

## CHAPTER III

### THE INCOHERENCE OF THE NO-SUBJECT ACCOUNT OF 'I'.

I propose to devote this chapter to an examination of Wittgenstein and Schlick's account of no-subject or no-ownership theory, and to see if it could explain the concept of person apropos of Strawson's observation that we ordinarily talk of ourselves by ascribing two different kinds of predicates which seem to suggest that a human being or a person is the subject of both these types of predicates. Unlike the Humean or the classical no-subject account, Wittgenstein and Schlick's account lacks orientation of explaining the concept of subject in such a way as of admitting relations among its experiences. Again, interestingly they oppose the approach of the theorists who rather might be supposed to have claimed that experiences belong to body. This variety of no-ownership or no-subject view, which neither Wittgenstein nor Schlick precisely held, has been reconstructed by Strawson out of the hints they both dropped in their works.

The no-subject theory in its most primary and particular appearance opposes any ascription of our states of consciousness not only to the very same entity to which we ascribe our ordinary physical characteristics but simply opposes the ascription of states of consciousness to anything at all. And so one of the questions asked by Strawson 'why do we ascribe our states of consciousness to the very same thing as certain corporeal characteristics &c.?' does not arise in this view. For the supporters of this view maintain that it is only because of the

linguistic illusion that we think that we ascribe all kinds of predicates to one and the same thing. Strawson's other question 'why do we ascribe our states of consciousness to anything at all?' would not arise in this account for the same reason that it is only a linguistic illusion that we assign our states of consciousness to anything at all.

Although both Wittgenstein and Schlick are in favour of no-subject theory, it is better to study them separately. So let us proceed with the views of Wittgenstein. In a footnote of his Individuals Strawson says, 'The evidence that Wittgenstein at one time held such a view is to be found in Moore's articles in Mind on 'Wittgenstein's lecture in 1930-33' (Mind, Vol. LXIV, PP. 13-14).'<sup>1</sup> With this remark of Strawson as the central part of his intention to make an outline of the no-ownership theory, it may also be added that Wittgenstein reveals such a view about person in both his early and later works particularly in Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations. Of course, the Tractarian and the later characterization of the concept of person may apparently seem to be different.

In Tractatus Wittgenstein gets him to have reflected this concern of the subject in the following proposition.

5.631 There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.

If we examine what exactly is the logic for such a concern about the no-subject, we would see an exegesis Wittgenstein himself offers for this account in proposition 5.632. He says, 'The subject does not belong to the world : rather, it is a limit of the world.' He explains this proposition with the support of an analogy of the eye and the visual field. Whatever we see, we see that in our visual

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1. Individuals, p.95.

field; but never does the eye appear in the visual field, and nothing in the visual field allows us to infer that it is seen by an eye. Similarly the subject being the source of the experiences could not be found among those experiences as an object and nothing in the world of experiences allows us to infer that its owner or bearer is the subject. Wittgenstein expresses this view at 5.633. He says, 'Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found ? You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.'

To have some more Tractarian characterization of the concept of the subject we may consider what Wittgenstein says at 5.5421, for it would support our appreciation of his view. He says, '... that there is no such thing as the soul-the subject, etc. - as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day.'

In psychology some forms of propositions - e.g. 'A believes that P' and 'A has the thought P' etc. - are considered to allow someone to think that P as an object gets related to A which stands for the subject. But rejecting this notion of psychology Wittgenstein writes in 5.542 : 'It is clear, however, that 'A believes that P', 'A has the thought P', and 'A says P' are of the form "'P" says P' : and this does not involve a correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects.' That is, if the form of this proposition "'P" says P' is considered, the idea of the subject will appear to be superficial since in the ontology of his Tractatus he speaks of one world, the world which is the totality of facts; and so there can not be any distinction between mental and physical objects, rather they are alike, even there is no conceptual distinction. According to Derek Bolton, 'Since, however, no

subject is required to bring about the correlation of facts, the conclusion is that there is no thinking subject.’<sup>2</sup>

Having gone through this Wittgensteinian no-subject approach, we see that he is silent about any criteria of personal identity. When, for example, he says of the eye and the visual field, he speaks of this that nothing in the visual field allows him to infer his own eye no matter if he sees by his own eye. Here Wittgenstein surely will come to face the questions viz. who sees? and how? If someone agrees to admit this approach of Wittgenstein, then for him no subject may be required and also no question of identification. But can we agree with what Wittgenstein is hinting at by his no-subject theory or the consequence of this theory?

Derek Bolton says, ‘The Tractatus account of the self is similar to Hume’s, in that there appears to be no need for a thinking subject.’<sup>3</sup> This way of comparing, however, between the Humean and the Wittgensteinian account of the concept of self or person or subject, I think, is not justifiable. Hume was not ready to admit the existence of mind in the sense that as a substance it must exist, and yet will be nowhere. His intention very clearly we get from his reasoning : ‘As every idea is deriv’d from a precedent impression, had we any idea of the substance of our minds, we must also have an impression of it.’<sup>4</sup> Can we get any impression of the mind-substance? Hume says that when at any time he enters

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2. Derek Bolton, An Approach to Wittgenstein’s philosophy, Macmillan, 1979, p.31.

3. Ibid., p.80.

4. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965, p.232.

most intimately into what he calls himself, he always stumbles on some particular perception or other, and never can catch himself without a perception and observe anything but a perception. What, then, is a self? His answer is that it is not something more than a bundle or collection of various perceptions. He says, 'The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.'<sup>5</sup>

While Hume's predecessors specially the rationalists uphold that self is a substance existing in itself, he makes a departure from their line of viewing it and supports an empirical self which is a bundle of several different perceptions or a kind of theatre for perceptions. Now it appears that Wittgenstein's view of the no-subject is not comparable with that of Hume's empirical self. So far as the account of the concept of person is concerned, Wittgenstein's account particularly seems to be ambiguous. Indeed it's very difficult for us to think that there will be perception without a perceiver, thinking without a thinker. If subjectless thinking is possible, then objectless perception is also possible, and then no perception will be a perception at all. Hume is at least free from such ambiguities. Again in principle his empirical self being a collection of perceptions, is at least identifiable.

The real inconsistency however in Wittgenstein's subject account we may see in his view he expresses in his Notebooks (p.80). This view of the subject indeed turns to a new direction to its being postulated. He writes, 'The thinking subject is surely mere illusion. But the Willing subject exists. If the will did not exist, neither would there be that center of the world, which we call the I, and

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5. Ibid., p.253.

which is the bearer of ethics. What is good and evil is essentially the I, not the world.' Now, if on demand of ethics he postulates a willing subject, would it be tenable? In his Tractarian framework there is no need of any thinking subject. That is, if for thinking no thinking subject is required, then how can he intend to talk about the I as willing subject? This also seems to be an illusion. For without thinking there can not have any Willing. In point of fact, Willing is nothing but an activated thinking.

Wittgenstein's dual account of the subject concept we also see in Moore's articles on "Wittgenstein's Lecture in 1930-1933". In that lecture which he delivers at Cambridge he speaks of the two uses of "I". The first of the two uses of "I" is shown in the examples like "I've got a matchbox", or "I've got a bad tooth", where "I" is replaced by "this body" as possessor of a matchbox or of a bad tooth. In the other case of the use of "I", for example, the "I" in "I have toothache", or "I see a red patch", does not denote a possessor, and no ego is admitted to have involved in having toothache or seeing a red patch. Wittgenstein here seems to approve Lichtenberg's dictum that "instead of saying, 'I think', we (or Descartes) ought to say 'There is a thought'".<sup>6</sup>

When, of course, G.E. Moore says, 'In speaking of these two senses of "I" he said, as what he called "a final thing", "In one sense 'I' and 'conscious' are equivalent, but not in another" <sup>7</sup>, it appears that Moore is reporting about the two senses of "I" something in favour of which no justification or evidence we could find in Wittgenstein's Tractatus or his Philosophical Investigations.

6. Individuals, p.95.

7. G.E. Moore, "Wittgenstein's Lecture in 1930-33", in R.R. Ammerman (ed), Classics of Analytic Philosophy, op.cit. p.275.

Moore claims that Wittgenstein compares this difference to a difference between the pictures on a film in a magic lantern and the picture on the screen. He expresses this view that the two types of picture are not on the same level for the pictures on the film have neighbours, while the picture on the screen is neighbourless, and, therefore, if we use the word "conscious" to speak of any one of the pictures on the film, it would be meaningful, but it is meaningless to say that the picture on the screen is conscious. Indeed in the Wittgensteinian sense 'I' and 'conscious' are not equivalent. From the very example which Wittgenstein uses, namely, "I have a toothache" it may not be said that here he uses "I" to denote himself as a possessor. For "I" is not replaceable by any subject, and so it can not be held that what G.E. Moore claims to have reported is true and that the 'I' is equivalent to 'conscious'. It has been seen in the Tractatus account of the concept of no-subject that the idea of any subject or person does not come into the description of any sensations or experiences, and that is why there is no reason to use "conscious" to say of the picture on the film that it is conscious.

H.O. Mounce says, 'What Wittgenstein is objecting to is not the idea of A as the subject but the idea of A's soul as the subject.'<sup>8</sup> But this remark of Mounce seems to be inappropriate. The reason is obvious since Wittgenstein admits no subject at all in the form of A or in the form of something else.

It is a matter of great philosophical interest that this type of no-subject concept Wittgenstein also seems to have entertained in his later work Philosophical Investigations. He says, "when I say 'I am in pain', I do not point to a person who is in pain, since in a certain sense I have no idea who is." And this can be given justification. For the main point is : I did not say that such-

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8. H.O. Mounce, Wittgenstein's Tractatus : An Introduction, Basil Blackwell, 1981, p.87.

and -such a person was in pain, but “I am...” Now in saying this I don't name any person' (Part-1, Section -404). It is thus a novel Wittgensteinian approach that when he speaks of 'I am in pain', he speaks of the experience of feeling pain itself, without talking about the owner of the experience referred to by the 'I'.

In The Blue and Brown Books Wittgenstein says, ‘...that the word “I” in “I have pains” does not denote a particular body, for we can't substitute for “I” a description of a body.’<sup>9</sup> Now a question may arise. If “I” in the sentence “I have pains” does not refer to any subject, why, then, is this word “I” used in such sentences? Here we see Wittgenstein adopt the Cartesian line of treating the body as no-subject and say that “I” can not refer to “this” body. He, therefore, says that one should not say that “I have pains” means “This body has pains”. Then, is he indicating by using this word “I” something bodiless which Descartes said to have referred to? Certainly he isn't. For when he speaks of feeling pain itself, he refuses to accept any owner or bearer who feels pain.

It is indeed an awkward position which has been created by Wittgenstein's exposition of the concept of self. There is experience of feeling pain, but no subject is there to experience that feeling of pain. We would see later that exactly this position of Wittgenstein has been vehemently attacked by P.F.Strawson. Of course, Wittgenstein seems to have given answer to the question of why “I” is used in the way he actually did. He says that like the word “It” in “It is raining”, the word “I” is simply a grammatical filler in the sentences like “I have pains”.

In an important passage in Philosophical Investigations (PI), (Part-1,

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9. The Blue and Brown Books, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1978, P.74.



Section-351.) Wittgenstein tells us, "Pain is pain - whether he has it, or I have it; and however I come to know whether he has a pain or not." In this account he appears to have admitted as a matter of fact that it is possible to know whether someone has a pain or not. But how did he come to know it? This question may be put in another way, how did he know whether any other person is in pain or not? In this context he says, "...the supposition that he has a pain is simply the supposition that he has the same as I" (PI, Part - 1, Section - 350). But the supposition gets him no further because it is based on the argument from analogy. However, he remarks, "what would it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 'toothache'" (PI, Part - 1, Section - 257). Wittgenstein here seems to have rejected the argument from analogy. He said that the supposition that he has a same pain as I did not help us go further to say whether someone is in pain or not, and followed behaviourism to dissolve this problem of other minds.

From the view that behaviour is the criterion of knowing mental processes Wittgenstein, however, may get a justification to have stated that from one's pain-behaviour he may rightly say whether that person is in pain. By adopting this criteria he also opposes the private language thesis. He says that 'language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose : to convey thoughts - which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please' (PI, Part-1, Section -304). Furthermore, his another important statement : 'you learned the concept of 'pain' when you learned language' (PI, Part-1, Section - 384), seems to convey the sense that we naturally speak of the mental phenomena-for example, pain - and these mental phenomena we know from the common behaviour of mankind. So he goes on saying, "Once you know what the word stands for, you

understand it, you know its whole use" (PI, Part-1, Section - 264).

Now it appears that if in conveying thoughts language in our human contexts serves the same uniform purpose in a certain way (really our language functions this way), then in that same context there shall definitely be a use of the word "I" as a pronoun to replace a noun standing for each person who uses it. Of course, there may be controversy over this question of whether a person denoted by the word "I" is an understanding subject or something else. Whatever a person might be, i.e. a subject of experiences or body or self or combination of body and self in a unique way or person, he or she can never stand for a no-subject. But Wittgenstein says that in using sentences like 'I am in pain', he does not point to a person who is in pain for in a certain sense he has no idea of the person who is in pain. And it is in a definite sense a violation of the rules of the usage of ordinary language in which the concept of subject as the owner of experiences is admitted to function in one way.

Another type of inconsistency in his account we might see when we see him entertain different ideas of the concept of "I" as the no-subject, the willing subject, and the subject as language - game -player. The concept of language - game - player we get from his emphatic saying that we learn actually the concept of meaning from what he calls the language - game, and so here it will not be inappropriate if we call the participants of the language - game as language - game - players.

Now let us again examine an important statement what Wittgenstein says at Section 404 in his Philosophical Investigations. For I think this is the key-section of this masterwork and in this section he clearly reflects a view of the subject which is nothing but a continuation of his no-subject account of 'I' he

entertains in his earlier work Tractatus. The statement is stated in its indirect form that when he (Wittgenstein) says 'I am in pain', he does not point to a person who is in pain, since in a certain sense he has no idea who is. Is it not a strange matter, then, to think that there is pain, but there is no identified subject or person who is in pain or who is the possessor of it? Wittgenstein's account of the subject throughout his early and later works, therefore, appears to be an account of the no-subject.

In his article "The Self and the World",<sup>10</sup> Roderick M. Chisholm strongly supports what Wittgenstein says in Section 404 of his Investigations. He says, 'I believe that what Wittgenstein is telling us in this important passage is true.'<sup>11</sup> If Mr. Chisholm's belief is true, then Wittgenstein's account of the concept of subject which he holds in his Investigations will not be an account of the no-subject and my view will be based on weak foundation of reasoning; but Chisholm's belief appears to be false. He says, 'It would hardly be plausible to say that the word "I" has no referent. For surely each person uses the word "I" to refer to himself. What Wittgenstein is telling us is that the word "I" has no sense.'<sup>12</sup> Chisholm's belief is wrong because he unfortunately explains Wittgenstein's view in an unwonted way. For Wittgenstein here has not at all said that the word "I" has no sense in the first-person sentences, he rather says that the word "I" has no referent. He writes, "When I say 'I am in pain', I do not *point* to a person who is in pain, since in a certain sense I have no idea who is." It seems that this statement is

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10. R.M. Chisholm, "The Self and the World" in E. Leinfellner and Others" (eds.), Wittgenstein and His Impact on Contemporary Thought, Vienna, 1978,

11. Ibid., p.407.

12. Ibid., p.407.

equivalent in meaning to the following one, viz. 'When I say 'I am in pain', I do not *refer* to a person who is in pain, since in a certain sense I have no idea who is in pain.' (In the place of the word "point" is used the word "refer" and also "in pain" is added to the end of the statement Wittgenstein writes in section 404). But why does he say that he has no idea of the one who is in pain ? It seems that it is for that same classical problem of the concept of human person about which he fails to have given a plausible account in his Tractatus.

In Investigations Wittgenstein speaks of the subject as the active participant in the language - game, and at least this sense of the subject we may get from different passages where he tells us of the language - games. But if it is asked what is the nature of this subject, perhaps no plausible answer we could find in this book. He says, 'If the picture of thought in the head can force itself upon us, then why not much more that of thought in the soul ? The human body, is the best picture of the human soul' (PI, Part-II, Section - iv). We may suppose that the subject of the immediate data of experience, then, is meant by him as the human body. But this view we again will see him oppose in Section - 286 (Part-1). He states : 'But isn't it absurd to say of a body that it has pain? - And why does one feel an absurdity in that? In what sense is it true that my hand does not feel pain, but I in my hand? What sort of issue is : Is it the body that feels pain? How is it to be decided? What makes it plausible to say that it is not the body? - Well, something like this : if someone has a pain in his hand, then the hand does not say so (unless it writes it) and one does not comfort the hand, but the sufferer.'

Is, then, the sufferer a soul, or a material body, or a living body with a consciousness? Wittgenstein denies the concept of soul, so let us consider if the sufferer is a material body, or a living body with a consciousness. If the human

body is just like a material body, then the question of ascribing states of consciousness to it will further welcome another question why states of consciousness we ascribe to material bodies and if they are ascribed to material bodies why they won't be ascribed to all material bodies instead of being ascribed only to some material bodies which are being named as human bodies. It may be said that if someone says, 'I am in pain', then the word "I" would be used to refer to the speaker who himself is a sufferer or a living body with a consciousness. But somehow this living body with a consciousness is a body; we may call this body as body C; and so the word "I" would be used to refer to his body C. Now if the word "I" is used to refer to his body C, then also the states of feeling pain could not be ascribed to his body C, and also it could not be said that this body C is the possessor or subject of the states of feeling pain, since there is not any necessary relation between his body C and the states of his feeling pain inasmuch as the states of feeling pain may causally depend as well on some other body C1. However conscious a living body might be, it seems that it could not be the owner, or possessor, or subject of mental states and processes.

Concerning Chisholm's opinion that according to Wittgenstein the word "I" has no sense, I would say that in Philosophical Investigations he never expresses any doubt regarding the meaning or sense of the word "I". Some examples may be taken here. Wittgenstein says, 'That philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions' (Section - 2), and 'A child uses such primitive form of language when it learns to talk. Here the teaching of language is not explanation, but training' (Section - 5). Thus, according to him, a child when starts speaking he is given training to learn the language, and he understands the meaning of words and expressions of the

language when he understands how they function in that language. And this is the reason why he goes on saying : ‘The meaning of a word is its use in the language’ (Section - 43). Now if use is the meaning of a word, then the word “I” in the sentence “I am in pain” surely has its sense or meaning, for it has been used in the concerned sentence.

Wittgenstein also explains the concept of meaning of words as their use in the language of everyday in Section 120 of Investigations. He writes, ‘You say : the point isn’t the word, but its meaning, and you think of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the word, though also different from the word. Here the word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow that you can buy with it. (But contrast : money, and its use.)’ Thus, it seems that there cannot have any possibility of making a ground for believing, as Chisholm does, that it is the view of Wittgenstein that the word “I” has no sense.

But why, then, Chisholm says that Wittgenstein opposes the view that the word “I” has sense. He says that, according to Frege, the word ‘I’ has both reference and sense. For example, if some person says, ‘I am in pain’, the speaker himself is referred to by this use of the word “I”, and that person’s individual concept, i.e., his concept or idea of himself is the sense of it. This view of Frege has some important implications. According to Chisholm these are as follows :

First, each person’s individual concept is different from others and one particular person is different from others because of his own individual concept. And as every person possesses individual concept, so this individual concept is the property or essence which that person himself knows to have.

Second, for the individual concept anyone can say : 'This property of being me is essential to me; for, if I didn't have it, I wouldn't exist.'<sup>14</sup>

Third, someone when uses an 'I' - sentence to make an 'I' - proposition, that 'I' - proposition implies the speaker's individual concept which is his property or essence. For example, if I use the sentence 'I am in pain' to express an 'I' - proposition, the proposition in question will imply the property or essence of being me in addition to the property of being in pain.

Some philosophers oppose this essentialistic view that 'I' -proposition implies the speaker's individual essence. Particularly Brentano says that we can not grasp in our perception such individuating essence. According to him, if something deserves to be called an essence, then that at least theoretically will exist in many things at once. Chisholm says, 'And I suggest, this is one of the things that Wittgenstein is telling us.'<sup>15</sup> But if Wittgenstein really tells us this thing, what does he tell us ? Surely he denies the essentialistic view that the individual essence, i.e. the property of being me is the sense of the word "I" when it is used in the first - person expressions or sentences. Now to say that essence of being me is not the meaning of the word "I" is not to say that the word "I" has no sense at all. So Chisholm seems to have positively committed a mistake in saying that 'What Wittgenstein is telling us is that the word "I" has no sense'. Here in this connection let us see what Wittgenstein has said in Section - 116 of his Philosophical Investigations. He says, 'When philosophers use a word - "knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name" - and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself : is the word ever actually used

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14. Ibid., p.408.

15. Ibid., p.408.

in this way in the language - game which is its original home ? -

What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.' It, therefore, seems that as far as the 'I' - sentences are concerned in Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein never says in this masterwork that the word "I" has no sense; rather he says in some occasions that the word "I" has no reference. And this is what Mr. R.M.Chisholm fails to have estimated.

Wittgenstein's account of the concept of person seems to appear to be incoherent chiefly for the reason that it denies that the expression "I" may be used by any speaker to refer to himself. And this failure to explain the concept of first persons signals that he fails also to explicate the concept of other persons. Strawson says that the no-ownership theorists are profoundly wrong. For they failed to reckon that 'it is a necessary condition of one's ascribing states of consciousness, experiences, to oneself, in the way one does, that one should also ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe them, to others who are not oneself'.<sup>16</sup>

Let us examine the views what Wittgenstein expresses to concern other people. He says, 'If we are using the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it ?), then other people very often know when I am in pain. -Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself-' (PI, Part I, Section-246). Wittgenstein probably here denies behaviour as the only criterion for knowing if someone is in pain or not, and thus in some sense opposes that language we do ordinarily use to serve the same purpose. How do we learn to use the word "pain" in our language? Could a child from his feeling of an acute sensation caused by some kind of physical injury give a name to this

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16. Individuals, p.99.



sensation from his own ideas only saying it that it is called 'pain'? A child learns the words, their uses and thus the language in the actual contexts in which he and others in that same human environment behave in one way. For instance, when a child hurts himself and cries, his mother feels anxiety for her dear child, and says oh! what's a serious wound! Then immediately she nurses her child with proper care, and asks him frequently 'Are You feeling pain now?' or 'Aren't you getting relief from the pain?' or the like. (And also there are other ways from which a child starts learning to have the concept of pain. This history is true for having perhaps many other concepts.) The child learns that this sensation caused by that wound is pain. He thus learns to use this word "pain" in other circumstances also to connect that with similar type of pain - behaviour. This is what Wittgenstein means when he speaks of the language-game. So when he says that other people can not know his pain from his pain -behaviour with the certainty with which he knows his pain, he however says something contrary to his own idea that 'language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose : to convey thoughts - which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please' (PI, Part-1, Section - 304).

Of course, there is a sense that other people may doubt whether I have pain or not; and for this reason Wittgenstein may say, 'I tell someone I am in pain. His attitude to me will then be that of belief; disbelief; suspicion; and so on' (PI, Part-1, Section - 310). For 'If one has to imagine someone else's pain on the model of one's own, this is none too easy a thing to do : for I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the model of the pain which I do feel' (PI, Part - 1, Section -302). But still this is not sufficient to say that from pain-behaviour we can not speak certainly if someone is in pain. Is it possible to think about someone that he is in pain when in fact he has no pain-behaviour or the

symptoms of pain? Indeed we cannot think about pain without pain-behaviour though we should not think that pain-behaviour is pain.

One thing, however, is theoretically possible that someone may say he is in pain just showing his deceptive pain-behaviour. But again this possibility is practically useless and theoretically baseless. For instance, in a clinic two persons may claim to have suffered from severe pain of toothache while one of them really is in pain, and the other isn't. Let us suppose that the two men in the clinic are exhibiting several pain-behaviours. But at the time of check-up won't the man who exhibits deceptive pain-behaviours be rebuked by his doctor for giving him wrong information and the waste of his time? As far as the pain of toothache of the other person is concerned we can think of the doctor to successfully identify his pain and advise him to follow prescription.

Then, why did Wittgenstein say that other persons can not know with certainty when I am in pain from my pain-behaviour, and 'I can only believe that someone else is in pain, but I know it if I am'? Does he doubt here that behaviour is the only criterion of knowing whether someone is in pain? If he does so, what does he mean by saying that behaviour is not the only criterion? Saying this, does he intend to accept some other criterion like the argument from analogy? It seems that Wittgenstein's view is not clear enough. He himself says that it can not help us go further from my feeling of pain to the pain other people feel. He says, "But if I suppose that someone has a pain, then I am simply supposing that he has just the same as I have so often had"... It is as if I were to say : "You surely know what 'It is 5 o'clock here' means; so you also know what 'It's 5 o'clock on the sun' means. It means simply that it is just the same time there as it is here

when it is 5 o'clock."- The explanation by means of identity does not work here. For I know well enough that one can call 5 o'clock here and 5 o'clock there "the same time", but what I do not know is in what cases one is to speak of its being the same time here and there.

In exactly the same way it is no explanation to say : the supposition that he has a pain is simply the supposition that he has the same as I' (PI, Part I, Section - 350).'

In the above section Wittgenstein seems to have doubted the argument from analogy. In this context I would like to refer to what G.E. Moore says in his article "Wittgenstein's Lecture in 1930-1933". I think the views as to the concept of the subject of experiences which Wittgenstein expresses in that series of lectures have not substantially been changed later on particularly in his Philosophical Investigations. Moore says that in his lecture Wittgenstein introduces a question, viz. "Is another person's toothache 'toothache' in the same sense as mine?", and as to this question he seemed 'to give definitely the answer "Yes"... though he never expressly said so; and though he seemed to throw some doubt on whether he meant this by saying "I admit that other people do have toothache- this having the meaning which we have given it".'<sup>17</sup> Moore further says, 'It seemed, therefore, that he did not think that the difference between "I have toothache" and "He has toothache" was due to the fact that the word "toothache" was used in a different sense in the two sentences. What then was it due to? Much that he said seemed to suggest that his view was that the difference was due to the fact that in "He has toothache" we were necessarily talking of a physical body, whereas in "I have toothache" we were not.'<sup>18</sup> Here if the reports of G.E. Moore is true, it would be

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17. "Wittgenstein's Lecture in 1930-33", p. 273

18. Ibid., p. 273.

plausible to say that there is an unbridgeable gap or distance between the Wittgensteinian notions of the first-person pronoun "I" and the third-person pronoun "he", i.e. between myself and others.

In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein also expresses similar type of views. This is, according to Strawson, a fundamental mistake of Wittgenstein. Why? Feeling of pain is a state of consciousness and to ascribe this state of consciousness to oneself 'one should also ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe them, to others who are not oneself.'<sup>19</sup> Wittgenstein fails to have done this; whereas this is the necessary condition of ascribing one's states of consciousness to oneself. Consequently he has been compelled to say that he can only believe that someone else is in pain, or other people cannot know with certainty whether I am in pain. He fails also to answer successfully the challenges of the sceptics regarding the issue of other minds since he himself employs scepticism in saying that other people can not know with certainty when I am in pain, or I can not know with certainty when someone is in pain.

Harold Morick suggests that Wittgenstein seeks a middle path between behaviourism and analogical argument. But this opinion of Morick does not seem to be satisfactory. For if he had employed this middle course, he at least would have said that though only from some pain-behaviours I cannot be sure of someone's being in pain, yet to some extent on the analogy of the resemblance of his pain-behaviours to the pain - behaviours of mine, I can say if that person is in pain. It, therefore, appears that Wittgenstein incoherently entertains the concept of myself and others or the general concept of a person or subject of states of consciousness in his philosophical writings. What is to be noted is that

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19. Individuals, p.99.

he has not expressed his views in any particular section or chapter or part of his books. So it is highly difficult to arrange these scattered lines to explain his views in a consistent or systematic manner. I of course have tried to arrange some of those scattered pieces to explain that his concept of the subject is evidently the concept of his no - subject.

Following strawson's view I would say that in the ordinary usage of language the first - person pronoun "I", and the third-person pronoun "he" have both first-and third-person referring uses<sup>20</sup>, and Wittgenstein neglected, or was indifferent to , or failed to mention, this first-and third-person referring use of the pronouns concerned, and much of the philosophical difficulties which arise from his account of the concept of the subject are due to this negligence, or indifference, or failure on his part. In other way it may be said that he himself has contradicted his own outlook of philosophy that 'when I talk about language (words, sentences, etc.) I must speak the language of everyday' (PI. Part - 1, Section - 120).

According to Strawson, in our language of everyday both first-person and third-person pronouns have their referring uses and the reciprocal use of the pronouns is a fundamental aspect of our ordinary language which like other philosophers Wittgenstein doesn't reckon. And for this crucial mistake Wittgenstein perhaps says, as G.E. Moore reports, that the two sentences "I have toothache", and "He has toothache" are different, since 'what verifies or is a criterion for "I have toothache" is quite differnt from what verifies or is a criterion for "He has toothache", and soon added that, since this is so, the meanings of "I have toothache" and "he has toothache" must be different'.<sup>21</sup> I think similar views

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20. Ibid., p 108.

21. "Wittgenstein's Lecture in 1930-1933" pp. 272-273.

Wittgenstein exposes in Philosophical Investigations. He says, 'The truth is : it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself' (PI Part-1, Section-246). Other people can doubt whether I am in pain as what verifies their pain is different from mine, and I can not doubt my pain for my criterion which is different from theirs. When other people speak of my pain, they say 'He is in pain', and to speak of my pain I say, 'I am in pain'.

Moore also writes, 'And he (Wittgenstein) also expressed his view that the two expressions are on a different grammatical level by saying that they are not both values of a single propositional function "X has toothache"; and in favour of this view he gave two definite reasons for saying that they are not namely, (1) that "I don't know whether I have toothache" is always absurd or nonsense, whereas "I don't know whether he has toothache" is not nonsense, and (2) that "It seems to me that I have toothache" is nonsense, whereas "it seems to me that he has" is not.'<sup>22</sup> Couldn't we get such kind of views in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations? Let us analyse the last sentence in Section 246 of this book. The sentence seems to imply (1) that it is absurd to say that 'I doubt whether I am in pain' whereas it is not absurd to say that 'I doubt whether he is in pain', and (2) that 'It seems to me that I am in pain' is nonsense, whereas 'It seems to me that he is in pain' has sense.

The two reasons which Wittgenstein is reported to have given are not sufficient and necessary enough to prove that the concerned expressions are not values of the single propositional function. We do not normally use sentences like "I don't know whether I have toothache" or "I doubt whether I am in pain"

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22. Ibid., p 273.

but if someone under certain circumstances uses such sentences, the propositions expressed by these sentences would not be nonsense. Suppose someone is suffering from inflammation of his gum; he goes to his doctor, and tells him that he is feeling now an acute toothache. After examining this patient's tooth, and the inflated area of his gum, the doctor may ask him, is it that you have a toothache? The patient may, then, reply him- I am feeling an acute pain. but I don't know whether I have a toothache; or it seems to me that I have a toothache. Let us suppose that the patient says it to mean that the said pain may be the effect of some other causes or cause unknown to him. The same thing may be said regarding the expression "I doubt whether I am in pain"; but that may be said in another situation and I think to give an example of that is not essential here. Now it seems that Wittgenstein's reasons are wrong. Hence the said expressions are values of the propositional function "X has toothache".

Wittgenstein had a general conception of philosophy. According to him, 'Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it' (PI, Part-I, Section - 124). But it is obvious from the above study of his concept of the subject of the immediate data of states of consciousness that he interferes with the ordinary use of every day language while his aim was to describe it. He says that the first-person pronoun "I" in the sentence "I am in pain" is a grammatical filler and thus when he says that 'I am in pain', he only means that there is a pain.

Thus eventually we see that in spite of his earnest desire to have dissolved the philosophical problems, he rather complicated those problems. Undoubtedly one such patent example is 'I am in pain'. P.F. Strawson, however, seems to have solved this problem by his theory of person. He says that when I say that I am in pain I report a feeling of my pain. This pain is the pain of an identified person

referred to by the use of the first-person pronoun "I". Indeed without the identified subject of experiences we cannot identify the experiences at all, and say that this is experience A, and that is experience B. Can we speak in the wittgensteinian sense of this, and of that, experience? What is the criterion of making this distinction if the subject of this experience and the subject of that experience are not admitted and identified? Having quoted a sentence from Philosophical Investigations, viz. 'There might actually occur a case where we should say "This man believes he is pretending" ', some critics may say that as Wittgenstein tells us different kinds of inconsistent views of the concept of the subject, so we should believe that he also has pretended. I do not at all think that Wittgenstein did so. There are many other great philosophers who have failed to explicate coherently this concept of human person or subject of states of consciousness.

But why did Wittgenstein speaks of such a feeling of pain which according to him has no subject as its possessor or owner? It is something like this, as G.E. Moore says, that in saying 'I have toothache' he only says of having toothache which is a direct or primary experience. The character of this primary experience is that it does not signify a possessor of it. Is it thinkable that there is a primary experience of toothache although no person is there as the subject of that primary experience? Wittgenstein states that when I say 'I see a red patch', my physical eye in terms of the description of a visual sensation of a red patch does not enter into the visual field; similarly no idea of any person enters into the description of a primary experience what I call 'having toothache'. He says, "A description of a sensation does not contain a description of a sense-organ, nor, therefore, of a person."<sup>23</sup>

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23. Ibid., p.274.



Like Wittgenstein, Moritz Schlick in his article "Meaning and Verification"<sup>24</sup> also intends to have offered us a negative account of a subject of consciousness. He is convinced that philosophical issues like the subject or mind could be solved if we go back to the language, and the outlook of the primitive people. He says that in the language of the primitive people there was no use of any sentences of the form "I perceive a tree" but of the form "There is a tree".<sup>25</sup> The clause "I perceive" is of such a strange type that the natural root of the so-called mind-body dualism may be located in the use of it. Schlick says, "Perception" implies the distinction between a subject which perceives and an object which is perceived.<sup>26</sup> Obviously the question arises, who is the perceiver? The problem of mind and body unavoidably gets started from this distinction between the perceiver and the perceived object. The body with all its sense-organs fails to have treated as the perceiver for the reason that it is also perceived as an object. Thus it becomes imperative to postulate a new subject in the name of self or mind as the perceiver. What is a mind? and where is it to be located? Traditionally it is thought that it resides inside the body. According to R. Avenarius, it is a mistake to seek proper location of the house of mind inside the body. This mistake he calls "introjection".<sup>27</sup> Schlick thinks that this "introjection" gives rise to all sorts of philosophical problem of mind and body.

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24. M. Schlick, "Meaning and Verification". in James B.Hartman(ed.), Philosophy of Recent Times, Vol. 11, Megraw-Hill Book Company, U.S.A., 1967.

25. Ibid., p. 391.

26. Ibid., p. 391.

27. Ibid., p. 391.

Schlick seems to have formulated his view concerning the no - subject concept in two ways. So it will not be an error if I start first from the line of his argument he puts forward as a measure to avoid the solipsistic or idealistic error which comes into being as the necessary consequence of "introjection". The view which is nurtured by the idealists or the solipsists is that the idea of the world is my world; and when they use the word "my", the first person singular possessive pronoun, they do it in a quite different manner. This pronoun "my" they would not use to refer to a body. So when an idealist says, for example, 'I can feel only my pain', he will not admit that he can feel pain in body M. His intention is simply that in his world there is no body except the content of his consciousness. Schlick says that in the statement of the idealists or solipsists, viz. 'I can feel only my pain', the first person pronouns "I" and "my" are absolutely meaningless. If we say that this horse is white, we admit the logical possibility that it might not have been white. So to use meaningfully the pronouns "I" and "my" in the sentence "I can feel only my pain", the idealist must have to admit that there are some meaningful third person pronouns like "he" and "his" by which the first person pronouns could be replaced. But the idealist or the solipsist is not ready to admit it. His statement is, therefore, meaningless; it can not be verified or falsified. This position of the idealists or the solipsists, according to Schlick, is sufficient enough to show that as the consequences of "introjection" their approaches are wrong.

Second, Schlick also states that introjection itself is a mistake and truly it is the source of all types of philosophical difficulty concerning body and mind. Descartes' famous statement, 'I think, therefore I am', then, from this point of view of the mistake of introjection, is meaningless. Descartes has intended to prove that mind alone is real; it can exist without the body, and all thoughts belong to it. We know that 'I think, therefore I am' was Descartes' first principle or the

first foundation of his philosophy in which he finds metaphysical certitude. And so far as Descartes' foundation of philosophy is concerned it is very similar to the approach of the idealists or solipsists who claimed for the metaphysical certitude of mind and its ideas. Moreover, in Cartesian statement 'I think, therefore I am', the 'I' is supposed to be the owner of thoughts. Schlick writes, 'The words "I" and "my", if we use them according to the solipsist's prescription, are absolutely empty, mere adornments of speech. There would be no differences of meaning between the three expressions, "I feel my pain"; "I feel pain"; and "There is pain". Lichtenberg, the wonderful eighteenth-century physicist and philosopher, declared that Descartes had no right to start his philosophy with the proposition "I think", instead of saying "it thinks".'<sup>28</sup>

It seems that Schlick agrees to accept the suggestion of Lichtenberg to use the proposition "it thinks" just in the place of the Cartesian proposition "I think". But by using the word "it" in the proposition "it thinks", does he intend to say that this "it" refers to a body which is the owner of the states of consciousness including thinking? Schlick says, 'The grammar of the word "owner" is similar to that of the word "my": it makes sense only where it is logically possible for a thing to change its owner, i.e., where the relation between the owner and the owned object is empirical, not logical ("external", not "internal").'<sup>29</sup> And, according to him, body in this sense cannot be the owner of the experiences or states of consciousness. He, therefore, says, '...unless we choose to call our body the owner or bearer of the data-which seems to be a rather misleading expression - we have to say that the data have no owner or bearer.

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28. Ibid., p. 395.

29. Ibid., p. 395.

This neutrality of experience - as against the subjectivity claimed for it by the idealist - is one of the most fundamental points of true positivism.<sup>30</sup>

Let us see what Schlick has meant by saying that the facts of experiences as empirical facts can not help us think that the body is the owner of these data. Here to explain Schlick's view I shall take three statements he uses. These are as follows:

P. I feel pain only when the body M is hurt. (Here the expression "the body M" has been used by Schlick to substitute the expression "My body".)

Q. I can feel only my pain.

R. I can feel somebody else's pain as well as my own.

According to Schlick, P and Q are equivalent as they describe the same fact of experience in two different ways; and the words "I" and "my" in Q signify "the body M" of the proposition P. Now if it is thought that I can feel pain when another body O is hurt, then both the propositions P and q would be false because of the empirical possibility denoted by the word "can". That is to say, the description of an empirical fact may be different from what it is; and from this empirical possibility (even if it doesn't happen at all) I can say that proposition R is true. What R expresses is the fact that one can feel pain not only when his body or the body M is affected, but also the pain of other affected body O. Schlick, therefore, seems to have concluded that 'if the data depend also on other bodies O (which differ from M in certain empirical respects, but not in principle),

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30. Ibid., p. 396.

then there will be no more justification in calling the data “my own”, other individuals O will have the same right to be regarded as owners or proprietors of the data.’<sup>31</sup> The pronoun “my”, therefore, should not be taken to denote the body as an owner of the experiences which are neutral. Schlick writes, ‘Primitive experience, mere existence of ordered data, does not presuppose a “subject”, or “ego”, or “me”, or “mind”; it can take place without any of the facts which lead to the formation of those concepts; it is not an experience of anybody.’<sup>32</sup>

I have already mentioned that Schlick has supported the world-view of the primitive man who used to say simply that ‘There is a tree’, instead of saying ‘I perceive a tree’. Like him if we say that, ‘It is a pain’ or ‘There is a pain’ in the place of ‘I have a pain’, then the mistake of locating consciousness or mind inside the body we would not commit, and consequently there would be no need to say that the data have bearer or owner. Schlick’s remark in this context is very important. He says, ‘...that the naive representation of the world, as the man in the street sees it, is perfectly correct; and that the solution of the great philosophical issues consists in returning to this original world - view.’<sup>33</sup>

Now on the basis of the above general consideration of the nature of the no-subject concept entertained by Wittgenstein and Schlick, it seems that it can be said that Strawson is justified in naming them as the no-ownership or no-subject theorists.

The no-ownership theorists speak most unusually of the immediate data

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31. Ibid., p. 393.

32. Ibid., p. 397.

33. Ibid., p. 398.

of experience without admitting any subject as its bearer; and to deny the bearer of the experiences they afford some reasons. First, the ascription of the states of consciousness to a body does not mean that the relation between the states of consciousness and the concerned body is necessary. The states of consciousness in question may be dependednt on some other body. Second, the states of consciousness can not be ascribed to the so-called ego or self which is supposed to be an exclusive owner. The idea of exclusive ownership is an idea which makes ego's ownership as non-transferable. But according to the no-ownership theorists, ownership must be logically transferable, i.e. states of consciousness can be owned by an ego only if it is logically possible for that ego to transfer that states of consciousness to other egos. And states of consciousness can not be owned in this sense; therefore, the ego can not be held to be the owner of the states of consciousness.

The views of the no-subject theorist are not coherent. The reason is obvious; he admits experiences but denies any subject as the possessor or owner of these experinces. This position of the theorist, according to Strawson, is ridiculous as he 'is forced to make use of that sense of possession of which he denies the existence, in presenting his case for the demial.'<sup>34</sup> When the theorist states the contingent fact of the relation between his body and the experiences which are dependent on his body, he states that 'All my experiences are had by body B'. He can not eliminate the 'my', since in that case it will be like this that all experiences are had by a single body B, but all experiences can not be attributed to one single body; this attribution is false. Now if the theorist says 'all my experiences are had by body B' means 'all experiences contingently

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34. Individuals, p. 96.

dependent on a certain body B'<sup>35</sup>, then this proposition will not be contingent, but analytic and necessary. Strawson, therefore, says that the theorist can not but speak of possession or ownership which he proposes to deny. According to him, the theorist can not speak of some experiences in the way that these are only contingently dependent on some body B. For the defining characteristic of these experiences is that they are 'my' experiences or the experiences of some other person.

Strawson seems to have given special emphasis on the internal incoherence of the no-subject theory. The theorist believes that states of consciousness can not be ascribed to something, while he ascribes that to himself or others. The theorist believes that states or experiences cannot be said to have owned if the ownership is logically non-transferable. Against this view Strawson says that in our general structure of thought 'it does not seem to make sense to suggest, for example, that the identical pain which was in fact one's own might have been another's... For if we think, once more, of the requirements of identifying reference in speech to particular states of consciousness, or private experiences, we see that such particulars can not be thus identifyingly referred to except as the states or experiences of some identified person. States, or experiences, one might say, owe their identity as particulars to the identity of the person whose states or experiences they are.'<sup>36</sup> From this view of Strawson it therefore follows that if states of consciousness are to be identified, they must be possessed by some person in the sense of logically non-transferable kind of ownership, i.e. a particular experience owned by a person X can never be owned by another person

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35. Ibid., p. 97.

36. Ibid., p. 97.

Y. This is the reason why Strawson says that the identity of states of consciousness or experiences depend on the identity of the person; and importantly this question of the identity of states of consciousness justifies that the question of logical transferability of ownership is meaningless. Strawson concludes : 'So the theorist could maintain his position only by denying that we could ever refer to particular states or experiences at all; and this position is ridiculous.'<sup>37</sup>

Now if Strawson's view is plausible, the no-subject account of 'I' is incoherent. But what exactly is Strawson's view of the concept of person? So far only we have got the negative view from his analysis of Wittgenstein and Schlick's no-subject concept ,i.e. I have followed his approach so far on the way of considering opinions of his opponents, to dissent from their arguments, sometimes to agree with them, and thus largely to rebut their concerned views. So we need to highlight now Strawson's concept of person. In the very next chapter therefore I shall try to follow his descriptive metaphysical approach from a particular point of view in the context of basic particulars with an intention to examining the fundamental aspect of his concept of person.

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37. Ibid., p. 98.