CHAPTER V

Challenges to the Kantian Notions

Kant’s strong espousal for knowledge where there is a combination of characteristics of synthetic and a priori awareness brought a revolution in philosophy. Successful completion of his critical project was like an insurrection in the field of philosophy which agitated many philosophers’, his contemporaries and of later period, minds. There were philosophers who thought that Kant’s view had ushered a remarkable breakthrough in the arena of philosophy. On the other end, there were philosophers who were determined to show the impossibility of this newfound knowledge. A survey of this is a worth exercise and indeed also difficult as the terrain is huge. As it is not possible to traverse the entire domain, I intend to concentrate on the views given by logical positivists, W. V. O. Quine and Saul Kripke.

A scrutiny of Kant’s claim makes us aware that a number of concepts are involved in it. Usually concepts combined here were combined previously, i.e., before Kant, with some other judgement or to put it another way their shuffling were different. If we want to recount the concept involved in Kant’s account we find that following concepts are encompassed here:

1. Analyticity,
2. Syntheticity,
3. A prioricity,
4. Necessity, and
5. Universality.

Scholars before Kant arranged them in the following way:

- Analyticity with a prioricity
A prioricity with necessity and universality

Pre-Kantian thinkers held that the first combination is extensionally equivalent. In the second conjunct the first sort of knowledge essentially contains the two marks mentioned in this combination. Kant gives up this traditional type of thinking and holds that two characteristics contained in a priori knowledge (i.e. necessity and universality) are not co-extensive with analyticity. These traits can extend even in some synthetic judgements when they are not a posteriori. This is a possibility that his predecessors could not think of and perhaps it is for this reason Hume could not explain necessity that we are habituated to think in causal relations. It sounds like this: Kant was reminding Hume and like-minded philosophers that they were searching at wrong place what they have been looking for. As he could find the thing and at a different setting, Kant’s now wants to show what is that location and also roadway to that location.

Logical positivists who propounded their philosophy almost over a century later of Kant disagreed with him and made effort to show the impossibility of Kant’s view. Quine, an American philosopher, a few decades later in 1951 in his ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, gave another dissenting view and in a more radical way. His view was radical in the sense that he did not admit Kant’s distinction between analytic-synthetic as tenable as he showed, or at least he thought so, there can be no analytic proposition. And the impossibility of analytic proposition entails that such distinction (i.e. between analytic and synthetic judgement) is otiose. First let us see the standpoint of logical positivists.

The advent of logical positivism in the arena of philosophy was at a juncture which witnessed the triumph of scientific temperament and logical analysis on the one hand and declining trend of idealism on the other. Thinkers of this group also imbibed this spirit. And this spirit is reflected in their arguments given against Kant’s view. Among their views two important
points are: their effort to show nonsensicality of metaphysics and their advocacy of the principle of verifiability to decide meaning of a statement. These two points are actually two sides of the same coin. The latter point, i.e. the principle of verifiability, holds that a statement is meaningful if we know the method of its verification. This principle has undergone several changes. In spite of these changes by and large it assumed the aforesaid form. They got a support of their view in early Wittgenstein’s work in the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*. In this book Wittgenstein held that to understand the meaning of a proposition means to know what the case is, if the proposition is true. He, by holding this, espoused a theory of meaning known as picture theory of meaning. This view of Wittgenstein, coupled with their (of logical positivists) steadfastness to only extensional logic, forced the logical positivists to admit only analytic and empirical propositions.

Adherence to the above views gives us a hint that they cannot admit synthetic *a priori* combination that Kant so emphatically advocated. Positivists challenge the view of Kant and not only that they also are eager to show that this combination does not logically hold good. Pushing their argument forward Moritz Schlick, a prominent member of the group, writes: “...as a matter of principle, all propositions are either synthetic *a posteriori* or tautologus; synthetic *a priori* propositions seem to be a logical impossibility.”

This idea of logical positivists actually is a sequel of number of other views that they uphold. A. J. Ayer, considered as spokesperson of the group, delineates these views mainly in the 4th chapter of his *Language, Truth and Logic*. The contentions that form the core of their views are: necessary statements are actually reports of linguistic usage, they portray conventions, these statements are analytic and they are devoid of factual content. These contentions, scrutiny reveals, are interlinked.

Ayer argues with a number of illustrations that in analytic proposition we simply call “attention to the implications of a certain linguistic
usage.” As they regard, and we saw it in the immediate preceding paragraph, that only analytic propositions can be necessary, and also that necessity can be found only in analytic propositions, it is not astonishing that for them necessity is merely a report of linguistic usage. Not only that, going a step further they hold that necessary propositions do not vouchsafe relations between things. They only unfold relations between our own ideas and meanings. Let us take an instance of analytic proposition “All bachelors are unmarried”. For positivists, this proposition merely states that two expressions—subject and predicate—have the same reference. Beyond this any assertion about relation between the traits of two expressions—’bachelor’ and ‘unmarried’—cannot validly be claimed to hold. Ayer shows that the proposition ‘Either some ants are parasitic or none are’ does not give us any information about the behavioural pattern of ants, i.e. about any matter of fact. Treating this as an analytic statement he argues that as the proposition lacks factual content, no experience can rebut it.

Ayer further argues that though analytic proposition does not lend us any data about an empirical circumstance, “they do enlighten us by illustrating the way in which we use certain symbols.” For example, ‘Nothing can be coloured in different ways at the same time with respect to the same part of itself’ (Ayer’s example), though this statement does not say anything about the feature of an actual thing, the statement is not also nonsensical. In this analytic statement we are “simply calling attention to the implications of a certain linguistic usage.” It points to a ‘convention’—a convention that guides our usage of words. These propositions assert relationship between symbols and not between characteristics or attributes of things that symbols actually denote. This view ultimately boils down to the view that necessary propositions actually affirm about the way of employment of linguistic expressions.
Positivists’ contention that necessary propositions are linguistic convention has deeper significance. In the preceding passage we have seen that for Ayer linguistic expressions are symbols. Interpreting Kant’s definition of analytic judgement Ayer writes: “... a proposition is analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions of symbols it contains,...”\(^5\) We need to take note of his usage of the word ‘symbol’. Ordinarily symbols do not possess any meaning intrinsic to it and therefore relationship between symbols is not anything permanent or fixed. Hence their associations remain valid till we remain committed to our current usage. Once we decide to alter our convention pattern, what we now think contradictory (e. g. the denial of the proposition “All bachelors are unmarried”), will no longer be thought of as contradictory. In this way positivists tried to show that necessary propositions owe their necessity to convention. Writes Ayer: “... it is necessary only because we happen to use the relevant words in a particular way. There is no logical reason why we should not so alter our definitions that the sentence ‘A thing cannot be in two places at once’ comes to express a self-contradiction instead of a necessary truth.”\(^6\) He then goes to extend this argument to the principles of logic and mathematics by saying that they are universal purely because we never let them to be something else.

It is interesting to note that in the second edition of his book A. J. Ayer emended many of his views he espoused in the first edition of the same. In the section “The ‘A Priori’” he brings an emendation of his view that necessary propositions are only a matter of convention. His improvement was prompted by C. D Broad’s criticism, as Ayer himself admits, made in his article ‘Are there Synthetic a priori Truths?’. Broad in his article pointed out that Ayer’s analysis of a priori propositions actually pruned them into a sub category of empirical propositions. Susceptibility of this interpretation was engendered by Ayer’s view that usage of symbols is a matter of convention. If it is the case, ‘it is undoubtedly an empirical fact that people use symbols in the ways that
they do." Having understood the pitfalls of this view now Ayer says that though “the validity of a priori proposition depends upon certain facts about verbal usage ... this is not equivalent to saying that they describe these facts in the sense in which empirical propositions may describe the facts that verify them ...”

Now Ayer argues elaborately to elucidate the import of his view. His arguments seem to be of two tiers. First he shows that the usefulness of a priori knowledge is established on ‘the empirical fact that certain symbols are used in the way that they are and on the empirical fact that the symbols in question are successfully applied to our experience.’ Positivists’ view that necessary propositions are upshots of linguistic rules coupled with their view that they are actually matter of convention pose a challenge to the Kantian view that some a priori propositions are synthetic. This in turn implies that necessary propositions are necessarily analytic as it cannot be otherwise (i.e. synthetic)

By saying that necessary propositions can only be analytic, the novelty feature of such propositions has been stripped away. In other words these propositions do not state anything novel, new, or extra. According to Moritz Schlick, the novelty here indicates of logical novelty. For positivists, a proposition is analytic if its meaning can be derived solely from the terms it contains. They are independent of the external world as well as our mind. They also hold that denial of such a proposition gives rise to self-contradiction. Moreover, positivists also draw a parallel between analytic and tautologous propositions. However, the way they explain analytic propositions and tautologous propositions and the instance they cite for these propositions seem to be of different in intent from Kant’s. Hence, their view about co-extensiveness of these expressions can be questioned. As they (i.e. positivists) equate analyticity with a prioricity (of course with a claim that apriori propositions are necessary in a specified way), they reject the Kantian view that some necessary truths can be synthetic.
Even propositions of mathematics, which is quite contrary of Kant’s view, they show to be analytic. Arguing this Ayer says “... propositions of pure geometry are analytic. And this leads us to reject Kant’s hypothesis that geometry deals with the form of intuition of our outer sense. For the ground for this hypothesis was that it alone explained how the propositions of geometry could be both true *a priori* and synthetic...” He argued in detail to show that these propositions are not synthetic. Soon after that he also advanced arguments to show that arithmetical propositions are also not synthetic. He proclaims that there is nothing mysterious in the claim of apodictic certainty of logic and mathematics. Positivists are not ready to admit of any exception of their thesis. Thus they dismissed the view of Kant that *a prioricity* is not a monopoly of analyticity.

**W. V. O Quine’s View**

Perhaps the severest shocks to Kant’s view came from American philosopher W. V. O Quine. Quine in his widely acclaimed article ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, published in 1951 held that Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgement is not defensible and on account of this he rejected the distinction. Not only that in the end of the section 4 he says: “That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith.” Such a radical opinion about this distinction trembled the philosophical world which for almost one and half century centered around the distinction in the sense that philosophical theory began assuming this distinction as an accepted one or sometime criticizing it showing its inadequacy. Out of the dogmas that Quine criticizes the first one is aimed at showing indefensibility of analytic-synthetic distinction and the second one is reductionist principle of logical positivists which believed that each meaningful statement in ultimate analysis is equivalent to logical construct upon terms which refers to our immediate sense-experience. Having criticized these two dogmas Quine paves the way
for his own theory of meaning where, on the one hand, he talks about indeterminacy of translation and, on the other, espouses meaning holism. Let us now see his main points of criticism directed against the first dogma—analytic-synthetic distinction.

Quine’s interpretation of the distinction, its analysis and criticism is divided into four sections. He held that Kant’s distinction had forerunner in Leibniz’s and Hume’s philosophy. Former philosopher distinguished this truth by using expressions ‘truths of reason’ and ‘truths of fact’ and the latter philosopher distinguished the same truth by other expression—‘relations of ideas’ and ‘matters of fact’. However, while criticizing the distinction he mostly uses the term ‘analytic’ which gives us enough hint that his target is mainly Kant. Initially he defines analytic statements as “statements whose denials are self-contradictory” and then goes on to hold that this definition has no explanatory worth as the term ‘self-contradictoriness’ is equally blurred and demands elucidation just like ‘analyticity’. In view of this he does not consider this explanation of the concept in question as at all worthy.

He then shows two shortcomings of the Kantian distinction. As the Kant in his definition of analytic judgements used the ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ terms Quine holds that such a distinction is then only confined to judgments having subject-predicate form. This is a limitation of Kant’s distinction as it excluded from its purview a significant number of judgements which are not of subject-predicate form. Second, in Kant’s distinction he used the term ‘contain’. For Quine, the notion of ‘containment’ is not clear and actually Kant used it metaphorically. Having shown these two flaws of the distinction he redefines analytic judgment, allegedly taking clue from Kant’s ‘intent’ as ‘a statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of meanings and independently of fact.11’ In this definition the term ‘meaning’ is important and most of the arguments advanced by Quine hinge on the concept of meaning. He refuses to link meaning with naming like many of his predecessors whether it is at the
level of concrete or at the level of abstract terms or singular or general terms. Taking the instance of general terms he shows that meaning should not be treated as equal to its extension as the general terms, e. g. ‘creature with heart’ and ‘creature with kidneys’ have identical extension but do not have similar meaning. Differing from Aristotelian view he also declares that essence is not meaning as essence belongs to objects and meaning is the property of linguistic forms. He says: “Meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word.” Coupled with this view he held that the key task of the theory of meaning is to supply synonym of linguistic forms which he found equally obscure as the term ‘synonym’ demands clarification.

Quine shows that by and large analytic statements falls into two categories. One group of analytic statement may be called logically true and is exemplified by statement like ‘No unmarried man is married’. This sort of analytic statements is logical truth and they remain true under all interpretations. Rest of the analytic statements though not logical truth, e. g. ‘No bachelor is married’ still they can be transformed into logical truth by replacing them, using Leibniz’ principle salva veritate, with synonymous words. For example, in the aforesaid instance (i. e. ‘No bachelor is married’) we can replace the word ‘bachelor, with the expression ‘unmarried man’ and the statement that we get as a result of this is ‘No unmarried man is married’. This reveals that we can easily turn second category statement into first category (i. e. logical truth) by putting synonymous words. However, Quine is of the opinion that this effort cannot become successful as the notion of synonym is recondite and needs to be clarified. On account of this the notion of analyticity remains abstruse. Even Rudolf Carnap’s attempt to explain analyticity in terms of state-descriptions (an attempt to assign truth-value to all non-compound sentences so that truth-value of each compound sentence becomes fixed by these atomic sentences and logical devices required for this)
serves only limited purpose. As Quine says ‘state-descriptions is a reconstruction at best of logical truth, not of analyticity.’\(^{13}\)

Thus Quine shows that the second type of analytic statements are problematic and any effort to solve them by the assumption of synonym or showing sameness of meaning is bound to fail and this notion also begs the question. A section of thinkers attempt to reduce second category of analytic statements into the first category (i.e. logical truths) by means of definition. But to Quine this attempt is repugnant as he shows after a lengthy discussion that no sort of definition—whether descriptive or stipulative—can serve our purpose. In former sort of definition whether it is lexicographical or explicative it is usually presumed that the concept of synonym is crystal clear to us. Further explanation goes on presuming this. For example, the term ‘bachelor’ is defined as ‘unmarried male that never has been married’. Such a definition ordinarily attests an association of ‘synonym antecedent to the exposition in hand.’ What Quine intends to underscore is that such a definition rests on usage and hence in dictionary when we find synonymous words what we find are not definitions rather reports based upon usage. Apart from attempting to define words by supplementing with synonymous words there is another way to define and this has been called by Carnap ‘explication’. This is an attempt to give contextual definition. It aims to better the definiendum by ‘refining and supplementing its meaning’. Quine is of the view that though in such cases it is not merely reporting previous usage, it still counts on ‘other preexisting synonymies.’ Therefore, explicative mode of definition has two-pronged use— it protects the usage of these favoured contexts and on other hand it intends to fine-tune the usage of other context. Thus it seems that whatever route we pursue, definition ultimately rests on the notion of synonym and hence we cannot make any headway in understanding the notion of analytic as defining the latter in terms of the former involves circularity. He further goes on to show that even attempt of use of stipulative definition does
not improve the prospect. For example, if we attempt to define logical operators in terms of primitives (e. g. if ‘if p then q’ is defined as ‘not-p or q’), such effort though free from previous flaws still depend on formulation of artificial languages and is language specific. Hence all our efforts to transform the second type of analytic statements into first type by appeal to definition ultimately come to a naught.

Some scholars propose that another alternative to show the cogency of synonyms of two linguistic forms suffices if it can be shown that they are interchangeable in all contexts without alteration of their truth value. Though this proposal is free of some imperfections of previous proposal, still not satisfactory enough and hence does not deserve acceptance. For instance, can we make out synonym as intersubstitutivity, *salva veritate*, so that (invoking our previous example) ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried male’ are synonymous and we can substitute ‘unmarried male’ in any sentence wherever the term ‘bachelor’ occurs. About this proposal Quine says nevertheless the moot question is whether “interchangeability *salva veritate* … is a strong enough condition for synonym” or whether some non-synonymous expressions can also become interchangeable in this sense. In holding this Quine is not concerned with synonyms in the sense of complete identity rather he focuses on what he calls ‘cognitive synonym’. Thus the question at hand is can we have an account of cognitive synonym without presupposing analyticity. Quine tries to show that the condition of interchangeability *salva veritate* loses its vitatility if not relativized to a language in the sense that its workability is conditioned by the richness of a language. He shows that a logically rich language can be adequate to classical mathematics, though it is not extensional. Hence we face a dilemma: on the one hand in purely extensional language even non-synonymous expressions are interchangeable *salva veritate* on the other a language is rich enough to block this possibility, i. e.
interchangeability of non-synonymous terms presupposes our knowledge of analyticity.

Quine is quick to show that extensional equivalence is not sufficiently capable to express the notion of synonym. Taking the instance of factual occurrence he shows that though all and only creatures with hearts are creature with kidneys, yet these two expression — ‘creatures with hearts’ and ‘creatures with kidneys’ — are not cognitively synonymous. This can be made evident from the following statements

X believes that fish are creatures with hearts, and

X believes that fish are creatures with kidneys.

Out of these two statements the former can be true whereas the latter can be false. Hence Quine says that these general terms are interchangeable in terms of extension though they are dissimilar in meaning.

In order to examine whether interchangeability is a sufficient condition for cognitive synonym Quine invokes the notion of necessity and examines whether it can be of any help in the present case. After discussion he shows that the notion of necessity is of no help as when we say ‘Necessarily all and only Xs are Ys’ we only convey that ‘All and only Xs are Ys’ is analytic. Let us explain this point with the help of an example. When we say ‘Necessarily all and only bachelors are unmarried men’ and then we try to convert this sentence by turn and twist, i.e. using cognitive synonym and other logical apparatus, ‘All and only bachelors are bachelors’ then the adverb ‘necessarily’ is ‘so construed as to yield truth when and only when applied to analytic statement.’ But if we recall that it is analyticity that we have been trying to explain, then an account of analyticity in terms of necessity involves circularity (as we saw that fixing ‘necessarily’ in front of a sentence just posits that the statement was analytic). After all these wriggles Quine comes to the
conclusion that the option of interchangeability will not work to clarify the notion of synonym which in turn will define analyticity.

At last he examines whether semantical rules can help us to clarify the notion of synonym. It mainly addresses Rudolf Carnap’s approach to define meaning. Quine tries to show that the problem with analyticity is not established in the vagueness of ordinary languages. Semantical rules are also problematic for artificial language. Quine’s concern is that appeal to semantical rules of a particular language, say L, for explaining analyticity only explains ‘analyticity-for-L’. The limitation of such an endeavour is that it is language-specific, i.e. it does not have scope to explain analyticity for any other language and second, it does not explain the notion ‘analyticity’ per se.

Hence, Quine holds that no boundary between analytic and synthetic has actually been drawn. It becomes evident from the fact that we are not clear what analyticity is. If it is the case, how can we say that such a cleavage indeed exists?

The second dogma, which is about verification theory and espouses a reductionist approach, says that the meaning of a statement is the method of its verification. By verifying we empirically confirm it or declare it as unsound or invalid. Not only that, verifications go to the extent of saying that every meaningful statement is convertible into a statement about immediate experience or some logical construct which ultimately refer to immediate experience. By holding this, verificationists hold that the notion of synonym (or cognitive synonym) is applicable to statements. Given this concept of synonym analyticity could be defined ‘in terms of just synonym of statements together with logical truth.’ The irony then is that if the verificationists’ theory is accepted, i.e. if it is thought that their account of statement synonym is satisfactory, the notion of analyticity can be protected from the onslaughts that we saw before. It is so as analytic statements are confirmed irrespective of
any circumstance. However, Quine is not in a position to accept this. The verification theory and their process of reduction, of whose one foremost champion was Carnap as he arduously worked it out in detail in his *The Logical Structure of the World and the Pseudoproblems in Philosophy*, Quine shows, that it is not a new one. Even before them a number of writers, and mainly empiricists, made attempt to reductionism. But reductionism is unproven and also very difficult to prove. He shows that the two dogmas have identical root. Says Quine, “… one dogma clearly supports the other … as long as it is taken to be significant in general to speak of the confirmation and information of a statement, it seems significant to speak also of a limiting kind of statement which is vacuously confirmed … come what may; and such a statement is analytic.”

Having shown the flaws of the two dogmas and thereby the notion of analyticity Quine introduces his theory of meaning holism. He advances the view that our utterances about external world ‘face the tribunal of sense experience’ not singly but as interconnected body. Moreover, Quine also denies any steadfast distinction between a linguistic and factual element of the truth of any lone statement. His intention is to show that it is not an isolated statement taken out from the whole interconnected body, rather it is the entire intricate and interwoven body that are verified. In this cobweb of interrelated statements we depend on language as well as experience for their verification. Thus no statement can be exclusively linguistic. Empirical significance holds the key for the entire arena of science. In this complexity of belief in logical laws, scientific theories and empirical claims all have share and importance of any one of them cannot be ignored. Once we understand this labyrinth, it is a small step to show that any attempt to treat the empirical content of a single statement is fallacious. And this takes us to show that distinction between synthetic and analytic statements are unsustainable as former statements are dependent on experience whereas the latter are true no matter what happens in
the empirical world. Quine discussing at length shows that no statements, including logical laws, are immune to revision. This view of Quine that even logical laws are not immune to revision in the given light of empirical evidence generated a fierce debate.

“Two Dogmas of Empiricism” came out 1951. Quine’s attack to analytic-synthetic cleavage did not remain confined to this essay only. Even after that in 1961 in his “Carnap on Logical Truth” and in his Word and Object (1960) he continued the attack unabated and even sharpened his arguments. Looks at his all the three writings mentioned above make us feel that his criticism of the split in question centers on mainly four points. First, Kant’s and his successors’ endeavours to prove that a group of sentences (they term analytic) are true solely by virtue of their meanings either involves circularity or are vacuously true. Second, he rejects sentence atomism and espouses sentence holism. This espousal led him to hold that sentences are not understood in isolation; rather they are only part of a corporate body. This has deeper implications. For example, if it is the case we cannot fix verification condition by taking recourse to reductionist approach for a sentence individually. This in turn implies that we cannot identify some sentences as analytic which do not require any verification condition to be treated as true. Holism does not allow us to single out sentences and separate them off from the complex web. Third, the so-called analytic statements are not immune to revision. This radical claim holds that all sentences are revisionable taking into account new data available. Quine shows how the definition of the notion of momentum has been revised in the new light of fact and even revision of logical laws (law of the excluded middle) was also proposed for simplifying quantum mechanics. Finally, the idea of meaning lacks clarity and has no explanatory value. This view of Quine is actually an integral part of his another theory known as indeterminacy of translation. It is his behaviouistic theory of meaning that led Quine to hold such a view.
What is at issue: some reflections

The attack of Quine against analytic-synthetic distinction generated a heated debate in the philosophical circle. It was not any ordinary sort of criticism, rather it questioned some fundamental issues that became an integral part of philosophical discourse in philosophy and hence Quine’s criticism shook the foundation of many philosophical views. Actually the distinction was central to many philosophical schools and plenty of philosophical theories. The fierce debate that Quine’s attack ensued generated many new interpretations and explanations.

Quine further developed his positions in his Word and Object in 1960. From various sources we also get inklings that in developing his view on analytic-synthetic distinction he was in contact with (i. e. interacted with) prominent scholars of that time such as Rudolf Carnap, Nelson Goodman, Alfred Tarski and so on. In his essay “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” he made reference of Carnap several times. When I went through the aforesaid essay first I felt that in interpreting analyticity Quine has adopted a doctrinaire attitude and the extreme rigidity of explanation adopted by him could not retain the spirit of Kant’s distinction. His (Quine’s) insistence on clarification I found unreasonable and hardly beneficial for philosophical discussion. To put it in another way, ordinary language cannot cater the demand that Quine is making. Moreover, I started pondering over the issue how the Kantian distinction can be saved, if it can at all be saved without any prejudice, from this onslaught. Quine appears to consider the notion of analyticity as illusory and this made the entire critical project or topic in question on the edge of a precipice. In other words now the general problem of the Critique i. e. How are synthetic a priori judgements possible? becomes a non-issue. While deeply thinking over the issue it appeared to me that these two stalwarts of philosophy were actually emphasizing different facets of the analytic-synthetic distinction—whereas our German philosopher were obsessed in
epistemological side of the issue, the American philosopher remain engrossed with the metaphysical side. In order to suit his purpose, Quine interpreted the notion in his own way and then began to show the untenability of the notion.

The distinction, as Quine interpreted, seems to be based on the fact that some statements (say, analytic) are true by virtue of meaning alone and some statements (i.e. synthetic) become true or false by virtue of fact. But study of the first Critique did not give me this impression. When Kant defines analytic and synthetic judgements (“Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand in connection with it”) and also subsequently states some of their characteristics perhaps the foremost thing that was in Kant’s mind was to accentuate the cleavage for his readers. Before that in the previous sections of the Introduction he in similar fashion distinguished between a priori and a posteriori. If Kant could not distinctly made these two contrasts, he hardly could have been successful in his principal aim, i.e., to take his reader of the critical project to argue in favour of the possibility synthetic a priori knowledge in different fields. Hence, perhaps Kant was obsessed to do so. But if the distinction does not exist at all, as Quine thinks it to be, the entire edifice of Kant’s philosophy seems to have been brought down. Can almost one hundred seventy years’ philosophy that developed in between, i.e., pronunciation of this distinction in 1781 and demolition of it in 1951, can bear such a shocking burn. As I was thinking agape all these things I decided to reread the distinction of Kant. During this rereading I found certain terms that Quine capitalized in his elucidation of the notion of analyticity. Quine was a doyen of philosophy of the last century and lived almost 92 years. He gave wide variety of philosophy though mainly remained in the analytical tradition. Kant also lived a quite long life of almost eighty years and is known for rigor of his thinking. Of course he was not philosophizing in analytical tradition. Analytical tradition came into being
almost after a century of his death. So he could not utilize this tool or methodology for philosophizing. As he ushered in the era of critical philosophy, Kant had in mind two prominent schools or traditions of his time—empirical and rationalistic traditions. He might have thought that bickering between these two schools might lose the spirit of philosophy. This is somewhat dogmatic to adhere to any school without a critical look. Hence critical outlook can retain the truth of both the schools and shed off things that are otiose and dogmatic. It is this belief that might have propelled to develop a philosophy of his type and also had to bear the burn of authorities—state authority as well as religious authority.

Kant in his definition and subsequent statement of traits of analytic and synthetic knowledge (in Kemp Smith’s translation), as we said in the preceding passage, used certain words which are susceptible to various interpretations if we belong to a different tradition and Quine exploited this opportunity to its fullest extent as he philosophized at a time which can be called heyday of analytical tradition. In asserting one characteristic of analytic judgement, soon after giving a typical example, Kant says that in analytic judgement we “do not require to go beyond the concept” (subject concept) to find that the predicate concept is bound up with the subject concept. Kant further says to “meet with this predicate, I have merely to analyse the concept, that is, to become conscious to myself of the manifold which I always think in that concept.”\textsuperscript{16} Though in the second edition of the 1\textsuperscript{st} Critique Kant made slight changes, by and large he stuck to this view. This statement of Kant, his use of the expressions like ‘analyse’, ‘concept’ made room for further discussion by the analytic philosopher. As they are now equipped with new tool (tool of analysis), they used it, explained the notion (analyticity) it in their own way and found it easy to refute it. Among other writings of Quine “Two Dogmas” got widespread publicity as it demolished a well known distinction that has been used by philosophers for a long time to base many of
their views. In subsequent writings Quine sharpened his arguments and developed his other theses such as holism, indeterminacy of translation, behaviourism and so on. But a close scrutiny of his writings makes us think that germs of these contentions lie in his aforesaid essay. Being a logician and analytic philosopher he was justified to subject Kantian distinction to a scrutiny of logic and analytical method. But the jolt he gave wake up many philosophers and they came forward sometime to defend Kantian view and sometime to re-examine the views of both sides and sometime to rehabilitate the distinction by giving it more teeth. Actually Quine’s view posed a threat to any meaningful discourse. It is indeed a fact that day to day interaction is based on concepts like synonym, meaning etc. that Quine rejects and silence on these issues means to accept the impossibility of everyday discourse. Thus philosophers came forward in defense of long-established notion and distinction. Out of these thinkers mention must be made of Rudolf Carnap, P. F. Strawson and H. P. Grice and of Hilary Putnam. Let us get a glace of their views.

**Paul Grice and P. F. Strawson’s standpoint**

Chronologically Paul Grice and P. F. Strawson reacted to Quine’s rejection of the notion of analyticity earlier than other philosophers of analytic tradition. In 1956 they articulated their view in famous article “In Defense of a Dogma”. In that paper they argue that Quine’s argument may demonstrate some of the shortcomings of the distinction, but that does not warrant its rejection. If statements have meaning, and indeed they have meaning, then it definitely makes sense to ask “What does it mean?” They raised questions about Quine’s skeptical approach to meaning. They further attempted to show that Quine’s rejection of the notion of analyticity is based on his adherence to a notion of reduction which itself is a dogma. Let us see their arguments in a greater detail.
Grice and Strawson hold that even if there is plausibility in Quine’s criticism, it does not justify the rejection of the distinction. Stating various grounds for criticizing a distinction (e.g. uselessness of it, inadequately clarified, etc.) they welcome these sorts of criticism as that paves way for further discussion and bringing clarification. But they find a fundamental deviation in Quine’s criticism as he considers the distinction as totally illusory. His use of phraseology such as ‘unempirical dogma of the empiricists’, ‘metaphysical article of faith’ exhibits extreme illusoriness of the distinction. Grice and Strawson opine that there are many accepted distinctions in philosophy which also lack clarity though they have not been declared illusory. In the end of his essay he gave a positive account of his view which does not fit in with the distinction in question. Moreover, the rejection of analytic-synthetic distinction does not remain confined in this distinction alone. A close reading of his article, and this point is also corroborated by Grice and Strawson, that it is in conflict with a number of other distinctions, which are quite long-lasting and not dubious in philosophical tradition— such as a priori and a posteriori, necessary and contingent, etc. These Oxford philosophers show that the distinction has workable or functional utility and hence rejection of it is ‘absurd’ and ‘senseless’. They write: “…if a pair of contrasting expressions are habitually and generally used in application to the same cases, where these cases do not form a closed list, this is a sufficient condition for saying that there are kinds of cases to which the expressions apply; and nothing more is needed for them to mark a distinction.”

Another interpretation of Quine’s viewpoint may be that, as Grice and Strawson say, he is not actually denying that some sort of difference indeed exist between analytic and synthetic statements, rather the user of these expressions misunderstand the nature of and reason for the difference.

In showing that the notion of cognitive synonym lacks adequate clarity, Quine held that if this is the case, we cannot use ‘X means the same as
Y’. This ultimately brought him to reject the notion of analyticity and then analytic-synthetic distinction. Grice and Strawson arguing against this view say that it is too stringent to consider it unacceptable such as ‘X and Y have the same meaning’. In our everyday language we very often use such expressions. Hence it is a sort of absurdity to hold that co-extensional terms are not synonymous. Even renunciation of this view has greater implication. It will inevitably take us to the view of giving up the notion of meaning, a task that analytic philosophers so dearly try to explore. Let us see how Quine’s view will drift us towards such an unacceptable consequence.

Denying synonymous character of co-extensional and such other terms commonly known as synonymous will lead us to hold that translation of sentences of one language into sentences of another language is meaningless and that has little believability. Write Grice and Strawson: “If talk of sentence-synonym is meaningless, then it seems that talk of sentences having a meaning at all must be meaningless too. For if it is made sense to talk of a sentence having a meaning, or meaning something, then presumably it would make sense to ask “What does it mean?” These ordinary language philosophers try to define sentence synonym as two sentences are synonymous iff “any true answer to the question “What does it mean?” asked of one of them, is a true answer to the same question, asked of the other.” They argue that if our discourse about sentence-synonym is unintelligible, then our talk about sentence meaning becomes nonsensical. And if our talk about sentences having meaning is pointless, we are led to the unacceptable view that the notion of meaning is incomprehensible and therefore be given up. This consequence is contrary to reason as in our common parlance talk about meaning make sense and life revolves on this. There is no gainsaying the fact that in our everyday discourse we understand whether two sentences have the same meaning or not. If we go by Quine’s argument, the moot question that arises here is: why should we stop here? If we follow the same rigour we need
to give up other obvious and frequently used other notions such as sense, etc., and if it is done we involve ourselves in what Grice and Strawson say ‘philosopher’s paradox’. Hence they are of the view that rather then “examining the actual use that we make of the notion of meaning the same, the philosopher measures it by some perhaps inappropriate standard (…standard of clarifiability)”\textsuperscript{20}, and as it fails to meet this inoperable standard, Quine declares it illusory.

Talking about clarity of a notion Quine uses an expression which seems to be a new one. It is ‘family-circle’. In latter Wittgenstein we have heard about family-resemblance. Almost in similar tone he clubs a number of expressions into one group which are in some way or other related and then call them family-circle, e. g. necessary, analyticity, synonymous, self-contradictory etc. If one expression of the group can be shown to have been satisfactorily explained, with the help of this expression, we can spell out other expressions of the group. Till here his claim seems to be plausible one. But going still further ahead he claims that in order to clarify one expression of the group, two conditions must be met. First, in such an explanation the explanator must not include or take help of other expressions from the family-circle. Second, this account must have the general form as an explanation e. g. in the case analyticity it requires to provide a catalogue of necessary and sufficient conditions, say, we need to state that a statement is analytic if and only if…. Grice and Strawson find these requirements insupportable. It is so such an account is hardly achievable. Again, it cannot be ‘a necessary condition of an expression’s making sense’. In most of the cases such exposition is not realizable. This led Grice and Strawson to hold that not many “people would want to say that expressions belonging to either of these groups were senseless on the ground that they have not been formally defined … except in terms of members of the same group.”\textsuperscript{21} The pitfalls of Quine’s view are that his draconian requirements are too demanding which are scarcely
attainable. Not only that his choice of expressions in the so-called family-circle of analyticity has been done without good reasons. What is more important thing, and that has been pointed by these British philosophers, is that if an expression cannot be explained in Quinean stipulated way that does not mean that they cannot be explained in other ways.

Espousing his view of holism Quine holds that it is an erroneous view to think, following reductionist approach, that individual statements—statements considered segregated from its fellows—can be confirmed or disconfirmed. He firmly declares that a particular experience or a collection of experiences cannot be decided definitively as true or false without placing them in the network of our overall attitude. Grice and Strawson go on to show that there is no apparent conflict between Quine’s holisitic principle of confirmation/disconfirmation and still retain the notion of sentence synonym as valid. For them, Quine’s view is in harmony with and even an enhanced account of statement-synonym which follow the same spirit. They say it is enough to show “that two statements are synonymous if and only if any experiences which, on certain assumptions about the truth-values of other statements, confirm or disconfirm one of the pair, also, on the same assumptions, confirm or disconfirm the other to the same degree.”

Moreover, let us recall the view of Quine where he held that no statements are immune to revision. Pointing out our misconception to the view that some statements remain true irrespective of new light gained or new discovery Quine opined that it is in principle possible to maintain that any particular statement, whatsoever category it might belong, is open to revision. About this Grice and Strawson point out they are at on with Quine. However, revision of synthetic and analytic statements take different routes — in the former case they can be amended by confessing falsity of former view and in the latter case they could be corrected by ‘changing or dropping a concept or set of concepts.’ This proves that distinction between these two sorts of
statement—analytic and synthetic—has not been unreal or illusory as Quine wanted to prove. We can well say that even after admitting review we can differentiate between those statements where revision occurs as a shift of opinion only regarding matters of fact and the statements where this is ensued following a shift in the sense of the words. Thus the distinction is retained and has been accommodated within Quinean orbit. Summarizing their viewpoint, these philosophers say that conceptual revision (which they reformulate as “the same form of words, taken in one way (or bearing one sense), may express something true, and taken in another way (or bearing another sense), may express something false”) can come to aid to save the distinction between analytic statement and synthetic statement notwithstanding somebody’s adherence to revisibility-in-principle.

Thus we find from the penetrative analysis and stout defence put up these two British philosophers quite reasonable. The long article of Quine and his variegated approach was not successful to dismiss the distinction that has been accepted in philosophy for a long time. What is more interesting it appears that the distinction contains sufficient adaptability or flexibility to fit in views which are not typically Kantian rather anti-Kantian. If we consider Quine as a member of the latter group, Grice’s argument that the distinction in question and constant revisibility can also dovetail amply proves our claim. The discussion that was triggered off by Quine’s view about the distinction actually paved way for bringing more clarity to the distinction and the amazing resilience it had shown in almost last near about six decades is indeed spectacular.

Carnap’s stance

Quine had close contact with members of the logical positivists and reading of his essay “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” gives us the impression that he drew heavily from Rudolf Carnap’s view. But Carnap could not agree
with Quine’s view on analyticity and he prepared a reply of it though it was published after a lapse of considerable time (in 1990). In the section 4 of his essay Quine examines the statement “Everything Green is extended” and after examination he concludes that we cannot decide whether the statement is analytic or not. This indecision is not due to our incomplete understanding of the terms ‘green’ and ‘extended’. The uncertainty is due to vagueness in the notion of ‘analyticity’. Refuting this argument Carnap says that “the difficulty here lies in the unclarity of the word ‘green’, namely in an indecision over whether one should use the word for something unextended, i.e. for a single space-time point. In daily life it is never so used, and one scarcely ever speaks of space-time points.”

Having understood that most of the Quine’s argument obtains plausibility when attempts are made to define analyticity in natural language, Carnap attempts to define analyticity in artificial language framework. In such an artificial language we need to simplify the issue by defining ‘green’ (or some synonymous term of it). Once it is accomplished, the difficulty no longer exists. This argument and also other arguments advanced by Carnap make me feel that Carnap is determined to retain the notion of analyticity in the realm of artificial language and Quine is intent on refuting it in the domain of ordinary language. Moreover, we get the impression that these two contemporary philosophers were at loggerheads about the very need of this notion (i.e. analyticity) in philosophical discourse. Whereas this prominent member of the Vienna Circle, being empiricist, held that though all knowledge in the ultimate analysis is founded on experience, he was not ready to hold that logical and mathematical propositions were also of the same type. They had a different footing. Quine, on the other hand, espoused an extreme empirical position by holding that all knowledge, including propositions of logic and mathematics, are empirical. Hence he could claim that no statement was immune to revision.
Hillary Putnam’s position

Hillary Putnam, who is regarded as a major figure of analytic philosophy of United States of America of the second half of the last century, analysing Quine’s argument in his “Two Dogmas” Revisited attempts to show that Quine is actually attacking two separate notions in his essay. These two notions are: analyticity and apriority. Attack of one notion entails an attack on other notion. We have seen before that Quine’s criticism of the notion of analyticity centered around the view that it involves circularity and vagueness. These become evident when we try to understand the concept analytically. About the former problem Putnam holds that the argument of Quine is not sound. About invoking the notion of synonym for understanding analyticity Putnam argues that it is linguistically useful notwithstanding the fact that we may not have clear definition of it. Quine also held that fallibilism spreads over every branch of knowledge without exception (as he says nothing is immune to revision). This view has the implication that even the laws of logic which have so far thought to be a priori are not a priori. Hence we need to remain prepared to consider new ideas such as revising logical laws if it is called for in scientific pursuit. On this point Putnam seems to deny there is a priori truth in the sense held before, but he also admits that contextual apriority can be proven to exist. Even holding this view implies that there is distinction between a priori and a posteriori which he seems to deny. Contextual a priority means that there is a category of statements which possess a type of a priority before the invention of the new theory which supersedes them. Logical laws enjoy this status. Thus the view Putnam advances criss-crosses with Quine’s view. Though he (i. e. Putnam) does not accept the notion of traditional a priority (as he accepts only contextual apriority), nevertheless he says that there are analytic truths. Interestingly, he hypothesizes that these analytic truths are revisable. He justifies this empiricist view by holding that ‘the logic of the world may be different from what we
suppose it to be.’ Putnam’s analytic truths are not standard or long-established *a priori* truths. Thus he agrees with Quine that nothing is true only by dint of meaning. About revisibility also these two Harvard philosophers were at one.

**Saul Kripke’s scrutiny**

Saul Kripke, well-known for his exceptional brilliance and flair in philosophy, gave some view on the above issue which analysed and separated some threads of the concept of analytic, *a priori, a posteriori* and necessity which are very illuminating. His view is mainly found in his celebrated work *Naming and Necessity*, a compilation of three lectures delivered at Princeton University in 1970. Whereas Kant combined certain concepts such as *a priority* and necessity, *a posteriority* and contingency, analyticity and apriority, Kripke seems to have separated them and showed that they can be recombined in a different way. In addition to that this book contains critique of descriptivists’ theory of naming and espousal of rigid designator theory. He makes a plea for non-linguistic and non-epistemic idea of necessity. He also advances the notion of *de re* necessity which posed a shield against Quine’s onslaught to the necessity and analyticity (the way these notions have been explained by the positivist group of philosophers). Kripkean necessity is not necessarily *a priori*. He showed that necessity can be conferred on *a posteriori* knowledge as well. Once this argument is successfully carried through, it is an easy step to show that this view is compatible with Quine’s holism. At the same time it can also be shown that therein lies an important difference between contingent and necessary truth.

We have seen that Kripke advanced a view of proper name which he called ‘rigid designator’. Of course his notion of proper name is not Russell’s logically proper name, it is his ordinary proper name which is susceptible to descriptions. In calling a proper name rigid designator he wanted to show that proper names refer to the same object in all possible worlds. About the origin
and dissemination of a name he gave another theory which is known as causal historical theory. This theory expounds the process of origin of a name right from baptism and ways of its circulation. But his theory does not end here. It has greater implications. One such implication is that the notion of necessity which was inseparably related with *a priori* has been disentangled and thus now Kripke shows that necessary *a posteriori* knowledge is possible. Before him usually philosophers considered this category of knowledge is an empty category. But Kripke could show that as proper name contains necessity (as necessarily they designate same object in all possible worlds) and also its knowledge we obtain through *a posteriori* means, the combination of necessary *a posteriori* knowledge is clearly possible. Hence he refuses to use *‘a priori’* and *‘necessity’* interchangeably as it would then apply that there is a relation of identity between them. For him, the idea of *‘a prioricity’* is an epistemic idea and hence Kant defined it as that knowledge which is not dependent on sense-experience. With this Kripke traces a modal notion latent in the characterization of *a priori* knowledge. It is *‘can’* as *a priori* is sometimes interpreted as something that *can* be known independently of sense-experience. This *‘can’* in turn imply that it is *possible* to have this knowledge in the aforesaid way. And some “philosophers somehow change the modality in this characterization from *can* to *must*. They think that if something belongs to the realm of *a priori* knowledge, it could not possibly be known empirically”\(^{24}\). And it is here that Kripke records his dissent. Citing an example of knowledge gained through computing machine he shows that it is an obvious mistake to jump from *‘can be known *a priori’* to *‘must be known *a priori’*. Many philosophers fell prey to this conviction.

Analyzing the notion of necessity Kripke shows that it has been used in epistemological way as well as physical way (which includes physical and logical necessity). Kripke’s interest in necessity is in metaphysical sense. This sort of necessity has nothing to do with ‘anyone’s knowledge of anything’.
Even if it can be shown that both these concepts are vague, still in taking about these two concepts we answer to two different domains—one is epistemological and the other one is metaphysical. Again arguing against co-extensionality of these two terms (necessity and *a prioricity*) Kripke shows that there are necessary *a posteriori* truths. He writes: “The terms ‘necessary’ and ‘*a priori*’ … as applied to statements are not obvious synonyms. There may be a philosophical argument connecting them, perhaps even identifying them; but an argument is required, not simply the observation that the two terms are clearly interchangeable.”\(^{25}\)

In short Kripke teased apart these two conflated concepts—*a priori* and necessity—as they apply to unassociated things. In saying *a priori* an epistemic adverb he meant that it tells us a way of knowing something and works as a kind of justification that the knower has and can put forward. On the other hand necessity of a proposition does not depend upon the knower. Taking the example of mathematical fact Kripke shows that one could know it because it has been shown to be true by a computer. This mathematical fact would not be *a priori* even though it is a mathematical knowledge. But this mathematical truth, like other mathematical truth, will be necessary. Kripke is not denying any connection between two concepts in question. His intent is to show that they are different notions and we need to adduce arguments in order to prove their connection, if they have any tie.

Invoking the distinction between *de dicto* (‘about what is said’) and *de re* (‘about the thing’) necessity Kripke showed that the latter is a belief in modality whereas the former is a sheer advocacy of necessity. Then he said it is ‘a *statement* or a *state of affairs* that can be either necessary or contingent! Whether a particular necessarily or contingently has a certain property depends on the way it’s described.”\(^{26}\)
Another important idea he advanced in his book is that if something can be known *a priori* it does not imply that it cannot be known *a posteriori*. He goes on to argue, contrary to traditional belief, that some necessary propositions can be known *a posteriori*. This is another effort to extricate necessity from *a prioricity*. In the traditional view that necessary propositions are *a priori* he finds a fusion of the concepts of necessity and analyticity. Digging deep into the issue he showed that without much reflection philosophers have presumed that all necessary propositions are *a priori* as they considered analytic propositions as both *a priori* and necessary. Kripke considered this presumption as mistaken. Citing instances of identity statements he holds that whereas statement such as “Venus is Venus” is knowable *a priori* but the statement “The Morning Star is the Evening Star” is not so knowable. Mere reflection cannot tell us about the veracity of the latter statements. In actuality before its discovery by astronomical observation long ago by the Babylonians, it was not known. It only demonstrates that this source of this knowledge is *a posteriori*, not *a priori*. In spite of this it contains necessity as it is impossible to imagine the opposite. In order to show that we have necessary *a posteriori* statements which are of material origin he gives the instances such as “This table is made of (a particular piece of) wood” and “Water is H₂O” which is an instance of natural-kind essence. In order to show the viability of contingent *a priori* he defines the meter bar as ‘stick S at time t₀’. Metaphysical status of this statement is obviously contingent as we can conceive a counterfactual situation where stick could have been longer or smaller than the present ‘meter’. Moreover, it need not be same in all other alternative worlds. But looked from epistemic angle ‘meter’ is a rigid designator which by way of certain descriptors rigidly designate ‘stick S at time t₀’. It is known *a priori* as we do not learn it but only introduce it and hence known without investigation.
Kripke’s view seems to have disentangled different threads that his predecessors conflated into one. For example, he showed that modal status and epistemic status of a claim are distinct. The notion of necessity has also been extricated from a prioricity. Introduction of contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori was definitely an achievement in the arena of thought. Extrication of threads and determination of metaphysical status (of necessary and contingent truths), semantical status (such as determining truth value of analytic and synthetic statements by virtue of meaning) and epistemological status (i. e. knowability of a priori and a posteriori knowledge by reflection and observation) were definitely an improvement in the domain of analysis. With ingenuity Kripke asserted that sheer fact of learning something from experience does not establish that what we have learnt that cannot be necessarily true. With arguments he showed that a claim can be empirical as well as necessary at the same time. This sort of necessity is metaphysical and not logical. Hence he claims the possibility of necessary a posteriori truths. As we have seen he took the help of Frege’s puzzle of morning star and evening star in order to showcase his view. Similarly contingent a priori propositions could turn out to be false though its truth is knowable a priori.

Åsa Maria WIKFORSS in her “An a Posteriori Conception of Analyticity” holds that this new notion of necessity (i. e. Kripke’s a posteriori necessity) has suppleness as it can fit within Quine’s framework of philosophy. She writes that this notion of necessity does not “seem to be at odds with Quine’s holistic picture of belief revision and his skepticism about the a priori… it suddenly appeared possible to agree with everything Quine says about the positivists conception of analyticity, and yet hold on to the idea that there is an important distinction between contingent and necessary truths.”  But this attempt invites a further question. Now that necessity has been extricated from its epistemic bond which in turn led to the conclusion that necessary truths are not necessarily a priori, can it steer us to the view that
that all analytic statements are not \textit{a priori}. Wikforss, taking a clue from Hillary Putnam who argued that Quine confused analyticity with \textit{a prioricity} on account of positivists’ interpretations, maintained that the notion of analyticity \textit{per se} is not epistemic. There might have a long history of the association of these two ideas—analyticity and \textit{a prioricity}—but this connection may be an ‘historical accident’. Paul Boghossian says that even if analyticity can be construed as an epistemic notion yet this construal is neutral to it’s \textit{a prioricity}, i. e. it does not guarantee that it is knowable \textit{a priori}. He shows the views of externalists in support of this view.\textsuperscript{28} Tyler Burge, a distinguished contemporary philosopher of America, argued that even supporting the Quine’s rejection of the notion of analyticity and his (i. e. Quine’s) epistemic holism we can accommodate the idea that there are truths which are true by virtue of meaning and that they perform an important role in the realm of philosophy. This compatibility he shows by exhibiting that truths of meaning are contingent on facts of the external world and hence are \textit{a posteriori}.

\textbf{Concluding remarks}

Thus we find that the concept of analyticity or distinction between analytic and synthetic statements that Kant formulated in his \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} was a landmark distinction in the history of philosophy. Subsequent philosophers took this distinction as valid and no major challenge was thrown to Kant’s view for a long time. It is Quine who posed a real challenge to this notion as well to this distinction. The discussion that Quine’s view sparked off is still going on. It is sometimes held that Quine’s main target was logical positivists in general and Rudolf Carnap in particular. But a dipper analysis can show that Kant was also aimed in his attack as Quine’s view (negative as well as positive) was really a challenge to an idea of philosophy as an \textit{a priori} discipline that Kant advocated in his long journey of philosophical enterprise. In spite of this Quine did a historic task by articulating his view with so much
rigour that it resulted in thorough scrutiny of the notion. During this scrutiny many more new concepts came to forefront, discussed and examined. It is indeed a momentous task that subsequent philosophers have performed. It is expected that the clarity that we have achieved out of this sustained discussion will go a long way to come out of traditional bonds/associations. Kant actually was harbinger of such efforts. He did this task by not conforming to his predecessors view and admitting a new combination that *a priori* judgements can also be validly combined with their synthetic counterpart. Who is right—Kant or Quine? Time has not arrived to give a conclusive answer to this question (and Quine himself said no belief is immune to revision), but we cannot deny Kant’s contribution, as whether we refute him or strive to defend him, it is he (i.e. Kant) who is at the centerstage of discussion.

Right from the beginning our focal point was to show how Kant made it known to his readers, in his all the three *Critiques*, the possibility of blending of synthetic judgements with *a priori* knowledge. We have discussed in separate chapters his efforts made towards this direction in different spheres of knowledge. One moot question about his efforts is that whether synthetic *a priori* knowledge, the existence of which he spotted, in his three *Critiques* are of the same nature or is their variation in nature? Kant though explicitly did not address this issue, a minute study of his *Critiques* gives us some clue to provide an answer to this debate. There are arguments which can apparently show that nature of synthetic *a priori* judgements in different *Critiques* is different. Arguments to the contrary can also be given. Let us take a look of this issue.

In the immediate previous passage we talked about different spheres of knowledge where Kant claimed to have noticed the presence of synthetic *a priori* knowledge. In the first *Critique* where the German philosopher is preoccupied with theoretical knowledge, his newfound variety of judgement (i.e. synthetic *a priori* judgement) is a class apart from their usual previous
combinations— analytic *a priori* judgements and synthetic *a posteriori* judgements. In this new synthesis we find two distinct labels (‘synthetic’ and ‘*a priori*’) that Kant has given to this new sort of experience. His definition of these expressions are primarily negative (as when he says that a judgement is synthetic when its negation does not involve contradiction and it is *a priori* when it is not logically dependent on sense-experience). At the same time we may need to bear it in mind that the meaning of two combined expression may not always be summation of expressions combined. Kant’s ‘synthetic *a priori*’ knowledge instantiates our claim. Out of the combination of these two expressions Kant imparted it a sense which we may call its technical sense. In the 1st *Critique* its technical sense is: canons that articulate the conditions of the possibility of theoretical experience. For Kant, if human experience is to take place, and it is a matter of fact that it does take place, it must comply with certain conditions. If these conditions are not accepted then we are led to a conclusion akin to Hume’s philosophy or, to be more precise, his type of skepticism. Kant’s predecessors failed to discern this. Citing the instance of principle of causation—every event must have a cause—Kant shows that without presuming it to be true we cannot obtain any theoretical experience. In this sense Kant’s synthetic *a priori* knowledge of the 1st *Critique* acquires a technical sense. They state certain prerequisites for making possibility of our experience in spatio-temporal world. Recognition of this truth was a breakthrough in knowledge acquisition process.

Synthetic *a priori* knowledge of the 2nd Critique deals with supreme principle of morality what Kant called Categorical Imperative. Calling his ethics pure ethics Kant seems to say that his supreme principle has no spatio-temporal concern. If it is so, then the synthetic *a priori* principle of the 2nd *Critique* does not seem to stipulate conditions for the possibility of moral experience. But this is only one side of the issue. Kant does not claim that here synthetic *a priori* principle is constitutive. He clearly says that it plays a
combinations— analytic *a priori* judgements and synthetic *a posteriori* judgements. In this new synthesis we find two distinct labels (‘synthetic’ and ‘*a priori*’) that Kant has given to this new sort of experience. His definition of these expressions are primarily negative (as when he says that a judgement is synthetic when its negation does not involve contradiction and it is *a priori* when it is not logically dependent on sense-experience). At the same time we may need to bear it in mind that the meaning of two combined expression may not always be summation of expressions combined. Kant’s ‘synthetic *a priori*’ knowledge instantiates our claim. Out of the combination of these two expressions Kant imparted it a sense which we may call its technical sense. In the 1st *Critique* its technical sense is: canons that articulate the conditions of the possibility of theoretical experience. For Kant, if human experience is to take place, and it is a matter of fact that it does take place, it must comply with certain conditions. If these conditions are not accepted then we are led to a conclusion akin to Hume’s philosophy or, to be more precise, his type of skepticism. Kant’s predecessors failed to discern this. Citing the instance of principle of causation—every event must have a cause—Kant shows that without presuming it to be true we cannot obtain any theoretical experience. In this sense Kant’s synthetic *a priori* knowledge of the 1st *Critique* acquires a technical sense. They state certain prerequisites for making possibility of our experience in spatio-temporal world. Recognition of this truth was a breakthrough in knowledge acquisition process.

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regulative role. Hence, synthetic a priori principle here provides conditions for the determination of ‘what we ought to do’. Therefore, it furnishes a necessary requirement for the determination of our obligation/duty.

The above view cannot be sustained when we find that Kant’s supreme principle instead of expressing conditions for determining what we ought to do actually says what we not to do: e.g. we should not do those actions whose maxims cannot be universalized. This negative formulation does not tell us (positively) what we should do. If it is so, i.e. if it fails to provide us a positive criterion, can then we say that Kant’s supreme principle furnishes us with conditions for determining what we ought to do. This forces us to opine that Kant’s synthetic a priori judgement in the realm of moral experience is a test to determine what is impermissible and herein lies a difference with synthetic a priori knowledge of the 1st Critique.

The 3rd Critique deals with synthetic a priori knowledge in the realm of reflective judgement. Prima facie we get the impression that sense in which Kant employ the expression ‘synthetic a priori’ in the third Critique is different from the senses of the previous two Critiques. A judgement of test is neither a theoretical or practical cognitive judgement. In this reflective realm the evaluator is not using any determinate concept. Aesthetic judgement being subjective experience cannot state something as objective condition. This gives us a feeling that sense of synthetic a priori in the realm of test is different from other two domains.

In spite of above minute differences in natures of synthetic a priori knowledge in three Critiques, there are some similarities too. Otherwise Kant’s critical project will fall apart. All these judgements (i.e. judgements of different domains as discussed in three separate Critiques) share certain common characteristics: they are necessary, contains universality and synthetic (synthetic in the sense defined in 1st Critique). In spite of having
necessity and universality as their characteristics, they can be denied without involving contradiction. Again we find some crisscrossing relations in these three domains’ judgements. Universality and necessity found in the synthetic a priori judgement of the 1st Critique have objective validity. Interestingly though synthetic a priori knowledge of the 2nd Critique has objective validity though this objective validity here differs from the 1st Critique’s objective validity. Judgements of test is not claimed by Kant as objectively valid. The universality and necessity of the 1st and 2nd Critique have logical overtone, but aesthetic judgements’ universality and necessity do not have this logical undercurrent. It is universal and necessary as it extends this predicate ‘over the whole sphere of judging subject.’ Thus synthetic a priori knowledge somewhere is constitutive (say in the 1st Critique), somewhere regulative (say, in later two Critiques) (though in the 2nd Critique it is in the form of determination of what is impermissible, in the 3rd Critique it is in the sense of systematic investigation of our aesthetic experiences).

References:

3 Ibid., p. 106.
4 Ibid., p.106.
5 Ibid., 105.
6 Ibid., 77.
7 Ibid., p. 22.
8 Ibid., p. 22.
9 Ibid., pp. 111-12.
11 Ibid., p. 199.
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13 Ibid, p. 199.
16 Critique of Pure Reason. (Norman Kemp Smith’s translation), Palgrave macmillan, 2007, p. 49.
18 Ibid., p. 344.
19 Loc cit.
20 Loc cit.
21 Ibid, p. 345.
22 Ibid., p. 351.
25 Ibid., p. 38.
26 Ibid., p. 40.
27 WIKFORSS, Åsa Maria: “An a Posteriori Conception of Analyticity” (available in Hans-Johann Glock et al edited Fifty Years of Quine’s “Two Dogmas”, Rodopi, pp. 120).
28 He held this view in his ‘Epistemic Analyticity: a Defense’ (available in Hans-Johann Glock et al edited Fifty Years of Quine’s “Two Dogmas”, Rodopi, pp. 15-35).