

## Postcolonial Aporia in South Asia: A Case Study of Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary India

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[Editorial Note: The author argues and revisits the role of the army in independent India and raises questions on some deficiencies in India's management of the army resulting from the contradiction with or inherent weakness of bureaucratic and political decision-making process. D.A.]

**Abstract:** *In recent time, we have been witnessing that the postcolonial south Asian states have a problem with civilian control over their military while India, as one of the distinct countries in south Asia, proved to be initially successful in maintaining such control since its independence in 1947. The strong democratic institutions, free press, responsible political parties, and the professional military kept India out of the fear of a military coup in the contemporary times. Yet, India has strikingly witnessed an absent dialogue among its stakeholders in matter of civil-military relations that gives birth to several misleading situations recently. Besides, the structure and the nature of civil-military relations have had an adverse impact on the effectiveness of the Indian military. Several crucial features characterized the developing relationship between civilians and the military in post-independent India that remain at the heart of understanding civil-military relations even in contemporary period. Parenthetically India, after having series of external wars within the south Asian regions and internal unrest and resistance, sought to provide a tight bureaucratic control over the military. India's inherent hierarchical mechanism in the military like Higher Defence Management (HDM), Defence Planning Committee (DPC), the Chief of Staff Committee (CSC) and most recently the Chief of Defence Staff in 2019 (CDS) further obfuscated the need for clear goals of policy implementation, frequently producing discord and tension in civil-military relations in India.*

*Therefore, this essay tries to present thematic overview of Indian civil-military relations over more than seven decades by examining the key characteristics and describe how these characteristics in turn affect, the military's effectiveness in India and subsequently civilian intervention in this field.*

**Keywords:** *South Asia, India, civil-military, military effectiveness, defence*

### **Introduction:**

This paper presents a thematic overview of civil-military relations in India for more than seven decades by critically investigating the key debates and polemics between India's political leadership and its military. In the years following independence, India's political leadership offered its military a minimal role in policymaking, and it has subsequently been kept out of such activities for a number of reasons. Advancing a socialist-economic system

has gained primacy over military growth and all under the leadership of first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. On the other hand, military rule in Pakistan foregrounded certain warnings for Indian civilians who used to respond to giving not much power to its own military. (Pant 2008: 65-90)

In post-independent India, we have observed several important features characterizing the developing relationship between civilians and the military. The latter remained at the core of understanding on civil-military relations even today. Indian Army was certainly constituted by considering ethno-linguistic and caste lines. However, many of the principles of British attitudes towards professionalism and mechanism of doctrinal issues have also been absorbed as military policy even in the post-independence era. (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010: 2-9) Issues like India's higher defence management and the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs occupied the crucial place in matters relating to army. The Committee consists of senior ministers from the Prime Minister's cabinet exercising chief responsibility over defence and foreign affairs. Under such mechanism, it is presumably argued that the civil-military attitude has been translated into multiple meaning and this has developed since the birth of the nation. People associated with this has their conflicting notion while the civilian interpretation of military has taken a back seat. (Roy 2010: 12-21)

### **Fight or Not to Fight: India and Its External Wars**

Post-independent India initially fought four crucial wars with her neighbours Pakistan (1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999) and one with China (1962) in which the contours of its foreign policy and military strategy has exposed unexpectedly. It is evident that both India and Pakistan shared a common enmity over the issue of Kashmir in October 1947, when the Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, requested assistance from the government of India and subsequently India's involvement to rescue Kashmir from Pakistan became a matter of animated debate. The war ended on 1 January 1949 through a UN backed ceasefire urging both countries to honour their commitment to hold a referendum in the state. (Kundu 1996: 201-13) Later in 1954, Jammu and Kashmir's accession to India was ratified by the state's constituent assembly. During the time of 1957, it approved its own constitution keeping the basic notions of the Indian Constitution in mind. Besides, at the same, a crucial issue received global attention regarding a small region, the Azad (Free) Jammu and Kashmir, which, the Indians call 'Pakistan-occupied Kashmir', has gained prominence in the backdrop of Indo-Pak recalcitrant atmosphere. Even, the larger areas like Hunza and Nagar are also likely to be administered by Pakistan. (Chandrasekhar 2017: 23)

India-administered Kashmir once again proved to be a hot bed of contestation in 1965, when Pakistani soldiers launched a covert operation across the ceasefire line into this area for greater strategic reasons. Here, one must remember that both states also shared conflicting claims over the Rann of Kutch. Seeing the turbulent condition, the United States and the Soviet Union along with Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan met at Tashkent and unanimously agreed to withdraw all armed personnel from both sides to positions held

prior to the outbreak of war and to observe the terms of the ceasefire. (Kukreja 1991: 23-29)

While India was managing its civil-military atmosphere, the incident of 1971 proved to be significant both for Pakistan and India and the civilian response got highlighted for a number of reasons. In 1971 a popular uprising was taken place in East Pakistan that brought ordinary citizens together demanding freedom, democracy, and human rights over religious bigotry and ultra-fanaticism committed by some Islamist separatist groups there. These could be identified as some of the reasons that instigated people in this region to go for it (Ray 2016: 50) The much-needed electoral victory of the Awami League in East Pakistan raised concern for the Pakistani Army, which after witnessing this unleashed most controversial genocidal violence against its Bengali population East Pakistan for creating political and economic deadlock condition. Seeing such ambivalent condition and a variety of circumstances further compelled India to intervene wholeheartedly to solve the treacherous act. (Raghavan 2013: 19) Finally, the defeat of the Pakistani forces at the hands of Bangladesh Mukti-vahini, which was well backed by Indian force had been able to provide a platform for creating a separate nation called Bangladesh in south Asia. The creation of Bangladesh strategically proved crucial for India and its eastern border afterwards. The blemish attitude of Pakistani army continually refuses to accept their loss and wanted to hold responsible India and US for making such move that initially caused harm to Pakistan's foreign policy and diplomacy worldwide. (Kipp and Grau 2012: 140)

Now, we can discuss the Kargil incident to emphasize the growing tension between India and Pakistan that further accelerated the blow to the South Asian geo-political space. India's tryst with the nuclear weapon power in 1998 had declared a nationwide phenomenon and paved the ground for raising concern for Pakistan at one level. Under such tremulous conditions, Pakistani soldiers occupied a number of strategic posts on the border of Indian side of the Line of Control to make their presence felt. Diplomatically and strategically, Indian soldiers conscientiously pushed back Pakistani forces in a series of small battles. Hostilities and crude enmities ended when Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif travelled to Washington responding to President Clinton's call for a ceasefire on 4 July 1999. (Wilkinson 2015: 141-49) The Kargil conflict has opened multiple narratives for shaping and reshaping the future structure of civil-military relations in India. These areas are like nuclear deterrence and democratic peace within the South Asian boundary while taking serious care of ushering in a new phase of military modernization and doctrinal innovation. The conflict also germinated a debate on the role played by the third parties in it. Here it has clearly indicated the pivotal role of the United States in pressurizing the Pakistani government in negotiating a peace deal for greater peace and stability in the South Asian regions. At the end of the war, a report called the Kargil Review Committee Report indispensably highlighted a number of recommendations that further advocated changes in military strategy and proposed a fresh new set of institutional responses in the presence of nuclear weapons and its utilization in these regions. (Chari 1977: 23-31) Later

a number of incidents like the atrocious attack on the Indian Parliament in 2000-2001 further revitalized the debate on preparing for a limited war with Pakistan keeping the civil-military association in mind.

Starting with the rising tensions in South Asia, India's relations with China marked a turning point in 1962, with the outbreak of war between the two countries offering us a panoramic view of crisis on longstanding India's tryst with China. As we have been able to see that quite expectedly China launched a military offensive, completely taking New Delhi by surprise for the first time since India's independence in 1947. The discussion on this issue further indicated the colossal debate on Defence Minister Krishna Menon's utter incompetence and enduring neglect in realizing timely warnings from senior military officials (Sukhla 2012: 34). While parts of the Henderson-Brooks Report were declassified, it was generally indicated that Nehru could have taken strong position for not making India's humiliating defeat in 1962 (Verma 2016: 43). The report also discusses how the Indian military has been allegedly ordered to engage the Chinese military in a war which they were bound to lose despite having combat capabilities. (Elahi 2019: 1-9) In this camouflage, one might argue that China's predictable military superiority remains an elongated threat for Indian security environment. In these changing circumstances, the role of Pakistan in south Asian geo-politics generated concerns for India for diverse strategic purposes. Even, the instability of Pakistan has posed a much more immediate threat to Indian security interests in the subcontinent that are closely interlinked to the larger issues of hope and aspiration. Besides, the various issues like rapid proliferation of militant groups, growing internal sectarian conflict and the increasing influence of the separatist group like Tehreek-e-Taliban in Pakistan provide lethal challenges to India and its very existence sometimes consequently got afflicted by it. (Basrur, Das and Pardesi 2014: 45-51)

#### **Towards a Utopia of Stable Environment: Internal Discontent and Resistance**

This is quite evident from the fact that the military offered its assistance to civilians as 'aid to civil power' in the maintenance of law and order since the birth of the nation. This is also true to fact that the military acted as the only reliable agency that could restore law and order and maintain stability accordingly for the sake of its motherland. Over time, however, changes in the nature of India's external and internal threats and inedible condition foreground the role of the military to embrace aspects of counter-insurgency operations in specific parts of the country giving proper priority. As an example, we can say that in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the Indian Army was fighting against the brutal Mizo rebels in the north-east, Sikh rebels in Punjab, Kashmiri separatists in Jammu and Kashmir and Tamil guerrillas in Sri Lanka continuing into the late 1980s. Broadly, such operations offered direct threat to the very foundation of Indian Army and its core establishment. During the Naga insurgency the army and civil administration had little to no experience of such situation, and this further aggravated the state of events. Local unrest gradually spread to various parts of the country and motivated organized and sometimes

unorganized separatist groups to carry on their movement in the name of identity formation and social recognition. Despite knowing the nature and if not the possible outcome of such insurgency, the political leadership failed to develop a coherent policy that often seemed fractured between using military force and appeasing the local population keeping specific agendas in mind. The Indian Army now adopted diverse strategies to isolate entire population from rebel groups in many parts of North-East Indian states for making their movement enfeebled from within. Both the states of Nagaland and Mizoram have witnessed different doctrines for eliminating the rebel tendencies and ultimately produced mixed results. (Rosen 1996: 11-17) Furthermore, a violent insurgent movement in Punjab gained momentum in the mid-1980s having specific aims and objectives. Led by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, this movement developed a violence-centered strategy to foster communal unrest within the state and thus provided a ground for communal sensibilities, which proved to be hazardous for the Indian nation around that time. To keep the Hindus out of Punjab was one of the mottos of the Dal Khalsa. It later created a backlash that could unite the Sikh community in building a new homeland as argued by the counter-insurgency experts of South Asia. Now, it has been seen that the Army had been able to realize the gravity of this violent movement while the contemporary Government led by the Congress party had little or no intension to counter this and thus offered glaring explanation. Later, on June 5, 1984, the military launched an operation code, named Operation Blue Star to evict Sikh rebel militants who had seized control of the Golden Temple, the holy shrine of the Sikhs in Amritsar, Punjab. This was argued as an epicentre of the movement. Finally, it has been observed that the Indian Army successfully destroyed the Sikh militant base through a fierce campaign and Punjab had been placed under the military rule. (Mukherjee 2020: 45-56).

After briefing on the two significant insurgency operations and its very nature, the present author seeks to turn the attention of the readers towards Kashmir once again. The separatist movement in Kashmir since 1990s proved to be one of the most challenging cases which caused the damaging of the army men, both physically and in terms of resources and it had its overwhelming impact on the society and economy of India squarely. Subsequently, rising tide of disillusionment with the politics of the state government uniquely provoked unrest and discontents against the local state machinery in a repeated manner. As a result, it had been seen that the conflicting violence spread across the state and such activism had not been controlled by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the Border Security Force (BSF). In 1989, Government of India turned to the Indian Army for assistance to help local agencies for combating with insurgents in one hand and maintaining law and order on the other.

Moreover, the Rashtriya Rifles was specifically created to manage counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir by the Indian government to maintain peace and stability in this region. To concretise the policies regarding the insurrections in this region, the Special Task Force (STF) and Special Operations Group (SOG) were also created from within the J&K

Police in 1995 broadly helping the Rashtriya Rifles in close-contact counter-insurgency operations. In the last two decades, however, the Indian military has been unable to disengage itself from Kashmir. Moreover, it has also been strikingly pointed out that the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) had given the military to exercise its power with impunity, leading often to arresting, detaining, and killing suspected civilians in fake encounters. Issues like extrajudicial executions and disappearances became frequent in this region. It has also indicated the lack of professionalism of military units and further this caused the spawning of outrage among the embittered Kashmiri youth against the army and largely the government of India. This has also caught the attention of the world on a global sensitivity scale. trapped between offering protections to Kashmiri civilians against a powerful militant movement and facing rising unrest to a perceived occupation, the morale of the Indian armed forces had suffered a serious blow (Bhimaya 1997: 49). Indian Army's gradual transformation towards a police force needs to be re-evaluated here. Though, it is trying to offer various schemes of developmental aid and assistance to disaffected local population to win their support and provoking them to be sensible with the contemporary government. (Chatterjee 2013: 180)

It has been argued that the counter-insurgency operations in Sri Lanka by the Indian Army proved to be crucial for the bi-lateral relations between these two countries. Tamil separatist movement was gaining ground in Sri Lanka while the Sinhalese government had started to plummet political freedom and rights of Indian born Tamils. This act has alternately given rise to the aggressive militant group namely the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). It subsequently gained a stronghold in the provinces of Jaffna Peninsula, and it conducted violent attacks against Sri Lankan defence forces. This virulent tussle has continued for several years and ultimately Sri Lankan forces has started to launch a massive offensive against the LTTE in the summer of 1987. It has been argued that this action led by the Sri Lankan Army in the Jaffna Peninsula proved to be influential for India's security question. Concerned about the future of Tamil minorities in Sri Lanka, India's political leaders empathized with the Tamils as the Indian state of Tamil Nadu had a significantly large Tamil population. Moreover, extending political support to Tamil minority representative groups have been promised by the Government of India. Initiatives have been taken by India's political leadership to mediate between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil separatists and such leadership wanted to play a key role in the anti-militant campaign in Sri Lanka (1983-87). Later, it proved to be disastrous when Indian political leaders allowed Tamil separatists to conduct the training camps for Tamil guerrillas in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. (Narayan 2010: 5-17) After signing the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, India decided to send an 'Indian Peace Keeping Force' (IPKF) to the northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka, and this has been done under the leadership of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on 29 July 1987. Violent repercussion in form of aggressions between radical Sinhalese nationals and the IPKF caught the global attention. As a result, a number of military clashes between the IPKF and the LTTE broke out without giving much attention on the peace process. This activism also compelled New Delhi to

decide to withdraw the IPKF forces from Sri Lanka under any condition. Finally, despite continued fighting in Sri Lanka, during the month of March 1990 most of the Indian soldiers had returned to India. (Bandarage 2009: 110-13)

#### **Maoist Insurgency and Civil-Military Imperatives:**

In recent times, a more challenging episode facing the Indian military is a strongly entrenched Maoist insurrection that threatens to destabilize the internal security of the country since its very genesis. The Maoists have emerged in 1967 and conducted a series of popular peasant revolutions against the abusive Zamindars and state apparatus in a combined manner. Popularly known as the Naxalite movement, the group has gained significant momentum against the Indian state since 2004 using violent mechanism to sustain and achieve their goals. The Government reports and various other official documents revealed the news that the Maoists are mostly active in the states of Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana and several parts of West Bengal as a force against the oppressive state mechanism. Seeing their virulent presence, the Indian military launched Operation Green Hunt (a 100,000-troop strong counter-offensive mechanism) to fight the guerrillas. The then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has opined in one of the meetings that the biggest challenge faced by the contemporary India was that of the Maoist insurgency. One can see the gravity of this statement by examining the contemporary activities of the Maoists across the country. For example, one may talk about the most vicious campaigns executed by Maoist guerrillas in May 2013 to attack a Congress party convoy in the central Indian state of Chhattisgarh. It was ambushed and exhibited dissent against the government efforts not to reduce their miseries. (Sawan 2020: 65-76) Despite having lethal expression, the Maoist movement is unique in regard to India's other counter-insurgency campaigns due to the tactical advantage enjoyed by Maoist guerrillas over Indian security forces. They were initially successful in organizing and conducting operations against the Indian state and a very recent incident in Chhattisgarh proved fatal for the Indian Army. During a deadly encounter between the security forces and the Naxals in this region, 22 jawans were died and 31 faced injuries. (The Wire 2021: 6) This issue has deepened over time and caught public attention, while the challenge for the Indian government and security forces now is to fight against the Naxals without estranging the local population. Now, it has become imperative that the military force of India has to devise alternative and infuriating tools effectively for fighting against the Maoists and their constantly changing strategy and doctrinal mechanism. (Sundar 2016: 7)

#### **Reality Versus Power Status: Nuclear Proliferation and Strategic Orientation**

Nuclear capability slowly started influencing India's stance on external and internal security issues and the contemporary geo-political capabilities. As we all know the emergence of India as nuclear power begun to materialize during the two subsequent tests in 1974 and in 1998. The first nuclear test, as is argued, in 1974 was conducted for some peaceful purpose while the second introduced India as a declared nuclear weapon state to

the world and placed her in the league of states that share the same equilibrium in the larger backdrop of nuclear proliferation programme. After those two tests, India's stated nuclear doctrine has undergone various permutations and combinations and along with this, significant debate concerning India's military and political leadership by keeping the issues of nuclear power in mind had germinated in the 1970s. (Pant and Joshi 2018: 63)

The strategic presence of India and its relation with her neighbours have to be explained in order to understand the nuclear proliferation process. Moreover, experts used to argue that India's nuclear doctrine is determined by a variety of considerations. On the external front, it is argued that there is a need to maintain a minimum credible nuclear deterrent in order to keep India's geopolitical realities with Pakistan and China in a changing politico-strategic ambience. Various issues like those related to Pakistan and its attitude towards competing with India's conventional military superiority, its failure to prosecute the perpetrators of the 1998 Mumbai attacks, the almost constant state of political instability within its borders, the rise of Islamist fundamentalism and covert support to militancy in Kashmir are some of the aspects that continue shaping India's future nuclear position and preparedness in South Asian scenario. While talking about the nuclear programme of India, most experts are likely to agree to the fact that the presence of nuclear weapons will inevitably influence the possibility of future conflict between the two countries. China as one of the advanced countries of South Asia as compared to India and Pakistan will continue to complicate the whole process and to stir up the entire situation. The security environment in this comparative perspective has played a challenging role in the whole process of nuclear proliferation programme. (Tellis 2001: 65)

### **Beyond the Issues of Doctrines and Strategy: Exploring the Defence Reforms**

This has been quite evident from the fact that defence reforms play a pivotal role in shaping and reshaping the army in India. Despite concern over doctrine and strategy, the discussion on defence reforms in India has also emerged (in the context of wars or crises) as a burning issue over the last couple of decades. However, it is intimidating to say that the much-needed defence reforms in India continue to be a divisive issue, as it is essentially characterised by bureaucratic functions, utmost secrecy and lack of proper coordination between the Ministry of Defence and the three services of the army. Such initiatives have been taken quite repeatedly since 1990s in India. After the end of the Kargil War, a complete reappraisal came from the Kargil Review Committee Report for the reform of the state of Indian defence and its overall management for the future prospect. On the other hand, the then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee was instrumental in constituting a group of ministers to review India's national security system and implement the recommendations of the Committee for eliminating the internal fiascos in the army. Strategic experts like Ayesha Ray and Anit Mukherjee have informed that the recommendations of this Committee still remain declassified and function of the Task Force, headed by Arun Singh, has not been completed its job properly. Creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has been foregrounded to head the Integrated Defence Staff

and the creation of a tri-services command at Andaman and Nicobar (ANC) and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) became vital for the fruitful management of the army in India. Later in continuation to the earlier Committee, the Naresh Chandra Committee formulated another set of recommendations urging quick and effective defence reform in 2010. While the arguments regarding such recommendations were going on for rationalization of the army, the Ministry of Defence started to blame the three services for discrepancies in the Committee's respective recommendations for the army in India. This generated debate and dissent among the civil-military arenas in India and eventually attracted greater public attention. (Ray 2004: 1-7)

Another major issue, namely the defence preparedness requires crucial attention in this respect. Arguably, a clear lack of coordination between various agencies in higher defence management has even worsen the situation. The question has been asked repeatedly that is the Indian armed forces ready in effectively defending the country during an external attack and providing immediate corollary to this angle. Even, it has been also enquired whether the Indian military possesses cutting-edge technology both in weapons and design to execute successful operations on the battlefield. Often, it is very disappointing to say that these areas are not in a very decent condition. One incident might be cited here when former chief of the Indian Army, General V.K. Singh expressed his anguish over the dire state of India's defence preparedness to the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh through a letter and urged to initiate immediate fruitful steps to avoid/ to handle such calamities in the future.

There were exclusive reports through investigative journalism and some in-depth studies, which reveal an overall Bureaucratic apathy and the control of the defence by a weak set of ministers resulting in an equally weak system of defence management. In matters like arms procurement and defence equipment, India is constantly facing a multitude of challenges, ranging from obsolete artillery and air defence systems to a rigid attitude towards military doctrine and inter-service cooperation. Even, India's navy is undergoing through various phases of ups and downs and as a result navy's only aircraft carrier is creaking towards retirement after more than five decades of British and Indian service. While India is struggling to improve its defence reforms on the other hand, two of its neighbours namely China and Pakistan seem to have a much better record in their defence investments. But despite such recurring problems, political involvement in this regard produced a very thin result. This entire process usually increases the corruption level inside the defence procurement. (Mukherjee 2009: 5-7)

#### **(Dis) agreement between Armed Forces and Civilians: Inter-service Rivalry and Discord**

While talking about the conflicting nature of the civil-military relations in India, one can see a long-standing complex orientation further intensifies discord and disagreement between the armed forces and civilians, and between the three services of the army in general. These issues, over the years, have demonstrated a growing sense of unease and

frustration with the Ministry of Defence. The overarching overlap between political and bureaucratic control sometimes provoke the army and civilians in equal terms and the political propaganda make use of this as their source for further deliberations. A number of examples could be cited here to elaborate this aspect further. Recently, a public battle of talk between former Chief of Staff, General V.K. Singh, and the government happened over a tenure issue that ultimately pushed the general to take his own government to court. On the other hand, under the Narendra Modi government, same V. K. Singh became the Chief of Defence Staff without consulting the officials associated with this. He has become the chief of all three services of the army and would likely to provide information to the current government for better running of the said department. Therefore, it is quite obvious that these kinds of activism raise mutual suspicion and the lack of coordination is increasingly making Indian civil-military relations more unstructured, and sometimes highly unprofessional. (Behera 2021: 1-19)

Over a couple of years, most of the states of South Asia and of course India has seen a bitter and acrimonious debate constantly happening within the three services and this sometime leaks the information and squarely distresses the civilian machinery with a strong note. Here one may cite an example of Kargil conflict. During the said conflict, the then army chief, General V.P. Malik, and IAF chief, A.Y. Tipnis, have put their conflicting opinions especially on key operational issues, such as ‘deployment of reconnaissance planes, fighters and helicopters with the purpose of evicting troops from dominating heights’ and eventually other difficulties arose due to that. Even the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Parliamentary Standing Committee on defence also highlighted the diverse orientations of lack of coordination between the navy and the Indian Coast Guard. This ultimately led to the process of making the Indian coast vulnerable to external threats in future. Such constant divisiveness is really making the orientation of the civil-military vicious and further leading the ground for constant aporia. (Dasgupta 2001: 44-61)

### **Concluding Remarks:**

By analysing various aspects of the civil-military relations in India since 1947, we can provide some broad conclusions on its different notions. In the first place, this is quite obvious to know that Indian civil-military relations present a rather complex picture and civilian control over the army and army internal management sometimes remain absent or rather incomplete. Secondly, it has been seen that the military strategy and doctrinal innovation often find themselves in conflict with political objectives and the so-called political environment of India is not at all ripe for realizing such technicalities. It is often argued that repeated inconsistencies in political and military objectives during periods of brief crises or wars make a smooth implementation of political and military strategy much more challenging and is hardly welcomed by its civilians. Recently, we have been witnessing the manipulating friction in matching military strategy and doctrines to political goals gives Indian civil-military relations a complex and misinterpreted character, which

raise pejorative concerns nationwide. India's regular border clashes with Pakistan demonstrates the need for clearly articulated military objectives and sometimes need to have a clear vision to tackle the situation of keeping the international geo-political atmosphere stable. So, one can argue that Indian military relation responses need to be attuned in such a way that it will take into account the success of India's long-term political and military objectives and their dual responsibilities to make this aspect a grand success. While, we have been arguing the civil-military relations and its orientation, the role of bureaucracy has to be taken into consideration. As an intermediate agency between the political leadership and the military, the bureaucracy is severely obstructing direct civil-military communication. Sometimes, excessive involvement of the bureaucracy in the military matters and their allied performances put negative impact on their relation. Recent researches adequately highlighted a general apathy and inattention of the Ministry of Defence in the timely creation of institutional organisation to manage nuclear doctrine and military strategy. Therefore, this is drawing a deeper wedge in civil-military relations in India and the narrative of understanding on such issues project the ground reality in dubious terms. In order to expedite and foreground greater cooperation in Indian civil-military relations, it is equally required to standardize the system of higher defence management in India. This further requires the much-needed complete reorganization of the Indian defence management in order to cope with the current conjecture.

Some strategists like Harsh. V. Pant and C. Raja Mohan have repeatedly warned on the rise of the Islamist fundamentalists in Pakistan and its threat to India's external security. This issue needs some additional critical rethinking so that Indian civil-military responses towards Pakistan offer doctrinal and strategic goals and thus making its civil-military relation in tune with this situation. The question thus arises is that whether India needs to develop a combination of offensive and defensive doctrines to combat such threats visible and sometimes hidden threats for overall security of the country? In this respect, one may even ask about India's position and responses towards the stiff challenges of nuclear doctrine of Pakistan. We have to remember that both military and political goals are loosely associated with such issues, and it further provide dichotomous atmosphere. Besides, the vast expansion of terror networks also requires serious consideration and careful examination so that India could restrain its alarming impact for further implications. Several terrorist or rather separatist groups such as the Jaish-e-Mohammad, Hizbul Mujahideen continue to present India with a formidable threat, particularly in Kashmir and Pak administered Kashmir. The efforts to disrupt peace in India by Pakistani militant groups are entitled again to desolate humanitarian works keeping complete miseries in mind. Not only to this, issues like the rise of Al-Qaeda's South Asia unit, along with its links to ISIS, is demonstrating counter-terrorist activism in India and would try to push hard press on its security aspects. Therefore, India's topmost priority should be to keep the three services of the Indian military in coordination with security agencies for resisting

unlawful and unexpected terrorist attacks and tracing the earliest move of such activity. This will definitely strengthen the civil-military coordination in a greater way.

Finally, in the South Asian countries, the geo-political issues sometimes make serious concern for the emerging nature of civil–military relations and India is considered to have better position in this respect. Moreover, we must take into account the way it has evolved over last seven decades bearing significant implications to maintain the atmosphere of democratic governance. There is always a tendency in India that its political leadership has always been wary of designating too much decision-making power to the military in order to keep the armed forces under democratic parlance and to control it in an indirect manner. India's political leadership should learn to work in developing a modernised military with enough weight in defence policy. The political leadership has to even learn the mechanism of identifying clear political goals without ever compromising the external and internal security interests of the country.

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