

General Introduction

Historical preliminaries of Referential Theory

During the first half of 20th century, philosophy took a linguistic revolution or turn where metaphysical assertions based on speculation were questioned with regard to referential perspective. It was claimed that speculative metaphysical doctrines or assertions were created out of misinterpretation of language. The main contention of linguistic revolution is to overcome the slums of language first and then to establish the relationship between language and reality or ontology. The relationship between language and reality is made possible through the referential function of language. Even though there are various functions of language on the basis of which one may come to know about the relationship between language and reality. Having said this, referential theory is the most important one through which the relationship between language and reality can adequately be justified. Alternatively, it can be said that to hold the relationship between language and reality, one has to focus much on the referential function or theory of language. There is no question of doubt that language does refer. It has been accepted without begging question. However, the most important point is that whether the reference of language does foothold on reality or not. What we intend to say here is that the referential aspect is *sui-gensis* of language when we do involve to show the relationship between language and reality.

Language thus appeared as a philosophical method and it had been accepted that clarification of language is all about of philosophy. It states that philosophy is all about of the analysis or clarification of language and all traditional philosophical problems were engendered due to the misapprehension or misinterpretation of language. As a result of that philosophers began to

examine the connection between language and thought by exploring how meaning is being created and how language as such shapes out thoughts. Thus, it seems to us that philosophy of language takes an attempt to understand the nature of language and its relationship with the world through communication or through speech acts of different sorts. In this regard, the most important question is to know about the *problem of meaning*. The problem of meaning can be extracted by way of illumination the questions, such as, what is language? What are the purposes of language? How do we understand each other? Thus, the problem of meaning is associated with the *functional aspect of language*. The function of language is multifarious in nature. It has been reflected from Plato onwards. Plato in his *Republic*¹ has shown considerable interest about language and its relationship with the world. One can explore the relevance of language in Descartes as well. Descartes, the founding father of modern philosophy, believed in the existence of universal language for the use of human communities and it was reflected in Chomsky's mentalistic approach. Noam Chomsky, the leading proponent of mentalist, appeared as a precursor of the theory of the innateness of linguistic abilities. In fact, Chomsky revived and reestablished the innate idea of Descartes in a new way. That is why, some would say that Chomsky's innatism may be attributed as New Innatism and Descartes innatism has been attributed as Old Innatism.

The relevance of language was a talking point in Hobbes and Locke as well. Both Hobbes and Locke were interested about the relationship between language and thought or ideas. Hobbes goes on to say that a man in the real sense of the term is the seeker of truth and man finds truth in

¹ Plato, *Theaetetus* in Plato, 1961.

every name he uses. Locke asserted that every word is the sensible mark of ideas. “The use of words” Locke says, “stands as outward Marks of our internal Ideas.”²

What then is a theory of reference?

Language does refer. There is no question of doubt. But what does language refer and what is the locus of reference is itself a debatable issue. A theory of reference is primarily concerned with the question: how do words refer? This question admits different interpretations. Various linguistic philosophers over the course of history have developed various interpretations of reference. When we speak of the theory of reference, we are primarily concerned with proper names because according to the semanticists, the vocabulary of ideal language is proper names. Thus, when we are talking of reference, we are saying the semantic property of names. The semantic property of name is based on the perception that every proper name refers to an object. Russell classifies two different types of proper names, such as, *logical proper name* and *ordinary proper name*. He then says that a logical proper name is a genuine proper name and an ordinary proper name is nothing but *a disguised description*. Thus, for Russell, a logical proper name, being a genuine proper name, refers to an object with which we are directly acquainted. In fact, Russell developed the theory of reference as the paradigm of semantics. According to Russell, the problem of meaning can be solved with regard to the reference of the sentence. A sentence is to be meaningful if it refers something other than the sentence itself and there must be a referential connection between the sentence and what it refers to. That means, the referential connection constitutes the meaning of the sentence. We think that the referential theory of meaning is based on *linguistic realism or language realism* where it has been admitted that there are independent objects in the world apart from languages. It is further observed that referential

² See Locke, 1975, II, 11, 9.

theory of meaning is an externalist theory where language refers something externally other than the language itself.

Mill in his book *A System of Logic* also asserted the concept of proper name with regard to reference. According to Mill, a proper name which is singular must refer to an object. Wittgenstein also admits name and by a name he means to say that it (a name) denotes an object. For Wittgenstein a name denotes an object and the meaning of the name is the meaning of the object. Frege in his article "Sense and Reference" also develops the concept of reference of proper names. Kripke in his book *Naming and Necessity* introduces the concept of proper name with regard to rigid designator. According to Kripke, a proper name is a rigid designator because a proper name designates (refers) to an object and not only an object but the same object in every possible world of an actual world. Thus, even though we examine various approaches of the theory of reference, but what we can say at this point of time is that the concept of reference is the foundation of semantic theory because semantic theory addresses the problem of meaning with regard to the concept of truth that has been established by the referential content of proper name or sentence or proposition constructed with the help of singular terms or proper names.

The question then naturally arises: how do names refer? We have a mechanism at our hands that every name connects to an object. It is said that to be a name it to be a name of an object. Even Frege's theory of *sense and reference* is an account that offers a mechanism in which a name stands for an object. It has become a standard view that Frege held that names represent object descriptively. In this sense we can say that Frege develops *the descriptive theory of names*. Here Frege differs from Russell. For Russell, proper names are truncated descriptions though he did not hold it as part of theory of sense. A descriptive theory of name says that a name is equivalent to a description or set of description. Thus, Russell's version of the object theory of reference is

different because Russell held that a name stands for the object which is its bearer. We think that Russell's object theory of reference or alternatively known as *no-sense theory of reference* is compatible with the idea that such theory is associated with a thing as a rational power of name. It is also compatible with the ideal that the rational power of a name for a subject consists in the subject's possession information. That means, a name being a singular term, must possess the subject position of a *subject- predicate* sentence and it simply stands for its object. Thus, a name being a rational power for a subject is the object itself.

It seems that Russellian theory of reference must be set against the background of his epistemology. Russell believed that the object theory was correct because it only applied to genuine singular terms. A genuine singular term is one that would satisfy the *principle of acquaintance*. The only genuine singular term were the demonstratives pronouns, such as, 'this', 'that', 'it', etc.

Types of Reference

From one perspective, reference may be classified as *singular reference and non- singular reference*. Unlike non-singular reference, singular reference is associated with reference to one single particular object as distinct from all others. From semantics perspective, singular reference is more fundamental than non-singular reference. Russell's principle of acquaintance is a glaring example of singular reference. According to Pranab Sen, even though singular reference is not the most fundamental mode of reference, "it is one of its most fundamental models."³ There is a well-defined class of expressions what may be called *singular terms* and anyone who uses such an expression make singular reference. Thus, every singular term has singular reference. The

³. Sen, P.K., *Reference and Truth*, Allied Publishers Ltd., 1991, p.17

class of singular terms contains proper names ('John', 'Socratics', 'London'), definite descriptions (' the author of Waverley', 'the present king of France', 'the point of intersection of the lines a and b'), singular pronouns ('he' 'she' 'it'), demonstratives ('this', 'that',) indefinite descriptions in some of their uses (' a man has given me the information'), and besides these more familiar items, such as, variables ('x', 'y', 'z'), of an associates with pronouns, as in Quine), sentences (treated as proper names of truth-values by Frege), and 'that' – clauses ('that $2+2=4$ ' as a name or designation of the proposition expressed by the sentence ' $2+2=4$ ')

Some philosophers have maintained that definite descriptions are referring expressions and that they can be used to make singular reference. Accordingly, it can be said that the expression of the form 'the-so and-so' constitutes one among different kinds of expression which can be used for the purpose of singular reference. In this regard we can refer Mill who says singular terms fall into two kinds: those which are *connotative* and those which are *non-connotative*. Connotative singular terms are called definite descriptions and non-connotative singular terms are called proper names. Thus, a proper name is a singular term which is non-connotative.

Gotlob Frege's view of definite descriptions belongs fundamentally to the same kind. According to Frege, definite descriptions with proper names like 'John', 'Bill', have both sense and reference, and their reference is determined by their senses. Frege's sense may be identified with Mill's connotation and Frege's reference may be identified with Mill's denotation. Besides, Frege explicitly identified a property with a concept being the reference of a predicate, belongs to the realm of reference. Following Dummett, we can say that the realm of reference as well as

the realm of sense is exclusive of each other. The reference of the predicate is a concept for Frege, but the denotation of the predicate, for Mill, is “any object of which it is true.”⁴

Some contemporary philosophers of language, namely, Leonord Linsky, distinguished two uses of definite descriptions, *an attributive use* and *a referential use*. In case of *an attributive use*, the reference of the definite descriptions is wholly determined by the condition it embodies; whereas in the case of a referential use it is not. For example, when we say, ‘Smith’s murderer is insane’, Smith’s murderer here *refers to* a particular individual *if and only if* the individual satisfies the condition expressed in the open sentence ‘x murdered Smith’s.’ But the same sentence ‘Smith’s murderer is insane’ can be used in a different way under different circumstances. Suppose, that an individual is accused of Smith’s murder and is put on trial, during which he behaves in a most abnormal way. Referring to this man, we may say, ‘Smith’s murderer is insane’. Here we intend to refer to a particular individual who is accused of Smith’s murder and our success in referring in this particular case does not depend upon the individual’s satisfying the conditions ‘x murder Smith’s.’ It is perhaps being the case that here the accused did not murder Smith’s and it may be possible that some one unknown did it. But we succeeded in referring to the man we want to refer to, the man- under tiple, and the person to whom we make this remark understands who we are referring to. In the above case, the first use of ‘Smith’s murderer’ is the *attributive use* and second use of the same is *referential use*.

We think that unlike description, a proper name does not depend on any associated condition for achieving reference. It is related directly to its objects. Following Wittgenstein, we can say that to be a name is to be name of an object. In this regard Wittgenstein says, “A name means an

⁴ . Ibid, p.20

object. The object is its meaning.”⁵ So either a name refers to the particular object or it does not refer at all. This view of proper name has been challenged by Frege and his followers. Frege holds that like a definite description, a proper name also has a sense and it refers to the object because of the sense which it has. This position of Frege has been challenged by both Mill and Kripke.⁶ Frege holds the view that the reference of a proper name was determined by its sense. The sense of an expression *is the mode of presentation* of the object which is its reference.

Non- Singular Reference

There is a strong philosophical perception within philosophy of language that all reference is singular and many would say that there is *no non-singular reference*. It is only a singular term which does nothing but refer. All non-singular, general terms really describe. Since they have a descriptive content, they can have a descriptive function only. The kind of reference which a singular term is capable of making is singular. Therefore, the only kind of reference that is possible is the singular reference. The tradition which acknowledges singular reference as the only kind of reference possible can perhaps be located to Frege. Although both the subject and the predicate in *a triple subject-predicate statement* are, according to Frege, referring expressions, both of them refer to just one thing, the subject to an object and the predicate to a concept and thus the reference is singular in either case. The singular reference of the subject *is object* and the singular reference of the predicate *is concept*. Thus, Frege did not believe, while Russell did, that the presence of some descriptive content would necessarily disqualify an expression as referring. Besides, Frege did not believe that this would render the reference non-

⁵ . Wittgenstein, L. *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*. Translated by Pears, D.F., and B.F. McGuinness. London, New Year, 1974, p.12.

⁶ . See Kripke, Saul, “Identity and Necessity”, in *Identity and Individualism*, edited by Milton. K. Munitz, New York. University Press, New York, 1971.

singular. Instead, Frege believed that reference itself is possible only because of the presence of these so-called descriptive contents. For Frege, there cannot be any reference without sense. Having said that, both Frege and Russell have maintained and shared that reference is always singular. Thus, it is generally accepted that *all reference is singular*.

This does not, however, make sense to say that non-singular reference is not possible. Non-singular reference is also possible. Russell did commit a mistake by ignoring the possibility of non-singular reference. His mistake is associated with his supposition that there is no difference between having a descriptive *content* and having a descriptive *function*. Russell admits that definite description having some descriptive content has no referring function. Since it has no referring function, it can never be used for the purpose of referring. Frege was also wrong for different kind of reason. Frege did not realize that there is a very important way in which the presence of a descriptive content can destroy the singularity of reference.

To establish the issue that non-singular terms do have reference, we have to refer Donnellan's distinction between *purely referential and attributive uses of definite description*. Russell was wrong to denying that a definite description can ever have any referential use. Since a definite description is, after all, a singular term associated with the definite article 'the', any reference is made by definite description can be singular. In such a case, we have to keep in mind Donnellan's distinctions between the purely referential and attributive uses of a definite description. If the use to which the definite description is put is purely referential, the reference which is made by it is singular. On the other hand, if the use to which it is put is attributive the reference is in very important sense general.

We think that when a definite description is put to an attributive use, no reference is made with it. Thus, in a sense it may be assumed that Donnellan's distinction between referential and attributive use is very much the same as the distinction between referential and non-referential uses. Alternatively, it can be said after Donnellan, that what is referential is meant purely referential having no other function than that of referring. While the use which he calls attributive is not purely referential because he does not have the function of referring alone but has some other function as well. Thus, in a sense Donnellan's distinction is actually directed to two kinds of referential uses—one is purely referential use and the other is not. Purely referential uses of Donnellan's may be termed as *strong referential theory of uses* and attributive uses of referential theory may be termed as *weak referential theory of uses*.⁷

The essential feature of referential use, according to Donnellan, is that a referential use tolerates inappropriateness of the description. In Donnellan's example the description 'Smith's murderer' may be inappropriate for the man accused of Smith's murder, and now standing in the dock—he may be quite innocent of the crime—but we still can manage to refer to him by using it in the utterance 'Smith's murderer is insane.' Secondly this use relates only to what the speaker has in his mind. Thirdly, a purely referential use is always what we want to call 'sighted' as opposed to 'blind.' This means that the speaker knows who he is referring to by his description. Fourthly, this use of definite description is that the choice of the definite description is not essential for what is said. It is not essential for reference to go through. Here the speaker may use some other description than the one which he chooses and yet succeed in making the reference. Closely connected with this is the essential character of the occurrence of a definite description used referentially is the fact that a definite description used in this manner can be replaced by any

⁷. See. Donnellan, Keith, "Reference and Definite Descriptions" in Stephen Schwartz (ed.), *Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1977.

other definite description having the same reference, *salva veritate*. Finally, a purely referential use of the definite description results in a *singular reference*. Here, the speaker has a particular individual in his mind, and he wants to make reference to that individual. If the circumstances are in fact favorable, he will also succeed in making his hearer pick out that particular individual as the object of the speaker's reference.

Even though the attributive use of a definite description defers from the purely referential, it is also referential in the basic sense. The basic feature of attributive use of a definite description is that it does not tolerate any inappropriateness of the description. In an attributive use of a definite description, the speaker does not necessarily have any particular individual in his mind. That means, an attributive use need not be sighted, it can well be blind. Here the choice of the particular definite description is not vacuous. Finally, an attributive use of a definite description cannot result in a *strictly reference*. However, there is an essential generality about a reference which can be made by such a use of the definite description. The definite description is used to refer, even though it is used attributively. The reference is in a very important way *general*. This generality is not to be equated with the kind generality which Russell ascribes to all statements involving definite descriptions.

Referring as Meaning

Referring is understood to mean something. That means the problem of meaning can be solved with regard to reference. In this regard, there develops the referential theory of meaning. It is to be noted here that the problem of meaning is the hallmark of analytic philosophy or philosophy of language. Theory of reference is one of the important proposals to solve the problem of meaning. According to referential theory of meaning, a sentence would be meaningful if it refers

something other than the sentence itself. There must be a referential connection between the sentence and what it refers to. Thus, in a sense, referential connection constitutes the meaning of the sentence. This clearly suggests that one can understand *referring as meaning*. Here one may attempt to capture the notion of referring by putting together Grice's definition of meaning what we characteristically *mean* when we refer. In this regard we can mention Grice's general definition of meaning. There are two versions of this. The one defines just "Speaker S means something by uttering X." The other correlates a particular proposition meant with a particular intended audience response. It may be stated like: "Speaker S meant that P is the case by uttering X=df. (EA) (S uttered X M- intending audience A to think that S thinks that P is the case." Here 'S means something by uttering X.'

Searle gives an account of referring which is explicitly linked with the notion of Grice theory of meaning. On this account, referring is "characterized by four salient features."⁸

These are as follows:

- a. The act of referring must be a part of at least a purported complete illocutionary act.
- b. The act of referring requires the existence of the object the speaker intends to be referring to.
- c. In referring, the speaker must intend to identify for his audience the object he is referring to.
- d. In referring, the speaker must intend to identify the referent for his audience by means of the audience's recognition of his intention to do this.

⁸ . Searle, S., *Speech Acts*, 1969, p.86.

Thus, the account of referring reveals a certain independence of reference from the communication of descriptive content. There are really two dimensions to this. First, the account allows reference where no part of the utterance used to refer conventionally denotes the referent. The referent eventually is determined by what one means, and one need not mean what one says. For example, I can refer ironically to the loser with 'the winner.' The second dimension emerges if we consider that what mean is what I M- intend the audience to think I think. In referring, what I thus M-intend is relational with respect to the referent. As a result of that, what I mean is relational with respect to the referent-what I mean I mean of the referents. Thus, not only is the referent not tied to the descriptive content of what I say, it also not tied to any particular description of the referent conveyed by what I mean. It is perfectly possible to refer where there is no uniquely applying description of the referent conveyed by what I mean. This, in fact, is the typical case of referring. Since my M-intention is fulfilled provided my audience has the appropriate belief of the referent, there is no requirement of overlapping between the terms in which I think of the referent and the terms in which my audience thinks of it.

Reference and Understanding

Reference and understanding is directly linked with *understanding of language* on the basis of which there developed various theories, namely, *the picture theory of meaning* of early Wittgenstein, *the use theory of meaning* of later Wittgenstein and what was going on in nineteenth century objections to *a correspondence theory of truth*. We think that the account to which understanding of language consists is being able to use it to translate it into a language one can use, is the only account in the field. While a *true-to-life* model of the global use of a language is hardly to be hoped for, an over-simplified model is contained in the work of Carnap and Reichenbach. This is model of the speaker / hearer as possessing and inductive logic, a

deductive logic, a preference ordering and a rule of action. In such an over-simplified model, speech will affect behavior in a rich variety of ways. The better the inductive logic, the better the deductive logic, the more realistic the utility function, the more the behavior of these creatures will resemble *understanding of language*. Such a model is not tied to an individualistic conception of language. Since speakers may acquire knowledge from each other, it is not necessary that each speaker who has a word, say, 'gold' in his vocabulary should be himself able to tell whether or not something is gold. As long as each speaker who has the word 'gold' in his vocabulary possesses a standard minimum amount of information about gold, he will be able to participate in collective discussion about gold. Thus, the future that we called 'the linguistic division of labor' is perfectly compatible with such a model. Finally, such an over simplified model of a speaker/ hearer is essentially *holistic*- the conditions under which any particular sentence will be uttered and the behavior that we result if any given sentence is uttered does not depend upon any isolated thing that could be called the 'sense' of the sentence.

However, if we revisit referring and understanding with regard to the nineteenth century philosophical content, we have a slightly deferent perception of it. The nineteenth century argument against the correspondence theory of truth was that one cannot think of truth as correspondence to facts because thinking of truth in this way would require one to be able to compare concepts directly with unconceptualized reality. If truth is correspondence to reality, it would seem as if knowledge of what *the correspondence is* - is presupposed by knowledge that such and such a statement stands in the relation in question to anything or does not stand in the relation in question to anything. Moreover, if understanding of the statement is equated with knowing what it is for, it to be the case that it stands or does not stand in the relation in question to appropriate entities then knowledge of what the correspondence is – is presupposed in the

understanding of every statement. If we view language understanding as the possession of a rational activity of language use- an activity involving 'language entry rules', procedures for deductive and inductive inference, and 'language exit rules', then implicit knowledge of truth conditions is not presupposed in any way by the understanding of the language. Alternatively, one does not need to know that there is a correspondence between words and an extra-linguistic entity to learn one's language. But there is such a correspondence none the less, and it explains the success of what one is doing. After one has learned one's language one can talk about anything-including the correspondence in question. Wittgenstein's view in the *Tractatus* that the correspondence in question cannot be described but only 'shown' is true in only a limited sense.

Speaker Reference and Linguistic Reference

From one perspective theory of reference may be classified as speaker reference and linguistic reference. Speaker reference is a more fundamental notion than linguistic reference. In fact, referring is ultimately not something that words do but something that speaker's use words to do. What then is speaker reference? Here one does not depend on the kind of singular term being used to refer. To refer to something is not merely to talk about it. For example, we could be talking about Chess without ever referring to it. We might refer to Anatoly Karpov and Gary Kasparov, making remarks like 'Karpov plays with an iron grip' and 'Kasparov always counter attacks when he plays the Sicilian.' Even we could be talking at great lengths about Chess but never refer to Chess itself. Thus, something can be topic of conversation without ever being referred to.

Is referring something merely lies in the mind? In this regard, it can be said that referring is not be something merely having it in mind. Even when one is using an expression that denotes it, it

does not make sense to say it is in the mind of the speaker. We think the notion of having something in mind is notoriously vague. Some philosophers have tried to conceive reference with regard to identification. For them to refer is to identify. Identifying something is nice but not necessary. One may refer something successfully without identifying it. A speaker can refer to something by means of a personal pronoun and not even attempt to provide the information needed by the hearer to determine the intended referent. Or one could use an incomplete definite description (for example, 'the visitor') or even an indefinite description (for example, 'a visitor') to refer to some specific individual without specifying which one. It may be true that referring to something requires being able to identify it, but this is not the same as actually identifying it. Moreover, successful reference requires that the hearer identify the referent, but this is not verbal identification. Besides, the hearer may be able to identify the referent without the benefit of any identification on the part of the speaker. Here the hearer actually depends on *contextually available information* rather than information provided by the speaker. However, this is not a case of the speaker identifying the referent for the hearer. A referring expression, namely, 'he' serves merely to suggest the sort of information the hearer is to look for and rely on.

Thus, owing to understand what speaker referent is more precisely, what it is for a speaker to use an expression to refer an audience to something, the point that needs to be taken care of is that *referring never occurs by itself*. Referring is always part and parcel of performing a larger, illocutionary act. One cannot just refer to something. Since referring to something is always part and parcel of performing an illocutionary act, a referential intention is simply a component of a communicative intention. Of course, not every communicative intention includes a *referential intention*. It includes one only if the attitude being expressed in the utterance has an object.

Clearly, the referential intention is the component of the communicative intention that is directed specifically at this object.

We think that the above consideration obviously points to suggest a provisional definition of referring which asserts that *to refer to something is simply to express an attitude about it*. The idea is that not every attitude is an attitude about an individual, but whatever a speaker does express such an attitude, he has a *referential intention* which is directed at that individual. For example, suppose someone asks me what I think of the writer of Gitanjali and I respond, ‘I do not like the writer of Gitanjali.’ Here, even though I would be expressing an attitude about the writer of Gitanjali, I would not be referring to the writer of Gitanjali. Our definition of referring should require that the utterance contains a singular that is being used specifically to indicate the object of the attitude being expressed. Accordingly, we can say that “to refer to something is to use a singular term with the intention of indicating to one’s audience the object of the attitude one is expressing.”⁹

Thus, while defining reference, we have a four-place relation between speaker, expression, audience, and the object. Thus, in speaker reference we have four-place relation whereas in the case of linguistic we have a two-place relation between expression and object. Since referring is a part of communication, the condition of its success is part of the condition on successful communication itself. A communicative act is successful just in case one’s audience identifies the attitude one is expressing. So, if the attitude is about a certain individual and one is using a singular term to indicate its objects, the act of reference is successful only if the audience identifies the object of that attitude. Since identifying the object is part of identifying the attitude being expressed, successful reference requires that the audience identifies the object of the

⁹ Bach, Kent, *Thought and Reference*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987, p.,52.

attitude being expressed in accordance with how the speaker intends him to identify the attitude as a whole.

Referential Relations

On the basis of the above observation it seems to me that referential relation plays an important role to make reference successful. Normally, users of language construct symbolic representations of the world. Such constructions require interpretation of a causal kind between the language users and the world. There is a kind of dynamic feedback process in operation here. For the success of a language user's efforts to deal with their environment will help to determine their ability to represent it accurately. However, the accuracy or inaccuracy of their representations will affect the validity or success of their efforts in dealing with the environment. So, we should regard the relation between the world and the users of language as part of "a causal model of human behavior."¹⁰

One of the advantages Putnam claimed for this model is that it helps make sense of the notion of truth to which he was committed. The truth depends on the existence of a specifiable correspondence relation of a certain sort. This relation has three terms: it takes the whole of a linguistic system as one term; particular uses of that system and finally those particular extra linguistic facts relevant to the statement. On this view, a sentence is true if and only if it is by the triadic relation R that it stands to reality; true assertion is those that correspond in this way to extra- linguistic facts. Thus, for Putnam, reference is a part of the *causal interaction* between speaker's and reality that enables him to conceive of truth in this way. It explains how extra- linguistic entities can be related to our uses of language in such way that the truth of later can be

¹⁰ Putnam, Hilary, *Meaning and the Moral Sciences*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p.,4.

made to depend on correspondence with the former. The correspondence theorist can appeal to the specifiable correspondence relation R to answer the question; such assertions do bear the appropriate relation to the extra linguistic fact.

It thus seems to us that there are various perspectives of the theory of reference. Philosophers of language over the course of history have developed various sense of reference. At the very outset they were talking in favor of logical proper names and ordinary proper names which are the genuine candidates of the theory of reference. It is said that to be a name is to be name of an object. Accordingly, every name refers to an object or every name used in a sentence refers to an object. A name is the name of an object. This philosophical position actually has set up the tone of the theory of reference. As a result of that linguistic philosophers were in favor of *linguistic revisionism*. For them revision of language is prerequisite for setting up a cogent and viable theory of reference. In this process there develops no sense theory of reference, sense theory of reference. Putting everything into perspective, we can say that all referential theories developed so far are classified into three different schools, namely, the descriptive or classical theory of reference; the causal theory of reference and the neo-classical theory of reference. These are broad schools in the sense that in each school more than one philosophers of language are involved. Therefore, in the **First Chapter** of this thesis we propose to analyze and examine the descriptive theory of reference with special reference to Russell, Frege and others and it would be entitled as **The Classical (Descriptive) Theory of Reference**. We think that the theory of reference was inaugurated at the very outset with the help of or in the name of descriptive theory of reference. The causal theory of reference appears as an anti-thesis of the descriptive theory of reference. It denies the standpoint what has been asserted or stated in the descriptive theory of reference. Therefore in the **Second Chapter** of the thesis we propose to examine and exemplify

with critical outlook the philosophical position of the causal theory of reference and it would be entitled as **The Causal Theory of Reference**. Again many philosophers of language, namely, Kripke, Donnellan, Putnam, Marcus, and others were involved with this theory of reference. If the descriptive theory of reference is said to be thesis, then surely, the causal theory of reference would be regarded as anti-thesis. Each of these schools takes different standpoint to develop the theory of reference. The development of the theory of reference continues further in the name of neo-classical theory of reference. The main objective of neo-classical theory of reference is to give the response of those criticisms raised by the causal referential theorists against the descriptive theory of reference and extends it further in terms of incorporating new philosophical approach. Therefore, in the **Third Chapter** of this thesis we propose to analyze and examine the neo-classical theory of reference with special reference to Katz and others and it would be entitled as **The Neo-Classical Theory of Reference**.

We think that all referential theories so far have been developed will belong to either one of these schools or theories. We think that even though the theory of reference is the main contention of philosophy of language in particular and philosophy as such in general and linguistic philosophers or philosophers of language over the course of history were deeply involved to develop this theory from different perspectives, but still it can be said that there is a theory developed under the term 'reference' that can be taken into account or philosophical resolution without begging question. Thus, the theory of reference as such deserves praiseworthy even at present in the realm of philosophy of language. In the **Fourth Chapter** an attempt will be made to extract a way-out paradigm of the theory of reference from my own rationale and it would be entitled as **Concluding Remarks**. The thesis ends with a short Bibliography.