

CURRENT APPROACHES TO THE THEORY OF REFERENCE : A CRITICAL OBSERVATION

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL
FOR THE AWARD OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHY

By

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UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF

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JUNE, 2018**



*With the Blessing
Of
Param Pujoyapado Sree Sree Babai Dada
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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the research work embodied in this thesis has been carried out by me in the Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal, Darjeeling-734013, West Bengal, India, under the supervision of Prof. (Dr.) Kanti Lal Das, Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal, Darjeeling-734013. I also affirm that this work is original and has not been submitted before in part or full any degree/diploma or any other academic award to this or any other University or Institution.

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CERTIFICATE

I certify that Gouranga Biswas has prepared the thesis entitled **CURRENT APPROACHES TO THE THEORY OF REFERENCE: A CRITICAL OBSERVATION**, for the award of Ph.D. degree of the University of North Bengal (old regulation), under my guidance. He has carried out the work at the Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal.

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Preface

I have been deeply involved to complete the thesis with the hope and belief that the thesis constitutes a modest breakthrough from philosophical perspective. The thesis deals with a core philosophical concept, such as, the concept of reference which perhaps would be the single most important function of language that we are hunting in the arena of philosophy of language. Philosophy of language or linguistic philosophy talks about many different aspects of language and each different aspect is deeply rooted in showing or establishing the relationship between language and reality in some sense or other. Without the perception of reference the relationship between language and reality would remain obscure in the real sense of the term. Of course, there is no question of doubt that philosopher of language has taken ambitious drive at times to develop the relationship between language and reality. Language refers. There is no question of doubt. To talk of language is to talk of something other than language. This clearly suggests that language has some extra-linguistic implication. Therefore, there should not be any philosophical complication about the referential function of language. Then why there remains problem of reference? Why do the philosophers belonging to different referential schools involve in philosophical debate regarding the authenticity of this theory? We think all sorts of problems actually come from reality side. Language refers, but what does language refer? Does language refer something in the world? If it does, then what type of world it would be? Would it be empirical world? Would it be other than empirical world? Would it be logical or actual or possible world? This is where the debate actually hinges on. Moreover, if language refers, what type of language would it be? Would it be logical language or other than logical language? Thus, the philosophical debate comes from about the very nature of language and also about the very nature of reality. Considering everything into perspective, the thesis has been proposed to divide

into four main sequels besides **General Introduction** and **Bibliography**. In the main **Chapters**, various theories developed in the name of reference are proposed to discuss. The thesis begins with the classical theory of reference, followed by the causal theory of reference and reveals these two theories as conceptually contradictory with each other. In this sense, if the classical theory of reference is attributed as thesis, then the causal theory of reference may be attributed as anti-thesis and the debate between thesis and anti-thesis is vivid and clear. The thesis examines these two theories at length. After that the thesis engages to develop the neo-classical theory of reference which appears as a synthesis of both classical and causal theory of reference. Thus the classical, the causal and the neo-classical theory of reference jointly cover the whole development of the concept of reference. The thesis ends with concluding remarks where some concrete proposals on the part of the author of the thesis are extracted. These proposals would reflect the contribution of the author of the thesis.

Acknowledgement

In the journey of my research work many people deserve my deep appreciation and acknowledgment. I do express my sincere gratitude to all those personalities whose constant encouragement and wholehearted cooperation help me a lot whatever I have achieved in my research work. The starting point of my research proposal was extremely encouraging even though it takes almost ten years to complete this thesis.

First of all, I am deeply indebted to my respected supervisor Dr. Kanti Lal Das, Professor of the Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal under whom I have the golden opportunity of carrying out of this research work. From the very first day of my introduction with Professor Das, I was impressed by his lectures he delivered in the PG Courses. At that time I thought that I would do my research work under Professor Das. I am happy to say that my will eventually be fulfilled. I am profusely influenced by his sincere and sympathetic attitude in guiding me throughout my research work. Over the years he was extremely busy, but instead of that he encouraged me whenever I have faced conceptual difficulties while writing this thesis. His valuable and timely suggestions immensely helped me to complete the thesis. I owe my deep sense of gratitude to his untiring and constant inspiration. From the core of my heart I thankfully acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Das for taking a keen interest to guide me throughout the pretty long journey of the work from the initial stage to the final stage of the work.

I am equally grateful to the then Heads of the Department of Philosophy, the existing Head of the Department of Philosophy, the past and existing faculty members of the Department of Philosophy for their love, care, sympathy and valuable suggestions towards completing the

thesis. I ever remain grateful to the Department of Philosophy to the rest of my life where I got better philosophical environment to study over the years.

I am thankful to the staffs of the central library, the staffs of the administrative office, and the staffs of the Department of Philosophy for their wholehearted cooperation time and again.

I feel happy to remember those of my friends who encouraged a lot during my research work. I must thank to them for caring me as a true friend of them.

I must express my deep sense of gratitude to my parents, my wife, Mrs. Sambita Biswas, my little son Sri Gunendra Sundar Biswas, for their unselfish encouragement and constant mental support towards completing the thesis. In fact, it is my candid confession that without the contribution and sacrifice particularly of my wife, it would not be possible for me to complete the thesis. The source of inspiration that I have from my son helps me a lot to complete this work. I immensely owe to them.

Last but not the least, I have given much effort to the best of my ability and knowledge to make this thesis flawless both theoretically and conceptually and takes sufficient care to make it perfect from typographical point of view. However, still if there remains any flaw and loopholes, I myself would be responsible for this.

Date: 21.05.2018

Gouranga Biswas
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General Introduction

Historical preliminaries of Referential Theory

During the first half of 20th century, philosophy took a linguistic revolution or turn where metaphysical assertions based on speculation were questioned with regard to referential perspective. It was claimed that speculative metaphysical doctrines or assertions were created out of misinterpretation of language. The main contention of linguistic revolution is to overcome the slums of language first and then to establish the relationship between language and reality or ontology. The relationship between language and reality is made possible through the referential function of language. Even though there are various functions of language on the basis of which one may come to know about the relationship between language and reality. Having said this, referential theory is the most important one through which the relationship between language and reality can adequately be justified. Alternatively, it can be said that to hold the relationship between language and reality, one has to focus much on the referential function or theory of language. There is no question of doubt that language does refer. It has been accepted without begging question. However, the most important point is that whether the reference of language does foothold on reality or not. What we intend to say here is that the referential aspect is *sui-gensis* of language when we do involve to show the relationship between language and reality.

Language thus appeared as a philosophical method and it had been accepted that clarification of language is all about of philosophy. It states that philosophy is all about of the analysis or clarification of language and all traditional philosophical problems were engendered due to the misapprehension or misinterpretation of language. As a result of that philosophers began to

examine the connection between language and thought by exploring how meaning is being created and how language as such shapes out thoughts. Thus, it seems to us that philosophy of language takes an attempt to understand the nature of language and its relationship with the world through communication or through speech acts of different sorts. In this regard, the most important question is to know about the *problem of meaning*. The problem of meaning can be extracted by way of illumination the questions, such as, what is language? What are the purposes of language? How do we understand each other? Thus, the problem of meaning is associated with the *functional aspect of language*. The function of language is multifarious in nature. It has been reflected from Plato onwards. Plato in his *Republic*¹ has shown considerable interest about language and its relationship with the world. One can explore the relevance of language in Descartes as well. Descartes, the founding father of modern philosophy, believed in the existence of universal language for the use of human communities and it was reflected in Chomsky's mentalistic approach. Noam Chomsky, the leading proponent of mentalist, appeared as a precursor of the theory of the innateness of linguistic abilities. In fact, Chomsky revived and reestablished the innate idea of Descartes in a new way. That is why, some would say that Chomsky's innatism may be attributed as New Innatism and Descartes innatism has been attributed as Old Innatism.

The relevance of language was a talking point in Hobbes and Locke as well. Both Hobbes and Locke were interested about the relationship between language and thought or ideas. Hobbes goes on to say that a man in the real sense of the term is the seeker of truth and man finds truth in

¹ Plato, *Theaetetus* in Plato, 1961.

every name he uses. Locke asserted that every word is the sensible mark of ideas. “The use of words” Locke says, “stands as outward Marks of our internal Ideas.”²

What then is a theory of reference?

Language does refer. There is no question of doubt. But what does language refer and what is the locus of reference is itself a debatable issue. A theory of reference is primarily concerned with the question: how do words refer? This question admits different interpretations. Various linguistic philosophers over the course of history have developed various interpretations of reference. When we speak of the theory of reference, we are primarily concerned with proper names because according to the semanticists, the vocabulary of ideal language is proper names. Thus, when we are talking of reference, we are saying the semantic property of names. The semantic property of name is based on the perception that every proper name refers to an object. Russell classifies two different types of proper names, such as, *logical proper name* and *ordinary proper name*. He then says that a logical proper name is a genuine proper name and an ordinary proper name is nothing but *a disguised description*. Thus, for Russell, a logical proper name, being a genuine proper name, refers to an object with which we are directly acquainted. In fact, Russell developed the theory of reference as the paradigm of semantics. According to Russell, the problem of meaning can be solved with regard to the reference of the sentence. A sentence is to be meaningful if it refers something other than the sentence itself and there must be a referential connection between the sentence and what it refers to. That means, the referential connection constitutes the meaning of the sentence. We think that the referential theory of meaning is based on *linguistic realism or language realism* where it has been admitted that there are independent objects in the world apart from languages. It is further observed that referential

² See Locke, 1975, II, 11, 9.

theory of meaning is an externalist theory where language refers something externally other than the language itself.

Mill in his book *A System of Logic* also asserted the concept of proper name with regard to reference. According to Mill, a proper name which is singular must refer to an object. Wittgenstein also admits name and by a name he means to say that it (a name) denotes an object. For Wittgenstein a name denotes an object and the meaning of the name is the meaning of the object. Frege in his article "Sense and Reference" also develops the concept of reference of proper names. Kripke in his book *Naming and Necessity* introduces the concept of proper name with regard to rigid designator. According to Kripke, a proper name is a rigid designator because a proper name designates (refers) to an object and not only an object but the same object in every possible world of an actual world. Thus, even though we examine various approaches of the theory of reference, but what we can say at this point of time is that the concept of reference is the foundation of semantic theory because semantic theory addresses the problem of meaning with regard to the concept of truth that has been established by the referential content of proper name or sentence or proposition constructed with the help of singular terms or proper names.

The question then naturally arises: how do names refer? We have a mechanism at our hands that every name connects to an object. It is said that to be a name it to be a name of an object. Even Frege's theory of *sense and reference* is an account that offers a mechanism in which a name stands for an object. It has become a standard view that Frege held that names represent object descriptively. In this sense we can say that Frege develops *the descriptive theory of names*. Here Frege differs from Russell. For Russell, proper names are truncated descriptions though he did not hold it as part of theory of sense. A descriptive theory of name says that a name is equivalent to a description or set of description. Thus, Russell's version of the object theory of reference is

different because Russell held that a name stands for the object which is its bearer. We think that Russell's object theory of reference or alternatively known as *no-sense theory of reference* is compatible with the idea that such theory is associated with a thing as a rational power of name. It is also compatible with the ideal that the rational power of a name for a subject consists in the subject's possession information. That means, a name being a singular term, must possess the subject position of a *subject- predicate* sentence and it simply stands for its object. Thus, a name being a rational power for a subject is the object itself.

It seems that Russellian theory of reference must be set against the background of his epistemology. Russell believed that the object theory was correct because it only applied to genuine singular terms. A genuine singular term is one that would satisfy the *principle of acquaintance*. The only genuine singular term were the demonstratives pronouns, such as, 'this', 'that', 'it', etc.

Types of Reference

From one perspective, reference may be classified as *singular reference and non- singular reference*. Unlike non-singular reference, singular reference is associated with reference to one single particular object as distinct from all others. From semantics perspective, singular reference is more fundamental than non-singular reference. Russell's principle of acquaintance is a glaring example of singular reference. According to Pranab Sen, even though singular reference is not the most fundamental mode of reference, "it is one of its most fundamental models."³ There is a well-defined class of expressions what may be called *singular terms* and anyone who uses such an expression make singular reference. Thus, every singular term has singular reference. The

³. Sen, P.K., *Reference and Truth*, Allied Publishers Ltd., 1991, p.17

class of singular terms contains proper names ('John', 'Socratics', 'London'), definite descriptions (' the author of Waverley', 'the present king of France', 'the point of intersection of the lines a and b'), singular pronouns ('he' 'she' 'it'), demonstratives ('this', 'that',) indefinite descriptions in some of their uses (' a man has given me the information'), and besides these more familiar items, such as, variables ('x', 'y', 'z'), of an associates with pronouns, as in Quine), sentences (treated as proper names of truth-values by Frege), and 'that' – clauses ('that $2+2=4$ ' as a name or designation of the proposition expressed by the sentence ' $2+2=4$ ')

Some philosophers have maintained that definite descriptions are referring expressions and that they can be used to make singular reference. Accordingly, it can be said that the expression of the form 'the-so and-so' constitutes one among different kinds of expression which can be used for the purpose of singular reference. In this regard we can refer Mill who says singular terms fall into two kinds: those which are *connotative* and those which are *non-connotative*. Connotative singular terms are called definite descriptions and non-connotative singular terms are called proper names. Thus, a proper name is a singular term which is non-connotative.

Gotlob Frege's view of definite descriptions belongs fundamentally to the same kind. According to Frege, definite descriptions with proper names like 'John', 'Bill', have both sense and reference, and their reference is determined by their senses. Frege's sense may be identified with Mill's connotation and Frege's reference may be identified with Mill's denotation. Besides, Frege explicitly identified a property with a concept being the reference of a predicate, belongs to the realm of reference. Following Dummett, we can say that the realm of reference as well as

the realm of sense is exclusive of each other. The reference of the predicate is a concept for Frege, but the denotation of the predicate, for Mill, is “any object of which it is true.”⁴

Some contemporary philosophers of language, namely, Leonord Linsky, distinguished two uses of definite descriptions, *an attributive use* and *a referential use*. In case of *an attributive use*, the reference of the definite descriptions is wholly determined by the condition it embodies; whereas in the case of a referential use it is not. For example, when we say, ‘Smith’s murderer is insane’, Smith’s murderer here *refers to* a particular individual *if and only if* the individual satisfies the condition expressed in the open sentence ‘x murdered Smith’s.’ But the same sentence ‘Smith’s murderer is insane’ can be used in a different way under different circumstances. Suppose, that an individual is accused of Smith’s murder and is put on trial, during which he behaves in a most abnormal way. Referring to this man, we may say, ‘Smith’s murderer is insane’. Here we intend to refer to a particular individual who is accused of Smith’s murder and our success in referring in this particular case does not depend upon the individual’s satisfying the conditions ‘x murder Smith’s.’ It is perhaps being the case that here the accused did not murder Smith’s and it may be possible that some one unknown did it. But we succeeded in referring to the man we want to refer to, the man- under tipple, and the person to whom we make this remark understands who we are referring to. In the above case, the first use of ‘Smith’s murderer’ is the *attributive use* and second use of the same is *referential use*.

We think that unlike description, a proper name does not depend on any associated condition for achieving reference. It is related directly to its objects. Following Wittgenstein, we can say that to be a name is to be name of an object. In this regard Wittgenstein says, “A name means an

⁴ . Ibid, p.20

object. The object is its meaning.”⁵ So either a name refers to the particular object or it does not refer at all. This view of proper name has been challenged by Frege and his followers. Frege holds that like a definite description, a proper name also has a sense and it refers to the object because of the sense which it has. This position of Frege has been challenged by both Mill and Kripke.⁶ Frege holds the view that the reference of a proper name was determined by its sense. The sense of an expression *is the mode of presentation* of the object which is its reference.

Non- Singular Reference

There is a strong philosophical perception within philosophy of language that all reference is singular and many would say that there is *no non-singular reference*. It is only a singular term which does nothing but refer. All non-singular, general terms really describe. Since they have a descriptive content, they can have a descriptive function only. The kind of reference which a singular term is capable of making is singular. Therefore, the only kind of reference that is possible is the singular reference. The tradition which acknowledges singular reference as the only kind of reference possible can perhaps be located to Frege. Although both the subject and the predicate in *a triple subject-predicate statement* are, according to Frege, referring expressions, both of them refer to just one thing, the subject to an object and the predicate to a concept and thus the reference is singular in either case. The singular reference of the subject *is object* and the singular reference of the predicate *is concept*. Thus, Frege did not believe, while Russell did, that the presence of some descriptive content would necessarily disqualify an expression as referring. Besides, Frege did not believe that this would render the reference non-

⁵ . Wittgenstein, L. *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*. Translated by Pears, D.F., and B.F. McGuinness. London, New Year, 1974, p.12.

⁶ . See Kripke, Saul, “Identity and Necessity”, in *Identity and Individualism*, edited by Milton. K. Munitz, New York. University Press, New York, 1971.

singular. Instead, Frege believed that reference itself is possible only because of the presence of these so-called descriptive contents. For Frege, there cannot be any reference without sense. Having said that, both Frege and Russell have maintained and shared that reference is always singular. Thus, it is generally accepted that *all reference is singular*.

This does not, however, make sense to say that non-singular reference is not possible. Non-singular reference is also possible. Russell did commit a mistake by ignoring the possibility of non-singular reference. His mistake is associated with his supposition that there is no difference between having a descriptive *content* and having a descriptive *function*. Russell admits that definite description having some descriptive content has no referring function. Since it has no referring function, it can never be used for the purpose of referring. Frege was also wrong for different kind of reason. Frege did not realize that there is a very important way in which the presence of a descriptive content can destroy the singularity of reference.

To establish the issue that non-singular terms do have reference, we have to refer Donnellan's distinction between *purely referential and attributive uses of definite description*. Russell was wrong to denying that a definite description can ever have any referential use. Since a definite description is, after all, a singular term associated with the definite article 'the', any reference is made by definite description can be singular. In such a case, we have to keep in mind Donnellan's distinctions between the purely referential and attributive uses of a definite description. If the use to which the definite description is put is purely referential, the reference which is made by it is singular. On the other hand, if the use to which it is put is attributive the reference is in very important sense general.

We think that when a definite description is put to an attributive use, no reference is made with it. Thus, in a sense it may be assumed that Donnellan's distinction between referential and attributive use is very much the same as the distinction between referential and non-referential uses. Alternatively, it can be said after Donnellan, that what is referential is meant purely referential having no other function than that of referring. While the use which he calls attributive is not purely referential because he does not have the function of referring alone but has some other function as well. Thus, in a sense Donnellan's distinction is actually directed to two kinds of referential uses-one is purely referential use and the other is not. Purely referential uses of Donnellan's may be termed as *strong referential theory of uses* and attributive uses of referential theory may be termed as *weak referential theory of uses*.⁷

The essential feature of referential use, according to Donnellan, is that a referential use tolerates inappropriateness of the description. In Donnellan's example the description 'Smith's murderer' may be inappropriate for the man accused of Smith's murder, and now standing in the dock-he may be quite innocent of the crime-but we still can manage to refer to him by using it in the utterance 'Smith's murderer is insane.' Secondly this use relates only to what the speaker has in his mind. Thirdly, a purely referential use is always what we want to call 'sighted' as opposed to 'blind.' This means that the speaker knows who he is referring to by his description. Fourthly, this use of definite description is that the choice of the definite description is not essential for what is said. It is not essential for reference to go through. Here the speaker may use some other description than the one which he chooses and yet succeed in making the reference. Closely connected with this in essential character of the occurrence of a definite description used referentially is the fact that a definite description used in this manner can be replaced by any

⁷. See. Donnellan, Keith, "Reference and Definite Descriptions" in Stephen Schwartz (ed.), Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1977.

other definite description having the same reference, *salva veritate*. Finally, a purely referential use of the definite description results in a *singular reference*. Here, the speaker has a particular individual in his mind, and he wants to make reference to that individual. If the circumstances are in fact favorable, he will also succeed in making his hearer pick out that particular individual as the object of the speaker's reference.

Even though the attributive use of a definite description defers from the purely referential, it is also referential in the basic sense. The basic feature of attributive use of a definite description is that it does not tolerate any inappropriateness of the description. In an attributive use of a definite description, the speaker does not necessarily have any particular individual in his mind. That means, an attributive use need not be sighted, it can well be blind. Here the choice of the particular definite description is not vacuous. Finally, an attributive use of a definite description cannot result in a *strictly reference*. However, there is an essential generality about a reference which can be made by such a use of the definite description. The definite description is used to refer, even though it is used attributively. The reference is in a very important way *general*. This generality is not to be equated with the kind generality which Russell ascribes to all statements involving definite descriptions.

Referring as Meaning

Referring is understood to mean something. That means the problem of meaning can be solved with regard to reference. In this regard, there develops the referential theory of meaning. It is to be noted here that the problem of meaning is the hallmark of analytic philosophy or philosophy of language. Theory of reference is one of the important proposals to solve the problem of meaning. According to referential theory of meaning, a sentence would be meaningful if it refers

something other than the sentence itself. There must be a referential connection between the sentence and what it refers to. Thus, in a sense, referential connection constitutes the meaning of the sentence. This clearly suggests that one can understand *referring as meaning*. Here one may attempt to capture the notion of referring by putting together Grice's definition of meaning what we characteristically *mean* when we refer. In this regard we can mention Grice's general definition of meaning. There are two versions of this. The one defines just "Speaker S means something by uttering X." The other correlates a particular proposition meant with a particular intended audience response. It may be stated like: "Speaker S meant that P is the case by uttering X=df. (EA) (S uttered X M- intending audience A to think that S thinks that P is the case." Here 'S means something by uttering X.'

Searle gives an account of referring which is explicitly linked with the notion of Grice theory of meaning. On this account, referring is "characterized by four salient features."⁸

These are as follows:

- a. The act of referring must be a part of at least a purported complete illocutionary act.
- b. The act of referring requires the existence of the object the speaker intends to be referring to.
- c. In referring, the speaker must intend to identify for his audience the object he is referring to.
- d. In referring, the speaker must intend to identify the referent for his audience by means of the audience's recognition of his intention to do this.

⁸ . Searle, S., *Speech Acts*, 1969, p.86.

Thus, the account of referring reveals a certain independence of reference from the communication of descriptive content. There are really two dimensions to this. First, the account allows reference where no part of the utterance used to refer conventionally denotes the referent. The referent eventually is determined by what one means, and one need not mean what one says. For example, I can refer ironically to the loser with 'the winner.' The second dimension emerges if we consider that what mean is what I M- intend the audience to think I think. In referring, what I thus M-intend is relational with respect to the referent. As a result of that, what I mean is relational with respect to the referent-what I mean I mean of the referents. Thus, not only is the referent not tied to the descriptive content of what I say, it also not tied to any particular description of the referent conveyed by what I mean. It is perfectly possible to refer where there is no uniquely applying description of the referent conveyed by what I mean. This, in fact, is the typical case of referring. Since my M-intention is fulfilled provided my audience has the appropriate belief of the referent, there is no requirement of overlapping between the terms in which I think of the referent and the terms in which my audience thinks of it.

Reference and Understanding

Reference and understanding is directly linked with *understanding of language* on the basis of which there developed various theories, namely, *the picture theory of meaning* of early Wittgenstein, *the use theory of meaning* of later Wittgenstein and what was going on in nineteenth century objections to *a correspondence theory of truth*. We think that the account to which understanding of language consists is being able to use it to translate it into a language one can use, is the only account in the field. While a *true-to-life* model of the global use of a language is hardly to be hoped for, an over-simplified model is contained in the work of Carnap and Reichenbach. This is model of the speaker / hearer as possessing and inductive logic, a

deductive logic, a preference ordering and a rule of action. In such an over-simplified model, speech will affect behavior in a rich variety of ways. The better the inductive logic, the better the deductive logic, the more realistic the utility function, the more the behavior of these creatures will resemble *understanding of language*. Such a model is not tied to an individualistic conception of language. Since speakers may acquire knowledge from each other, it is not necessary that each speaker who has a word, say, 'gold' in his vocabulary should be himself able to tell whether or not something is gold. As long as each speaker who has the word 'gold' in his vocabulary possesses a standard minimum amount of information about gold, he will be able to participate in collective discussion about gold. Thus, the future that we called 'the linguistic division of labor' is perfectly compatible with such a model. Finally, such an over simplified model of a speaker/ hearer is essentially *holistic*- the conditions under which any particular sentence will be uttered and the behavior that we result if any given sentence is uttered does not depend upon any isolated thing that could be called the 'sense' of the sentence.

However, if we revisit referring and understanding with regard to the nineteenth century philosophical content, we have a slightly deferent perception of it. The nineteenth century argument against the correspondence theory of truth was that one cannot think of truth as correspondence to facts because thinking of truth in this way would require one to be able to compare concepts directly with unconceptualized reality. If truth is correspondence to reality, it would seem as if knowledge of what *the correspondence is* - is presupposed by knowledge that such and such a statement stands in the relation in question to anything or does not stand in the relation in question to anything. Moreover, if understanding of the statement is equated with knowing what it is for, it to be the case that it stands or does not stand in the relation in question to appropriate entities then knowledge of what the correspondence is – is presupposed in the

understanding of every statement. If we view language understanding as the possession of a rational activity of language use- an activity involving 'language entry rules', procedures for deductive and inductive inference, and 'language exit rules', then implicit knowledge of truth conditions is not presupposed in any way by the understanding of the language. Alternatively, one does not need to know that there is a correspondence between words and an extra-linguistic entity to learn one's language. But there is such a correspondence none the less, and it explains the success of what one is doing. After one has learned one's language one can talk about anything-including the correspondence in question. Wittgenstein's view in the *Tractatus* that the correspondence in question cannot be described but only 'shown' is true in only a limited sense.

Speaker Reference and Linguistic Reference

From one perspective theory of reference may be classified as speaker reference and linguistic reference. Speaker reference is a more fundamental notion than linguistic reference. In fact, referring is ultimately not something that words do but something that speaker's use words to do. What then is speaker reference? Here one does not depend on the kind of singular term being used to refer. To refer to something is not merely to talk about it. For example, we could be talking about Chess without ever referring to it. We might refer to Anatoly Karpov and Gary Kasparov, making remarks like 'Karpov plays with an iron grip' and 'Kasparov always counter attacks when he plays the Sicilian.' Even we could be talking at great lengths about Chess but never refer to Chess itself. Thus, something can be topic of conversation without ever being referred to.

Is referring something merely lies in the mind? In this regard, it can be said that referring is not be something merely having it in mind. Even when one is using an expression that denotes it, it

does not make sense to say it is in the mind of the speaker. We think the notion of having something in mind is notoriously vague. Some philosophers have tried to conceive reference with regard to identification. For them to refer is to identify. Identifying something is nice but not necessary. One may refer something successfully without identifying it. A speaker can refer to something by means of a personal pronoun and not even attempt to provide the information needed by the hearer to determine the intended referent. Or one could use an incomplete definite description (for example, 'the visitor') or even an indefinite description (for example, 'a visitor') to refer to some specific individual without specifying which one. It may be true that referring to something requires being able to identify it, but this is not the same as actually identifying it. Moreover, successful reference requires that the hearer identify the referent, but this is not verbal identification. Besides, the hearer may be able to identify the referent without the benefit of any identification on the part of the speaker. Here the hearer actually depends on *contextually available information* rather than information provided by the speaker. However, this is not a case of the speaker identifying the referent for the hearer. A referring expression, namely, 'he' serves merely to suggest the sort of information the hearer is to look for and rely on.

Thus, owing to understand what speaker referent is more precisely, what it is for a speaker to use an expression to refer an audience to something, the point that needs to be taken care of is that *referring never occurs by itself*. Referring is always part and parcel of performing a larger, illocutionary act. One cannot just refer to something. Since referring to something is always part and parcel of performing an illocutionary act, a referential intention is simply a component of a communicative intention. Of course, not every communicative intention includes a *referential intention*. It includes one only if the attitude being expressed in the utterance has an object.

Clearly, the referential intention is the component of the communicative intention that is directed specifically at this object.

We think that the above consideration obviously points to suggest a provisional definition of referring which asserts that *to refer to something is simply to express an attitude about it*. The idea is that not every attitude is an attitude about an individual, but whatever a speaker does express such an attitude, he has a *referential intention* which is directed at that individual. For example, suppose someone asks me what I think of the writer of Gitanjali and I respond, ‘I do not like the writer of Gitanjali.’ Here, even though I would be expressing an attitude about the writer of Gitanjali, I would not be referring to the writer of Gitanjali. Our definition of referring should require that the utterance contains a singular that is being used specifically to indicate the object of the attitude being expressed. Accordingly, we can say that “to refer to something is to use a singular term with the intention of indicating to one’s audience the object of the attitude one is expressing.”⁹

Thus, while defining reference, we have a four-place relation between speaker, expression, audience, and the object. Thus, in speaker reference we have four-place relation whereas in the case of linguistic we have a two-place relation between expression and object. Since referring is a part of communication, the condition of its success is part of the condition on successful communication itself. A communicative act is successful just in case one’s audience identifies the attitude one is expressing. So, if the attitude is about a certain individual and one is using a singular term to indicate its objects, the act of reference is successful only if the audience identifies the object of that attitude. Since identifying the object is part of identifying the attitude being expressed, successful reference requires that the audience identifies the object of the

⁹ Bach, Kent, *Thought and Reference*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987, p.,52.

attitude being expressed in accordance with how the speaker intends him to identify the attitude as a whole.

Referential Relations

On the basis of the above observation it seems to me that referential relation plays an important role to make reference successful. Normally, users of language construct symbolic representations of the world. Such constructions require interpretation of a causal kind between the language users and the world. There is a kind of dynamic feedback process in operation here. For the success of a language user's efforts to deal with their environment will help to determine their ability to represent it accurately. However, the accuracy or inaccuracy of their representations will affect the validity or success of their efforts in dealing with the environment. So, we should regard the relation between the world and the users of language as part of "a causal model of human behavior."¹⁰

One of the advantages Putnam claimed for this model is that it helps make sense of the notion of truth to which he was committed. The truth depends on the existence of a specifiable correspondence relation of a certain sort. This relation has three terms: it takes the whole of a linguistic system as one term; particular uses of that system and finally those particular extra linguistic facts relevant to the statement. On this view, a sentence is true if and only if it is by the triadic relation R that it stands to reality; true assertion is those that correspond in this way to extra- linguistic facts. Thus, for Putnam, reference is a part of the *causal interaction* between speaker's and reality that enables him to conceive of truth in this way. It explains how extra- linguistic entities can be related to our uses of language in such way that the truth of later can be

¹⁰ Putnam, Hilary, *Meaning and the Moral Sciences*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p.,4.

made to depend on correspondence with the former. The correspondence theorist can appeal to the specifiable correspondence relation R to answer the question; such assertions do bear the appropriate relation to the extra linguistic fact.

It thus seems to us that there are various perspectives of the theory of reference. Philosophers of language over the course of history have developed various sense of reference. At the very outset they were talking in favor of logical proper names and ordinary proper names which are the genuine candidates of the theory of reference. It is said that to be a name is to be name of an object. Accordingly, every name refers to an object or every name used in a sentence refers to an object. A name is the name of an object. This philosophical position actually has set up the tone of the theory of reference. As a result of that linguistic philosophers were in favor of *linguistic revisionism*. For them revision of language is prerequisite for setting up a cogent and viable theory of reference. In this process there develops no sense theory of reference, sense theory of reference. Putting everything into perspective, we can say that all referential theories developed so far are classified into three different schools, namely, the descriptive or classical theory of reference; the causal theory of reference and the neo-classical theory of reference. These are broad schools in the sense that in each school more than one philosophers of language are involved. Therefore, in the **First Chapter** of this thesis we propose to analyze and examine the descriptive theory of reference with special reference to Russell, Frege and others and it would be entitled as **The Classical (Descriptive) Theory of Reference**. We think that the theory of reference was inaugurated at the very outset with the help of or in the name of descriptive theory of reference. The causal theory of reference appears as an anti-thesis of the descriptive theory of reference. It denies the standpoint what has been asserted or stated in the descriptive theory of reference. Therefore in the **Second Chapter** of the thesis we propose to examine and exemplify

with critical outlook the philosophical position of the causal theory of reference and it would be entitled as **The Causal Theory of Reference**. Again many philosophers of language, namely, Kripke, Donnellan, Putnam, Marcus, and others were involved with this theory of reference. If the descriptive theory of reference is said to be thesis, then surely, the causal theory of reference would be regarded as anti-thesis. Each of these schools takes different standpoint to develop the theory of reference. The development of the theory of reference continues further in the name of neo-classical theory of reference. The main objective of neo-classical theory of reference is to give the response of those criticisms raised by the causal referential theorists against the descriptive theory of reference and extends it further in terms of incorporating new philosophical approach. Therefore, in the **Third Chapter** of this thesis we propose to analyze and examine the neo-classical theory of reference with special reference to Katz and others and it would be entitled as **The Neo-Classical Theory of Reference**.

We think that all referential theories so far have been developed will belong to either one of these schools or theories. We think that even though the theory of reference is the main contention of philosophy of language in particular and philosophy as such in general and linguistic philosophers or philosophers of language over the course of history were deeply involved to develop this theory from different perspectives, but still it can be said that there is a theory developed under the term 'reference' that can be taken into account or philosophical resolution without begging question. Thus, the theory of reference as such deserves praiseworthy even at present in the realm of philosophy of language. In the **Fourth Chapter** an attempt will be made to extract a way-out paradigm of the theory of reference from my own rationale and it would be entitled as **Concluding Remarks**. The thesis ends with a short Bibliography.

Chapter One

The Classical (descriptive) Theory of Reference

According to the classical (description) theory of reference, the sense of a name is given by a definite description associated with the name; its sense is the sense of that description. So, names can be treated as abbreviated description. The name 'Aristotle' is an abbreviated description because the definite description associated with 'Aristotle' is 'the people Plato and teacher of Aleksandar the Great.' Here the name Aristotle stands as an abbreviated description, because the description expresses the sense of 'Aristotle.'

Russell's Descriptive Theory of Reference

Russell's descriptive theory of proper name is associated with ordinary proper name. According to Russell, proper names are two types, ordinary proper name and logical proper name. While identifying the distinction between ordinary proper name and logical proper name, Russell goes on to say that an ordinary proper name, such as, 'Socratics', 'Aristotle' are known *by description*; whereas logically proper names are *known by acquaintance*. According to Russell, demonstrative pronouns, such as, 'this', 'that', 'it' etc. are logical proper names. The distinctive feature of logical proper name is that it is known by acquaintance. To say that 'this is a pen' is to say that one has to be acquainted with the pen. Here the referential connection between the sentence and what it refers to can be established with regard to acquaintance. Therefore, logical proper names do not have any descriptive content. On the basis of logical proper name, there develops no-sense theory of proper name and Russell mainly took the initiative to develop this theory. Thus, when we are engaging to explicate and examine the descriptive theory of reference after Russell, we are primarily concerned with ordinary proper name. We think Russell's

descriptive theory of proper name has been developed with the background of ordinary proper name.

According to Russell, an ordinary proper name though looks like a proper name, but in real sense it is not a genuine proper name. Rather it is called a *disguised description* or an abbreviated description. Many philosophers belonging to analytic tradition would consider 'Socratics' as a proper name. But Russell does not think so. He considers the name 'Socratics' as an abbreviated description or as a disguise description.

To know about the descriptive theory of Russell, one has known about Russell's theory of description. A description, according to Russell, may be of two types, definite and indefinite. Definite description is unambiguous and indefinite description is ambiguous. Russell then says that an indefinite description is in the form of 'a- so-an-so' and a definite description is in the form 'the-so-an-so'. Whether it is definite or indefinite, the description is the description of somebody else. When I say that 'I met a man', I am here referring to a person with whom I actually met. Likewise, when I say 'I meet with the man', here again I am talking of a man with whom I met. Thus, reference does not lose its gravity or relevance even when we involve with definite or indefinite description. In the case of indefinite description, the hearer may not identify the person with whom I actually met when I am uttering the sentence 'I met a man'. Whereas in the case of definite description, the hearer can easily identify the referent of the sentence or the person with whom I actually met when I am uttering the sentence 'I met with the person'.

Russell held that certain expression must be defined contextually because they have no meaning 'by themselves', though they 'contribute to the meaning' of the sentences in which they occur.

These signs are given contextual definition because they are *incomplete symbols*. An incomplete symbol, for Russell, is an expression which does not have any meaning in isolation. It must be defined in 'certain context'. Incomplete symbols are the connectives of the propositional calculus. These signs are given contextual definitions because they are incomplete symbol. In the case of definite description, Russell offered a proof that they were incomplete symbols. His 'proof' that descriptions are incomplete symbols, is, in fact, a proof that they are not what we call proper names. Russell's account of proper names is clearer than his account of incomplete symbols.

According to Russell, a name is a simple symbol, directly designating an individual which is its meaning, and having this meaning in its own right, independently of the meanings of all other words. This position of Russell is deeply rooted with his referential theory of meaning. What does it mean to say that a symbol *directly designates* an individual? What does it mean to say of a 'symbol' that it has its meaning in its own right and independently of the meanings of all other words? When Russell inclines to say that a symbol directly designates an individual, it is clear that for Russell this individual is the meaning of the name. What does Russell actually mean by the term 'the meaning of the name'? By the term 'the meaning of name' Russell actually means the 'bearer' of the name. That means the thing which has the name is the meaning of the name. Russell while developing his descriptive theory of reference further assumes that in any subject-predicate proposition, the meaning of the subject term is the thing denoted or referred to by this term. However, the problem arises to how we can make assertions which are true and therefore significant about what does not exist. If we assert 'Socratic is wise', we may analyze our assertion as saying of a certain individual that he has the characteristic of being wise. It follows from Russell's assumption that if this individual does not exist, the assertion is meaningless

because its subject term is meaningless. Thus, the object denoted by the subject term of a subject-predicate proposition must exist if the subject term is a proper name. The question is: how can we assert significantly that round squire does not exist? This assertion cannot be analyzed as saying that there is a certain object, i.e., the meaning of the expression 'the round squire', which has the characteristic of not existing: for then the assertion would be a contradiction asserting both that there is a certain object and that it does not exist. Thus, there is nothing which is the meaning of the phrase the 'round squire'.

It thus seems paradoxical that if the proposition is true, it is meaningless. Russell concluded that the grammatical similarity, between 'Socratic is wise' and 'The round squire does not exist' covers a vast difference in the logical forms of these two propositions. According to Russell, 'The round squire does not exist' cannot be analyzed as being a subject-predicate proposition, the meaning of whose subject term is the round squire. Here the object as denoted by the 'round squire' does not exist. Accordingly, the apparent subject term 'round squire' cannot be a proper name and accordingly the proposition in which it occurs in the subject term, would be meaningless. Russell thus assumes that the only possible subject terms of propositions genuinely of the subject-predicate forms are proper names. Accordingly, it can be said after Russell that a proposition of subject-predicate form where the apparent subject term denotes something which does not exist are not genuinely of the subject-predicate form. In Russell words, 'Whenever the grammatical subject of a proposition can be supposed not to exist without rendering the proposition meaningless, it is plain that the grammatical subject is not a proper name, i.e., not a

name directly representing some object. Thus, in all such cases, the proposition must be capable of being so analyzed that what was the grammatical subject shall have disappeared.’¹¹

Here Russell is making two assumptions: (i) that the meaning of a name is the bearer of the name, and (ii) that the subject term of a genuine subject-predicate proposition is, in all cases, a proper name. The first assumption is explicitly made; but the second is not. According to Russell, ‘The round squire does not exist’ could not be true if what is denoted by the grammatical subject exist. It then follows that the ‘round squire’ is not a genuine proper name in our assertion. The only genuine subject terms, Russell opines, are proper names. According to Russell, the proper analyses of the proposition ‘The round squire does not exist’ is at par with the proposition it is not the case that there is one and only one object which is both round and squire. In *Principia* the symbol (IX) (QX) represents a definite description an expression of the form ‘the so-an-so’. This symbol can be read ‘the (unique) X which has the property Q’. Russell then says any proposition of the form ‘The (unique) X which has the property Q does not exist. On Russell’s view, the assertion that the so-an-so does not exist is analyzed as saying that it is not the case that *one and only one* thing has the property so-and-so. Consequently, the assertion ‘The so-and-so exist’ is analyzed by the proposition ‘The so-and-so exist’ is symbolized in *Principia* by the expression EI (IX) (QX).

To me, Russell perhaps doubts something odd about the assertions ‘The round squire does not exist’, ‘The queen of England exists’. Ordinarily we can say that there is no such thing as round squire or England is a monarchy and its monarch is a queen. The proposition into which this one is analyzed contains no definite descriptions. In Russell’s words the description has disappeared

¹¹Russell, Bertrand, *Principia Mathematica*, Vol. I, 2ndedn., Cambridge University Press, 1925, p. 66.

on analysis. Thus, we think Russell's theory of descriptions offers us an analysis which enables us to eliminate descriptive phrases from any context in which they occur.

What is observed from the above is that 'The round squire does not function as a proper name in the assertion 'The round squire does not exist' according to Russell. Russell attempts to prove that 'The round squire is an incomplete symbol'. Consider the proposition expressed by the sentence 'Scott is the author of *Waverley*'. Here 'The author of *Waverley*' is of the form (IX) (QX). Thus, for Russell any expression of the form (IX) (QX) would be regarded as incomplete symbol. Here (IX) (QX) means it is (IX) (X wrote *Waverley*). Here the word 'is' is used in the sense of identity.

Now let us assume that the sentence 'the author of *Waverley*' is a proper name. Then there is some object, call it 'C' which is 'directly designated' by this name. For Russell a name always designates an object. Accordingly, 'Scott is the author of *Waverley*' means the same as 'Scott is C'. Here we have two possibilities: (i) either Scott is not identical with C, in which case 'Scott is C' is false or (ii) 'Scott is identical with C, in which case 'Scott is C' means the same as 'Scott is Scott', and is a tautology. Therefore, if 'the author of *Waverley*' is a proper name, 'Scott is the author of *Waverley*' is either false or tautological. Therefore, according to Russell's 'the author of *Waverley*' is not a proper name in our sentence.

Russell thus concludes by saying that 'the author of *Waverley*' means nothing. It cannot mean C and it cannot mean anything other than C. But since everything is either C or other than C, 'the author of *Waverley*' means nothing. Here Russell attempts to prove that descriptions are not proper names in his sense. He thinks that the meaning of a definite description cannot be the thing it describes. Accordingly, with referring to his descriptive theory of meaning, the

descriptive phrases ‘mean nothing’. It thus assumes that the meaning of descriptive phrase, if it has meaning, is the thing it ‘describes’. But this assumption is not justified. Further the above argument reveals that it is circular. Russell asks us to consider the proposition expressed by the sentence:

(I) Scott is the author of *Waverley*

There is no such thing as the proposition expressed by these words. According to Russell’s theory there are at least four different propositions that (I) might be used to express. (I) might be understood as containing either (a) two proper names, or a proper name and a description. This name might be (b) ‘Scott’ or (c) ‘The author of *Waverley*’. A fourth possibility (d) is that (I) consist of two descriptions, one disguise and the other explicit. It seems clear that (c) and (d) are excluded in the above argument for Russell is clearly assuming that in (I) ‘Scott’ is functioning as a proper name and not as a disguised description. This still leaves alternatives (a) and (b).

Now according to Russell it cannot be alternative (a) which the correct one is. For if (I) contains two proper names the proposition which it expresses would be trivial and it would be same as ‘Scott is Scott’, which according to Russell, is not the case. This leaves us with alternative, Russell’s proposition is the one expressed by (I) when it is understood to contain a definite description to the Wright of the copula, i.e., ‘the author of *Waverley*’. But if it is assumed from the beginning that ‘the author of *Waverley*’ in (I) is a definite description and not a proper name, then we assume the very thing which it is the aim of the prove to establish. Another way to bring out the circularity of Russell’s argument is this. At a certain point in the above argument, Russell rejects the assumption ‘Scott is Scott’. But how can Russell know that the proposition expressed

by (I) is not trivial unless he is assuming that in (I) ‘the author of Waverley’ is not functioning as a proper name in his desire sense. If he is assuming that, what is the point of proving it?

While responding to this objection, Russell inclines to say that the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘Scott is the author of Waverley’ cannot be analyzed as saying that ‘Scott’ and ‘the author of Waverley’ are two names for the same person. If it were what the proposition asserts, what would be required for it to be true is that someone should have name ‘Scott the author of Waverley’. If someone had name ‘Scott the author of Waverley’, then ‘Scott would have been the author of Waverley’, who in fact writes Waverley. This, in fact, may not know to him who named ‘Scott the author of Waverley’. On the other hand, since Scott did write Waverley, he is the author of Waverley, even if it may perhaps be the case that no one ever named him ‘the author of Waverley’. Further, if someone had named him ‘the author of Waverley’ he would not have been the author of Waverley, if he had not, in fact, written *Waverley*. On the basis of this, Russell concludes that the proposition ‘Scott is the author of Waverley’ is not a proposition about names, like ‘Nepoleon is Bonaparte’. “This clearly illustrates the sense in which ‘the author of Waverley’ defers from a true proper name”¹². Since description is not proper names, they have no meaning in isolation. That is why Russell in his *Principia* introduces descriptions by *contextual definition*.

Many would say that the above argument given by Russell is fallacious. Linsky says that there is no reason in logic, why Scott should have been named ‘The author of Waverley’. If he had been thus named, and if someone in appropriate circumstances had asked him ‘The author of Waverley’. In such a case it would have been true to say this whether are not Scott had actually

¹². Ibid, p.67.

written *Waverley*. According to Linsky, "...if I wished to tell you that Scott was the author of *Waverley* I would just say, 'Scott is the author *Waverley*'"¹³

Let us now consider to the analysis of propositions of the form 'the-so-an-so'. Consider Russell's example: 'The author of *Waverley* was a poet'. According to Russell, here the definite description express through the sentence entails three propositions. These are:

- (i) At least one person authored *Waverley*
- (ii) At most one person authored *Waverley*
- (iii) Whoever authored *Waverley* was a poet.

According to Russell the conjunction of these three propositions as cited above define what is meant by the proposition 'The author of *Waverley* was a poet'. The original proposition is in the form of 'the-so-an-so'. It is in the form of definite description. According to Russell any statement what so ever, if it would accord with the form of definite description i.e., 'the-so-and -so', it can be logically paraphrased into 'at least one', 'at most one', and 'an exactly one'. That means the conjunction of these tree propositions (namely, (i), (ii), (iii)) define what is meant by the original proposition. In his *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, Russell tells us that this means that 'The author of *Waverley* was a poet' both logically entails and is entailed by the conjunction of these three propositions. Accordingly, they are equivalent. For Russell, any proposition of the form $\exists x (Qx)$ entails (1) $\exists x (Qx)$, and (2) $(x) \{ (y) [(Qx) \& (Qy) \supset (x=y)] \}$. (1) states that at least one thing has the characteristic, Q and (2) states that at most one thing has Q. The conjunction of (1) and (2) is logically equivalent to $(\exists c) \{ (x) [(Qx) \equiv (x=c)] \}$. And this is the definiens of the definitions for $E! (Ix) (Qx)$. Therefore $E! (Ix) (Qx)$ is entailed by every

¹³Linsky, Leonard, Referring, Humanities press, 1967, p.55.

proposition of the form U (IX) (QX). What is further entailed is that the unique thing which has the characteristic Q also has the characteristic U.

It may however be the case that what, for one person, is a proper name, is for other person is a disguised description. This is true even if we compare Russell with Frege. What Russell has said disguised description is at par with what Frege has said proper name. According to Russell, ordinary proper names are disguised description because even though they apparently look like names, but in real sense of the term, they are really disguised descriptions or *surrogate names*. Frege thinks the other way around. Unlike Russell, Frege holds that a linguistic expression, including phrase, clause or an incomplete part of a sentence would be treated as name if it has complete sense. Thus, unlike Russell, Frege gives importance on the sense or mood of presentation of proper name. Since the meaning of name is its bearer or what the name designates, to know the meaning of a name or to know the sense of a name is to know its bearer, i.e., its designator. Again to know the bearer of a name is to be acquainted with the bearer according to Russell. Since we are not at all acquainted with the same things, what is for one person a proper name may not be for other person a proper name according to Russell. Since Russell's interpreted proper name as logical proper name where a proper name designates an object, with which we are acquainted, a proper name which fails to designate an object would not be treated a genuine proper name according to Russell. Thus, Russell understanding of proper name is uniquely determines whether the proper name under consideration fulfills its referential commitment. In our sense *the referential commitment* is an inevitable commitment where the referential object is known to us in terms of acquaintance.

Now if a name, according to Russell, designates an object which at times is acquainted to a person and at other times is not acquainted to another person than certainly it would not be

regarded as a genuine proper name, what Russell termed as logical proper name. In such a case, what is a name for one person may be regarded as a description for another. In such the problem will occur and there might be difficulty in two such people understanding each other. However, Russell has not been disturbed by this. He anticipated the problematic area of proper name as far as their denotations and connotations, extensions and intentions are concerned. He anticipated very well that the distinction between logical proper name and ordinary proper name is prerequisite. As a result of that when the whole host of semanticists were voicing in favor of proper names, Russell further extended a little bit about the distinction between logical proper name and ordinary proper name. His descriptive theory of proper name has been originated and developed because of this problematic area of proper name. Russell elsewhere things that so long as what is a name for the one person names the same thing that is described by what is a description for the other there will be no difficulty.

However, Leonard Linsky finds some problems with Russell's positions just stated above. According to Linsky, it is not at all clear how this difficulty can be avoided. In this regard he goes on to say that suppose that you are 'acquainted' with John F. Keenedy and I am not. When you hear the assertion 'John F. Keenedy is dead' this will certainly mean something different to you than what it means to me. Linsky asserts that what it means to me depends on what description 'John F. Keenedy' is a 'disguise' for in my case. Even it may be a 'disguise' for 'the husband of Mrs. Keenedy'. Then 'John F. Keenedy is dead' means to me (Linsky) that the husband of Mrs. Keenedy is dead. However, it does not mean the same to you. Further, suppose that in a third case the description is a disguise for 'the father of John-John'. Then 'John F. Keenedy is dead' in the third case means that the father of John-John is dead. Linsky claims that in such a case it would seem to be only in the case of a lucky accident the two people would

mean the same thing by 'John F. Keenedy is dead'. These consequences, Linsky reveals, are absurd and he was wondering how Russell can avoid them.

Linsky, however, attributes credit to Russell that he (Russell) recognizes a difficulty here. At the same time linsky thinks that Russell's attempt to deal with this difficulty is not sound enough. If we say, e.g., Bismark was an attitude diplomatist following Russell, we intent to make our statement, not in the form involving the description, but about the actual thing describe.

Accordingly, we should like to make the judgment which "Bismark alone can make, namely, the judgment of which he himself is a constituent."¹⁴

But however, we cannot make the judgment according to Linsky because we can use an expression which means in such a judgment being unacquainted with Bismark. As a result of that we do not come to know the meaning of an expression which 'means' Bismark. As a result of that, any proposition containing such an expression would be meaningless for us. What Linsky intends to say here is that there is 'an object B' called 'Bismark' and we know that B was an attitude diplomatist can thus describe the proposition, namely, 'B was an attitude diplomatist', where B is the object which stands for Bismark. Here Linsky claims that what enables us to communicate in spite of the varying description we employ is that we know there is a true proposition concerning the actual Bismark. We may vary the description, according to Linsky, so long as the description is correct, the proposition described is still the same. This proposition, which is described, is known to be true, is what interest us: but we are not acquainted with the proposition itself, and "do not know it, though we know it is true".¹⁵

¹⁴Mysticism and Logic, Longmans, Green & Co., 1925, London, p.218., Chapter X.

¹⁵ Ibid., P. 218.

What Linsky finds incoherent here is that the idea of a proposition which we know to be true which we cannot understand. Alternatively, it can be said after Linsky that a proposition cannot be understandable even though it may perhaps be the case that we come to know it to be true. But the question is: how can we intend or so to speak intend to make a proposition which we cannot understand? How can we possibly know such a proposition to be true without understanding it? In this regard Linsky finds a special difficulty in Russell's view on the topic in connection with non-extensional context. Russell's understanding of logical proper name is denoting an object with which we are acquainted. However, his descriptive theory of reference is non-extensional in the sense that here the reference of proper name, that is an ordinary proper name, is not something with which we are acquainted. Thus, it would perhaps be the case and Russell would like to say that what is a proper name to X may not be a proper name to Y. Here Linsky asserts, if I say something of the form $f(a)$ where a is a proper name for me, my assertion $f(a)$ must then, on Russell's views, mean something different for me for what it means for you. For Linsky, what it means for you will be expressed by a sentence involving some definite descriptions say $f(IX) (QX)$. Here two cases need to be consider (i) $a = (IX) (QX)$ is not true. This case involves a special kind of misunderstanding according to Linsky, because here the thought of one person may be differentiated from the thought of another person. For Linsky, this sort of misunderstanding surely occurs in connection with our use of proper names and can easily be corrected (ii) this is the usual case, $a = (IX) (QX)$. Here one can get the reference correct. Further, if f represents an extensional predicate, what I mean when I say $f(a)$ is materially equivalent with what you understand by $f(IX) (QX)$. Russell's has found the problem and as a result of that he intended to find the distinction between logical proper name and ordinary proper name. For Linsky Russell's can face the result of misunderstanding of his theory

with equanimity for the following reason: “what you understand has the same truth-value as what I mean, and we are talking about the same thing, for $a = (IX) (QX)$. On Russell’s view, then, the normal situation with regard to human communication involves misunderstanding, but not so great a misunderstanding as to keep us from communicating truths about a commonly understood object of reference.”¹⁶

Now let ‘f’ stands for a non-extensional predicate. Further suppose I have George IV say, ‘I wonder if Scott is the author of Waverley.’ Further supposed to us ‘Scott’ is a proper name in Russell sense. Further suppose, I now say to you, ‘George IV wants to know if Scott is the author of Waverley.’ Further finally suppose that for you ‘Scott’ is not a proper name but a disguised description. What you understand by what I said will be expressed with the use of a description which expressed what ‘Scott’ means for you. Let that description be ‘the author of Ivanboe’. Now what you understand is expressed by the sentence George IV wants to know if the author of Ivanboe ‘is the author of Waverley’.

This situation creates or presence a difficulty here. Even though, Scott is the author of Ivanboe, it is perfectly possible that George IV does not know this. George IV like me knows it very well that ‘Scott is the author of Waverley,’ but he may not know that the author of Waverley is the same as the author of Ivanboe. Let us further suppose that George IV does not know that Scott wrote Ivanboe. In such a situation what we understand is not even materially equivalent with what I meant when I said, ‘George IV wants to know if Scott is the author of Waverley’. What we understand by this word is false. It would be a mere accident if what we understand in such a situation were to be materially equivalent with what I mean. It just happens to be the case that George IV also wants to know if Scott is the author of Ivanboe. No matter what descriptions

¹⁶Ibid., P.61

‘Scott’ disguises for you. The normal situation will be one in which what I mean by ‘George IV wants to know if Scott is the author of Waverley’ is true and what you understand by these words is false. According to Linsky, since the same argument can be repeated for non-extensional predicates (non-denotative predicates) generally, we may conclude that Russell’s theory faces a serious difficulty if it is viewed as a theory of communication in natural language. For Linsky, the difficulty actually hinges on how it is possible, on Russell’s views, for communication to take place when what is being reported are the beliefs, wants, hopes i.e., the ‘propositional attitudes’ of a third person.

What has been observed so far is that there is no problem as to what is meant by the phrase ‘definite description.’ It is extremely eliminative precise and vivid from logical point of view. Of course, Russell has very little to say as to what a definite description is. He precisely and succulently says that a definite description is in the form of ‘the-so-an-so.’ It is an expression of the form (IX) (QX). In this regard, Russell says that it can be read as ‘the (unique) X has the property Q.’ At the very outset of his article ‘On Denoting’ he explains the notion of definite description by giving a list of examples, namely, ‘the present king of England’, ‘the present king of France’, ‘the center of mass of solar system at the first instant of the Twentieth century’ ‘the revolution of the earth round the sun’, ‘the revolution of the sun round the earth’. All these are called ‘denoting phrases’ by Russell in 1905. Later on, denoting phrases have been renamed and called ‘definite description.’ Since a definite description is in the form of the-so-an-so, accordingly, it can be said after Russell that “a phrase is denoting in virtue of its form.”¹⁷

It seems to us that while talking about definite description of Russell, we have to talk it in terms of the form ‘the-so-an-so.’ What does it mean to say of a phrase that it is of the form ‘the-so-an-

¹⁷Russell, B. “On Denoting, reprinted in *Logic and Knowledge*”, P.41

so'? According to Linsky, the obvious response to this question is that the form of a phrase *is a matter of Grammar*. Strawson, for example, talks about phrase begging with the definite article followed by a noun, qualified or unqualified, in the singular.¹⁸ According to Strawson this is the class of expression with which Russell's Theory of Description is concerned. Strawson thinks that the phrase so-described are 'expression of the form "the-so-an-so"'.

Linsky, however, thinks that 'form' cannot be understood as grammatical form in the accounts of definite descriptions. Consider the proposition '*The Vicar of Wakefield* is behind the desk'. Here if the words 'The Vicar of Wakefield' are used to refer to novel they are the name of novel, not a description. But if the words are used to refer to the Vicar they are a description, not a name. On the basis of this, Linsky concludes by saying that the distinction cannot be one of grammatical form. More importantly, not any expression used to refer a unique object is a definite description. For example, proper names are not definite descriptions. Thus, it seems to us that whether a phrase is or is not a definite description actually depends on the logical form of that proposition description contains, and also on how the proposition is to be analyzed in a certain fashion it contains a definite description, otherwise not. Clearly, we can say, 'The Eterna city' in 'The Eternal City welcomed. The Neo Pope is not a descriptive phrase. The proposition does not entail that there exist one and only one, City which is Eternal. However, if the only way to decide whether a given expression functions as a definite description is to see whether or not Russell's analysis of such propositions would be the correct one in the case in question. It would thus follow that Russell analysis cannot be mistaken and who have argued that it is mistaken are confused over a definition.

¹⁸See Strawson, P.F., "On Referring, reprinted in *Essays in Conceptual Analysis*, ed., by A. G. N. Flew, Macmillan Co., London, 1956, P.21

Frege's view

The classical theory of reference has been treated as the basic theory of reference developed by Frege, Russell, Carnap, Searle and others. In this sequel we propose to deal with Frege and Russell. We think that the contribution of Frege and Russell holds the centrality of classical theory of reference. As far as theory of reference is concerned, there we find various types, such as descriptive theory of reference and non-descriptive theory of reference. Classical theory of reference of Frege and Russell has been attributed as the descriptive theory of reference. Even though both Frege and Russell hold the centrality of classical theory of reference, but there is no point in saying that their philosophical position regarding this theory remained same. There we find serious discriminations and conceptual differences between Frege and Russell. Having said this, their theory has been treated as the traditional or classical theory of reference because of its appearance prior to other theories on the same issue.

Frege and Locke

There is no question of doubt that Frege, being a mathematician and philosopher, has been regarded as *the father of analytic philosophy*. In fact, Frege has developed a wide conception of analytic philosophy is compare to other philosophers in the same field. Even there is nothing wrong to say that Frege has developed an integrated account of analytic philosophy in the real sense of the term. His theory of reference or referential semantic in some sense or other is associated with the prior thinkers such as Locke and others and also the later development of analytic philosophy or philosophy of language has deeply been ingrained in Frege's philosophical insights. In fact, Frege's theory of referential semantic has earned philosophical acceptability for important reasons. In this regard, Morris says, "First, his philosophy of language presents a way of accepting what seems most natural and intuitive about the kind of

approach to language found in Locke, while decisively rejecting what seems most questionable about it. And, secondly, his work offers the prospect of a thoroughly systematic approach to meaning”.¹⁹ We will certainly examine these two aspects in the course of the development of the theory of reference after Frege. According to Morris, Frege’s theory of semantic reference in some sense or other is associated with Locke’s theory of language in three important senses. Like Locke, Frege conceived that the nature of language is defined by its function. It means, both have given over emphasized on the functional aspect of language. Secondly, Frege, like Locke, holds that the essential function of language is to communicate. We think this the general apprehension as far as language is concerned. Even non-philosophers would say that language is a medium of communication. Language, so to speak, appears as a tool that can be used for communication. Of course, when both Locke and Frege said that the function of language is to communicate, they have altogether different perception of the function of language unlike the non-philosophers. Thirdly and most importantly, what language is meant to communicate is thought. We think the concept of thought is a tricky philosophical issue and many philosophers over the centuries had deeply been involved with the concept of thought. Many would like to say that Frege’s concept of thought had deeply been rooted in Locke’s concept of ideas.

Having said this, there we find some conceptual difference between Frege and Locke. According to Locke, every word is a sensible mark of ideas. In this sense, word always signifies the components of what language is meant to communicate. Thus, Locke talked in favor of the atomistic interpretation of language where words meaning had been treated prior to sentence meaning. Frege in some sense or other favors the atomistic interpretation of meaning like Locke. However, his interpretation would certainly be non-Lockean. According to Locke, as every individual word bears an idea or stands for self-standing Ideas in the mind of the speaker and in

¹⁹ Morris, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language*, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.21.

turn would constitute sentential meaning by way of combination with grammatical syntax and produces a complete meaning of the speaker's mind. Unlike Locke, Frege gives importance on the context principle where priority has been laid on sentence meaning rather than word meaning. Frege thus rejects Lockean conception of the relation between words and sentences. Further Locke holds that the components of thoughts are Ideas and by way of asserting it he intends to say that words mean Ideas. However, Frege does not intend to say that words mean Ideas. Rather he intends to say that the meaning of a word is what is known by someone who understand the word. According to Frege, it is not true that all words mean or refer to ideas. In fact, Frege's conception of philosophy of language or referential semantic has been developed with the background of the *material of formal logic*. He took the advantage of formal logic to illustrate the meaning of words. He started with the development of a new system of formal logic and subsequently it has been treated as the guideline of studying elementary logic. Even Frege's development of logic completely outdated or superseded Aristotelian logic in the real sense of the term. As the problem of meaning has been interpreted with the outlook of formal logic, Frege initially deals with non-natural language like other semantics. Thus, the language of Frege profusely differs from the language of Locke. Locke being a representation realist certainly engaged with natural language, whereas Frege, being a referential semantics, engaged with non-natural language. This makes a huge conceptual difference as far as their understanding of the meaning of language is concerned. However, the debate between Locke and Frege is very interesting and it deserves worthy of philosophical consideration and clarification.

Since Frege began with formal logic, he was completely against psychologist. There is no role of psychology in logic. Simplistically, it can be said that logical language appears against psychology. According to Locke since every word is the sensible mark of Ideas, so the Ideas

must be relevant to the meaning. Frege thinks the other way around. For Frege, Ideas must be irrelevant to meaning because it may perhaps be the case that people having different Ideas of a word have the same meaning of the word under consideration. Thus, Frege, unlike Locke, makes distinction between the *meaning of a word* and *its associated Ideas*. Further as a mathematician, Frege intends to say that there is nothing in mathematics to do with Ideas. In arithmetic we are concerned with numbers; not Ideas of any kind. The same is equally true in the case of aeronautical engineer, who is concerned with Aeroplan's, but certainly not with the Ideas of Aeroplan's. However, we need to assume that words belong to fields of human concern really determines the meaning of a word. Further we need to assume that the basic objects of human concern are not Ideas, but will be concerned with numbers, gardeners with plants etc. Only certain kind of psychologists will be concerned with Ideas. This clearly creates a gulf between Frege and Locke. The concept of Ideas comprehended by Locke in some sense or other rests on psychology; but the concept of thought as conceived by Frege never rests on psychology.

Undoubtedly, Frege offers us a comprehensive account of the problem of meaning. Without entering into the domain of psychology, Frege offers us a fundamental world-oriented conception of meaning. In this regard, Frege inclines to say that words will mean things which are the object. In this regard, it can be said that things make up the world. Here the function of language can be comprehended in two important accounts. First, there develops a theory of language being designed to communicate *thoughts* and secondly, there develops a theory of language being designed to communicate *facts*. When language functions as a theory to design thought, it is primarily concerned *with the concepts of people's mind* and when language functions as a theory to design facts, it is being *concerned with the state of the world*. Thus, there are two accounts of language to describe the content of people's mind as well as the state of the

world. Many referential semantics, such as, Russell, early Wittgenstein, Kripke and referential reductionists have accepted the one and rejected the other. However, in Frege, we find the accommodation of both. That is why Frege's theory of sense and reference has been attributed as the comprehensive theory. This, in fact, gives Frege a distinctive position as far as the development of referential semantic is concerned. Frege goes on to say that language is concerned both with the communication of thoughts and equally concerned with the state of mind. Thus, while anticipating language as the communication of thoughts, Frege does not rule out the relevance of *world-oriented conception of language*. These two approaches of language apparently seem to be incoherent with each other. In fact, referential realists do not agree with Frege and they criticize Frege in this regard. However, these two accounts or interpretations of language actually open up further invitation of some philosophical concepts. One such concept is Context Principle (CP).

Context Principle

It is important to note here that those who talk in favor of logical proper name would like to say that a proper name denotes or refers an object. According to Russell, a logical proper name refers to an object with which we are directly acquainted. Early Wittgenstein says that a name denotes an object and the meaning of the object is the meaning of the name. Even Kripke says that a proper name is a rigid designator which designates the same object in every possible world. For them, proper name has no sense, but only reference. The reference of a proper name makes it meaningful. Thus, there develops two theories of proper name, such as, *no-sense theory of proper name* and *sense theory of proper name*. According to no-sense theory of proper name, the context is irrelevant to determine the meaning of a proper name. Rather the referential assurance of a proper name makes the proper name meaningful.

However, when we read Frege, we find a different interpretation altogether. According to Frege, context principle plays an important role while determining the meaning of a proper name. By introducing context principle, Frege enables to introduce *sense theory of reference*. According to Frege, proper names must have sense without exception. If a proper name lacks sense (mode of presentation) it would no longer be treated as a proper name. The context principle of proper name states that a word in isolation has no meaning. A word can acquire meaning in the real sense of the term only *in the context of a sentence*.²⁰ Alternatively, it can be said after Frege that words have meaning only in the context of a sentence. Thus, Frege with his context principle appears as a proponent of holistic interpretation of meaning where the priority of sentence meaning has been recognized over word meaning. A word in isolation has no meaning. However, a word in normal case contributes to the meaning of sentences in which it occurs. What is the philosophical relevance of context principle? Why does Frege favors it? Why should we accept context principle? Of course, the philosophical implication of introducing context principle is colossal from Frege's point of view. According to Frege, if we do not accept context principle, then we will be driven to think that words mean Ideas. In such as case, Frege would be treated like Locke. As we have seen that Locke claimed that a word is the sensible mark of Ideas. Thus, by incorporating context principle within the realm of referential semantic, Frege differs from Locke. In this regard, Frege says that if we do not contend with context principle, then we have to think that a word has meaning in isolation and the correlation between a word and the idea with which it is associated are distinct in nature. In such a case, it could be run into outside language. Then we have to look at something extra-linguistic to be correlated with every word and in turn we have to look inside the mind as Locke did. Instead of this, if we admit context principle, we can easily avoid this problem because in such a case out point of issue would be *the*

²⁰Frege, *The Foundation of Arithmetic*, trans. J. L. Austin, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980, p.x.

meaning of sentences. The advantage of it is that it would immensely help us to overcome the temptation to think that words have meaning in virtue of the kind of correlation which we notice in Locke.

The other notable importance of context principle is that it would adequately address to the problem of *the unity of sentence*. What problem unity of sentence deals with? Unity of sentence actually finds the problem generated from independently meaningful parts. The context principle tries to overcome this problem by way of considering unity of sentence as basic and the meaning of its parts in some way or other derivative from the meaning of the sentences. But still there remains some visible problem with context principle. It is still not clear how context principle can be true? In fact, Frege while developing his referential semantic in his later writings anticipated a converse principle of context principle in the name of Principle of Compositionality.

Principle of Compositionality (PC)

What then is principle of compositionality according to Frege? The strongest version of PC runs as follows: *The meaning of a grammatical complex form is a compositional function of the meanings of its grammatical constituents.*²¹ In this regard, Frege goes on to say that ‘there is no more to the meaning of a sentence than what is determined by the meanings of the words of which it is composed and the way in which they are arranged’. Principle of Compositionality deals with the most basic facts about language that the meaning of sentences depends on the meaning of their component words. Moreover, Frege considers PC as the core principle of the study of semantics and in this regard, he has been designated as the founder father of PC. One should not confuse here of considering semantics in a non-specific way. It should be kept in mind that semantics has wide varieties. Therefore, when we interpret semantics with regard to

²¹ Cruse, *Meaning in Language*, Oxford University Press, 2000, p.67.

Frege's PC, we have a definite perception in mind. According to Frege, semantics is the systematic explanation of 'how the meaning of words determines the meaning of sentences composed from them'.²²Semantics is the core of analytic philosophy and it is generally associated with the problem of meaning. Again, the problem of meaning is a tricky philosophical issue. When semantics as a branch of philosophy deals with the problem of meaning, it is primarily concerned with the relation between language and the world.

If we carefully go through the definition of PC after Frege, we find various insights. First, it states that the meaning of a complex expression in some sense or other is being determined by the meanings of its constituents. Secondly, it equally assumes that the meaning of a complex expression is completely predictable by general rules from the meanings of its constituents. Thirdly, it leads us to assume that every grammatical constituent has a meaning which in turn combines to the meaning of the whole. The pertinent question then is: what is the rationale behind this principle? It actually hinges on two deeper presuppositions. First, language has an infinite number of grammatical sentences and the second is that language has unlimited expressive power or dispositional power (the illocutionary force according to Austin). On the basis of the dispositional power, speech-acts are being performed. It means anything that can be conceived of can be expressed in language. Thus, there seems nothing problematic in PC as far as determining the meaning of sentences.

Thus, there we find notable distinction between Context Principle and Principle of Compositionality. Context principle says that sentences are basic; whereas Principle of Compositionality says that words are basic. The question then is: How can both be true? We think that both are coherent as far as proving the meaning of language is concerned. According to Morris, sentence is basic in our understanding of the relation between language and what is

²² Morris, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language*, op. cit., p.25.

outside language. It is by means of sentence that we can get language to engage with the world. Alternatively, it can be said that the relationship between language and world is made possible by way of understanding the meaning of sentence in proper. In this sense, sentence as part of language is basic. Like sentence, *word is basic in our understanding of the relation between each sentence and the rest of the language to which it belongs*. There is no question of doubt that one can understand the meaning of a sentence just by way of knowing or understanding the meaning of its constituent words. Therefore, whether we do prefer context principle or the principle of compositionality that does not make difference, they are in some sense or other is integrated. Moreover, there are various types of the principle of compositionality and various modes of the same. Truly speaking, the principle of compositionality does not take us very far in understanding how meanings are combined. There are various modes of combinations, such as, *additive modes of combination; interactive modes*. A combination will be said to be *additive* if the meanings of the constituents are simply added together and both survive without radical change in the combination. In *interactive types of combination*, the meaning of at least one constituent is radically modified.

Frege on Sense and Reference

Frege's referential semantics or whole philosophy of language was shaped by his work on logic. In his early work *Begriffsschrift*, which literally means 'concept-script or concept notation', Frege developed logical system in a systematic manner and it appeared and studied as *elementary logic*. As Frege started his referential semantics with the help of concept-script, his understanding of language would certainly be artificial or ideal language. Frege at this stage has chosen logical perfect language instead of natural language like other semantics because of its obvious loopholes and ambiguities. As a founder of elementary logic, Frege put emphasize on

the validity. According to Frege, logic is the study of validity. In logic, an argument is valid if its conclusion is logically followed from its premise/s. Thus, the basic task of any elementary logical system is to know what actually makes an argument valid; how the constituent of an argument, i.e., the premise/s and the conclusion are inter-related; and more importantly whether the conclusion is logically followed from the premise/s or not. Frege then applied the concept of validity in his philosophy of language or referential semantics. Alternatively, it can be said that Frege's whole philosophy of language is guided by the concept of validity that he comes to know from logic. Frege then gives the general form of the validity of an argument. He says that 'an argument is valid if and only if it is impossible for all of its premises to be true and its conclusion is false. This definition of validity opens us or adds new information, i.e., the concept of truth and falsity. Frege here understands the validity of an argument with regard to the truth value of its constituents, i.e., propositions appearing as premise/s and conclusion. Frege, in fact, developed modern elementary logic in two important layers, such as, sentential or propositional logic and predicate logic. The first layer is sentential logic. It is held to be primitive and basic in the sense that other logical systems are being developed on the basis of sentential logic. In this sense, sentential logic is being treated as *First Order Logic*. The next layer of elementary logic is predicate logic which is primarily concerned with arguments based on relations between parts of sentences known as subject and predicate. Thus, at bottom, Frege recognizes two basic kinds of parts of sentences of which one kind consists of words or phrases which refer to particular individual objects known as singular term and Frege called them proper names. The other kind of basic part of sentence is called predicate. What then is a predicate according to Frege? A predicate, Frege asserts, is just the result of removing one or more singular terms from a sentence. Predicate may be monadic or dyadic. Monadic predicate is a one-place predicate and

dyadic predicate is a two-place predicate. For example, 'x was gentle' is a monadic predicate and it is obtained from the sentence 'Radhakrishnan was gentle'. Again, 'x was as gentle as y' is a dyadic predicate and it is obtained from the sentence: Radhakrishnan was gentle as Gandhi. Thus, in the Concept-script, Frege developed a kind of artificial language that would be constituted only by logical proper names and predicates. At this stage, he understood sentence with regard to truth and falsity; he interpreted singular terms with regard to objects which they refer to; he interpreted predicates with regard to difference they make to the truth and falsity of sentences, given any particular choice of singular terms in place of the variables. Simplistically, it can be said after Frege that his whole philosophy of language actually began with the bedrock of elementary logic and the language he presumed in his *Begriffsschrift* (concept notation) was purely logical language comprising singular terms known as proper names and predicates towards achieving logical decisions with regard to truth and falsity in the case of proposition or sentence or validity in the case of an argument.

Two Aspects of Meaning

So far, we are engaging with Frege's early work of his philosophy of language. At his early work, Frege sweepingly used two German words which are deeply riddled with meaning or the problem of meaning. One is 'Bedeutung' a noun form (the verb form is 'bedeuten') which might naturally be translated by the English word 'significance' or 'signification' as well as 'meaning'. The other is 'Sinn', which is naturally translated by 'sense' or 'the mode of presentation'. Thus, it seems to us that Frege has developed two different aspects of meaning. However, his mature account of language has been reflected through *Bedeutung*. *Bedeutung* has two aspects. In one sense he takes it for the purpose of logic and science to some extent and in another sense, he reads it simply equivalent to 'meaning'. Frege finds the relevance of *Bedeutung* particularly in

the case of singular terms because singular terms, according to Frege, refer to objects. Like singular terms, Frege does not expect the same sort of referential implication in predicate and sentences. According to Frege, predicate does not refer to object like singular term; rather a predicate refers **to functions of a particular kind**. The possible values of the function are just truth and falsity and hence meaningful. For example, $x + y$ has the value 5 for the arguments 2 and 3 if you put '2' and '3' in place of 'x' and 'y' in the expression 'x + y'. Frege then called functions of this kind *concepts*. For Frege, predicates stand for *concept-words*. Thus, he understands reference in two different senses. When he says that a proper name being a singular term refers to an object, he in this regard takes the realist position of referential semantics. However, he has certainly be deviated from this position when he understands the reference of predicate with regard to concept and considers predicates as concept words. This, in fact, involves Frege into a peculiar problem and Frege has to pay a lot to overcome this problem. Frege himself gives different philosophical status of two different types of referent. He, in fact, notes grammatical difference between singular terms and predicates. According to Frege, the referents of singular terms are called objects and such referents are complete and saturated. On the contrary, the referents of predicates are concepts and they are incomplete and unsaturated. For example, the referent of the predicate 'x is horse' is the Concept horse. Frege in this regard strictly holds that the Concept horse is not an object; rather it is the referent of a predicate. Further Frege goes on to say that even sentences too have referents. What then are the referents of sentences according to Frege? In this regard, Frege says that **truth-values are the referents of sentences**. This position of Frege again seems to be problematic as it would invite the threat of collapsing the difference between singular terms and sentences.

The question naturally arises: why does Frege anticipate that truth and falsity should really be what matters about the meaning of sentences? In responding to this question, Frege seems to offer two arguments. We have seen that Frege has cognized the word 'Bedeutung' as synonymous to *meaning or significance or sometimes as reference or even as importance*. Thus, in a sense his Context principle is in some sense or other being concerned with Bedeutung. He then quips: Why should it be important for us that a singular term has reference? Why is it so important that there is a real object to which it refers? These questions, of course, are no longer relevant in fiction. Frege's response is that such questions matter because if we do not assert that there is a real object to which a singular term refers, we would no longer be in a position to claim that the sentence in which the singular term is included or is associated with is really true or false. That means the truth or falsity of a sentence in which the singular term is associated with actually hinges on whether the singular term under consideration refers to an object or not. The sentence 'The water bottle is full of water' is true if the proper name or singular term 'the water bottle' associated with the sentence under consideration refers to a real object *bottle*. If the water bottle fails to refer to a real object 'bottle', the question of its fullness simply does not arise. Thus, it can be said after Frege, that the truth or falsity of sentences is important just like the same way as the real existence of the referents of singular terms is. *Thus, there is no problem in saying that truth or falsity is the referents of sentences.*

Secondly, the same can equally be justified with regard to PC. As per as PC is concerned, the meaning of a sentence remains unchanged 'if we swap the words within it for other words whose meaning is the same'. Frege applies this principle to reference as well, of course, in a more ordinary sense. He intends to say that as per PC is concerned only the truth value of sentences as such remain the same even though some component words may be exchanged with regard to

other words. Here again, Frege understands reference with regard to the truth-values of sentences.

Many would say that Frege's theory of reference actually creates a huge gulf between the reference of expressions and what might ordinarily be called their meaning. All true sentences have the same reference affirmatively and all false sentences have the same reference negatively. However, this does not make sense to say that all true sentences or all false sentences have the same meaning. Likewise, if we go through Frege's theory we find that two predicates have the same reference if they are true of the same things. For example, the same creatures have hearts as well as kidneys. Accordingly, it can be said after Frege that the predicates, such as, 'x has a heart' and 'x has a kidney' are true of just the same creature. Accordingly, they have the same reference, but it would be absurd to assume that they have the same meaning. Thus, Frege notes that two or more expressions having different meaning may have the same reference. This actually has prompted Frege to write the celebrated article "Sense and Reference" (Über Sinn and Bedeutung).

Sense Theory and the Problem of Informative Identity Statements

While introducing the notion of sense, Frege at the very outset compares the following two identity statements:

(i) $a = a$

(ii) $a = b$

According to Frege, (i) is obvious and it can be determined as true without thinking. It cannot give us new information. But (ii) is different from (i) in the sense that its truth actually hinges on information. Hence it is treated as informative identity according to Frege. Frege then claims that this sort of informative identity is necessary to determine the same reference of two different

meaningful sentences. For example, the sentence ‘The morning star’ and the sentence ‘The evening star’ have different meaning. The morning star actually means a star that will rise in the morning and the evening star actually means a star that will rise in the evening and thus they express different meaning. Having said this, their referent is the same. Both of these sentences refer to Venus. Those who come to know the fact would like to say that $a = b$. However, those who do not know the information would no longer in a position to know that $a = b$. This would be unlikely in the case of $a = a$. Thus, by introducing the concept of informative identity in the form of $a = b$, Frege actually enables to overcome the problem of meaning. In $a = b$, both ‘a’ and ‘b’ stand for proper names and ‘=’ stands for concept in Frege’s technical sense. Even Frege at times considers semantic complexity in terms of his notion of reference. For him even a large number of arithmetical expressions can be treated as functional expressions. For example, the whole expression of ‘ $2+3+6$ ’ is just that it names the number 11. Accordingly, the number 11 is its referent. The same is applied in other cases as well. Thus, in a sense it can be said that the whole expression contributes to sentences in which it occurs is the object it refers to. The expressions, such as, ‘ $3+3+3$ ’ and ‘ $4+4+1$ ’ refer to the same whole number 9 in different ways. Frege in his early logical work, *Begriffsschrift* (concept-notation), claimed that identity statements were really about the *words involved*. To say that the sentence ‘the morning star’ is identical with sentence ‘The evening star’ or to say that ‘The morning star *is* evening star’ is just to say that the words in the left had the same content (reference) as the words on the right.²³By the term ‘meaning of the words’, Frege means sense (Sinn) and then says that the sense of expressions may be different even though their reference would remain the same as we have seen in the case of ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star’.

²³ See Frege, *Begriffsschrift*, Halle, 1879, section 8.

What then is a sense according to Frege? Frege says sense ‘contains’ the way in which the object (in the case of singular terms) is given. Alternatively, it can be said that sense contains the mode of presentation of the referent. The mode of presentation regarding two singular names may be different but their reference would remain the same. Again, consider the following two sentences:

(a) Aphla is the same mountain as Ateb

(b) Aphla is the same mountain as Aphla

In the above, (a) is informative and (b) is obvious. Aphla is a mountain appears from the south and Ateb is a mountain appears from the north. The southern aspect provides one way in which the mountain may be given and the same happens in the northern as well. Thus, the sense or mode of presentation of these two mountains differs from each other, but they actually refer to the same mountain. One might wonder whether the mode of presentation could remain the same in the case of complex singular terms and simple singular terms like ordinary proper names. In this regard, Frege inclines to say that all kinds of linguistic expression could have sense as well as reference. He says that sentences as wholes (PC) had sense and he equally thought that the Senses of sentences are thoughts. Thus, we have many important coins as used by Frege while developing his referential semantics, such as, sense, the mode of presentation, reference, thought, concept, singular term, proper names, predicates, etc. One has to have the clear vision of each of these concepts to know about Frege’s referential semantics. According to Frege, sense or mode of presentation must be possessed by every linguistic expression used as proper names (singular or complex, simple or logical). **The Sense expressed by a sentence is the thought.** Thus, in Frege’s sense thought is independent from language and we think this position actually goes against later Wittgenstein who vehemently denies the possibility of private language. In fact,

those who admit the possibility of private language would like to say that thought has its independent locus beyond language. Thought is being expressed by means of language, in Frege's sense, through sense or mode of presentation. Two persons have the same thought of an object, but when they express their thought by means of language their mode of presentation would be different. However, different mode of presentation of two different persons regarding an object may not lead to two different referents of the object under consideration. This is where the relevance of PC.

It seems that Frege's notion of sense is defined in terms of informativeness²⁴ what has been characterized by Gareth Evans as the *Intuitive Criterion of Difference*. Evan in this regard says, "The thought associated with one sentence S must be different from the thought associated with another sentence S' as its sense, if it is possible for someone to understand both sentences at a given time while coherently taking different attitudes towards them, i.e., accepting (rejecting) one while rejecting (accepting) , or being agnostic about, the other."²⁵Frege's concept of sense not only offers us a solution of the problem of informative identity statements, it also addresses two other problems. First, it enables to overcome the problem about sentences containing singular terms which do not refer to any real thing. That means it offers us a solution of the problem of empty proper name. According to Frege, the complex singular terms, such as, 'the least rapidly converging series' does not refer anything because there is no such thing. However, it has sense. Likewise, in the case of sentence containing fictional name, e.g., 'Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep', the name Odysseus does not refer to any real thing and hence it lacks reference. If the name has no reference, the sentence as a whole can have no reference either. Having said this, it is meaningful in some sense or other because reading the

²⁴ See Frege, 'Über Sin and Bedeutung', p.32.

²⁵ Evans, *The Varieties of Reference*, Oxford University Press, 1982, p.19.

Odyssey is not wholly an empty exercise. According to Frege, the name Odysseus has sense, but no reference. The sentence as a whole expresses a thought even though it has no truth-value.

By the term sense of a proper name (sign), Frege explicitly means the mode of presentation in which the referent is given. Of course, there is no point of saying that referent is given if there is no referent at all. Rather we can make sense of a way of specifying a referent if there is one. This is the nature of understanding of *mode of presentation*. The other problem Frege uses the notion of sense to solve is the problem arising out of offering semantics for ordinary languages. The semantic theory for a language is a systemic account of how the meaning of sentences in that language depends on the meaning of their parts. The latter part of 'Über Sin und Bedeutung' was primarily concerned with the semantic account of ordinary languages which contain for reporting speech, for describing thoughts and feelings of people, etc. what Frege termed as *indirect contexts*.

Chapter Two

The Causal Theory of Reference

The new theory of reference appears as *an antithesis of the classical theory of reference* as developed by Frege, Russell and others. This theory became widespread in the 19670s and is still flourishing today. It states that many proper names (many locutions) refer directly to items and thus deviated from the classical theory of reference. According to the classical theory of reference or so to speak old theory of reference, names and relevantly similar locutions express descriptive senses or are disguised descriptions. The new theory differs from the classical theory in the sense that it encompasses such notions as direct reference, rigid designation, identity across possible worlds, the necessity of identity, a posteriori necessity, singular propositions, essentialism about natural kinds, the argument from the failure of substitutivity in model contexts that proper names are not equivalent to contingent definite descriptions, and related ideas and arguments. Unlike the classical theory of reference, the new theory of reference encompasses such notions as **direct reference**, **rigid designation**, and **identity across possible worlds**, the necessity of identity, a posterior necessity, singular propositions, essentialism about natural kinds, the argument from the failure of sensitivity in model contexts that proper names are not equivalent to contingent definite descriptions, and related ideas. Some of the leading contributors to the development of this theory include Kripke, Putnam, Donnellan, Kalpan, Perry, Salmon, Soames, Almog, Wettstein and a number of other contemporary philosophers. In this sequel we propose to analyze and explicate the views of Kripke, Donnellan and Putnam.

The Program of the New/ Causal Theory of Reference

The causal theory of proper names is an account of the meaning relation for the terms associated with the relation. For example, when utterance-type N is the proper name of object 0, the connection between N and 0 is – a causal connection of some sort between 0 and at least some utterances of N. The New theory of reference asserts that there always underlies a **chain of causal connection** that would ensure chain of references. In this regard Kripke says, “A rough statement of a theory might be the following: An initial baptism take place. Here the object may be named by ostension, or the reference of the same (sic) may be fixed by a description. When the name is ‘passed from link to link’, the reference of the name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it.”²⁶ Thus the chain of references thesis is introduced as part of the challenges to the descriptive theory’s thesis of use where a speaker’s reference to 0 in uttering N depends upon the uniquely applying descriptions of 0 the speaker associated with N. Thus, the chain theory of references thesis is coupled with the assertion that the chain must go back to 0 itself. Accordingly, by way of stipulating a causal connection from utterances of N to 0 is established. This stipulation actually amounts to a commitment to the causal theory of proper names as the basis for the rigid treatment of these terms. However, it should be kept in mind that the utterance of N to refer to 0 requires a causal connection between the utterance and 0. Having said this, they are in principle separable even though there underlies a chain references in between them. It is perfectly intelligible that the speaker’s reference using a name is to be determined by tracing back a chain of references to an *initial baptismal* reference without insisting that any of the utterances in the chain be causally linked to the referent. This would lead us to allow the crucial baptism to be some sort of association of the name a uniquely applying description that has been in the mind of the speaker.

²⁶Kripke, 1972, p.302.

It might be thought that what is important is not their commitment to the causal theory of proper names per se. Certainly, it is the chain of references thesis that would force us to revise the simple descriptive picture of meaning-knowledge for proper names. Having said this, the chain of references account is still compatible with the semantic chains of descriptive theorist. The fact is that a speaker's reference is not determined by the description(s) he associates with N in no way excludes the logical equivalence of N to some identifying descriptions with which it is associated in its initial baptismal use. By contrast, it can be said that causal theory of proper name does seem to bring with it the semantic thesis that proper names are rigid. Let me begin by laying out the notations of rigid /non-rigid designators. Consider a sentence of the form 'Fa', where 'a' stands for a proper name and 'F' stands for a predicate expression. It is very similar to the singular proposition that we use in predicate logic which may be true or false. Here 'Fa' may be said to express a function from possible-worlds to truth-values. If 'a' is a rigid designator, 'Fa' expresses a function which may be characterized thus: Let W be our world, the world in which 'a' is given its conventional denotation, and let x be the individual which 'a' denotes in W. For any possible-world W', in which x exists, the function then assigns true to W' if x is F in W', and false to W' if x is not F in W', no matter what else is true of x in W'. On the other hand, if 'a' is non-rigid, 'a' is associated with properties P which comprise the criterion of the application of 'a' in W. The function expressed by 'Fa' then assigns true to W' if the individual having P in W' is F in W' and false to W' if the individual having P in W' is not F in W'- no matter whether the individual having P in W' is x. Where 'a' is non-rigid, then, 'a' has in P its Fregean sense.

Now, let W be the world in which N is actually used and let W' be any other world. Clearly, to hold the causal theory of proper name is to hold that with respect to W the referent of N is just

the object 0 with which it has the appropriate causal connection in W. Now what about the referent of N with respect to W? If we do not say that it is 0 – the very same 0 as in W – then either we must say that it is the object having in W' the causal relation to N apropos of naming, or else that the properties P which comprise the criterion of N's application in W determine N's reference with respect to W' as well. Neither of these alternatives seems attractive because in each case, N is equivalent to a definite description and accordingly, the role of causality in connecting the proper name with its referent seems to dissolve. Therefore, in maintain the causal theory of proper name, we seem compelled to treat N as a rigid designator. Thus, the causal theory of proper names itself opposes the classical or descriptive theory of use. Since N will be rigid, these descriptions cannot be taken as equivalent to N according to Fregean sense.

The Chain of References Thesis

1. The Chain of References thesis is like: For utterance-type N and object 0, N is a proper name of 0 if and only if there is an established practice or convention to use taken of N to refer identifying to 0, no matter whether any terms embedded in N are true of 0. Here the causal theory of referring entails the causal theory of proper names. That means, if the speech act of referring requires a causal connection with the individual referred to, then the causal theory of referring incorporates causality as an essential element in the meaning-relation for proper names. On the contrary, if referring does not entail causality, then it is hard to see the proper names do either. In such a case, we can name anything we can refer to.

Points of departures

The new theory of reference deviates from the classical theory of reference on the following points.

First, according to the causal theory of reference proper names are directly referential and are not abbreviated or disguised descriptions, as Frege and Russell and most philosophers up to the 1770s believed. In this regard, Marcus writes, "... to give a thing a proper name is different from giving a unique description. An identifying tag is a proper name of the thing. This tag, a proper name, has no meaning. It simply tags. It is not strongly equitable with any of the singular descriptions of the thing."²⁷ We think this is the basis of the contemporary 'direct reference' theory of proper names which has been further seized the foothold with the contribution of the famous theory 'Rigid designator' of Saul Kripke. Even though there we notice a controversy regarding the forerunner of the theory of direct reference as many would say that it was Kripke who actually has planted the seed of this theory. However, if we carefully go through the literature, it seems clear to us that Marcus has developed this theory before Kripke. Anyway, the debate is not so much relevant in the context of this point. The position of Marcus and Kripke remained the same as both of them talked in favor of direct reference theory that would go against the classical theory of reference. For example, Frege understands reference through sense. Thus, his interpretation of reference is not direct but indirect. Frege actually gives importance on the sense or meaning of proper names. Thus, to Frege the sense of a name is primary and the reference of a name is secondary. The reference of a linguistic term can be known through the sense of the term under consideration. As we have already stated that Frege conceives the sense of a proper name as a mode of presentation. Thus, the position of direct reference theory certainly goes against Frege. Russell says that ordinary proper names are disguised descriptions or abbreviated descriptions. He says that even though ordinary proper names look like proper names but in real sense they are disguised descriptions. We think where there is a scope for descriptions there is a scope of ambiguity. Thus, for Russell, the reference of

²⁷ Marcus, 'Modalities and Intentional Languages', *Synthese*, 13, 1961, pp.303-322.

an ordinary proper name is known by descriptions and its reference is no longer direct; it is indirect. This clearly suggests that the classical theory of reference talks in favor of indirect reference whereas the causal theory of reference talks in favor of direct theory of reference. For example, 'Scott' refers directly to Scott and does not express a sense expressible by such a definite description as "the author of Waverly".

Secondly, every proper name has two aspects, the denotative aspect and the connotative aspect. The denotative aspect is associated with reference and the connotative aspect is associated with sense or meaning or mode of presentation. As a result of that there develops two theories of proper names, such as, the sense theory of proper names and the non-sense theory of proper names. The classical theory addresses on the sense theory of proper names. The causal theory of reference is predominantly concerned with the non-sense theory of proper names. For Marcus, a tag has reference but no sense. For Kripke, a proper name is a rigid designator that would designate the same object in every possible world. Even though Frege admits both the sense and the reference of a proper name, but he gives priority to the sense of a proper name over the reference of a proper name. According to Frege, a proper name cannot be without sense; the sense of a proper name determines its reference. But there may have proper name having sense but no reference at all. Thus, Frege's classical theory of reference admits referential failure of proper name. The direct reference theory does not anticipate any referential failure of a proper name. This is a distinctive deviation of the causal theory of reference from the classical theory of reference.

Thirdly, according to the causal theory of reference, we can single out a thing by a definite description, but this description serves only to single it out, not to be strongly equitable with a proper name of the thing in question. In this regard Marcus says, "It would also appear to be a

preconception of language [especially assigning names] that the singling out of an entity as a thing is accompanied by many unique descriptions, for otherwise how would it be singled out? But to give thing proper names is different from giving a unique description.”²⁸We think this later idea became widely disseminated through Kripke’s discussion of how reference-fixing descriptions are sometimes used to single out a thing as a bearer of a name, but that the names are not disguised descriptions as classical theory anticipated. In this regard Kripke says, “It seems plausible to suppose that, in some cases, the reference of a name is indeed fixed via a description [but the description is not “part of the meaning of the name].””²⁹In this regard, Kripke also added a novel idea by saying that in other cases names’ reference may be secured by a historical causal chain steaming back to the original “baptismal”.”³⁰

Fourthly, unlike the classical theory of reference, the causal or new theory of reference gives importance on **the modal necessity**. By saying that proper names are directly referential both Marcus and Kripke introduced the concept of modal necessity. Modal necessity ensures the referential guarantee in trans-world communication. Let us make clear Marcus position first:

(10) The evening star eq the morning star

(15) Scott is the author of *Waverly*

According to Marcus the symbol ‘eq’ stands for some equivalence notation. According to her, types of equivalence relation include identity, indiscernibility, strict equivalence, material equivalence and others. For Marcus the equivalence relations to be unpacked in (10) and (15) are not strong enough to support the relevant thesis of the *disguised contingent description* theory of proper names. She says, “If we decide that “the evening star” and “the morning star” are [proper]

²⁸ Ibid., p.309.

²⁹Kripke, ‘Naming and Necessity’, in Davidson and Harman, eds., *Semantics of Natural Language*, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1972, p. 276.

³⁰ Ibid., p.298-303.

names for the same thing, and that “Scott” and “the author of Waverly” are [proper] names for the same thing, then they must be indistinguishable in every context. In fact, it often happens, in a growing, changing language that a descriptive phrase comes to be used as a proper name –in an identifying tag – and the descriptive meaning is lost or ignored.”³¹ However, following Marcus, we can say that not all of the relevant expressions are names for the same thing. As a result of that they are not indistinguishable in modal contexts. According to Marcus, if they express a true identity, then, ‘Scott’ ought to be anywhere intersubstitutable for ‘the authority of Waverly’ in modal contexts, and similarly for ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star’. However, if they are not so universally intersubstitutable then according to our position they are not really proper names stand for the same thing. That they express equivalence in surface or grammatical level, but in deep or logical level they appear as false. In our case, someone else might have written Waverly and the star first seen the evening might have been different from the star first seen in the morning. If it does then surely, they are not identical. Marcus’ modal argument reflects why the ‘disguised contingent description’ theory of proper names is false. (10) and (15) do not express identities. Here the expressions flanking ‘is’ are not proper names for the same thing. In (10) and (15) a weaker equivalence relation should be unpacked by a theory of descriptions. As a result of that it does not pass Marcus modal test based on necessity. However, instead of these, if we consider the sentence “Hesperus is Phosphorus” it demonstrates an identity sign flanked by the two expressions. As a result of that, it then clearances Marcus’ modal test for containing two proper names of the same thing. Even this modal argument as developed by Marcus and Kripke goes back to Marcus’ proof of the necessity of identity in her extension of S4, which is a fourth component she introduced into her The New Theory of Reference. Here Marcus actually extended Lewis’s S4 by QS4 where the symbol ‘Q’ stands for Quantification. Thus, Marcus’

³¹ Marcus, ‘Modalities and Intensional Languages’, op. cit., pp. 308-309.

Modal theory is a quantification extension of Lewis S4. As identities are necessary, a failure of intersubstitutivity in modal context will show that a proper name does not express the relevant descriptive sense.

Now our point is that if ‘Scott’ is not intersubstitutable with ‘the author of Waverly’, ‘Scott’ does not express the sense expressed by the definite description. It then actually opens the door to the theory that proper names do not express descriptive senses but instead are directly referential. In this regard, we have to distinguish between ‘definite descriptions’ and ‘necessary definite descriptions’. We think Marcus and Kripke by way of outlining direct reference theory do not fully ignore the descriptive content of the proper names. We think Marcus’ position does not prove that proper names do not express sense. What it suggests is that proper names in the real sense of the term do not express sense of contingent definite descriptions. Marcus’ modal argument is consistent with the idea of Linsky (1977) and A Plantiga (1978) that proper names express sense expressible by *necessary definite descriptions*. Necessary definite descriptions are definite descriptions that express modal stable sense. For example, “Scott” may express the modally stable sense of “the author of Waverly”.

Fifthly, Marcus’ argument for the ‘direct reference theory’ make manifest her discovery of the fifth crucial component of the New Theory of Reference, the concept of rigid designation that has been coined by Kripke at first. “Hesperus” is intersubstitutable *salva veritate* with either occurrence of “Phosphorus” in “Necessarily, Phosphorus is Phosphorus”. Each of these two names actually designates Venus in respect of every possible world in which Venus exists and does not actually designate anything in respect of worlds in which Venus does not exist. Now if these two names were instead equivalent to contingent descriptions (e.g., ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star’), they would not be intersubstitutable *salva veritate* in this modal context and

thus would be non-rigid designators. According to Marcus, “individual names don’t alter their reference except to the extent that in respect of some worlds they may not refer at all.”³² It should be pointed out here that Marcus does not use the term ‘rigid designator’. It has been used by Kripke. However, we intend to say that Marcus’ perception regarding the direct reference theory has an extensive assimilation with the concept of rigid designator as used by Kripke. We think that Marcus’ points can be incorporated consistently with the continued use of ‘rigid designators’. In fact, if we make the genus/species terminology, we can say that the genus is rigid designators and the different species are proper names, or referentially used definite descriptions in Donnellan sense, attributively used definite descriptions that express a modally stable sense, or uses of indexical, or natural kind terms. We can avoid embracing proper names to some modally stable descriptions since proper names refer directly, whereas attributably used definite descriptions that express modally stable senses refer indirectly via the expressed sense. Sixthly, the New Theory of Reference also departs from the classical or traditional theory of reference in the sense that unlike the latter the former anticipates **a posteriori necessity**. In this context, Marcus’ position about Venus and evening star is particularly relevant. According to Marcus, ‘you may describe as the evening star and I may describe the Venus as the morning star. Further we may both be surprised that, as an empirical fact, the same thing is being described. However, it is not an empirical fact that:

(17) Venus is Venus’³³

Let us consider the expression “Hesperus is Phosphorus”. Here we do not know this to be a priori. Rather it is an analytic assertion whose truth value is known by analysis of the concepts involved. It is, of course, necessary true because here both names refer to the same thing, Venus.

³² Marcus, “Essential Attribution”, *Journal of Philosophy*, 68, 1971, p.194.

³³ Marcus, ‘Modalities and Intentional Languages’, op. cit., p.85.

Accordingly, like the expression “Venus I Venus”, where ‘I’ stands for identity, it is equally true that:

(a) Hesperus I Phosphorus

Given Marcus’ theorem of the necessity of identity, it follows that

(b) Necessarily, Hesperus I Phosphorus

Accordingly, it can be said that the expression “Hesperus I Phosphorus” can be conceived as a synthetic a posteriori necessary truth.

Direct Reference and linguistic meaning:

The point of direct reference is the main contention of the New Theory of Reference. According to this theory, proper names and indexicals are often said to have define referentiality. They are referentially rigid. The term ‘rigidity’ is particularly coined with the name of Kripke. For Kripke, a designator is rigid that denotes the same object in all possible worlds. Even in Kripke’s context, there we notice at least three different notions of the term ‘rigid’. These are: rigidity as a matter of scope, rigidity as a matter of truth-conditions, and rigidity as pure or direct referentiality. In case the last sense of rigidity is mostly relevant. Many would say that a rigid designator is simply a designator that always takes wide scope in modal contexts. Keeping this contention in mind, even Kripke’s notion of rigid designator can alternatively be expressed by saying that a rigid designator refers to the same thing whether we use to talk about what is actually the case or about some counterfactual situation.³⁴ Now when a designator – say, a definite description –takes wide scope in a modal sentence, i.e., in a sentence used to talk about possible worlds, it does refer to the same object as when it occurs in a sentence used to describe the actual world. The description (1) “The president of France”, when it is given wide scope, refers to the person who is the president of France in the actual world, even though the sentence as a whole describes a

³⁴Kripke, 1971, p.145.

counterfactual situation. Thus, it seems that a description designates rigidly when it takes wide scope. The difference between proper names and definite descriptions, on that view, is simply that, contrary to definite descriptions, proper names always take wide scope in modal contexts. That is why (i) The president of France might have been tall- is ambiguous and (ii) Mitterrand might have been tall – is not. (i) means either France might have had a tall man as president or that Mitterrand might himself have been tall. As far as the first alternative is concerned it is asserted that the property of being tall in some possible world- says, w – is ascribed to the individual who satisfies the description in w (but not in the actual world). As far as the second alternative is concerned, it is asserted that the individual who satisfies the description in the actual world is said to be tall in some possible world. Now depending on whether the description does or does not fall within the scope of the modal operator, its referent, i.e., the individual satisfying the description is picked out either in the actual world or in the possible world introduced by the modal operator. What is important to note here is that unlike (i) there is no scope ambiguity in the case of (ii) which contains a proper name instead of a description.

Rigidity and Scope

Many would say that rigidity as comprehended with regard to scope is not tenable. Even Kripke does not accept this. In the preface of *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke tells us that rigidity cannot be reduced to, a matter of scope. It is not at all legitimate to claim that a designator is rigid if and only if it always takes *wide scope* in modal contexts. If it does, then the concept of rigidity would purely be treated as ‘modal rigidity’. But in our case the rigid/non-rigid distinction applies to designators in general.

Again, let us consider the sentences:

(iii) Mitterrand is small

(iv) The president of France is small

Now (iii) and (iv) provide good evidence that 'Mitterrand' contrary to 'the president of France' rigidly designates its referent. (iii) is true with respect to a world if and only if, in w , Mitterrand is small. In this case, there is a unique individual x such that, for any world w , the sentence is true with respect to w if and only if x is small in w . However, there is no single individual such that, for any world w , (iv) is true with respect to w if and only if that individual is small in w . It may perhaps be the case that there is a world in which Giscard is the president of France, Giscard's being small makes (iv) true, whereas in a world with Chirac as president, the truth of (iv) actually depends on Chirac's being small. It thus seems that like (iii), there is no particular individual involved in the truth-condition of (iv). (iv) is true with respect to a world if and only if, in that world, there is an individual x such that x is both the president of France and small. But this individual may not be the same with regard to all possible worlds. We have a different approach altogether in the case (iii). Here the individual whose being small would make the sentence true is the same in all possible worlds. Here we bring the rigid/non-rigid distinction again without bringing the contention of scope. In this regard, Kripke remarks that the rigidity theory 'is a doctrine about the truth-conditions, with respect to counterfactual situations, of all sentences, including simple sentences.'³⁵ Thus, there is no point in saying that that rigidity finds its authenticity with regard to wide scope. At least Kripke does not think it so.

Rigidity and Referentiality

According to Kripke, rigidity is a matter of truth-conditions. Accordingly, to say that a designator is rigid is to say that there is an individual such that, with respect to every counterfactual situation, the truth-condition of any sentence containing the designator involves the individual in question. Actually, this theory was first explicitly put forward by Christopher

³⁵Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge: Mass, 1980, p.12.

Peacocke. According to Peacocke,³⁶ (R) ‘t is a rigid designator in a language L free from both ambiguity and indexical) if and only if: there is an object such that for any sentence G (t) in which t occurs, the truth (falsity) condition for G(t) is that x satisfies. Criterion (R), Peacocke opines, captures Russell’s idea that sometimes the reference of a singular term is a constituent of the proposition expressed by the sentence where it occurs. For if a term t denoting an object x is a rigid designator by criterion (R), then any sentence G (t) will be true if and only if x satisfies G(t), is a constituent of the truth-condition of the sentence. It thus seems that what a rigid designator contributes to the truth-condition of the sentence is the object itself which it refers to, not an attribute which an object possesses in order to be referred to. Russell’s logical proper name is purely referential. For Russell a logical proper name is known by acquaintance. He says that a logical proper name denotes an object with which we are directly acquainted. Thus, in a sense, Russell’s idea is the idea of a purely referential term where reference in terms of acquaintance counts the most. Peacocke, in effect, equates rigidity in the sense of the criterion (R) , with referentiality . In this regard Peacocke remarks: “The criterion of rigid designation can be seen ... as merely a more explicit formulation of an idea variously expressed as that of a term’s ‘serving ... simply to refer to its object’ (Quine) , ‘tagging’ an individual (Marcus), or in general of an expression’s being ‘used to enable ... individuals to be made subjects of disclosure’ (Mill); and the view that proper names are rigid designators in our sense seems a natural elucidation of Miss Anscombe’s remark that the proper name contributes ‘to the meaning of the sentence precisely by standing for its bearer.’”³⁷ We think that this equation of rigidity with referentiality is consonant with Kripke’s perseverance on the Mill’s idea of proper names. In fact, Kripke conceives Mill’s idea of proper name as ‘paradigm example’ of rigid designation.

³⁶Peacocke, 1975, p.110.

³⁷ Ibid. p.111.

Proper name, Mill says, 'are attached to the objects themselves, and are not dependent on ... any attribute of the other.'³⁸ Kripke while outlining the very nature of proper name as rigid designator takes notes following Mill. Following Mill, Kripke goes on to say that the function of proper name is to refer to an object independently of the properties it may have, so as to enable one to refer to this object even with respect to possible worlds. Thus, the link between a name and its referent is, for Kripke, 'stipulative' rather than 'qualitative'. However, as far as referentiality is concerned one may supposed to distinguish proper name from definite descriptions. Some definite descriptions are rigid and satisfy Peacock's criterion. For example, a mathematical description like 'the cube root of 27' denotes 3 in all possible worlds, since '3 is the cube root of 27' is a necessary truth. It can be checked using Peacock's criterion at the level of truth-conditions. For any sentence S of the form 'The cube root of 27 is F', where F stands for a predicate, there is an object x, namely the number 3, such that, with respect to any possible world, S is true if and only if x satisfies the predicate. We cannot say anything on the other way round. That means, we cannot say that for x to be true, x must also be the cube root of 27. More importantly, like any description, the description 'the cube root of 27' denotes the object which has the property it 'connotes', namely, the property being a number of x such that $x^3 = 27$. The link between the description and its referent is typically qualitative in Kripkian sense. Kripke thus finds a subtle distinction between rigidity and referentiality. For Kripke there is a difference between a rigid definite description and a proper name even when the description in question is used to 'fix the reference'. A name, for Kripke, is purely referential, while the rigid description such as 'the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter' is not.

Thus, we may find considerable distinction between referentiality and rigidity. Referentiality always implies rigidity. A referential term is rigid '*de jure*' because it is, Mill's terminology,

³⁸ Mill, 1947, p.20.

‘attached to the object itself’ independent of its properties. As a result of that it cannot fail to denote the same object in all possible worlds. What changes from world to world is not the object itself, but only its contingent properties. The denotation of an object always remains the same as it is attached to name. A name, Wittgenstein says, denotes an object and the meaning of a name is the meaning of an object. Alternatively, it can be said that to be a name is to be a name of an object. The only visible change one may notice in the case of an object is its connotative meaning. However, in the case of mathematical description or for that matter in any essential description we notice exception. A mathematical description is rigid only ‘de facto’ because like any description, it denotes the object that falls under a certain concept. In this case the concept happens to fit the same object in all possible worlds. Having said this, we can still say that as far as the theory of direct reference is concerned the denotative meaning of a name cannot be changed. If there is any change, it is the connotative properties of the object under consideration. Further we can say that the concept of rigidity is well-defined notion unlike the concept of referentiality. Referentiality in the strict sense of the term is not so specific like the concept of rigidity that we notice in Kripke and Peacocke. What does actually mean to say that a referential term refers to the object ‘itself’? One readymade answer is that a referential term is a term wholly devoid of descriptive content, a term whose link to its reference is purely stipulative, as Kripke says. Perhaps this is far too strong, because not all referential terms are like proper names in this respect. Demonstrative expressions like ‘this table’ or pronouns like ‘I’ or ‘You’ clearly have some sort of descriptive content. Following Peacocke we can say that a term is referential if there is an object such that the truth-condition of any sentence containing the term involves this object. However, many would say that this criterion is too weak because it then incorporates all rigid expressions including rigid descriptions which nobody would want to classify as referential.

One should not confuse *referentiality* with *rigidity* even though the concept of referentiality is viable while talking about rigidity. Having said this, it may still be possible to define referentiality as opposed to mere rigidity. According to Lockwood, a rigid expression is an expression such that the truth-condition of any sentence containing it involves a certain object, in conformity to criterion (R). By contrast, when an expression is referential, there is an object such that not only the truth condition but also the proposition expressed involves that object. Now to understand a proposition expressed by an utterance where a referential term occurs, it is necessary to know which object has been referred to. In such a case it is necessary to identify the reference.³⁹ This sort of identification does not seek the *concept of object* under which it falls. However, when a term is non-referential the proposition expressed involves only a certain concept. If the term is rigid *de facto*, this concept happens to fit the same object in all possible worlds. However, it is not necessary for understanding the proposition to identify the object in question.⁴⁰ According to Lockwood, the expression ‘the cube of 408’ is functioning referentially irrespective of whether one knows what the cube of 408 is. The problem is that we do not know exactly ‘what is meant by the proposition expressed’ as opposed to the truth-condition of the utterance. We think the notion of proposition expressed is essentially tied to that of understanding and thus there we seem a connection between referentiality and understanding. ‘The cube root of 27’ rigidly designates the number 3, but we can understand the description without knowing what number it designates. On the other hand, a referential term is such that to understand an utterance one has to know which object it designates. Lockwood thus finds a close proximity between referentiality and understanding. He has put forward a definition of referentiality in terms of understanding which eventually helps one to cognize the relationship

³⁹ See Evans, 1982.

⁴⁰ Lockwood, 1975, p.88

between referentiality and rigidity. According to Lockwood, a term is referential if and only if there is an object x such that (i) an utterance $G(t)$ is true if x satisfies $G(\)$, and (ii) to understand the utterance, one must know that it is true if x satisfies $G(\)$. Following Lockwood, we can say that a referential term is a rigid designator (following clause (i)), but it would be a rigid designator of a very special kind. In such a case to understand an occurrence where it occurs one has to know that it designates an object rigidly and also to know about which object it so designates. Thus, understanding an utterance, according to Lockwood's criterion, actually involves *de re* knowledge of the inference. Here knowing a certain object involves that the utterance is true if and only if this object satisfies the predicate.

Many would still be skeptical regarding Lockwood's criterion of referentiality. According to his criterion of referentiality, understanding an utterance with a referential term involves identifying the reference of the term. This in turn entails that the reference actually entails. Many would indeed say that if the reference of a referential expression does not exist, there remains nothing to understand. If the reference of a referential expression does not exist in the true sense of the term, the expression under consideration would not express a proposition. There is a strong perception that to say anything of an object, one has to presuppose beforehand that the object under consideration must be a real object. An object is to be a real object if it exists. How can we talk of an object that is unreal? Philosophers like Strawson would stick to this philosophical position. However, many would say the other way around. For them identification of reference is not a necessary condition of referentiality. A term may well be referential and understood by the hearer as referential without its reference being identified. To understand the utterance 'Ralph Banilla is a midget' one has to understand or know about who Ralph Banilla is, but to understand the sentence only involves knowing that the term is referential in the sense that there is an

individual that must be identified for an utterance of the sentence to be understood. According to Lockwood, a term is referential only if there is an object such that to understand the utterance involves identifying the object. We think this is wrong because in our sense a term can still be referential even though there actually is no such object. The term 'Ralph Banilla' is referential even if for some reason it would fail to refer or even if it does not exist. Thus, in a sense the category 'referential term' is not different from 'proper name' in that respect. 'Ralph Banilla' is linguistically a proper name even if for some reason it has no bearer. The notion of a referential term without reference would be self-contradictory. Many would even make the distinction between 'referentiality for a term' and 'referentiality for a use of a term'. 'Referentiality for a term' does not require the existence of the object; whereas 'referentiality for a use of a term' makes sense if there is an object it refers to. Accordingly, we can say that expressions, such as proper names and demonstrative pronouns, are referentiality for a term and definite descriptions are referentiality for a use of a term.

Type referentiality

There is a perception that the reference of a linguistic expression is something extra-linguistic. When we say that the reference of a sentence exists independently, it actually means to say that the reference of a linguistic expression is extra-linguistic. Thus, the relevance of type reference comes into being. Type referentiality is supposed to be a feature of the linguistic meaning of some expressions and the linguistic meaning of an expression so to speak is its contribution to the linguistic meaning of the sentence where it occurs. Thus, by the term 'type referentiality' we mean to say: when the term t in an utterance $G(t)$ is a rigid designator, there is an object such that the utterance is true if and only if this object satisfies the predicates G . In such a case, the truth-condition of the utterance is a singular truth-condition. More succinctly it can be said, a

term is a type-referential if and only if its linguistic meaning includes a feature, call it 'REF', by virtue of which it indicates that the truth condition (or, more generally, satisfaction-condition) of the utterance where it occurs is singular. The truth-condition of an utterance $G(t)$ is singular if and only if there is an object x such that the utterance is true if and only if x satisfies $G()$. Now, if the term t is referential, its meaning includes a feature by virtue of which it indicates that there is an object x such that an utterance of $G(t)$ is true or more generally satisfied if and only if x satisfies $D()$. According to this criterion of type-referentiality, some referential terms are not wholly devoid of descriptive content. They have what Loar calls a *referential qualifier*. Many would conceive it as 'referential feature' or referential 'character'. A referential expression such as 'this table' or the pronoun 'you' somehow characterizes the reference in such a way that it can be identified in context. Here understanding the utterance involves identifying the reference of the term. In his identification of the reference, the hearer is helped by the meaning of the referential term. A referential term indicates not only that there is an object such that the utterance is true if and only if this object has a certain property. It equally indicates how this object can be identified. Alternatively, it can be said that a referential term as part of its meaning is a mode of presentation of the reference. Thus, in combination both to the feature REF and to the presentation, a sentence $G(t)$ where t is a referential term indicates: There is an object x which is F (=mode of presentation), such that the utterance is satisfied if and only if x satisfies $G()$.

For example, "This table is G " indicates that there is a table prominent in the vicinity. The utterance that 'The table is G ' is true if and only if it is G . Likewise, 'You are G ' indicates that there is a person to whom the utterance is addressed. The utterance is true if there is a person to whom the utterance is made. In all those cases the 'mode of presentation' associated with the

referential term make a certain object contextually identifiable and the utterances are satisfied if and only if this object has the property expressed by the predicate in the sentence.

Now we are in a viable position to capture the intuitive notion of pure or direct referentiality which, we think, is the foundation of the New Theory of Reference as comprehended and developed by Marcus, Kripke, Peacocke, Lockwood and others. We think that it is part of the meaning of the term, and also the meaning of the sentence where it occurs. The mode of presentation of the sentence is no part of the proposition expressed by the utterance. The proposition expressed by the utterance is the satisfaction condition the utterance presents itself as having. When we say 'a is G', where 'a' stands as a referential term whose meaning includes a certain mode of presentation of its reference. It means that there is an object x, possessing certain property F (= mode of presentation), such that the utterance is satisfied if and only if x is G. Alternatively, we can say that the utterance presents itself is true if and only if a certain object x, of course contextually, is G. The utterance expresses the proposition that a is G – a singular proposition with the object a and not the concept F as constituent. The concept F, as the mode of presentation, helps the hearer to understand under what condition the utterance of the object is satisfied with regard to certain property.

We are now in a position to assess rigidity in terms of truth conditions along with the line of Kripke and Peacocke. A rigid designator is such that the truth condition of the utterance where it occurs is singular. A referential term indicates that the truth condition of the utterance is singular. It indicates that there is an object x such that the utterance G (t) where it occurs is true if x satisfies the predicate G (). A referential term, therefore, is a designator that signifies its own rigidity. Many would say that the notion of 'propositional content' is arguably more problematic than that of truth-conditions. Likewise, the term referentiality is more problematic than that of

rigidity. The reason perhaps is that they are more ‘intentional’, closer to the paradigmatically intentional notion of ‘meaning’. As a result of that it would always be philosophically worthy to analyze the notion of proposition in terms of truth-conditions, or referentiality in terms of rigidity. Many would even say that the study of direct reference is firmly rooted in the study of language and language use. This however does not make sense to say that the study of direct reference is divorced from psychology. Following Grice, we can say that the study of meaning itself is rooted in psychology. Moreover, utterances endowed with meaning are used to communicate thoughts. So, the connections between utterances and the corresponding thoughts cannot be ignored in the pragmatic approach to meaning and communication. Following Evans and Lockwood, we can say that understanding an utterance with a referential term involves forming a *de re* thought about the referent. Thus, the study of *de re* thoughts must be undertaken by anyone endeavoring to theorize about direct reference.

We think this problem is deeply rooted in the philosophical controversies between neo-Russellian’s and neo-Fregeans. Neo-Russellian anticipates singular proposition including direct reference but forgoes mode of presentation and psychological credibility. Thus, it deals with the semantic properties of utterances, Neo-Fregean, by contrast, is both semantically and psychologically adequate. It equally obeys cognitive constraints unlike neo-Russellian. The best philosophical outcome of direct reference theory is to make an attempt to bring both of them close together. We need both the *de re* thoughts of the neo-Fregean and the singular propositions of the neo-Russellian in a complete manner which deals not only with the thoughts which our utterances express but also with the meaning of our utterances themselves. This is how one can enrich the direct reference theory of meaning.

Singular Propositions and Thoughts

So far, we have seen that understanding an utterance involves identifying its truth condition (possible world). However, the truth condition of an utterance need not be identified in an absolute sense for the utterance to be understood. ‘The cube root of 27 is odd’ is true *if* 3 is odd, yet the hearer who understands the utterance may not know that it is the case. Of course, the hearer who understands the utterance must know its truth condition under a certain mode of presentation but the fact is that he may not be able to recognize it under another mode of presentation. The utterance on the background of linguistic meaning gives indications concerning its truth-conditions. For example, directly referential terms convey a semantic feature on the basis of which they indicate that the truth condition of the utterance in which they occur is singular. Thus, in a sense the meaning of the utterance gives rise to a direction to the truth condition. The truth condition is presented by *the utterance itself*. For example, ‘The root cube of 27 is odd’ present itself as true if there is a number x such that $x^3 = 27$ and x is odd. We also observe that the distinction between the *proposition expressed* and the truth condition gives rise to the basis for the distinction between rigidity and direct referentiality. We have seen when the subject term ‘a’ in a sentence ‘a is G’ is rigid, the truth condition of the utterance is singular. When ‘a’ is a directly referential term; the utterance presents its truth-condition as singular. An utterance ‘a is G’ in which ‘a’ stands as a directly referential term means that there is an object x , possessing a certain property F, such that the utterance is true if x is G. This is a singular proposition that contains the reference of ‘a’ and the property expressed by the predicate ‘G’. Thus, in a sense, the proposition expressed by an utterance in which a directly referential term occurs includes the reference of that term as a constituent, in the same way as the truth condition of an utterance in which a rigid designator occurs includes the reference of that designator as a

constituent. Now in order to understand the proposition expressed one has to know about the truth condition of the utterance conveyed by the sentence. Understanding the truth condition of the sentence involves more than merely understanding the meaning of the sentence.

It is noted that the distinction between truth condition of the utterance and the proposition it expresses enables us to define direct referentiality as opposed to mere rigidity. The second distinction between the meaning of the sentence and the proposition expressed enables us to cognize as directly referential terms which convey a certain mode of presentation of their reference. Terms like 'I' or 'this table' are directly referential, yet they present their reference with certain attribute. To define direct referentiality in terms of the proposition expressed makes it possible to bypass Mill's overly strong definition of direct referentiality as straightforward lack of meaning or 'connotation'. Here the descriptive meaning of a referential term is not reflected in the proposition expressed. As such proposition is singular, it involves only a particular object. The pronoun 'I' is referential and connotative, contrary to Mill's equation of referentiality with non-connotativeness. Kaplan expresses the same by means of his famous distinction between 'content' and 'character'. According to Kaplan, the content of a connotative term may be either its reference or the mode of presentation of the reference. If the content is constituted by the reference, i.e., if the term is referential, the mode of presentation of the reference is external to the proposition expressed and constitutes only the character of the term. However, if the mode of presentation does not only belong to the character of the expression but also constitutes its content, as happens when the term is not referential, then it is the reference that is external. It is external in the sense that it is only part of the world. In such a case, it is possible for the utterance to make sense even if the reference does not exist or cannot be identified. Contrary to this, if the

term is referential, its reference is part of the proposition expressed by the utterance and must be identified for the latter to be understood.

Of course, Kaplan has devised an operator, DTHAT, which prevents the mode of presentation of the reference from going into the content in such a way so that the content of an expression within the scope of DTHAT can only be its reference. In a sense, reference does exactly the same job as DTHAT. The only notable difference between reference and DTHAT is that reference to be regarded as the semantic feature of language whereas DTHAT is an operator in an ideal language. Reference is part of the meaning of referential expressions, namely, proper names, demonstratives and the like. Since definite descriptions are not referential, reference is not part of their meaning. However, Donnellan thinks the other way around. According to Donnellan a description can be used referentially so as to express a singular proposition. More succinctly it can be said that descriptions can only be 'token referential' whereas proper names and demonstratives expressions are 'type referential'. This is where the difference between reference and DTHAT comes out. The presence of DTHAT simply means that a singular proposition is expressed with the reference, but not the mode of presentation of the reference as a constituent.

Chapter Three

The Neo- classical Theory of Reference

Historically we have witnessed the trio-concepts, such as, thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. These trio-concepts are associated with the concept of dialectic. It has been witnessed in Hegel and also in Kant. Kant's understanding of knowledge is a form of synthesis, an attempt of amalgamation between thesis and antithesis. If we start with empiricism as the thesis, we find that sense experience is the main or only (Hume) source of knowledge. Then we find anti-thesis in rationalism which proclaims that reason is the only source or the main source of knowledge. Kant synthesizes both empiricism and rationalism and thereby claims that proper knowledge would be the outcome or byproduct of both empiricism (thesis) and rationalism (anti-thesis). Very similar to this, we notice the same historical development in the theory of reference. The classical or descriptive theory of reference, we have already outlined after Russell and Frege, is supposed to be the thesis because the referential theory, in fact, has been started with the contribution of Russell and Frege along with others. Then we have noticed the causal theory of reference as anti-thesis to the classical or descriptive theory of reference. It seems there remains a polarization between the classical and causal theory of reference. The neo-classical theory of reference that has been developed by Katz and others is supposed to a synthesis of the theory of reference. In this chapter we propose to explicate the new classical theory of reference as a synthesis of both the classical and the causal theory of reference.

We have seen that the classical theory of reference actually intends to say that the meaning of a word is the basis on which speakers use it to refer. This actually reminds us the position of

Locke. Locke in fact says that ‘every word is the sensible mark of idea’⁴¹. Even we have noticed the same perception in Heraclitus as well. Thus, in one sense the root of the classical or descriptive theory of reference as developed by Russell, Frege, Church, Lewis and Searle actually ingrained or deeply rooted in the antiquity. The causal theory of reference that has been developed by Kripke, Putnam and Donnellan tell us that knowledge of causal relations associated with baptismal ceremony is the basis on which speakers refer.

According to Katz the conflict between classical and causal theory of reference actually started in the middle of 20th century with the appearance of the understanding paper written by Donnellan. In fact, Donnellan in his paper has attempted to dig out the weak spot of the classical theory of reference. According to Katz, the classical theory of reference has mainly concentrated on the development of two important things. First, it has attempted to explicate on what basis the speakers while inter-personal communication has fixed inter-subjective criteria for applying words in their language. While developing the referential theory of meaning, Russell and other classical thinkers hold that the meaning of a linguistic expression is determined on the basis of its referent. Or more specifically it can be said that the philosophical meaning of a sentence would be determined on the basis of its reference independent from the sentence. The extra-linguistic reference of a linguistic expression or a sentence would be the determining criterion of measuring the meaning of the sentence. In this regard, the classical thinkers give importance on the referential connection between *the sentence and what it refers to*. That means, the referential connection constitutes the meaning of the sentence under consideration. In this regard Katz says, “The classical theory is supposed to do two things. It is supposed to explain how the speakers

⁴¹ John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, ed. P. Nidditch, Oxford University Press, 1975, III, ii, I.

have fixed, intersubjective criteria for applying words in their language, and it is to account, on the basis of this explanation, for necessary truth in terms of criteria inclusion.”⁴²

According to the classical theory, the sentence “Bachelors are unmarried” expresses a necessary truth because these two words are synonymous. Now, if the terms ‘Bachelors’ and ‘unmarried’ are synonymous, one word can be substituted or replaced by other. Even great German philosopher Immanuel Kant has recognized this statement as analytic on the basis of the principle that all identical statement without exception must be analytic. Quine in his article “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” has criticized Kant. According to Quine, by introducing analytic statement on the principles, such as, (i) the predicate term is overtly or covertly contained in the subject term and (ii) the denial of an analytic statement leads to a contradiction, Kant, like Carnap, introduces a *dogma* in philosophy. According to Donnellan, the most notable weak spot of classical theory of reference is that the criterion that has been adopted for identifying necessary truth cannot, at the end, support the burden of a doctrine of necessary truth.

Classical thinkers, by and large, conceive that meaning determines reference or more specifically it can be said that the reference of the sentence in turn constitutes the meaning of the sentence. How do we determine the reference of a word? In this regard, it can be said that if the user of language knows the meaning of the word under consideration, he or she, in turn, *ipso-facto* comes to know how to use it to refer. This position of the new-classical theory of reference is very close to the pragmatic interpretation of language whether the use of language in general can be treated as the determining factor of knowing the meaning of language. We think that the classical position that *meaning determines reference* can be acceptable as a theory if the meaning

⁴²J. J. Katz, “The New Classical Theory of Reference”, included in *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language*, edited by P. A. French, T.E. Uehling, Jr. Howard K. Wettstein, University of Minnesota, Morris, 1977, p.103.

of a word is supposed to be the necessary and sufficient conditions for determining its reference. What then is the meaning of a word? In this regard, Frege says that meaning of a word is nothing but *a mode of linguistic presentation* represented as a set of characteristics which are supposed to be necessary and sufficient conditions of determining the reference of the word. Now, if the user of language comes to know the meaning of a word, he would, in turn, identify what the word actually refers to; he can equally come to know by virtue of analyzing the meaning of sentence, whether the sentence is a necessary truth or not.

The weak point of the classical theory of reference, Donnellan claims, is that while determining the reference of the word (sentence) with the help of meaning the classical thinkers actually preconceived *a preexisting relationship* between the meaning of the sentence and the reference of the sentence. As a result, it can be objected by saying that in the real sense the classical theory of reference says nothing to explain in what sense the so-called meaning of a word can fix the criterion for a word's application in advance. Here conceiving or fixing preexisting meaning of language actually demands *a priori criterion* for supporting a doctrine of necessary truth. If it does, then the classical theory definitely invites *a philosophical trouble*. One cannot set an a priori criterion in the process of linguistic analysis. It is indeed circular to say that a criterion C is part of the meaning of a word W just in case "W is C" is necessarily true. Donnellan then goes on to say that without the anticipation of necessary truth, the classical theory would fail to dig out a subtle distinction between the *semantic criteria* and the *empirical criteria* of the following sentence, such as:

(c1) creature with a heart has a hollow muscular organ whose rhythmic contractions act as a pump to circulate blood

(c2) creature with a heart has a kidney

We think preconceiving a priori criterion for determining necessary truth is a philosophical dogma. Quine has shown that such philosophical dogma is not tenable. Philosophical analysis of language should be transparent, flexible and in this process, there is no need for conceiving *a priori criterion whatsoever*. According to Donnellan, even though it would be a matter of fact that ‘Whales are mammals’, is a necessary truth to the classical theory of reference, but considering the gravity of the analysis of language, it would be prudent for us not to consider this sentence in any determinate fashion. The sentence ‘Whales are mammals’ is indeterminate. According to Donnellan, it is indeterminate because “the decision as to which it is would depend upon our being able to say now what we should say about certain hypothetical cases.”⁴³ Following Quine we can say that to determinate a sentence as a necessary or contingent truth in the sphere of linguistic philosophy is a misnomer because it actually hinges on the analysis of language. Here one can take *translation manual* to identify a sentence as a necessary truth. However, Quine shows us that any form of translation manual is indeterminate.

Donnellan divulges the criticisms raised by Kripke and Putnam against the classical theory of reference. According to them there underlies a priori demand within the classical theory of reference for identification of meaning. However, Donnellan, following Kripke and Putnam, goes on to say that there is no point of assuming a priori specification of criteria for identification of meaning. In this regard, they have mentioned a few counter examples through which they intend to show that instead of a priori criteria one should lay emphasize on certain *hypothetical cases* which are contingent in nature. As a result, they intend to say that the classical theory of analytic truth within the sphere of linguistic analysis or in the process of analysis of language

⁴³ K. Donnellan, “Necessity and Criteria”, *Journal of Philosophy*, vol.59, 1962, p.43.

does not bear any notable difference from truths based on matters of contingent fact. Let us consider the following examples after Kripke and Putnam.

Gödel discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic

According to the classical theory of reference, this statement is presumably supposed to be a necessary truth. However, Kripke has intuited it in other way round. Kripke imagines that an unknown mathematician, namely, Schmidt, really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic, but Gödel took the credit. Gödel is the man to “Gödel” applies but not the person who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic. The same perhaps will happen in other cases as well. We think that causal theorists, such as, Donnellan, Kripke, and Putnam not only criticize the classical theory of reference, they at the same time offer an alternative approach known as the causal theory of reference. Theoretically the causal theory of reference has been conceived as the *antithesis of the classical theory of reference*. It is regarded as the anti-thesis because it appears or stands on opposite assumption that ‘all criteria of application are grounded in extra linguistic matters of fact- stereotypes concepts from empirical science, and information about baptismal ceremonies’. The classical theory of reference in some sense or other hinges on a priori concept as we have noted in the case of proposition expressing necessary truth. On the contrary, by giving emphasizes on *stereotypes and baptismal ceremony*, the causal theory of reference finds its foothold on *aposteriori matters of scientific or qua-scientific facts* in which words become the names of their referents. Thus, the tussle between the classical and the causal theory of reference is immanent as both views stands on conflicting philosophical foundation and one theory can only be survived by way of denying the other.

The Aim of New-Classical Theory

The main philosophical contention of New-Classical theory is to *synthesis* both the classical and causal theory of reference. According to the new-classical theory of reference, the contradiction between the classical and causal theory of reference arises mainly for the fact that the classical theory of reference actually takes *rationalist approach to meaning* whereas the causal theory of reference favors its *empiricist approach to language*. The rationalist approach to language actually hinges on an *a priori criterion* whereas the empiricism approach of language actually hinges on *a posteriori criterion*. Thus, there we observe two distinct accounts of meaning which are conflicting in nature. As we start from the classical theory of meaning, it is presumed to be *thesis* and as the causal theory of reference appears as the criticism of the classical theory of meaning, it is supposed to *anti-thesis*. According to the classical theorists, natural languages as historical products has gradually been shaped generation after generation on the basis of experience with what the previous generation believes and also knows the use of words. As a result, there is no point of constructing a rationalistic account of meaning which in turn would make a separation between a priori account of meaning and a posteriori account of meaning. Searle's account in this regard is particularly relevant. Searle, being a proponent of classical theory of reference, goes on to say that the statement 'Aristotle never existed' is based on false conventional statements or presuppositions those have been raised in supporting the statement under consideration. However, which statement or presupposition is wrong with regard to this statement perhaps may not be clear. This is mainly for the fact that what precise conditions constitute the criteria for applying "Aristotle" is not yet laid down by the language even though it would perhaps be true to say that a cluster of properties, i.e., the mode of presentation of the object to which they refer can adequately determine the reference of the object under

consideration. According to Searle, the sense of a proper name, the mode of presentation in Frege's sense, to be something like most of its conventionally presupposed entities. In the case of Aristotle, cluster of properties, such as, the properties of 'being the teacher of Alexander' are chosen by classical theorists because they expressed the kind of widely known fact which would be extremely useful for identifying a historically well-known figure. That is how the sense of a proper name adequately determines its reference.

According to Katz, Kripke, being a leading proponent of causal theory of reference, does not agree with Searle's classical account of reference. Kripke's examples show that the classical theorist cannot have it both ways. It makes no more sense to talk about a logical connection holding in loose sort of way than it does to talk about being a little bit pregnant. According to Katz, either a property or set of properties is part of the sense of proper name or not. If a property or set of the property is supposed to be the part of the sense of proper name in our desired sense then the classical theory is up against the counter-examples given by Kripke. In a situation like this it would seem clear that situations can be imagined in which 'a sufficient number of the controversial presuppositions' fail. Contrary to that, if a property or set of properties is not part of the sense of proper name then the classical theory has no longer any account of how proper names refer. Searle thinks that an elastic sense-reference distinction actually helps him to have an account of the reference of proper names without having to face the counter-examples expounded by Wittgenstein.⁴⁴ According to Katz, Kripke actually uses Wittgenstein's insight and in turn bounces the elasticity of Searle's distinction past its breaking point.

The main contention of the new-classical theory is to make a contrast between classical and new-classical theory first and then to show how the difference between the classical and the new

⁴⁴ See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford, 1953, pp.36-37.

classical theory enables to overcome the objections raised by the causal theorists against the classical theory. First, the new-classical theory differs from the classical theory in the sense that unlike the classical theory of reference, the new-classical theory of reference takes an uncompromised rationalistic stance on natural languages. As a result of that it enables to overcome the contradiction or dichotomy appears in the classical theory. If we carefully study this theory, it seems to me that it actually takes this stance by adopting or by way of anticipating Noam Chomsky's rationalist theory of grammatical structure. Chomsky has introduced a scientific grammar and named it as Transformational Generative Grammar (in short TGG). It is purely structure oriented. It has two structures, what Chomsky calls 'phrase structure' and 'deep structure'. Phrase structure is superfluous in nature; the real structure of TGG is the deep structure where the elements of sentence are perfectly manifested.⁴⁵ Thus, it can be said that Chomsky's theory enormously helps the new-classical theory to overcome the contradiction appears in the classical theory of reference. Donnellan actually raised so many objections against the classical theory of reference and by taking the clues from Chomsky's intensionalist theory of meaning; the new-classical theory of reference has overcome these philosophical muddles. The new-classical theory of reference actually supplies the principle for distinguishing sense and reference, semantic structure and extra-linguistic belief, meaning and use. This has been completely forfeited by the classical theory of reference.

The new-classical theory of Katz gives more emphasis on the theory of meaning unlike the classical theory of meaning. According to this theory, the grammar of language contains a semantic component as well as a syntactic and phonological component. The meaning of a sentence can be measured with regard to both semantic, syntactic and phonological component

⁴⁵ Noam Chomsky, *Reflections on Language*, New York, 1975, p.56.

and the classical and causal theory of reference have been guilty of giving importance on either one of these. Alternatively, it can be said that just as the syntactic and phonological components are an explication of *sentence of language*, so as the semantic component is an explication of *meaning of sentence of language*. The semantic component actually explicates the speaker's semantic competence, i.e., speaker's knowledge of the compositional structure of sentence meanings. Accordingly, it can be said that the semantic component is a theory of how an ideal speaker who knows the syntactic and phonological structure of a language can know the meaning of its infinitely many sentences. It can equally be said that the semantic component takes the form of rules that generate semantic representations. Semantic representations are held to be formal in the sense that the mode of presentation or meanings of the sentences are assigned to them. That means the assignment of semantic representations to a sentence must foresee each semantic property and relation of the sentence irrespective of envisaging whether the sentence under consideration is meaningful or meaningless, ambiguous or not ambiguous; whether it is synonymous with other sentences or not and so on. Accordingly, it can be said after the new classical theory of reference that the true semantic description of a language is supposed to be the semantic component whose rules predict each semantic property and relation of every sentence in the language.

In this regard one can mention the *intentionality theory of meaning*. The intentionality theory of meaning autonomously gives rise to a principle of distinguishing semantic from non-semantic information. This distinction corresponds to the distinction at the phenomenological level between speech, sounds and noise. Such distinctions actually lie submerged in the philosophical presumption that the so-called grammatical structure in question eventually fixes the properties and relations of sentences at that level. The sound configuration of a sentence determines its

rhymes, alliterations, etc., and the meaning of a sentence determines relations, ambiguity, etc. As semantic representations that successfully envisage semantic properties and relations will correctly represent the meaning of the sentence to which they are assigned, the full set of semantic representations will draw the semantic distinction very similar to the full set of phonological representations draws the distinction between speech, sounds and noise. Thus, one can formulate the intentionality theory of meaning just as: Language gives us the information of the world and the information of sentence or language here is semantic information. The semantic information of language is intimately associated with the semantic representation of the linguistic expression. Here the semantic representation of the linguistic expression is the true semantic description of the language that represents information as part of the meaning of that linguistic expression.

The central point of new classical theory of meaning is that it does not demand to extensional notions like applicability or truth to say what the meaning of a word is. The new classical theory thus enables to avoid an appeal to its theoretical definition of meaning that is required to postulate semantic properties and relations comprehensively. We have seen in the previous sequel that the classical theory of reference in the true sense of the term attempts to equate meaning with the characters that are necessary and sufficient for application. Here the concept of truth commits it to using relations between language and the world (reality) and this in turn causes a difficulty that has been well exposed by Donnellan. However, the new classical theory of reference enables to overcome it. Here instead of using extensional structure for determining the meaning of a word, the new classical theory of reference uses only intentional structure and pays due importance on the internal properties and relations to the sense structure of the language. The insights of the new classical theory of reference is that it emphasizes more on the

conditions of reference of terms in analytic sentences that are fixed in the same way as are those of quantificational structures in logical truths. The conditions for a sentence like “If someone is not happy, then not everyone is happy” are fixed a priori because they are fixed on the basis of judgments or on the basis of the very meaning of the sentence under consideration. More, succinctly, it can be said that they are fixed on the basis of the judgments about the internal grammar of sentence rather than on the basis of experience. If we carefully examine then it can reveal to us that the conception of meaning that has been underlying in the new classical theory puts the fixing of the conditions of reference in connection with analytic sentences on the same equilibrium. For example, the conditions for a sentence like “Bachelors are male” are fixed a priori because they are fixed on the basis of judgment or on the basis of the very intentional meaning or the internal grammar of the subject and the predicate terms of the sentence under consideration. If anybody comes to know the very meaning of the terms, such as, ‘Bachelor’ and ‘male’, he comes to know without experience that the sentence or judgment under consideration is a priori in particular.

Thus, the immediate advantage of the new classical theory of reference is that here the conception of meaning clearly avoids the counter-examples against the classical theory of reference as raised by Kripke and Putnam. According to the new classical theory of reference, we can comprehend an a priori account of the relation between subject and predicate concepts because here the propositional structure of a sentence is completely independent of the facts about applicability and contingent truth. Accordingly, the counter-examples that have been raised by Kripke and Putnam are irrelevant to the new classical theory. This is mainly for the fact that like the classical theory of reference, they do not have the proper form to be counter-examples to claims that a sentence has analytic propositional structure. Such claims, in fact, do

assert that the sense of the predicate in a sentence like “Cats are animals” is part of the sense of its subject. As a result, anything falling under the later concept must fall under the former. Putnam criticizes it. He claims that ‘cats’ fall under neither. For him something that is not an animal cannot be a counter-example to an assertion about a certain kind of animal. What we learn from Putnam’s example is that the so-called denotative conditions of words are acquired inductively *from experience with acts of reference*. Accordingly, it can be said that connections like that between the conditions for ‘cat’ and the conditions for ‘animal’ are generalizations from past experience. It is learnt from the past experience that objects to which uses the ‘cat’ have referred were objects to which uses of ‘animals’ have referred. If the denotative conditions can be apprehended in this way and also determines from where the relations between the objects comes from as we have seen in the example under consideration after Putnam, then Donnellan’s observation is that ‘there is no reason, a priori, why our present usage should legislate for all hypothetical cases’ is clearly true. There then is no point of talking analyticity. Only extensional relations based on causal or conditional reasons counts the most. The distinctive feature of such extensional relations is that if it holds for some cases conceivably hold for all cases as well. Adoption of this approach requires a replacement of empiricist assumptions with its rationalist counterpart. It would help us to reveal why such example might fail against analyticity claims generally. As far as rationalist assumptions are concerned, it can be said that how the denotative conditions of words are acquired. How acquisition of connections is like that between the conditions for ‘cat’ and ‘animal’ are logical connections between senses determined by innate principles of semantic structure. They are logical in the same sense in which sentences like “If someone is not happy, then not everyone is happy” expresses logical connections. Thus, it seems to Katz that Putnam actually fails to see the proportions of the conflict when he replies against

the possibility of intentional semantics. According to Putnam, intentional semantics is ‘bad linguistics’⁴⁶ because for him the explanation of how we can say ‘Cats are robots’ is simply an all-purpose explanation of how we can say anything. According to Putnam, Katz’s theory predicts that “Cats are robots” is deviant, while “There are not (and never were) any cats in the world”⁴⁷ is nondeviant, in fact standard, in the case described. The epithet “bad linguistics” as used by Putnam is just like a Jew scolding a Christian for eating pork for what Putnam calls “an all-purpose explanation of how we say *anything*”. According to Putnam, it is only such an empiricist assumption about language and its use. The point that needs to be addressed here is that if intension lists are correct in thinking that the best theory of semantics of English implies that the sense of ‘animal’ is part of sense of ‘cat’, and that ‘animal’ and ‘robot’ are antonymous, and hence that ‘Cats are robots’ is taken to be deviant. If “Cats are robots” is deviant, then on what basis people do presume such contradictory assertion? What actually has prompted to do such assertion? According to Katz, in connection with the contradictory sentence, there is the special problem of explaining the contradiction pragmatically. It thus inquires how a charitable interpretation of the speaker’s intentions would accord the utterance of “Cats are robots” in question the meaning that the things people had been calling cats is in fact really robots. In this regard Katz says, “The utterance of “Cats are robots” in question is what someone might be expected to say who wished to convey the awful discovery about the things we had thought were cats.” Therefore, there is no point of saying that “Cats are robots” is clearly a genuine deviant sentence like “Charity drink procrastination”. According to Katz, what makes it possible to use “Cats are robots” to break the news is that, being meaningful, the hearer

⁴⁶ H. Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, included in *Language, Mind, and Knowledge*, ed. By K. Gunderson, Minneapolis, 1975, p.162.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 162-163.

understands its sentence meaning to be too transparent a contradiction for the speaker to intend the utterance to receive no pragmatic interpretation.

According to Katz, Putnam equates nonconformity or deviance along with the need of contextual construal, but Katz reveals that there is no sentence that would not require contextual construal in some situations. Even it may perhaps be the case that contextual construal in most appropriate situations need not deviate from the semantical rules of language. Non-deviant sentences like “He is the life of the party” require contextual elucidation when used incongruously or paradoxically. Further it would be the case that the requirement for contextual construal or reading does not even coincide with situational deviance. For example, Katz says, that if we use “The train in Spain falls mainly in the plain” out of the blue while one involves in a serious discussion about one’s child accident, the utterance would be treated as situationally deviant. It is no longer be treated or constructed to fit it with the ongoing discussion. Having said this, we have a different perception altogether when we say that “Cats are Robots”. Like the previous example, here we do not find any serious problem. Here, hearers can construct it to express the news that the things we have been referring to as cats are really robots. What Katz here insists is that even though Putnam is relatively correct in assuming that the assertion that ‘there are not (never) any cats in the world’ is non-deviant, but his criticism of this prediction is not sound. According to Katz, if ‘cat’ means ‘feline animal’, there can be nothing semantically deviant sentence or situationally deviant about its use. However, instead of this, if we begin with the assumption that the stereotype reflecting the observable features of cats is the meaning of ‘cat’, we can conclude that in such a case the use of the sentence, so to speak, is situationally deviant. Of course, it may perhaps be the case, Katz opines, that Putnam’s empiricist assumptions commit him to taking the meaning of ‘cat’ to be some inductive generalization from that uses of ‘cat’

have referred to everyone's experience. Putnam, in fact, bypasses the very meaning of the 'cat' as he does not give importance or takes no notice on the step from the fact that it is everyone's experience that 'uses of 'cat' have referred to the instantiations of our stereotype to the conclusion that such and such things are the reference of 'cat' and the stereotype conditions are its meaning. It hides with the philosophical perception that our knowledge in general and our denotative knowledge in particular comes from our experience. The semantic hypotheses of language are based on innate conceptual universals and such innate based hypotheses are much more philosophically richer than experience. For rationalists, the language learner's hypotheses about the referents of words impose logical connections between denotative conditions not found in experience.

Katz, however, does not think that rationalism is correct. Rather what he intends to say at this juncture is that the linguistic issue about the nature of semantics is logically prior to the philosophical issue between rationalism and empiricism. This so happens because the truth about the linguistic issue is part of the basis for deciding the philosophical issue. Both rationalism and empiricism are integral part about the structure of the system used for acquiring knowledge. Katz here brings the concept of 'black box' and then goes on to say that the input of black box is linguistic information about the use of language and whose output is a semantic description of the language. The pertinent question with which both empiricists and rationalists are engaged is: how much of the output is part of the system in its initial state? According to Katz, even though it would be pertinent for empiricist assumptions to guide Putnam in theorizing about meaning and reference, his arguments for views about meaning and reference ought not to be defending on such assumptions. Katz continues by saying that there is no point of assuming or so to speak arguing as Putnam does, from a premise about past references to robot spy devices with the word

'cat' to the conclusion that such mechanisms actually constitute the reference of 'cat'. Even if it would be the case that every single referential use of the word 'W' is a use referring to X, it does not follow that X is the referent of 'W'. According to Katz, up to a certain point in history, the word 'witch' was used to refer to ugly, frightening women but never to refer to women with super natural powers having devil power. Having said this, the referent of 'witch' is not ugly frightening women. Even though it is not vivid in the real sense of the term but it can easily be established. Of course, one may rely on one standard refutation of the theory of meaning on the basis of which one may be able to equate the meaning of a word with its referent. According to this position, 'witch' and 'warlock' would be synonymous on the fact that they have a null extension. As a result of that it can be assumed that no ugly frightening women can be the referent of 'witch'. Katz defends it even with regard to the concept of possible-world. In this regard Katz says that in possible-worlds where there is a non-empty set of ugly frightening women and a disjoint nonempty set of women with supernatural powers, it is the members of the latter set, not the members of the former, who are the referent of the 'witch'. According to Katz, the case Putnam imagines is one in which each reference to a 'cat' is a reference to a robot spy device because each of these things is *a robot spy device*. However, Putnam in fact fails to realize such cases because it becomes obvious that the notion of the reference is in some sense independent of what its past referential uses picked out.

This actually brings out the second major difference between the new-classical theory and the classical and causal theories. The insight of new-classical theory is to explicate the so-called purely grammatical account of meaning to make a distinction between the *referent of an expression and the referent of an expression on a use of the expression*. The referent of an expression is associated with language and the referent of an expression on a use of the

expression is associated with a context. The former is known as ‘type-reference’ and the latter is known as ‘token reference’. While outlining the very definition of type-reference Katz says:

“X is the type referent of the expression ‘W’ just in the case X has each of the properties expressed in the best hypothesis about the meaning of ‘W’ in the language; if nothing has each of these properties, the expression ‘W’ has null type reference.”

Katz then narrates his position with regard to type-referent as stated above. According to Katz, in the actual world there are no women with supernatural powers and as a result of that the type-reference of the word ‘witch’ is void or null. The same is true about ‘warlock’. However, in possible-worlds the type-reference of ‘witch’ is not null or empty but women with supernatural powers. Again in the actual world the token reference of ‘witch’ on the various successful denoting uses of the word is non-empty. Katz then goes on to say that in the case of token reference, non-semantic information like stereotypes plays an important role in picking out the object referred to as a referential act. It is also to be noted that the token reference need not swerve from the type referent. When someone refers to a policeman with the use of ‘policeman’, the token reference converges or unites with the type reference of ‘policeman’ even though the speaker actually intends to pick out the policeman solely on the uniform stereotype. Thus, there remains the possibility of divergence and convergence in our use of language and it enables us to reconstruct the important distinction ordinary linguistic philosophers made between standard and non-standard uses of language. A standard referential use of an expression is a use on which its token referents are members of the set of type referents, and on the contrary, a non-standard use is one on which the token referents are outside the set.

According to Katz, the distinction between type reference and token reference actually leads to the third difference which states that the new-classical theory differs from the classical theory in rejecting the latter's fundamental tenet that *meaning determines reference*. The distinction between type reference and token reference renders the tenet oblique. Here we have two independent claims of which one states that meaning determines type reference and the other states that meaning determines token reference. The new classical theory adheres to the view that meaning determines type reference and it does not pledge the later. We think many theories are guilty of the failure of recognizing that a theory can subscribe to the former without subscribing to the latter.⁴⁸ We are now in a better position to revisit Putnam's fantasy. We see better what is involved in references to robot spy devices with the word 'cat'. According to Katz, the token referents of these uses of 'cat' are nothing but electronic contraptions. On the other hand, the type referent of 'cat' is null. People before discovered the truth had the false belief that anything that looks like an animal is an animal. On the basis of this sort of belief along with their stereotype of cat's function as the criterion of their token references, they referred to non-cats with the word 'cat'. However, when people came to know the truth that the previous referential uses of 'cat' were non-standard uses and did not token refer to cats. Therefore, one may assume that successful references to robots using the word 'cat' are nothing more than token reference under a false semantic description.

The fourth distinction between the neoclassical theory and the classical theory is that the former does not claim that proper nouns have a meaning in the language. Classical theory holds that proper nouns have a meaning in language and it goes back to Frege. In fact, Frege's conception of sense was not theoretical and as a result of that it is not delimited to intentional structure. It

⁴⁸ Donnellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions", *Philosophical Review*, 65, 1966, pp.285-304.

reflects a primary concern with reference because Frege works with the philosophical conviction that the sense of an expression is the description under which the expression is applied to objects. Sense, Frege vehemently claims, is a projection of reference.⁴⁹ It means that proper nouns are applied to objects in the world under specific descriptions. In fact, unlike the other semantics, Frege distinctly claims that proper nouns have sense like *common nouns*. He, of course, does not forget to note that unlike common nouns the descriptions that constitute the sense of proper nouns differ widely from speaker to speaker. In this regard, Frege says “The sense of a name like ‘Aristotle’ might, for instance, be taken to be the following: the people of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. Anybody who does this will attach another sense of the sentence “Aristotle was born in Stragira” than a man who talks the sense of the name teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Stragira.”⁵⁰ Unlike Frege’s account of classical theory, the new classical theory holds that the sense of an expression is those concepts the expression is associated *with the language that determine the semantic properties and relations of all the sentences in which the expression appears*. According to this theory since the meaning of an expression determines its semantic properties and relations, an expression that is found to have no semantic properties or relations can have no meaning. Thus, the so-called meaning of an expression actually coincides with the semantic properties and relations and accordingly one can reformulate the question whether proper nouns have meaning by asking question whether they have semantic properties and relations. The classical theory firmly believes that the answer to this question would be negative, i.e., proper nouns do not have meaning without semantic properties and relations.

Let us further illustrate this point. Generally, common nouns like ‘general delivery’ and ‘general admission’ can be questioned by asking either “What is it” or “What does it mean?” Proper

⁴⁹ See Frege, “Sense and Reference”, ‘.60.

⁵⁰ Ibid. p.58.

nouns, on the contrary, can be questioned only by asking who or what it is. Moreover, questions like ‘Who is Colonel Morton?’ or ‘What is General Electric?’ are alright, but questions like “What does ‘Colonel Morton’ mean?” or ‘What does ‘General Electric’ mean?” are odd. These divergences are explained on the basis of the assumption that common nouns have a meaning whereas proper nouns do not have a meaning.

The fifth difference between classical and the new classical theory is that unlike the former the latter denies the assumption common to the classical and causal theories. It denies that the speaker’s semantic basis for referring with proper and common nouns is the same. The classical theory concedes the use of common nouns as the model of reference and accounts for the referential use of proper nouns in accord with this model. The causal theory runs the other way around. It concedes the use of proper nouns as a model of reference generally and accounts of the referential use of common nouns in accord with this model. Thus, it seems that both the classical and causal theories accept that the reference of common nouns and the reference of proper nouns have a homogeneous grammatical basis: meaning in the case of classical theory and beliefs about the world in the case of causal theory.

The neoclassical theory distinctly deviates from the other two theories by claiming that reference has a homogeneous grammatical basis. Accordingly, it accuses the classical theory of *gaining homogeneity* at the expense of making false claims about the meaning of proper nouns. It equally alleges the causal theory as well of gaining homogeneity at the expense of making false claims about the meaning of common nouns. The underlying assertion is that proper nouns have no meaning are also arguments that common nouns have a meaning. However, in making a heterogeneity claim, the neoclassical theory asserts that a speaker’s use of common noun relies on knowledge of what the nouns means in the language. But the point is that his or her use of

proper name does not have such semantic knowledge on which to rely. This claim from grammatical perspective is straightforward. The semantic component explains the grammatical meaning of sentences using a *dictionary* and a *projection rule*. The projection rules explain how the senses of sentences are a function of the senses of their elementary syntactic parts.

However, the most pertinent question at this juncture is: how does the neoclassical theory develop a uniform account of reference on a heterogeneous grammatical basis? Here Katz offers us a solution. In this regard he insists on the underlying theory of *semantic competence* to show that type reference comes under this theory. On the basis of this he then develops a new model of how speakers use common nouns to token refer and as a final step he tries to show how the use of proper names can be brought under this model without jeopardizing it. Here one needs a theory of sense competence arising out of structural definitions. There are various forms of structural definition. Structural definition helps us to whether a sentence is meaningful or ambiguous or synonymous. Accordingly, it can be said that a sentence is semantically anomalous when it is assigned no semantic representation. An expression is meaningful just in case it is assigned one semantic representation. A sentence is ambiguous just in case when it is assigned two or more semantic representations and finally, a sentence is synonymous with another sentence if and only if they are assigned the same semantic representation. Thus, the sentence and its semantic representation counts the most of designating whether the sentence under consideration is anomalous or meaningful or ambiguous or synonymous or not. Here one has to emphasis on semantic properties and relations of sentence to the semantic representations assigned to them. Here one comes to know the sense of a sentence just by way of knowing what sentence properties and relation it has.

In the case of semantically anomalous sentence, we are no longer in a position to say that such sentence is true or false in any possible world. This so happens because there is no type referent. A meaningful nominal may or may not have a type referent in a possible world and a meaningful sentence is true or false in some possible world. In the case of ambiguous nominal there may have more than one class of type referents and as a result of that an ambiguous sentence expresses more than one truth or falsehood in some possible worlds. Finally, in the case of synonymous nominal we have a common type reference and as a result of that synonymous sentence may express the same truth or falsehood in every possible world. The semantic representation further incorporates the definitions for analyticity, contradiction and semantic entailment as well. Accordingly, it states that an analytic sentence is secured against falsehood and true when the proposition it expresses is a statement. A contradiction is fortified against truth and falsity when the proposition it expresses is a statement and a sentence is semantically entailed by another is implied by it and also substitutable for it in any non-translucent context. All these segmentally extended definitions lead to a theory of semantic competence. Thus, a theory of semantic competence developed out of semantic representation of various sorts helps the speaker to know about the referential structure of the sentence. It is too complex and difficult to set up. However, the most notable salient feature of this theory is that it challenges Frege's claim "that a full theory of language requires both a theory of compositional structure for intentions and one for extensions." Here each sentence and each of its constituents, receives a set of semantic representations illuminating its sense.

We think that the new classical theory's account of type reference is part of the grammar's account of the speaker's semantic competence. Here token reference can be taken into account as the semantic part of the theory of performance. Accordingly, the theory of token reference is thus

be treated as an explication of the performance principles underlying the speaker's ability to use the language to refer to things in actual speech situations. Following Putnam's 'robot-cat case', we may say that the token reference is based not only on the meaning of words but also on extragrammatical beliefs about the world. In fact, it seems to us that the taken reference to robot spy devices with the word 'cat' depends on both the meaning of 'cat' in English and extragrammatical beliefs about the underlying cause of their anima like appearance and behavior. Thus, our model of token reference in a sense will demand that such reference actually hinges on meaning stereotypes, scientific knowledge, and other factual beliefs. This position of new classical theory certainly goes against the causal theory of reference as developed by Kripke and others. Kripke, for example, does not agree with the perception that there are really two concepts of metal, such as, a phenomenological one and a scientific one. Kripke's argument proves that a property like yellow cannot be an essential property of the stuff that 'gold'. He does not argue against independent linguistic concepts. Rather Kripke like Putnam takes it for granted that linguistic concepts are really the same kind of concepts as scientific concepts. The only difference, if there be any, is that scientific concepts do possess more sophistication than linguistic concepts. According to Katz, they take this for granted because they fail to make a sharp language distinction. For Katz linguistic concepts and scientific concepts are different in kind, but not in degree as Kripke and Putnam felt. Linguistic concepts comprise the meanings of the sentences we use to communicate in a language, whereas scientific concepts comprise the theories we use to explain the behavior of things in the world.

Still we can say that Kripke's causal theory may fit into the new classical theory. We presume that the notion of the bearer of a name is not a semantic primitive. If it happens to be the case then how can it be explicated in semantic theory? According to Kripke, this so happens because

‘an initial baptism takes place’.⁵¹ As a result of that an object may be named by ostension on the reference of the same may be fixed by a synonymous description. Kripke says, “When the name is “passed from link to link,” the receiver of the name must intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it.”⁵² However the problematic area of Kripke’s position is to substantiate the implementing aspect of his theory. One has to work out the notion of a baptism so that it can cover the range of cases it desires to cover. Kripke conceives proper names as rigid designator. However, it seems to us that there may have semantically empty proper nouns which can obtain a meaning within a sentence. The derivative meaning of proper name receives in the sentence in which it occurs *through fail-safe procedure* for the use of that proper name. The derivative meaning of a proper name will contain the concept of the bearer of the name. It involves a cross-reference of the encyclopedia entry for the bearer of the name. The encyclopedia entry makes sense only if the bearer of the name falls under each of the concepts in the conjunction of the descriptive contents. As a result of that the speaker can make use of these concepts in constructing a fail-safe procedure for the use of a proper name.

We have started with the proposal that the new classical theory becomes a synthesis of the classical and causal theory of reference. In this sense, there is nothing wrong in claiming that the new classical theory that has been appeared as a synthesis of classical and causal theories, gives us the picture of higher truth. The new classical theory tries to cohere or so to speak minimize the philosophical gulf between the classical theory and the new classical theory. Even in some cases it establishes a bridge between classical and causal theories of reference.

⁵¹Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, p.302.

⁵² Ibid. p.302.

Chapter Four

Concluding Remarks

The thesis over the chapters attempts to evaluate various aspects of the theory of reference. Language has various aspects through which one can come to know about the world. In fact, the main contention of linguistic philosophy or philosophy of language is to develop the relationship between language and reality (world). Linguistic philosophers over the years have developed various theories to show the relationship between language and reality. Of course, linguistic philosophers over the years have disagreed about the nature of language and also about the nature of language and about their relationship. Whatever the nature of language and reality may be, one thing is very clear that language refers. The referential function of language determines the meaning of language. In this regard we can mention the name of Bertrand Russell who developed referential theory of meaning.

In this thesis we have outlined three different broad schools of referential theory of meaning. One is philosophically known as the classical (descriptive) theory of reference expounded by Russell, Frege, Searle, Carnap and others. The other theory is philosophically known as the causal theory of reference expounded by Saul Kripke, Donnellan, Putnam and others. The other school is known as the neo-classical theory of reference expounded by Chomsky, Katz, Fodor and others. While correlating these theories, we can say that the classical theory of reference may be taken as *thesis*, the causal theory reference may be comprehended as anti-thesis and finally the neo-classical theory of reference may be comprehended as *synthesis*. This clearly suggests that

the classical theory of reference and the causal theory of reference are diametrically opposite in nature because each of these theories develops and interprets the concept of reference in a different manner. The neoclassical theory of reference appears as a *synthesis* in the sense that it tries to overcome the defects of classical theory of reference in the eyes of causal theory of reference and makes an attempt to synthesis both the classical theory of reference as well as the causal theory of reference. We think that even though the theory of reference has immense varieties but all the varieties must belong to either one of the broad school of reference as mentioned above. The descriptive theory of reference or the classical theory of reference may be designated as the *primitive theory of reference* in the sense that this theory of reference initiated or began with the theory of reference. Here the problem of reference is to determine how thoughts and sentences can be about objects. If we take up the case of the hungry Cat, there is, first, the *referring expression* 'my Cat'. Then there is the *constituent of the proposition* introduced by the referring expression. The third element is the mental *representation* of the Cat. Finally, there is the *speech act of referring* itself that ties all these elements together. We think these four elements obviously correspond to expressions, propositions, beliefs, and speech acts, respectively, and each highlights a different aspect of the general problem of reference. If we put these problems into questions, then we can say how are referring expressions related to object? What propositions are expressed by sentences containing referring expressions? What is the role of mental representation in beliefs about objects? What is the correct analysis of the speech act of referring? While answering to the questions; how referring expressions are related to objects, Frege goes on to say that all names must have a sense that mediates between them and the objects they stand for. However, Searle rejects Frege claim, but insists that each name must be *backed by* a set of identifying descriptions. This position of Frege and Searle has been criticized

by Kripke who sees names as lacking any intrinsic sense or descriptive content. According to him, names are related to objects through a special sort of *causal chain* stretching from the moment a name is given, to any particular use of that name. We think that these different accounts attempt to provide a partial answer to the first question, such as, how are referring expressions related to objects.

The question then is; what proposition is expressed by sentence containing referring expression? To illustrate this point, we have to distinguish between general and singular proposition. The statement “The queen of England is ill” expressed the proposition *there is one and only one thing with the property of being the queen of England, and it is ill*. Such a proposition is called ‘general’ because here all references to particular things have been eliminated, and all that we have instead is a quantifier, and a bound variable. A statement such as “7 is prime,” on the other hand, is said to express the proposition 7 is prime, which is called ‘singular’. Here we note the vast difference between ‘7’ and ‘The queen of England’ as far as their contribution to the logical structure of the proposition is concerned. Here the referring expression ‘7’ simply introduces the integer 7 into the proposition, but the phrase ‘The queen of England’ is surely to be distinguished from her majesty herself.

We cannot ignore the role of mental representation in beliefs about objects. In this regard one can distinguish between *de dicto* and *de re* beliefs. A belief *de dicto* is a belief that a certain general proposition is true. A belief *de re* is a belief about a particular thing that it has a certain property. Accordingly, we can say that my belief that there are spies is *de dicto* but not *de re*. But the belief I have about myself that I am left handed is certainly *de re*. However, any belief that the President of United State in 1987 is old seems to be both *de dicto* and *de re*. It is the belief that the proposition under consideration is true and hence it is *de dicto*. In addition, the content of

the beliefs contains a representation of Ronald Regan. Here I am attributing the property of being old to Regan and so myself is *de re* as well. We further think that referring as *speech act* also plays significant role to the general problem of reference.

Russell's descriptive theory of reference has been marked as the paradigm of reference because Russell's theory plays an important role in providing the modifications that enable the descriptive program to overcome its difficulties and serve as a foundation for the computational model. We think that Russell's account of reference has both an epistemological and a semantic segment and they are entwined with each other. The epistemological segment describes how knowledge of objects is possible and the semantic segment describes how referring expressions are to be interpreted. Russell's epistemological segment is comprehended with the help of finding out the distinction between *knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description*. For Russell, one has knowledge by acquaintance of an object when one has a direct cognitive relation with it, i.e., when one is directly aware of the object itself. On the contrary, one has knowledge of description of an object when one knows that there exists one and only one object having a certain property. The property is the descriptive content of the object. For example, since I am directly aware of a pain in my left knee, Russell would say that I have knowledge by acquaintance of my pain. On the other hand I am not acquainted with the twelfth president of the United States, but I know that there was one and only one person in the world who happened to be the twelfth president of United States. Here I have knowledge by description of him. It is important to note here that Russell's theory of knowledge contains two postulates, such as, (i) every proposition that we can understand must be composed of constituents with which we are

acquainted and (ii) we do not have knowledge by acquaintance of physical objects. Thus, it seems to us that Russell's account of names and descriptions mirrors his epistemological distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by descriptions. A proper name designates its objects directly, but it has no meaning apart from the designated object. That is why Russell's theory of proper name has been attributed as non-sense theory of proper name. Accordingly, when a name is employed, the object itself is a constituent of the proposition, which, in turn, is a singular one. Since we are never acquainted with physical objects, they cannot participate in propositions we can understand. As a result of that the proper names we use to designate physical objects are not really proper names at all but **abbreviated descriptions**. A description, on the other hand, does not designate an object directly. Rather it is capable of denoting an object that satisfies its descriptive content. We think that the contribution made by a definite description to a proposition is rather complex. To have knowledge by description is to know that one and only one object possesses a certain property. Russell's account of logically proper names is indeed inconsistent with the descriptive theses. When we talk of descriptive or classical account of reference after Russell we are primarily convened with Russell's descriptive theory of proper names what we generally terms as 'ordinary proper names'. Except expressions containing logical proper names, all other referring expressions are descriptions. Thus, Russell's theory of description would be an integral part of the descriptive program of theory of reference.

Strawson's paper 'On Denoting' (1950) poses what is still an influential objection to Russell's theory of descriptions. Strawson bases his objection on certain distinction that Russell neglected. Strawson insists, "'Referring' is not something an expression does; it is something that someone can use an expression to do. Mentioning, or referring to, something is a characteristic of a use of an expression, just as 'being about' something, and truth-or-falsity, are characteristic of a use of

a sentence.”⁵³ We think the debate between Russell and Strawson is praiseworthy in philosophy of language. But we think Strawson fails to understand Russell in the true sense of the term. First and foremost their interpretations and approaches are different in nature. Russell’s descriptive theory of reference would be a part of semantics; whereas Strawson outlook is pragmatic in nature. Thus, at the very outset there lies methodological difference. Of course, expressions are used to refer; assertions are true or false and sentences are used to make true or false assertions. Nevertheless, these distinctions fail to undermine Russell’s theory. Let us state how Strawson represents Russell’s position. According to Russell, anyone who asserted “The king of France is wise” would be asserting that ‘there is one and only one king of France and whoever is king of France is wise’. If this is what Russell held, Strawson’s objection would have merit. But Russell’s talks not about assertions would have merit. However, Russell talks not about assertions but about sentences and about propositions, which he talks to be the meanings of sentences. We think he does not speak of asserting sentences, and his theory concerns the meanings of description sentences, not assertions made in using them. We think it would have been helpful if Russell had explicitly distinguished between sentences and the assertions made in using sentences, but nothing Russell does say implies that his claims about sentences were to apply to assertions they are used to make.

In Strawson’s view, when a speaker uses a description sentence to make an assertion, not only does the speaker not assert what Russell’s supposedly says he asserts, the speaker does not assert something that has to be either true or false. If there is no king of France, according to Strawson, the assertion of the sentence under consideration is neither true nor false. As a result of that the truth nor falsity of this sentence does not arise and the speaker is not really asserting that there is

⁵³ Strawson, P. F., “On Referring”, 1950, p.80.

a king of France, but is merely implying it. He can successfully use 'the king of France' to refer only if there is a unique king of France. Strawson would later put it, the sentence, not merely the speaker, presupposes the existence and uniqueness of the king of France. By this Strawson perhaps could not mean that the sentence is true or false only if its presupposition holds, for in his view the truth and falsity of sentences does not arise. Rather it would be the assertion made in using the sentence that is true or false, if the presupposition holds. In such a case, presupposition is not a semantic property of sentences.

We think that the trouble with Strawson's objection is that the claims on which it relies pertain not to description sentences but to assertion made in using them. In our sense, Russell's theory of descriptive meaning does not concern such assertions but rather *the meanings of the sentences themselves*. It was meant to exhibit the form of proposition expressed by description sentences, not a theory of their use. Even though Strawson defines presupposition as a property of sentences, it is so only derivatively. The property is not a semantic property and a sentence possesses it only by virtue of a property of assertions made in using the sentence. Our position is that, to be relevant to Russell's theory, it would have to be a *semantic property*, not merely a pragmatic property. Russell examines with regard to semantic property, whereas Strawson criticizes Russell with regard to pragmatic property.

For Russell, descriptions are not meaningful in isolation, but only within the context of a sentence. Russell like Frege was not much interested in language as a system of communication. But he would have agreed that the purpose of using referring expressions in conversation is to identify an object for the hearer. However, the descriptive theory of Russell, Frege and others has been denied by the new approach. According to the new approach, reference is determined by facts outside the mind. The descriptive theory seeks to explain reference in terms of properties of

mental states. We think that the shift from the descriptive program to the new approach was initiated by Donnellan (1966) just by way of introducing a distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. We think that Donnellan's referential/attribution distinction plays an important role in arguments against the descriptive theory of reference. While making the distinction clear, Donnellan starts with the single sentence 'Smith's murderer is insane'. Suppose first that we come upon poor Smith foully murderer. From the brutal manner of the killing and the fact that Smith was the most loveable person in the world, we might explain, "Smith's murderer is insane". I will assume that in a quite ordinary sense we do not know who murdered Smith. This, I shall say, is **an attributive use of the definite description**. Now supposed further that Jones has been charged with Smith's murder and he has been placed on trial. Imagine that there is a discussion of Jones's odd behavior at his trial. We might sum up our impression of the behavior by saying, "Smith's murderer is insane." If someone asks to whom we are referring, by using this description, the answer here is 'Jones'. This is a referential use of a definite description. We think that in the referential use, the intended referent can be identified even though no single entity fits the description used. The intended referent may also be identified even if something else altogether fits the description. In Donnellan's example, the speaker would have been referred successfully to Jones in the trial even if Jones had not been the murderer. In the attributive use, if nothing fits the description, no entity can be said to have been picked out and referred to. Consequently, if nothing fits the description in the referential use, the speaker act may still be successful. If the speech act is in assertion, the speaker may still say something true with respect to his intended referent. However, in the attributive use, if nothing fits the description, the assertion cannot be true of anything.

Summarily it can be said that a description in referential usage is just a tool for identifying the referent and other descriptions that can perform the same task may also be employed. In attributive usage, the speaker is referring to whatever fits the description and there is no particular entity to be identified apart from the description employed. We think Donnellan's distinction will be used here as a methodological tool for the systematic presentation of general objections to the descriptive approach. This does not, however, make sense to say that what Donnellan's has claimed against descriptive theory of reference is right. Kripke, for example, has attacked significant parts of the descriptive theory, while at the same time rejecting some of the alleged consequences of Donnellan's distinction. To me descriptive theory of reference is based on the essence of the referential expressions where essence is determined by meaning. To me the only way to establish the required relation between a referring expression and an object is by having a descriptive content that is associated with an object. This descriptive content in a loose sense is the meaning of the expression. But in the referential uses of definite descriptions, the descriptive content plays no direct role in establishing the relation between the expression and the object. The expression 'Smith is murderer' in its referential use refers to Jones, but the descriptive content seems irrelevant. Of course, there are some cases where reference is established independently of meaning.

A description theory of names explains the referential properties of one category of term, names, by appeal to those of another, definite description. On causal theory, 'a' designates x in virtue of being associated with 'the F which denotes x; designation in terms of denotation/reference. The referential properties of descriptions are explained, in turn, by appeal to those of the general terms: 'the F' denotes x in virtue of the fact that 'F' applies to x and nothing else; denotation is explained in terms of application. It has been criticized by saying that description theories can

give no clues as to how, ultimately, language is *referentially linked to reality*. These theories pass the referential buck, but *the buck must stop somewhere*. We think that the essential incompleteness of description theories of reference was not adequately address or notice until recently. It is still ignored by most writers on reference. Frege himself is responsible for this. While developing his descriptive theory, he does not rule out the reference of empty proper names. Philosophers of language who are common about the view that language refers not sure about the locus of reference and the descriptive theory of reference cannot overcome this shortfall. Hillary Putnam repurposes description theory of **natural kind terms** and in turn helps us to bring out this incompleteness. Imagine that somewhere in the universe there is a planet, Twin Earth. Twin Earth, as its name suggests, is very like Earth. In particular, each Earthling has a doppelganger on Twin Earth who is molecule for molecule the same as the Earthling. Consequently, many Twin Earthlings seek a language that seems like English. Indeed it is phonologically and syntactically the same as English. The question is: Is it semantically the same too? It cannot be if we deem it to include the proper names that Twin Earthlings use, because it is not referentially the same. When an Earthling uses a name in English, he refers to an object on Earth. When his doppelganger uses what is apparently the same name, he refers to an object on Twin Earth. When Friend Oscar declares his voting intentions” ‘I’ll vote for Regan; we need a dangerous president for a dangerous world’. Here he is talking about our local Earthly Regan. Twin Oscar produces an utterance that sounds the same, but he is not referring to Regan. Even he has never heard of Regan nor of any other Earthlings. He has his own problem with in Twin Regan in Twin USA.

It thus shows that reference, and hence meaning, does not depend solely on the association of some words with other words. For all those associations are the same in Twin English as in

English. Further, there is no internal state of the speaker that determines the reference, and hence the meaning, of his words. For Oscar and his twin are alike internally. No association of descriptions or mental images will make Oscar's words refer to Regan rather than Twin Regan. No state of Oscar's brain will do the job. As Putnam put it "meanings' just ain't in the head'. We must look for some relation that language and mind have to things outside themselves to explain meaning. How could meanings be in the head? Meaning depends on reference and reference relates a person and his words to something outside him. To hold that something internal to an object is sufficient to determine its relation to a particular object external to it is to suppose that it has a truly magical power. However, a person no more has the power over the relation of reference than he has it over the relation of kicking, teaching, being taller than, or being the father of. Having said this, there are some important truths in the description theory. The idea that we must know something about an entity in order to refer to it by name is appealing. The idea of reference borrowing is especially important. It highlights what Hillary Putnam calls 'the linguistic division of labour'.⁵⁴ Our ability to use our language is, in part, a social capacity. It depends on our interactions with others in a community of varying interests, capacities and expertise. Putnam made the point about general terms: our capacity to talk about chromosomes, microchips and curved space time, despite our ignorance of these things, is a result of our social links to other whose acquaintance with them is more intrinsic. The same is true of names. A person often succeeds in designating an object only in virtue of being at the end of reference chains running through her linguistic community to the object. However, our view of the nature of those links is very different from that of the description theorist.

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⁵⁴ Putnam, Hillary, 1975, 27-28.

The basic idea of causal theories of reference is that a term refers to whatever is causally linked to it in a certain way, a way that does not require speakers to have identifying knowledge of the referent. Here the causal links relate speakers to the world and to each other. In our sense, the basic idea of causal theory is based on the idea that the name is introduced ostensibly at a formal or informal dubbling. To perceive something is to be causally affected by it. As a result of that, a witness to the dubbling will gain ability to use the name to designate the object in virtue of one's causal link to the object, i.e., ostension of the object prompted the thoughts which led the use of the name. In short, those present at the dubbling acquires a semantic ability that is causally grounded in the object.

The causal theory of reference is based on three assumptions, such as, (i) referential relations are constituted out of causal relations, (ii) there exists a rich enough set of causal relations to give individuation conditions for the causal *relata* of native utterances and (iii) these rich causal relations are epistemically accessible to the field linguist given the tools at her disposal. Being a behaviorist conceptualist, Quine objects regarding (ii). Assumption (i) can be attacked by arguing that reference cannot be constituted out of causal relations as claimed by the causal theory of reference because **referential relations have normative properties** that causal relations do not. This is how there creates a huge gulf between causality and reference. Here one may claim that causal relations are not sensitive to mistakes about what we are causally interacting with, although referential relations are. We can have causal relations to rabbit even though we think we are trafficking with rabbit fusion. In fact it might be called **Davidsonian strategy** which asserts that causes are part of scientific world picture. Reference, by contrast, must be projected onto natives via a charitable interface with a simultaneous attribution of beliefs to them. In this sense we can say that even if assumption (ii) is right, still reference cannot be

constituted out of causal relation. For Davidson, reference is *a theoretical relation* rather than a causal relation. We have slightly a different position unlike *Davidsonian strategy*. We want to say something more about how the causal theorist should defend assumption (i) and argue that the normative flavor we sense in reference is there because of its links to truth. Thus, he should argue that there is nothing more to reference than what we do to refer. We think that assumption (iii) can be attacked by a variant of the *Davidsonian strategy* against (i). To recognize how natives are affected causally, we must attribute psychological states to them. But these are beliefs and so access to the very causes that the causal theorist needs are themselves inextricably tied up with belief-attribution. Accordingly, it can be said that these causes are not robust items independent of variations in how we attribute beliefs to natives, but the softer result of the holism of interpretation.

Another related way to attack assumption (iii) is to grant epistemic access to the causal relations constituting reference, but deny that the particular causal relations is actually constitute reference can be distinguished from other causal relations without attributing beliefs. In fact, there is much discrimination to causal imputes that does not emerge into the light of reference. While responding to both of these attacks we can say that the Davidsonian has the *evidential picture* backwards. Recognition of the appropriate causal factors precedes psychological attribution and hence does not rely on it. The robustness of the pertinent causal factors and our access to them are veiled by the language describing the relevant causes, because such language is invariably *psychologically loaded*. However, the apparently holistic latitude is psychological attribution encloses a rigid core of appropriate causal relations that underwrite successful psychological attributions. Accordingly, the causal theorist concedes the need to attribute beliefs, but at the same time denies this infirms the robustness of the causal factors recognized. The question then

is: what causal relation can individuate the object being causally interacted with in a way that the causal theorist needs? If we are restricted to perpetual relations, we will not find any. These relations are, at best, to the surfaces of things. The causal relations needed are those at work during the *entire history* of the interaction of a speaker with a kind of thing. If I point at the ocean or at a rabbit, my causal relations at that moment are pretty limited in both cases. In fact, there is nothing to reveal whether my interaction with the ocean is with one big thing or with lots of little things. The same is true of rabbit fusion. However, once my interactional capacities to make distinctions among things are brought to bear on the situation, and my causal history with regard to the ocean, and to rabbits, is perused, it can be seen that the ocean –causally speaking- is one big thing for me, and that rabbits are not. This, however, makes clear those causal relations are rich enough to individuate things in quite different ways and it is also easy to perceive that creatures with different powers individuate things differently.

The other limitation of **causal theory of reference**, we do reckon, is that it is not committed to a metaphysical claim about there being a fact in nature about how things are individuated. Metaphysics deals with being-qua-being and the causal theory of reference cannot reach up to that level. Instead, a causal theorist can at best be said that in most general cases the causal relations between a speaker and a kind of thing provide individuation conditions: they tell us the causally relevant units the speaker interacts with. Devitt claims that the causal theory of reference cannot fix references of the natural kind terms of our language because talk of ‘causality’ is just more theory and this theory can be reinterpreted along with all the previously reinterpreted theory. This clearly suggests that the causal theory of reference in isolation cannot determine the reference of referential expressions. The causal theorist thinks that what fixes the references of terms are causal relations. He thinks that there is a fact of the matter about whether

causality or something else does this fixing. So it's no argument against him to invoke causality as a possibility for our referential account. He can protest that, after all, there is no reason to think whatsoever the relations that fix our terms causal ones. We think that the causal relations the causal theorist wants are ones studied in science, namely, biology, sociology, physics, etc. In fact, the causal relations in question should amount to other relations we are already familiar with in other terms, relations, like 'touches', 'sees', 'hears about', etc. What we can say at this juncture is that the causal theory of reference will not rely on accounts we have of resources for fixing the references of relation-terms between us and the world. At the end we conclude by saying that the actual causal relations is underwriting the referential relations holding between terms and their referents.

Putnam offers us an interesting causal theory of reference. He always carefully prefaces his presentation of permutation argument with a discussion of 'operational' and 'theoretical' constraints on reference. Theoretical constraints are a set of sentences fixed in truth-value and containing the terms in question. These are assertability conditions associated with our sentences or experimental conditions that can be measured or observed. The operational and theoretical constraints exhaust all our resources for fixing the references of the terms of the language what Putnam called 'metaphysical realism' which holds that our terms refer to external objects must be wrong. As the argument applies to all our terms, one possible way of attempting to fix reference by the causal theory of reference seems ruled out. Accordingly, talk of causality is just more theory and one can reinterpret the term 'causes' just as we reinterpret any other term. In this regard we perceive a philosophical debate between Putnam and his opponents, namely, Devitt, Glymour, and Lewis. The first objection they raised against Putnam's causal theory of reference is that there is nothing to do with the word 'cause'; rather it has to do with *causality*

itself. For them, it is causality, i.e., the causal glue between the uses of our terms and the world, that fixes the references of our terms, and, consequently, it is that same causality that fixes what ‘cause’ itself refers to Putnam. Putnam begs the question against the causal theorist by shifting from causality to ‘causality’. Having said this, we think Putnam deserves credit for giving a slightly different causal theory of reference. Here he is taken to be employing a kind of skeptical strategy stating that the causal theorist tells a story about how our terms refer and on the basis of this the causal sceptic then ask questions about how the terms for that story are referentially fixed. Glymour (1982:177) describes it as an *endless dialogue* and in turn draws an analogy with logical positivistic demands for definitions. Devitt alludes to the childish habit of always asking ‘why’ and notes that the possibility of such a maneuver does not show the desire goal. Lewis’s position is far more interesting as he says that what Putnam has shown is that a ‘voluntaristic’ theory of reference that eventually leads to disaster. According to Putnam, since language is a creature of human convention, we can refer however we like and we have seen fit to establish a language in which reference works thus, individually or collectively, implicitly or explicitly, we have made this theory of reference true by definition. “We interpret our language or nothing does” If it were to be the case, then surely any proposed constraint would be just more theory. Because the stipulation that establishes the constraint would be something we say or think something we thereby add to total theory.⁵⁵ Lewis then concludes by saying, “Referring isn’t just something we do. What we say and think not only doesn’t settle what we refer to’ it does not even settle the prior question of how it is to be settled what we refer to. Meanings – as the saying goes – just ain’t in the head.”⁵⁶ Here Lewis sees two ways out of this quandary. Either one must stick with a causal theory of reference, not causal description, not the view that it is a theory

⁵⁵ Lewis, David., ‘Putnam’s Paradox’, *Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.63.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.63.

using causal terminology that fixes reference, or one must adopt elite classes, i.e., a coarser grid of available extensions for kind terms than that afforded by set theory. For Putnam, causal connection is attached to a particular referential relation by causal connection, not by any metaphysical glue. Accordingly, it can be said that causal connection is self-identifying. Here Devitt and Glymour emerge Putnam at the wrong point. To them, Putnam's error is similar to that in Quine's *Word and Object* (1960). According to Putnam, a causal theorist must take operational constraints seriously, because they contain the causal relations needed to affix terms to the world. However, such constraints are not operational. As a result of that operational constraints, on the causal picture, cut deep into the world. They don't stop only at what we observe, and consequently, to honor their restraints we must accept that they fix more than appearances. We think that Putnam's operational constraints stop at the observational level and at times he claims that 'operational constraint' and 'observational constraint' are *interchangeable*.⁵⁷ Here we see that Putnam's position is at par with Quine's position that a strict distinction between theory and observation is not available. Putnam claims that 'cause' is just a word and each time critics think he is opening himself. Anyway, we think that Putnam's version of the permutation argument that has been based on operational constraints is too weak as they are explicit, observational constraints only. Putnam says nothing about exactly how far the causal resources available to us to underwrite reference fall short.

The other important aspect is that while developing the causal theory of reference, one should be alert about **the ontological status of causality**. It is particularly relevant to know about how Kripke elicits intuitions to support a causal interpretation as opposed to descriptive interpretation. Suppose, someone says that a baby is born and his parents call him by a certain

⁵⁷ Putnam, Hillary, 'Model Theory and the Factuality of Semantics', in Alexander George (ed.), *Reflections on Chomsky*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1989, p.215.

name. They talked about him to their parents. Other people meet him. Through various sorts of talk the name is spread from link to link as just like a chain. A speaker who is on the far end of this chain, who has heard about, say Richard Feynman, in the market place or elsewhere, may be referring to Richard Feynman even though he cannot remember from whom he first heard of Feynman or from whom he ever heard of Feynman. He knows that Feynman is a famous physicist. A certain passage of communication reaching ultimately to the man himself does reach the speaker. He then is referring to Feynman even though he cannot identify him uniquely. It thus reflects that our reference depends not just on what we think ourselves in the line of classical theory of reference, but on the other people of community, the history of how the name reached one, and things like that. It is by following such a history that one gets to the reference.⁵⁸ Here the pertinent discussions of the epistemic and ontological status of observational regularities can be brought to bear on the epistemic and ontological status of these causal relations. In this way the claims made there about observational regularities can be used to justify to some extent theories of reference that depend on causality in a serious way. In this way one can find a way out against the objections raised against the causal theory of reference. Here just remember Hume. Hume says that causal relations are nothing but constant conjunctions and that the necessity or law-likeness of such connections is imposed. The notion of ‘cause’ or ‘regularity’ is a purely theoretical one. Causes are events which are not observed in any sense. Hume’s position is hiddenly reflected in Davidson when he goes on to say that *reference is a theoretical relation that arises only within the context of the imposition of a truth-theory on a language and consequently it cannot be used by the causal theorist to fix reference as he would like*. However, the causal theorist again can reject this charge by pointing out that the causal relations in question are **observational regularities**.

⁵⁸ See Kripke, Saul, *Naming and Necessity*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, p.91.

The causal theorist, we think, also avoids the requirement that reference be identifiable in physicalistically acceptable scientific terms by noting that gross regularities are epistemically independent of the empirical sciences. The term ‘refers’ may pick out the appropriate causal relations without their being a definition of ‘refers’ available in more pristine causal terminology that can do the job. Now let us consider two arguments raised by Putnam against the causal theory of reference which are directed to nullify causality sufficient robustness for the causal theorist to take it as fixing the reference of empirical terms. The first argument has been developed by Putnam in his essay “Beyond Historicism” (1983a). It raises the concern that causality must link ‘cause’ itself to its referent. The second argument as raised by Putnam simply states that the ordinary use of ‘cause’ presupposes a distinction between *causes* and *standing conditions*. But such a distinction is related to **explanation** according to Putnam. Putnam illustrates this point just by citing a beautiful example. If a pressure-cooker has a stuck valve and explodes, we may say the stuck valve was a cause of the explosion, but we would never say the absence of the holes in the body of the vessel caused the explosion, despite the fact that the absence of other holes in the body of the vessel is a reason why there was an explosion and moreover despite the fact that a stuck valve just amounts to the absence of such a hole. The notion of cause needed here is one largely couched in ordinary language, and context-sensitive and interest-relative. Putnam clearly thinks the causal relation therefore must be a product of our theorizing in the sense that it cannot be a robust relation between us and items independent of our theorizing. Thus for Putnam, the notion of causation has a **cognitive dimension**, even when we use it in a statement about innominate object. The cognitive or intentional dimension lies in part in the presupposition that hearers of the statement regard such facts as that the vessel of the pressure cooker does not have a hole in it as ‘background conditions’ which may be taken for

granted. Even Wittgenstein denies the causal theory of reference and finds transcendence of reference. In this regard Wittgenstein says, “If you’re asked: How do you know that it is a thought of such and such?” the thought that immediately comes to your mind is that of a shadow, a picture. You don’t think of a causal relation. The kind of relation you think of is best expressed by ‘picture’, ‘shadow’, etc.” We cannot rule out the elusivity of reference. All these as a whole suggest that reference cannot be denied in terms of underlying causal relations, nor can causal procedures of any sort be used to argument or restrict our notion of reference, just as truth cannot be characterized in terms of whatever truth-gathering methods are available at a given time. There might be instances of gold that we could never causally interact with no matter how much we perfect our procedures. However unlike referential irrealists we do not draw the conclusion that causality has nothing to do with reference. Our problem is related with the assertion of robust causality. It is not clear what role causality plays in our referential practices to ensure it as robust.

Even though the causal theory of reference is oversimplified in various ways, but it has many attractive features. First, it seems that it shares with description theories the capacity to account some special features of natural language, namely, stimulus independence, arbitrariness, medium independence. A name is stimulus independent in that the causal chain on which its use depends does not require the presence of the object. It is arbitrary and medium independent in that any symbol in any medium can be placed in the appropriate causal relation to the object. However, unlike description theories, it can also account for the apparent abstractness of proper names. Secondly, we think that the causal theory of reference avoids the problems of descriptive theory of reference. Since a name does not abbreviate a cluster of definite descriptions, there is no problem selecting which descriptions are in the cluster for a person. Here the connection between

naming and knowing is cut and here we do not require the name users be able to identify bearers. Here we sense a different view of competence with a name. Here no lender to be an expert about the object. Thirdly, the theory can solve the problem of identity statements. Here we identify the sense with the type of d-chain that makes up the network for the name. Moreover, the causal theory promises an explanation of the ultimate links between language and the world. The explanation in terms of causation seems agreeably naturalistic. We need an explanation of the external relation that the whole system of words bears to the world. We emphasized this with the help of Putnam's Twin-Earth fantasy. The causal theory of reference actually makes the reference of names dependent on an external relation. The causal theory of reference distinguishes empty names from nonsense syllables and there asserted that an empty name has an underlying causal network. What makes it empty is that its network is not property grounded in an object. Two reasons are behind this. First, a name may be introduced as results of a false posit and a person wrongly thinks that an entity exists. Secondly and more importantly, a name may be introduced in what is explicitly or implicitly a work of fiction, a story, novel, film, etc.

The neoclassical theory appears as a synthesis of descriptive theory and causal theory of reference. The classical or descriptive theory of reference asserts that knowledge of the meaning of a word is the basis on which speakers use it to refer. It is supposed to explain how the speakers have fixed, intersubjective criteria for applying words in their language and on the basis of this explanation it accounts for necessary truth in terms of criterion inclusion. The causal theory states that knowledge of causal relations to *an earlier baptismal ceremony* is the basis on which speakers refer. The causal theory of reference sees the weak point of the classical theory of reference precisely based on its conception of a doctrine of necessary truth. Thus, the causal theory of reference clearly stands against the classical theory of reference. The neoclassical

theory by contrasting it with the classical theory attempts to show how the differences enable it to avoid the causal theorist's objection to the classical theory. We think neoclassical theory differs from the classical theory in the sense that the neoclassical theory takes an uncompromised rationalist stance on natural languages. This can avoid the contradiction in the classical theory. It takes the stance adopting by Noam Chomsky's rationalist theory of grammatical structure. We think that Chomsky's position eventually helps neoclassical theory to escape the problem Donnellan found with the classical theory. The neoclassical theory thus supplies missing principle that we notice in classical theory, to distinguish sense and reference, semantic structure and extra linguistic belief, meaning and use.

Thus, we do conclude by saying that even though language refers and it has been accepted without begging question, but what language refers, where it refers and what is /are the modalities of referring is a matter of serious philosophical debate. This research works reflects it adequately. Philosophers of language were involved over the years to find a way out to the solution of the problem of reference, but there we do not find a single theory that would be taken without question begging. This actually reflects the importance and complexity of this theory within the realm of philosophy of language. The problem would remain so long linguistic philosophers would fail to come under the same perception about the very nature of language as well as the very nature of reality.

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