Chapter-II

The Concept and Debates in Intrinsic Value

2.1: Introduction

The notion of intrinsic value is of paramount importance in ethics, and that this claim needs to be defended. There are many varieties of goodness and badness. At their core lies intrinsic goodness and badness. It is in virtue of intrinsic goodness and badness that other types of goodness and badness may be understood, and hence that we can begin to come to terms with questions of virtue and vice, right and wrong, and so on. Many ways philosophers try to clarify the concept of intrinsic value- sometimes from deontological way of explaining and sometimes from consequentialists' perception. Whatever the path of discussion, Human life always wants a good life in good environment and the major ethical theories recognize to promote what makes something good or what is that something that is intrinsic.

2.2: Plato, Aristotle and Kant

There are also accounts of the concept of intrinsic value as depicted by different philosophers time to time. Plato gave an analogy saying that the Good is in some way like a Sun.[4] He suggested that each is a source of immense value. And just as the Sun is too blinding to observe directly with the naked eye, so the Good is too dazzling to contemplate directly with naked mind.

Plato says, "In the world of Knowledge, the last thing to be perceived and only with great difficulty is the essential form of Goodness. Once it is perceived, the conclusion follow that, for old things, this is the cause of whatever is right and good; in the visible world it gives birth to light and to the lord of light, while it is itself sovereign in the intelligible world and the parent of intelligence and truth. Without having had a vision of this form no one can can't act with wisdom, either with in his own life or in matters of states".

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[4] Plato, (1958),*The Republic*, translated and with an introduction and notes by Francis MacDonald Cornord; New York and London, Oxford University Press, p -231.

Aristotle in his *Nicomechean Ethics*[5] conceived goodness in other ways. We can assume that there are several sorts of 'goodness'. First and foremost of course, there is intrinsic goodness, the "Chief Good" (in Aristotle's phrase it means there are several lesser sorts of goodness. Aristotle indicates that he is searching for something that is so good that if you have it, your life can't be improved by the addition of anything else. Happiness (which he takes to be an important thing) is alleged to be ' not a thing counted as one good thing among others- if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by addition of even the last good - it is… "That which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing. The intrinsically good is the most final good. Aristotle says that the Chief Good is something final……always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. Immanuel Kant likewise drew comparisons. In describing a thing he took to be good in some fundamental way, he tried to make it clear that this does not have its value because of its capacity to produce good results, for even if "by the niggardly provision of step motherly nature" it were to have no extrinsic value at all. "…it would still sparkle like a jewel in its own right, as something that had its full worth in itself. …its usefulness would be only its setting as it were, so as to enable us to handle if more conveniently in commerce or to attract the attention of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to those who are experts or to determine its worth." [6]

2.3: G. E. Moore on intrinsic value

Principia Ethica[7]of Moore asserts that what is "common and peculiar" to all ethical judgments is the concept of "good" - what Moore later calls "intrinsic value." All ethical questions and claims can be divided into "two kinds." One has to do with the good: what things "ought to exist for their own sakes? And the other concerns the right: "What kind of actions ought we to perform? One of *Principia*'s central claims

[5]Aristotle, The *NicomecheanEthics* (2004) Translated by J.A. K. Thomson , Penguin Group , London , p-31.

[6] Kant, Immanuel; (1959) *Foundation of Metaphysics of Morals,* translated with an *Introduction* by Lewis White Beck, Indianapolis and New York; Bobbs-Merril Company, Inc. p.10.

[7] Moore, G. E; (1948), *Principia Ethica,* secs. 1–2, pp. 53–54. (G. E. Moore, "The Conception of Intrinsic Value" was originally published in 1922 as chap. 8 of *Philosophical Studies* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner), p. 253–75. It is included in Baldwin's revised edition of *Principia Ethica,* p. 280–98.)

is that questions of the second kind can be reduced to those of the first. It means what one should do on an occasion reduces to which action, of those available, would produce the most good."To assert that a certain line of conduct is, at a given time, absolutely right or obligatory," Moore writes, "is obviously to assert that more good or less evil will exist in the world, if it be adopted than if anything else be done instead."[8]Moore distinguished his view from the view of deontological intuitionists, who held that "intuitions" could determine questions about what *actions* are right or required by duty. Moore, as a consequentialist, argued that "duties" and moral rules could be determined by investigating the effects of particular actions or kinds of actions, and so were matters for empirical investigation rather than direct objects of intuition. On Moore's view, "intuitions" revealed not the rightness or wrongness of specific actions, but only what things were good in themselves, as *ends to be pursued.*

G. E. Moore tries to define more precisely the most important question, which, is really at issue when it is disputed with regard to any predicate of value, whether it is or is not a 'subjective' predicate.[9] According to Moore, there are three chief cases in which this controversy is raised.

1. With regard to the conceptions of 'right' and 'wrong,' and the closely allied conception of 'duty' or 'what ought to be done.'
2. Secondly, with regard to 'good' and 'evil,' in some sense of those words in which the conceptions for which they stand are certainly quite distinct from the conceptions of 'right' and 'wrong,' but in which nevertheless it is undeniable that ethics has to deal with them.
3. Thirdly, with regard to certain aesthetic conceptions, such as 'beautiful' and 'ugly;' or 'good' and 'bad,' in the sense in which these are applied to works of art, and in which, therefore, the question what is good and bad is a question not for ethics but for aesthetics.

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[8] Ibid, p. 53-54

[9] Moore, G. E.; (1922) The Conception of Intrinsic Value; *Philosophical Studies*, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London) , P 260- 266

G. E. Moore makes a distinction between intrinsic properties and intrinsic nature. If it is said that two things have different intrinsic properties or are intrinsically different then it means that they may be either numerically different or qualitatively different. On the other hand if it said that two things have different intrinsic natures then it means that they are qualitatively different (besides being numerically different). Thus if two things have different intrinsic nature then they are both qualitatively and quantitatively different. From what is said above, i.e., intrinsic difference (in nature) is not merely numerical difference; one should not hastily conclude that intrinsic difference (in nature) always implies qualitative difference. Although qualitative difference between two objects implies difference in their intrinsic natures, yet the converse is not true. Intrinsic difference may or may not mean qualitative difference. So intrinsic difference may only mean quantitative difference. Two things may have different intrinsic natures in spite of being qualitatively alike; e.g., they may differ in respect of the degree in which they possess some quality. To take a concrete example: a very loud sound and a very soft sound – they are qualitatively alike and only quantitatively different. Thus qualitative difference is only one species of intrinsic difference. We can notice, here, that Moore's way of distinguishing between intrinsic nature and intrinsic property is not clear. This is because the difference between intrinsic natures and intrinsic property (of two things) both implies either quantitative difference or qualitative difference. Moore speaks of two equivalent conditions for any value to be intrinsic: -

- If two or more things are exactly alike (having same qualities) and possess intrinsic value then they all possess intrinsic value in the same degree.
- If two or more objects have intrinsic value in a certain degree then they will all possess it in same degree under any circumstances and under any causal laws. That is to say, if these two things existed in a different universe where causal laws are different from this universe then also those things will possess intrinsic value in the same degree.

He says that intrinsic value is not subjective, but objective. Intrinsic value does not depend on the human beings valuing them. He makes a distinction between intrinsic value and intrinsic property. Examples of intrinsic value are beauty,

goodness, etc. (*In Chapter 3 of Principia Ethica Moore argues that the existence of beauty apart from any awareness of it has intrinsic value, but in Chapter 6 he allows that beauty on its own at best has little and may have no intrinsic value*[10]*. And in the later work Ethics he implicitly denies that beauty on its own has value*[11].) Whereas examples of intrinsic property are yellowness, redness, etc. Intrinsic value constitutes a unique class of predicate because they do not have anything in common with other kinds of predicates of value. Both intrinsic property and intrinsic value depend on the intrinsic nature of the thing possessing them. However intrinsic value is not identical with intrinsic property. They are different. There is something in intrinsic value which is not present in intrinsic property. But Moore cannot say what this something is. John O'Neill was dissatisfied with G .E. Moore's view of intrinsic value and this will be elaborated in the later part of this chapter.

Human beings evaluate things and event only when they take an interest. That is why a value relationship comes into picture where it did not exist before. In the process of evaluation, especially when the evaluation of nature is concerned, philosophers become interested to the "properties" or "potentialities" which are objective properties. The question, "can moral values be assigned to these properties of nature" leads to a debate and it generates an idea of ascribing instrumental value to nature. Some philosophers say that nature has intrinsic value which becomes more significant from different point of view including preservation of nature even if it is within human centered framework. But before addressing the debates that involve in *intrinsic value,* a clear concept of it and how it can be warranted needs to be understood.

Intrinsic value has traditionally been considered as the prime subject matter of discussion specially in environmental ethics. We have already mentioned that there are diverse number of terms to refer to such value as used by philosophers such as "in itself," or "for its own sake," or "as such," or "in its own right." The term 'intrinsic value' and alternative term 'inherent worth' (though not widely used) mean, lexically synonymous. In the tenth edition of *Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, the

[10] Moore, G. E; (1948), *Principia Ethica*, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press,sec1–2, p. 53–54.
[11] Moore, G. E.,*Ethics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 107.

term intrinsic is defined as “belonging to the essential nature or constitution of a thing.” And the term “inherent” is meant as “involved in the constitution or essential character of something...: intrinsic.” The English word “value” comes from the Latin word “*valere* to be worth, to be strong”; and “worth” comes from the old English word “*weorth* worthy, of value.” Thus it can be claimed that the value (or worth) of something is intrinsic (or inherent) means that value (or worth) which belongs to its essential nature or constitution.

Intrinsic value plays an important role to influence the variety of moral judgments. For example, according to a fundamental form of consequentialism, whether an action is *morally right or wrong* has exclusively to do with whether its consequences are intrinsically better than those of any other action one can perform under the circumstances. Many other theories also hold that what it is right or wrong to do have at least in part to do with the intrinsic value of the consequences of the actions one can perform. Moreover, if, as is commonly believed, what one is *morally responsible* for doing is some function of the rightness or wrongness of what one does, then intrinsic value would seem relevant to judgments about responsibility, too. Intrinsic value is also often taken to be pertinent to judgments about *moral justice* (whether having to do with moral rights or moral desert), insofar as it is good that justice is done and bad that justice is denied, in ways that appear intimately tied to intrinsic value. Finally, it is typically thought that judgments about *moral virtue and vice* also turn on questions of intrinsic value, in as much as virtues are good, and vices bad, again in ways that appear closely connected to such value.

Many theories of value are theories of intrinsic value. For example, hedonism says that pleasure is the only thing with positive intrinsic value and pain the only thing with negative intrinsic value. Critics of hedonism reply either that some pleasures are not intrinsically worthwhile - e.g., malicious pleasures - or that things other than pleasure are intrinsically worthwhile - e.g., knowledge and justice. In this case, the disputants agree that all value is either intrinsic or derivative from intrinsic value. Indeed, agreement on this point is sometimes even built into the definitions of key terms. According to an entry in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘an intrinsic

good is something valuable in itself; a non-intrinsic good is something valuable by virtue of its relationship to an intrinsic good'.[12]

2.4: Instrumental Value

Many writers distinguish intrinsic value from instrumental value, the value something has because it may prove useful in obtaining other things of value. Others allow also for contributory value. Something, such as a dissonant chord in a symphony, whose value depends upon being a part of a whole, is frequently called a contributory good, the value of a contributory good derives from the intrinsic value of the whole to which it contributes. One may explain that 'Intrinsic goods are to be contrasted with things that are extrinsically valuable and things that are necessary conditions of realizing intrinsic value'. In these views, intrinsic value is the source of all other value, so, if nothing were of intrinsic value, nothing could have any value at all. But it is also possible to hold that all value is instrumental and that there is no such thing as intrinsic value.

We can suppose that x has instrumental value to the extent that x has value that is due to x's being possibly instrumental in bringing about something else. Or, in terms of valuing, x is valued instrumentally to the extent that x is valued because x is (or would be) instrumental in bringing about something else. This definition does not require that what is brought about have intrinsic value.

Money has instrumental value because it can be used to purchase things; we can suppose this without having any particular purchases in mind and without supposing that the items that may be purchased are valued intrinsically. Many of these items - food, shelter, medical care, transportation, and clothing - are themselves highly valued; but it would seem that they themselves are valued instrumentally rather than intrinsically. Now food is valued in part because it tastes good and it is plausible that the experience of eating tasty food is intrinsically good. If so, money leads indirectly to something of intrinsic value. As we have seen, many philosophers assume that instrumental value is always in this way derivative of the expected

[12]Edwards, Paul, (1967), (eds), Encyclopedia of philosophy,Macmillan, New York.

intrinsic value to which something might lead. In what follows we will consider whether this is a defensible assumption.

2.5: Debates Concerning Intrinsic Value in Normative Ethics

Apart from G. E. Moore I would like to put forward the arguments of R. M. Chisholm, Noah M. Lemos and John O' Neill in connection with the debates concerning intrinsic value in normative ethics.

Chisholm's View

The distinction between 'intrinsic' and 'non-intrinsic' value is a prominent area of discussion in environmental ethics. From Plato through Aristotle, to Brentano to Mill, this discussion has been widely developed and has been a great concern for environmental ethics. These philosophers have taken into granted that if there is something 'good' then there is something intrinsically good or good in itself and if there is anything that is bad then there is something intrinsically bad or bad in itself. But for Chisholm, this distinction has been questioned in many ways and sometimes it became ridiculous. Chisholm first tried to define what intrinsic value is and in doing so he is concerned with the qualification that makes value intrinsic. In saying so Chisholm would like to state that the state of affair under which something is considered to be valuable is to be kept in isolation and such value is considered as the 'extrinsic' and not intrinsic since in such cases the value is dependent on the states of affair.[13] For Chisholm, if a state of affairs is intrinsically good then it is intrinsically good in every possible world in which it obtains (or is true). But a state of affairs that is instrumentally good need not to be instrumentally good in every possible world in which it obtains.[14] He, in this context, mentions that all intrinsic value concepts may be analyzed in terms of intrinsic preferability.

[13] Roderick M. Chisholm;(1981), Defining Intrinsic Value: *Analysis, Vol. 41, No. 2*, Oxford University Press: p. 99-100
[14] Ibid, p 99-100

Noah M. Lemos's View

In the first chapter of his book *Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant*,[15]Lemos tries to give a detailed account of the concept of Intrinsic Value by analyzing different philosophers' views. Specially he makes known the analysis on the basis of the views of Franz Brentano, A. C. Ewing, Roderick M. Chisholm and examine that intrinsic value is such that which is explicated in terms of the notions of ethically 'fitting' or required emotional attitudes such as love, hate and preference. He points out some traditional views of intrinsic value.

1. The first view is that if something is intrinsically good than it cannot beintrinsically bad.
2. Intrinsic value is a non-relational concept.
3. For the cognitivists, we know that something is intrinsically good and something is intrinsically bad.
4. Intrinsic value is distinct from any natural property, relation or state of affair.
5. Lastly, intrinsic value of a thing does not depend on its being the object of any psychological attitude.

Franz Brentano[16], C D Broad[17], A C Ewing, R M Chisholm[18] hold that something being intrinsically good may be understood in terms of its being 'correct' or 'fitting' to love or like that thing- in and for itself or its own sake. This concept of intrinsic value has certain intuitive appeal. Lemos also mentions some objections to these traditional views. The first objection is in explication of the notion of intrinsic value in terms of an ethical obligation, we are confusing intrinsic value with moral value, i.e. we are confusing intrinsic goodness with moral goodness. Secondly, it is also objectionable to prefer something other than intrinsically. And thirdly, two things

[15]Lemos, Noah M;(1994), Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant, DePauw University , Cambridge university press, P. 3-19

[16] Franz Brentano, (1969)The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, English edition edited by Roderick m Chisholm and translated by Roderick Chisholm and Elizabeth schneewind (London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul),p.18

[17] C D Board, (1981), Five types of Ethical Theory (New York; Harcourt, Brace and Co, 1930) p.283

[18] Roderick Chisholm; "Defining Intrinsic Value"; *Analysis 41*, (March), p.100

might have same intrinsic value, whereas the attitude and the feelings that are appropriate to one might be inappropriate to another.[19]

Lemos elaborates about the bearers of intrinsic value taking into in to consideration about the different traditional views. In this context he refers to Panayot Butchvarov who says that some properties are intrinsically good and some properties are intrinsically bad[20]. For example, pleasure and wisdom are intrinsically good and pain is intrinsically bad. Chisholm also says that 'state of affairs' is the bearer of intrinsic value.[21] On the other hand he points out approach of W. D. Ross who mentions 'fact' as the bearer of intrinsic value. However, Lemos took a stand in the line of Chisholm's view after considering the different views as mentioned above. He also makes some metaphysical assumptions regarding state of affairs and properties. He suggests that it is not pleasure or perfect justice, considered as abstract properties that have intrinsic value. According to him wisdom, pleasure, beauty are 'good making properties'[22]. He also points out that fact can also be the bearer of intrinsic value on the ground that if it is a fact that someone is suffering from pain then the fact is intrinsically bad and if it is a fact that makes someone happy, then the fact is intrinsically good. If facts are states of affairs that obtain and if facts are bearers of values then there is an understandable temptation to say that some states of affairs are bearers of value. Hence, by this, he made a distinction between facts and states of affairs. Intrinsic value is not contingent in nature, they are universal. Concrete particulars are not intrinsic as they do not bear universal character of intrinsic value. It has a distinctiveness for which something is intrinsically good or intrinsically bad and it must be complex objects like states of affairs or facts.

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[19]Lemos, Noah M; (1994) Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant, DePauw University , Cambridge university press, P. 3-19

[20] Ibid, p 3-19

[21] Charles Stevenson, Richard Brant, Values and Morals *; Essays in honor of William Frankena*, edited by Alvin I. Goldman and Jaegwon Kin, Volume -13, the University of Michigan, D. Redial Publishing Company

[22]Lemos, Noah M, P. 3-19

John O'Neill's View

The term intrinsic value has many senses. The variety of senses leads philosophers into confusion. Environmental ethics suffer from a conflation of these varieties of senses. O'Neill discusses these senses as follows:[23]

1. Intrinsic value is non-instrumental. The idea in regard to this case is that an object has intrinsic value if it is an end in itself. In environmental ethics it is argued that among the entities that have such non-instrumental value are non-human beings and states. It is this claim that Arne Naess makes in defending deep ecology.
2. The second sense is that intrinsic value means having a sort of intrinsic properties. It refers to the value of an object which has intrinsic properties. This view is developed by G. E. Moore. According to Moore, as O'Neill stated "To say a kind of value is intrinsic means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question." These properties come from the intrinsic nature of the object in question. The link between the thing's intrinsic value and its intrinsic property (ies) is immediate and does not depend on any relations between that entity and other things outside of it. Such relations might be, for example, those between the psychological states of valuers and the thing being valued. That is, this value can be characterized without reference to other objects and any of their states of affair.
3. The third meaning of intrinsic value as O'Neill stated is that intrinsic value is used as a synonym of objective value. It means that the value of an object possesses independently of humans' perception. This meaning of intrinsic value has some sub-varieties. i.e. (a) if non humans have intrinsic value then this claim is a meta-ethical claim. (b) It denies the subjective view that the source of all value lies in the evaluators' preferences, affinities and so on.

The environmental ethicists, according to Neill, uses the term "intrinsic value" in the first sense - non-humans are ends-in-themselves. However in order to

[23]Neill, J. O', "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," *The Monist*, vol. 75, No 2, The Intrinsic Value of Nature (April 1992); Oxford University Press. P.119-137

strengthen their position the environmental ethicists claim that the term "intrinsic value" is also used inboth second and first senses. Among these three senses of "intrinsic value", John O' Neill accepts the third sense and partially the second sense. He believes that the first sense (Moore's sense) is not acceptable i.e. intrinsic value is non-instrumental and that an object has intrinsic value if it is an end in itself.

Regarding the second sense i.e., intrinsic value in the sense of objective value we find two types of objectivity - weak objectivity and strong objectivity. Neill believes that intrinsic value can be objective only in the strong sense. Unlike the non-anthropocentrists, he also shows that if intrinsic value can be used in the sense of the subjective value (as opposed to objective value), then such an intrinsic value can establish non-anthropocentrism. He discusses the first two senses of the term intrinsic value.

First Sense

Moore holds that an object possesses intrinsic value by virtue of its intrinsic nature. All the objects possessing intrinsic value possess it equally; there is no hierarchy of intrinsic value. Secondly, if an object has intrinsic value then it will possess it in the same way throughout its existence. Neill argues that such a concept of intrinsic value cannot establish non-anthropocentrism. Intrinsic nature or property is a non-relational property. Neill gives two explanations of "non-relational property":[24]

1. Non-relational properties are those that persist regardless of the existence or non-existence of other objects.
2. Non-relational properties are those that can be characterized without reference to other objects.

According to Neill, non-anthropocentrism offers the following arguments to prove that nature has intrinsic value. The argument is:

- To hold an environmental ethics is to hold that non-human natural objects have intrinsic value.

[24] Neill, J. O', "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," *The Monist*, vol. 75, No 2, The Intrinsic Value of Nature (April 1992); Oxford University Press. P.119-137

- The value objects have in virtue of their relational properties, e.g. their rarity, cannot be intrinsic values.
- The value objects have in virtue of their relational properties had no place in an environmental ethic.

This argument will be clearer through the following example: Rarity is a relational property of an object since this property depends on the non-existence of other objects and thereby cannot be characterized without reference to other objects. Nowadays a special status is ascribed to the rare entities of our environment, such as endangered species, flora and fauna, etc. In Neill's view, such rarity seems to confer a special value, but not intrinsic value to these natural objects. Hence such value has no place in environmental ethics which confers intrinsic value to nature. Objects possessing non-relational property have intrinsic value. All the animals, plants, etc. have intrinsic value in the sense of non-relational property.

Neill objects to the above argument because it commits the fallacy of equivocation. The term 'intrinsic value' is used in two different senses. In the first premise it means non-instrumental value whereas in the second premise it means value an object possesses in virtue of its non-relational properties (Moore's sense of intrinsic value). This is a gross mistake because the two senses are distinct from each other. Intrinsic value in the Moorean sense means also non-instrumental value but not vice-versa. A thing may have non-instrumental value, but not intrinsic value (Moorean sense). e.g., wilderness has non-instrumental value because it is not any means to satisfy human desires. But wilderness cannot be said to have intrinsic value (Moorean sense); wilderness has value because it is untouched by humans which is equivalent to saying that wilderness has value in virtue of its relation with humans. Thus wilderness has a relational property, and not a non-relational property. At the same time wilderness has intrinsic value. So non-instrumental value and non-relational property are not equivalent to each other. Thus the term 'intrinsic value' is not used in the same sense throughout the above argument and this kind of fallacy is called fallacy of equivocation. Hence the above argument is invalid. Moorean sense of intrinsic value (non-relational property) cannot attribute intrinsic value to

wilderness. Neill thus shows that environmental ethicists cannot use intrinsic value in the first sense (Moorean sense).

Second Sense

Let us now discuss Neill's account of whether the term 'intrinsic value' can be used in the second sense – intrinsic value means objective value as opposed to subjective. A thing has subjective value if it is dependent on the valuation of the evaluator. In other words, if an evaluator says that something X is valuable then and then only X becomes valuable. On the contrary, an objective value is independent of the valuation of an evaluator. The value of X, in this case, is not dependent upon whether a subject confers value on it. X has value whether or not X is valuable to a subject. Those who maintain that intrinsic value is objective value in this sense argue that to say that non-human nature has objective value is to say that it has intrinsic value. But Neill does not think that subjectivism leads to anthropocentrism. The subjectivist asserts that the only sources of value are the evaluative attitudes of humans. But this does not mean that the only ultimate objects of value are humans. Neill takes up the theory of Emotivism to explain his claim.

C.L.Stevenson, an emotivist, defines intrinsic value as non-instrumental value. Intrinsically good means good for its own sake, as an end in itself, which is distinct from good as a means to something else. He holds: 'X' is intrinsically good asserts that the speaker approves of 'X' intrinsically and acts emotively to make the hearer or hearers likewise approve of 'X' intrinsically."[25] Neill claims that this 'X' can very well be non-human entity instead of being only human attitudes. An emotivist believes that ecosystem has intrinsic value and acts emotively, e.g., expresses her joy in the existence of natural ecosystem, whereas expresses her pain in the destruction of nature by humans. Thus nature has intrinsic value according to this view.

Some may object, still, that emotivism does not support environmental ethics. Since humans are the only source of value, a world without humans (even in the presence of non-human) would have no value at all. Neill's rejoinder is that emotivism does not confine moral utterances only to the periods in which human exists, e.g., an emotivist can express his joyous mood in saying "Wilderness exist

[25]Stevevson, C. L; (1994) *Ethics and Language* ,New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 16

after the extinction of human species". Thus subjectivism does not support anthropocentrism. In fact subjectivism can establish non-anthropocentrism by attributing intrinsic value to nature.

On the other hand, objectivism is not an adequate theory to prove that nature has intrinsic value. The objectivist account of value is whether or not something has value does not depend on the attitudes of humans. This something i.e., what kind of objects have intrinsic value is not specifically stated by them. So this "something" can be humans or attitudes of humans. Objectivism, thus, is compatible with anthropocentrism. For anthropocentrism states that non-human nature does not have intrinsic value. According to the objectivists, evaluative properties of objects are real properties of objects - evaluative properties exist independently of the evaluations of evaluators (humans).

Neill speaks of two interpretations of the phrase "independently of the evaluations of evaluators" or we can say "real property".

- In the weak interpretation, the evaluative properties of objects are properties that exist in the absence of evaluating agents. Or we can say a real property is one that exists in the absence of any being experiencing that object.
- On the other hand, in the strong interpretation the evaluative properties of objects can be characterized without reference to evaluating agents. Or we can say a real property is that which can be characterized without reference to the experiences of an experiencer.

In accordance with the weak interpretation of "real property" we have weak objectivity and, in accordance with the strong interpretation of this term we have strong objectivity. He does not admit that weak objectivity will help to establish the view that nature has intrinsic value. But he admits that strong objectivity will help to prove that non-humans have intrinsic value.

2.6: Debates concerning Intrinsic value in Environmental Ethics and its Implications

Let us begin by distinguishing between anthropocentric and various types of non-anthropocentric theories, before turning to the debate over subjective versus objective intrinsic value. When the term 'anthropocentric' was first coined in the

1860s, amidst the controversy over Darwin's theory of evolution, to represent the idea that humans are the center of the universe[26], anthropocentrism considers humans to be the most important life form, and other forms of life to be important only to the extent that they affect humans or can be useful to humans. In an anthropocentric ethic, nature has moral consideration because degrading or preserving nature can in turn harm or benefit humans. For example, using this ethic it would be considered wrong to cut down the rainforests because they contain potential cures for human diseases.

We generally refer to "nonhuman nature" as "nonhuman beings." These phrases are not intended to imply a specifically Kantian, rather than a Moorean i.e., states of affairs notion of nonhuman intrinsic value. While may say that environmental ethicists have perhaps tended toward a more Kantian concept of intrinsic value, in many cases the literature in environmental ethics could be interpreted through either a Moorean or a Kantian lens. Moore's environmental ethics is consequentialists' perception whereas Kant's view is deontological. Although the implications of these two different interpretations of intrinsic value are certainly not trivial to conservation, it is unfortunately beyond our scope to engage fully with these finer nuances. Therefore, we should not point specifically to either a Kantian or a Moorean interpretation of intrinsic value, unless otherwise noted. Throughout this chapter and in our discussion, "intrinsic value of nonhuman nature" or "intrinsically valuable nonhuman beings" should be read to imply, "intrinsic value of nonhuman nature or its interests," or, "intrinsically valuable nonhuman beings or states of affairs pertaining to them."

Environmental ethics have sought to more comprehensively account for intrinsic value in the natural world by extending the theory of intrinsic value beyond humans alone (i.e., beyond anthropocentrism) to also include various sets of nonhumans (i.e., non-anthropocentrism). Before Leopold's *land ethic,* there was no ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow

[26]Campbell, E. K. (1983). *Beyond anthropocentrism*: Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 19, p. 54-67.

upon it. Thus the enlargement of ethics to this third element in human environment is. . .an evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity.[27]But what is intrinsic value?

Expressions such as "this should be preserved for *its own sake*" are very common: but there are philosophers and scientists who opposed to apply such common concept to natural phenomena. For them there must be an evaluator valuing things—that is, there must be humans in the picture. In a sense this is true. Theories of value, like theories of gravity and rules of logical or methodological inferences, are human products. But this does not rule out the possibility of truth or correctness. For Arne Naess the positions in philosophy often referred to as "value nihilism" and "subjectivity of value" rejects the concept of valid norms. Other positions accept the concept. [28]

Anthropocentrism, as we define it, is the view that only humans possess intrinsic value, and therefore humans alone are worthy of direct moral consideration. Non-anthropocentrism, conversely, is any perspective recognizing intrinsic value in at least some nonhumans, and thus granting those nonhumans direct moral consideration. Anthropocentrism is often, incorrectly conflated with anthropogenesis, the idea that as humans everything we do is, by necessity, human-centered. Sometimes the anthropogenic acknowledgment of intrinsic value in the nonhuman world is referred to as "weak anthropocentrism". On the definition above, this position is not anthropocentric, and can instead be considered a form of subjectivist non-anthropocentrism. To elucidate by analogy, humans are perhaps trivially "self-centered," in that we can only see the world through our own eyes, but we need not be morally "self-centered," in the sense that we think and care only about ourselves. In a similar way, anthropocentrism is centered on humans because it only attributes intrinsic value to humans, not because only humans attribute intrinsic value.

Biocentric environmental ethicists argue that life, or simply "being alive," is the criterion for intrinsic value. What is referred to here as an 'ecocentric' ethic comes from the term first coined 'biocentric' in 1913 by an American biochemist,

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[27]Leopold, A. (1949). *A Sand Country Almanac*: With Essays on Conservation from Round River. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 238-239

[28]Naess, A. (1993). Intrinsic value: Will the defenders of nature please rise. In P. Reed & D. Rothenberg (Eds.), *Wisdom in the Open Air,* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 70–82.

Lawrence Henderson, to represent the idea that the universe is the originator of life[29]. This term was adopted by the 'deep ecologists' in the 1970s to refer to the idea that all life has intrinsic value (Nash, 1989). In an ecocentric ethic nature has moral consideration because it has intrinsic value, value aside from its usefulness to humans. Using this ethic, for example, one could judge that it would be wrong to cut down the rainforests because it would cause the extinction of many plant and animal species. Biocentric versions of intrinsic value are often rooted in conation, the condition of striving to fulfill one's interests or pursue one's good. Paul Taylor, for example, describes living beings as "teleological centers of a life" that seek to thrive and flourish[30]. On this basis he argues all living beings possess an equal degree of intrinsic value which he also calls "inherent value". Holmes Rolston argues that living beings literally embody in fulfilling their individual and evolutionary interests.

In ecocentric ethics, the extension of intrinsic value goes beyond living beings to the other nonhuman entities such as species or ecosystems. Some ecocentric philosophers use the conative properties of living individuals to ground the intrinsic value of ecological collectives, which are characterized either literally or by analogy as living beings. Some thinker argues that species and ecosystems, like individual organisms, have morally relevant interests. Similarly, there are others who proposes that species are of life (i.e., made up of individual living organisms), if not literally alive, and therefore have intrinsic value. James Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis, depicting planet Earth as an integrated, homeostatic living organism, could also be used as a basis for a biocentric environmental ethic[31]. More commonly, however, environmental ethical theories extend intrinsic value to ecological collectives on grounds other than their status as or resemblance to individual living entities. Deep Ecology, for example, is an ecocentric ethic attributing intrinsic value to the flourishing of life in all its richness and complexity. For Deep Ecologists' individual human selves and their flourishing nature are fully realized in relation to the

[29]Campbell, E. K, (1983),*Beyond anthropocentrism*: Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 19, p.54-67.

[30] Taylor, P.W., (1981), The Ethics of Respect for Nature; Environmental Ethics 3, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 197–218.

[31] Lovelock, J., (2000), Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, P. 45.

ecological Self, which integrates humans, nonhumans, and the abiotic environment. Callicott, in a different vein, defends the intrinsic value of ecological collectives by developing the philosophical underpinnings for Aldo Leopold's celebrated land ethic. According to Callicott human attribution of intrinsic value reflects a socio-biological adaptation for altruistic sentiments, such as love and respect for the moral community, which over evolutionary time have increasingly extended from inner kin groups to human society and eventually the full biotic community of "soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land".[32]

Philosophically, it is important for environmental ethicists to establish a sound ontological and epistemological basis for nonhuman intrinsic value, the wider, more practical significance of this project lies in defining the normative or ethical repercussions that follow from acknowledging intrinsic value in nonhuman nature. Paul Taylor, for example, argues that we should adopt a "biocentric outlook,"[33]conferring due respect to all living beings as bearers of intrinsic value. In another context Rolston suggests, we have commitment to protect nonhuman bearers of intrinsic value from destruction for more recent accounts justifying preservation on the basis of intrinsic value, while ecofeminists like Warren[34] suggests an ethic of engagement with love and care for nonhuman others.

More generally, environmental ethicists often suggest intrinsically valuable nonhuman beings should be granted direct moral consideration like good pester. The idea behind direct moral consideration is that humans, at the very least, should recognize and consider the interests of all morally relevant beings, i.e., beings who possess intrinsic value, in making decisions that might affect them. Some philosophers have suggested we ought to go even further and grant universal moral consideration. Arguments of this sort recognize that any criterion used to distinguish bearers from non-bearers of intrinsic value is contestable, and to some extent

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[32]Callicott, J.B., (1989), In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy. State Universirty of New York Press, Arlbany, NY, p.

[33]Taylor, Paul W. (1986). *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.

[34] Warren, K.J., (1990), *The power and the promise of ecological feminism*: Environmental Ethics 12, p.125–146.

arbitrary. Of course, universal consideration creates a host of practical challenges (how to arbitrate among interests or make tradeoffs if everything has moral standing?), leading philosophers to distinguish between basic moral consideration and higher tiers of ethical concern and obligation. But as persuasively argued by some thinkers, universal consideration is less a normative guide to navigate practical situations than a dramatic re-orientation of worldview, in which the license to unilaterally exploit or disregard entities as mere things, without first exploring the possibility that they may have morally relevant interests, becomes indefensible.

Ethics, one of the major sub-disciplines of philosophy, has historically been concerned only with humans and human affairs. As part of a wave of environmental consciousness taking shape in the 1960s and 1970s, environmental ethics emerged with the primary objective of pushing ethics, including theories of intrinsic value, beyond the human realm. Though we cannot provide a comprehensive survey in this review, we will offer a concise overview of some of the major positions on intrinsic value in environmental ethics. We begin by distinguishing between anthropocentric and various types of non-anthropocentric theories, before turning to the debate over subjective versus objective intrinsic value. We may say by discussing some of the ethical implications we might recognize intrinsic value in nonhuman nature.

Intrinsic value is a multifaceted concept that can be considered from various angles of philosophical inquiry, including the following:

1. **Ontological**: What is intrinsic value? What sorts of things possess intrinsic value? Are there degrees of intrinsic value and can intrinsic value be summed or otherwise aggregated?
2. **Epistemological**: How can we recognize intrinsic value and, if relevant, differences in degrees of intrinsic value? Is intrinsic value a discoverable, objective property of the world, or a subjective attribution of (human) valuers?
3. **Ethical**: What obligations or duties do moral agents have in relation to intrinsic value? How should we balance these duties/obligations against other ethical considerations (e.g., issues of justice or rights)?

Ontology, epistemology, and ethics are the three major dimensions of intrinsic value, which philosophers use to develop and explain their particular interpretation of

the concept. Different theories will be characterized by different ideas about the ontological, epistemological, and ethical status of intrinsic value.

Intrinsic value signifies recognition of fundamental goodness in the world. Though it may appear quite basic at first glance, the concept of intrinsic value is multifaceted, with philosophically rich ontological, epistemological, and ethical dimensions. Philosophers have characterized these dimensions differently, and it would be misleading to suggest any one, monolithic concept of intrinsic value emerges from the philosophical literature. We can distinguish between two major schools of thought on intrinsic value, one generally aligned with the work of G.E. Moore, and the other more closely aligned with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. These two camps diverge primarily in identifying different types of things as bearers of intrinsic value, which in turn leads to different ideas about how humans ought to conduct themselves in relation to intrinsic value.

Home Rolston's conception of intrinsic value

Rolston[35] debated about what environment has "good" in itself which is remarkably a milestone to the celebrated ethical issues in the present day context. For him, caring for the planet is a means to the end of nature only. We witness, as Rolston argues that from plants to the higher sentient animals have a sound survival system. They are capable to value their own world. An animal values its own life for what it is in itself intrinsically. In the same way plants make themselves, overhaul injuries, move water, and photo-synthase from cell to cell; they stock sugar, make toxins and adjust their leaves in defense against grazers, they make nectars and emit pheromones to influence the behavior of possible insects and responses to other plants; they make thrones and trap insects. Hence a life is defended for what it is in itself. Even organism has a "good" of its kind; it defends of its own kind as a good kind.[36] Hence these show that everything in nature is valuable and able to value of its own. Holmes Rolston III says that environmental ethics should pay primary attention on nature

[35]Rolston, Homes; (2006), Art, Ethics and Environment*: A Free Inquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature.* Newcastle. UK: Cambridge Scholars Press, P. 1-11.

[36]Ibid, p. 1-11

itself and not on human interests.[37] In his opinion, environmental ethics is not an ethics of resource use; it is also not one of benefits, costs and their just distribution; it is also not one of pollution levels or needs of future generations.[38] He believes that an environmental ethic must illuminate, account for or ground appropriate respect for and duty towards the natural environment without giving priority to human interest.

Tom Regan's View

Tom Regan is on the opinion that ethics which lays primary importance on human interests would give us an ethics for the use of the environment and the ethics which sets primary importance on nature is an ethics of the environment. He speaks of two types of environmental ethics - *ethics for the use of the environment* and *ethics of the environment*[39]. The first one echoes anthropocentrism and the second echoes non-anthropocentrism. The advocate of an environmental ethic of the *second kind* hold that an ethic of such kind can be established if they provide profs that animals, plants and all non-living things have intrinsic value. J. Baird Callicott adheres to this view when he says: "An adequate value theory for non-anthropocentric environmental ethics must provide for the intrinsic value of both individual organisms and a hierarchy of super organism entities – population, species.... and the biosphere".[40]

The environmental ethics which Holmes Rolston III and J. Baird Callicott propose is precisely an ethic of the environment which accounts for or ground appropriate respect for and duty towards nature as a whole by appealing to its intrinsic value. Such an ethic attributes different intrinsic values to different living beings of nature, such as greater intrinsic value to wild in comparison to domestic organisms.

Regan examines this particular conception of environmental ethic and concludes that such a conception rests on a mistake because there is no satisfactory

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[37]Rolson, Holmes III, (1994), *Conserving Natural Value.* New York: Columbia University Press, p.

[38] Holmes Rolston III,(1975), Is There an Ecological Ethic?: *Ethics, Vol. 85, No. 2*, The University of Chicago Press, p. 93-109

[39] Regan, Tom, (1981), "The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic." Environmental Ethics 3.1: p.19-34.

[40]Ibid, p. 19-34.

theory of intrinsic value which can provide a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic (ethic of the environment)[41]. Regan is concerned with two issues. Firstly, what is the role played by the concept of intrinsic value in establishing the non-anthropocentric ethic? His intention is not to define intrinsic value, but the role played by it in framing a proper environmental ethic. He assumes that if intrinsic value is possessed by an entity then the thing is good-in-itself. Secondly he discusses four different theories of intrinsic value. These theories differ from each other in the following respects:

- some are monistic (only one thing is intrinsically valuable e.g., Hedonism) whereas some are pluralistic (more than one thing is intrinsically valuable e.g., Moore's view);
- some theories present intrinsic value as the sole ground of our moral obligation e.g., classical utilitarianism whereas some theories present intrinsic value as merely one of the grounds of our moral obligation e.g., Rolston's view;
- The kinds or types of objects possessing intrinsic value are all different in the four theories (one theory advocates that pleasure possess intrinsic value, another theory regards beauty as intrinsically valuable, another one says rational autonomous individuals possess intrinsic value and the last one says that ecosystem possesses intrinsic value).

This last difference, according to Regan, is concerned with the ontology of intrinsic value and it is more fundamental than the first two because he believes that this point has not been discussed much earlier in the philosophical literature regarding intrinsic value in general or intrinsic value of nature in particular. Regan discusses in detail this issue and argues that ignoring this discussion is a mistake.

Ernest Partridge's View

In an abstract of a paper, Ernest Partridge said that wilderness can be defended in terms of the intrinsic value of the experience that is gained through encountering it. He also said, affirming the intrinsic goodness is one thing and justifying is another. Intrinsic value is not arguable by an appeal to other values. To

[41] Regan, T, (1992), Does environmental ethics rest on a mistake? *Monist,* 75, p. 161–182.

offer normative support of a value is to presume that value is derivative; that is not intrinsic. While an intrinsic value can be examined and recognized, it is not likely to be found as the conclusion of an argument. It is, in this sense, in the nature more of a datum (like pain or yellow) than of an assertion…something one has rather than one derives.[42]

For partridge, perhaps the best approach to a justification of intrinsic worth of wilderness may be of the experiences of wilderness. It should be an account detached, as much as possible, from second hand reports of the experience, and based, as much as possible, upon the recollection of feelings evolves directly by that experience. In this regard, Partridge elaborated his own experiences which he considered to be phenomenological.

Ben Bradley's View

As per Ben Bradley, there is a dichotomy between Moore and Kant in the concept of intrinsic value[43]. While Moore is saying that states of affairs such as states of pleasure or desire, satisfaction are the bearers of intrinsic value Kant viewed that concrete objects like people are intrinsically valuable. Hence both the views are seemed to be contradictory. A short analysis can show the picture between Moore and Kant. Moore's theory of intrinsic value has three components:

1. That to say that something has intrinsic value is to say that it ought to exist for its own sake, is good in itself.
2. That to say that something has intrinsic value is to attribute to it a simple, unanalyzable, non-natural property.
3. That concerning the claim that something has intrinsic value ' no relevant evidence whatever can be adduced…….we can guard against error only by taking care that, when we try to answer a question of this kind, we have before our minds that question only, not some other.'

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[42]Partridge, Ernest,*Meditations on wilderness*, The Wilderness Experience as Intrinsically Valuable, Viewpoint, Wisconsin Institute, unpublished and unsubmitted paper in early 1970.

[43] Bradley, Ben, (2006), *Ethical theory and the moral practice;* vol. 9, No. 2, published by Springer, p. 111-130

In these three central components the first one is an analysis of the concept of intrinsic value. The second establishes that Moore's view is a realist, objectivist and naturalist. And third is a thesis about epistemology of value is suitably elaborated.

"Nonhuman nature" is a highly generalized term. Non-anthropocentric theories actually fall along a spectrum of inclusivity, with increasingly expansive theories attributing intrinsic value to increasingly wider circle of beings, and for different reasons. As such, the arguments a conservationist might use to defend the intrinsic value of some nonhuman entity (or its interests) and advocate its protection would depend on which set of nonhumans was of moral concern. By referring to the intrinsic value of "nonhuman nature," we are vastly simplifying a multidimensional concept that has been debated at length by the environmental ethics community. It is also important to note that non-anthropocentric conceptualizations of intrinsic value are not unilaterally conducive to conservation efforts. Consider, for example, a case in which the re-introduction of predators might serve overall ecosystem health. An animal-centrist, concern for the resultant stress and suffering of individual prey, might not support predator re-introduction, arguing that the rights or welfare of individual animals ought to take moral precedence over the health of the system. In this paper we emphasize non-anthropocentric theories of intrinsic value as an ethical basis for conservation. However, it is also the case that nonhuman intrinsic value might, in some instances, present complex ethical challenges for conservation.

In the Moorean ethical tradition, moral agents should strive to maximize the goodness of the world, as measured by the intrinsic value of its constituent states of affairs. Though perhaps, conceptually simple, the task of computing the intrinsic value of some situation, let alone the whole world, is operationally challenging to say the least. For example, consider the state of affairs, which might have intrinsic value to degree five. It would seem to make sense that also has intrinsic value to degree five. But is the intrinsic value different? Or is a distinct state of affairs with negative intrinsic value that does not affect the positive intrinsic value of Lester's pleasure? Our point is that there is no objectively "correct" way to define states of affairs, let alone assign them degrees of intrinsic value, and different philosophers have proposed different ways to handle computation and aggregation of intrinsic value.

While for Moore intrinsic value is generally associated with the consequentialist ethics, which focus mostly on producing good or beneficial outcomes, Kantian intrinsic value is generally associated with deontological ethics, which focus more on appropriate intentions and dutiful conduct. In terms of intrinsic value, consequentially right conduct will maximize the positive intrinsic value of the world's states of affairs, while deontologically right conduct will demonstrate due honor or respect to bearers of intrinsic value. For example, a consequentialist might justify trophy hunting by citing the financial benefits it creates for conservation programs or local communities. A deontologist, on the other hand, might believe on principle that life is sacred and should not be sacrificed for sport or recreation, no matter how many beneficial outcomes might be achieved as a result. Along these lines, Kantian intrinsic value is used to ground normative claims about the duties and obligations moral agents have toward bearers of intrinsic value. Kant, for example, believed bearers of intrinsic value should be treated with respect, "always at the same time as end and never merely as means". Interpreting this normative injunction as it applies specifically to nonhuman beings has been an important part of the environmental ethical agenda.

Eugene C. Hargrove's View

The non-anthropocentrists were dissatisfied with the concept of instrumental value of nature and with arguments based on human use and benefit from nature. Some of them propagated the view that nature has the right to be preserved. They argue that nature has intrinsic value and so nature has the right to protection from careless handling of human beings. According to these environmentalists, unlike traditional intrinsic value (which is attributed to art) nature possesses non-anthropocentric intrinsic value. This non-anthropocentric intrinsic value is opposed to instrumental value and consequently the term "anthropocentric" becomes a synonym for the word "instrumental".

However, Hargrove believes that this is a misconception due to the fact that the pragmatists wanted to eliminate intrinsic value and propagate instrumental value. He insists that "anthropocentric" is not a synonym for "instrumental". Rather the word "anthropocentric" means "viewing anything from the standpoint of human" or

"human-centered". In his article "Weak Anthropocentric intrinsic value", he holds that non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theories are broadly divided into two kinds – an objectivist version and a subjectivist version. He will gradually show that both these versions have certain drawbacks and so they cannot encounter anthropocentrism. He offers his own theory called "weak anthropocentric intrinsic value theory" as a guideline to preserve and protect nature. He discusses in detail the objectivist and subjectivist intrinsic value theories and also Pragmatic instrumentalism. Finally, he presents his own new theory.

Hargrove begins with the concept of moral and immoral acts. In the history of western civilization, there have been two contrasting approaches towards morality. One is called virtue approach, where people were trained to develop a good moral character because moral persons alone can act morally. Such an approach is found in ancient and medieval periods. The other view is called rule approach where certain universal rules are to be followed very strictly. This approach is found in modern period. The effect or intention of rule approach, according to him, is to limit the range of ethical decision making so that weak our unscrupulous moral agents cannot waiver or modify universal rules to satisfy their own immoral desires.[44]

The purpose behind the objective non-anthropocentric intrinsic value seems to be similar to the rule approach because objective intrinsic value is independent of human judgments and man's cultural ideals. Human judgments and their cultural ideals, at present, support preservation of nature but in future they may change in such a way as to destroy nature. So Paul Taylor a prominent proponent of objective non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory says that anthropocentrism is related to human culture; if a particular society's culture does not promote nature's preservation then the people of that society would not preserve or protect nature. Hargrove speaks of two kinds of rules – constitutive and non-constitutive which correspond to the rules of a game and the rules of a good play. Constitutive rules are those which if followed exactly under any circumstances produce a moral act. On the other hand, there is

[44]Hargrove, E.C., (1992), Weak anthropocentric intrinsic value, *The Monist*, Vol. 75, No 2, Oxford University Press,183–208.

relaxation on non-constitutive rules. These rules may be followed exactly or may be followed with slight deviation as circumstances demand. Objective non-anthropocentric intrinsic value is similar to constitutive rules because such values, being independent of human judgments and their culture, automatically generate moral behaviour in man.

The history of environmental ethic has seen changes frequently occurring in human attitudes towards environment. For instance, people initially thought that nature was not beautiful and this attitude changed afterwards. However the objective non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory, like constitutive rules, has a stronger approach because it believes in the existence of intrinsic values in nature without being dependent on individual's attitude at all. But the question is: how can we persuade the ordinary people to believe in the independent existence of such values in nature? Hargrove suggests that it is better to discard objective non-anthropocentric value theory. We should defend the values of nature on the ground that they are a part of our culture. We can focus on the merits of these values as culturally evolved values. In this context he speaks about four kinds of values:-

- Non-anthropocentric instrumental value
- Anthropocentric instrumental value
- Non-anthropocentric intrinsic value
- Anthropocentric intrinsic value

Non-anthropocentric instrumental value – such a value is derived from the instrumental relationship of benefit and harm between plants and animals. It is maintained that one object (existing in nature) either instrumentally benefits another or not, irrespective of human's thinking and knowledge about its existence. Such values are independent of human judgments. Anthropocentric instrumental value indicates whether a plant or an animal is useful to humans or any living being. Such judgments are made by humans. Non-anthropocentric intrinsic value is possessed by living organisms that are centers of purposes and use nature for their own benefits. These values do not depend on human interests. Anthropocentric intrinsic value is totally dependent on humans. Living beings and nonliving entities are intrinsically valuable according to human beings. Such values are totally dependent on human judgments. Thus from this discussion we find that non-anthropocentrism stands for

"not viewing from human standpoint" whereas anthropocentrism stands for "viewing from human standpoint".

Non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theorists have two reasons to object to anthropocentric intrinsic value theories:-

1. Non-anthropocentric intrinsic values are desperately required to defeat anthropocentric instrumental values.
2. Non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theorists claim that there can only be one kind of intrinsic value and that is non-anthropocentric value.

Hargrove seriously objects to this second reason. The claim made in the second point, that there is only one kind of intrinsic value or even that this one kind is relevant to environmental ethics, is unacceptable to Hargrove. It appears to him that there is a competition between various conceptions of intrinsic value and among this recognition of anthropocentric intrinsic value is harmful to non-anthropocentric intrinsic value. Against such an idea, Hargrove argues that anthropocentric intrinsic values are absolutely essential in environmental ethics and are not in competition with non-anthropocentric intrinsic values.

Paul Taylor is a proponent of non-anthropocentric intrinsic value. He speaks of three kinds of intrinsic value – the immediately good, the intrinsically valued and inherent worth. He defines the immediately good as "any experience or activity of a conscious being which it finds to be enjoyable, satisfying, pleasant, or worthwhile in itself." [45] This value is sometimes called intrinsic value. He proceeds to define the intrinsically valued and inherent worth. As Taylor says "An entity is intrinsically valued in this sense only in relation to its being valued in a certain way by some human evaluator. The entity may be a person, animal or plant, a physical object, a place or even a social practice".[46] A person assigns such a value to an entity only when it is precious or he admires it, loves it or appreciates it. This entity may be a ceremonial occasion, historically significant objects, significant locations, natural wonders, works of art, ruins of ancient culture and also living beings (e.g., a pet dog/cat, rare plants, etc.). From a moral point of view, we have the negative duty not

[45]Taylor, P.W, (1981), The Ethics of Respect for Nature; Environmental Ethics 3, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 197–218.

[46] Ibid p. 197-218

to destroy, harm, damage or misuse the thing and also a positive duty to protect it from being destroyed, harmed, damaged or misused by others. Finally, inherent worth is the value of a thing because it has a good of its own. Such an entity's good (welfare, well-being) deserves consideration and concern of all moral agents and the entity's good should be promoted and protected as an end-in-itself for the sake of that entity. This entity is a living being (human or animal or plant) and not any non-living things. These entities are objects of respect. This respect should not be confused with the attitudes which we have towards intrinsically valued entities.

Hargrove believes that Taylor's concepts of intrinsically valued and inherent worth are close to the concepts of anthropocentric intrinsic value and non-anthropocentric intrinsic value respectively. Hargrove feels that the central issue in Taylor's discussions is whether the intrinsically valued can be separated from inherent worth. If they cannot be then human beings can assign intrinsic value to those having inherent worth. Two questions may be raised here according to Hargrove:

1. Firstly Taylor has not shown that respecting something is equivalent to assigning intrinsic value to that thing, although he rightly holds that respect should not be identified with love, admiration and appreciation which are forms of intrinsic valuing. But Hargrove thinks that respecting something is nothing but intrinsically valuing it.
2. Secondly, Taylor said that an object possessing inherent worth is "seen" as an object of respect and this implies that no human judgment is involved here. Human beings simply see or discover that an object possesses inherent worth and then automatically respect that object. This account, according to Hargrove, is implausible.

Hargrove thinks just the opposite of what Taylor said. Hargrove feels that when an entity is seen to possess inherent worth, human beings alone can decide to value it intrinsically on the basis of cultural values. Thus human judgment has to be involved in case of respecting a living being. He explains his point with an example from the films 'Alien' and 'Aliens'. The aliens reproduce within another living organism which may be a human. The new-born comes out of that organism killing

that organism. Now these aliens have goods of their own and so have inherent worth. From this fact it follows that men will automatically respect the aliens (according to Taylor's theory) and will have moral duty to protect and preserve the aliens. But Hargrove thinks this is not the case. He says human beings will have such a moral duty and intrinsically value those aliens only if they (human beings) decide to do so. In the present case humans may not decide to intrinsically value the aliens because:

- Aliens are not safe to people and
- Aliens would have to be in its natural ecosystem and not in another ecosystem where they are very destructive.

In fact, Hargrove wants to show that a creature's good of its own is not irrelevant to the moral concern of the humans; only thing is that after realizing a creature's own good, humans decide to value it intrinsically and also show moral concern.

Hargrove points out another defect in Taylor's theory. The non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory fails to include nonliving objects in the purview of moral concern of humans because nonliving objects do not have inherent worth (only living beings, Taylor says, have inherent worth). So Hargrove do not support non-anthropocentric value theory and speaks of "weak anthropocentric theory" where humans out of cultural values will attribute intrinsic value to the nonliving entities. Among the nonliving entities cave is one example which will show the hollowness of objectivist non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory in protecting and preserving the caves. Cave is not an object at all. It is a hollow space in layers of sediments. One can argue to preserve and protect cave following Taylor's definition of inherent worth. Bats, insects, worms etc. have inherent worth because they are living beings and they live in caves. So we can preserve and protect caves in terms of preserving bats, worms, etc. But this argument, Hargrove thinks, is not sound to generate preservationist concern. The strongest argument for protection and preservation of caves can be provided by "weak anthropocentrism". Humans will attribute intrinsic value to the caves and then decide to protect and preserve the caves. People will decide to act in such a way so as to preserve natural beauty. Hargrove clearly states

that he disagrees with objectivist non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory on two points:

1. Only living entities deserve moral concern from humans and

2. Humans themselves do not attribute intrinsic value to living or non-living beings.

He highlights some portions of Rolston's theory to show the need of anthropocentric intrinsic value theory. Holmes Rolston III, an advocate of objectivist non-anthropocentric value theory, divides the world into two groups - beholders of value (humans) and holders of value (organisms with goods of their own) the value that the beholders behold.

Rolston also speaks of value producers or systemic value. Ecosystem has systemic value since it produces value and ecosystem can also be termed as a value holder because it projects, conserves and elaborates value holders (living beings). Rolston cannot give much importance to natural beauty because he adheres to objective non-anthropocentric value. But contrarily we find that he appreciates natural beauty. To quote Hargrove "Rolston writes, no philosopher has a better feel for and appreciation of natural beauty than he does". So Rolston has to introduce anthropocentric intrinsic valuing to make place for his own aesthetic values rather than to propagate non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory.

Let us now consider the theory of Subjectivist non-anthropocentric intrinsic value. Callicott is the most renowned advocate of subjectivist non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory. Callicott developed two theories: First he has argued that humans confer intrinsic value on nature, but for the sake of nature itself. Second, human beings have to realize that he is one with nature.[47]An anthropocentric value theory (or axiology), by common consensus, confers intrinsic value on human beings and regards all other things, including other forms of life, as being only instrumentally valuable, i.e., valuable only to the extent that they are means or instruments which may serve human beings. A non-anthropocentric value theory (or

[47]Callicott J. B, (1984) Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics; American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4, University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical Publications,p. 299-309

axiology), on the other hand, would confer intrinsic value on some non-human beings. [48]

So, if man is intrinsically valuable then nature is also intrinsically valuable. He believes that his theory is non-anthropocentric because human beings value something (nature) other than themselves; his theory is intrinsic because humans value nature for the sake of nature itself. He says that it is only humans who make decisions about which thing to be valued and which things not. They may value an object either intrinsically or instrumentally. They value nature as a possessor of intrinsic value.

An intrinsically valued entity, according to this theory, is one which is valuable "for" its own sake, for itself, but it is not valuable "in" itself, i.e. its value is not independent of any human consciousness. Hargrove makes three points about Callicott's theory: First, Hargrove believes that it is not true that only humans can impose value on an object, otherwise the object would not have any value. On the contrary, nature has intrinsic value independently of being valued by humans. Second, Callicott's position cannot be termed non-anthropocentric as he holds that the source of all values is human consciousness and this view reflects nothing but anthropocentrism. Third, his theory is "too much subjective".

Hargrove argues when it is said that values depend entirely on human beings, it does not mean that all such values should be considered as merely subjective. There are some such values which are objective in character since these are values which are accepted by all the people of a particular society, e.g., cultural values. So these values can be regarded as objective in a sense. Similarly when human beings impose value on nature for its own sake then also these values are objective. Hargrove moves on to discuss a very important issue related to anthropocentric intrinsic value theory.

1. The term "intrinsic value" is confusing or mystical.
2. It will be easier for ordinary people to understand a value-theory if it is based on instrumental value.

[48] Ibid, p. 299-309

These arguments are put forward by the Pragmatic instrumentalists who believe that nature has only instrumental value. Hargrove dismisses the above two criticisms. Many environmental philosophers will disagree with this second criticism. It is certain that if we impose instrumental value to nature then it will devaluate nature. Conferring instrumental value to nature will not persuade people to look at nature with respect.

Hargrove turns to the first criticism. Bryan Norton, a renowned pragmatist, says that nature has transformative value – a value that changes human life.[49] Hargrove disagrees with this concept of transformative value and says that it is not true that valuing nature will change a human life or move him emotionally. Valuing nature depends on our social standards just as valuing paintings depend on some social standards. The famous painting of Mona Lisa has intrinsic value not because it changes the life of viewers.

In fact many thinkers would not even understand the depth of the painting but still would appreciate it because the experts value it on the basis of some social ideals. Similarly nature has also intrinsic value relative to some social standards and ideals. Nature has cultural value. It is valuable in a non-instrumental way which cannot be rated in terms of money. People cannot fix any rate for buying or selling natural objects. Actually, nature is priceless or we can say, it is too valuable for any price to be set upon them. Nature is to be valued aesthetically and scientifically so that we all exempt from using nature as our means. Nature is comparable to paintings because paintings are also kept away from the market value system. Such values which we impose on nature or paintings are due to our desires as individuals, as a society, as a historically evolved culture to value some objects non-instrumentally.

Finally, Hargrove speaks about his own theory termed ‘Weak anthropocentric intrinsic value theory’. He justifies the name of his theory in the following way. It is termed weak anthropocentrism rather than anthropocentrism to specify the fact that nature is not to be valued instrumentally, nature has intrinsic value. The term “anthropocentrism” is indispensable in the name of his theory. Whatever is valued in

[49]Hargrove, E.C, (1992), Weak anthropocentric intrinsic value, *The Monist*, Vol. 75, No 2, Oxford University Press, p. 183–208.

whatever way (either instrumentally or intrinsically) is to be valued by humans. It is humans who impose value on any object. So we cannot do away with the term "anthropocentrism". But this does not imply that humans always value things instrumentally. There are some things which humans value intrinsically.

It is a wrong conception that human can value things only instrumentally. The term "non-anthropocentric intrinsic value is really more problematic then the term anthropocentric intrinsic value ...". In case of the former name, the word "non-anthropocentric" is reluctant. The word "intrinsic" means "for it's own sake". Nature has intrinsic value means it has value-in-itself, it is valued for its own sake.

The term "non-anthropocentric" means that an object's value is not derived from the value of a human evaluator. An object has value independently of any human beings. Thus the meanings of the terms "intrinsic" and "non-anthropocentric" are same. So Hargrove chose the name 'anthropocentric intrinsic value' for this theory. By this name, he emphasized the fact that nature has intrinsic value (value for its own sake) and humans value nature intrinsically (humans value nature for its own sake).

2.7: Conclusive remark

The dilemma is that most of our fundamental beliefs about intrinsic value are in direct conflict with the anticipated changes in nature. That is the challenge. The debates about the concept and warrant of intrinsic value go right from the consequentialists' form to the deontologists' structure that leads to the root of our basic thinking. In Environmental ethics ethicists have tendency to substitute our anthropocentric thinking with ecocentric thinking. Anthropocentric philosophy considers everything from the point of view of mankind, and the inalienable right to pursue his fortune as he sees fit. The egocentric person thinks only of himself in a social context as opposed to an ecocentric philosophy, which advocates respect for all nature and all creatures' basic rights. This issue is at the very heart of philosophy and religious beliefs. European philosophy and Christianity is founded on anthropocentric concepts. However, philosophically speaking this is the anthropocentric thinking which was the driving core of the approach to life. There was little concern for nature and other creatures as equal partners. This is seconded in European philosophy by our

Greek heritage. This started with the sophistic thinking, which took its starting point in the human being and his ability to think as opposed to a competing concept of the human being in an all-embracing cosmos. From this developed the roots of logic and scientific thinking. In this regard, environmentalists in particular are antagonistic to one of the most prominent European philosophers, Rene Descartes (1596-1650), for his statement: “Cogito ergo sum”. Everything starts with man and his ability to think. All values, all concepts are derived from man. It is thought provoking that the most basic and scientifically fundamental considerations of the renaissance were devoted to something as “useless” as astronomy. Galileo Galilei (1564- 1642) proved that the earth circled the sun and not the other way around and was condemned by the Church. He introduced experiments and applied mathematics, further developed by Isaac Newton (1642-1727), Pierre de Fermat (1601-1665), G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716) and many others to follow. Science became one of the pillars in European philosophy and formed the basis for the industrial revolution of the last century. In this context, the result was the western concept to conquer the world-not only the world in a geographical sense, but also in the sense of mastering the universe. Man can shape his own destiny without constraints. This anthropocentric attitude is quite understandable in view of what has been achieved. But that becomes one sided doctrine and has equally (rather more strongly) been criticized.

The antipode to anthropocentric thinking is frequently associated with philosophers like Arne Neass, Homes Rolstom III and many others along with the American Indian. In Indian philosophy, man is intermingled with nature and must live in harmony with it. The spirits are the nature in all its forms.

The Western human-nature dichotomy has long been criticized by environmental ethicists as a fundamental problematic of the modern age, which must be dissolved to curb the trend of increasing and irreversible environmental degradation. Dismantling the dichotomy could potentially de-center humans from the moral universe, into a more evolutionarily and ethically accurate position alongside the rest of the biota. And yet, if humans come to view themselves as part of nature, why or on what grounds would we ever limit the human enterprise? The great potential of a non-dichotomized view of humans and nature is balanced by an equally

great risk, that the use of important conservation strategies like protected areas often justified by ethical appeals presupposing a separation of humans and nature may no longer be utilized even though these strategies may still be effective and justifiable on other ethical grounds. Therefore, the intellectual shift toward socio-ecological systems thinking, "humans and nature", is both promising and precarious. While this shift has begun to blur the boundaries between humans and nature, it also necessitates a careful and creative ethical framework suited to the unique challenges of protecting the complex world we inhabit.

Some thinkers made an effort in this direction, proposing new normative postulates for modern conservationists in a paper that stimulated lively discussion and debate. Two years later, however, this debate was stifled by the pragmatic call for conservationists to stop bickering over values, embrace their differences, and focus on outcomes on the ground. This pragmatic turn is somewhat puzzling, in that it suggests conservation is more of a practice than a mission, or more of a means than an end. In its pragmatic stance, conservation appears to operate with the primary agenda of "working," a normative pursuit whose only principled commitment is to be effective. But we might stop to ask, effective to what end? What actually constitutes success? As individuals and as a community, how do conservationists define their mission in the 21st century?