronted by the world, the Existentialists give us accounts of their subjective feelings and emotions like dread, anguish, nausea,

loneliness, abandonment etc. They have described these subjective feelings and emotions, and this might not have been possible without the exercise of intellect or reason as a Philosophical activity. Although as an existentialist Kierkegaard bases his philosophy upon feeling and intuition as a way of realization of truth as subjectivity, he is not antagonistic to reason, but he dis-approves abstract Idealism which gives absolute authority to pure reason. He maintains a harmony between reason and feeling or imagination and says that they should be unified in simultaneity. As he says, " Science.....are unified in existence" ¹⁶

He does not deprecate thought or reason, but says that reason should be tinged with feeling or emotion, reason should be emotional, so to say. A reason, that is, totally dissociated from feeling and emotion is a bad reason, that is, not reason proper. As he says, " And just as it is an as bad as losing his reason". Reason must be concrete, not abstract, i.e. it must recognize the emotional aspect of existence, otherwise it becomes a misnomer, having no connection with human life and existence.

C H A P T E R- II

S E C T I O N- I

A brief account of Kierkegaard's Philosophy.

INTRODUCTION :

Søren Kierkegaard, known as the father of Existentialism, was born in 1813 in Denmark and died at the age of 42. Kierkegaard can not be regarded as a Philosopher in the traditional sense. His philosophy was an adjunct to his religious faith. He was mainly interested in religion, particularly in Christianity. But he gave a new interpretation of Christianity from the existentialist point of view. He is regarded as the parent of Existentialism. The notion of 'existence' takes a quite different colour with Kierkegaard and with later existentialists of the twentieth century. " In him we can see for the first time..... the desire to change one's readers, to free them from their past illusions, and make them not only think, but even live differently ".¹ and this characteristic is found in all existentialistic writings, says Mary Warnock. According to Margaret Chatterjee, " He was a protestant in many senses of the term. He protested both against all

collectives which threatened to swamp men's individuality and he protested against the way in which philosophers had cut off intellect from the inner springs of human existence which alone could give it life".²

" Indeed Kierkegaard was so much impervious to the idea of system-making that he chose rather an academically non-conformist mode of Philosophizing a deeply personal one- for breaking up a new path in philosophical thinking",³ says Prof. Debabrata Sinha.

KIERKEGAARD ON EXISTENCE

That existence is primordial and irreducible is a truth which was overlooked in traditional philosophy. Kierkegaard laid his hand upon this simple truth- that unlike a category of thought, existence is unamenable to conceptual analysis. According to him, " existence can not be represented in a concept, because it is too dense, concrete and rich. I am, and this fact that I exist is so compelling and enveloping a reality that it can not be reproduced thinly in any of my mental concepts, though it is

clearly the life and death fact without which all my
concepts would be void",⁴ Unless existence is a concept,
it can not be rationally analysed. According to him, it
is impossible to prove that anything exists. " Generally
speaking, it is a difficult matter to prove that anything
exists, the entire demonstration always turns into
something very different and becomes an additional development
of the consequences that flow from my having assumed that the
object in question exists. Thus I always reason from existence,
not toward existence, whether I move in the sphere of palpable
sensible fact or in the realm of thought..... Whether we
call existence an accessorium or the eternal prius it is never
subject to demonstration"⁵

He points out that 'Existence' as such and 'the
thought of Existence' are not the same thing. By this he seems
to mean that philosophers may think about 'Existence' in
different ways and may formulate different views about it ,
but 'Existence' as a fact is so rich in content that it cannot
be represented in a concept. There can be no concept of
Existence. Or it may be said that the fact that I exist does
not imply ' I think, I exist'. Because I must first exist, in order

that I may think that I exist. It may, therefore, be said that if existence can not be a concept, then quite clearly it can not be reduced to essence, nor can priority for essence over existence be claimed. Then, again, if thought as the objective reality be identical with being, an actually existing being becomes identical with his thought of himself. But this is sheer tautology, because this being which is ascribed to the thinker does not signify that he is, but only that he is engaged in thinking. The existing subject, on the other hand, is engaged in existing, which is indeed the case with every human being. The existence of a human being who is a historical being living here and now is prior to 'essence' prior to the abstractions of impersonal thinking. This may be taken as an anticipation of the Sartrean statement 'Existence precedes essence'.

Although Kierkegaard's is a revolt mainly against Hegel, it is virtually a revolt against the entire, Platonic tradition, against all those who maintain that 'essence' is prior to 'existence'. Kierkegaard thus initiates the discussion on Existentialism and we look for its further elaboration and development in subsequent Existentialist

thinkers. Existentialists do, however, differ among themselves and they divide themselves into two Camps-theists and atheists. But nevertheless, none of them, while formulating his view, can rise above the basic principle of Existentialism as set forth by Kierkegaard.

THE MEANING OF EXISTENCE

The word 'existence' acquired a new meaning in Kierkegaard's Philosophy. So long it had identically the same sense as 'being', i.e. it was just a synonym for 'being'. Previously it could be said that a table exists as meaningfully as it could be said that a man exists. But with the foundation of the Existentialist system of Philosophy by Kierkegaard who himself coined the term "Existentialism", 'Existence' and 'being' disengaged themselves.

According to Kierkegaard, 'existence' means much more than what is meant by mere 'being'. Every instance of existence is also an instance of being, but not vice-versa i.e. 'being' is not necessarily 'existence'. Existence belongs

only to human beings, and not necessarily to all human beings, but only to those who are self-conscious and self-determined or at least endowed with the freedom of the will.

Unlike Hegel, Kierkegaard holds that actual existence (existence is always actual) can never be reduced to a concept which signifies only the possibility of actual existence. On his part, he is concerned only with individual human existence, and this spirit of Existentialism is found in the thoughts of all succeeding existentialists in so far as they unanimously hold that existence always stands for individual existence, never for collective existence, Hegel failed to value the individual human being standing apart from the 'Crowd', but Kierkegaard did not. He appreciated the seriousness of the ethical dilemma facing the individual, i.e. he appreciated that the concept of 'individual existence' involves the notion of 'Choice', 'individuality', 'freedom' 'responsibility', 'commitment', 'despair' and 'guilt'.

In Kierkegaard's special sense of 'individual existence', a man is not simply a biological, Psychological or social animal, but a 'human being', and 'existence'. Existence may be authentic or inauthentic. In the strict sense, it means only authentic existence, not the inauthentic. The distinction between authentic

and inauthentic existence has been beautifully explained by Kierkegaard in his 'Concluding Unscientific Postscript', " Eternity is a winged-horse, infinitely passed, and time is a worn-out jade, the existing individual is the driver. That is to say, he is such a driver when his mode of existence is not an existence loosely so-called, for then he is no driver but a drunken peasant who lies asleep in the wagon and lets the horses take care of themselves. To be sure, he also drives and is a driver, and so there are many who also exist" ⁶ .

Unlike Descartes and his followers, Kierkegaard holds that existence is something to be striven for, not self-evident. It is only by passionately committing itself that can one exist at all.

Thus according to Kierkegaard, 'existence' means the significance which one provides for his own life through the realization of one's personal freedom and autonomy, through passionate commitment. True existence is not mere existence characterized by the capacity for abstract thinking.

The Cartesian ' Cogito ergo sum ' is Criticised by Kierkegaard as being confused, because the 'cogito' presupposes

one's existence and does not prove it. As he says, " because I exist and because I think, therefore, I think that I exist... I must exist in order to think⁷ ". He makes a sharp distinction between the theoretical and the practical and argues that there is only a practical self, i.e. a living or existing self, and no theoretical self or transcendental self. According to him, Kant put undue emphasis upon the knowing self to the neglect of the existing self. Instead of beginning with thinking or knowing self, one could begin with the willing, striving, living, existing self. Instead of saying, ' I think, therefore, I am, one could very well say, " I suffer, therefore, I am "or" I get married therefore, I am ". Kierkegaard diametrically opposes the traditional Cartesian view point by denying the existential thinking subject and says that a purely conceptual existence is no existence at all. Only our ethical being is real, the abstract thinker (the Cogito) does not exist, because abstract thought is thought without a thinker. As Kierkegaard says, " The real subject is not the cognitive subject, the real subject is the ethically existing subject"⁸. Again, " A particularly existing human being is surely not an idea, and his existence is surely something quite different from the conceptual existence of

the idea. An existence is as a particular human being is doubtless and imperfection in comparison with the eternal life of the idea, but it is a perfection in comparison with not existing at all."⁹

Kierkegaard makes a distinction between self and existence. In the words of J.W. Elrod, "The self and existence are not synonymous. The self is the being of the individual, an existence..... is constituted by the individual's ethical responsibility for actualising the self or his being. Every human being is characterised by possession of this self-structure. The existing individual however, is particular. The particularity of existence is constituted by the manner of the individual's relation to his being"¹⁰ Self and existence are dialectically related. Existence emerges as a result of the individual's execution of his ethical task of actualizing and understanding himself. "The more the existing individual understands himself the more concretely he exists ; and the more concretely he exists, the more he understands himself. The ethical task of actualizing and understanding the self-structure gives rise to existence."¹¹

In this connection we must refer to the ambiguity of the word existence. Throughout the existentialist literature, there can be found the double meaning attitude to this word. When Kierkegaard says that one must exist in order to think, he takes the word 'exist' in its general sense of being really and concretely. Unless an individual exists first, there is no question of his thinking that he exists, because thinking is possible only for an existing human being. But when Kierkegaard says that existence emerges as a result of individual's execution of his ethical task of actualizing and understanding himself, he does not take 'existence' in its general sense, but in the technical existentialist sense meaning that existence is authentic being which is acquired by the individual concerned not with which he is born. It is an attainment through moral and spiritual discipline. Thus 'existence' means really ethico-religious existence, not mere in authentic being. To quote R.C.Solomon, " This play between two senses of 'exists' and 'existence' (and occasionally 'being') permeates all of Kierkegaard's writings (as well as the writings of later

'existentialists'). Kierkegaard unlike the many Philosophers after Descartes for whom personal existence was simply self-evident, insists that existence is something to be striven for. In this sense, therefore, the standard and worn existentialists Cliche' " Existence precedes essence" does not apply literally to Kierkegaard (or to Heidegger)."¹²

Existential Dialectic and the
spheres of existence

Kierkegaard has introduced an existential dialectic in his philosophical system, which must be sharply distinguished from the historical dialectic as found in the Philosophy of Hegel. Both the kinds of dialectic are concerned with the formation of mutually opposite concepts ; and there is a close similarity between the different stages of life or modes of existence as delineated in the dialectic of Kierkegaard and the different forms of consciousness envisaged in Heidegger's monumental work the Phenomenology of Spirit'. In the dialectics of both the Philosophers, there can be found mutually opposing concepts regarding life, self

and different value systems. On account of this similarity between the two dialectics, one may be very often confused with the other. As a matter of fact, Kierkegaard's dialectic is quite different from that of Hegel in respect of relation inspite of their similarity in content. Dr. M. K. Bhaara says, " The difference between Kierkegaardian dialectic and Hegelian dialectic does not lie in their content but rather in the relations between the various stages and forms of life."¹³

According to both the aesthetic life, i.e. the life of non-com attitude is unsatisfactory, and Christianity is the most authentic. view of life. But while in Hegel's dialectic the different stages of life have been arranged according to the movement of reason, in Kierkegaard's dialectic the different stages of life have been arranged according to choice on the basis of faith and passion. Hegel's rationalism or conceptualism is applicable to logic, not to life. The free choice of a man is not directed by any rational principle, but by a leap of faith. Reason informs us that we have the power or the right to choose something, but

it does not inform us about the object of our choice. While walking along the way of life man encounters paradoxes and alternative ways of action ; but he can not solve those paradoxes by means of reason, he can solve them only by a choice of one alternative through leap of faith. R.C.Solomon opines that Kierkegaard's dialectic is often presented in misleading language, as he speaks of his dialectic as 'qualitative' as opposed to Hegel's dialectic of pure being, which is 'quantitative' ; and he claims that his dialectic is the dialectic of actual existence rather than that of the concept of existence but as a matter of fact he is equally concerned with conceptions of existence, and his difference with Hegel lies in the value he places on the conception of oneself as an individual not as collectivity, and in the nature of the process of movement from one conception to another.

In the existential dialectic of Kierkegaard, one comes across three alternative ways of life, in other-words three fundamental commitments , sometimes called by him 'view of life', 'existential categories', 'spheres of

existence', 'modes of existing' and 'stages on life's way',
These three conceptions of life are fundamentally incompatible
in the sense that one can choose only one of them at a time
without any compromise between them by the use of reason.
Each sphere of existence as its own system of values, hence
there can be no further criterion for choosing between spheres.
Thus the choice must be made without a criterion, without a
guiding principle, without reason, but only by a leap of
commitment which can not be defended further. " Thus there is
no rational way of life, no one conception of life-style which
is more reasonable than others. One's choice of fundamental
values is ' irrational ' because there is no reason for
choosing one style of life rather than another, nor is there
the possibility that one can compromise to find the best of
each.....it is not chosen because it is most rational,
but chosen inspite of its lack of defence by Reason".¹⁴

Kierkegaard has glorified the freedom of choice
as much as Hegel has glorified reason. As he says, " The
most tremendous thing which has been granted to man is the
choice of freedom "¹⁵
He considers the freedom of choice
to be the most basic value that makes a man existent in the

real sense of the term. Says Dr.M.K.Bhadra, " This freedom of choice, Kierkegaard believes, is the most fundamental of values and it is what makes a man a human being or an existent individual. It is the recognition and the use of this freedom that is far more important than the object of choice. In Hegel's opinion, freedom consists simply in following the dictates of reason. Kierkegaard thinks that the obedience of freedom to anything else is the cancellation of one's freedom".¹⁶

According to Kierkegaard, each man's life may have three stages namely, (i) the aesthetic stage (ii) the moral stage (iii) the spiritual stage. These stages are distinct and independent of one another. That is to say, no compromise is possible among them. There is no rational way of passing from one of these stages to another. However, these stages indicate the advancement of the sense of the value of human life. Kierkegaard believes that the spiritual stage is the highest (however, he sometimes glorifies the ethical stage). Sometimes he says that both the moral and religious stage are opposed to the aesthetic stage. According to R.C.Solomon,

such ambiguity persists throughout Kierkegaard's writings, and so the consistency of his dialectic becomes questionable.

The first stage of life is called the aesthetic stage in the sense that it is a stage of non-committal attitude. At this stage, one does not give one's opinion on a subject either positive or negative ; he rather withholds his opinion in all matters of life, where the situation demands either a positive or a negative answer. The second stage i.e.the moral stage is the stage of 'either or', i.e., the stage of choosing one of the alternatives. In a sense it is the central stage of human life because success in life depends upon authentic choice. If one's choice is not authentic, one can not act authentically, and consequently the desired goal can not be reached. The ultimate stage, namely, the spiritual stage is a stage beyond the ethical, and at this stage , a man surrenders himself absolutely to the will of God, his indwelling spirit, and his will being absolutely attuned with the will of God, all responsibility is ultimately vested

upon God. Here everything occurs spontaneously, as man becomes divinised through self-development in course of the preceding stages of life, " The ethical life is the life of a man in the Society, the life of a man is regarded as a part of the community. Such a man lives according to principles which consider every man as an end in himself and self interest is subsumed under moral duty. The ethical life with the characteristics of universality, rationality and duty, in short, morality, meant for Kierkegaard the ethics of Kant." ¹⁷ But while Kant gives a justification of ultimate moral principles Kierkegaard does not give any such justification, and he holds that the categorical imperatives as ultimate values are not ultimately justifiable. " The central thing of an ethical life which is accepted as the most necessary is not the claim to justifiability of these ethical principles. The ethical life considers the individual interest to be subservient to the demands of principles. But the origins or justifications of these principles is not provided by the dialectic of Kierkegaard". ¹⁸

According to Kierkegaard, the transition of a man from one stage to another stage is not logically necessary but only Psychological. He does not claim to give us a valid argument for accepting one stage over another, and so there does not arise the question of logical compulsion of the choice of one stage rather than another. In the words of Solomon, " The reasons which Kierkegaard gives for moving from one stage to the next are not logical but Psychological ; they are not logically compelling, but they may be compelling for some individual".¹⁹ Again, " Kierkegaard is not giving reasons in the sense of logically compelling reasonsbut reasons only in the degenerate sense that they are personal considerations which might persuade us to accept his position".²⁰

It may appear that Kierkegaard's thought involves self-contradiction, because the transition from one stage to another has no rational justification, yet he gives some reasons for passing from one stage to another by appealing to the feeling of despair and guilt. But this is only apparent, as Dr. M.K. Bhadra says, "There is an apparent inconsistency in the philosophy of Kierkegaard and it issues from the ambiguous use of 'reason' and 'rational'. It is true that 'reason' and 'rationality' are strictly logical notions. It is in this sense that Kierkegaard denies that an individual can demonstrate the logical necessity for choice of one sphere than another. Another sense of 'reason' also exists and this has been utilized by Hegel.

It means anything that makes one more likely to accept some conclusion. In Hegel's philosophy this use of 'reason' and the use of 'reason' in the sense of logical necessity are combined together in the central notion of teleological explanation. The senses often remain undistinguished. In Kierkegaard's philosophy also, the senses of 'reason' and 'rationality' are often confusingly fused and the inability to distinguish these different uses produce confusions in his entire philosophy".²¹

ANXIETY AND DEPRESSION IN HUMAN LIFE

The word 'anxiety' may be used to denote a phenomenon discussed by several Existentialist Philosophers, although the word does not have precisely the same meaning in every writer who uses it. 'Anxiety' (also called anguish or dread).

is understood somewhat differently by Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre. Still there is close affinity among them in the use of the word. Kierkegaard is regarded as the pioneer in dealing with the concept of anxiety in Existentialist Philosophy.

Heidegger developed his own concept of anxiety on the basis of Kierkegaard's concept of the same, and Sartre is indebted to both Kierkegaard and Heidegger for the formation of his own concept of anxiety. Heidegger says, " The man who has gone farthest in analysing the concept of anxiety.....is Soren Kierkegaard"²² . Contrasting the descriptions of anxiety in Kierkegaard and Heidegger, Sartre says that they " do not appear to us contradictory ; on the contrary, the one implies the other"²³.

Kierkegaard's concept of anxiety has been elaborately dealt with in his book ' The Concept of Dread'. He introduces the notion of anxiety in the context of a discussion of the origin of sin. He understands the story of the fall of man as one that describes an event or development in the life of every man, the passage from innocence to sin. It is the prior condition of anxiety that makes this event possible. It is described in at least three ways :

- 1) It is inherent in the state of innocence ;
- 2) It is linked to freedom ; and
- 3) It is associated with man's peculiar constitution as body and soul, established in spirit.

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First, already in dreaming innocence there is something like an instability, an uneasiness, by which the tranquility of bliss is disturbed. This is illustrated in the awakening of sexuality and sensuality in the individual. There is a malaise (malady) which finally issues in the sensual act and therefore, in the loss of innocence and a changed quality of existence.

According to Kierkegaard, "Dread is a qualification of the dreaming spirit, and as such it has its place in Psychology"²⁴. When we consider the dialectical determinants in dread, it appears they have precisely the characteristic ambiguity of Psychology. "Dread is a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy"²⁵. "The Dread which is posited in innocence is, in the first place, not guilt, in the second place, it is not a heavy burden, not a suffering which can not be brought into a harmony with the felicity of innocence.... this dread belongs to the child so essentially that it can not do without it, even though it alarms him, it Captivates him nevertheless by its sweet feeling of apprehension"²⁶.

Secondly, anxiety is a kind of instability prior to action, and so it is described as the 'Vertigo' or 'dizziness' of freedom, in so far as freedom means possibility and standing on the edge of possibility is like standing on the edge of a precipice. Using a different metaphor of his own John Macquarrie has

explained this concept of anxiety thus : " One might say that freedom is by its very nature pregnant with possibility, and it is the stirring of possibility in the womb of freedom that is experienced as the primordial anxiety"²⁷

Thirdly, anxiety is the tension which man with his peculiar constitution is subject to. Man is a synthesis of body and soul united in the spirit." The human task is to accomplish the synthesis of body and soul, and this task is from the beginning anxiety-laden. Anxiety is a peculiar human phenomenon. An animal knows no anxiety, for its life is purely sensual, an angel likewise, knows no anxiety, for his life is that of the pure intellect. But man conjoining sense and reason, body and soul lives in the shadow of anxiety"²⁸.

According to Kierkegaard, anxiety is not only the presupposition or precondition for sin, it is also the effect of sin, because a fallen man lives amidst ever-deepening anxiety which is not the fear of something definite but that of something indefinite, for instance, the fear of death or that of infinite freedom.

According to Kierkegaard, there is no one who does not have anxiety in the face of his existence. The life of

modern man is lived in despair. Kierkegaard summed up the agony of the beginning and end of life.

" Hear the cry of the mother at the hour of giving birth, see the struggle of the dying at the last moment, and say then whether that which ends like this can be designed for pleasure" .
29

Human life is not designed for pleasure. We strive for happiness in order to escape anxiety and despair. But there is no escape. This is the universal human condition. We suffer from anxiety even when we are not aware of it, and even when there is nothing to fear, nothing in the objective world to feel anxious about. This is because our anxiety is not objective at all, it is subjective anxiety- it is the universal fear of something that is nothing, it is the fear of the nothingness of human existence. About the meaninglessness of our existence, he says :

' I stick my finger into
existence- it smells of nothing.
Where am I ? What is the thing
called the world ? ... Who am I ?
How did I come into the world ?
Why was I not consulted ?
30

The story of an ordinary young man in his 'Either/Or', 'A Fragment of Life', shows how the man keeps falling into depression though he experiences the various forms of enjoyment, sensual and aesthetic. For Kierkegaard, in the fact of total crisis, at the edge of the abyss, only absolute faith and the leap to God can overcome the meaninglessness of our existence. Only the restoration of Orthodox Christianity, and the surrender of reason can overcome the sense of anxiety and hopeless despair for the solitary individuals of the modern world.

Kierkegaard's maxim ;
"Truth is Subjectivity "

The 'Characteristic of all the Existentialist writing is the desire to change one's readers, to free them from their past illusions, and make them not only think, but even live differently" .

31

"It is Kierkegaard, an Existentialist, who, for the first time, wanted to free people from the illusion of 'Objectivity' to him, the task of philosophy is to rediscover 'subjectivity' which we have lost. 'Subjectivity' is taken to be the very home of concrete being, to which we have access

in ways other than cognitive. As Kierkegaard sounds the cardinal note 'Subjectivity is truth, subjectivity is reality' .³²

Now we are to understand what Kierkegaard means by 'objectivity' and 'Subjectivity' and also the significance of his above said cardinal note. 'Objectivity' is the tendency of those people who adopt or discover general laws that govern both behavior and thought. It is the acceptance of the role of the observer. History, Sociology, Psychology, Ethics- any subject matter which is bound by rules of evidence or which can be taught in the class-room is an objective study. This tendency transforms an observer into almost a ghost and the spontaneity and inwardness of life is lost. In objectivity the individual loses himself in the mass and ceases to recognize that the knower is an existing individual.

Kierkegaard aims to destroy the scientific myth which could dominate a man's ethical life and religious life too. The myth being, that everything is causally determined and a proper observation could provide us with a complete and true account of the behaviour of everything, Kierkegaard raises his voice against this domination of Scientific myth i.e. objectivity, over religious life and

says, " An objective acceptance of Christianity is papanism or thoughtlessness..... Christianity protests against every form of objectivity, it desires that the subject should be infinitely concerned about himself. It is with subjectivity that Christianity is concerned and it is only in subjectivity that its truth exists, if it exists at all. Objectively christianity has absolutely no existence."³³

He thinks that it is not easy to discard objectivity. There are many people who can live their whole lives under the domination of objectivity. Under this condition, they are benighted and need to be rescued from this state of darkness. So long they are in this state, they are in illusion and when they are freed, they are enlightened. This enlightenment is called by Kierkegaard a sort of conversion. He comes to this conclusion from his own life when he lived a short part of his, under the domination of objectivity i.e. under illusion, and threw of the illusion later on.

Kierkegaard formulates his principle 'subjectivity is truth' in his book 'Concluding Unscientific Postscript', and here, by this principle, he means the inwardness of religious life. Descartes and Kant also thought of Subjectivity. But subjectivity for Kierkegaard, is something different. It

is of the essence of the person not of the subject,

Every existentialist speaks about an individual subject existing in the world, who freely acts for realization of his subjectivity, or his 'real being', and proves himself an existent. Kierkegaardian subjectivity is the realization of a concrete individual existent of his 'true being' in the Being of God, and this realization is as good as his realization of truth. "Subjectivity is the truth," says Kierkegaard³⁴. He shows in his 'Concluding Unscientific Postscript' how subjectivity is the truth :
" when subjectivity, inwardness, is the truth, the truth becomes objectively a paradox ; and the fact that the truth is objectively a paradox shows in its turn that subjectivity is the truth. For the objective situation is repellent, and the expression for the objective repulsion constitutes the tension and the measure of the corresponding inwardness. The paradoxical character of the truth is its objective uncertainty, this uncertainty is an expression for the passionate inwardness, and this passion is precisely the truth"³⁵ .

Now the question is how does the truth become a paradox ? " By virtue of the relationship subsisting between the eternal, essential truth and the existing individual, the

paradox came into being. Let us now go further, let us suppose that the eternal essential truth is itself a paradox. How does the paradox come into being ? By putting the eternal, essential truth into juxtaposition with existence. Hence when we posit such a conjunction with the truth itself, the truth becomes a paradox. The eternal truth has come into being in time, this is the paradox"³⁶ - says Kierkegaard.

About paradox he says that paradox is above every system. It is religious life which makes us aware of Paradox the paradox of the God-man (the Incarnation), the paradox of communication between human and divine (prayer), the paradox of eternal life, Such paradoxes are beyond reason. We can not possibly be objective about them, Only subjectivity or faith can comprehend the paradoxes of Christianity. He also says that it is the internal conflict between the objective uncertainty and our passion of the infinite that enables us to attain subjectivity.

From the above description of subjectivity, the essential characteristics of subjective knowledge can be pointed out in the following way : firstly, it can not be passed on from one person to the next. Secondly, it always has

the nature of a paradox, and lastly, it is concrete, not abstract. And for this reason it must be necessarily related to a concrete living existent.

The difference between the objective truth and subjective truth is brought out by Kierkegaard in the following passage :

"When the question of truth is raised in an objective manner, reflection is directed objectively to the truth, as an object to which the knower is related. Reflection is not focussed upon the relationship, however, but upon the question of whether it is the truth to which the knower is related. If only the object to which he is related is the truth the subject is accounted to be in the truth.

When the question of truth is raised subjectively, reflection is directed subjectively to the nature of the individual's relationship, if only the mode of this relationship is the truth, the individual is in the truth even if he should happen to be thus related to what is not true" ³⁷.

He further says, "The objective accent falls on WHAT is said, the subjective accent on HOW it is said....objectively the interest is focussed merely on the thought content, subjectively

on the inwardness. At its maximum this inward 'how' is the passion of the infinite, and the passion of the infinite is the truth. But the passion of the infinite is precisely subjectivity, and thus subjectivity becomes the truth" .³⁸

Kierkegaard's view on Religion

Particularly Christianity

Kierkegaard was mainly interested in Religion and specially Christianity. It may be said that his philosophy is an adjunct to his religious faith. In the nineteenth century European thought we see the general intellectual tendency towards reducing reality to a mere category of thought, to a rational concept, in the philosophy of Hegel's panlogistic system. Reason or spirit becomes in Hegel the be-all and end-all of Philosophy. The logical categories become the framework of reality itself. The logic of the mind is the same as the metaphysics of reality. 'The real is the rational and the rational is the real'³⁹. Hegel's reason is in a process of evolution. This process of the self-development of the reason, Hegel calls the dialectic of reason.

In the second part of the Century Hegelianism met with a revolt in the form of radical anti-intellectualism. Hegelianism which reduces the entire world to a system of

abstract categories and tries to explain man from the objective point of view can never do justice to man as a living subject intent on working out his own destiny. An objective treatment of the human being only weakens ethical and religious passion. Besides, Hegel's Absolute Idealism does not recognise the reality of the individual and his freedom and responsibility. It holds that man is the reproduction of the Infinite Spirit. It places man beyond death i.e. it tries to prove the unreality of death. Hence arose Kierkegaard's bitter attack on Hegel's 'System'. Hegel, who goes to the length of talking of 'Objective Spirit', 'Objective will', 'General will' and 'Universal spirit' are the permanent target of Kierkegaard's scathing Criticism, irony and satire. 'Infact, Kierkegaard can be described as socrates reborn in the nineteenth century to counteract the beneful effect of Hegel on Contemporary Ethics and Religion"⁴⁰

' There can be no doubt about his passionate attachment to the christian faith. Yet this was accompanied by an equally passionate hostility to the conventional and, as he believed degenerate forms of Christianity current in nineteenth century Denmark, and this hostility culminated in an all-out

attack on the church as he knew it" ⁴¹. Kierkegaard was preoccupied with the religious problem and with how to become a Christian. The progress of the human self is from the aesthetic through the ethical to the religious stage, but again this can not be rationalized or presented in a logical way. Christianity itself is the paradox and demands the leap of faith. ' All Christianity is rooted in the paradoxical, whether one accepts it as a believer, or rejects it precisely because it is paradoxical'.....⁴²

What commonly passes for Christianity, the doctrines and ceremonies of the conventional Church, is a perversion. Towards the end of his life Kierkegaard became increasingly violent in his attacks on Christian institutions. In his last journals he sees Christianity more and more in world-renouncing terms and as the inward decision of the individual. Christianity in the New Testament has to do with man's will, everything turns upon changing the will, every expression everything is related to this basic idea in Christianity which makes it what it is- a change of will. In Christendom on the other hand, the whole of Christianity has been transferred to intellectuality ; so it becomes a doctrine.

Kierkegaard is, therefore, a spiritual pragmatist. He maintains that God being a spiritual principle and not an object, can not be interlectually understood, far less proved, except by my own inward straining and development towards God in faith, respect, worship, love, fear and suffering. The so called arguments for the existence of God miss this point and are unspiritual in outlook. The intellectual idea of God can at best posit a ' possible ', and no amount of argument can make a leap from the possible to the existing. ' One proves God's existence by worship..... not by proofs'⁵¹ - says Kierkegaard.

Section- II

Elements of Intellect and Emotion in Kierkegaard's Philosophy and their relative predominance

Now we are to find out the elements of intellect and emotion in Kierkegaard's Philosophy. His Philosophical views can be classified under the following heads :

- a) His revolt against all those who maintain that ' Essence is existence '.
- b) His idea of God.
- c) His view on religion.

and our whole concern is with the intellectual"⁴³ . Kierkegaard discusses with a good deal of humour, the behaviour of professional monks and religious preachers who fritter away their love of God in outward demonstration and profession which only serve to inflame their vanity and tempt them away from God.

" He formulated his main problem in the form, how can I become a Christian ? and asserted that his religion was neither the habitual religion of an unreflective Church-goer nor that of a Hegelian. An unreflective church goer, according to Kierkegaard, is a Christian only because he is a member of a particular community. His Christianity is only superficial, depersonalised, it does not belong to the core of his personality. Similarly the religion of a Hegelian rationalist who looks upon abstract thought as the ultimate reality is also depersonalised religion so neither the unreflective church goer nor the Hegelian can be a Christian in the true sense of the term'.

" According to him, most men who call themselves Christians do not know what true Christianity is Religion is not a mere formalistic or ritualistic affair. It must be realised in one's own life. The church has reduced Christianity to an empty ritualism. 'To be' and not 'to know' should be the main motto of our life, if we want to be true

religious. A man is truly religious not because he is versed in theological literature but because he has living contact with God, a contact which transforms his whole life. He should feel the presence of God everywhere and be guided by Him at every moment of his life.

Thus Kierkegaard renounces a barely formalistic or ritualistic conception of religion and at the same time a Hegelian conception of it."⁴⁴

KIERKEGAARD'S IDEA OF GOD

Kierkegaard is a theist. He calls God an "unknown something":

" It is the unknown. It is not a human being, in so far as we know what man is ; nor is it any other known thing. So let us call this unknown something : the God"⁴⁵ - says Kierkegaard. He thinks that it is very difficult to prove that anything exists, because we always reason from existence, not toward existence. So the idea of demonstrating that this ' unknown something ' (God) exists is nothing but a folly attempt, because the idea of God's existence is already presupposed as certain in the beginning. In that case nothing is proved but merely the content of a

conception is developed The God is not a name but a concept. As regards the proof he says, ' as long as I keep my hold on the proof i.e.continue to demonstrate, the existence does not come out but when I let the proof go, the existence is there.....whoever therefore attempts to demonstrate the existence of God, proves in lieu thereof something else, something which at times perhaps does not need a proof.....' ⁴⁶

So ' if the God does not exist it would of course be impossible to prove it ; and if he does exist it would be folly to attempt it- says Kierkegaard. ⁴⁷

But the question if the existence of God can not be proved, how is it that Kierkegaard speaks of the ' unknown something (God) ? What is the ground of his belief in God or wherefrom does he get the idea of God ?

Here Kierkegaard refers to the paradoxical passion of reason. About this paradoxical passion of reason he says '..... the paradox is the source of thinker's passion..... But the highest pitch of every passion is always to will its own downfall and so it is also the supreme passion of the reason to seek a Collision, though this collision must in one way or another prove its undoing. The supreme paradox

of all thought is the attempt to discover something that thought can not think⁴⁸.

Reason being inspired by its paradoxical passion, collides with this 'unknown something' which thought can not think. This something is neither a human being nor any known thing. Kierkegaard calls this unknown something : The God. So, according to him, the paradoxical passion of the reason necessarily leads to the idea of the God which does indeed exist, but is not known.

This ' unknown something ' is the limit to which the reason repeatedly comes but cannot advance beyond this point. For Kierkegaard then, our reason is incompetent to pronounce anything positive. He says, ' The reason has brought the God as near as possible, and yet He is as far away as ever ?⁴⁹

He further points out that a man equipped with the power of reason makes the best of it, but ultimately comes to discover its discursive character. Reason, with its dazzling brilliance leaves us half way resulting in disappointment when the path of reasons wings off, a void is created between the knower and the known, leaving the former in a state of

deep reflection, out of which emerges another faculty, namely 'faith'. For Kierkegaard, faith alone can fill up the gap. In a state of extreme bewilderment faith evolves as the last resort and the person concerned, with full enthusiasm, takes a leap upto goal- a leap that is founded on faith. Kierkegaard regards God as the supreme eternal subject who reveals Himself to faith. He comes to the conclusion that God is the ultimate foundation and we find ourselves as interrelated subjects fastened to God, i.e. we realize our true selves & faith is the only organ for our comprehension of the significance of inter-subjectivity.

As to the visibility of God, he thinks that God is invisible, since His visibility would annul His omnipresence. Only in inwardness or subjectivity we can feel His presence everywhere. 'Nature, the totality of created things, is the work of God. And yet God is not there ; out within the individual man there is a potentiality (man is potentially spirit) which is awakened in inwardness to become a God-relationship, and then it becomes possible to see God everywhere'⁵⁰ - says Kierkegaard.

- d) His maxim 'Truth is subjectivity'.
- e) and development of human life.

If we analyse his philosophical views. We shall see that his Philosophy is established on the basis of intuition or experience and by means of reason or rational arguments. His subjective feelings are not mere feelings or emotions. Practically they are all reasonable emotions. He has analysed his subjective feelings or emotions and this analysis is not possible without the exercise of intellect or reason.

- a) We shall first discuss the basic principle of Existentialism the principle being 'Existence is different from essence'. This cardinal note of Existentialism is a revolt against the entire platonic tradition, against all those who maintain that 'Essence precedes Existence'. But this basic principle of Existentialism is itself established by criticising the Platonic view : Essence is prior to existence.

Kierkegaard says that existence can not be represented in a concept and unless it is a concept, because it is too dense, concrete and rich, it can not be rationally analysed. He explains the characteristics of 'existence', compares ~~it~~ it

with concept and then says that there can be no concept of existence. And as because it is not a concept, it is unamenable to rational analysis and proof.

He finds fault with ' I think therefore, I am', and says that it is a sheer tautology, because this being which is ascribed to the thinker does not signify that he is, but only that he is engaged in thinking. I must first exist, in order that I may think that I exist.

In this way Kierkegaard analyses criticises compares, argues and then comes to the revolutionary conclusion that ' Existence precedes essence', the pivot on which the entire thesis of Existentialism stands.

b) Now we shall analyse his idea of God with a view to showing that his Theism is grounded on reason, though, according to him, our reason is incompetent to prove the existence of God. He says, ' The reason has brought the God as near as possible, and yet he is as far away as ever.'⁵² This saying shows that he can not discard the role of reason out and out though it is incompetent to pronounce anything positive.

He calls the God 'unknown something' . '.....It is the unknown. It is not a human being, in so far as we know what man is ; nor is it any other known thing. So let us call this unknown something : the God'⁵³ - says Kierkegaard.

Here also we see that he compares his ' unknown something ' (God) with human being and other known things, distinguishes between the two and then calls this unknown something : the God and regards Him as the supreme eternal subject. As regards the proof of God's existence, he says that the idea of demonstrating that this ' unknown something ' (God) exists is nothing but a folly attempt, because the idea of God's existence is already presupposed as certain in the beginning. In support of his opinion, he argues with the help of the following dilemma :

' If the God does not exist it would of course be impossible to prove it ; and if He does exist it would be folly to attempt it.'⁵⁴ - 1st premise

Either God does not exist or

He does exist- 2nd premise

∴ Either it is impossible to prove It or it is folly to attempt it- Conclusion.

It is interesting to note that Kierkegaard discards 'proof' outright and lays stress on the paradoxical passion of reason which leads to 'faith' through which God reveals Himself. But we see that he himself argues or takes the help of proof in support of his opinion that God's existence can not be proved. So we see that Kierkegaard builds his Theism step by step with the help of reason or intellect. Yet, in the end, he speaks of 'faith' as the last resort and the only organ of our comprehension of God. But his 'faith' originates from reason- the paradoxical passion of reason. So Kierkegaard's faith in God is not pure faith or passion, rather it may be called intellectual faith.

d) Kierkegaard wanted to free people from the illusion of 'objectivity'. To him, the task of philosophy is to rediscover 'subjectivity' which we have lost. He says, 'subjectivity is truth, subjectivity is reality'.⁵⁵

Kierkegaard makes a rational analysis of the nature of human existence which was directly felt by him in his very being and comes to the conclusion that so long men are under the illusion of objectivity they are benighted and need to be rescued from this state of darkness. He thinks that

it is not easy to discard objectivity. But when they are freed, they are enlightened. This enlightenment is called by him a sort of conversion.

Now it is one thing to experience something oneself, and it is another to convey one's own experience to others. This can be done only by means of reason or language. When on the basis of personal experience Kierkegaard argued that all human beings are subject to such experience, then there is a kind of generalisation in the way of induction. That 'subjectivity is truth' is true not of one man but of all men in general. It is also not true that only this or that person is under the illusion of objectivity, but most people are under such illusion. He is conscious of the evil effects of such illusion on human life and wanted to make people free from its spell, and in doing this he was not quite irrational. He differs between the subjective truth and objective truth and concludes that 'subjectivity is truth' 'Subjectivity is reality'. Kierkegaard's subjectivity is the realisation of a concrete individual existent of his 'true being' in the being of God ; and this realisation is as good as his realisation of truth..... But this realisation and differentiation is not possible without the exercise of intellect or reason.

So this kind of Philosophy can not be merely emotional.

Kierkegaard himself lived a short part under the domination of 'objectivity' i.e. under illusion and threw off the illusion later on. This enlightenment is called by him a sort of conversion. After his conversion, he looked back into the stages he passed, the stages being, the aesthetic stage, the ~~axiata~~ ethical stage and the religious stage. He generalises his own three stages of life upon human life. To him, these stages are the different modes of life view which a man forms and lives accordingly. Here we see that on the basis of his own experience, he generalises in the way of Induction. About the ethical stage, he says that it is the stage of choice. Here, man for the first time chooses himself. Ethical life is subjective, it is primarily fixed on inner decisions of the will.

Now forming of different life-views, a conception of life's significance and of its purpose, making choice and decisions of which Kierkegaard speaks in the ethical stage, are all works of reason or intellect. A leap from the ethical stage to the religious, a lifelong and cheerrul striving for absolute happiness, faith in God- the dialectical struggle,

his view on religion, His faith in God, his realization of truth in the being of God, love for God etc. all indicate the predominance of intellect in his philosophy. His philosophical views are grounded on reason and in some cases originates from reason though he discards the role of reason outright. The elements of emotion that we find in Kierkegaard's philosophy are all reasonable emotions.

Chapter - III

Section - I A brief account of Heidegger's Philosophy.

HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTION

' With Martin Heidegger, the German Philosopher - who began his philosophical career as a student of Husserl, we come across for the first time a formidable exposition of existentialist thought in its distinctly philosophical role ' ¹

Heidegger belongs to the German Phase of Phenomenological movement. He came under the influence of Husserl, the transcendental phenomenologist in his early life. He discussed most of the philosophical topics from the phenomenological point of view. But he gradually deviated from Husserl's way of thinking and developed a philosophy of his own. Later on, he came to be regarded as an existentialist, though he himself did not like the title.

SOURCES :

Heidegger ~~marx~~ derives the basic elements of his thought from different sources, From the early Greeks he imbibes an interest in the problem of being as such in its unity and totality. Under the influence of Husserl's phenomenology, he approaches Being inwardly through consciousness.

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He is also influenced by Kierkegaard's insights into subjective existence, particularly the emotional moods of care or concern, dread and awe. His primary debt is to his German predecessors, Kant and Hegel. Heidegger follows Kant in rejecting the view of knowledge as representation. He also follows Kant in concentrating on temporality, and in seeing the domain of time as greater than that of space. His debt to Hegel shows up in his use of the concepts of negation and death. Thus Greek ontology, Kierkegaard's existentialism, Husserl's phenomenology, Kant and Hegel contribute different elements to Heidegger's master plan for an exhaustive philosophy of Being, with which he starts his famous work, 'sein Und zeit' (Being and Time).

HEIDEGGER'S IDEA OF PHILOSOPHY

For Heidegger, the problem of being is of immense importance, it should be considered the starting point of all philosophy. In his book ' what is philosophy ? ', he defines philosophy as the conversation between ' Being ' and the being in an individual man. He says, " we find the answer to the question, what is Philosophy ? not through the historical assertions about the definition of philosophy, but through conversing with that which has been handed down to us as the Being of being " ². He maintains that Being and not things which have being is the principal object of philosophical enquiry and that in order to know the real nature of a thing we must have

resort to intuition, and try to grasp it in its givenness. According to him, Philosophy should be practical and theoretical. Philosophy is no philosophy at all. The task of Philosophy is the analysis of 'Being'. But Philosophy is not merely the analysis of philosophical concepts. His task is to formulate new and new concepts. The new philosophical concepts must explain the concrete world and must not refer to abstract entities unrelated to the world of experience.

According to Heidegger, Philosophy is opposed to common sense ; it attempts to seek out the roots of common sense and display them as unfounded prejudices. Thus Philosophy is not based upon common sense, it is the criticism of common sense.

Heidegger's Philosophy is neither conceptual analysis nor simple ontology. He is trying to get a new language in which to express insights concerning 'Being'. He brings forward his programme for a reconstruction of metaphysics which implies at the same time a destruction of metaphysics in the traditional sense.

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PROBLEM OF BEING

Heidegger's charge against the Philosophers is that none before him with the single exception of Aristotle, has considered the problem of 'Being' properly which is the primal object of Philosophical enquiry. His ambition was to be the Aristotle of his time so far as the problem of Being is concerned. There have been moments in which the disclosure of Being has been approached most notably in the German Idealism initiated by Kant, Fichte and Schelling, culminating in Hegel, but which collapsed in the middle of the 19th Century. Even Nietzsche had fallen from 'Being'. To him, 'Being' is not only an empty word, it is not even a word. Heidegger thinks that the problem of the meaning of Being needs to be taken up afresh, and, in particular the way of approaching the problem needs to be reconsidered.

To ask for the meaning of Being is not to ask a grammatical question. It is to ask what the Being of beings is. We have to settle, therefore, what particular kind of being is to be selected for philosophical analysis as the first step in the search for the meaning of Being. And, according to Heidegger, we must start with the being of the questioner himself i.e. man considered as the being who is capable of raising the problem of Being.

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Now the question to ask, what precisely is Heidegger looking for, what is this problem of Being? It is certainly not the problem of ultimate reality, of transcendent being in the sense of God. For according to Heidegger, God would be a being rather than Being. And it is Being, not beings or a being, with which we are concerned. As to the exact ~~the~~ problem of Heidegger (whether it is a linguistic analysis or a metaphysical one), Frederick Copleston says, "And I suppose that the problem is for Heidegger a linguistic or logical problem upto a certain point. Yet at times he appears to speak about Being as though he were talking about the Absolute or about the Transcendent. And it seems to me that he ~~was~~ oscillates between the point of view of a logical analyst and that of a metaphysician without making it really clear with what precise problem he is engaged".³ Professedly, however, he is concerned with a problem in ontology, which is prior to any problem about God. Before we can even raise the problem of God we must answer the question, what is the Being of beings? And as it is man who raises this problem and who thus has a preliminary idea of Being and stands in a special relation to Being, we should start with an analysis of man as the being who is open to Being.

Heidegger says, "There are some presuppositions and prejudices which are constantly fostering the belief that an enquiry into Being is unnecessary. These presuppositions are:

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First, 'Being' is the most universal concept. Secondly, the concept of 'Being' is indefinable. Thirdly, it is held that 'Being' is of all concepts the one that is self-evident⁴.

But Heidegger thinks that these presuppositions do not eliminate the question of its meaning. The very fact that we already live in an understanding of Being and that the meaning of Being is still veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise the question again. That is why he undertakes the task of analysing the hidden meaning of 'Being'.

Heidegger's conception of 'Being' is different from Plato's 'Idea of Good', Aristotle's 'Prime Mover', and Hegel's 'Absolute'. Heidegger's 'Being' is also different from Husserl's 'Transcendental ego'. He does not characterize his 'Being' as something ~~divine~~ divine. His 'Being' is simply an ontological entity.

Like all other existentialists, Heidegger makes a sharp distinction between being and existence, and says that existence belongs only to self-conscious individual human being. In general, however, existence is being, but it is not mere being, it is a unique kind of being. Being is of

three kinds namely, the being of man, the being of common objects and the being of tools or instruments. The being of man or the human being is the active self-conscious individual - this is the being proper called 'existence'. The other two kinds of being are improper beings. The being of common objects, as for instance, the being of the lower animals, physical objects and even mathematical objects is not being proper, that is to say, is not existence. The being of the tools or instruments is the 'being for', for instance, the earth is, for the farmer, that which is ploughed by him for growing corn. Thus there is being proper or existence only in the first sense.

According to Copleston, the problem of being for Heidegger is, upto a certain point, a linguistic or logical problem ; yet sometimes he appears to speak about Being as if he was talking about the Absolute or about the Transcendent. On the basis of Vol. 1 of 'Being and time', Heidegger's philosophy may be interpreted in an atheistic sense. It is true that he does not deny the existence of God in so many words. But at first sight he seems to suggest that apart from man himself and the brute impenetrable existence of things, there is nothing, and the way in which the problem of Being is handled by him seems to suggest that for him

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Being is necessarily finite and temporal. If this had been the case, the existence of infinite Being, transcending the temporal order, would be ruled out and the problem of God would not be significantly raised in Heidegger's Philosophy. But he strongly protested against the atheistic interpretation of his philosophy. In his "Letter on Humanism" (Brief Uber den Humanismus), he says that the existential analysis of man neither affirms nor denies God. Yet this should not be taken as a case of indifferentism. According to Heidegger, the problem of the existence of God can not be raised on the level of thought to which the existential analysis of man belongs ; it can be raised only on the plane of ' The holy '. Modern man is so absorbed in his pre-occupations in the world that he is not open to the plane of the holy, and the idea of God as traditionally interpreted has retreated from his consciousness. But ' the death of God ', in the sense that the Christian notion of God has lost its hold on human minds, does not mean that God is a non-entity. In his own version, Heidegger's philosophy is a waiting for God, for a new manifestation of the Divine.

In his " Letter on Humanism ", Heidegger says, " If man, is once again to find himself in the nearness of

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Being, he must first learn to exist in the nameless. He must recognise the seduction of the public, as well as the impotence of the private. Man must, before he speaks, let himself first be claimed himself by Being at the risk of having under this claim little or almost nothing to say. Only in this way will the preciousness of its essence be returned to the word, and to man the dwelling where he can live in the truth of Being ".⁵

According to Heidegger, man is a vehicle for the self-revelation of Being just as for Hegel, individual man is a manifestation of the Absolute spirit. Man's relationship to Being likened to the function of the shepherd in Christianity. " The need is : to preserve the truth of Being no matter what may happen to man and everything that ' is ' ".⁶

The true thinker and the true poet transcend the world of actual existences and tuned their life and thought to the truth of Being and listen, in gratitude to the soundless voice of Being. The preparation for the truth of Being consists not in careful preparing or ' thinking & in any ordinary sense of the word, but in an extra-ordinary sense. As Heidegger says : " Out of long guarded speechlessness and the careful clarification of the field thus cleared, comes

the utterance of the thinker ... Poetry and thinking are most purely alike in their care of the word, ... The thinker utters Being. The poet names what is holy :⁷

Thus Heidegger gives us a theology devoid of God and ~~which~~ ultimately Being becomes a mystery making room for an existential mysticism. The Being-in-general or the Holy is an all-pervading Being or Reality like the Hegelian Absolute or the Upanisadic Brahman or like the universal man (Manab Brahman) of Rabindranath Tagore, which is both transcendent to and emanent in the individual, which permeates through every nerve and vein of the world.

Heidegger studies analyses and described the inner existential aspects (' existentialia ') of the human individual and suggests also their ontological implications.

Heidegger's word for human being is ' Dasein '. The term ' Dasein ' may be analysed into ' Da ' meaning ' there ' and ' Sein ' meaning ' Being '. Dasein therefore signifies ' Being-there ' Dasein is Being-in-the-world. An individual finds himself there-in-the world. He is related to the whole world in a compelling way ' Vorhandene ', ' Zuhandene ', ' Sorge ' and ' Stimmung ' are four important terms in connection with his relation with the world. Things of the world that just

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happen to be there before him are 'Vorhandene', and things that he makes and uses as his tools are 'Zuhandene'. The inner organizing principle that determines his relation to ~~xx~~ things, and to the world as a whole is 'Sorge'. The unique way in which he is related to the world is reflected in his varying mood is 'Stimmung'. Our different moods like anxiety, happiness, boredom, fear, dread etc. express the different ways in which the human Dasein is related and tuned to the world.

By 'Dasein' Heidegger means an existing individual ~~man~~ human being, consciously striving to realize Being, which is nascent in him as possibilities. As because only man can consciously strive to actualise his possibilities, Heidegger attributes existence to human being only. Everything else simply 'is' on earth. Heidegger employs a threefold terminology in an attempt to avoid confusion over the word 'Existenz'. He restricts Dasein to the being exemplified in man. Dasein is not equivalent to man. 'Dasein' is an ontological term. It designates man in respect of his being, and if this kind of being is found elsewhere than in humanity, then the term 'Dasein' could be appropriately applied. For the traditional term 'existentia', he proposes the expression Vorhandenheit, which may be translated

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as 'presence-at-hand'. This points to the passive kind of existing, that we have called a mere 'lying around'. It is something that one may come across in the world. The third of Heidegger's terms is Existenz, existence Heidegger attributes existence only to Dasein, and says that the essence of Dasein lies in its existence. He declares, 'the term "existence" (Existenz) as a designation of being, will be allotted solely to Dasein'⁸. This simply means that human reality can not be defined because it is not something given, it is in question. A man is a possibility, he has the power to be. His existence is in his choice of the possibilities which are open to him, and since this choice is never final, once for all, his existence is indeterminate. Nevertheless, the mode of existence of the human being has a structure ; it is being-in-the-world. This being-in-the-world which constitutes human being is the being of a self in its inseparable relations with a not-self, the world of things and other persons in which the self always and necessarily finds itself inserted. There is no separation possible.

Like Dasein, objects or things are constituted by their relations to other things in the world and to an existent of the nature of Dasein ; ' the needle implies the thread, the garment, the sewer, and the wearer. That is to say, the object as tool is constituted by the system

of relations in which it exists, and refers to an end in Dasein, which is itself constituted by its relations to the system but refers to its own possibilities and not to the system for its meaning⁹. Dasein as possibility and constituted by relations with objects as tools in a serviceable system gives intelligibility to the world as the realization of projects.

To Heidegger, there is no dualism of mind and matter or consciousness and the world as Descartes and Husserl take for granted from the outset, rather than discover it. Heidegger begins by trying to go behind the question posed by Husserl and Descartes. They had asked, "How can consciousness come to know a world outside consciousness?" Husserl had behaved as if it was clear that the investigation of conscious states of mind was one thing, the investigation of consciousness-in-the-world another. But whence this dualism? What makes us dualist? What is the "I" which poses the question "What can I know?" Heidegger names the "I" which asks the cartesian question, he names it in its most primitive mode of being-in-the-world Dasein, literally "being there." What is the mode of being-in-the-world? It is a general movement toward things, reaching out after objects we grasp Dasein as being-in-the-world or not at all¹⁰. Heidegger's Dasein is not separable

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from not-self, the world of things and other persons ; it is an inseparable relation. So, is it not a victory over Cartesian dualism ?

Dasein is distinguished from any other concept in the following way: Firstly, its character is not that of a thing among things. It is to be differentiated from things of objective experience which may be characterised either as presented ~~in~~ before us ("Vorhanden") or as something to be used for our purpose ("Zuhanden"). Human existence belongs to neither of the categories. Dasein is marked by an ontological implication.

Secondly, Dasein is in a special relationship with the world and other conscious beings. My personal unique existence is not divorced from the social and cultural situation in which I find myself involved. It is not a self-enclosed being like the windowless monad of Leibnitz. To exist, for the Existentialists, is not merely to be ("Sein"), but to be here and there ("da-sein"). In other words, it is being in a situation.

Dasein is defined as care ("Sorge") or concern ("be Sorge"). All other structures of Dasein are introduced as structures of 'Care' which is a generalised structure of

'concern', 'Concern' stands for some common practical attitudes as distinguished from the theoretical and descriptive knowledge of the Scientist, in careful detached reflection. The practical attitudes regarded as 'Concern' are attitudes like " having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, given something up and letting it to go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining"¹¹

What characterizes our concern is our finitude and the way in which our being is consumed in the moment to moment passage of time. We do not exist only for the present moment. Human existence is open toward the future. We confront possibility and we are filled with angst. Here Heidegger follows closely Kierkegaard's analysis of dread. I can only overcome angst by facing my existence in its totality, and for human existence that is to face the fact of my own death as the limit of possibility. Both conscience and guilt play their part here, for conscience informs me of what I might be and guilt of what I might have been . I can not escape an inauthentic existence except by continually living as one who knows that he is going to die. I am, therefore, confronted with a decision between the inauthentic and authentic existence.

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Heidegger's account of Dasein is thus a blend of the concept of dread and Either/Or. We are no longer faced with choice as the key to truth ; we are faced with a systematic and argued ontology - or at least with the prologue to such an ontology - in which choice has its place. The ontology is that of The Concept of dread - ~~with~~ without God'.¹²

The Concept of 'Anxiety'

Here Anxiety is primarily the anxiety for death, and it is a key-mood of great significance. Heidegger owes much to Kierkegaard's concept of dread . The object of dread in Kierkegaard's sense is ' that indefinite something which is nothing. ' Kierkegaard had analysed the concept of dread in order to penetrate into the deepest layer of human feeling, and Heidegger uses it for the same purpose. An existential analysis of death occupies an important place in Heidegger's philosophy. He thinks that to understand Dasein as a whole we must understand it as " being-towards-death ". Death, says Heidegger is ' a phenomenon of life !'¹³ He further says, ' Let the term "dying" stand for that way of being in which Dasein is towards its death'.¹⁴

Heidegger develops the concept of man's being-towards-death in the following way. Death is the most private of all possibilities in that it is specifically mine. "Death is the only thing which nobody can do for me". And man is the only being who knows he has to die. Death is furthermore an "unrelated possibility" in that through it any relation to other Daseins is dissolved. In addition it is an unsurpassable possibility, "the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein"¹⁵. Man is certain of his death but uncertain as to when it will occur. This constant threat of the possibility of death causes anxiety, in fact it constitutes the experience of 'Care' in its extreme form. Thus death reveals itself as that 'possibility which is one's ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped'¹⁶. Death is something distinctively impending. It is through the experience of death that an individual becomes conscious of the true nature of his existence and his authentic possibilities. Death is not an event that takes place at a particular point of time. Hence the question what happens after death has no philosophical importance. If death is defined as the end of Dasein, this does not imply any ontological decision whether after death still another Being is possible, either higher or lower, or whether Dasein

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lives on or outlasts itself and is immortal. The this-worldly ontological interpretation of death takes precedence over any ontical other-worldly speculation. The existential interpretation of death takes precedence over any biology and ontology of life. But it is also the foundation for any investigation of death which is biographical or historiological, ethnological or psychological. In any typology of dying the concept of death is already presupposed. 'What might be discussed under the topic of a 'metaphysic of death' lies outside the domain of an existential analysis of death', says Heidegger.¹⁷ Anxiety or dread differs from fear in seeming to have no object and no cause, and that is what makes it so profoundly disturbing, it is seldom felt in its intensity and clarity. The decisive character of dread is that it can not be localised and it refuses to be pinned down to anything. It is a possibility which not only has empire over all other possibilities, since it eventually extinguishes them, but which also has a bearing upon them while they remain options, for it reveals their contingency. I see all my possibilities as already annihilated in death, as they will be, like those of others in their turn. In face of death when all the possibilities are annihilated, there are only two alternatives before us : acceptance or distraction. We are free either to choose acceptance of death as the supreme and normative possibility of my existence, or to remain lost in the illusions of everyday life.

It may be asked : how is the temporality of anxiety related to that of fear ? In answer to this question, Heidegger says : " Anxiety, like fear, has its character formally determined by something in the face of which one is anxious and the something about which one is anxious This does not mean that their structural characters are melted away into one another, as if anxiety were anxious neither in the face of anything nor about anything. Their coinciding means rather that the entity by which both these structures are filled in is the same - namely, Dasein ¹⁸. In fact, that in the face of which one has anxiety is not encountered as something definite in the world, it is not anything ready - to - hand or present-at-hand. Environmental entities do not have any involvement in the case of anxiety. We concern ourselves environmentally. Anxiety, however, springs from Dasein itself. When fear assails us, it does so from what is within-the-world. Anxiety arises out of Being-in-the-world as thrown Being-towards-death ".

Anxiety is said to be anxious in the face of ' nothing ' of the world. " Anxiety discloses an insignificance of the world, and this insignificance reveals the nullity of that with which one can concern oneself....." ¹⁹

According to Heidegger, the temporality of anxiety and that of fear are not of the same nature. In the case of anxiety one is brought back to one's δ thrownness as something possible that can be repeated, but is not so in the case of fear. As Heidegger says : " The character of having been is constitutive for the state-of-mind of anxiety; and bringing one face to face repeatability is the specific ecstatic mode of this character " ²⁰. Existentially anxiety means that it can not lose itself in something with which it might be concerned, it is only in fear that it may so happen. Again, according to Heidegger, anxiety merely brings one into the mood for a possible resolution. " Although both fear and anxiety as modes of state of mind are grounded primarily in having been, they each have different sources with regard to their own temporalization in the temporality of care. Anxiety springs from the future of resoluteness, while fear springs from the lost present of which fear is fearfully apprehensive, so that it falls prey to it more than ever. " ²¹

' Thus dread which at first in contrast to fear is so vague and meaningless proves the most specific and significant of all emotions, a pitiless pointing to my original situation, an awful anticipation of my personal

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choice, a fear of being already cast into the world and a fear for my authenticity in living in the world '22

It is dread, then, that reveals Dasein, the mode of existence of the human being, the sense of the situation and vital attitude in face of it.

The Concept of ' Nothing '.

In theistic Existentialism there is scarcely any reference to nothingness with the exception to Kierkegaard, who in his book ' The Concept of Dread ', gives us only a vague idea of nothingness. In his ' What is Metaphysics ? ' Heidegger deals with the problem of 'Nothing'.

The conceptions of Non-being, Nothing, Death and Dread (Anguish) are intimately connected in Heidegger's Philosophy. Non-being or Nothing is not mere emptiness or the absolute negation of everything. The idea of negation applies properly to particular limited things, but the idea of Non-being applies to the totality of all things. In Dread or Anguish we come face to face with absolute Non-being or Nothing. 'Dread' is a mental state that has got no definite object for its source, and a

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person in 'dread' can, therefore, think of nothing definite : so that the entire world slips away from his mind. About nothingness, he says in 'What is metaphysics ? ', " And this total relegation to the vanishing ~~what-is-in-totality~~ - such being the form in which Nothing crowds round us in dread - is the essence of Nothing, nihilation. Nihilation is neither an annihilation of what is, nor does it spring from negation. Nihilation can not be reckoned in terms of annihilation or negation at all. Nothing nihilates of itself".²³

But this withdrawal of '~~what-is-in-totality~~' leaves with us not only a positive experience of nothing, but also an experience of pure Being into which all beings and we sink and return as into their own source and enduring home. Heidegger says, " An experience of Being as sometimes 'other' than everything that 'is' comes to us in dread, provided that, we do not from dread of dread shut our eyes to the soundless voice which attunes us to horrors of the abyss ".²⁴

Nothing is not merely a notional negation, not-anything, and thus the counter concept opposed to Being. It can be experienced and is itself the source of all forms of negation and negativity. Dread is the experience of Nothing. What happens when we come face to face with Nothing ?

' The intelligible world constructed by personal existence,

in which man feels safe and at home, the world of meanings, is nihilated and he is plunged back in to the sheer 'is-ness' of what is, his ship on which he is riding and voyaging disappears in the night and he finds himself in the deep waters and tastes their saltness. This is an experience of brute existence denuded of meanings, it uncovers the nervelessness of pure 'is-ness', contingency, which reason covers up, and is therefore a revelation of Being '.

Heidegger coins a ~~new~~ verb, 'nichten', 'to nothing' which means the discovery by a human being of his insecurity in this world of ordinary objects, which causes anxiety in him. He uses the word 'nothing' in two senses. The first sense of the word 'nothing' is a man's realization that he arises out of a chance which hurls him into the world, and ends in death when he will not exist any more. Death stares us in the face. No one knows when it will occur but everyone knows that it must occur at some point of time. Death is the final end towards which every one is moving. In this sense 'nichts' means 'non-existence' or 'nothingness'.

The second sense of the word 'nothing' is the great alarm that one feels when one experiences a great void, the

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abyss, the vacancy which surrounds one. Things of the world recede to the background and lose their attraction and importance, and this is 'nothingness' in the second sense.

The problem of Nothing has been carried further in Heidegger's ' Kant and the problem of Metaphysics ' than in his ' Being and Time '. In the former work, he criticises Kant on two grounds ; first, Kant concentrated too much on the pure perceptive 'I' without considering his position as a human being in the world of things ; and secondly, Kant did not recognize Nothing which is the only possible ground of the analysis of human being. Here Nothing is connected by Heidegger explicitly with the finitude of human beings which essentially move them towards their end in death. In fact the realization of man's finitude was the beginning of his recognition of the concept of Nothing. Man's finitude means that he is mortal, and the realization of the fact of mortality on the part of a man arouses in him the feeling of Nothing.

Temporality

The subject of time has always been attractive of Philosophers and trivial to non-philosophers. Heidegger, as a philosopher

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gives us an account of his idea of time which is different from the everyday concept. But his theory is not absurd in contrast to the common-sense view of time. We shall see how his theory arose and how it seeks to explain observed phenomena. Like Being, Temporality also receives in his system an ontological status. Temporality is the name of the way in which time exists in human existence. There could ~~not~~ be no 'Concern' if there were no temporality.

The potentiality of Being is latent in human being. The moment human being understands this and becomes conscious of his inevitable death, he feels an urge to actualize his inner possibilities and at the same time ~~he~~ begins to reflect upon himself. Particularly the dread of death pulls him up to authentic existence from inauthentic self-forgetful common existence as one of the many. He then tries to understand who he is, wherefrom his being is, where to the being tends, for whom it is. The human Dasein thus tries to explore its present, past, future and its own inner possibilities which he is free to develop. He freely decides what he proposes to be. According to Heidegger's existential temporality, the latent potentiality of human being is his future, the inauthentic fallen state in which he finds himself thrown is his past and the concrete situation which is presented for realization of potentiality is his present. These three are the elements

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of the unitary existential effort - care or concern. So Heidegger thinks that there could be no concern if there were no temporality. Heidegger's human being thinks first of all of the future, then he mentally moves back to the past, and finally comes to be conscious of the present situation. Thus future, past and present are the three modes of temporality that produce time. Heidegger poetically calls these modes ' ecstasies of temporality '. There is a continuity between the three modes of temporality. ' The past originates from the future so as to engender the present'²⁶. The successive moments of past, present and future are really nothing but a repetition of 'nows'. Nature as a collection of such present objects connotes no inner existence, no potentiality and therefore, no genuine future, past and present. So Heidegger holds : ' only existent man is historical. Nature has no history'²⁷.

The Existential modes of Dasein

Heidegger refers to three existential modes of Dasein, namely, Existenz, Facticity and Fallenness, By (a) Existenz he means that a priori or existential structure of Dasein which stands for a "projection of possibilities". According to him, the freedom of choice and the recognition of this freedom constitute the essence of existence. In each case Dasein has its own possibility and it has 'this possibility' but it is not a property like something present at hand.

As such, it can in its very being, choose itself and never win itself. The implication is that we should not desire any a priori characterization of human projects and values. In the words of Dr.M.K.Bhadra " Heidegger is not so much concerned with freedom of action, as with freedom of choice. In this he opposes Kant who argued for freedom of action, but insisted that human choice was dictated by some rational criteria. Heidegger rejects the rational guidelines and points out that there are no a priori grounds for

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making such choice. Again, he is not concerned with specific choices, but only with the most general choices, choices of ultimate evaluative criteria. He thus stresses the point that every life-style is not based upon rational justification, but is always based on personal decision or choice"²⁸

(b) Facticity as an existential mode or a structure of Dasein is an elaboration of the definition of Dasein as being-in-the-world'. According to Heidegger, Dasein lives in a particular world at a particular time. An individual man's being born of particular parents, in a particular place, on a particular date, and having a particular name rather than another and the like, all are nothing but his facticities. In simple words the facticities of Dasein are just the things and events of a man's life, which could have been otherwise, although they have not been so. One could have been born of other parents in another country. On another date, could have another name- these possibilities were there. So the facts of a man's life are only facticities, not logical necessities.

While explaining Heidegger's facticity, Dr.M.K.Bhadra says,

" My entire past is my facticity, for it is a collection of facts which I have not chosen. My bodily structure is also a part of my facticity. I can leave this place, this country, and even this planet, but I am the prisoner of my body. Facticity, for Heidegger, is the set of all these 'givens' which I encounter in my existence.²⁹ However, the circumstances, the facticities of a man are always determined, just given to him. He is thrown into them ; but the particular ways in which he will confront these circumstances are always undetermined, they depend upon his own choice and action.

(c) When Dasein fails to recognize existence or possibility as one of its existential structures, he has the tendency to neglect his existence. This tendency has been called fallenness by Heidegger. Man is so preoccupied with the petty tasks and problems of everyday life that he has no time for reflection on his existence. Says Dr.M.K.Bhadra," The life of das Mann is easy, as it simply follows the rules of everyday life and does not have to make a decision of his own. Dasein is therefore tempted to remain in the mode of Existenz dictated by das Mann, although it is not 'I' in the in the sense of my own self that "am", but rather the others, whose way is that of das Mann.

This temptation to remain in the state of das Mann
is the condition of fallenness and it is also the
foundation of in authenticity"³⁰

Beyond Metaphysics ;

Godless Theology

An atheist, in the beginning, Heidegger turned towards
a kind of theism or spiritualism in his later writings,
as one who finds the concept of the Holy in his "Letter
on Humanism". The transition from 'Being and Time' to his
latest works, is marked by several contrasts.
The most important of them is a shift from the study
of the Being of particular entities including human
being to an attempt to have an acquaintance with Being
itself. He took poetry as a Kin of Philosophy. As he says,
"only poetry stands in the same order of philosophy and
its thinking, though poetry and thought are not the same
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thing"

Again he says, "Thinking is.....poetizing..... the thinking of Being is the fundamental manner of poetizing"³². The search for an unmetaphysical language leads him to the poetry, philosophy of the pre-socratics, and the poetry of Holderlin. However the search for an unprejudice language to express Being itself carries Heidegger ultimately away from even those quasi-philosophical enterprises to a kind of Mysticism, in which the philosopher no longer tries to disclose truth, but simply waits patiently and passively for 'The word', of Being itself, not of God. In the words of R.C.Solomon, "The concern for the acility of language to hold discourse about Being to the word' which is spoken by Being to man"³³. Gradually 'Being' in Heidegger's philosophy takes the place of Christian God and man's relation to Being is liken to that of the shepherd to God in Christian Theology.⁶ In his later writings it becomes quite clear 'that Being has taken the place of the traditional transcendent Christian God and man is a vehicle for the self-revelation of Being. Being becomes grossly personified, and man's attitude towards Being is more like worship of God. than the asking

S E C T I O N- II

Elements of Intellect and emotion in Heidegger's
Philosophy and their relative predominance.

Like Kierkegaard also gives a rational analysis of human existence and the real nature of human being. Heidegger's philosophy is primarily a philosophy of being in the form of a 'human being' or 'existence'. It is an analysis of human existence which brings to light the hidden meaning of 'Being'. He thinks that being and not things which have being is the principal object of Philosophical enquiry and that in order to know the real nature of things we must have resort to intuition and try to grasp it in its givenness. According to him, the task of philosophy is the analysis of 'Being'.

Accordingly, in his analysis of Being, he distinguishes between three sorts of being and thinks that the being of man, as an active self-conscious individual, is human being.

This is being in its proper form and is called 'existence'. I experience myself as existence itself and not as a thing having being by comparing myself with lower animals,

physical objects etc. and by feeling that I am free to choose and decide between alternatives and my freedom consists in the act of choice.

So we see that though Heidegger speaks of intuitive method as a must in Philosophy, yet he openly adopts the analytical method in discovering the hidden meaning of Being which he thinks the principal object of philosophical enquiry. The question is, is it possible for Heidegger to distinguish between three sorts of being without the exercise of intellect? The task of analysis and making distinction, to choose and decide between alternatives, to experience one's own existence etc. presuppose the involvement of intellect or reason.

Heidegger deals the problem of Being from three points of view, and as such three different questions are raised regarding Being. First, there is the question concerned with the conceptual analysis of Being. Secondly, there is the metaphysical question regarding the nature of Being. Thirdly, there is the theological question regarding Being.

In the task of conceptual analysis of Being Heidegger is dealing with concepts. In the conceptual analysis of Being there is actually nothing but a dissection of the concepts in its different meanings and the determination of its uniform

meaning. Here he is attempting to formulate new concepts. To him, the task of Philosophy is to formulate new and new concepts, philosophy is analysis of language and concepts, it is linguistic and conceptualistic. We see that Heidegger's analysis of Being and existence is in accord with his idea of philosophy. Regarding the nature of Being, we are told to know the essence of Being. But to find out the essence of a thing is to find out the common characteristics lying in that class and to point out the similarities and dissimilarities by comparing it with others and then to generalise.

Heidegger says, ' The essence of human being lies in its existence'. According to him, we can experience our existence through ' concern' which connects human being with the world. ' Concern' is our way of raising the question-' What shall I do ? (or ' What Can I use ? ' or ' Are things for me or against me ?'. Raising of such questions indicate that human being is free to make choice and to make choice and decide between alternatives is not possible without rational thinking .

Regarding the theological question of Being, Heidegger speaks of our finitude and our future state of perfection through self-development which is the final end of

Being. Heidegger's realization of man's imperfection and finiteness, his idea of care or concern, dread, anguish, nothingness etc. are all meant for man in general. From individual experience he comes to the conclusion that human beings experience like him under similar situation. This is nothing but generalization by induction. In fact, in order to realize the real nature of existence and Being, Heidegger has adopted intellectual intuitive method. His direct intuitive knowledge has been systematised by reason or intellect.

Heidegger adopted a novel philosophical method known as the hermeneutical method by the application of which the revelation of significance of Being and the world could be effected. The word 'hermeneutic' means interpreting or explanatory. Thus the hermeneutic method may be taken as a method, explanatory of the significance of Being and the world, " Heidegger uses the expression ' hermeneutic Phenomenology' as the name of a method which can be applied by human beings to themselves, and by means of which they can understand features of their perceptions and thought about the world, which, without this method, they might have neglected, familiar to them though they are. It is by this method that ' Concern' is revealed in its crucial role" 36 .

The application of the hermeneutic method helps a man in understanding the Being and the world. In fact, in Heidegger's Philosophy knowing consists in 'understanding', which again consists in 'intuiting' and 'thinking'. As Heidegger says, "Intuition' and 'Thinking' are both derivatives of understanding.....Even the Phenomenological 'intuition of essences'..... is grounded in existential understanding".³⁷

All seeing is grounded primarily in understanding, and 'seeing' is a way of access to entities and to Being. Heidegger uses the word seeing in a very special sense. It is not mere seeing in the ordinary sense" 'Seeing' does not mean just perceiving with the bodily eyes, but neither does it mean non-sensory awareness of something present-at-hand in its presence-in-hand,... It lets entities which are accessible to it be encountered unconcealedly in themselves"³⁸ Thus Heidegger disfavours pure intuitionism. He is rather an upholder of qualified intuitionism in so far as according to him knowledge consists in understanding involving both intuition and reason or thought. By showing how all sight is grounded primarily in understanding..... we have deprived pure intuition....of its priority, which corresponds noetically to the priority of the present-at-hand in traditional ontology"³⁹

In Heidegger's philosophy, there is predominance of intellect and intuition ; still the role of emotion is not negligible .Of course emotion is not so much predominant in his philosophy as it is in Kierkegaard's philosophy, in whom reason was overtaken by passion, passion for truth and divinity. Nevertheless, in Heidegger's philosophy emotion plays an important role in care of reason or intellect. While explaining the nature of Being, he naturally brings in the concept of 'nothing' which can not be understood without the faculty of feeling and emotion being active. In one sense, the awareness of 'nothing' according to him, is the emotional feeling that the whole world with the individual human being concerned may be destroyed or reduced to 'nothing' at any moment. This feeling is comparable to poet Tagore's feeling expressed in a couplet ;

' We shall not remain, brother, none of us,

Nothing at all will endure ;

With that delight (in mind) move on and on

Following the strides of time, ⁴⁰

With this feeling of nothingness there is connected the feeling of anxiety and this is another element of emotion in Heidegger's philosophy. The feeling of anxiety consequent upon the feeling of nothingness is a reality that can not be denied but can be superseded by inner strength of mind and the observance of inner discipline. Heidegger's philosophical quest at last brought him to the vantage of the Holy i.e. beyond the comprehension of ordinary thinking, i.e. transcendent to the temporal order.

Thus in Heidegger's philosophy, there is to be found a passage from the knowledge of the finite to that of infinite, from the knowledge of the temporal being to that of the timeless Being, the Being everlasting, and this final knowledge that is intuitive, gives rise to divine passion or emotion in the Dasein concerned to be in tune with the Holy in self-abnegation. This passion towards the universal or absolute Being sounds like a devotee's absolute self-surrender to God, although this is not a passion for the deity but only a philosopher's passion for the absolute truth.

Thus in Heidegger's philosophy, there is to be found a happy intermingling of reason and intuition and of intellect and emotion.

Chapter - IV

Section - I

A brief account of Sartre's Philosophy.

INTRODUCTION

Though Kierkegaard, Husserl, Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel etc. are called ~~as~~ the pioneer of Existentialism, this philosophy owes much to Sartre, the French philosopher, for its wide popularity. Sartre was born in Paris in 1905. World war II and the experience of France under German rule transformed him, the withdrawn, apolitical intellectual, into a political being. These years of the German occupation of France were to be the most astonishingly productive of Sartre's life and moulded his philosophy of life in many respects. His major intellectual production during that period was the massive essay ' Being and Nothingness '. Sartre had begun to write this systematic statement of his philosophic view point during the gloomy winter of 1942 in occupied France.

Sartre was already thinking of constructing a serious philosophy which would provide guidance for life in the contemporary world by explaining the nature of the world and by expressing the human condition, what it is to live as a human

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condition, what it is to live as a human being. He turns away from all empiricism and cartesian Rationalistic deduction, for both can neither explain the world nor express what it is like to live as a human being. He turns to Descartes, Husserl, Heidegger, Hegel, Marx, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche from whom the richness of his philosophy is derived. He took Descartes' subjectivism of the Cogito, Husserl's view of consciousness as intentional, Heidegger's concept of conscious existence as being-in-the world, Hegel's concepts of the object as it is "in itself" and the object as "it is "for" a subject, concept of the dialectic of being and nothingness and the principle of negation, Kierkegaard's emphasis upon individual conscious existence, Nietzsche's concept of the death of God, and from Marx, his entire system, with some revisions. These concepts and themes converge, yet remain identifiable in Sartre's philosophy. To quote from Lavine, 'Sartre's originality lies in his reinterpreting, revising, and reworking these materials into a bold new integration which became the centre of French existentialism, in the form of philosophic treatises, novels, plays and literary and political essays'.¹

Appearance and BEING (Being-in-itself)

The dualism of being and appearance which we find in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, and in the philosophy

and Kant, Baradley etc. in modern time is an important problem of philosophy which Sartre tries to solve. Sartre's theory of Phenomenon is that the appearances does not refer to being as Kant's phenomenon refers to the noumenon or Bradley's appearance to reality. In his book ' Being and nothingness ' (page 3) he cites the examples of 'force' and 'electric current' which do not refer to anything hidden behind them. They are nothing but the totality of their effects and actions respectively. They indicate only themselves and the total series. Likewise, there is no exterior or covering for the existent which hides from sight the true nature of the object. As he says. ' The obvious conclusion is that the dualism of being and appearance is no longer entitled to any legal status within philosophy. The appearance refers to the total series of appearances and not to a hidden reality which would drain to itself all the being of the existent. And the appearance for its part is not an inconsistent manifestation of this being. To the extent that men had believed in noumenal realities, they have presented appearance as a pure negative. It was " that which is not being ", it had no other being than that of illusion and error ' ². He further thinks that the phenomenon can be studied and described as such, for it is absolutely indicative of itself.

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Sartre denies the existence of any kind of objects which can not be reached by consciousness. Beyond appearances there are no: transcendental objects. Objects are nothing but the conglomeration of appearances. The appearance is not supported by any existent different from itself ; it has its own being.

Sartre speaks of two kinds as well as, modes of being, viz, 'being-in-itself' and 'being-for-itself'. There is also a third mode of being namely, 'being-for-others', though not a third kind of being. ' The first being which we meet in our ontological inquiry is the being of the appearance' - says Sartre ³. The ' being-in-themselves' are external objects around us. They need nothing in order to exist, for they are there, massive, shapeless. There can be no explanation of how or why things are what they are. They just are. They obtrude, and when I have a sheet of paper before me, I can not make it be anything other than what it is. These things he calls ' being-in-themselves '. They are neither passivity nor activity. This inertness of the content of perception is being-in-itself. They exist in themselves but they are in no way exact. It is consciousness that illuminates them , that delineates form within the chaotic world

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of things, and gives it meaning. By 'being-in-itself' we are to understand a being which does not refer to anything beyond itself. The primary characteristic of being is never to reveal itself completely to consciousness ; and so they are in no way exact.

Sartre speaks of three characteristics of being. These are : being is ; Being is in-itself. Being is what it is. ' Uncreated, without reason for being, without any connection with another being, being-in-itself is de trop for eternity ' ⁴
- says Sartre.

BEING AS EXISTENCE

' Existence Precedes essence '.

Sartre, like all other existentialists, is concerned mainly with ' being as existence ', not with any kind of being, because existence alone is being proper or authentic being. Being in the sense of existence is prior to essence, and this is expressed by the statement ' existence precedes essence '. Being other than existence may not precede essence, but being as existence must precede essence. Of all existentialists, Sartre alone is most emphatic on this point. In his book 'Existentialism

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and Humanism', Sartre has allotted pages to clarify the implication of the statement 'existence precedes essence'. This is a view just opposite to the view that 'essence precedes existence' as held by the essentialists like Plato and others. So, in order to make the contrast clear, Sartre first explains in what sense essence is supposed to be prior to existence. Citing a common instance he says that before the production of a pen-knife or a book, the producer of it makes a plan as to the nature, shape and form of the thing to be produced, the purpose likely to be served by it, and the method or procedure of producing it. Thus the idea or concept of the thing is prior to its actual being. This idea or concept of the thing is in fact its essence, and so the essence of the thing is prior to the being or existence of the thing. Similarly, the theists believe that God had in his mind an idea, concept or plan of the world of things produced by him, and thus the essence of the things of the world was prior to the actual existence of the things. Plato, the Ideal-Realist, held that idea, concept, form, substance, essence or universal is the only reality, while the particular things and beings are only the imitations or imperfect copies or shadows of the ideas. Thus the so-called existent thing, a sensible particular, has

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no reality, and the so-called reality that it has is dependent upon the reality of its corresponding idea or essence. Existence, is, therefore, posterior to essence.

Contrarywise, Sartre says that if God does not exist, there is at least one being whose existence is prior to its essence, a being which exists before any conception of it can be formed. That being is man or the human reality. Says Sartre, " what do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence ? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world - and defines himself afterwards. If man, as the existentialists sees him is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus, there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it. Man simply is. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself to be, but he is what he wills, and as he conceives himself after already existing - as he wills to be after that leap towards existence. Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. That is the first principle of Existentialism⁵.

From man's existence being prior to his essence, it follows that man is solely responsible for what he is and what he does ; there is none else who may be held responsible for his

being and doing. So says Sartre, " If, however, it is true that existence is prior to essence, man is responsible for what he is. Thus, the first effect of existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders "⁶. Not only this. A man is responsible also for all men by his own choice ; that is to say, an individual's choice is not for him alone but for all human beings, in so far as he has to see that his choice does not stand in the way of the well-being of others. " When we say that man chooses himself, we do mean that everyone of us must choose himself ; but by that we also mean that in choosing for himself he chooses for all men. For, in effect, of all the actions a man may take in order to create himself as he wills to be, there is not one which is not creative, at the same time, of an image of man such as he believes he ought to be what we choose is always the better ; and nothing can be better for us unless it is better for all. If, moreover, existence precedes essence, and we will to exist at the same time as we fashion our image, that image is valid for all and for the entire epoch in which we find ourselves. Our responsibility is thus much greater than we have supposed, for it concerns mankind as a whole "⁷. The image of man that is created by an individual man by setting an example of his own is an

essence that comes only after the existence of an individual man. A individual's own choice in conformity with the good of humanity as a whole is universalised, and thus there is a passage from existence to essence. Says Sartre, " I am thus responsible for myself and all men, and I am creating a certain image of man as I would have him to be. In fashioning myself, I fashion man " ⁸.

CONSCIOUSNESS

(Being - for - itself)

Appearances refer to something which expresses itself through its appearances, and that something must be consciousness. Consciousness, on the other hand is 'being-for-itself'. Being-for-itself is all the things which being-in-itself is not. It is the second type of being which Sartre speaks of .

According to Sartre, consciousness is the only reality that man experiences. As because he rejects the metaphysical, that is, the unverifiable, he refuses to imagine behind consciousness a supporting mind, or behind things a separate existence. The distinguishing trait-of-consciousness is never to be itself but always to be attentiveness to an external object ' All

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consciousness is consciousness of something'. It exists only to the extent that it is tied to external objects, and it needs them in order to exist. The "Percipi" referred us to a percipiens, the being of which has been revealed to us as consciousness. Sartre speaks of the ontological proof in support of his theory of consciousness. Consciousness is consciousness of something. This means that transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness; that is, that consciousness is born supported by a being which is not itself'.⁹ This is what he calls the ontological proof. This proof is derived not from the reflective cogito but from the pre-reflective being of the percipiens. Like Husserl, Sartre admits that consciousness is intentional in the sense that it reaches out towards an object. In reaching the object consciousness is also consciousness of itself. But the self is conscious of itself not as an object. We are aware of 'being-for-itself' in ourselves, in self-consciousness.

Consciousness is nothing by itself except the power to delimit the world. It is the power to set itself outside of being. That is, to deny one part and also to deny that it is identifying itself with that part through a withdrawal effected with respect to things. It is the power to set itself outside of being. Sartre designates ^{it} as 'for-itself' and calls it 'a being through which nothingness comes to things'.¹⁰

It is consciousness that illuminates them, that delineates form within the chaotic world of things and gives it meaning. Thus when consciousness says, ' there is a Chair ', it is separating from the chaotic world of things a tiny portion of matter and conferring on it a structure and a meaning. It becomes indifferent to the rest of the world in order to consider the chair, it assumes that everything else does not exist, it relegates everything else into nothingness. Thus Sartre assimilates consciousness with nothingness.

Sartre thinks that as consciousness is intentional and it has a negative character, it is not possible to define consciousness. Of course, some characteristics of consciousness can be mentioned and they are as follows :-

Firstly, it is impersonal. Consciousness is consciousness of something. He criticises Descartes 'Cogito ergo sum' and Husserl's ' pure consciousness ' and shows that human consciousness must always be directed upon some object of which it will be aware. Further, in being aware of this object, it will also be aware of itself perceiving, or being aware. Sometimes the object of awareness will be something in the world, sometimes it will be the self. But in either case it will always

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be accompanied by an awareness of being aware. This second-order awareness is referred to by Sartre as 'the pre-reflective Cogito'. According to him, the reflective 'ego' is not the consciousness itself but is created by consciousness.

Secondly, Consciousness is not a substance of any kind. It is not like a 'thinking substance' of Descartes. As it is always intentional, i.e. tries to reach out towards an object, substancehood can not be ascribed on it.

Thirdly, there is a lack in consciousness, and, he thinks that it is the essential characteristics of the 'for-it-self'. This lack is described in different ways by Sartre. He says that consciousness is a vacancy or an emptiness. He says that it essentially consists in a gap - a gap, that is, between thought and the object of thought. 'This lack does not belong to the nature of the in-itself', which is all positivity. It appears in the world only with the upsurge of human reality. It is only in the human world that there can be lacks ¹¹.

Sartre makes use of the concept of the possible to explain what he means by the lack which is characteristic of consciousness. He compares this lack of consciousness with the broken disc of the moon and says, '.... in the human world, the incomplete being which is released to intuition as lacking

is constituted in its being by the lacked - that is, by what it is not. It is the full moon which confers on the crescent moon its being as crescent, what-is-not determines what-is. It is in the being of the existing, as the correlate of a human transcendence, to lead outside itself to the being which it is not - as to its meaning '12

He says that consciousness lacks for something else. What is lacked by a conscious being is the coincidence of himself with himself. What a human being ceaselessly aims at is himself, that which he is not, his own possibilities. So the lack which is at the heart of consciousness is a lack of completed possibilities ; and it must always remain unsatisfied as long as a being is conscious '13

So, we see that Sartre tried to reconcile Philosophical Realism and Idealism. To resolve the difficulty of the two, he reinforced the link between consciousness and things by making them interdependent ; without consciousness things are but they are nothing other than a meaningless chaos. Without things, consciousness does not even exist, for its life consists of imagining them.

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N O T H I N G N E S S

The idea of 'nothingness' is central to Sartre's Existentialism. Nothingness has no meaning except in relation to being. His theory of nothingness and the relation between being and nothingness is very complicated. But however obscure the meaning of the term 'nothingness' as used by Sartre may be, there is no doubt that this conception holds a very important place in his philosophy.

By 'nothingness' Sartre does not mean absolute non-existence. He identifies nothingness with consciousness i.e. for-itself and says, 'Man is the being by whom nothingness comes to things'.¹⁴ He says that nothingness can not be produced by 'being-in-itself'. The notion of being as full positivity does not contain nothingness as one of its structures. He says, '.... being is prior to nothingness and establishes the ground for it. By this we must understand not only that being has a logical precedence over nothingness but also that it is from being that nothingness derives concretely its efficacy. This is what we mean when we say that nothingness haunts being'.¹⁵ This means that being has not need of nothingness in order to be conceived. But on the other hand, nothingness has a borrowed existence, and it gets its being from being. 'Nothingness can be

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conceived neither outside of being, nor as a complementary, abstract notion, nor as an infinite milieu where being is suspended. Nothingness must be given at the heart of being, in order for us to be able to apprehend that particular type of realities which we have called negatités¹⁶.

So, nothingness as such, can not be conceived. If we can speak of it, it is only because it possesses an appearance of being. Nothingness is not, nothingness is made to be. In our perception when we say, ' That is a Chair ', we become indifferent to the rest of the world in order to consider the chair ; it assumes that everything else does not exist, it relegates everything else into nothingness. Thus nothingness is made to be by us i.e. for-it-self or consciousness.

Ordinarily we think that non-existence simply means nothing. It is a negative concept. It is comprehended within the meaning of a negative judgement. A negative judgement simply denies that there is any relation between the subject and the predicate. Sartre rejects this view and maintains that we have an intuitive knowledge of nothingness. This intuition precedes the negative judgement. In support of his view, Sartre described a situation in which we can have actual experience of nothingness. The situation is : suppose, ' I have an appointment with Pierre at

four o'clock. I arrive at the Café a quarter of an hour late. Pierre is always punctual. Will he have waited for me? I look at the room, the patrons, and I say, "He is not here". Is there an intuition of Pierre's absence, or does negation indeed enter in only with judgement? ¹⁷

Sartre says that, at first sight it seems absurd to speak of intuition here. But on analysis it will be clear that the absence of my friend Pierre, whom I had expected to see is a perceived absence, and it is an actual experienced negation or nothingness. In perception there is always the construction of a figure on a ground. When I enter the Café to search for Pierre, there is formed a synthetic organization of all the objects in the Café, on the ground of which Pierre is given as about to appear. This organization of the Café as the ground is an original nihilation. Thus the original nihilation of all the figures which appear and are swallowed up in the total neutrality of a ground is the necessary condition for the appearance of the principal figure, which is here the person of Pierre. This nihilation is given to my intuition. ¹⁸

Here what is offered to intuition is the nothingness of the ground, the nihilation of which causes the figure to appear, and also the nothingness of the figure which slips as a nothing

to the surface of the ground. It serves as foundation for the judgement - "Pierre is not here." So, we see that in every negative judgement we have an intuitive apprehension of this double nihilation. Sartre thinks that this example is sufficient to show that non-being does not come to things by a negative judgement it is the negative judgement, on the contrary, which is conditioned and supported by non-being.

He explains the nature of question and shows that in every question, be its reply affirmative or negative non-being or nothingness is intrinsic. Likewise, the idea of destruction of objects give rise to the idea of nothingness. He says that destruction presents the same structure as the question. That nothingness is in the root of the idea of destruction, is clear from the following : ' In order for destruction to exist, there must be first a relation of man to being i.e. a transcendence ; and within the limits of this relation, it is necessary that man apprehend one being as destructible. This supposes a limiting cutting into being by a being, which is already a process of nihilation. The being under consideration is that and outside of that nothing '19

Sartre says that in order for negation to exist in the world and in order that we may consequently raise questions concerning being, it is necessary that in some way nothingness be given.

F R E E D O M

The dispute between the determinists and libertarians about free will or human freedom is a long one, and Sartre also, like the other philosophers attempts to solve the dispute. It is a familiar paradox that human beings are both free and not free. ' To be a " free mortal " itself indicates a paradox, for death is the final full stop, the final limit to my freedom .'²⁰ We see that we are born in a certain place at a certain time with certain characteristics which are not of our choosing and which are beyond our control. Our freedom is limited by all these factors.

Again, on the otherhand, we feel that there is nothing to prevent me from doing a particular act. We also feel that there is nothing which can compel us to do that particular act. We are free to be what we choose to be. Even our feelings, as much as our actions, are freely chosen. So, we see that we are both free and unfree, and herein lies the paradox of free will.

Sartre attempts to solve the problem. He does not try to solve the problem by reconciling what is free with what is undetermined, or by showing that the apparent opposition between them is a false one. His attempt is different from his predecessors.

Ordinarily, by freedom or free will we understand our ability to do everything at our sweet will. But Sartre says that, '..... the formula "to be free" does not mean " to obtain what one has wished " but rather " by oneself to determine oneself to wish " (in the broad sense of choosing). In other words, success is not important to freedom the empirical and popular concept of "freedom" which has been produced by historical, political and moral circumstances is equivalent to " the ability to obtain the ends chosen ". The technical and philosophical concept of freedom, the only one which we are considering here, means only the autonomy of choice ' 21

Sartre says that, we are free. Our power to choose to decide, to plan, to act is a direct proof of our freedom. The manifest difference between active and passive can not be denied and we can experience this difference all the time. He analyses human action and motives and shows that there could be no such thing as action at all if human consciousness were not free - free to contemplate its 'situation' and form negative judgments about it and about the future. The fundamental condition of act is freedom. ' I am indeed an existent who learns his freedom through his acts ' 22. Freedom makes itself an act, and we ordinarily attain it across the act which it organizes with the causes, motives and ends which the act

implies. It is the act which decides its end and its motives, and the act is the expression of freedom.

He further says, ' I am necessarily a consciousness (of) freedom since nothing exists in consciousness except as the non-thetic consciousness of existing. Thus my freedom is perpetually in question in my being ; it is not a quality added on or a property of my nature. It is very exactly the stuff of my being, and as in my being, my being is in question, I must necessarily possess a certain comprehension of freedom.

An individual, according to Sartre, is absolutely free. Indeed freedom is one with being. I am free in the sense that each of my acts is wholly unconnected with what happened in the past. It is our choice of the future which makes our nature and not a fixed structure which was formed in the past. This free deciding has its context. This context is what Sartre calls 'Situation'. Sartre does not deny 'facticity' or our factual situation which restricts our freedom, and these factual situations are my place, my body, my part, my position and finally my fundamental relation to the other. But these obstacles and restrictions have meaning only in and through the free choice which human reality is. The paradox of freedom is : ' there is freedom only in situation, and there is situation only through freedom ' 24

Sartre says that freedom is not an accidental possession of man but a necessity of his being. " Man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet he is nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for everything he does " ²⁵.

Sartre modified his views about human freedom in his later work ' The Critique of Dialectical Reason '. In the critique Sartre has laid less emphasis on the absolute freedom of the individual in so far as he considers the individual in a socio-material milieu.

(That Sartrean notion of freedom is incompatible with the notion of 'leading a moral life' is decisively shown in a paper named 'Sartrean autonomy and morality' by Smt. Koyeli Ghosh - Dastidar ²⁶ .

BAD FAITH

One interesting contribution made by Sartre in connection with his discussion of freedom is his notion of 'bad faith'. According to him, 'bad faith' is pretence, self-deception, a sheltering behind a role, making out that one is completely determined and could do no other. The human being is one who can take negative attitudes with respect to himself. 'The determined attitude which is essential to human reality and which is such that consciousness instead of directing its negation outward turns it toward itself. This attitude, it seems to me, is bad faith'²⁷ - says Sartre.

Bad faith is frequently identified with falsehood. But Sartre analyses the characteristics of lying and shows that bad faith has in appearance the structure of falsehood. The main point of difference between the two negative attitudes lies in the fact that in bad faith it is from myself that I am hiding the truth. The duality of the deceiver and the deceived does not exist here. Bad faith implies in essence the unity of a single consciousness. Bad faith does not come from outside to human reality. One does not undergo his bad faith. One is

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not infected with it, it is not a state. But consciousness affects itself with bad faith. That which affects itself with bad faith must be conscious of its bad faith since the being of consciousness is consciousness of being. So, it follows that the one to whom the lie is told and the one who lies are one and the same person. So, it is the unitary structure of a single project. This unitary structure is explained by Sartre in the following way : ' There must be an original intention and a project of bad faith ; this project implies a comprehension of bad faith as such and a pre-reflective apprehension of consciousness as affecting itself with bad faith. It follows first that the one to whom the lie is told and the one who lies are one and the same person, which means that I must know in my capacity as deceiver the truth which is hidden from me in my capacity as the one deceived. Better yet I must know the truth very exactly in order to conceal it more carefully - and this not at two different moments but in the unitary structure of a single project ' ²⁸. He further says that even though the existence of bad faith is very precarious, and though it belongs to a kind of psychic structure, it presents nonetheless an autonomous and durable form. It can even be the normal aspect of life for a great number of people. A person living in bad faith implies a constant and particular style of life.

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Sartre now speaks of the two patterns of bad faith. In the first kind a human being tries to believe, while knowing at the same time that it is pretence, that he is just a thing, and therefore, can not help behaving as he is behaving.

He illustrates this mode of bad faith by his story of a girl who is taken to a restaurant by a man, and who, in order to preserve the excitement of the occasion, and to put off the moment when she must face making a definite decision, saying either 'yes' or 'no' to him, pretends to herself that she does not notice his intentions towards her. The aim is to postpone the moment of decision as long as possible. Her hand rests inert between the warm hands of her companion - neither consenting nor resisting - a thing. Her hand, then, is a thing, quite separate from herself, and she has disowned it and can not be held responsible for what happens to it.

This girl is in bad faith. This is the first pattern of bad faith, and it is, it must be said, instantly recognizable and familiar.

Sartre illustrates the second type of bad faith by the example of a waiter in a Café. He is observed by Sartre to be plainly acting a part manifestly playing at something.

All the movements and gestures of the waiter are slightly over-done. His movements are all of them like the movements in a mime or a game. The game which he is playing is the game of being a waiter. Sartre described the over-acting of the waiter in the following way :

' His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes toward the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly; his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tight-rope walker by putting it in a perpetually unstable, perpetually broken equilibrium which he perpetually re-establishes by a light movement of the arm and hand '29

All his behaviour seems to us a game. He is playing, he is amusing himself. There is nothing surprising about this. The waiter plays with his situation in life in order to realize it. Sartre says that the obligation to do this is the same as is imposed on all businessmen. Their status is entirely one of show, and the public requires them to realize it as show 'there is the dance of the grocer, of the tailor, of the auctioneer, by which they endeavor to persuade their clientele that they are nothing but a grocer, an auctioneer, a tailor '30

All these people are in bad faith, according to Sartre. But at the same time the fact is that what the waiter, in acting out his part, is attempting to make real is the being-in-itself of the Café waiter. He knows that he cannot be wholly and completely a waiter and nothing else at all. The 'ideal' waiter is a representation, not something actual ; and so one can only represent the waiter as oneself, in the way in which images may represent non-existent things by a kind of analogy. But the waiter does not pretend to be a thing as the girl in the first example does. ' But if I represent myself as him, I am not he ; I am separate from him as the object from the subject, separated by nothing - but this nothing isolates me from him ; that is, I imagine to myself that I am he. And thereby I affect him with nothingness ³¹ '.

It is clear from this quotation that bad faith is linked with our freedom of imagination as the power to conceive what was not the case, and it is also linked with our power to choose and decide. The play of the waiter is pretence, for he could choose not to play the part of a waiter, he could value things differently. To value things as he does and to accept the consequences of the evaluation is his own decision.

' Basically, bad faith is an attempt to escape from the

anguish which men suffer when they are brought face to face with their own freedom.

Conscious beings are essentially free, not only to act as they choose, but to see the world under the headings and categories that they choose. They are free in their accepting the truth about things or in imagining things which are not true. It is also involved in their choice of ends and means to these ends. They are even free to accept hopeless and useless kinds of behaviour in the face of their difficulties. They are free to make use of the magical, in emotion . 32 .

Sartre comes to the conclusion that such a kind of behaviour (bad faith) is possible only to a free conscious human being.

Besides, he uses bad faith to prove the existence of the power to conceive non-existence with which he is primarily concerned. His argument is ; if human beings were not capable of conceiving what is not true there would be no such thing as bad faith. But there is such a thing as bad-faith ; therefore, they are capable of conceiving what is not the case.

He takes it for granted that bad faith occurs and says that the necessary condition for bad faith is the grasping of nothingness, which is identical with the freedom of consciousness.

Being-for-others

About being-for-others Sartre says : ' What I know is the body of another, and the essential facts which I know concerning my own body come from the way in which others set it. Thus the nature of my body refers me to the being of others and to my being-for-others. I discover with it for human reality another mode of existence as fundamental as being-for-itself, and this I shall call being-for-others '33.

So, we see that the above definition of being-for-others shows that first, I am aware of my own bodily existence as something which is known to other people. Secondly, I am aware of the bodies of other people and thence their existence in the world.

In traditional philosophy, the existence of other minds is argued by an analogy with our own case. But for Sartre there is no such thing as ' the problem of other minds '.

Sartre first argues against solipsism and by examining the theories of other philosophers like Husserl, Hegel and Heidegger, seeks to prove that at one and the same time as I am aware of myself, I necessarily become aware that other people exist and are observing me. If I were not aware of this fact

I should be only partially conscious of myself.

Before going to the discussion of the proof of the existence of others, we should see first what does Sartre mean by a proof. ' A proof is, for him, a description so clear and vivid that, when I think of this description and fit it to my own case, I can not fail to see its application The particular description of my case must come first and may then be used as a description of another particular case, and then of another, and so on ' ³⁴ . ' He believes that only after its descriptions have been recognized as true for me can they be used in the construction of a description of the world as a whole : ³⁵

This is the characteristic of existentialist writing - insistence on the particularity and concreteness of descriptions, from which ontological and metaphysical and general statements may be drawn. Sartre's demand is that philosophy should be concrete, particular and true to life. This method is found in his novels, plays and philosophical doctrines.

Anyway, now Sartre seeks to show how we know, without doubt, that other people exist. He describes a concrete situation which we can feel to be plausible. The situation is : ' Let us imagine that moved by jealousy, curiosity or vice I have just

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glued my ear to the door and looked through a keyhole. I am alone on the level of a non-thetic self-consciousness.....³⁶ This means that I am for the time being, completely absorbed in what I am doing, in such a way that my consciousness of myself and my body is reduced to the minimum of prereflective consciousness. ' I am my acts, and hence they carry in themselves their whole justification ' ³⁷

' But all of a sudden I hear footsteps in the hall. Someone is looking at me ! what does this mean ? It means that I am suddenly affected in my being and that essential modifications appear in my structure - modifications which I can apprehend and fix conceptually by means of the reflective cogito ' ³⁸

It means that my existence is reconstituted in a wholly new way. I suddenly exist, not just as a series of aims and actions, but as a person eavesdropping. I suddenly spring into existence as an object which can be looked at from outside, a thing such as can be truly or falsely described. I accept these descriptions of myself in shame.

This anecdote is simply intended to make us recollect the emotion of shame, as it is actually experienced. Shame is shame of oneself before the other. In order to feel ashamed it is necessary to be aware of someone besides oneself. When in the

moment of shame, I realize that I am under observation, I also understand a profound philosophical truth, namely that we exist, essentially, in relation to other people. Without inference of any kind we know that people exist in a full-blooded way.

Thus Sartre proves that other people exist.

Sartre on God

Sartre seems to be influenced by Anthropocentric Humanism. He emphasizes the problems of human life more than the problem of God. To him, the problem is not, therefore, whether God exists. Each of us must, on the otherhand, realize that man occupies a lofty position in the universe and that he has an important role to play. and in no case he can shake off the responsibility. He says, " Not that we believe God does exist, but we think that the real problem is not that of His existence ; what man needs is to find himself again and to understand that nothing can save him from himself, not even a valid proof of the existence of God " 39

Sartre is an atheist. His idea of God is the logical outcome of his conclusion on human freedom. He thinks that if human being is to be free, then the idea of God as ordinarily conceived, can not be accepted. All the traditional views about

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God are inconsistent with human freedom. He says that the very idea of God is self contradictory. He rejects the idea of God as a Causa sui and also as a creator of the universe and man. It is man who contemplates God - the ideal of perfection - and pursues that in a way determined by himself - God is the name given to the impossible conjunction of properties which we all aim to have. Every human being, realizing his own imperfections tries to become perfect and loses the human characteristic of emptiness and imperfections. To him, man is a useless passion. He says, ' Thus the passion of man is the reverse of that of Christ, for man loses himself as man in order that God may be born. But the idea of God is contradictory and we lose ourselves in vain ' ⁴⁰

Sartre analyses the nature of consciousness and shows that God as self-identical consciousness can not exist. ' Consciousness is always consciousness of something which is itself not consciousness. Thus there is an internal rift in consciousness. Now, my consciousness is my awareness of my being conscious of something. All consciousness is, then, inclusive of something other than itself, and any notion of a self-identical consciousness is self-contradictory. For, consciousness and selfidentity are mutually exclusive, since the

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aforesaid internal rift is the essence of consciousness. As a result, God as an absolute, infinite, self-identical consciousness, can not exist'. He further says, 'Imperfect being surpasses itself toward perfect being; the being which is the foundation only of its nothingness surpasses itself toward the being which is the foundation of its being. But the being toward which human reality surpasses itself is not a transcendent God, it is at the heart of human reality, it is only human reality itself as totality'.⁴¹ As an existentialist, he attributes existence only to man, and as an atheist he denies the existence of God on the above ground. According to Sartre, 'God is ~~any~~ a useless and costly hypothesis nothing will be changed if God does not exist. We shall find ourselves in the same norms of honesty, progress and humanism, and we shall have made of God an outdated hypothesis which will peacefully die off by itself'.⁴²

Echoing Nietzsche, Sartre says that God is dead i.e. it is our belief in God that is dead.

Nature and Kinds of emotion

Sartre's treatment of emotion is novel and unique in so far as he considers emotion to be a kind of perception in the sense that it is a peculiar way of perceiving things. Of course emotion is a kind of feeling, still it is not an unmixed feeling. It is invariably connected with perception and action, with thought and conation or volition. The thought arising out of or involved in the perception of something gives rise to a feeling or emotion which results in some particular willing and action. There is no feeling or emotion that is not preceded by any perception and not succeeded by any action. Like William James' "specious present" that includes the immediate past and the immediate future, Sartre's emotion includes also the immediately preceding perception and immediately succeeding action. That emotion is caused by something, by some perception, is admitted by all, but it is generally held that emotion is unproductive, it leads to inaction, because when a man is emotional, he can not perform any serious act; he becomes passive. But Sartre holds that emotion makes a man active, it is not a fact that emotion and passivity always go together. In his book, 'Sketch for a theory of the Emotions', Sartre has defined emotion as intentional, that is, as directed towards an object, as a particular kind of perception, a way of apprehending the world. In emotion, a person sees the world

not as governed by causal laws, but as governed by magic. A man is gripped by fear at the sight of a face at the window, because he sees the face as belonging to some one who could reach him and destroy him immediately, although as a matter of fact, he may be quite safe in his room looked from inside. This shows that emotion consists in looking at the state of things in a new light in one's own way. Thus when a man stamps his foot in anger, he does so because he can not really trample his enemy under foot, the enemy being a stronger than him. Whenever the perception of a thing creates unbearable tension in the mind of a person, he or she tries to perceive the thing otherwise, or he automatically perceives it otherwise in order to get rid of the tension. When a man can not have some grapes, he may consider them to be green and sour. One may relieve the tension by fainting or by weeping so that there is no longer any perception of the offending object. This early view of Sartre about emotion remained unchanged even at the time of his writing 'Being and Nothingness'.

Sartre recognizes mainly three kinds of emotions namely, anguish, the feeling of absurdity and nausea. Anguish is the affective tonality of man's boundless freedom or that of the apprehension of such freedom. The feeling of absurdity

is the feeling of the dispensableness of everything. And nausea is the feeling of disgust in ~~the~~ the face of certain characteristics of beings-in-themselves.

Anguish (Psychological and ethical).

This kind of emotion arises entirely from the conscious being's perception of himself, from the contemplation of his own freedom. Hence, it is characterised as the affective tonality of man's unrestricted liberty, or as the affective tonality of man's apprehension or consciousness of his unrestricted liberty. It is fear of something indefinite, and thus is to be distinguished from ordinary fear that is always related to something definite. It is in anguish that man becomes conscious of his freedom, but it is not a proof of human freedom, it depends upon freedom, it is a special consciousness of freedom. This kind of anguish may be taken as psychological, because there is also, another kind of anguish called ~~xxx~~ ethical anguish which occurs when we recognise our own causal responsibility for what we do and what we are.

According to Sartre, the statement 'man is in anguish' means that " when a man commits himself to anything fully realizing that he is not only choosing what he will be,

but is thereby at the same time a legislator deciding for the whole of mankind - in such a moment a man can not escape from the sense of complete and profound responsibility ⁴³. Some people disguise this anguish or take flight from it. Only by a kind of self deception can a man get rid of the disturbing thought as to what would happen if everyone did as he is doing. To say that everyone will not do it is nothing but an act of lying in self excuse, it is a denial of the universal value. A man's action becomes exemplary, so whenever a man does anything, the thought of his responsibility for other members of the society arouses anguish in him. For instance, when a military leader himself shoulders the responsibility for an attack and sends a number of soldiers to their death, he alone makes the choice, but the thought of his responsibility in taking the decision he necessarily feels anguish. Thus anguish is not an impediment to action, it is a condition of action.

Anguish also accompanies the feeling of abandonment, as it accompanies the feeling of responsibility. Abandonment is a state of being forlorn consequent upon the thought that God does not exist, and therefore, one has not account for his action to anybody, the sole responsibility of the action lying entirely upon oneself .

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Another concept dealt with by Sartre in this context is that of Despair. " It merely means that we limit ourselves to a reliance upon that which is within our wills, or within the some of the probabilities which render our action feasible "44. That is to say, despair arises out of the thought of the limitations of our wills and probabilities. We can rely only upon our limited wills and limited probabilities, beyond that nothing can be relied upon. There is no God and no convenient design to adapt the world and all its possibilities to one's sweet will. This thought arouses despair, because one has to act without the hope of crossing the limits of one's will and probabilities. This concept of despair is different from quietism or the attitude " Let others do what I can not ", it is also different from pessimism, because the feeling of despair does not discourage man from action, but tells him that there is no hope except in his action. The feeling of absurdity arises out of the contemplation of our own ' facticity '. " The facticity of a human being is the particular set of contingent facts that are true of him and of him alone. For each one of us there is such a set of facts, concerned with our parents, our date of birth, the physical appearance which we happen to possess and so on. We tend to take these facts for granted, as a necessary part of each one of us ; but though it is true that every one must have

some parents, some sort of appearance, hair of some colour or other, there is no possible reason why one of these features in particular should be present rather than another, for any particular person. There is no possible point in our being as we are .⁴⁵ Nothing that is an integral part of a rational plan is absurd or de trop. So long as we believe that there are things to do and materials or tools to use for doing them, and we make plans and projects seriously, we do not suffer from the sense of the absurd. But as soon as I have the apprehension of the facticities of my life I apprehend myself as being for nothing, as being de trop.

Nausea

It is a feeling of disgust, detastation or lothesomeness at the apprehension of nasty look of things in an outside one's own body. It is a quality of our awarness of the body, without which we can not be aware of anything else. It is through the medium of our own awareness of our bodies that we have all our contacts with the world, whether in perception, emotion or action. Thus nausea is a kind of physiological counterpart of pre-reflective consciousness . A man carries it around with him

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inevitably as long as he is alive, but very often he is not conscious of it, because he is fully engaged in some other feeling or activity. But when he is not so engaged in any other feeling or activity, he becomes conscious of the nausea which was so long overlooked by him. Says Sartre, " This perpetual apprehension on the part of the For-itself of an insipid taste which accompanies me even in my efforts to get away from it, this we have described under the name of nausea. A dull and inescapable nausea perpetually reveals my body to my consciousness. Sometimes we look for the pleasant or for physical pain to free ourselves from this nausea, but as soon as the pain or the pleasure are experienced by consciousness they manifest its facticity and its contingency, and it is against the background of nausea that they are revealed "46

We experience nausea not only in the apprehension of our bodies, but also in the apprehension of certain key-aspects of the world. The very nature of existence itself is disgusting to us. If it is asked, what it is like to exist, the answer is : it is disgusting. In Sartre's novel ' La Nausee ', Roquentin, looking at the roots of a chest-nut tree in the park, suddenly saw it was existing as part of an un-differentiated mass of being,

and he reflected thus : " But all that was happening on the surface. If anyone had asked what existence was, I should have replied in all good faith that it was not anything, just an empty form which was added to external things, without in anyway changing their nature. But suddenly there it was as clear as day, existence was revealed. It lost its in offensive look of an abstract category ; it was the very stuff of things the roots, the park railings, the benches, the sperse, the grass on the lawn, had all disappeared, the diversity, the individuality of things was a mere illusion, a veneer had splintered, living moustrous flabby, disorganised masses - naked, terrifyingly and obscenly naked "47.

This being a real aspect of nature which can be revealed to us at any moment, the natural objects possessing this kind of features, as experienced by Roquentin in the tree stump, will obviously disgust us by the revelation of the true nature of reality.

Chapter - IV

Section - II

Elements of Intellect and emotion in Sartre's
philosophy and their relative Predominance

Lastly, we are to analyse Sartre's philosophy, and for this purpose we shall classify his philosophy under the following heads :

- a) Appearance and Being (Being -in-itself).
- b) Being as existence.
- c) Consciousness (Being - for - itself).
- d) Nothingness.
- e) Freedom.
- f) The Being-for-others.
- g) God.
- h) Nature and kinds of emotion.

a) Appearance and Being

Sartre thinks that beyond appearances there are no transcendental objects. Objects are nothing but the conglomeration of appearances. The appearance is not supported by any existent different from itself ; it has its own being. Sartre denies the existence of any kind of objects which can not be reached by consciousness.

In support of his view he cites the examples of

'force' and 'electric current' which do not refer to anything hidden behind them. They are nothing but the totality of their effects and actions respectively. ' They indicate only themselves and the total series'.⁴⁸ Further he speaks of two kinds of being ' being-in-itself' and 'being-for-itself', that is to say, he classifies being. Lastly, we see that he speaks of three characteristics of being. They are :being is, being is in itself, being is what it is.

Therefore, we see that to establish his view on being, he compares it with 'force' and 'electric current', classifies it on some principle and characterises it in the end. Now the question is : Are comparison, classification and characterisation possible without the exercise of intellect ? Certainly not. So, it is clear that although Sartre's view on being and appearance is grounded on experience, it is also supported by reason.

b) 'Existence Precedes essence'.

Like other Existentialists, Sartre also attaches utmost importance to existence and insists that 'existence precedes essence'. This cardinal doctrine of the Existentialists is itself established by opposing the platonic Idealistic

proposition : ' essence precedes existence'. When the Existentialists talk of existence they talk of human existence, Human existence is actual and not conceptual, To say that ' existence precedes essence', it to affirm that there is no prior definition of man. Now the question is whether Sartre has in fact been able to throw essentialism completely overboard. We see that instead of the concept of 'human nature' he offers the concept of 'human condition'. But the characteristics of the human condition are after all general characteristics. So we see that Sartre could not avoid generalising about man, altogether.

c) In his theory of consciousness, Sartre tried to reconcile between philosophical Idealism and Realism by making them interdependent. Without consciousness things are nothing but meaningless chaos, and without things, consciousness does not even exist. Thus, by reinforcing the link between the two he tried to resolve the difficulty.

Sartre does not define consciousness but he speaks of the characteristics of consciousness. As for one of its characteristics, he says that it is impersonal. To prove this he criticises Descartes' ' Cogito ergo sum' and Husserl's

pure consciousness and shows that human consciousness must always be directed upon some object of which it will be aware. ' All consciousness is consciousness of something' - says he.

Again, Sartre speaks of the ontological proof in support of his theory of consciousness.

He speaks of the negative character of consciousness. He says that consciousness is nothing by itself except the power to delimit the world. It is the power to set itself outside of being. That is, to deny one part and also to deny that it is identifying itself with that part through a withdrawal affected with respect to things. This power to delimit the world, to deny and to set itself outside of being is rational. Lastly, he speaks of the ' lack' which he thinks the essential characteristic of consciousness and to make the idea of 'lack' clear, he compares it with the broken disc of the moon, Sartre makes use of the concept of the possible to explain what he means by the 'lack'.

a) Sartre assimilates consciousness with nothingness and says, ' man is the being by whom nothingness comes to things'. Nothingness is made to be by us i.e. for-itself or consciousness.

He maintains that we have an intuitive knowledge of nothingness. In support of his view he described a situation, the situation of pierre's absence in a cafe where I had an appointment with him at a particular time, in which we can have actual experience of nothingness. Thus, from the observation of a particular situation he generalises that we have an intuitive knowledge of nothingness.

Besides, he explains the nature of question and the idea of destruction to show that nothingness is intrinsic in them.

Lastly, he uses a connected concept of 'badfaith' to prove the existence of the power to conceive non-existence. His argument is : if human being were not capable of conceiving what is not true there would be no such thing as badfaith. But there is such a thing as bad faith ; therefore, they are capable of conceiving what is not the case.

He thinks that the necessary condition for bad faith is the grasping of nothingness, which is identical with the freedom of consciousness.

e) We see that human being is both free and unfree,

and herein lies the paradox of free will. Sartre attempts to solve the problem and his attempt is different from his predecessors. Sartre understands freedom not in the ordinary sense. By freedom, he means only the autonomy of choice. He says that man is absolutely free. Our power to choose, to decide, to plan, to act is a direct proof of our freedom. According to him, every individual man is the master of himself. He is the sole authority to decide what he will to be, as also to determine the means to the end. It is upto him to choose what he will do and how. He is the best judge of his own good. The fundamental condition of act is freedom.' I am indeed an existent who learns his freedom through his acts.' It is the act which decides its end and its motives, and the act is the expression of freedom. Sartre says that freedom is not an accidental possession of man but a necessity of his being. Indeed freedom is one with being.

So we see that in his attempt to solve the problem of free-will he analyses the characteristics of human act or action and shows that action implies freedom. For the existentialist freedom is not to be proved, but is rather a postulate of action. But that freedom is a postulate of action is established by Sartre by analysing our power to decide,

to choose, to plan, to judge, to act and says that man is absolutely free.

One interesting contribution made by Sartre in connection with his discussion of freedom is his notion of 'bad faith'. Sartre shows that bad faith is linked with our freedom of imagination as the power to conceive what was not the case ; and it is also linked with our power to choose and decide. The play of the waiter is pretence, for he could choose not to play the part of a waiter, he could value things differently. To value things as he does and to accept the consequences of the evaluation is his own decision.

The course of the discussion of bad faith is not only of interest in itself but is also a useful and central example of Sartre's philosophical method. In this description of interaction between man and the world, between being for-themselves and being-in-themselves, he argues both from certain very general features of the world which he assumes to exist to the particular nature of individual situations in the world ; and also, starting from a description of a particular scene, he argues that this could not be a true

description, which we recognize that it is, unless in general the world were as he wishes to say it is. In this pattern of argument he starts from observations. He observes how people in fact behave, and argues that they could not behave in this way unless the whole structure of the world were thus and so.

Taking first, then, the argument from the general to the particular, Sartre proceeds as follows : there are certain features (consciousness) of Beings-for-themselves from which it is possible to derive the concrete fact of bad faith. Bad faith would not be possible except to a creature who was capable both of self-consciousness and of negation; it consists in seeing what one is, and denying it ; asserting that one is what one is not.

If we turn our eyes to the second type of arguments which move from the particular to the general, we shall find that Sartre here observes particular behaviours of man, for example, a waiter in a Café, or a girl who is taken to a restaurant by a man, and herefrom he deduces that such behaviour would be impossible without the human ability to conceive of that which is not, and to transcend any particular situation. This transcendence is the essential characteristics of consciousness.

According to Sartre, consciousness is compounded of distance or nothingness, which sets conscious nature apart from non-conscious nature and to prove this he has established the existence of bad faith by means of acceptable and recognizable descriptions of kinds of human behaviour which are familiar to us. And in the attempt for establishing bad faith, we see that Sartre's arguments are both of deductive and inductive nature.

f) Lastly, in his attempt to prove the existence of others (being-for-others), we see the same philosophical method which we have previously discussed in connection with his notion of 'bad faith'. His definition of being-for-others^{4.1} shows that first, I am aware of my own bodily existence as something which is known to other people. Secondly, I am aware of the bodies of other people and thence their existence in the world. Here in lies the method.

Sartre proceeds by providing the telling example. He gives us the example of 'a peeping Tom, a voyeur, from which he concludes that other people exist in a full blooded way like us.

Though Sartre says that without inference of any kind we know that other people exist, yet the method which he adopts is nothing but generalisation from particular concrete facts. In his discussion or proof he says, 'A proof is a description so clear and vivid that when I think of this description and fit it my own case, I can not fail to see its application.....The particular description of my case must come first and may then be used as a description of another particular case, and then of another, and so on.....He believes that only after its descriptions have been recognized as true for me can they be used in the construction of a description of the world as a whole !'⁴⁹

This discussion of 'proof' by Sartre himself shows his insistence on the particularity and concreteness of descriptions, from which ontological and metaphysical and general statements may be drawn. So we see that in his attempt to prove the existence of other people (being-for-others), he adopts a rational or logical i.e. inductive method which is found also in his novels and plays.

After analysing Sartre's different philosophical views, we can firmly affirm that his entire philosophy is

the outcome of his rational thinking. In the course of our previous discussion we have seen that Sartre's philosophical method is both deductive and inductive in nature. In the course of his philosophical thinking, nowhere we see him to be emotional or to resort on faith or to draw conclusion from intuitive knowledge of any kind. He criticises, analyses, classifies, compares, argues differently and offers proofs in support of his theories and then draws his conclusions about this world and human being.

g) Sartre is an atheist. His idea of God is the logical outcome of his conclusion on human freedom. According to him, man is absolutely free. And if human being is to be free, then the idea of God as ordinarily conceived, can not be accepted. He tries to prove the non-existence of God with the help of the following hypothetical argument (" MODUS PONENS") :

If human being is to be free,
then God can not exist.

It is the fact that human being is free.

. . . God can not exist.

Sartre gives priority to existence over essence as the other existentialist philosophers did. As conscious being man determines his own essence only by his choices of what he would like to become. His essence is not pre-determined. So he can not turn to God as his creator or foundation for truth and virtue.

Besides, he analyses the nature of consciousness and shows that the notion of God as a self-identical consciousness is contradictory.

So we see that by criticising the traditional proofs of God, and analysing the nature of consciousness, Sartre shows that the idea of God as a 'Causa Sui' and Creator of the universe and man is contradictory. As an Existentialist, he argues for human freedom which excludes the idea of God as an outdated contradictory hypothesis. Thus it may be concluded that although according to Sartre experience is, in all cases the basis of his philosophy of existence, experience alone does not constitute his philosophy. When reason is applied to experience, there arises knowledge, and no philosophical is an exception to it. While Hegel based his philosophy upon abstract reason, the existentialists based

their philosophy upon concrete reason. Reason becomes concrete when it is applied to the concrete experiences of our life. In this connection we may refer to the very beginning of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, where he says that all our knowledge begins with experience alone does not constitute knowledge. When reason applies the a-priori concepts of categories on the manifold of sense intuitions, then and then only does knowledge arise, so it is with Sartre. He based his philosophy on concrete experiences of life, but in doing that he exercised his reason. So it may be said that in Sartre's existentialism experience comes first and reason next, but reason is there nevertheless. One may not understand by 'reason' here any discursive reason, but a kind of rational thinking without which life itself becomes impossible. In this wider sense of the term we may say along with Sartre that there is 'reason of life' and 'reason of existence'.

C H A P T E R- V

Section- I

CONCLUSION

A Comparative account of the place of intellect and emotion in the Philosophies of Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre.

So far we have discussed the elements of intellect and emotion in Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre's philosophy and we have seen that intellect plays a dominant role in drawing out their philosophical conclusions. Now we wish to undertake a comparative analysis of the place of intellect and emotion in their philosophy.

We have seen that existentialism is a revolt against the extravagances of extreme Rationalism. It is the revolt of life against thought, of passion and feeling against reflective contemplation. The existentialist philosophers are all anti-intellectualists, and for this reason they attach more importance to feeling or intuition and action than to abstract speculative thought. But on analysis, we shall see that the aforesaid philosophers could not carry out this

anti-intellectualistic trend all along their philosophical discussions, and the elements of intellect and emotion vary in their philosophy.

It will be convenient to begin with the method they applied in their philosophy. In the course of the discussion of Sartre's philosophy we have seen that he has adopted both the deductive and inductive method. His idea of ' bad faith ' . in connection with his discussion on human freedom, shows his philosophical method. He argues both from particular experiences to general one, and from general to particular. This method lies in his attempt to prove the existence of other minds. His atheism is the logical outcome of his idea of human freedom. God must not exist if human being is to be absolutely free. He argues, criticises, offers proof, compares, analyses, classifies in support of his conclusions regarding appearance and being, consciousness, nothingness, human existence, freedom, God etc. Nowhere we see him to make his stand on intuition or faith like Kierkegaard and Heidegger ; everywhere, on the contrary, he is logical and rational. If we turn our eyes to the philosophy of Heidegger and Kierkegaard, we shall see that here also Heidegger and Kierkegaard adopt inductive method. Like Sartre,

they also observe particular facts and come to the general conclusion about human being. Heidegger speaks of intuitive method in philosophy, but in his discovering the inner meaning of Being he adopts analytical method. In fact, Heidegger's method is intellectual intuitive method. He has systematically rationalised his intuitive knowledge of Being. In his book, 'What is philosophy' ? , he opines that the task of philosophy is the analysis of Being and to formulate new and new concepts which will explain the concrete world. So we see that by his intellectual intuitive method he analyses the hidden meaning of Being, and his realization of human finitude and imperfectness, his idea of care, dread, anguish, nothingness etc. clearly show that he has adopted inductive method (These are all meant for man in general).

So far it is clear that Heidegger is rational and logical enough in his analysis of Being and the related notions or ideas like care, dread, anguish etc. He is an atheist. But his idea of 'Holy', the highest ideal of perfection which is the final end of human being, forces us to conclude that he has some faith in God, and this faith originates from his realization of imperfectness of human being.

Kierkegaard also has his stand mainly on intuition or experience, reason is not altogether discarded. We have seen that like Heidegger and Sartre, he also has adopted inductive method. When he says, 'subjectivity is truth', it is meant for man in general. He generalizes his own three stages of life upon human life, His faith in God, his realization of truth in the being of God, absolute happiness- all these elements of emotion are there. But reason is also present in his philosophical thought, as he critically considers the views of others.

So we see that in respect of philosophical method, Sartre adopts both deductive and inductive procedure, whereas Kierkegaard and Heidegger accept only inductive method in drawing their philosophical conclusions. Heidegger, in addition applies the analytical method in his task of analysing the hidden meaning of Being, though he speaks of intuition as a must.

As regards the unverifiable metaphysical objects, Sartre refuses to imagine behind consciousness any supporting mind, or behind things a separate existence. According to him, consciousness is the only reality that man experiences. He analyses

the characteristics of consciousness and draws logical conclusions therefrom, Sartre proves that our action necessarily implies freedom, and our freedom excludes the possibility of God's existence outright. His atheism is the logical outcome of his idea of human freedom. We see that Sartre has no faith in God. The idea of God is an outdated hypothesis to him.

On the contrary, Kierkegaard has a firm faith in God. According to him, one proves God's existence by worship, not by proofs, God exists only for subjectivity in inwardness. God, being a spiritual principle can not be realized except through faith and respect in God, worship and love of God, and fear and suffering for God. So, Kierkegaard's theism is based not on reason or intellect but on faith, fear, love etc, and these are nothing but personal feelings and emotions. In Heidegger also we find this element of faith which can be traced out in his idea of the 'Holy', the highest ideal of perfection, the final end which human being aims at through self-development. While Kierkegaard in his philosophizing was more passionate than rational, Heidegger and Sartre were more rational than passionate or emotional- they gave a rational analysis and interpretation of emotion in human life. So, in the end, it is clear that

of these three eminent philosophers, Sartre is thoroughly rational and logical in his philosophical conclusions, and in his philosophy, intuition is found to have been illuminated by reason. All of them give arguments in support of their views and try to refute the theories held by others, and are thus not quite faithful to their creed of irrationalism.

In this connection it should be mentioned that so far as the methodology of existentialism is concerned, Heidegger and Sartre followed the Phenomenological method of Husserl, but Kierkegaard did not. However, according to some scholars Kierkegaard's philosophical method may be taken as implicitly phenomenological to some extent, although as a predecessor of Husserl, the question of his being influenced by Husserl does not arise at all. The Phenomenological method of Husserl has many aspects of which descriptive analysis of consciousness is one- it consists in the description of the noetic and the noematic, i.e. the act of experiencing and the object experienced. Consciousness, by its intentional activity, always intends some object, i.e. directs itself towards some object in general, which is regarded as essence or meaning, that which is meant by consciousness.

" Though Phenomenological descriptions are found in the writings of the Existentialist philosophers, they have not taken over Husserl's phenomenology in the form in which he taught it. They have developed phenomenology to suit their own purposes and it is heard that Husserl was critical of the use to which Heidegger was putting his ideas. But we have already seen that Keirkegaard and Nietzsche had not heard of Husserl but as Ricoeur has shown, many of their descriptions are essentially phenomenological" ¹ . Although the existentialists, mainly Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau- Ponty have applied the phenomenological method in their philosophies, their approach is different from that of Husserl. This has been most appropriately pointed out by a renowned scholar of existentialism , Dr.M.K.Bhadra in the following words; " There is an important difference between Husserl and the Existentialist phenomenologists and it is that whereas Husserl lays stress on essence and thinks of phenomenology as an eidetic science. Existentialists like Sartre think that existence precedes essence, and according to many, man's existence generates his essence . In that case it makes no sense at all to suspend the question of existence. But they agree with Husserl in contending themselves with the description of the phenomenon as

it shows itself. Husserl insisted that consciousness is always intentional in the sense of being directed to an object beyond itself. But he wanted to absorb everything into consciousness. The Existentialists reject Idealism and they want to say that consciousness may not be confused with consciousness of objects. Such a confusion arises if we start from the thinking consciousness rather than from the total range of existence."²

S E C T I O N - II

Existentialism is a synthesis of both
emotionalism and intellectualism.

No philosophical study is possible without reason or intellect in other words every philosophical study is a rational or intellectual study. The existentialists philosophical study of human existence is also no exception to this. They have made a rational analysis of human existence. According to the existentialists, existence consists in self-consciousness and self-determination or freedom of the will. Again, self-consciousness and free will have also been rationally analysed and their natures have been explained by the existentialists. Their existential philosophy is established on the basis of intuition or experience and by means of reason or rational arguments. Just as in Indian philosophy we find a synthesis of both experience and reason, so existentialism may be understood as a synthesis of intuitional experience and reason. The truths visualized by the Vedic seers have been established by the followers of the six systems of Hindu Philosophy on rational grounds, otherwise Indian philosophy would have been merely dogmatic. So the existentialists have also supported by reasonings, the truths experienced or felt by them through intuition or

subjective experience. Thus both experience and reason have been synthesized in their philosophical thinking or investigation. Although in the writings of the existentialists we find frequent references to the emotional states and attitudes of human beings, the role of reason or intellect is not altogether neglected. Of course, the role of reason is not to be found in all the existentialists in equal degree, but it is to be found in all of them nevertheless. In the very inception of the existentialist movement in between the two World Wars, rational study of the various phenomena connected with human life had played an important role. Kierkegaard, for example, made a Critical observation of the facts of human life and came to the conclusion that so long human beings have been under the illusion of objectivity, from which they should be immediately made free for leading themselves to their proper goals. The Existentialists are, in general, anti-objectivists, and in this sense, they are called anti-rationalists. But it is to be remembered that when they disfavour rationalism or intellectualism, they only discard excessive rationalism or intellectualism, not the whole of it. Kierkegaard objected to the absolute or objective idealism of Hegel, because that is a kind of abstractionism in

so far as according to Hegel. Absolute Mind, Thought or Idea is the basic or ultimate reality. Again he makes a rational analysis of the nature of human existence which was directly felt by him in his very being, as others also feel by themselves. It is one thing to experience something one self, and it is another to convey one's own experience to others; this can be done only by means of reason or language. Even the emotional states and attitudes are also studied rationally and analytically, so as to make others convinced of their faculty. When on the basis of experience, it is argued that all human beings are subject to such experiences, then there is a kind of generalization in the way of induction. Not that an Existentialist dogmatically says that all human beings must have like experience, but he says so on the basis of experience and reason, and hence any person can testify to the truth of such a statement about human nature. That truth is subjective is true not of one man, but of all men in general, and this kind of philosophy can not be merely emotional. It is also not true that only this or that person is under illusion of objectivity, but most people are under such illusion, and Kierkegaard being conscious of the evil effects of such illusion on human life, wanted to make people free from its spell, and in doing this he was not quite irrational.

When different mental states, feelings or emotions or wills are defined or characterised by the existentialists, they are dealing with concepts and concepts are always intellectual, there can be no non-intellectual or emotional or volitional concepts. So existentialism can not be regarded as something non-intellectual. Human emotions have a prominent place in Existentialism, but for that reason, it can not be mistaken for a kind of pure emotionalism. The existentialists have given an account of the feelings and emotions natural to man as an existent being, but they have not advised man to become only emotional and not rational. Therefore, Existentialism is neither pure intellectualism nor pure emotionalism, although in it both intellect and emotion have their respective places.

Section - III

The influence of Existential Intellectualism and
Emotionalism on Literature, _____

In the previous section we have shown that Existentialism is a synthesis of Emotionalism and Intellectualism; now we are going to show that Existentialism, with its both elements has exerted great influence on world Literature, Art and Society. Existentialism is the philosophy of man, and every man is a combination of intellect and emotion ; and Literature, Art and Society - all are the creations of man; thus in all of these we can discover the role of human intellect and emotion. However, in Literature and Art the role of emotion is greater than that of intellect, while in society the role of intellect is greater than that of emotion.

EXISTENTIALISM AND LITERATURE

In the jungle of so many 'isms' Existentialism draws our serious attention both for its philosophical import and its immense ~~immense~~ literary value. No other philosophical system has ever given us such an acute analysis of the pain-stricken human heart, which is expressed in their philosophy and literature.

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' In fact, it is the literary aspect of Existentialism that makes it all the more popular'.²

There is no denying the fact that the sources of great literature can be traced in man himself and his life from time immemorial. According to Aristotle, " No great genius was ever without some mixture of madness, nor can anything grand or superior to the voice of common mortals be spoken except by the agitated soul ".³ This agitation we find in this age of anxiety which has produced a literature and a philosophy. For example, we can cite the name of Existentialism which flourished in the continent in between 1940 and 1950, and this philosophical movement has exerted much influence in literature. In some cases this influence is direct and in others it is rather a spontaneous growth in a common soil.

From time immemorial, the philosophers have used literature as the media of their philosophical views. Albert Camus, Dostolevsky and Sartre are known to us as a novelist and dramatist more than as a philosopher. Nietzsche, the poet-philosopher Kierkegaard and plato were eminent philosophers of their age, but their philosophical views supplied materials of literature. Likewise, the name of Rabindranath Tagore, the poet-philosopher of the East, may be cited. His philosophical views

are occasionally expressed in his writings, particularly in his poems and songs. Among the Existentialist philosophers, the name of Sartre tops the list as a successful one who has efficiently presented his philosophical views through his stories, novels and dramas. In the history of philosophy as a whole, no other philosopher has even been able to draw the attention of such a large number of readers.

The Existentialist reaction to our life and times has been extensive especially in literature. The basic existentialist categories are contingency, (tragic) necessity, (unlimited) freedom, ~~an~~ loneliness, anguish and absurdity. We are to see how and to what extent these categories are used in literature. Existential literature in the nineteenth century starts from Dostolevsky (Notes from the underground, 1864). The most prominent existentialist writers are Jean-Paul Sartre of France, Albert Camus of Algeria, Franz Kafka of Germany. Besides these, we can mention the names of Samuel Beckett of Dublin, Pinter and Hemingway of England and Norman Mailer of U. S. A.

Some of their writings will be considered here with a view to understand the impact of Existentialism on literature. We should note that the existentialist philosophers are writers first. Their philosophical views are expressed through their

writings. Novels, dramas, notebooks, diary etc., written by them, are the mirrors which reflect their philosophical views.

To begin with, we shall start from France, as the existentialist novel properly speaking belongs to France. According to Margaret Chatterjee, " Existentialist theory and practice in literature provide much of the provinder for French literary ~~and~~ polemics. The problem of the relation between form and freedom, fact and fantasy, bedevils dramatist and novelist. "4

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SARTRE

Now we shall consider some of the writings of Sartre with a view to find out the influence of Existentialism in literature. Though Kierkegaard, Husserl, Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel etc. are called the pioneer of Existentialism, this philosophy owes much to Sartre for its wide popularity. Rather we should say that Existentialism finds its expression in the hand of Sartre through his short stories, dramas, novels, lectures and various psychological and philosophical essays. Indeed, in the contemporary world Sartre is a matchless creative genius. Like many other philosophers, in the case of Sartre there is also the large body of literary writings which we can not divorce from his philosophical work. He lived in France when that country was under German occupation during the second world-war. The stringent conditions under which the Frenchmen were compelled to live during the foreign occupation exercised great influence over Sartre and moulded his philosophy of life in many respects.

In Sartre's philosophy, Man is nothing but futile emotion. The entire world is sick of 'nausea'. His philosophy is an expression of the disillusionment of our time - a

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recognition of the absurdity of human life. This understanding finds its expression in his dramas, novels, stories and other writings. Of course, in his 'Critique of Dialectical Reason', Sartre modified some of his philosophical views. In his last long interview with B. Levi (P. Victor) in 1980, he said " The world seems nasty, bad and hopeless. That, that is the quiet despair of an old man. But justly I resist and I know that I will die in hope " ⁵ . This interview shows how Sartre's outlook on life and the world - some of his philosophical views, evolve with the age and gradually tend towards modification.

Out of his vast body of literary writings, we shall consider a short story ' The wall ', his first novel 'Nausea' and the play, ' Men without Shadows' to serve our purpose.

' The Wall ' ;

The back ground of the story is the civil-war of Spain in which most of the intellectual middle class group of Europe took part. ' The wall ' represents the 'fascists' terrorism and the resistance of the 'International Brigade' which was formed by a great number of artists, literateurs,

critics and intellectualists of Europe. The story creates a peculiar type of reaction, an extraordinary feeling in the mind of the readers.

Besides this political background, the story throws some light on Sartre's philosophical view which is the most important. Sartre criticises Berkeley's 'Esse est percipi' and concludes that 'esse' is not 'percipi' and the objective world can not be denied in any way. There is the objective world commonly inhabited by all men - the world apart from which the very existence of man is inconceivable. This is because the Existentialists speak so much of the phrase 'man-in-the world'. Every individual has a definite role to play in the scheme of the universe. He actively participates in the universal world order; so that he can not afford to lose his identity as a separate individual subject.

Death occupies an important place in existential philosophy. We can be best aware of our existence as separate individuals, when our life is at stake. We also become conscious of the true nature of our existence and our authentic possibilities through the experience of the approach of death. Death always stares us in the face and casts its shadow over us.

This awareness of one's own existence before death and the phrase 'man-in-the world' is vividly depicted by Sartre in this story. In 'the wall', Sartre narrates the episode of three revolutionists, sentenced to death imprisoned in the same cell. The three prisoners, Steinbock (Tom) Pablo Ibbieta and Juan Mirbal are sure of their death - they are in peril. Each of them fixes on the horrors of death. Life on earth ceases to carry any meaning for them. Sartre gives us a vivid picture of the psychical condition of each of the prisoners in the cell. Such an accurate verbal formulation of human thoughts and feelings is rare indeed.

Little Juan can not think of anything more than the suffering involved in death. Premature death has snatched away from him all opportunity to develop himself. His only desire now is his death with least possible pains. He asks the Belgian doctor, "Does it hurt very long?"⁶ And just before the execution he cries out bitterly: "I do not want to die. I do not want to die"⁷. He feels his true existence before death and opts for life. Pablo, who is sufficiently grown up with some attainments in life is equally conscious of the tragic end.

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He thinks of his beloved Concha. He thinks of what he has already done as also of things yet to be done. He feels the cold touch of death in everything around him. For him, everything looks cold and dead. He says, " My life was in front of me shut, closed, like a bag, yet everything inside it was unfinished ⁸ ". Since each of them shall suffer the same fate, he thinks it simply meaningless to pity on himself or on his fellow-prisoners. He is forlorn in the world of his own thoughts. And it is on the eve of execution that his feeling of loneliness grows most intense. He is mentally upset. But he thinks, he should die like a man. Tom goes on talking to Pablo. He says, " I see my corpse, that's not hard but I am the one who sees it, with my eyes. I have got to think think that I ~~want~~ won't see anything anymore and the world will go on for the others ⁹ ". He also thinks of the pains of death. He declares himself to be a materialist who does not believe in the life hereafter. But he soon realizes that it is futile to think of all this at the moment. He is unable to make out anything of what is going to happen. He refuses to believe that death is so near. He says, " I wonder I wonder if it's really true that everything ends ¹⁰ ". Thus we see that the three prisoners live together in the same cell and each of them is at the same time confined within his own world of thoughts peculiar to himself.

Like Tom, Pablo and Juan, we are imprisoned in the common cell of the universe as also within ourselves. All of us as separate existents feel alone. We can be best aware of our existence as separate individuals, when we are in peril. Being face to face with the same situation we can react differently like the three prisoners. This difference in outlook on life and the world constitute our individuality. But the world is the common platform without which our existence becomes meaningless.

Nausea

The philosophical novel *Melancholia*, which Sartre's publishers changed to *Nausea* was published in France in 1938 and it was his first novel. Sartre presented this novel in a diary form. This novel shows how aptly he has applied philosophy in literature. It is a novel of the alienation of personality and the mystery of being. It presents us with the first full-length essay in the existentialist philosophy for which Sartre has since become famous.

This novel is basically a diary of Antoine Roquentin who lived in the Norman Port of Bouville. His only desire was

to write the biography of Mousieur de Rollebon, a nineteenth century aristocratic personality. All the necessary papers were concerning Rollebon, preserved in Bouville library. He stayed at the Cafe' Mably, went to the library regularly and carried on his research work on Rollebon.

Basically, Nausea is a clear statement of Sartre's philosophical experience and this experience is revealed to us through the experience of Roquentin which he gathered while travelling in Central Europe, North Africa and the Far East. In fact, it is Sartre who describes his experience in the guise of Roquentin. The diary begins just with the moment when nausea reacts on Roquentin.

In Latin, 'nausea' means 'seasickness'. While travelling on sea, a kind of mild sickness (vomiting tendency) grows due to constant movement of the ship. This sickness is called 'nausea' which reacts on the traveller painfully. With the motion and movement of the ship this nausea continues.

Like this sea-sickness, the different materials of this world create nausea, ~~uncertainty and~~ restlessness, anguish, dread and uncertainty in us.

Nausea is our most primitive and original feeling about the world, for we can not experience anything without experiencing this. The three feelings which we must all of us experience when we reflect upon the world are nausea, a sense of the absurd, or of our own superfluity, and anguish. Sartre intends us to understand that we actually and necessarily feel this nausea in our apprehension of the world. The reason for this is in the nature of the world itself. Nausea arises because the world is as it is.

Roquentin's Nausea was his own particular disease. His diary is a description of the condition of nausea which he had come to be familiar with. The insight to which Roquentin gives voice is put in a philosophical manner in *Being and Nothingness*, years later the diary was written.

Sartre's concept of Being-in-itself and nothingness is rooted in an experience which he described in his novel 'Nausea'. This is the world-shattering vision of a Chestnut tree. Sitting in the Municipal Park, Roquentin, the hero, finds that Being in general is *de trop*, contingent, unjustifiable, absurd. Sitting in the park he stares at the root of a chestnut tree.

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It is what it is. There is no rhyme or reason about it. Roquentin says : " That root existed in so far that I could not explain it. Knotty, inert, nameless, it fascinated me, filled my eyes, repeatedly brought me back to its own existence. It was no use my repeating : " It is a root " The function explained nothing. That root with its colour, its shape, its frozen movement, was beneath all explanation. Each of its qualities flowed out of it, half solidified, almost became a thing ; each one was superfluous in the root ¹¹.

In the midst of spell he also felt that existence is not necessity. To exist is simply to be there, what exists appears, lets itself be encountered, but we can never deduce it. Existence everywhere, to infinity, superfluous. Every existent is born without reason, prolongs itself out of weakness and dies by chance. All of a sudden they existed and then, all of a sudden, they no longer existed ; existence has no memory, it retains nothing of what has disappeared; not even a recollection.

Sartre thinks that 'nothingness' is inconceivable without existence. To him, this huge absurd world is

undeniable, The world was present everywhere, in front, behind. There had been no moment at which it might not have existed. About the relation between nothingness and existence. Roquentin writes; ' in order to imagine nothingness, you had to be there already, right in the world, with your eyes wide open and alive ; this nothingness had not come before existence. It was an existence like any other and one which had appeared after a great many others'¹² .

This idea of nothingness and its relation to being is fully discussed in ' Being and Nothingness' where he says, 'man is a being by which nothingness comes to things.'¹³ Roquentin understands the real secret of existence. Being seized with nausea, he feels

that life is meaningless, existence has no inner significance. There is no past, no future. Only the present exists because we are only conscious of the present moment. Understanding the absurdity of the past, and realizing the implication of the present existence, he stopped writing the biography of Rollebon who lived in the 18th Century. Roquentin says, ' I have made up my mind : I no longer have any reason for staying at Bouville since I have stopped writing my book'.¹⁴

Roquentin and Anny now understand the real secret of existence. To them, existence has no inner significance. They feel repulsion on life and a sense of alienation grows in them. They feel that in this adverse world man is nothing but a dumb spectator. Man is alienated though he is in- the-world. Roquentin now understood his nausea ; nausea is what human beings can not help feeling

in the face of a world which is irrational, superfluous, and thus absurd.

He has already stopped writing the biography of Rolleston and now he decides to create something, a work of art, since art transcends the contingency of existence. He thinks that in artistic creation he will perhaps find a reason for living, and a way to redeem his life.

' MEN WITHOUT SHADOWS '

Sartre's play ' Men without shadows ' (Morts sans sépulture) deals with a group of Resistance fighters who are captured and tortured by the officials of Pe'tain's Vichy regime in collaboration with the Germans. The officials torture them (off-stage) with a view to learning the names and

lairs of more important rebels. Lucie, one of the captives is a young woman. She is raped by her torturers. But she looks upon them in such a way in the Sartrean style that they feel degraded for what they have done with her. She rejoins the prisoners and shifts most of the time in somber silence. Each of the accused thinks within himself as to whether he will be strong enough to resist the torture when his turn comes. They are afraid that the fifteen year old Francois, the youngest of them, will divulge the secret, being unable to bear the torments. So they agreed to strangle him to death. Although he is Lucie's brother, she assends to his death. And Francois is actually killed. Thereafter Lucie shrinks from the touch of her fellow-prisoners. At last, one of them, unable to bear the torture talks in return for the promise that all will be spared. But they are all taken out and shot dead.

In this play, Lucie's assent to the strangling of her brother Francois, for the fear that being unable to bear the torture he may disclose the name of their leader to the officials, is an instance of pre-dominance of reason over emotion, or it may be regarded as an instance of the predominance of patriotic emotion over the personal.

NO EXIT (HUIS- CLOS)

In this play Sartre has dramatized the ideas expressed by him earlier in his 'Being and Nothingness', that other people are one's potential enemies and the look of them is one of the tortures of life. This play was produced at Paris in May, 1944. The story of the play runs thus ; Three people, each of whom has been guilty of 'bad-faith', refusing the choice of an authentic existence, find themselves shut up, after death, in a drawing room in hell. In course of their discussions they are trapped in an eternal vicious circle. The coward man loves the Lesbian, the Lesbian loves the infanticide girl and the girl loves the coward. One of them says, " Hell is other people", Thus one fails to define oneself by referring to other people. This is the crystalization of Sartre's view of 'bad-faith'.

THE ROADS TO FREEDOM

Sartre's three important novels namely, the "Age of Reason" (L' Age de raison), ' The Reprieve' (Le Sursis) and 'Iron in the soul' (La Mort dans l'ame) are collectively entitled " The Roads to Freedom' (Les chemins de liberte'). In these three volumes there is to be found the depiction of the diverse and usually foolish ways in which the men and women of France had sought their intellectual, moral, or political freedom since 1938. The scene of ' The Age of Reason' is Paris, 1938, and the story revolves around Mathieu Delarue, aged 34, a professor of Philosophy. One feels tempted to identify him with the ~~xxxxx~~ author, but Sartre protests against such identification. Mathieu is a bourgeois liberal. He rejects bourgeois moral norms and marital bond, sympathises with radical interests, but does not commit himself to any of them. He values intellectual freedom about party discipline. He is an atheist, a cynic, sceptical of every doctrine, of both revolution and reform. He avoids marriage as contrary to freedom and reason, but takes Marcelle Duffet as a mistress, and let her Ivich as his lady love. Through the novel, man is represented as a futile passion and life is depicted as absolutely meaningless.

The Second volume, namely, ' The Reprieve ' is full of humour, but also deep with tragedy. It begins on September, 29, 1938, with the opening of negotiations between Hitler of Germany, Mussolini of Italy, Daladier of France and Chamberlain of England ; and it ends with the signing of the Munich Pact (Sept 29-30), which gave the western powers a year's reprieve from war. The early pages seek to convey the somber tension of Europe in those testing days. The novel shows Brunet hoping that the socialists of Europe, putting class above nation, will take a united stand against war. Day after day the excitement and the terror rise. Then suddenly the news blares out ; the pact has been signed, " Peace in our time " fills a hundred million hearts with joy, a million heads with doubts. Mathew again teaches philosophy. Everything in France is as before, as safe and dull and meaningless.

In volume three of the trilogy, there is depiction of the French army in chaotic flight before the triumphant Germans, and Paris awaiting spoliation by rough teutons eager for French wines and slender women. While retreating some French Officers

ride off by deserting their troops, the privates curse them and loot the villages for liquor. As a private Mathieu is disgusted with their drunken vomiting, but finally he joins their carouse, hoping that they will gradually like him, but they do so unwillingly because of his education and polite vocabulary. Some of them admire the victorious Germans. In the final scene, when the fugitives resist the attack of the Germans, Mathieu learns to shoot and kill with a maiden rapture. Thus he frees himself from himself by commitment to his group.

ALBERT CAMUS

Albert Camus has been popular mainly as a novelist and a dramatist, but he is also no less an essayist. Allthrough his writings there is found an existentialist theme and he has developed a socio-political philosophy of his own from the existentialist point of view. His important novels are: 'The Outsider', 'The Plague', 'The Fall', 'Exile' and 'The Kingdom'; the important plays are: 'Caligula', 'Cross Purpose', 'State of sieze' and 'The Just'; and the important essays are 'The Myth of Sisyphus' and 'The Rebel'.

In 1938, Camus wrote and successfully produced the play 'Caligula'. It presents the conflict between a Government and the principle of morality. The main character of the play, emperor Caligula, discovers, in the demise of his sister and mistress Drusilla, that death loves at status, that nature has nothing to do with morality or manners, that everything is meaningless. As a reaction, he gives up all moral restraints and commits inhuman cruelties. He argues that the date of a man's death is insignificant because everyone must die sooner or later, and moreover, the "only way of being equal with the gods.....is to be as cruel as they are." But at the end he admits with reluctance that "murder is no solution".

'The Outsider' (1942) is a parable which illustrates the philosophy of the absurd. It is not simply a narrative fiction. Meursault, the main character of the novel, is an unimportant office-clerk in Algiers. He lives a mediocre life. He attends his mother's funeral but sheds no tears, sleeps with Marie, a typist, but tells her that he does not love her,

and agrees to help an acquaintance in defending himself against an injured and vengeful Arab. He meets the Arab and kills him and is tried and condemned to death. It is a simple tale no doubt, but enclosed within it there is the totality of the world's absurdity.

To Meursault, even the fundamental values of our society are meaningless. Nothing remains for the absurd man. He only experiences a sense of revolt and irresponsibility. At this moment he even does not feel the necessity of justifying any incident. To him, everything is lawful, everything is possible, Camus' view of life is nothing but the seventeenth century classical pessimism which expresses itself in repulsion to life in indifference in nothingness, in meaninglessness of everything- the absurdity of human condition.

Meursault's indifference to worldly affairs, his sense of meaninglessness to the fundamental values of society is so deep that he even does not react at the news of his mother's death. The story begins thus ; " Mother died to day.

Or may be yesterday, I don't know. I had a telegram from the home ; ' Mother passed away. Funeral tomorrow. Yours sincerely ;
That does not mean anything. It may have been yesterday" ¹⁵

To Meursault, mother's death news does not mean anything. It is a fact among so many facts. The above quoted words of Meursault shows his indifference which is the outcome of his feeling of the absurd. ' In our society, any man who does not cry at his mother's funeral is liable to be condemned to death' ¹⁶, says Camus. But Meursault does not play the game. His lack of reactions is a scandal in the eyes of the conventional. At the end of his mother's funeral, he rather goes to bed and sleeps at a stretch for twelve hours. He enjoys his life as before. For this, he is condemned. So he is an outsider to the society in which he lives. Again, to him, the words ' to love' are

meaningless and he finds no sense of seriousness in the word 'marriage'.

Death occupies a prominent place in the feeling of absurdity. The inevitability of death arouses indifference. Camus clearly depicts this indifference through Meursault, the absurd man, who is sure of his death. Meursault is accused of murder and is condemned to death. But it does not matter to him. Being asked by chaplain, who came to see him in his cell, how he was going to face up to that terrifying ordeal, his reply was : 'I'd face upto it exactly as I was facing up to it now ' . He has no belief in God.

In, a Godless world, being face to face with death, everything is meaningless and without any purpose to him. Now ' what did other people's deaths or a mother's love matter to me, what did his God or the lives people choose or the destinies they selected matter to me, when one and the same destiny was to select me¹⁷ pours Meursault from the bottom of his heart. He continues, ' What did it matter if he was accused of murder and then executed for not crying at his mother's funeral ? What did it matter that Marie now had a new Meursault to Kiss ? ¹⁸ .

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To him, life is the only value. At that point, on the verge of death, he opts for life again. He says, ' For the first time in a very long time I thought of mother. I felt that I understood why at the end of her life she'd taken a "fiance" and why she'd pretended to start again..... so close to death, mother must have felt liberated and ready to live her life again And I too felt ready to live my life again '19

So we see that ' Meursault is the prototype of the hero of the absurd. Meursault personifies twentieth century anomie He is unable to react at his mother's funeral. His killing of an Arab on the beach is quite pointless. His only passion is his truthfulness about his lack of feeling He refuses to lie about his feelings.... Meursault is a stranger to his society and to himself Meursault is a stranger in the world because the world is absurd Even nature is no consolation..... He is at the same time a stranger among men because he accepts to live the absurd He is neither good nor bad '20

The Myth of Sisyphus

The Myth of Sisyphus (1942) is a brilliant explanation of the central notion of absurdity, one of the chief existential concepts, which was developed artistically in 'The Outsider'. It probably reflects Heidegger's 'Being and Time' (1927) and Sartre's 'Nausea' (1938). He reviews the latter critically in the 'Alger Republican' (Oct. 1938). According to him, "The realization that life is absurd can not be an end but only a beginning. Life can be "magnificent and overwhelming".

The 'Myth of Sisyphus' is a story of futile labour. Sisyphus is the absurd hero. The gods had condemned Sisyphus' to ceaselessly rolling a rock to the top of a mountain whence the stone would fall back of its own weight. His scorn of the Gods, his hatred of death, and his passion for life won him that unspeakable penalty in which the whole being is exerted towards accomplishing nothing. 'This is the price that must be paid for the passions of this earth'²¹ - says Camus.

Sisyphus is conscious of his penalty which involved fruitless labour & endless repetition of the same task. The

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'Myth' seems to be tragic, and if it is tragic, it is because the hero is conscious of his futile labour. But Sisyphus is not a pathetic figure. He has dignity. He is superior to his fate. He is stronger than his rock. His dignity lies in his ability to face reality. So we see that The Myth of Sisyphus is fully significant. Sisyphus stands for the absurd man, of the modern age of anxiety, and the task imposed on him by the gods indicates the mechanical nature of our day to day life. The difference lies in the fact that in our case, the task is undertaken mechanically, whereas sisyphus is conscious of his futile labour.

Like Sisyphus, we are also engaged in futile labour in most part, unconsciously. But one day the mechanical nature of our life brings the sense of absurdity. To quote from Camus ' Absurd Walls, ' It happens that the stage-sets collapse. Rising, tram, four hours in the office or factory, meal, tram, four hours of work, meal, sleep and Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday, according to the same rythm - this path is easily followed most of the time. But one day the 'why' arises and everything begins in that weariness tinged with amazement. 'Begins' - this is

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important. Weariness comes at the end of the acts of a mechanical life, but at the same time it inaugurates the impulse of consciousness. It awakens consciousness and provokes what follows at the end of the awakening comes, in time, the consequence : suicide or recovery !²²

It is this rare moment of consciousness, which brings the sense of tragedy. Sisyphus is conscious from the very beginning, whereas our mechanical nature of life, the sense that time is passing - we are drawing near to death, and we are striving for nothing makes us conscious of the meaninglessness of life at the end of our act when weariness comes. The absurd man then contemplates on the consequence : suicide or recovery.

At this point Camus raises the serious philosophical problem : Does the absurd dictate death ? Camus' answer, in short, is this. There is no relationship between the absurd and suicide. Besides, contradiction lies in the idea of relationship between the two. To him, suicide or hope is to accept the absurd. He rather suggests revolt-true revolt against the absurd, and it is in continuing to live - to act.

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Being confronted with the maningless life - the absurd, some of us commit suicide or have resort to hope, and others, like Sisyphus, revolt against the absurd. (Of course. Camus speaks of personal revolt here). The life of contemporary man in an absurd world is not without its dignity. Like Sisyphus, ' the dignity of man lies in his ability to face reality in all its senselessness, to accept it freely, without fear, without illusions - and to laugh at it ' 23

In dealing with the Existentialist influences in literature, we must not point to just vague and possibly accidental resemblances between the understanding of man found in the literateurs and that found in the Existentialists, but we must point to something more definite, restricting ourselves to those literary products where prominence is given to the ' recurring themes ' of Existentialism, such as freedom, decision and responsibility ; even more, finitude, alienation, guilt and death, and not the least, the peculiar and indefinable intensity of feeling apparant in most of the Existentialists. Thus considered, we can call Kafka an Existentialist Writer, but not Shakespeare. Perhaps, the Existentialists of the 19th

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and 20th centuries were aware of a crisis, a threat, a fragmentation and alienation, being something new in their chilling intensity. Regarding this sense of crisis, William Barrett has remarked, "The image of modern man lies in T.S. Elliot's line ; men are bits of paper, whirled by the cold wind"²⁴. In the 19th century, two great Russian novels, introduced some of the themes of Existentialism- 'The death of Ivan Ilyitch' by Tolstoy and 'Fathers and sons' by Turgenev. Tolstoy studied death and Turgenev made a study of nihilism. However, in their time, the greatest literary exponent of Existentialism was Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821-81), particularly in his works 'The brothers Karamazov' and 'Notes from the underground'. According to Walter Kaufmann, Dostoevsky's 'Notes from the Underground' contains "the best overture for Existentialism ever written". He further says, "With immitable vigor and finesse the major themes are stated here that we can recognise when reading all the other so-called Existentialists from Kierkegaard to Camus"²⁵

CAMUS-(La Chute) (1956 ; The Fall)

' The Fall ' is Camus' last major work which is an autobiographical monologue. It is a series of talks by Jean- Baptiste Clamence, who had been a prosperous Parisian lawyer, proud of his virtues, respected for his defense of moneyless clients. One day, crossing a bridge over the Seine, he saw a woman leaning over the rail. As he left the bridge he heard a splash, then a cry ; the woman had jumped- or fallen- into the river. Should he turn back and try to rescue her ? He walked slowly away. Thereafter the memory of that cry haunted him ; the thought that he should have tried to save her destroyed his peace of mind. He began to think of himself as a coward. He wondered had not his virtues been a device for popularity and success. Having no religious belief, he could not seek relief by confession to a priest. He looked sceptically, then cynically, at all virtues as stratagems ; every " good" man, he concluded, was a calculating and secretly self-centered as himself. He began to despise civilization as a tissue of competing hypocrisies.

Franz Kafka

Franz Kafka (1883-1924) , the Austro- German novelist must be regarded as the greatest Existentialist writer of all. In his writings we discover the themes of Existentialism. Here also we see- that ' man ' who is thrown in the world, basic individuality, the alienation, insufficiency and impotency inherent in the very existence of ' man' and the resultant inevitable feeling of frustration and anguish, the meaninglessness and absurdity of existence- the most important category of Existentialism developed by Sartre and Camus in their philosophy.

It seems from ' The Trial' that the main character of the story is trial, not Joseph K- But the case is not so. Joseph K. stands for Kafka's own painful experience of alienation of existence. The story indicates that everywhere we are in uncertainty. We are moving in a labyrinth and there is no way out. There is also no means of knowing the happenings of our life i.e. we do not know whence or how do they happen. This uncertainty gives rise to 'angst' and 'uread'. Human life is just like a labyrinth. We are moving in it aimlessly and helplessly.

' The Trial '

Now we come to this novel, ' The Trial '. The hero of the novel is an employee in Pargue Bank. We know nothing about his past life. His ordinary routine-bound life goes on without any exception. Suddenly, one day, a very trifling incident breaks the tune of his life. That the incident is a trifling one is expressed in the following words with which Kafka's novel ' The Trial ' begins ; ' Someone must have been telling lies about Joseph K., for without having done anything wrong he was arrested one fine morning"²⁶ . He did not know the reason for which he was prosecuted. He was sure of his innocence, yet he had to defend himself. The case proceeds and the lawyers thought it to be a critical one. In the meantime, his usual life goes on as before. Joseph K. wanted a prompt decision of his case. But even after month's wait, he remains in the dark about his case. Here in also lies that uncertainty. To him, the entire trial system, the judge, the court- everything is mysterious, unknown uncertain, unintelligible and invisible. After a year or two, one day, suddenly two strangers came to Joseph K's house and very politely asked him

to follow them. The gentle men took him to the dirty deserted suburb of Prague where he should be executed. Before execution Joseph K. asks himself, was help at hand ? were there some arguments in his favour that had been overlooked ? Of course there must be, where was the judge whom he had never seen ? where was the High Court, to which he had never penetrated ? But by this time the murderers thrust the knife into his heart twice. With failing eyes Joseph K. could still see the two of them, watching the final act. ' Like a dog ' he said ; it was as if he meant the shame of it to outlive him.

With these words the novel ends and we leave Joseph K. before an unworthy brutal death of his existence-existence which he knew to be true so long.

In the novel, 'The Trial', we see how Kafka reveals to us the absurdity of human existence and unreasonable human relation, through the mysterious bureaucracy, through the death sentence from a judge who remains unknown to Joseph K. till his death for some indefinite crime ; and through the meaningless and futile effort of K. to be freed from mysterious judicial bureaucratic labyrinth.

The absurdity here lies in the fact that is there any ground to be sentenced to death for some indefinite reason and it is meaningful to be involved in a futile labour ? Why this invisible trial ? In the trial everything seems to be real, yet they do not bear any meaning to us. If we try to find out any meaning our attempt will end in vain. In the writings of Kafka we see that both '.....'natural and unnatural, tragic, absurdity and logic are existing side by side, and this characteristic makes his writings serious and meaningful'²⁷ This outward contradiction and agony are the elements of absurd writing.

The Castle

Kafka's another book 'The Castle' is also an example of the uncertainty which is found in 'The trial'. Here also the hero of the story K., is in a labyrinth. He is puzzled, perplexed and confused. He is trying to get in the castle but finding no means or way through which he could come in. 'The Castle' is the best picture of alienation of the present age. In this universe, man is like an

isolated unit. He is trying his best to come close to others, but in vain. He is removed from others' heart though he is among them and this is what our life is.

In 'The Trial', we see that we are confined in the world, there is no way out and our existence is absurd. But Kafka thinks that the world is not exactly so as it seems to us. Kafka sees 'hope' in this barren absurd world. In 'the Castle', we see how he brings 'hope' in a peculiar way. The aim of 'The Trial' and 'The Castle' is not the same. They are complementary to each other. The problem in 'The Trial' is solved to some extent in 'The Castle'. So, the journey from the one to the other is inevitable. One has to write first 'The Trial' for writing 'The Castle'. The first describes but does not end. The second explains to some extent'. The Trial investigates the disease, The Castle proceeds for remedy'.²⁸ . The absurdity of death 'Like a dog', the meaninglessness of futile labour and existence in 'The Trial', become meaningful in 'The Castle'.

FRANZ KAFKA - 'The metamorphosis' (1915).

Kafka's stories are quite intelligible as stories they are simple and clear in plot and style ; but through that apparently transparent front the author has expressed or concealed his philosophy. The story runs thus ;

Gregor Samsa, a commercial traveler, turned overnight into a gigantic insect. Gregor has been a hard worker, the chief support of his parents and sister, but he has secretly aspired to replace his father as the head and lawgiver of the family. His suffering is multiplied by his retention of his human mind, feelings, and memories. Lying on his hard carapace back, convulsively wiggling his many legs, he recalls the monotony of his former life, and broods over the disgrace of his present state. His parents are horrified by hearing this insect talk like their son ; disgusted and fearful, they lock him in his room, and seldom look in upon him. His sister Greta pities him, daily brings him food, cleans his waste and pushes Gregor's armchair upto the window so that her transmigrated brother may climb upon it and look at the

passers by but she can not bear the sight or odor of him, and he, perceiving this, crawls under a sofa when she comes in. To support the family the mother takes in boarders, and the father, formerly retired, goes unwillingly back to work. Greta too takes a job and comes home so tired that she becomes negligent in feeding Gregor or cleaning his room. He grows thin and weak. One day the door is carelessly left open, and he creeps out, to the dismay of the boarders ; they leave ; the father throws some apples at Gregor, one hits and cripples him. Worse yet is the pain he feels when he hears his sister say, " We must get rid of him", He looses all will to live ; he refuses food and drink, grows thin and weak," Soon he made the discovery that he was now unable to stir a limb..... His head sank to the floor of its own accord, and from his nostrils came the last flicker of his breath", He dies, and a charwoman throws his corpse into the garbage can." Thanks be to God", says his father.

In 'The Metamorphosis', Kafka portrayed himself as transformed into an insect, dowered, however, with human

understanding and sensitivity. He seems to have felt some justice in his father's rejection of him for refusing to carry on the family's economic enterprise ; he mourns that he can no longer support the family and let his father retire. But the curses of his father are too bitter to bear ; they are the missile that breaks his back. Nor can he forget how his sister's tenderness has turned into revulsion and condemnation. When the insect dies it is Gregor and Kafka longing for the balm and absolution of death.

Ernest Hemingway (1898- 1961) was an American novelist. ' The way in which Hemingway's characters face their destiny through action has led some critics to class Hemingway among existentialist writers. John Killinger's study, " Hemingway and the dead Gods" (1960) is subtitled " A study in Existentialism" . But it does not mean that Hemingway had any direct contact with the Existentialist movement. However, it is not difficult to find out existentialist elements in Hemingway's novels. The hero in his novels achieves honesty in the encounter with death. Indeed Hemingway would have agreed with Heidegger's Characterization of man's being as being-towards-death. A man feels most free in extreme situations. He always prefers those who ' take a stand',

still his heroes often appear alienated from their environment and from their fellow-beings. This experience of alienation as described in his novels is typically existentialist. In his short story "A clean well-lighted place", one can discover the sense of 'nothingness'. However we shall discuss here ~~his~~ ERNEST HEMINGWAY 'S' The Old Man and the Sea (1952),

It is too long to be a short story, too short to be a novel, became the literary event of the year. The story runs thus ; An old fisherman, after gently refusing an admiring boy, who asked to accompany him, rows out alone into the Gulf stream to make a last great catch, to set a mark for youth to match, and to test his aging strength of body and soul. A giant marlin takes his bait, pulls him far from sight of land, and gives him a full day's fight before dying. Night falls on the struggle. The marlin surrenders, but it is too heavy to be pulled into the boat. He can only lash it to the side. Sharks feed on it, he kills them one after another. More sharks come and feast on it. The old man becomes exhausted by struggling and rowing throughout the night reaches shore. By that time the marlin is reduced to its

bones. The fishermen become astonished and compliment him. With his last strength he climbs the beach to his cabin and into his cot, and he can not decide as to whether he has been victorious or defeated.

This story has been interpreted by the critics as a parable of man's struggle with the challenges of life. However, the author disclaims any intent of symbolism, but the allegory stands out and raises the book to significance by expressing anew Hemingway's chosen motive "The first obligation in life is to endure".

ENGÈNE IONESCO (1912 -), a Romanian/ French dramatist, is well known as an avant-garde playwright. His 'The Lesson' (La Leson) is a terrifying experiment in the theatre of Cruelty and of the absurd. His advanced theatrical techniques go hand in hand with rather conservative political views. His Rhinocers (Rhinocérs) is a violent satire on all forms of totalitarianism, left and right, and he is equally hostile to the U.S.S.R. and to Sartre's theories on Commitment. His obsession with

death is most conspicuous in 'Exit the King' (Le Roi se meurt), while the more spiritual direction of his work, with its insistence upon the human need for love, found expression in 'Hunger and Thrust' (La Soif et la faim).

If we turn our eyes to the modern Bengali literature, particularly Bengali drama, here also we can see the parallels of existentialist thought which made its entry at the end of 1940. The inflow of this philosophy in Bengali literature starts mainly through the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre. Magazines and papers like ' Group Theatre Patrika', ' Manab man', ' Anrinya' began to throw light on the philosophy of Sartre and Camus, and also went on publishing different discussions, translations and interview with them. In between 1960 and 1980 Sartre's famous plays like ' The Flies', 'The Respectable Prostitute', 'Men without shadows' etc.were translated into Bengali and also. staged in Calcutta successfully by the Group Theatre. All these indicate the increasing influence of this Philosophy on Bengali literature. The feeling of 'absurdity', an important category of Existential philosophy is the link between Existentialism and absurd drama. This feeling of the

'absurd' is being largely felt in the recent writings of the modern Bengali novelists and playwrights. We shall mention here a few of their writings as the task is a vast one.

SUDHINDRANATH DUTTA

It is Jibanananda Das, the eminent modern poet of Bengal, who first recognized Sudhindranath Dutta as the only Bengalee Existentialist poet in his time. He may be termed a metaphysical poet with existentialist outlook. We can enlist the name of Sudhindranath with the names of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre and Camus. To him, nothingness and existence are inseparable and synonymous. In his poems we find a wonderful co-existence of uncertainty and emotion, and a marvellous inter-mingling of existence and nothingness. The uncertainty, negation, query, nothingness and melancholy which enrich his poems are in accordance with the main themes of existentialism. Consciousness is self-sufficient, but it is encircled by uncertainty. He feels the existential uncertainty in consciousness, ~~is~~ and many of his poems that are interrogative originate from this sense or feeling of uncertainty. We

can mention the names of his poems like 'Apachaya', 'Prashna', 'Orchestra', 'Bhavitavya' etc. in this connection. The poem 'Kasmai Devaya' expresses his feeling of negation best. Nothingness is an important concept in Existentialism. He has used this concept in his poems many times and in different ways. Mention may be made of his poems like 'Punarjanma', 'Anusanga', 'Kala' etc which deal with this important concept. He might have experienced nothingness in his personal life, and this experience might have been the origin of his philosophical thinking and that is why his poems are marked with the sense of eternal non-existence or nothingness from the very beginning to the end.

JIBANANANDA DAS

In the writings of Jibanānanda Das, another eminent modern Bengalee poet, we also find some existentialist concepts like loneliness, alienation, agony, death etc. But his philosophical thought is not fully expressed in his novels and short stories. We shall mention a few of his novels and short stories. The theme of his novel

' Mālyabān ' is about the unhappy conjugal life of Mālyabān and his wife Utpala. Their temperaments are contradictory and as a result, they suffer from a constant mental agony throughout their conjugal life from which there is no escape. His other three novels namely, ' Nirupama Yātrā ' 'Purnimā ' (Published in 'Pratikshan', 1984-1985) and ' Pretinir Rupakatha ' (1953) express a feeling of loneliness and alienation which the main characters of the novels feel. His short story 'Jamrultala' presents us a romantic picture of spiritual love between Hārānī and Abani. Death gives them a new outlook of life. Standing face to face before death Hārānī and Abani realized this world and life as a new one which they never experienced before.

In this connection, it is note worthy that the characters of Jibanānanda's novels feel and realize the crisis of modern mechanical civilization- the alienation and loneliness of life. They all accept it, but never revolt or never try to resist or overcome it.

However, Jibanananda should not be regarded as an absolute pessimist. He had a poetic vision of a distant

morning radiant with the light of hope, as it becomes evident from the symbolism through which the poet expresses his optimistic spirit in 'Suchetanā', one of his immortal poems : " Suchetana, by kindling light this way- only this way there will come the liberation of the earth ;

It is a task of the great men of many centurieshow absolutely radiant with the sun light in this air ;

A good human society almost alike .At the hands of tired but tireless sailors like us .

Will be fashioned, not now, far off in the last dawn".³⁶

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