

PREFACE

The main contention of this Ph.D. research work is to make a comparative study between Kant and Bhagavadgītā about the paradigm of moral action. Accordingly at the very outset, i.e., in the First Chapter the nature of moral and non-moral actions, various senses of moral actions, the fundamental distinctions between moral and non-moral actions have been outlined in the context of Western philosophy as well as in the context of Indian philosophy. In the Second Chapter of the thesis, the concept and the paradigm of moral action have been developed. Here Kant has been taken as a deontologist while discussing the nature of moral action. It should be noted here that Kant did not mention the term ‘desireless action’, rather we interpret Kant’s moral action as desireless to make a fruitful contrast with the concept of niṣkāma Karma of Bhagavadgītā. Kant developed a systematic account of moral action. His deontological outlook is rationally based on the precept of moral universality. He offered us a rigorous and stringent account of moral action and in this regard, he put emphasized freedom of the will of moral agent. He sets up a very specific criterion of duty as the guidelines of performing moral action by the moral agent. He eventually settled by claiming that moral actions in the real sense of the term can be done by those moral agents who became the *members of the kingdom of ends*. In the Third Chapter of the thesis, a conscious attempt has been taken to develop the paradigm of *niṣkāma Karma* regarding Bhagavadgītā even though the term of niṣkāma Karma has not been mentioned in Bhagavadgītā. Here special attention has been laid on the role of Sri Kṛṣṇa of Bhagavadgītā. It seems that the concept of *niṣkāma Karma* of Bhagavadgītā is paradigmatically different in nature. In the Fourth Chapter of the thesis, a comparison has been made between Kant and Bhagavadgītā in terms of similarities and differences. In the Fifth Chapter of this thesis, some observations have been made based on my rationale. It is concluded by saying that the Kantian paradigm of moral action

is purely deontological; whereas the paradigm of *niṣkāma Karma* of Bhagavadgītā is nether deontological, nor teleological, but is a unique concept.