

NAGARJUNA'S REASONING WITH NON-IMPLICATIVE NEGATIONS

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Introduction:

Does negation imply anything positive or negative? On this query, Nagarjuna's reasoning unfolds certain uses where negation is supposed not to imply anything. This is termed here as non-implicative negation which is found in his specific philosophical intent as well as an exposition of going beyond notions and conceptualization. Generally, the human mind is always occupied with some or other notions and concepts which have their empirical values and uses. However, some abstract concepts, and notions, for example, *svabhāva* or *ātman* are believed to represent something more real, that is to say, a metaphysical entity, which is categorized alongside or at the upper level of the empirical reality and its pragmatic value. This is not only wrong sometimes, but is also non-beneficial, and therefore, Nagarjuna has the task to expose their untenability by his dialectical use of reason, wherein the non-implicative negation has its primary use.

The Necessity of Non-Implicative Negation: It is a common understanding that the nature or *svabhāva* of things and beings points out their uniqueness. For example, water, fire air, etc., and flowers, fruits, eatables, medicines, etc., or pots, carts, etc., have their unique characteristics or *svabhāva*. Similarly, animals, as well as human beings, have their *svabhāva*. The *svabhāva* here points to the empirical characteristics and stands for the identity of things and beings. The *svabhāvas* are empirically real, 'but when empirically things and beings are keeping changing constantly, what about their *svabhāva* and identity?' The Buddhists accept the changeable identity by the principle of causation, with the argument that the previous state of the things, beings and personality is the cause of the next state, thus keeping continuity and giving us a sense of unity of the thing, being or personality.¹ The non-Buddhists, however, take up a notion of the universal, elemental, foundational, or base level non-changeability throughout the phenomenal individual changeability.² This non-Buddhist notion was not sufficiently understood, for which the wrong notion of it was developed, which

¹ The causal nexus is accepted in the conception of *pañchaskandha*, and *Vaibhasikas* and *Sautrāntikas*, and the notion *pratītyasamutpāda* by Mahayana and the stream of personality or *santānavāda* of *Yogāchāra*.

² For Example, Jainas conceive an Jiva, Vedanta conceives Ātman .

the Buddha was avoiding and not entertaining.³ It was because the empirical *svabhāva* was elevated to conceptual, and then supposed to point out to a metaphysical and spiritual upper level reality. In the next stage, this conception of *svabhāva*, particularly when taken about man himself describes an individual *ātman* or self. Mind is apt to explore this notion of *ātman* so much so that it is conceptualized in very many different ways, by many, in different situations, ultimately making man confused, and then developing justificatory speculations, and then getting attached to any to them. Having this ground, man most likely develops certain types of mental and physical behavior, way of living, engaged in peculiar speculations and practices in the name of spirituality. To cancel such speculations, disengage people from different harmful practices, the Buddha was dissuading people from them, and Nagarjuna applies dialectical reasoning. A part of such dialectic is what is understood here as non-implicative negation in reasoning. For example, to take up one of his arguments, everything come into existence by depending upon causes and conditions (*pratītyasamutpāda*), that comes into existence by their causes and conditions, have all empirical existence (*bhāva*), have their *svabhāva* in empirical sense of reality. However, all these *bhāvas* and *svabhāvas* by themselves are not found in the causes and conditions, separately or collectively, nor also found in something other than their cause and conditions, and therefore are metaphysically lacking or *śūnya*.⁴ In this context, when the metaphysical sense of the *svabhāva* is negated, ‘what more does it imply?’ Does it imply a *parabhāva*? This is not tenable as *svabhāva* itself is not plausible. The negation implies nothing. It is intended that the negation be the end of the discourse and does not imply anything positive or alternative to think of. This argument has its ultimate use in getting freedom from conceptualization, speculation, picturization, and reification in thought and meditation, which eventually helps in shedding the attachment, anger, and other factors that end up the involving of *karmas* and finally lead to *nirvāṇa*. It is this soteriological benefit that the logic of Nagarjuna aims at, for which the non-implicative negation is important.

³ The Buddha was asked about some extreme questions about eternity or not eternity of soul and such questions making total 14 unspeakable (Avyākṛitas). The Buddha remained silent for any answer to the questions in either assertion or denial or both or neither would lead to the problematic situation.

⁴ Ref. *Na hi svabhavabhavanampratyaśūvidyate*- MK.1.3;
Na cha vyastasamastesuPratyayesvasti tat phalam-MK.1.11

The Non-Implicative Negation: Nagarjuna's use of negation is expressed in different terms in Sanskrit such as *niṣedha*, *pratiṣedha*, and *vipratiṣdha*.⁵ There are many senses of negation by use of *nañ* for negative sense in the form of prefixes like *ni*, *vi*, and *a* before the words.⁶ In most of the negative expressions, negation generally implies something else than the negated. This is understood as implicative-negation. In such negation by negating or denying something, a concept, an idea or a notion, certain others are implied to be asserted. Accordingly, if by negation of any metaphysical notion, like *svbhāva*, *parabhāva* may be asserted, then a state of *nirvikalpa* (no-conceptualization), which is Nagarjuna's objective, may never be possible. It is because, when any notion or view is negated in his criticism, it may leave a space for another notion by implication, which is understood as implicative negation and so *ad infinitum*. Hence, for understanding Nagarjuna's objective, the division of implicative-negation and non-implicative negation, has to be brought out, wherein the latter can lead to no-conceptualization. This is the way out of conceptualization as well. In this regard, the non-implicative negation and implicative-negation may be clarified.

A brief discussion on some aspects of negation,⁸ what is excluded by negation, and the implication⁹ of the exclusion may be ensured. A negative sentence is that, where negation qualifies some or whole parts of the sentence. It qualifies the whole sentence by qualifying the predicate (verb or adjective), or subject (noun), or both in a sentence.

(i) Negation of sentence – It is not that the cow moves. (particular)

⁵ The first term means denial. The root is *śidh*, meaning to keep away and the prefix *ni* is used in the sense of certainty. The term *śidh* with *ni* is *niṣedha*. It means denial with 'no more'. *Niṣedha* is used in the sense of prohibition or negation of some rituals, while there is another word *vidhi* means the injunction of some rituals. The prefix '*prati*' in *Pratiṣedha* means a relation, and the total term *pratiṣedha* would mean a denial in relation to something. So, the term may mean contradiction. The prefix '*vi*' in *vipratiṣedha* is used in the sense of *viśeṣa* meaning 'more' or 'stronger'. Another sense of '*vi*' is '*vigata*' passed away or past, which of course is not used here. So, *vipratiṣedha* may mean to a stronger case of denial. However, all the three *niṣedha*, *pratiṣedha* or *vipratiṣdha* are also used in the sense of denial only. *Virodha* is another word meaning obstruction, prohibition, opposition, negation etc. It is also used to sense contrariety and contradiction in different cases. '*Nirodha*' is an instance of use of *nañ* or negation with a negative word, here, *rodha*, stresses the stronger meaning of obstruction.

⁶ *Tatsādrśyam abhāvaśchataadanyatvaṁ tadalpatā*

Aprāsastyam virodhśchanañārtham śatprakirtitāh. Iswarachandra Vidyasagar, *Samagra Vyākaraṇa Kaumudī*, Calcutta: (-) 1978, p. 630.

⁸ We find *pratiyogi* in *Nyāya*, *abhāva* in *Vaiśeṣika* and *Mīmāṃsā*, *niṣedha* in *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta*.

⁹ The term 'implication' is not used in strict logical sense.

No cow moves. (universal)

- (ii) Negation of sentence by negation with the verb – The cow does not move.
- (iii) Negation of noun with asserting the verb– That moves, but that is not a cow.
- (iv) Negation of verb and noun – There is neither movement nor there exists a cow.
- (v) Negation of verb, and adjective – There is no moving cow.

In each case, there is at least one declarative meaning (*abhidhā*) that can have an implication. There are ways of deriving different meanings, one of which is taking the meaning indirectly by analysis of the meaning of sentences, and another is picking up the intended or purported meaning (*lakṣaṇā*), and still another way is comradng the explorative meaning (*vyañjanā*).¹⁰ There are ways of finding the intended meaning by exclusion, implication, and presumption, etc. In the case of negation, one may find an implied positive meaning of the negations by exploration or presumption. By applying this, it can be seen that the above-mentioned sentences when negated may mean or imply something indirectly. For example,

(vi) Implied meaning of (i) – It may be that it is not not-cow (something otherthan cow) that moves.

(vii) It may be that the cow grazes.

(viii) It may be that something other than cow grazes.

(ix) Implied meaning of (ii) – It may be that not-cow moves.

(x) Implied meaning of (iii) – Something other than cow moves.

(xi) Implication of (iv)----(This case is important.)

(xii) Implied meaning of (v) – There may be a white cow that grazes.

It is clear in the above that if negation qualifies the sentence, it may qualify either of the noun or verb or both of them, and for this reason ‘(i) has different implications by negation. It has been seen that negation qualifies some part of a statement or the whole statement. The part of the statement, which is not qualified by negation, may be taken with what is excluded from the negation. The case of negation where there is no implication or excluded meaning are derived is a case of total negation. Such, sentence is in ‘(iv) - There is neither movement nor there exists a cow’. This is non-implicative negation or complete negation. In contrast, other sentences in ‘(i), (ii), (iii) and (v)’ are examples of implicative negations.

¹⁰ The predicate says about the subject only indirectly.

The implied meanings in all the cases of negations are not implications in the strict sense of the term, because in implication the implied is drawn from the implicands by a necessary meaning-based relation (*arthāpatti*) between them. *Lakṣaṇā* and *Vyañjanā* need the context, intents, etc., which are external to the sentence meaning. Now, if the above-mentioned meanings are considered as implications, then the implied statements are understood to be implied not from the statements alone, but the statement along with the situations or context and possibilities associated with the statements. The implication is due to the situation or context, which is **external** to the statement, but is related to it so far as the statement is within the context or is related to the context and is invariably, goes with certain intent. There is no necessary exclusive meaning-based relation between the implicated and the implicands. If, on the other hand, the statement and the situation make a totality and are taken as a whole, the whole can be the implicands and the derived statements are its implicated ones. The so-called implications are cases of other possibilities that are excluded from negation and stand out by negation of one possibility. The implication in this case, therefore, is not a material implication or strong implication (as between container and contained), but a case of presumption of the possibility, a kind of inference from possibilities in the context.

Paryudāsa and PrasajyaPratiṣedha: In the light of the above clarification of negation, its exclusion, and implication, it may now be understood that the above mentioned two types of negations have to be recognized in Nagarjuna's criticisms. One is *paryudāsapraṭiṣedha* that is the 'implicative negation', as described above, where negation implies an alternative (possibility as in the above) or allows a presumption that is not negated or excluded in the negation. The other is *prasajyapraṭiṣedha* that is the 'non-implicative negation', as in the above, which means a negation whereby negating or prohibiting a concept, there is no question of exclusion of something, and therefore there is no implication of the negation. Nagarjuna's use of both of the negations is the major issue in his *prāsaṅgika* and *svātantrika* method. To be clarified about the two negations, first, we have to know the terms in other philosophical texts, that though belong to post-Nagarjuna, but helps to get the meaning of these negations.

We get a clear-cut notion of both the terms of negations with use of *nañ* in Mimāṃsā. It is said that when *nañ* is used with the *uttarapada*, the negation is *paryudāsapratishedha*, when *nañ* is used with the verb, this is a case of *prasajyapratishedha*.¹¹ Negation with the verb, sometimes suggests that the remaining other cases of negation, i.e., the negation with other words like noun and adjective are not *prasajyapratishedha*, and such cases may be taken as *paryudāsapratishedha*. In Sanskrit, the term *uttarapada* means the second word of a compound word, where the first word is called *pūrvapada*. Such compounding of words into one word is called *samāsa*, and our case may happen in *vahubrihisamāsa* and *karmadhārayasamāsa*. In both these cases, compound words are used as adjectives and nouns. One instance may be considered here for our purpose. Take a word *pītodakaḥ* from *pītaḥ* (drunk) + *udakaḥ* (water), which means somebody who has already drunk water. Here, *pītaḥ* (‘drunk’) though is an adjective, but in its root is a verb part of the compound word, and it is the first part (*pūrvapada*) of the compound word. *Udakaḥ* is the second word (*uttarapada*). Now, if we attach *nañ* in *pūrvapada*, which is from verb (i.e., *pītaḥ*), like *nañ + pītaḥ*, it will be like = *apītaḥ* (‘a’ stands for ‘nañ’ when the word starts with a consonant). This, in compound with *udakaḥ*, will be like *apītaḥ + udakaḥ* = *apītodakaḥ*, which means **(somebody, who has) not drunk water**. Here negation qualifies the verb. On the contrary, if we attach *nañ* with *uttarapada* (i.e., *udakaḥ*), like *nañ + udakaḥ*, it will be like = *anudakaḥ*. By compounding it with *pītaḥ*, we may get *pītaḥ + anudakaḥ* = *pītonudakaḥ*, meaning that **(somebody, who has) drunk no-water**. Here, negation is used with a noun. Thus, by the discussion, now we may get a clear picture of both the terms *paryudāsa* and *prasajya* like:

Paryudāsapratishedha – *pītonudakaḥ*, who has drunk not-water.
Prasajyapratishedha – *apītodakaḥ*, who has not-drunk water.

¹¹ *Paryudāśṣaviññeyoyattrottarapadenanañ*
Pratiśedhaśṣaviññeyahkriyayāsaha yatra nañ. Ref. A.M. Ramanath Dikshit, (ed.), *Mimāṃsā-Nyāyaprakāsa of Apadeva*, Benaras: Kāshi Sanskrit Series, 1949.
Pratiśedha, by its literal as well as other meanings (if there is any), is used to deny something that is said or existed to which (*prati*) the negation (*śedha* from root *śidh*) pertains to. The case of negation (*pratiśedha*) qualifying the verb in the sentence may be explicit by adding not (*na / a*) or implicit by using words of opposite meaning. The first letter of the word that is to be qualified by negation, according to Sanskrit grammar determines either ‘na’ or ‘a’ to be the sign of negation. If the first letter is a vowel it takes ‘na’, otherwise, if it is a consonant it may takes up ‘a’ as the sign of negative expression.

There can be another combination, i.e., *apitonudakaḥ* - who has not drunk not-water. This may be another case, which may be an example of the strongest case of *prasajya*. It is to be mentioned that the definition of *paryudāsa* and *prasajya* are technical. The prefix *nañ* for negation qualifies the *uttarapada*, 'water', in *paryudāsa* making it 'not-water'. The prefix *nañ* qualifies *kriya*, 'drunk', in *prasajya* making it 'not-drunk'. *Paryudāsapraṭiśedha* is often called term-negation in contrast with the verb-negation in *prasajyapraṭiśedha*. The former shows exclusion, that is, something other than water is drunk. A presumption may be made from the excluded in the expression 'not-water, that is, something else is drunk, but not water. In the *prasajyapraṭiśedha*, the negation is applied to the verb 'drinking', and hence there is no question of drinking, and therefore, there is no question of anything else than water. That is, the negation of the verb negates the whole part qualified by the verb. This is a complete negation. Both the negations qualify the word that is used as predicate as well as adjective making a negative sentence.¹²

We may simplify these two types of negations by indicating their compounding word-structure. We know that '*prasajya*' (*pra+sañj*) means 'implying' or 'implication', 'consequence of something', 'result', what 'follows', 'be applicable' in the context, and '*praṭiśedha*' means 'denial'. Their compounding meaning with negation may be the case of a negation where any implication of it is also simultaneously denied in the negation. It is denying with denying the implication as well – so it is non-implicative negation. In a similar manner, '*paryudāsa*' may be split into '*pari* (in the sense of *paritaḥ* (around)) + *udāsa* (indifferent)'. Its application with negation may then mean that a case of negation, where the force of negation is indifferent to any implication of the negation, for which the implication can be carried out.¹³

Nagarjuna's Use of *Pratiśedha*: Nagarjuna's uses and Chandrakirti's arguments suggest both these negations in Nagarjuna. There are modern scholars, who

¹² To mention here, the same word may also be used as the subject in the place of an actual subject in further discussion of the continuing context, when the word is previously used as a predicate for the subject once. For example, if once we say that the cow is not drunk-water, in the sequence of talks regarding the cow we refer to the cow by just the word the 'not-drunk', without mentioning the cow and water.

¹³ The interpretation may be debatable but is made for simplifying by the scholar himself.

differentiate both the negations in Nagarjuna.¹⁴ In Nagarjuna's context, all *pratiṣedha* are not *prasajyapraṭiṣedha*.¹⁵ It is because *pariyudāsapraṭiṣdha* is also found as the cases wherever Nagarjuna negates opposite or contrary alternatives, without fail, and in the case, it must be understood that each negation is *pariyudāsa* type, while all such negations taken together can make the *prasajya* negation (as stressed here by the author). *Pariyudāsapraṭiṣedha* is taken as a relative negation, where something is excluded by negation, and it relatively implies something.¹⁶ For example, not-water in the above example, may suggest milk. *Prasajyapraṭiṣedha* is total negation, that is, there is no exclusion or inference of the negation, for which it is understood as non-implicative negation.

A little light may be focused on these negative functions. Kajjima comments, "In *pariyudāsa-pratiṣedha* a positive idea is yielded by the negative expression, and both sides are conveyed in a single sentence (*ekavākyatā*) because both refer to the same object. In *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, the primary aim is negation, – affirmation may be understood, but it is only secondary to negation.¹⁷" To note here that Kajjima's second statement seems to be implausible for allowing the affirmation with secondary value. There is no affirmation of what is negated nor is also any excluded aspect that can be implied and affirmed in *prasajya*. It is only the case that the negative statement is itself asserted as a statement, which puzzles Kajjima, but its assertion is of another level, i.e., of the sentence, not the object negated in the sentences. Scholars like J. L. Shaw, B. K. Matilal, Ruegg Seyfort, J. F. Staal as they are concerned with the question also similarly understand the negation that implies

¹⁴ J. F. Staal: "Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought: A Comparative Study", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. XXV, part I, pp. 52-71. For him *pariyudāsa* is exclusion and *prasajya* is prohibition.

Matilal says *pariyudāsapraṭiṣdha* is nominally bound negative and *prasajyapraṭiṣdha* is verbally bound negative. Ref. Bimal K Matilal: *Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis*, The Hague, Netherland: Morton & Co, N. V publishers, 1971, p. 163.

Seyfort Ruegg: "The uses of the four positions of Catuskoṭi and the problem of the description of reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism", *Journal of Indian Philosophy*. Vol. 5, No. 1 / 2, pp. 1-77.

¹⁵ It is not known definitely that where and when it is added, but the terms are already known in 900 AD in Arcat's *Hetu-Vindu-Ṭikā* and In Karṇakagomin's commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇvārtika-svāvr̥tti*.

¹⁶ "Pariyudāsa – praṭiṣdha is term-negation, the implication of which is directly positive." J. L. Shaw: "Negation and the Buddhist Theory of Meaning", *JIP*, 1978. 6. pp. 59-77.

¹⁷ Y. Kajjima, "Three Kinds of Affirmation and two Kinds of Negation in Buddhist Philosophy" *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Sudasiens*, (1973), vol. 17, pp. 161-175, p. 171. Also quoted in J. L. Shaw, "Negation and the Buddhist Theory of Meaning", *JIP*, 1978. 6. p. 61.

affirmative implication is a *paryudāsa* negation; and the negation that does not have any positive implication is *prasajya* negation. This way Kaṇṇakagom in also distinguishes both the negations and inferences from them. For him,

“*Niṣedhakmchanīṣedhamprādhānyenabhidhāyārthātanyabhidhānamāha Paryudāsa, pratipādakamtuvākyampratiṣedhapūrvakamanyavidhānamprādhānyenāhaitiastievaviśeṣaḥiti.*”¹⁸

That is to say, since the negation of something is primary in a negative expression, something other is also expressed therein. The *paryudāsa* sentence is negative, but there is something other (*viśeṣa*) in it.¹⁹ In other words, the *paryudāsapratīṣedha* is a negation, where there is a positive inference or implication of the negative sentence. In this sense, it is a relational negation. The examples of it are of many kinds as in the above ‘(i), (ii)’, etc., except the types that are *prasajyapratīṣedha* as in above ‘(iv)’. Thus, we may understand *prasajyapratīṣedha* as a negation, where no positive inference is possible. It is a total negation, also called ‘pure negation’ or ‘simple negation’. We may find it in the form of various formal statements, such as

- (a) negative universal statement, for example, as ‘(i) universal) in the above;
- (b) statements where both noun and verbs are qualified with negation, as ‘(ii)’ in the above;
- (c) where the negation is put at the beginning of the statement, by that distributing the negation both to the subject and predicate of the statement. In other words, the negative particle is found with such a part of the sentence that the negative statement does not imply any statement, the content of which would be excluded from the negation. It is as ‘(iv)’ in the above.

The *prasajyapratīṣedha* is described in three ways. (I) One is a direct negative sentence, where every part of the sentence is qualified by negation. The negative sentence does not mean or carry any positive inference or presumption. (II) There is another type of negative sentence, where no terms are directly negative, but the meaning says something negative. In this case, if any inference or presumption is derived from this, the inference may say the same as what the sentence conveys. (III)

Another type of *prasajyapratīṣedha* is that, where all alternative exclusions of negation are further negated exhaustively. That is to say, this is an exhaustive

¹⁸ As in Dharendra Sharma, *The Differentiation Theory of Meaning in Indian Logic*, Netherlands, Morton & Co., pp. 34-35. [Underlined is rewritten by breaking the long sentence.]

¹⁹ It seems that we have to be limited with this clarification regarding the concepts. There is no need to bring more texts and contexts regarding this that have developed unto Santaraksita.

negation of alternative *paryudāsa* negations. Example of *pasajya* negation (first type): (a) There are no cows in the world. (Universal)

(b) Negation of verb and noun – There is neither a movement nor there is a cow in the site. (It is made by putting negations before both subject and verb, which can then be analyzed in the form of putting negation only before the verb: ‘there is no moving cow in the site’.) Example of *prasajya negation* (second type):

(c) ‘Everything is void’. (Except the context, where Nagarjuna’s saying that he doesn’t have anything to negate by it in the *Vigrahavyāvartani*).

Example of *prasajya negation* (third type): (d) When all implied alternatives are exhaustively negated as seen in *chatuskoṭi*.

We may summarize our study on negation, its implication, and Nagarjuna’s Madhyamika position up to this, in the following table.²⁰

<i>Paryudāsa Pratiṣedha</i>	Subject	Predicate	Sentence	Inference/Presumption/Implication
	Subject	1.negative predicate	Negative sentence ‘The cow is not movable/ moving.’	Inference/Presumption/Implication
	Subject	2.negative predicates	Negative sentence ‘The cow is not moving speedily.’	Inference/Presumption/Implication
<i>Prasajya</i> ²¹ <i>Pratiṣedha</i>	Subject	Negative predicate	Negative universal ‘The cow does not sweat. Svabhāva does not exist.’	No inference/Presumption/Implication
	Negative Subject	Negative predicate	Total negation ‘There are neither any cow nor it sweat / There is no sweating cow.’	No inference/Presumption/Implication
	Subject	Negative predicate	Negation of essential and defining characteristics in a sentence in the predicate. ‘Things are devoid of intrinsic nature.’	
	Negation of all alternatives, for example, in <i>chatuskoṭi</i> .			No position. This is the <i>Mādhyamika</i> position.

***PrasajyaPratiṣedhaby* Negation of Exhaustive Alternatives:** Mind makes conceptualization, where there is a role of *paryudāsa* negation. A negation can imply

²⁰ It is to be mentioned that Nagarjuna’s much emphasis on use of negation and deriving negative meanings of the concepts may give rise to the concept of ‘*apoha*’ in the latter period.

²¹ It seems that there is an extra hype about Nagarjuna’s *prasajyapratīṣedha* in some contexts. The present effort needs to be cautious about some scholars’ descriptions of it. The complete elaboration and comment regarding this may be made in the latter study of it.

any alternative or its opposite as an implied alternative. In this case, each such alternatives must be negated. This is seen in Nagarjuna's writings, where he negates mutually opposite predicates to something. For example, in MK 25.3 he speaks about *nirvāṇa* in six negations - "*Nirvāṇa* is neither accomplished nor relinquished, is neither annihilation nor eternal, is neither produced nor cease...."²² Similarly, the opening verses of MK are individual examples of *paryudāsapratīṣedha*, wherein each opposite alternative is denied distinctively as *anutpāda-anirodha*, etc.²³ The alternatives are so related that negation of one implies the assertion of the other. So, each has to be denied. Such denial removes all options and predicates and thereby removes conceptualization. In certain cases, we may think, collection of *paryudāsa* negation of alternatives and opposites may therefore be a case of *prasajya* negation. It is because one *prasajya* negation denies a term as well as any possible implication of the negation, which is done by a series of exhaustive *paryudāsa* negation of mutual opposites and all alternatives. So, it can be said that exhaustive individual *paryudāsapratīṣedha* is equal to or makes up *prasajyapratīṣedha*, i.e., $paryudasa^n = prasajya$. It may not be practical that one can find n number of *paryudāsa* as equated with *prasajya* for the state of *nirvikalpa* or no-conceptualization.

***PrasajyaPratīṣedha* by *Chatuṣkoti*:** By *prasajyapratīṣedha*, mind may lead to no-conceptualization. It applies to simple sentences expressing one subject and one predicate. The case of negation of possibilities of more than one predicate as an alternative, and finding exhaustive alternatives, options, about any issue, is of course problematic. It is because, if one alternative is denied, it may imply the assertion of another alternative and innumerable alternative implications may be generated by the negation of one alternative after another by *parjyudāsapratīṣedha*. Pondering over this problem of alternatives and exhaustive denial of all of them, which is empirically not always possible can be logically possible. This brings us to the Buddha's

²² *Aprahīṇāmasamprāptamanucchinnaśāśvataṃ, aniruddhamanutpannametanirvānṃmūchate.* MK.15.3

²³ *Anirodhamanutpādamanucchedamaśāśvataṃ, anekārthamanānārthamanāgamamanirgamam.* *Yadpratītyasamutpādamprapañchopaśmaṃ, deśayāmāsasaṃbuddhastamvande vadatāmvaraṃ.* MK. Introductory verses.

conversion of *chatuskoti*,²⁴ wherein an issue is denied in four logical categories. For example, Kashyapa asks,

Whether, Gautama, *dukkha* is created on one's own?
 Whether, Gautama, *dukkha* is created by others (i.e., not by one's own)?
 Whether, Gautama, *dukkha* is created both by one's own and the other?
 Whether, Gautama, *dukkha* is created neither by one's own, nor by the other?

The Buddha negates all the alternatives exhaustively. Similarly, there are questions on which the Buddha remained silent, as nothing satisfactorily can be said in answer to them, and therefore they are called unspeakable (*avyākṛtas*). One of the examples of unspeakable is “Whether the *Lokas* finite or infinite or both or neither?”²⁵ To analyze, the first alternative can be expressed as ‘is the world finite?’

- The second alternative can be ‘is the world infinite?’
- The third alternative can be ‘whether the world is both finite and infinite?’
- The fourth alternative can be ‘whether the world is neither finite nor infinite?’

Thus, there are exhaustive alternatives of the issue in question, where first, second, third and fourth are originally expressed in *chatuskoṭī*. Each *koṭi* represents an extreme alternative in logical category, and there are four such alternatives or categories, in which no one can be reduced to the other, but all the alternatives can be represented with any issue or notion. When one alternative or extreme is not asserted, the other alternative comes in sequence. There is the need of denying and by that getting rid of all the alternatives to accomplish the no-conceptualization. For this reason, the Buddha is said to be silent, which, out of many possibilities, may mean that the alternatives are negated. (The importance of such negations in *chatuskoti* here is to stop the speculation which may burden us with the conceptualization.)

²⁴ An example of Buddha's discourse involving *chatuskoti* is like this.

“*Kim nu khobho Gotamasayamkataṃdukkhanti.*” - ‘Not so verily, Kassapa, said the exalted one.’”

‘*Kimpanabho Gotamaparakataṃdukkhanti.*’ - ‘Māhevaṃ Kassapati Bhagavāvocha.’

‘*Kimnukhobho Gotamasayaṃkataṃchāparamkataṃchādukkhanti.*’ - ‘Māhevaṃ Kassapati Bhagavāvocha.’

‘*Kimnukhobho Gotamaasayaṃkataṃchāparamkataṃchādukkhanti.*’

‘*Māhevaṃ Kassapati Bhagavāvocha.*’ *Samjukta Nikāya* (Pali text society ed. II. pp19-20.) The above translation is dialogue is quoted from *The Book of the Kindred Sayings*, Mrs. Rhys Davids and F.L. Woodward (eds), Pali Text Society, London: 1922. Vol. II. p.5. The similar is also dealt by Nagarjuna in the verse, *Svayaṃkrasyāprasiddheduh) khamparakr) taṃkutah), Paro hi dukhamyat kuryāttattasyasyātsvayaṃkr)taṃ.* MK.12.7.

²⁵ *Loka* here stands not only for the phenomena but also for the substantiality – it is something that exists or not in its own. Apart from this loka in the substantiality is understood to be the appearance of the Ātman, the substance. The Buddha's and Mādhyamika's dealing with this is made from their non-substantial approach.

Nagarjuna's use of *prasajyapratishedha* in *chatuskoṭi* directly leads to non-conceptualization. Exhaustive non-implicative negation in *chatuskoṭi* is used by Nagarjuna in his arguments upon different issues in the *Mūlamadhyakakārikā*.²⁶ The non-implicative negation by *chatuskoṭi* is also found in his criticism of *pramāṇas* in the *Vigrahavyāvartani* which may be taken up here to exemplify the matter that in this way that whether *pramāṇa* is (a) established by the other *pramāṇa* (*parataḥprāmāṇya*), or (b.1) without other *pramāṇa*, i.e., by itself (*svataḥprāmāṇya*), or (b.2) by *prameyas*, or (c) by each other or (d) not by each other, i.e., independently?

- a. If one *pramāṇa* is established by another *pramāṇa*, then it will lead to infinite regress or *anāvasthā*.

or

- b. 1. if it is said that the *pramāṇas* are established without another *pramāṇa*, then it amounts to the discordance that something needs to be proved by *pramāṇa*, but *pramāṇas* themselves do not need so.²⁷

- b. 2. If *pramāṇa* is established by itself without relating to the *prameya*, then what for it is to be called *pramāṇa*. It cannot be self-established without relating to *prameyas*.²⁸

or

- c. If *pramāṇa* and *prameyas* are established by each other, then it is like a father is established by a son and *vice versa*, then who the father is and who the son is.²⁹ Further, it amounts to the fallacy of *itaratarāśraya*, where the roles of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* will be interchanged. It may also fall into *chakrakadoṣa*.

or

²⁶ *Chatuskoṭi* in single verses: *MK.* 1.1, 1.3; 7.20; 12.1 (all these in dealing the same issue of causation, where the negation of 4th alternative is not found in 7.20); 18.8 (dealing the definite teaching of Buddha that everything is tathya or atathya etc.); 22.11 (dealing with the issue of holding *sūnya* as expressible, not expressible etc.); 25.17 (dealing with survival of the Buddha after *parinirvāṇa*), 22 & 23; 27.13 (respectively dealing with the issues, such as whether *dharmas* are finite, infinite etc., eternal, non-eternal etc, past and present of personality) ; in multiple verse in 25.5-16 (dealing with nirvāṇ is an element or not etc.). In *IV*, XXXIII – LII, Nagarjuna uses *Chatuskoṭi* the issue that whether (*pramāṇas* are self-established/proved), or (by its nature or by other) or (by different, i.e., one *pramāṇa* is established by another) or (established without cause /reason). *IV*, ed. by Sastri, Heramba Chatterjee.

²⁷ . *Teṣāmathapramāṇairvināprasiddhirvīhiyatevādaḥ, Vaiṣamikatvaṃtasminviśeṣahetuśchavaktavyaṃ.* *VV.v.33.*

²⁸ *YadiSvataścha pramāṇa siddhihanapekṣatavaprimeyani, Bhavati pramāṇa siddhirnaḥparapekṣāsvatahsiddhiḥ.* *VV. V. 40.*

²⁹ *Pitrayadyutpadyahputriyaditenacivaputrena, Utpadyahsayadi pita vadatatrotpadyatikahkam ? Kasca pita kahputrastaratvambruhitaubhayapica, Pitṛputralaksanadharaayatobhavati no samdehah.* *VV.v 49-50.*

- d. If *prameyas* are established, without *pramāṇas*, [and vice versa], then ‘what is the necessity of *pramāṇa*?’³¹

Therefore, Nagarjuna concludes that *pramāṇa* is not established by itself without relating to any or by other *pramāṇas*, or *pramāṇa* and *prameya* by each other.³² Like this, all phenomena have the same characteristics that their separate individuality cannot be established by themselves, by the other, or by each other or without any cause (and condition).³³

Concluding Remarks:

So far it is discussed, the non-implicative negation in the form of *prasajyapratishedha* is one of the important tools in Nagarjuna’s dialectic. He might not have any intention to advance a new vista in epistemology by this. By this dialectic, he negates all alternatives of a conception or thought exhaustively and thereby enables to reach a state of no-conceptualization (*nirvikalpa*). It was practically needed as the conceptions are the roots of ego-consciousness and that in turn is the root of all attachments and for this reason by exposing the weakness in the establishment of any conception, man can have an intuitive insight into the non-conceptual mode of consciousness, without being bound by them. It eventually helps to attain *nirvāṇa*.

³¹ *Atha tupramansiddhirbhavatyapekasyaivateprameyani, Vyatyayaevam sati tedhravampramanaprameyanamtepramanasiddhya premeyasiddhīh prameya siddhyaca, bhavati pramanasiddhirnastyubhayasyapitesiddhīh*, VV. v 45-6.

³² *Naivasvatahprasiddhirnaparasparatahparapramanarvā. Na bhavatīna-ca prameyairnacapyakamatpramananam*. VV. v 51.

³³ *Na svatahnaparatah no dvabhuyamapyahetutah. Utpannajatuvidyantebhavahkvacanakecan. Mūlamadhyamikakāikā* 1. 1.