

*Summary
&
Conclusion*

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In critique of pure reason, Kant defines understanding as 'the faculty of judging' and judgements have been classified by him as analytic and synthetic. According to Kant, in an analytic judgement the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject, while in a synthetic judgement the concept of the predicate stands outside the concept of the subject. Since Kant, philosophers have been attracted by the notion of analyticity from time to time and have come forward to give an adequate explanation of an analytic statement in various ways. Some such explanations are:

- 1) Analytic statements are apriori statements.
- 2) Analytic statements are necessary statements.
- 3) Truth of an analytic statement follows from the meaning of the words involved.
- 4) Analyticity of a statement follows from the synonymity of the terms involved therein.

A little reflection would reveal that the above explanations have tried to explain analyticity in terms of some other concepts which stand themselves in need of clarifications. One such concept is the concept of apriority. This particular concept has been used in different senses in the hands of philosophers. Thus, apriority sometimes has been used in the sense of 'independent' of empirical facts', sometimes in the sense of 'independent of experience',

sometimes in the sense of 'independent of empirical verification' and so on. And the exact sense in which the notion of apriority should be taken in the present context is not clear. Moreover, difficulty arises regarding the terms 'fact', 'experience' and 'verification' also. They can be used in more than one sense. And philosophers are not of the same opinion regarding the exact sense in which the terms should be used. In such circumstances, explanation of analytic statements as a priori statements cannot help us to understand the notion of analyticity properly.

In the same way, the concept of necessity has received various interpretations in the hands of different philosophers. Aristotle used necessity in two different senses, absolute and relative. According to him, absolute necessary truths express insight into the essences of things while relative necessary truths are necessary in relation to a given hypothesis. According to Leibnitz, necessary truths rest on the principle of contradiction. Hume distinguishes two types of necessity, natural and philosophical. Kant does not offer any positive definition of necessity. Rather, he defines necessity negatively as a concept the opposite of which would be inconceivable. The positivists also fail to offer a satisfactory explanation of the concept of necessity. In fact, to explain necessity, they have introduced terms like 'rules of language', 'apprehend', etc. which are undoubtedly obscure terms. Moreover, the particular concept 'necessity' may be used as logical necessity, psychological necessity, natural necessity and so on.

Hence, exactly in which of the above senses 'necessity' should be handled here, remains unspecified.

An attempt to explain analytic statement in terms of meaning of the words involved, cannot help us too much. If meaning is considered as a determining factor, it would be really difficult to draw a line of distinction between analytic and non-analytic statement. Moreover, in ordinary language a good number of words may be used in more than one sense. Hence, without referring to the context it becomes somewhat difficult to determine meaning of a particular word. Thus, in the two statements 'work hard to reach the goal' and 'he scored a goal' the word 'goal' clearly differ in respect of meaning. Above all, since the fundamental question regarding the concept of meaning i.e. 'what do we mean by meaning of an expression?' is yet to be answered, attempt to explain analyticity in terms of meaning bound to be futile.

Philosophers willing to explain analyticity in terms of synonymity fail to realise the fundamental point that the two terms used as the subject and the predicate in an analytic statement are not of the same status. That such two terms are not of the same status and hence cannot be regarded as synonymous can be shown by the following facts. One such fact is that although we can define 'bachelor' in terms of 'unmarried man', 'oculist' in terms of 'eye-doctor', we cannot define 'unmarried-man' by 'bachelor', 'eye-doctor' by 'oculist'. Again, while 'bachelor' may be used to denote 'graduate degree holders', 'unmarried man' cannot be used

to denote such. Moreover, in the absence of a suitable criterion of synonymy attempt to explain analyticity in terms of synonymy cannot achieve the desired result. Hence arises the need to explain the notion of synonymy.

The notion of synonymy is a very fundamental notion involving in the philosophy of language. In our earlier discussion, we have noticed that without the notion of synonymy we cannot explain analytic statements like 'Bachelors are unmarried men', 'Oculists are eye-doctors', 'Procrastination means putting things off' and so on. Again, the role of synonymy is undoubtedly very fundamental in understanding meaning of an expression. In reply to the question 'what do we mean by meaning of an expression' we exhibit another expression having the same meaning. Besides these, the notion of synonymy is implicit in indirect quotation, in translation and so on. Being a such important notion synonymy rightly deserves a suitable criterion. Hence, we come across a number of criteria trying to explain the particular notion of synonymy. Among them, criterion of evoking the same image, criterion of intensional identity, criterion of extensional identity and criterion of interchangeability are mentionworthy. According to the criterion of evoking the same image, since corresponding to each word there is an idea or mental image, two words would be regarded as synonymous only if they evoke the same mental image. The criterion of intensional identity tries to explain synonymy in terms of connotation of the concerned expressions. According

to the criterion of extensional identity two expressions would be considered as synonymous only if the expressions do apply to exactly the same thing. According to the interchangeable criterion two words would be considered as synonymous if they may be interchanged in each sentence without altering the truth-value of that sentence. Now, with a great dismay, we do notice that none of the above criteria has succeeded to explain the notion properly. Each of them suffers from limitations peculiar to its own. Hence, crops up another problem in connection with the notion of synonymy. The problem is to find out the exact synonymy of two expressions involving in ordinary language. Truly speaking, problem of finding out exact synonymy is not so acute a problem in artificial language as in ordinary language. An artificial language is a formal system governed by specified rules. In such system certain rules specify what meaning and denotation is to be attached to certain elements of the vocabulary. Hence, arises the question, 'Is there any factor standing on the way to get exact synonymous words in ordinary language?' Now, a careful examination points out a good number of factors standing on the way to get exact synonymous expressions in ordinary language. Some such factors are context-dependence, emotive force, new coinage, use of proverbs and metaphors, etc. Hence, another problem concerning the notion of synonymy stands before us in the following form. Would non-availability of exact synonym lead us to accept any other stand-point peculiar to ordinary language? This problem leads some philosophers to introduce the concept of degrees of synonymy. As

a result of introducing degrees of synonymity in ordinary language, synonymity of two expressions would only be a matter of more or less likeness of meaning. Thus, two expressions in ordinary language would be treated as synonymous expressions only if their kind and degree of likeness of meaning is sufficient for a particular purpose. Now, the point is that to admit degrees of synonymity is not all to explain the notion of synonymity and hence some philosophers look at the notion of meaning to explain the notion of having the same meaning or synonymity.

Among the three concepts analyticity, synonymity and meaning, the concept of meaning is perhaps the most widely discussed concept. Although, as a concept meaning is concerned not only to philosophers but also to linguists, grammarians, lexicographers and so on, it is only philosophers who have considered it as one of the most fundamental notions of language. Language is conventionally created for the purpose of communication and we do communicate with fellow beings through linguistic expressions having specific meanings. Naturally, regarding language, basic questions arise in the following forms : 'What it is for an expression to have a "meaning"? Or what do we mean when we say, 'procrastination' means 'putting things off', 'gradually' means 'bit by bit', 'if' means 'provided by'? Is there any entity called 'meaning'? In connection with the above questions different theories of meaning have been advocated by different philosophers at different times. Among them, some remarkable theories are the referential theory of meaning, the ideational

theory of meaning, the behavioral theory of meaning, the use theory of meaning, the truth theory of meaning and the verifiability theory of meaning. Now, although each of the above theories has noticed 'meaning' from various angles, none of them has been able to offer a complete account of the notion of meaning as such. And as underlying reasons, I would like to point out the following: (1) Different attitudes of philosophers towards language. Among the three aspects of language such as, syntax, semantics and pragmatics philosophers have not attached equal importance to each of them. The difference in attitude towards language stands on the way to construct an adequate theory of meaning. (2) Failure to distinguish between two stages of language. Philosophers willing to formulate a theory of meaning fail to realise that if we can think of a theory of meaning at all, it is only in learning stage. In compositional or creative stage, it is hard to think of formulating such a theory since meaning of an expression in this stage does not always depend on linguistic or extra-linguistic factors in a straight way. Rather, meaning of an expression in this stage is sometimes unique and self-revealed. (3) Failure to realise the fact that in ordinary language an expression can be used in multi-various senses. In ordinary language, since a single word may have different uses, possibility of formulating a theory of meaning is very meagre.

Now, the point is that if possibility of formulating a theory of meaning, is truly very meagre, it would put before us an answer-begging question in the following form. Is it possible

at all in ordinary language to give a satisfactory account of meaning? In connection with this question, I think that an account of meaning would be considered as suitable if it adopts two negative and one positive stand-points. From negative stand-point it should be remembered that meaning-statements are in no way be identical with identity-statements. That a meaning-statement is quite different from an identity-statement follows from the fact that whereas in an identity-statement like 'The capital of India is Delhi' there is an entity and a definite description of it, in a meaning-statement like 'Procrastination means putting things off' there is neither an entity nor any definite description of it. Moreover, to understand an identity-statement we require appropriate criteria of classification and individuation. On the contrary, understanding a meaning-statement is only a matter of knowing the conditions under which two words have the same use. From another negative stand-point it may be warned not ^{to} overlook the role of synonymy in explaining meaning. In fact, synonymy plays a very fundamental role in understanding an expression. Not only that, it has been shown that with the help of the notion of synonymy theories of meaning can be converted into theories of synonymy. If as meaning of an expression we consider only another expression, question like 'what do we mean by meaning of an expression' does not arise at all. Hence, different theories of meaning would turn into theories of synonymy in the following ways. Thus, 'meaning of an expression is its referent' would turn into 'meaning of an expression is

another expression having the same referrent, 'meaning of an expression is the idea it evokes' would turn into 'meaning of an expression is another expression evoking the same idea', 'meaning of an expression is its truth-conditions' would be 'meaning of an expression is another expression having the same truth-conditions. Now, in preparing a suitable account of meaning the positive standpoint would consist in considering understanding of meaning only as a process. Since meaning cannot be exhibited in the world, nor can it be embodied in the series of sounds, meaning of an expression should consider as something that can only be grasped or understood. Now, understanding an expression is a process. It involves two types of meaning, intended meaning and received meaning. Understanding of an expression depends on the synonymy of these two types of meaning. Hence, it follows that without taking into account the intended meaning or the context, it becomes somewhat difficult to determine meaning of an expression in ordinary language.

Now, referring to the context stands as a question-mark before analyticity of the so-called analytic statements. An analytic statement has been defined as a statement in which meaning of the predicate is contained in the meaning of the subject. However, the point is that if meaning of an expression is somehow dependent on context, would it be possible to draw a rigid distinction between analytic and non-analytic or synthetic statements? In other words, would it be possible to speak of eternal truth in connection

with analytic statement? In order to deal with the above questions we are to see whether analytic statement can be regarded as a statement depending solely on the literal meaning of the concerned expression or not. Although, from the above definition of analytic statement it may appear that such statement depends solely on literal meaning, a little reflection shows that it would not be correct to treat analytic statement as totally context-free statement. In fact, if analytic statement were actually context-free then all the sentences constructed out of synonymous terms as defining in a dictionary could be counted as analytic. Again, statements like 'Dunlop is Dunlop', 'Rabindranath is Rabindranath' would be treated as analytic if literal meaning were the only concern of analytic statement. Actually, the above statements are not analytic statements although they appear so in their surface-structure. Hence, it can be concluded that any sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic statement is difficult to draw and if analytic statement be called context-free statement, it is at least immediate or remote context-free and nothing more.

Now, impossibility of rigid distinction between analytic and synthetic leads us to another impossibility of drawing any sharp distinction between analytic truth or eternal truth and synthetic truth or contingent truth. In fact, due to some fundamental changes in the concept of eternal truths, such truths are not considered now as truths which would remain the same forever and forever. Hence, instead of speaking eternal or analytic truth

as such, it would be better to consider such truth only in relation to a system.

From our discussion on the three notions analyticity, synonymity and meaning arises another question regarding the jurisdiction of different branches of philosophy. It has been argued that if clarification of the notion of analyticity presupposes clarification of the notion of synonymity and notion of meaning, would it be possible to draw a clear-cut distinction among the different branches of philosophy in general and between epistemology and philosophy of language in particular? Philosophy has been defined as understanding and appreciating of life and universe. Now, thinking and understanding of life and universe means thinking and understanding of certain problems formulated in a language. Hence, clarification of the problems of language is a necessary step to understand philosophical problems properly. Thus, philosophy of language as a special branch of philosophy makes its appearance. Due to the pervasive nature of language, problems concerning language crop up in almost all the branches of philosophy and consequently, it becomes somewhat difficult to mark a clear jurisdiction of language. Epistemology as a branch of philosophy deals with the factors, conditions and limitations of knowledge. Now, epistemology or science of knowledge meets with language in connection with a number of problems and among those the problem of analyticity is mention-worthy. Regarding analytic knowledge questions arise in the following forms. In what way an analytic

statement expressing analytic knowledge can be identified? Can we identify such a statement as merely an a priori statement? Can the notion of analyticity be defined in terms of the notion of synonymy? Can the notion of analyticity be defined in terms of meaning? All the above questions make the point clear that any clear-cut demarcation among the different branches of philosophy should not be entertained. Since philosophy deals with the conceptual knowledge of the universe as a whole, demarcation among the different branches should be viewed only as apparent and imposed demarcation.