

Chapter - I

Analyticity

CHAPTER - I

ANALYTICITY

History of philosophy reveals the fact that philosophers, while dealing with the problem of knowledge have always tried to draw a line of distinction between truths considered as eternal in contrast to truths considered as contingent, i.e. true for the time being. Thus, Plato does distinguish between knowledge and opinion, Aristotle between absolute necessity and relative necessity, Hume between relation of ideas and matters of fact, Kant between a priori and a posteriori and so on. In the same manner, some philosophers look at the Kant's use of two types of judgements - analytic and synthetic and thereby willing to draw a clear line of demarcation between an analytic statement stating a priori knowledge and a synthetic statement stating a posteriori knowledge. Anyway, since Kant, philosophers have been very much attracted by the different aspects of the notion of analyticity and at the same time they have curiously observed some obscurities in Kant's explanation of the concerned notion. It is these limitations, which I consider liable to direct philosophers after Kant to interpret analytic statements in different ways.

Among the different obscurities, first of all it can be mentioned that in the hands of Kant the notion of analyticity has been confined only to judgments containing subject - predicate form, while in reality there are number of items of knowledge to which this particular notion can be attributed.

Secondly, when it is said that in an analytic judgment predicate-concept is contained in the subject-concept — difficulty arises regarding the term 'concept'. Generally, to have a concept of 'X' means to know something about 'X'. Now the point is that, having a concept is not something static. The more we know about 'X' richer our concept becomes. As a result, a statement which was not considered as analytic previously may be counted as analytic due to new discovery. Thus, only after the discovery of mammalian characteristic of whales - statement like 'whales are mammals' is being counted as analytic one.

Lastly, while defining analyticity, Kant's use of law of contradiction is not also clear. All that he says regarding this law is 'negation of an analytic judgement would be self-contradictory'. Now, to define analyticity philosophers after Kant have explained the law from different points of view. Some wish to take the law as a test or criterion of analyticity; some again consider the law as a mark of the necessary character of analytic statement and think that an analytic statement can be defined solely in terms of necessity.

However, the above obscurities lead philosophers after Kant to interpret an analytic statement in various ways. Consequently, we come across different interpretations of such statement. Among others, the following deserve special attention:

- 1) Analytic statements are apriori statements.
- 2) Analytic statements are necessary statements.
- 3) Analytic statement is a statement the truth of which follows from the meanings of the words involved.
- 4) Analyticity of an analytic statement follows from the synonymy of the terms involved therein.

Now, regarding the above interpretations, a question may arise in the following form : How far the above interpretations do serve the purpose for which they are proposed? In other words, can the notion of analyticity be actually explained in terms of the notions like apriority, necessity, meaning and synonymy?

Anyway, in connection with the above questions, our discussion on the subsequent four sections would reveal the fact that none of the above interpretations have been able to offer a satisfactory explanation of an analytic statement. And as reason of this failure, I would like to mention the following three important points:

- 1) The notions that have been introduced by philosophers to clarify analyticity, themselves stand in need of clarification.

In fact, discussion on each of the notions like apriority, necessity, meaning and synonymy would show that they are actually vague notions and hence, attempts to explain analyticity in terms of such vague notions can never achieve the desired result.

2) Another reason lies in the wrong step taken by these philosophers while considering all analytic statements as belonging to a single class and thereby asking for a criterion explaining all analytic statements whatsoever.

3) Since the concept of eternal truth has been jeopardised due to the advancement of knowledge, question arises regarding the feasibility of analytic statements themselves. Hence, any interpretation of such statements is bound to be incomplete.

The importance of the notion of Analyticity

As a notion, analyticity does deserve detailed discussion for the following reasons:

1) The problem of knowledge undoubtedly seems to be a perennial problem of philosophy. In the history of thought, Kant's theory of knowledge is actually a turning point. In fact, Kant's attitude towards knowledge has been considered as Copernican. Now, being involved as an important notion in Kant's theory of knowledge, analyticity rightly deserves special discussion. That is to say, understanding of the notion of analyticity is necessary to understand Kant's theory of knowledge properly.

2) In the history of philosophy it has been noted that from time immemorial philosophers have been very much concerned with truths considered as eternal in comparison to truths which are

merely contingent. Thus, Plato's account of knowledge as distinguished from opinion, Leibnitz's account of truths of reason as distinguished from truths of facts, Hume's relation of ideas as distinguished from matters of fact have attracted philosophers from time to time. And from this point of view clarification of analytic truth as distinguished from synthetic one is duly needed. In fact, clarification of analytic truth is required to understand the universe. In order to get an adequate global view of the world of thought, of language or of anything that is necessary for us is to become clear about the roles played in our conceptual system by different kinds of truth such as, logical truth, physically necessary truth in natural sciences etc. And for this, what is required is to clarify the statements expressing such truths. In other words, clarification of analytic statement is of utmost importance in order to appreciate and to understand the universe. And since understanding and appreciating of the universe is the sole task of philosophy, the notion of analyticity undoubtedly goes to the very centre of philosophy.¹

Now, prior to discussion on the above interpretations of analyticity I think it is necessary to mention the attribution

1. Hilari Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge University, 1986, p. 41.

to which the notion of analyticity would be ascribed in the present topic. Kant, in his theory of knowledge introduces the notion of analyticity in course of talking about judgment. He defines a judgment as analytic when the predicate repeats the subject either in whole or in part without any addition to the subject; while in a synthetic judgment, the predicate stands outside the subject concept and adds something to the subject. According to Kant,

"If I say, for instance 'all bodies are extended' — this is an analytic judgment. For I do not require to go beyond the concept which I connect with body in order to find extension as bound up with it. To meet with this predicate I have merely to analyse the concept, that is, to become conscious to myself of the manifold which I always think in that concept. The judgment is therefore analytic".¹

Philosophers after Kant apply analyticity to others — such as to proposition, truth and statement. Some of these philosophers reject judgment as an attribution of analyticity on the ground that a judgment which basically does refer to mental act can in no way be free from psychological influence.

Any way, in the present topic the notion of analyticity would be discussed as attributed neither to proposition, nor

1. Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason translated by Norman Kemp-Smith, Macmillan and Company, London, 1964, pp. 48-49.

to truth but to statements only. Now, some philosophers may not admit statements as proper attribution of analyticity by pointing out that as a notion, analyticity should be attributed to a certain non linguistic entity, such as proposition and so on and hence, linguistic entity like statement can in no way be regarded as proper attribution of analyticity. In the face of the above argument it can be said that any reasonable discussion should not be concerned with any non-linguistic entity, rather with a linguistic expression by which such entity is stated clearly. And from this point of view it would be quite justified to attribute the notion of analyticity to a linguistic expression called a statement.

SECTION - I

In order to show that the notion of apriority does help little to explain analyticity and consequently, interpretation like 'analytic statements are apriori statements' falls far short of the desired result, I would like to point out the major difficulties underlying the notion of apriority.

One of the most important notions involving in Kant's theory of knowledge is the notion of apriority. Although, etymologically the term apriori means 'from what is prior', as a concept apriori has been used in somewhat different senses and

received varied treatments in the hands of philosophers since Kant. Some such interpretations are:

- i) apriori means independent of empirical facts,
- ii) apriori means independent of experience,
- iii) apriori means independent of empirical verification.

A little reflection would show that each of the above explanations is confronted with some difficulties.

In case of (i) difficulty arises regarding the term 'fact'. A question may arise that in what sense the particular term 'fact' should be considered? Should it be considered as something external? or, something internal? Now, in connection with apriori statements it is said that such a statement does not correspond to anything in the external world. Hence, if apriori statement is considered as a statement independent of external fact then its concern must be an internal one i.e. an idea. And the problem is that an idea is something private. According to Frege,

"Every idea has only one bearer; no two men have the same idea".¹

However, if apriority does depend on an idea it would lose one of its essential characteristics of universality. Moreover, in

1. Frege, Gottlob, "The Thought : A Logical Inquiry" in Philosophical Logic, ed. P.F. Strawson, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 28.

whatever sense the particular term 'fact' is used, can we really speak of an unexperienced fact at all? If not, would it not be difficult to distinguish between apriori and aposteriori?

Regarding (ii) the use of the expression 'independent of experience' is not clear at all. According to P. Sen, knowledge as independent of experience does not definitely point to a knowledge derived from any particular source, rather knowledge derived from any source other than experience.¹ And in that case apriori knowledge may mean knowledge derived from intuition, knowledge derived from apprehension and so on. Again, in connection with the expression 'independent of experience' question may arise in the following form: Can knowledge be acquired without any experience at all? In fact, some philosophers think that in order to know a statement as apriori one, what is required is to have certain experience. Thus, according to Kripke, to consider the apriori statement 'The standard metre rod is 1 metre long' one should know the way in which the reference of the word 'metre' has been fixed.²

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1. Sen, Pranab, 'The Concept of the Apriori' in Logic, Induction and Ontology, The Macmillan Company of India Ltd., 1980, p. 4.
 2. Sen, Pranab, "The Necessary and the Apriori" in Logic, Induction and Ontology, The Macmillan Company of India Ltd., 1980, p. 221.

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In facing the above difficulties regarding the expression 'independent of experience', some philosophers intend to use 'independent of experience' as 'independent of empirical verification'. According to John Hospers, speaking of apriori is not referring to the way of coming by the piece of knowledge in question but to the way in which it must be verified.¹

Hence, to know an apriori statement like 'table is table' these philosophers think that one has to experience what table is and what word is used to refer to it. And the point is that the above statement would be considered as an apriori only in the sense that he is not required to investigate any instance of table to see whether it is really a table. In other words, there is no need to await the verdict of experience to find out whether the state 'table is table' always holds true and this is what is meant by the expression 'independent of empirical verification'.

Now, the point is that difficulty arises regarding the term 'verification'. This particular term verification as used here, has been derived from the 'verifiability theory of meaning' advocated by the logical positivists. According to this theory, to be meaningful, a statement should be empirically verified. Now, it is to be noted here that the logical positivists themselves have

1. Hospers, John, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, Allied Publishers Private Ltd., Calcutta, 1977, p. 181.

used the term 'verification' in more than one sense, such as, sometimes in the sense of complete verification, sometimes in the sense of possibility of verification and so on. Hence, the exact sense of 'verification' in case of apriori statement remains unspecified. Moreover, a large number of statements, such as evaluative-statements, belief-statements, etc. are beyond the reach of verification. Therefore, if 'independent of experience' would be the mark of apriority, the above-mentioned types of statements would undoubtedly come under the perview of apriori statements.

SECTION - II

In this section, I would like to show how various explanations of the concept of necessity in the hands of different philosophers at different times, instead of explaining the concept, have turned it more obscure. As a result of which the above-mentioned interpretation, 'analytic statements are necessary statements' would actually explain little about the so-called analytic statements.

As a concept, 'necessity' was used by many philosophers before Kant. Aristotle used necessity in two different senses - absolute and relative. Absolute necessary truths are those which express insight into the essences of things whereas relative necessary truths are treated by him as necessary only in relation to a given hypothesis.

According to Leibnitz, necessary truths are truths of reason and such truths rest on the principle of contradiction. Necessary truth, for example, expressed by 'an equilateral triangle is a rectangle' cannot be denied without being involved in contradiction in comparison to truths of facts or contingent truths which can be denied without logical contradiction. Now, despite making this distinction, Leibnitz does not admit any real contingency. According to him, in every true proposition the predicate is contained in the subject. That is to say, Leibnitz thinks that everything that is true of a thing is part of that thing's essence and it is so for God. It follows therefore, that according to Leibnitz nothing simply happens to a thing i.e. there is no real contingency. Now, the point is that due to his metaphysical standpoint Leibnitz's account fails to distinguish between necessary truth and contingent truth properly and thereby stands on the way to grasp the exact nature of the concept of necessity.

In the Treaties, Hume distinguishes two types of relations by which ideas are connected with one another — natural relation and philosophical relation. According to Copleston, in case of natural relation ideas are connected with one another by natural force of association. Hence, one tends naturally to recall the other, for example 'water flows downwards'. In 'philosophical relations' we can compare at will any objects, provided that there is at least some similarity of quality between them. In such

comparison, he thinks that the mind is not impelled by a natural force of association to pass from one idea to another; it does so simply because it has chosen to institute a certain comparison.¹ An example of philosophical relation is a mathematical proposition 'two plus two four'. The truth of the above proposition depends simply and solely on the relations between ideas, — it cannot possibly be refuted by experience. Now, the problem is that between these two types of necessities — natural and philosophical, which one would be counted as a defining characteristic of analyticity?

In his theory of knowledge Kant does not offer any positive definition of necessity; rather he defines it negatively as a concept the opposite of which is inconceivable. According to Kant, experience cannot afford the smallest ground for necessity. That is to say, Kant thinks that a necessary statement can in no way be derived from experience.

The above account of necessity cannot be accepted for more than one reason. Firstly, difficulty arises regarding the term 'Inconceivable'. On the one hand, it may mean inconceivable to this or that individual or it may mean inconceivable to all possible worlds. In the first case, Kant would be accused of psychologism and in case of the second he would be accused of introducing

1. Copleston, Frederick, A History of Philosophy, New York, Doubleday Co. international, 1967, Vol. 5, p. 75.

metaphysical concept in his theory of knowledge or epistemology.

Secondly, it is controversial whether a necessary statement can never be derived from experience. Saul Kripke, who classifies necessary statements as epistemically necessary and metaphysically necessary, holds that whereas metaphysically necessary statements are true in all possible worlds, epistemically necessary statements are rationally unrevisable. And Kripke thinks that property of being epistemically necessary is quite independent of the property of being a priori. Thus, the statement 'The standard metre rod is 1 metre long' according to Kripke, although a necessary statement does depend on experience.

Leaving aside the metaphysical realm, concept of necessity receives new dimensions in the hands of logical positivists. Ayer does identify necessity with allied concept a priori. He thinks that being universally true, necessary truths should in no way be dependent on experience. Propositions of logic and mathematics are considered by him as necessary truths. Now difficulty arises regarding the ways in which Ayer has tried to explain necessity. Once he said that although necessary propositions of logic and mathematics may be discovered through inductive procedure, once we apprehend them, we see they are necessarily true, that they hold good for every conceivable instance.¹ Elsewhere he said that

1. Ayer, A. J., Language, Truth and Logic, Penguin Books, 1978, p. 100.

propositions of logic and mathematics are necessary — simply because we never allow them to be anything else. And the reason for this is that we cannot abandon them without contradicting ourselves, without sinning against the rules which govern the use of language, and so making our utterances self-stultifying¹. These two different explanations of necessary truths, instead of explaining necessity, make the concept more confused. Moreover, difficulty arises regarding the terms 'apprehended' and 'rules of language' as used by Ayer. The term 'apprehend' may be used in different senses. It may mean the act of arresting, anticipation of evil, power of understanding and so on. Now, the exact sense in which the particular term 'apprehend' has been used here is not clear. Moreover, in whatever sense it may be used, would it be proper to consider necessity simply as a matter of apprehension?

A number of difficulties arise regarding the expression 'rules of language' also. Rules of language may mean rules of artificial language or it may mean rules of ordinary language. The above account does not clearly state whether 'rules' should be referred to rules of artificial language or rules of ordinary language. Moreover, question may arise regarding the very existence of rules in ordinary language. Since, the rules of an

1. Ayer, A.J., Language Truth and Logic, Penguin Books, 1978, p. 103.

artificial language are explicitly written down at the time of 'constructing' such language, no question arises regarding the very existence of rules involving in such language. Now, it is not the case in connection with rules of ordinary language. And the problem becomes critical when a group of philosophers do admit the existence of rules in ordinary language while others deny them. Philosophers denying the very existence of rules in case of ordinary language have argued that since people using ordinary language had not constructed any rules by making a linguistic contract at the dawn of history - there can be no such rules of language at all. Morton G. White writes:

" — natural languages have no rule-books and the question of whether a given statement is analytic in them is much more difficult".¹

Quine rejects the empirical view that, like rules of logic and rules of mathematics, there are also rules of language. According to Quine, if there is any such rule at all, it would be rule of artificial language only. In this connection, Hilary Putnam writes:

1. Morton G. White : "The Analytic and the Synthetics an Untenable Dualism" in Semantics And The Philosophy of Language, edited by Linsky, L., University of Illinois Press, 1952, p. 277.

"..... there are no further rules of language beyond the garden variety of rules which a lexicographer or a grammarian might discover, and which only the philosopher can discover".¹

On the other hand, philosophers admitting the very existence of rules of ordinary language differ among themselves regarding the nature of such rules. Thus, while Ayer considers rules of language as necessary truths, later Wittgenstein's opinion in this respect is quite different. According to Moore, Wittgenstein who always compares rules of language with rules of game, seems to use 'rule' in two different senses — (1) stating the rules of a game and (2) talking regarding the application of a rule. Now, Moore rethinks that, to Wittgenstein, sentences stating the rules of a game cannot by themselves be true or false, while sentences by which demonstrations are given regarding the application of rules may be true or false.

Now, in whatever sense rules of language are considered; reference to such rule would reduce necessity and thereby analyticity only to a matter of convention; or only a matter of human decision. If so, impossibility of falsification which^{is} characteristic of necessary truths is not a brute ontological fact according

1. Hilary Putnam : "Mind, Language and Reality" Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 38.

to Quinton. Rather, it is brought about by our refusal from the start to let any falsification occur.¹

Carnap defines necessary truth in terms of state - description. A state-description, according to Carnap is a class of sentences in S_1 which contains for every atomic sentence either this sentence or its negation, but not both, and no other sentences. A state-description, Carnap says:

"... gives a complete description of a possible state of the universe of individuals with respect to all properties and relations expressed by predicates of the system. Thus the state-description represent Leibnitz' possible worlds or Wittgenstein's possible state of affairs".²

Hence, to Carnap necessity means logical necessity and he writes:

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1. Quinton, Anthony : "The Apriori and The Analytic" in Philosophical Logic ed. P.F. Strawson, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 116.
 2. Carnap, Rudolf, Meaning and Necessity, University of Chicago Press, 1947, p. 9.

"the concept of logical necessity as explicandum, seems to be commonly understood in such a way that it applies to a proposition P if and only if the truth of P is based on purely logical reasons and is not dependent upon the contingency of facts: in other words, if the assumption of not P would lead to logical contradiction : independent of facts. Thus we see a close similarity between two explicanda, the logical necessity of a proposition and the logical truth of a sentence".¹

Carnap's attempt to explain necessity although very much promising, does really help little to get a clear picture of the concerned notion. Among others, the following are the main objections that can be raised against Carnap.

(i) Attempt to explain necessity in terms of semantic rules is of no avail at all. In fact, the notion of semantic rules is not a clear notion and stands itself for clarification. Hence, any such attempt to define necessity in terms of these rules which are explicitly stated in an artificial language would back ourselves in the same place from where we have started.

1. Carnap, Rudolf, Meaning and Necessity, University of Chicago Press, 1947, p. 174.

(ii) As Carnap identifies necessary truth with analytic truth, it follows therefore that all necessary statements would be counted as analytic statements. In that case there would be no room for synthetic a priori.

(iii) Carnap's explanation of logical necessity is not at all clear. He himself admits that

"... the concept of logical necessity is not sufficiently clear ; it can, for instance, be conceived in such a way that the sentences mentioned are true, but also in another way such that they, or some of them, are false".¹

(iv) Carnap's version that the concept of logical truth and necessary truth are identical cannot be accepted in all cases. For example, the truth of a logically true statement like 'either it is raining or not' is known only if the meaning of the logical constants 'either-or' are known, whereas to determine the truth of a necessary statement 'if John is a bachelor then he is unmarried' depends not only on logical constants 'if-then' but on the meanings of 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man'.

The most extreme version of the linguistic theory of necessity considers necessity only as a matter of linguistic convention. In fact, the conventionalists attack the ontological theory of necessity on the ground that a philosophical

1. Carnap, Rudolf, Meaning and Necessity, University of Chicago Press, 1947, p. 174.

theory presented in the ontological form of speech tends to create an illusion and thereby conceals what is being done with language. Hence, they propose to explain necessity in terms of language and hold that it is only a linguistic convention that makes a form of words expressing a necessary truth. Thus, according to the conventionalists, necessary propositions are only verbal propositions.

Now, regarding the above version of necessity difficulty arises in the following points:

- 1) If necessity is not something objective rather a matter of human decision, how can a line of distinction be drawn between necessary truth and contingent truth?
- 2) That necessary proposition can in no way be treated as merely a verbal proposition can be shown by the fact that the negation of a true verbal proposition is not a self-contradiction while negation of a necessary proposition involves self-contradiction.
- 3) The question of 'true' or 'false' does not arise in case of a necessary proposition, where as a verbal propositions may be 'true' or 'false'.
- 4) If a proposition reports the existence of a linguistic convention, it can in no way be regarded as a necessary one.

5) Lastly, in the above version the use of the term 'verbal' is not clear. Although different philosophers have offered different explanations to clear the use of the term 'verbal', the explanations actually help a little in this respect. Thus, Wittgenstein's explanation of two different uses of 'verbal' — one, original use describing the nature of proposition and the other, regarding the grammatical point of the concerned proposition creating the impression that the true nature of necessary proposition is being revealed — does not seem to be very much promising.

From the above account it follows that philosophers since Aristotle have looked at the concept of necessity from different points of view and consequently, we come across several kinds of necessity such as logical, psychological, natural and so on. Hence, in connection with the particular concept, questions arise in the following forms:

(a) In which sense 'necessity' as a defining characteristic of analyticity should be taken — logical or psychological or natural?

(b) In whatever sense necessity is used, would it imply absolute necessity or necessity relative to a system?

Without the proper answers of the above questions the interpretation 'analytic statements are necessary' would actually explain nothing.

SECTION - III

In this section, discussion would be based on the justification of the claim 'analytic statement is a statement the truth of which follows from the meanings of the words involved'. The proponents of this linguistic version of analytic statement put forward the following arguments:

1) Since some sentences may express an analytic statement at one time and not in another, there is no other way than to depend on the meaning of the terms involved in order to determine a statement as analytic one. Thus, 'All bars serve alcoholic beverages' is analytic if 'bar' means the same as 'place where alcoholic beverages are sold'; but if 'bar' means what it does in the phrase 'chocolate bar' or in 'bar examination', of course the proposition is not analytic in these senses.

2) That meaning is a factor of understanding analyticity, in other words, that analyticity of a statement does depend on the meaning of the words involved can be shown by the fact that a man who does not know the meaning of 'oculist', the statement 'an oculist is an eye-doctor' would not be treated by him as analytic one.

3) Owing to the novel discoveries, a statement which was not regarded as analytic in one time, may be regarded as so at another time. Thus, according to John Hospers, the sentence 'whales are mammals' was formerly not used to express an analytic proposition rather, the sentence would have been thought to express a false proposition. Now, since the mammalian characteristic of whales has been incorporated into the definition of whale, 'whales are mammals' as used today would be analytic.

Now, in connection with the above version objections may arise in the following forms:

(i) It may be pointed out that the linguistic version actually fails to distinguish between a sentence and a statement. It overlooks the important fact that meaning of words is a concern of a sentence and not of a statement which a sentence actually states.

(ii) All that can be said regarding the above version is that it would actually be wrong to think that meaning of a term is a concern exclusively for analytic statement. In fact, non-empirical statement like 'All men are featherless bipeds' does also depend on the meaning of the terms involved.

(iii) One of the fundamental questions raised against the linguistic version of analytic statement is that if an analytic statement like all other empirical statements is subject to revision

or change, it would be really difficult to draw a line of distinction between analytic statement and empirical statement and as a result, question would arise on the possibility of the so called analytic-synthetic distinction. In this connection Quine points out that the total field of our knowledge is so underdetermined by experience that there is every possibility to reevaluate a statement in the light of a single contrary experience. Quine writes:

"... it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on experience, and analytic statements, which hold come what may".¹

Besides the above limitations, the linguistic version suffers from a further limitation arising in connection with the notion of meaning. In fact, the notion of meaning as used by this version with a view to explain the notion of analyticity is itself a vague notion. Philosophers at different times have tried to explain 'meaning' from different angles. Truly speaking, problem of meaning has been considered as a perennial problem of philosophy. Thus, one of the fundamental questions of philosophy is : 'what is exactly meant by "meaning" of an expression'? Hence, philosophers'

1. Quine, W.V.O., "Two Dogmas of Empiricism in From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press, 1953, p. 43.

attempt to explain analyticity in terms of meaning cannot achieve the desired result.

SECTION - IV

This section contains discussion on the interpretation 'Analytic statement is a statement, analyticity of which follows from the synonymy of the terms involved therein.'

Some logical positivists trying to explain analyticity of a statement in terms of synonymy of the terms involved, think that analyticity of the following statements

- 1) Bachelors are unmarried men
- 2) Oculist is an eye-doctor
- 3) Procrastination is putting things off.

do follow from the fact that 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man', in (1), 'oculist' and 'eye-doctor' in (2); 'procrastination' and 'putting things off' in (3); are but synonymous expressions.

According to the logical positivists in case of each statement as mentioned above the word 'synonymous' is here used in such a way that two symbols belonging to the same language can be said to be synonymous if, and only if, the simple substitution of one symbol for the other, in any sentence in which either can significantly occur, always yields a new sentence which is equivalent to the old. It follows therefore, that the logical positivists try

to account synonymy in terms of interchangeability. Now, question may be raised : 'Does "interchangeability" as used here, also presupposes interexplainability?' If so, that is to say, if interchangeability is used in the sense of interexplainability, then no two terms in each of the above pairs are interexplainable as well as interchangeable due to the following reasons.

1) In each of the above statements the two terms used as the subject and the predicate are not of the same status, rather the predicate term is more fundamental than the subject one. Thus, 'unmarried man' is more fundamental than the term 'bachelor', 'eye-doctor' is more fundamental than 'oculist', 'putting things off' is more fundamental than 'procrastination'. That they are different in status and that the relation of synonymy does not hold between each of the above pairs is further justified by the fact that we can define 'bachelor' in terms of 'unmarried man', 'oculist' in terms of 'eye-doctor', 'procrastination' in terms of 'putting things off' and not conversely.

2) That the two terms 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' are not of the same status can also be shown with the help of a mathematical analogy. In a certain mathematical equation such as $2X-4 = 0$, when the variable X is assigned constant value 2, we equate the variable X to that constant value 2 - only in the perspective of the aforesaid condition. Similarly, the term 'bachelor' in the statement 'bachelors are unmarried men' has

been used like a variable symbol on which the meaning of 'unmarried man' has been assigned. From this it does not follow that 'bachelor' would be equated with the meaning of 'unmarried man' in all contexts.

3) That 'Bachelor' has been used like a variable symbol in the statement 'bachelors are unmarried men' can further be justified by the fact that in the expressions 'bachelor of arts', 'bachelor of science', the particular term 'bachelor' is used to denote graduate degree holders and not unmarried men. Hence, in the above two expressions a different meaning i.e. 'graduate degree holders' has been assigned to 'bachelor'.

4) According to Kant 'negation of an analytic statement would be self-contradictory'. Now, if analyticity is explained in terms of synonymy it would result in some synonymous statements. That the above statements are not analytic and hence not synonymous can be shown by the fact that negation of each statement does not involve contradiction at all. Rather, person using negative statement like 'It is not the case that bachelors are unmarried men', or, 'it is not the case that oculists is an eye-doctor', would be accused of not knowing the meanings of 'bachelor' and 'oculist' respectively. It also points out that meanings of 'unmarried man' and 'eye-doctor' have been assigned to the less fundamental terms 'bachelor' and 'oculist' in course of the development of language.

In reply to the above objections against the relation of synonymy holding between each of the above pairs involving in the above-mentioned statements, logical positivists may argue that the question whether the above statements are synonymous or not does not arise at all as in English language each of the above pairs are commonly used as synonymous expressions. Now, the point is that, this reference to use turns the notion of synonymity only as a matter of resolution. Hence, if analyticity is explained in terms of synonymity and synonymity is a matter of resolution, then analyticity would be reduced merely to a kind of resolution.

SECTION - V

From the above discussion it is clear that each of the above interpretations fails to explain analytic statements as such. At best, each can explain only a limited number of such statements. And as underlying reason of this failure, I would like to point out a common limitation shared by all the interpretations, in addition to the above-mentioned limitations peculiar to each interpretation. Now, the task of pointing out this common limitation would be easier if we go through the following analytic statements:

- a) No unmarried man is married.
- b) Either it is raining or not.
- c) Bachelors are unmarried men.
- d) Procrastination is putting things off.

A little reflection shows that although each of the above statements has been considered as analytic one, actually they do not belong to the same category and the following points of difference among them can easily be marked.

(i) Analyticity of the statements (a) and (b) follow clearly from the law of contradiction, while analyticity of (c) and (d) follow from the fact that the terms involved in the statements are but synonymous.

(ii) Being logically true, (a) and (b) are necessary statements — the denial of which would involve self-contradiction. Now, the case is not the same in respect of (c) and (d). Following Quine, it can be pointed out that (c) and (d) can only be turned into logically true statements by putting synonyms for synonyms.¹ Hence, in order to turn (c) and (d) into logically true statements what is required is empirical investigation of linguistic usage.

(iii) Wittgenstein has pointed out that logical propositions which are apriori can neither be confirmed nor refuted by experience.²

1. Quine, W.V.O., "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in From A Logical point of view, Harvard University Press, 1953, p. 23.

2. Wittgenstein, L., Tractatus Logico — Philosophicus translated by Pears, D.F., Mc Guinness, B.F. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1971, p. 213.

Now following Wittgenstein, (a) and (b) can easily be marked as apriori statements. They can neither be confirmed nor be refuted by experience, while in case of (c) and (d) we cannot say so. In fact, (c) and (d) requiring empirical investigation of linguistic usage can in no way be regarded as apriori or independent of experience.

(iv) That the above-mentioned four statements do not belong to the same order can be proved by the fact that while (a) and (b) are themselves logically true statements, (c) and (d) are not the like. In fact, in respect of (c) and (d), being logically true is subject to a further condition i.e. condition of putting synonyms for synonyms.

From the above account the following two important points emerge.

- (1) There are more than one type of analytic statements.
- (2) A single criterion can in no way explain analytic statements as such.

Hence, question may arise : If there are different classes of analytic statements i.e. if classification of analytic statements be admitted, would any attempt to explain all such statements by a single criterion be justified at all?

SECTION - VI

In order to show that no interpretation is sufficient to explain the so-called analytic statement, we can concentrate on our conceptual system of knowledge. Since the sole task of philosophy is understanding and appreciating the universe, we have no other way but to think over the totality of the so-called knowledge. However, the totality of knowledge is nothing but a massive alliance of beliefs facing the tribunal of experience off and on. As a result, revision in our conceptual system is inevitable. This possibility of revision is a big question mark before the concept of analytic truth or eternal truth. It may be noted that concepts which were considered as eternal in the field of science have been subjected to alteration and rejection. In this context, we can cite the example of time. Time is undoubtedly a very fundamental concept and has been considered as an independent physical quantity till the early part of this century. Now, the above concept of time has been shattered following Einstein's general theory of relativity. Instead of an independent physical quantity, time is now considered to be an observer dependent quantity. Time has been accepted to be conditioned by observer's position and speed. Hence, it follows that no physical theory should be considered as final. Stephen W. Hawking writes:

"Any physical theory is always provisional, in the sense that it is only a hypothesis : you can never prove it. No matter how many times the results of experiments agree with some theory, you can never be sure that the next time the result will not contradict the theory. On the other hand, you can disprove a theory by finding even a single observation that disagrees with the predictions of the theory".¹

Some philosophers may argue that possibility of revision would not be concern of analytic truth if such truth be determined solely by an analysis of the meaning of the words in the sentences expressing it. According to them, in that case, one need not investigate anything in the world apart from language to discover analytic truth. Hence, knowing the meaning of the word 'bachelor' is all that one requires to determine the truth of the statement 'a bachelor is an unmarried man'.

In reply, it can be pointed out that these philosophers, while arguing, ignore following two important points:

1) Meaning is a concern of both analytic and non-analytic statements. In fact, without being involved with the meaning of

1. Hawking, S.W., A Brief History of Time, Bantam Books, New York, 1989, p. 11.

the corresponding words 'poets' and 'philosophers' we cannot make the non-analytic statement 'All poets are philosophers'; just as by an analysis of the word 'bachelor' — we make the analytic statement 'A bachelor is an unmarried man'.

2) Meaning of an individual word can in no way be determined without taking into account the context. Any change in context is bound to be reflected in the meaning of the individual word. Admitting the monolithic character of our conceptual system as advocated by Quine, Hilary Putnam writes:

"I should like, with Quine, to stress the extent to which the meaning of an individual word is a function of its place in the network, and the impossibility of separating, in the actual use of a word, that part of the use which reflects the 'meaning' of the word and the part of the use which reflects deeply embedded collateral information".¹

Anyway, possibility of revision in our conceptual system is a factor that stands on the way to clarify the notion of analyticity and thereby to make a clear distinction between analytic and non-analytic statements whatsoever.

1. Hilary, Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge University, 1986, pp. 40-41.