

## CHAPTER VI

### THE PRIMITIVENESS OF THE CONCEPT OF PERSON.

Strawson's approach of the examination of the concept of person has two phases. In the first phase he has been concerned with the dualistic and the no-ownership theory of person; and in the second phase he has stated his own concept of person. In chapters II and III I have tried to show why the Cartesian and no-ownership theories from the descriptive metaphysical point of view are incoherent. In chapters IV and V Strawson's concept of person as basic particular is critically considered, and I have tried to say that this concept is congruous with his descriptive approach. Now I shall be concerned with an explication and evaluation of his view of the primitiveness of the concept of person.

Strawson says that if we want to free ourselves from the difficulties of the Cartesian and the no-ownership theory of person, we have to acknowledge the primitiveness of the concept of person. To understand the primitiveness of the concept of person one should look to the way in which the concept of person is 'articulately manifested ... to language'. For Strawson, 'linguistic usage is the only experimental datum which ... is relevant to inquiry about the behaviour of our concepts.'<sup>1</sup> He says, 'what I mean by the concept of a person is the concept

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1. "Discussion of Strawson's "Analysis, Science, and Metaphysics"", op.cit., p.324.

of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation &c. are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type.<sup>2</sup> Employing this new type of the concept of person, he has done two important jobs. First, he avoids the difficulties of the dualistic and the no-ownership theory of person. Second, he offers in this way a plausible theory of the concept of person.

Strawson's view of the primitiveness of the concept of person is entailed by his view of the basicness of the concept of person. He states that persons are ontologically or referentially basic to non-basic private states of consciousness or experiences. We can not identify a certain states of consciousness unless we identify the person whose states of consciousness they are. In the study of the concept of person he gives emphasis on two main questions.<sup>3</sup> The first question is, 'why are one's states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all?' According to him, states of consciousness are ascribed to some person, say, X to say what we do say about him or her. States of consciousness or experiences about which we talk in our speech are states or experiences of some person or other; and so to identify certain states or experiences we are to identify the person concerned to whose account they do belong to. In respect of the second question 'why are they ascribed to the very same thing as certain corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation, &c.?' he says that to admit that states of consciousness owe their identity to the identity of the persons is to admit that they are ascribed to the very same entity to which physical characteristics are ascribed. Regarding ascription of states of consciousness he says, 'For surely there can be a question

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2. *Individuals*, pp. 101-102.

3. *Ibid.*, p.90.

of ascribing only if there is or could be a question of identifying that to which the ascription is made.'<sup>4</sup>

The answers that Strawson gives to the two main questions, however, are not independent of each other, rather they are well-connected. These are the answers which the Cartesianism and the no-ownership theory can not offer. The no-ownership theory failed to offer the answers, since it failed to reckon that the phrases ascribing states of consciousness are used uniformly in our ordinary speech to speak irrespectively of the states of consciousness of the first -, second -, and third - persons. And because of this failure to reckoning the central thought, Wittgenstein has been compelled to say that I can know with certainty when I am in pain, but I can not when somebody else is. That is, the no-ownership theorist ascribes states of consciousness to himself and goes through the puzzle of myself and others. So, Strawson here seems to be justified in saying that 'when I say that the no-ownership theorist's account fails through not reckoning with all the facts, I have in mind a very simple, but in this question a very central, thought : Viz. that it is a necessary condition of one's ascribing states of consciousness, experiences, to oneself, in the way one does, that one should also ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe them, to others who are not oneself'.<sup>5</sup> On this same count, among others, he also rejects Cartesianism, according to which it is held that states of consciousness are to be ascribed to the non-physical substance, if they are to be ascribed at all.

Descartes becomes sure of his own mental states or of states of consciousness in his state of thinking, while he doubts the existence of everything

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4. Ibid., p.100.

5. Ibid., p.99.

including the other people. Interestingly enough from the state of his being sure of the existence of his own self it was not possible for him to prove with certainty the existence of other selves. The subject of states of consciousness being an independent non-physical subject is not identifiable. Strawson says, 'If, in identifying the things to which states of consciousness are to be ascribed, private experiences are to be all one has to go on, then, just for the very same reason as that for which there is, from one's own point of view, no question of telling that a private experience is one's own, there is also no question of telling that a private experience is another's. All private experiences, all states of consciousness, will be mine, i.e. no one's.'<sup>6</sup>

Strawson by his descriptive metaphysical approach tries to avoid difficulties of the dualistic account of mind and body. In such dualistic account it is stated that a person is a compound of two things of which one is corporeal, and the other is non-corporeal. To refute this view he writes, 'But, in particular, when we ask ourselves how we come to frame, to get a use for, the concept of this compound of two subjects, the picture - if we are honest and careful - is apt to change from the picture of two subjects to the picture of one subject and one non-subject... So the concept of the pure individual consciousness - the pure ego - is a concept that can not exist; or, at least, can not exist as a primary concept in terms of which the concept of a person can be explained or analysed.'<sup>7</sup>

For Strawson the concept of a person is primitive or primary because it is not to be further analysed in terms of the concept of a body or of a pure consciousness. The concept of a person denotes a type of entity or particular thing

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6. Ibid., p.100.

7. Ibid., p.102.

to it. From this also one may go forward stating that as I am uniquely related to this body of mine, others also in the same way are uniquely related to their bodies. This view according to Strawson is, however, incorrect. Descartes even though admitted a unique causal relation between experiences of a person and his body, he never deviated from his central view that states of consciousness are the necessary attributes of the mind. Now as per Strawson's criteria the states of consciousness one can ascribe to one's mind, if one ascribes them to minds of the other people; and one can ascribe them to other minds, if one can identify other minds or selves. Obviously it is not possible to identify the selves of other persons, if the selves are Cartesian egos - the subjects of pure consciousness. And if it is not possible to identify the selves of others, then one can not also identify one's own self. Strawson says, 'Uniqueness of the body does not guarantee uniqueness of the Cartesian soul.'<sup>8</sup>

Let us now see how Strawson's theory is free from the difficulties of Cartesianism. In his theory a person is not to be thought of as 'a secondary kind of entity in relation to two primary kinds, viz. a particular consciousness and a particular human body'.<sup>9</sup> For him the concept of a person denotes the type of basic entity to which predicates ascribing states of consciousness as well as corporeal characteristics are attributed. On this account, then, the question of identification does not make any conceptual or logical gap between myself and others. And this is implied by our conceptual scheme of thought. The predicates which somebody uses to ascribe states of consciousness to himself are equally used by him to ascribe states of consciousness of the same kind to others. It is

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8. Ibid., p.101.

9. Ibid., p.105.

possible because he identifies others as subjects of the same logical type to which he himself belongs.

Annette Baier views Strawson's concept of person as quite similar to Cartesian concept. She says, 'Cartesian thinking is intrinsically subject to correction and improvement, but for this purpose the only communication Descartes finds necessary is communication between a thinker and a perfect thinker, and communication between one time and another within the history of one finite imperfect thinker's progress of thought. Strawson's thesis that "one can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others" is, therefore, not an anti-Cartesian thesis but a Cartesian thesis brought down to earth.'<sup>10</sup> She intends to say that what Strawson has said in his thesis has already been admitted by Descartes. The basis of Cartesian statement that I am a thinking thing, is God, the perfect thinker. So Strawson's central thesis is just another version of the Cartesian thesis. It seems that Baier is justified in saying that Strawson has brought Descartes' thesis down to earth. But she seems to confuse the two schemes or approaches : revisionary and descriptive. Descartes' scheme does not correspond to our general structure of thought. This is what Strawson has pointed out in his scheme of descriptive metaphysics; therefore, his concept of person is fundamentally different from the Cartesian concept.

Ayer also had criticised the central argument of Strawson. He says that the premise of the argument is weak. It is the view of Ayer that the premise that one should ascribe states of consciousness to others is not a necessary condition of one's ascribing states of consciousness to oneself. For one may successfully

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10. A. Baier, Postures of the Mind : Essays on Mind and Morals, Methuen, 1985, p.78.

ascribe states of consciousness to others, but yet the ascription does not rule out the possibility of one's being mistaken.

To justify the view he asks to imagine a child kept in an artificial environment where no human being ever enters. But there is every arrangement made by mechanical means, so that the child will live there very normally as we do in our natural environment. In addition, there is a number of automata some of which in appearance are just like human beings, and they behave with the child like human beings. They talk with him; and teach him his name, the use of pronouns, demonstratives, and words which describe mental states. Ayer writes, 'In very much the same way as children normally do learn these things, he learns to say when he is hungry or satisfied, happy or in pain; he is coached, as other children are, to distinguish what he sees from what he imagines, or from what he remembers; and among his memories to distinguish those that are memories of dreams.'<sup>11</sup> From the automata the child has learnt all these because there is similarity between himself and the automata. That is to say, 'In this way he learns how to apply the concept of a person : and he satisfies the condition of being ready to apply it to other things besides himself.'<sup>12</sup> Ayer, therefore, comes to the conclusion that it is possible to ascribe states of consciousness to oneself while one is mistaken in ascribing them to others. The child successfully ascribes states of consciousness to himself, but his ascription of the states to other persons is in fact false; in his world no actual person is there. And, thus, if ascription of states of consciousness to oneself is possible without properly ascribing them to

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11. A.J.Ayer, The Concept of a Person, Macmillan, London, 1963, p.107.

12. Ibid., p.107.

others, then from Strawson's central argument it does not necessarily follow that what he has said is true.

Ayer's argument from the solitary child, however, does not make any harm to Strawson's theory of person. The concept of a person which the child develops is a general or social concept. Although no person is there around him, still the system of communications he has undergone is the system of ordinary human communications, the automata being the mechanical actors have performed the roles of some actual human beings.

Like Descartes, Wittgenstein also entertains a kind of dualism, 'paradoxically so-called'. Referring to Wittgenstein's two different uses of 'I' Strawson opines that this account involves a dualism of one - subject (body) and one non-subject or no-subject. In Strawson's view then 'both the Cartesian and the no-ownership theorists are profoundly wrong in holding, as each must, that there are two uses of 'I', in one of which it denotes something which it does not denote in the other'.<sup>13</sup> The use in which 'I' stands for body both Descartes and Wittgenstein held the same view. In the other use of 'I' Descartes unhesitatingly says that it stands for mind, while Wittgenstein says that this subject use of 'I' is superfluous, because there is no such thing as a self. Descartes' dualism, according to Strawson, is also a dualism of one subject and one non-subject, if the concept of soul is not a primary concept.

It seems that the substance dualism and the 'I' - dualism are fundamentally different. The former explains the concept of person in terms of the two primary concepts, viz. mind and body, while the latter avoids this way. In Descartes' view

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13. Individuals, p.98.



a person is a unique compound of one visible body and one invisible mind. Wittgenstein stands against this view, but his own view in this regard is not sufficiently clear. He has not admitted ownership of states of consciousness and this does not mean that he has stated that states of consciousness are nothing. Only he says that the relation between a certain states of consciousness and a particular human body is not necessary; the states of consciousness which this particular human body is possessing might belong to some other body.

Is a human being identical with his body ? Although Wittgenstein had some tendency to incline towards behaviourism, still he does not state like the behaviourists that mental terms are capable of being explained in terms of bodily behaviours. He seems not to have mentioned any particular criteria for articulating immediate data of experiences. He says that when I say that 'I am in pain', then for myself no observation of pain-behaviour is necessary to be able to say it, but to say that 'He is in pain', the observation of pain-behaviour is necessary. From this it appears that if he had been a behaviourist in the strict sense of the term, he would not have allowed to make a difference between first-person mental events and third-person mental events; rather he would have said that the two types of mental events are same in terms of bodily behaviours. Strawson therefore has rightly pointed out the two main causes which are the root causes for all sorts of philosophical difficulties in Wittgenstein's account of the concept of person. First, Wittgenstein's opposition to subject of consciousness. Second, his failure to reckoning that all personal predicates have their uniform interpersonal ascriptive use. This view of Strawson is also true for schlick's account of the concept of person.

In one possible situation Wittgenstein and schlick's attitude towards denying the subject of consciousness in terms of soul has ground. It is like this.

'If we try to think of that to which one's states of consciousness are ascribed as something utterly different from that to which certain corporeal characteristics are ascribed, then indeed it becomes difficult to see why states of consciousness should be ascribed to, thought of as belonging to, anything at all.'<sup>14</sup> But again it must be said that from the fact that no soul is there as subject of consciousness, it is not implied that nothing at all is there as the subject of consciousness. And in this perspective Strawson's account of the primitiveness of the concept of person seems to be appropriate. The states of consciousness we need not ascribe to a mind, but to a person to which we also ascribe physical attributes. Similarly against Descartes it is to be said that we ascribe mental characteristics to something does not necessarily mean that we ascribe these to immaterial mind. And regarding myself and others the question of logical gap which has been a serious concern not only for Descartes, Wittgenstein and schlick, but also for philosophers in general, Strawson says that it is not a genuine problem at all, if the concept of person is explained and understood in terms of our general structure of thought. And in this respect Strawson's theory of person appears to fare better than any other theory of his predecessors.

One might say that strawson has solved the problems of substance dualism and 'I' - dualism at the expense of introducing another type of dualism - a dualism of mental and physical properties. Against this objection I would say that as far as Strawson's descriptive metaphysical approach is concerned, his argument would withstand the objection. Indeed, the objection from the point of view of property dualism is really significant against Spinoza's monism. He said that everything that exists has two attributes : mental and physical. And something which has two attributes is neither purely material, nor purely mental. In Spinoza's

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14. Ibid., p.98.

philosophy no distinction is made between physical and mental. But Strawson's theory is fundamentally different from him. The difference is due to his descriptive metaphysical approach. He says very definitely and unambiguously that the concept of a person is primitive, i.e. a person is a single entity or thing which is not to be explained in terms of physical and mental properties, but the concerned physical and mental properties are capable of being explained in terms of the concept of person. Unlike Spinoza, Strawson also said that our unified world contains basic particulars : material bodies and persons.

Jerome A. Shaffer remarks that in Strawson's scheme a person is a thing 'which is neither purely immaterial nor purely material'.<sup>15</sup> To show the historical relation between double aspect theory and person theory he says that since in Strawsonian sense a person is a material thing with a certain sort of mental characteristics, so it is not purely material, nor is it purely mental. Indeed, Shaffer intends to have the concept of person in terms of a pure consciousness and a pure material body. In his view, a material thing is a subject of material states, events, and processes, while a mind as immaterial thing is the subject of conscious states, events, and processes. 'So in this respect', he says, 'immaterial things are no worse off than material things'.<sup>16</sup> Shaffer favours a reconstruction of Cartesian dualism. But we have seen that Strawson explained his concept of person to evade the difficulties of this theory. He says that rather the concept of a pure consciousness is secondary or non-primitive and the concept of a person is logically prior to it. And as a person is neither a totality or unity of mind and body, nor a thing which is mental from one aspect, and physical from another,

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15. J.A.Shaffer, Philosophy of Mind, PHI, New Delhi - 1,1994, p.50.

16. Ibid., p.58.

so it seems that the question from the point of view of attribute dualism significantly does not arise in his view of the primitiveness of the concept of person.

We may now examine some other objections Shaffer has raised against Strawson's concept of person. He says that Strawson's definition of the concept of person does not help us very much. 'That it does not come out when we ask how the person theory differs from the identity theory.'<sup>17</sup> According to the identity theorists mental states are identical with bodily states. Of course, they have not explained this identity in the sense in which one can say that the morning star is identical with the evening star. Shaffer writes, 'Not "identical" in the sense that mentalistic terms are synonymous in meaning with physicalistic terms but "identical" in the sense that the actual events picked out by mentalistic terms are one and the same events as those picked out by physicalistic terms.'<sup>18</sup> But if the events sorted out by mentalistic terms are identical with the events sorted out by physicalistic terms, then it becomes needless to use mentalistic terms separately in addition to physicalistic terms in order to speak of the events concerned.

In point of fact, the way we use language rather reveals that the two expressions - mentalistic and physicalistic - are tailored to refer to two different kinds of events. It seems that the example of venus referred to by the use of the two terms 'The morning star' and 'The evening star' can not help the identity theorist to argue against the ordinary use of the concerned mentalistic and physicalistic terms. It is a matter of fact that the two expressions with different

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17. Ibid., p.55.

18. Ibid., p.43.

sense - e.g. 'The morning star' and 'The evening star' - we can use to refer to one single thing, but this does not imply that the mentalistic and physicalistic terms also could be used to refer to the same events.

The identity theorist regarded mental states as identical with the states of the nervous system or of some bodily cells. This means that mental states are reducible to the states of certain cells of it. If so, a human being is at best a human computer. For any computer if any assembly or high-level language is translated into machine code language, then it is nothing but an ocean of O and I. That is, a language which a computer understands is identical with its bits, the smallest elements (we will call smallest cells) of its memory. A computer operates its tasks in terms of the operations of its cells. Similarly if a human being is just like a computer, then it will perform any actions mental or physical in terms of the synchronization of the states of its bodily cells. And in this sense a mental event will be identical with its physical event. But how does a human computer distinguish itself from other human computers, and ordinary bodies like chair, table, etc.? How would an identity theorist assure himself of the fact that other ordinary bodies are not like him. Now if he says that only physical states are ascribed to physical objects, and mental as well as physical states which are identical with each other are ascribed to human beings, and in this sense there is a difference between a human being and ordinary material bodies, then he is admitting that human persons are not like general bodies. That is, he is admitting a type difference between persons and material bodies. If he does not admit the difference, he should then use one single type of expressions to speak of all attributes of persons as well as ordinary physical bodies. As a matter of fact he can not but use two types of expressions : mentalistic and physicalistic. And this implies that mental events, states, and processes, or to say precisely the mental attributes are not attributes of material bodies, but of persons.

Strawson's observation that states of consciousness can not be ascribed to a thing unless it possesses corporeal characteristics is a consequence of his argument for the primitiveness of the concept of person. Accordingly to ascribe a particular conscious state to someone the state is to be identified. Don Locke says that the view that conscious states could not be identified if they do not belong to a person is unacceptable. Like Shaffer he argues that one might identify a state of consciousness as the state of a 'certain brain'.<sup>19</sup> It is thus possible to identify a state without reference to a person who possesses it. But if this view or the brain in a vat hypothesis is accepted, then also a question will arise : whose brain state or brain's operation is this ? To identify a certain brain state it requires to have identified a particular person whose brain state it is. One might argue supporting the physicalistic view that states of consciousness being brain states or brain's operations are identical with physical states ; and so there is no need to accept Strawson's account of the primitiveness of the concept of person. But the champions of such views can not spell out how the physical states or operations of material bodies and brain states or operations in vats are related and in what respect one differs from the other. Therefore, they can not help admitting a difference between material bodies and persons. According to Strawson this approach 'is merely a sophisticated form of failure to recognize the special character of P - predicates, or, rather, of a crucial class of P - predicates'.<sup>20</sup>

In another objection Shaffer says, '... if we can not even say that a person's "body" is a body in the same sense that rocks and trees are bodies, then these

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19. D.Locke, Myself and Others, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968, p.139.

20. Individuals, p.107.

laws of nature, which apply to bodies, can not be applied to the “bodies” of persons. And that would be so great an inconvenience ... as to count against the person theory.’<sup>21</sup> Against this view I would say that it would not be an inconvenience because Strawson has used all sorts of physical attributes in the same sense. And so, the physical attributes of a body and the physical attributes of persons are same. The laws of nature will hold good for persons and material bodies : both are four-dimensional things, and this is the common feature of them, and for this reason Strawson calls them basic particulars.

Shaffer further says, ‘When we say “They searched his person”, we are using “person” to mean a body.’<sup>22</sup> But it seems that this is not a serious objection at all. ‘They searched his person’ also may mean they searched him. Citing another example, he says, ‘If someone said, “They found a body in the lake today”, we would be very surprised if he meant a rock, or a tree trunk, or an old, sunken boat, or a fish, although all of these are, in the Newtonian sense, bodies, Here “body” means “corpse”, i.e., a dead human being ... A corpse or “body” in this sense is what is left when a person dies, although it is not a part of a living person or something which he has while he is alive.’<sup>23</sup> It will be a definite mistake if in this way we say that while a person (in Strawsonian sense) lives he has no body, but when he dies, he left a body. It seems that Shaffer has confused Strawson’s views with others when he says that in Strawson’s theory ‘a body is not a person, nor is it a part of a person, nor is it something a person has’.<sup>24</sup>

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21. J.A.Shaffer, Philosophy of Mind, pp.56-57.

22. Ibid., p.57.

23. Ibid., p.57.

24. Ibid., p.57.

Burstein also raises similar objection to Strawson's view. He says that since Strawson 'does not hold that a material body is a part of a person and he also does not hold that a person is identical with a material body, it remains for him to specify some further sense in which a person might be said to "have" a material body'.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, according to Strawson, a person is not a body, nor a body is a person; a body also is not a part of a person. But he emphatically says, 'It is a conceptual truth ... that persons have material bodies.'<sup>26</sup> States of consciousness, according to him, owe their identity to the identity of the persons concerned. Shaffer and Burstein therefore are mistaken in asserting that a body in the Strawsonian sense is not something which a person has. In framing the objections both Shaffer and Burstein seem to oppose Strawson's conceptual scheme. We know that Strawson has stated that the ways we think about ourselves are regulated by our conceptual scheme or structure. The structure is revealed in our ordinary speech. The ways of thinking about ourselves and things of the world are therefore regulated by our ordinary speech. In our ordinary speech also our concepts of persons and things take on an articulated form. And it is the concept of person he explains from this point of view of human conceptual scheme.

Strawson's view that an experience or state as non-basic particular owes its identity to the identity of a person has come under serious criticism. Don Locke argues that Strawson has ambiguously used the term 'identity', and due to this basic mistake he failed to distinguish " 'conscious states owe their identity to what they belong to' from 'conscious states can not be identifyingly referred to, except as belonging to such and such' ".<sup>27</sup> Locke says that one may identify Joe

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25. N.Burstein, "Strawson on the Concept of a Person", op.cit.,p.451.

26. Individuals, p.58.

27. Myself and Others, p.142.



Bloggs as the person in the green tie and use an expression to refer to him, but from this identification one will not say that Joe Bloggs owes his identity to the green tie he wears. Thus he concludes : 'we must distinguish between a thing's being identified, in the sense of being identifyingly referred to, and a thing's being identified, in the sense of its owing its identity to something.'<sup>28</sup>

According to Don Locke the fact that conscious states owe their identity to something is different from the fact that they can be identifyingly referred to. Joe Bloggs does not in fact owe his identity to his green tie, yet he has been identified in the sense of being identifyingly referred to. And if in this sense it is possible to make identifying reference to Joe Bloggs, it is also possible to make identifying reference to conscious states with reference to a person, but this will not mean that the states of consciousness owe their identity to the person concerned.

The above comparison of Joe Bloggs, a person with conscious states, the private particulars is unsuitable. Without making any reference to the green tie which Joe Bloggs Wears, Joe Bloggs as a person or thing is identifiable; but states of consciousness can not be thus identified, except as the states of consciousness of some identified person. Further, Don Locke says that conscious states can be identifyingly referred to. This implies that the identified conscious states are the states of some identified person. And if this is right there is no need to distinguish between a conscious state's being identified 'in the sense of being identifyingly referred to', and a conscious state's being identified 'in the sense of its owing its identity to something'. It seems that states of consciousness

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o28. Ibid., p.140.

can not be identifyingly referred to if they do not owe their identity to something, viz. persons.

Jenny Teichman points out that Strawson has defined the concept of person in two different senses. In one sense he says that the concept of a person is prior to the concept of soul, while in the other sense he says that it is logically primitive. Teichman writes, 'These claims have thrown up rather a lot of dust because Strawson omitted to explain what he meant by 'prior' and 'primitive'.'<sup>29</sup> While Teichman rightly has marked the use of the words concerned, she perhaps has not rightly considered what Strawson exactly had intended to mean. It seems that the meanings of the two words are sufficiently clear. Strawson has not used them to express different meanings, but one single meaning in two different well connected ways. He says that the concept of a person is logically prior to the concept of the pure ego means 'The concept of a person is not to be analysed as that of an animated body or of an embodied anima'.<sup>30</sup> Again concerning the meaning of the word 'primitive', he writes, 'All I have said about the meaning of saying that this concept is primitive is that it is not to be analysed in a certain way or ways. We are not, for example, to think of it as a secondary kind of entity in relation to two primary kinds, viz. a particular consciousness and a particular human body.'<sup>31</sup> Now, if the words 'prior' and 'primitive' are thus used by Strawson to express a certain definite meaning, then Teichman's opinion that Strawson has explained the concept of person in two different sense is not justified.

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29. J. Teichman, "The Definition of Person", *Philosophy*, Vol. 60, 1985. p. 175.

30. *Individuals*, p. 103.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105.

In consideration of Strawson's view of the primitiveness of the concept of person Norman Burstein opines that if corporeal states are ascribed to a person as well as to material bodies, it is to 'be said of both John Smith and his body that they have the identical corporeal attribute of occupying a certain spatio-temporal position (S.T.). But there is ground for questioning whether it can be said of both John Smith and a material body that they occupy the same place at the same time.'<sup>32</sup> From this view of Burstein it appears that a person named John Smith is different from the body which he has, or, for each person there are two different things : the person himself and his body. I think Burstein has misunderstood Strawson's view. Strawson simply has stated that corporeal characteristics are common for both persons and material bodies. And from this it is not implied that a person is an amalgam of himself and his body. We have seen that for Strawson the concept of person is primitive. He denies the view that a person is a unique compound of body and mind. According to the descriptive metaphysical approach a person can not be a combination of himself and his body. Indeed, it will be a mistake if someone thinks of a person in this way, and says that this is John Smith, the person and that is his body.

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32. N.Burstein, "Strawson on the Concept of a Person", *op.cit.*, p.449.