

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was a German philosopher and best known in Philosophy as a system builder. He gave his philosophy at a time when era of Enlightenment was receding and Romanticism was gaining its foothold. The then Europe was a fertile land for philosophical thinking. Prominent philosophers of modern times in Europe prior to him were Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley and Hume. These philosophers while giving their philosophies argued either asserting that reason is the primary source of our knowledge or sense experience is the main source of knowledge. Hence they came to be known either as rationalist or as empiricist philosophers. Kant though initially had inclined to rationalist side but did not continue with that proclivity. He considered both these trend of thought one-sided and hence decided not to veer around either of these sides. He, therefore, espoused a new way of enquiry which popularly came to be known as critical philosophy.

Introducing our Konigsberg philosopher

Among the nine children of Johann George Cant and Anna Regina Cant, Immanuel Kant was fourth. Though he was born in harness maker's family, his early education revealed his promising sign. Seeing this sign, a minister of a local Christian church made arrangement for young Kant's education. There he got attracted to Latin classics. Later at the University of Konigsberg he enrolled as a theology student though later on his interest in mathematics and physics diverted him from his curiosity in theology.

Kant's family had affiliation to Lutheran Protestant faith. The family was Pietist and hence stressed on religious devotion, literal interpretation of Biblical doctrine and so on. Brought up in such an ambience Kant adhered to Christian ideals for some time though it did not last long. As he gained knowledge in contemporary science he wrestled with his religious faith in order to dovetail them with modern science. Gradually he came to realize that arguments given for defending theism are not invincible. He held this as he became convinced that human knowledge is limited and unable to attain knowledge of God or soul. The extreme rigour of his theoretical philosophy did not allow him to make room for these though later on he accommodated them in the *Critique of Practical Reason*.

We often hear about Kant's strict and inflexibly-organized life. All his activities had a set routine and on account of its strict maintenance, it is sometimes said that his neighbors could even set their clock by seeing his daily routine work. After completion of his study he engaged himself in private tutorship. He had a close circle with whom he used to interact. Even before he announced his arrival in philosophical scene and the advent of critical philosophy with his *Critique of Pure Reason*, he authored several papers and books which provide us with his pre-critical flavour of thinking.

After a couple of years, in 1755, we find this would-be philosopher's return to the University of Konigsberg to continue his pursuit of knowledge which resulted in his award of doctorate in philosophy. Since then till 1770, when he became a professor in that University, he worked as a tutor and delivered lectures which were well-attended. His teaching career as professor of philosophy at the University of Konigsberg began with teaching of metaphysics and logic.

Kant's philosophical development

In Kant's philosophical development we find different phases out of which four stages are distinct. These are

- ❖ **the pre-critical period:** It ranges roughly from 1745 to 1770. During this time Kant worked largely within the tradition of Leibniz and Wolff. Most of his works during this span were explanations of natural phenomena;
- ❖ **the silent decade:** Between 1770 and 1781, Kant did not publish anything significant. It is understandable that he was busy with his *magnum opus*. It was in 1770 that he was appointed as professor in Königsberg University and hence we can presume that he was also busy with academic workload of his work-place in addition to his engagement with revolutionary work that came out in 1781 under the rubric *Critique of Pure Reason*;
- ❖ **the critical period:** Usually the span between 1781 and 1790 is regarded as his critical philosophy period. It is the most fertile time in his life and his trilogy of critique shook philosophical community. Other important works of this stretch were *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (1786), 'Answering the Question: What is Enlightenment?' (1784).
- ❖ **the post-critical period:** From 1791 onward till his passing away (1804), is often shown as works of old age. Important works of this spell were *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793) and *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), and *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795).

In the present venture our discussion will cover mainly critical phase of Kant's philosophy, still a glimpse of his pre-critical stretch's thinking will pave way for understanding his critical phase. Critical philosophy was actually unfolding of some thinking that Kant was harbouring and espousing right from pre-critical tenure. We shall also show that there was a continuity of thought and not an abrupt shift as one might think of.

Pre-critical philosophy

The publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in 1781 marked the watershed of a new kind of philosophy—critical philosophy which is well-known to the philosophical world. Not only that sometimes it is also said that it marked the decline of modern period and dawn of a new sort of philosophy hitherto unknown. But before this there was another Kant about whom and contributions of whose remained largely undiscussed or less discussed.

A cursory look of some of the major writings of Kant during this stage make us feel that in this duration he was mainly preoccupied with interpretation of natural phenomena, their principles and some metaphysical ideas. His writings on natural sciences and of metaphysical ideas are also remarkable in many respects. In a number of writings he gave conceptual solutions through his realistic insights of many underlying principles of nature. His evolutionary theory of the universe is nowadays regarded as models in cosmology.

Some scholars are of the opinion that even though Kant's philosophy is divided into distinct stages, still his intellectual tack was not a fractured or arbitrary one. His philosophical development was by far a unified attempt and hence there was a underlying continuity. His earliest works were continuous with his later claims.¹ Kant right from the beginning was pressing for a unique agenda. He began from natural philosophy, ontology and cosmology and pursued with these issues even at later period. Among some ventures of this period, i. e. pre-critical period, following are important.

He was keen on understanding the power of nature. One early initiative about this was to solve the puzzle of force. On the

question—what is force and how can it be measured, there was a controversy between Descartes and Leibniz. For Descartes, force is the product of mass and velocity. It is merely a ‘quantity of motion’ or ‘dead pressure’. It has no dynamic essence. Leibniz rejected this Cartesian view. For Leibniz, force is the product of mass and velocity squared. He called this new quantity a living force. It is presently called kinetic energy. Thus Leibniz turned physics to dynamics. Kant in his *Living Forces* tried to resolve this controversy taking clues from another philosopher and mathematician, George Bernhard Bilfinger. There he used a method, admittedly inspired by Bilfinger, known as heuristic method. The method tells us to identify an intermediate place when different experts advance contrary views. We can trace the use of this method in his critical period also.

Another important work during this phase was *Universal Natural History*. In this work he replaced Newtonian Christian view of natural design with a secular dynamic cosmology. During that time it was not easy to give such a secular interpretation and hence the work was published anonymously. Rejecting Newton’s view that cosmic operation required the intervention of the divine, Kant eliminated the need of divine intervention. He also failed to find any compelling metaphysical reason for such divine appeal. He there says that force is goal-oriented and its energy evolves the cosmos. He explains how nature out-wraps from primal force to complex structure. This ‘out-wrapping’ involves process and purpose and added that this purpose is not imposed by God rather is woven into nature’s fabric. He seems to admit teleology in the development of forces. But this teleology is not extrinsic rather it is latent in nature itself. By holding this view Kant gives us a hint toward his view that he will unfold at later period of his philosophizing. Kant here compares universe to a chain of nature and in this chain humans are

merely a link. He outrightly rejects the claim that this universe was created for human purposes. Among the different sorts of life, it is intelligent life that continues to exist. Human beings are intelligent though they occupy a middle rung in the hierarchy of creatures. They occupy middle rung as they are ‘halfway between wisdom and irrationality’. The view that Kant held in this pre-critical stage—that human beings are part of nature—continues to find echo in post-pre-critical stage.

In a thesis entitled *On Fire*, written as part of master’s, he held that all bodies—solid, liquid and gaseous— are made up of dynamic particles. Here also we find his engagement with discovering principles of nature or natural substances.

His doctoral dissertation *New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition*, written in 1755, was a deviation from his previous work. Here he tries to unearth the principle of ontology and in particular conceptual tools for metaphysical enquiry. In this work we notice a move in Kant that instead of concentrating on matters of nature he is focusing on rational life. This shift from natural process characterized by mechanicality to human being which is non-mechanical and free being is a watershed in his philosophy. Here Kant argues in favour of the view that there is compatibility in these two opposing characteristics. Nothing in nature happens arbitrarily and hence every incident in nature takes place for a prior reason. This rule applies to free actions of human beings as well as to natural events. By way of interpreting free will he says that it is ‘determining power’. This power helps human being not to become subject of impulses. In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, written during critical phase, Kant distinguishes between things and persons—the former comes to being through natural means whereas the latter as rational ends.

Not only in the above dissertation, even in his writing entitled *The Employment in Natural Philosophy of Metaphysics Combined with Geometry, of Which Sample I Contains the Physical Monadology* written as part of his position of *Privatdozent*, or lecturer, in 1756 he again returns to explanation of material things and made efforts to explain Leibniz's view on monadology. Explaining physical monads as energy spheres and how do they radiate extension he goes on to argue how the union of metaphysics and geometry can produce a better philosophy.

In 1764 in the *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* he gave a twist to his experience of nature. Nature to Kant was an encounter having aesthetic character. Here he initiated a phenomenology of beauty which ultimately culminated in his 3rd *Critique*. In that *Critique* he also argues for aesthetic notions such as design and unity.

In all the above writings and also some other writings of this phase which we have not mentioned, Kant relentlessly tried to give secular interpretations of events and opposed all interpretations which have been derived from divine power or interference.

In 1761 the Prussian Academy had announced a public competition on 'whether metaphysical principles, specifically the principles of natural theology and morals, could be proven with the same clarity and precision as the truths of geometry' in which many prominent thinkers participated. Kant in this essay popularly known as the *Prize Essay* examined whether such a quest is at all feasible. There are scholars who hold that the issue that Kant deals with in this essay actually became a prime concern in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the Essay Kant answers how, not whether, metaphysics is possible. As Kant was certain about the possibility of metaphysics, he thought that the task in hand is only determining right method for doing so. In the *Critique of Pure*

Reason Kant's obsession was to demonstrate the possibility of metaphysics as a system of *a priori* judgements which are at the same time synthetic. In 1781's *Critique* this quest was his main concern, of course with moderation now by his critical vigilance.

Dawn of the Critical Phase

1781 was the year when his first revolutionary work *Critique of Pure Reason* was published. It is regarded, and of course undoubtedly, as one of the most magnificent works in western thought. Though this voluminous (its first German edition contains 856 pages) work was not initially well-received by the intellectuals of that time and had to be revised and rewritten in 1783 under the rubric *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics which will be able to Present itself as Science*, soon it got readers and since then had been translated in many languages. His views about individual minds contribution to knowledge process have been found to be extremely original and startling. By his elaborate explanation of knowledge mechanism he showed, and thought to give due, to our capacity of reason and sense-experiences. He there claimed to bring a revolution in philosophy which was similar to Copernican revolution in astronomy. Kant found out a new sort of knowledge hitherto unrecognized in philosophy and he called this sort of knowledge synthetic *a priori* knowledge. Before demonstrating the possibility of this new-found knowledge he gave adequate explanation of possible sorts of knowledge recognized before him and untraced till then.

Soon after that in 1785 came his second important work *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, a treatise known for its rigidity in laying down the foundations of moral philosophy. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, an Irish scholar who devoted considerable time to disseminate Kantian philosophy to educated circle, translated this comparatively small

treatise into English and is widely regarded as a standard transliteration. Though this was the first exposition of his moral philosophy, it still now remains as a very influential discourse in the field. He called his ethics pure ethics, introduced the concept of ‘good will’ and clearly stated his view that action/duty is categorical imperative. This book laid the foundation of ethics, explained core concepts and principles of morality for a rational agent. His cutting edge argument—that rightness of an action is governed by the character of belief that a rational agent chooses to act upon— drew away attention of thinkers from teleological moral standard that was in vogue at that time. His firm declaration that we must act only on that principle which we would will to become a universal law, popularly known as categorical imperative, was landmark in moral philosophy. It is sometimes said that in spite of enunciations of forceful principles, the book was unclear in many respects. It is this thing that prompted him to write another critique—*Critique of Practical Reason*—which came out in 1788.

This second *Critique*, i. e. *Critique of Practical Reason*, though comparatively small, in T. K. Abbott’s translation it is about 182 pages, made a decisive influence in moral philosophy. The 1st*Critique* deals with theoretical reason but the 2nd*Critique* focuses on practical reason. Practical reason guides us to employ reason in order to decide how to act and theoretical reason, in contrast, is application of reason for deciding what to follow. In the 1st*Critique* he was eager to show capacities as well as limits of theoretical reason. He cautioned us to restrain theoretical reason as application of it outside its appropriate area will produce bewilderment. It is to be noticed that the 2nd*Critique* is not a critique of ‘Pure’ practical reason, rather a critique of pretensions of applied practical reason and also a defense of its capability. Pure practical reason, says

Kant, is not to be restrained, but be cultivated. In this employment of pure practical reason he made room for freedom, God and immortality of soul.

Next comes his *Critique of Judgement* which completes his critical project. This 1790's book primarily deals with aesthetics and teleology. Former part, i. e. Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, deals with four possible moments of aesthetic reflective judgements (agreeable, beautiful, sublime and the good) and links them to the table of judgements that he gave in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Contrasting reflecting judgements with determinative judgements (with which he dealt in the previous two *Critiques*) Kant tries to show that in aesthetic judgements we attempt to find unknown universals for given particulars whereas in determinative judgements we do the reverse— only subsume given particulars under universals. In the part of teleology he shows how things are judged in agreement with their ends.

About religion we previously said that he was brought up under strict religious discipline of Pietism, but his philosophical vision did not go hand in hand with his upbringing. He was under constraint to apply his philosophical findings in the realm of religion and this desire culminated in his work *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*. In this 1793 book which contains about 464 pages he espoused a religion what Allan W. Wood called moral religion. The four sections of the book previously appeared as articles in journals. Criticising biblical theology there, he tried to make room for moral theology. He made scathing criticism of dictatorial attitude of church, was also critical of rituals and so on. This non-familiar view was taken seriously by the then Prussian government as it went against state's proclaimed view. Kant has been warned to refrain from writing any such view which may go against traditional interpretation of Christianity.

Essay of 1784 “Answering the Question: What is Enlightenment?” (the peculiarity of title is due to the fact that the essay was written in reference to a question raised by Reverend Johann Friedrich Zollner which also has an interesting background) is another much-discussed writing of Kant. Here he held that lack of enlightenment means people’s ineptitude to think for them. It mainly happens not on account of dearth of intellect rather for lacking courage. He further delineated reasons for such deficiency and enumerated prerequisites imperative for making people enlightened. “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”, a 1795 essay, is another important contribution of this German philosopher. His proposed roadmap for a world which will be founded not only on cessation of hostility, but on solid peace has influenced many international organizations and also constitutions of many countries.

The *Metaphysics of Morals* was the last important work of Kant. It came out in 1797 and was a treatise mainly of political and moral philosophy. Here he gives his doctrine of rights—rights that people have or can acquire—and the doctrine of virtue—the virtues that people ought to acquire.

Formulation of the main problem of the *Critique of Pure Reason*

In his philosophical and other views given in the pre-critical stage one can easily discern that Kant had leanings toward rationalist line of thinking in general and Descartes, Leibniz, Christian Wolff in particular. He did not take empiricist philosophers’ view very seriously. But it is Hume’s philosophy that agitated his mind and forced to break his previous line of thinking. Unlike many critics of David Hume who dismissed his view as not that important, Kant found substance in Hume’s arguments. For him, it merits our attention on the one hand and on the other we need to find out where Hume had gone wrong which led him to

such a strange view. Let us see the arguments advanced by Hume mainly in his *A Treatise of Human Nature* and in *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*.

In the above treatises Hume blew a jolt to traditional undogmatic thinking about our acquisition of knowledge. He showed that many of our beliefs/ideas are neither founded on pure reason nor experience can give them a firm foundation. The idea of causality is one such idea. Hume's view is that knowledge of causality is of course useful, but the question is how do we arrive at such an idea which is regarded as a necessary idea. The justification of such a necessary idea is in question. About metaphysical ideas also Hume held a stand that was quite different from Kantian way of thinking. Let us explain the curious view of Hume that woke up Kant, as he admitted in the *Prolegomena*, from his deep dogmatic slumber.

This problem is sometimes also called the problem of induction. It is primarily an epistemological problem and questions the credibility of our inductive reasoning. We inductively reason about some principles. Taking the instance of causation he showed the lack of justification for jumping from observed behavior of objects to their future unobserved behavior. While taking such a leap we tend to believe that objects will behave in a similar manner in future also. It is this expectation of uniformity that Hume questions. His point is that from where (i. e. from what source) we get justification for holding such an expectation of uniformity which contains in its womb the concept of necessity. He repudiates any rational justification of such a claim. In philosophy two types of reasoning were popular—demonstrative reasoning and probable reasoning. Hume showed that both these tools were insufficient in justifying the claim. About uniformity belief Hume says that it cannot be demonstrated as we can easily conceive that nature might cease from

being regular. About probable reasoning Hume shows the lack of justification to hold that nature will continue to behave in a similar fashion only because it acted in this way in the past. Thus Hume shows why inductive inferences cannot have rational defense.

Thus shattering this popular way of thinking Hume put forward his own interpretation in consonance with his empiricism. He argued that it is not reason rather natural instinct of human being which accounts for our action of inductive inferences. Nature, writes Hume, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity condition us to think and judge in that way. About our belief in causation Hume says that it is nothing more than link of constantly conjoined events. On account of constant relationship of two events we mentally link the two. Reading anything more than this in this connection cannot be justified in any other way. From where do we get the assurance that future events will occur in the same way as it happened in the past, asks Hume. As he did not find any certitude in usually held view that every event has a specific course, he offered his own explanation. While doing so he divided human enquiry into two kinds: relations of ideas and matters of fact. In the last chapter and concluding paragraph of *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* he writes: "If we take in our hand any volume...let us ask, *Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No.* Commit it then to the flames: for it contains nothing but sophistry and illusion"². Relations of ideas are *a priori* truth (e. g. statements of mathematics) whereas matters of facts are discovered by individual experience. Causal relationship in such experiences is uncovered by experience and not through ratiocination. After a lot of explanation he wonders how human beings can predict future with certainty from his past experiences. In his explanation of the process of causal inference he develops his theory of

belief. It is our 'habit' or 'custom' that plays an important role in associating two successive events that we found to occur in nature repeatedly. In the *Enquiry* he writes that habit 'makes us expect for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past.'³ Notwithstanding this, Hume is not in a position to credit this association any moderate amount of certainty. Still from this habit there arises in human mind an expectation that future events will follow the past experienced course of action. This view of human behaviour is known as his theory of belief. Thus except our reliance on belief that future events will unfold like our past experience, in other words uniformity of nature, we have no ground to hold such a view.

The above view of Hume has become a major topic of discussion in later period of the history of philosophy. Even if we set aside those interpretations, its influence on Kant went down in history very firmly and reverberates still now. Unlike Thomas Reid, Kant was not ready to dismiss Hume's view as of no consequence. He considered it as a challenge thrown to the foundation of causal and other metaphysical knowledge. For Hume, these were merely habit of mind produced through repetition of events. Hence Kant considered Hume's view a challenge and he took up this gauntlet to give a fitting reply which ultimately resulted in his critical project. Instead of taking recourse to common sense for meeting Hume's doubt, as he thought this is not a fit instrument to respond to Hume, he tried to show where Hume had gone wrong. For Kant, belief in constant conjunction though arise from habit or custom but we need to examine source of utterance of such belief, i. e. judgement issued out of such belief. In making such judgement the speaker does not simply record his psychological state, rather asserts something to be true. Hence this assertion is not simply a subjective matter; on the contrary there is an objective claim. In this claim of objectivity in the assertion lies

the insistence of universality of its application. This claim is not to be ignored rather demands an examination.

Further, Kant held that human beings do not come across events as loose and separate rather experience them in relation to something else including the person who experiences. This relation or connection cannot be satisfactorily explained only in terms of habit. Rather its source lies somewhere else. Habit comes at a later stage of our experience. If in the beginning we did not experience things as related, it is not possible to make a habit. In order to recognize the second and all other following occurrence of events, we need to experience first successive occurrences as related. Wherefrom does it come is a moot question.

Moreover, if we did not experience occurrences as unity, we shall face an insurmountable problem in explaining consciousness. Hume also faced this problem and his explanation of 'I' has been reduced to succession of ideas.

The aforesaid problems set Kant's agenda for further enquiry. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* he initiates his critical inquiry and through it examines the power (capacity as well as limit) of reason. In his venture he also excavated the source of *a priori* necessity of causality and other metaphysical principles. In his transcendental idealism he hunted down *a priori* forms of intuition and pure concepts of the understanding. This discovery took him back to a problem which was not problematic to his predecessors.

The Synthetic *A Priori*

It is usually claimed that Kant got the clue from Leibniz to begin his search for a solution of the problem posed by Humean contention. Leibniz in his philosophy made the distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact. The distinction is about the foundation of a theory of knowledge. Though a lot of questions has been raised and addressed on this distinction⁴ still it is regarded as important one in the history of philosophy. It is also called necessary and contingent truths' distinction. In truths of reasoning the truth value of the statement can be discovered only by analyzing the notions or concepts it contains. For Leibniz, it was method to reduce or break down the notions into simpler ideas and simpler truths until we arrive at non-breakable or primitive part. In order to understand this we may invoke his principle of contradiction, principle of sufficient reason and predicate-in-notion principle. Principle of contradiction states that a proposition cannot be true and false at the same time and hence A is A and cannot be non-A. His predicate-in-notion principle asserts that except primitive truths all other remaining truths are reducible to primary truths with the help of definitions or in other words through the resolution of notions. If we combine these two principles, i. e. principle of contradiction and predicate-in-notion principle, it amounts to saying that in any true proposition the predicate is contained, either implicitly or explicitly, in the subject. In *A Calculus of Consequences* Leibniz writes: "In every proposition, the predicate is said to be in the subject, that is, the notion of the predicate is contained in the notion of the subject."⁵ He reiterated this view in a letter written to Arnauld where he stated that every true affirmative proposition—necessary as well as contingent, universal as well as particular—possess a characteristic in the sense that in such propositions the notion of predicate in some way or other is contained in the notion of subject. His principle of sufficient

reason says that ‘nothing is without a reason’ which in effect means every event has a cause whether we know it or not. On the basis of these principles Leibniz gave a foundation to his metaphysical views about the nature of substance, modality, etc.

After Leibniz, Hume also distinguished between relations of ideas and matters of fact. While enquiring about justification of beliefs in cause and effect relationships, he investigated our sources of knowledge and said that he found two sources as we stated above (i. e., relations of ideas and matters of fact). Relations of ideas are knowledge that can be justified *a priori*. In other words, they are independent of experience and contain necessity. Denial of *a priori* knowledge involves contradiction. Knowledge of matters of fact is *a posteriori*. This sort of knowledge is grounded in experience, e.g. knowledge of substance and causal relations. Denial of such judgement does not involve contradiction. Sources of knowledge of matters of fact are impressions and ideas (grown out of impression). Again they have several possible sources: sense perceptions, emotions, desires, or acts of will.

In order to meet Humean challenge Kant questions the presumptions that lied behind the old way of distinguishing judgements or propositions. Leibniz, Hume and some other philosophers while talking about judgements forked them in such a way that there are possibilities of only two types of judgements—relations of ideas and matters of fact. The former are judgements which are devoid of any factual content and can be known to be as true or false by mere conceptual analysis or by way of application of principle of contradiction. Judgements relating to matters of fact cannot be known in this way. Their truth or falsity is determined or known by experience. The former are analytic judgements and latter are synthetic judgements. Till the time of Hume it was thought that this distinction is collateral to the division of things known *a priori* and those

known *a posteriori*. It is exactly in this simplification or parallelism between judgements where something went wrong and Kant is eager to show that knowledge demands further scrutiny. He searches out a third alternative, i. e. synthetic *a priori* judgements, the possibility of which were either ignored or went unnoticed. This type of knowledge is unrefutable by experience as it contains *a priori* necessity and at the same time not based on pure reason, i. e. not analytic. He had the conviction that mathematics, natural science contain this class of judgement. Not only that metaphysical principles, e. g. causal principle as a condition of experience, principles of morality, e. g. freedom of will as a postulate of morality, fall in this kind of judgement. Thus Kant sets his main aim of critical project.

Hume's philosophy ultimately culminated in a sort of skepticism what he termed mitigated skepticism. Kant, after a long arduous enquiry, shows us that the abstract principle of causality and other metaphysical principles are only conditions of our experience and hence cannot be spurned scornfully. Any effort to find them in the world by means of our experience is bound to be a failure as they exist only as categories of our understanding. Reason is also of no help in search of this principle. Reason only applies these as rules in our experience process. Once we forget this, we tend to apply reason beyond its legitimate scope which, for Kant, are antinomies of pure reason.

Kant also introduced a new way of thinking by way of distinguishing between phenomena and noumena. Then he goes on to say that we can have only knowledge of phenomena or appearances, noumena or things-in-themselves are only posited to exist. Things-in-themselves cannot be experienced even by pure reason.

Thus Kant sets his goal. His goal is provide an answer to the challenge posed by Hume. In order to do this he now holds steadfastly

that previous thinkers could not grasp the possibility of a new sort of knowledge, i. e. synthetic *a priori* knowledge. He is keen to show that they play an important role in our knowledge process and are found in different fields of enquiry. Whether Kant succeeded in his attempt is a debatable issue, but there is no gainsaying of the fact that undertaking such an enquiry is indeed an uphill task.

References

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⁴ Heinemann, F. H. 'Truths of Reason and Truths of Fact' in *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 57, no. 5 (Sept., 1948) pp. 458-480 (source: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2181716>).

⁵ Roger, Ariew and Garber, Daniel (eds. and trans.): *G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989, p.11.
