

## **Chapter Three**

### **The Neo- classical Theory of Reference**

Historically we have witnessed the trio-concepts, such as, thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. These trio-concepts are associated with the concept of dialectic. It has been witnessed in Hegel and also in Kant. Kant's understanding of knowledge is a form of synthesis, an attempt of amalgamation between thesis and antithesis. If we start with empiricism as the thesis, we find that sense experience is the main or only (Hume) source of knowledge. Then we find anti-thesis in rationalism which proclaims that reason is the only source or the main source of knowledge. Kant synthesizes both empiricism and rationalism and thereby claims that proper knowledge would be the outcome or byproduct of both empiricism (thesis) and rationalism (anti-thesis). Very similar to this, we notice the same historical development in the theory of reference. The classical or descriptive theory of reference, we have already outlined after Russell and Frege, is supposed to be the thesis because the referential theory, in fact, has been started with the contribution of Russell and Frege along with others. Then we have noticed the causal theory of reference as anti-thesis to the classical or descriptive theory of reference. It seems there remains a polarization between the classical and causal theory of reference. The neo-classical theory of reference that has been developed by Katz and others is supposed to a synthesis of the theory of reference. In this chapter we propose to explicate the new classical theory of reference as a synthesis of both the classical and the causal theory of reference.

We have seen that the classical theory of reference actually intends to say that the meaning of a word is the basis on which speakers use it to refer. This actually reminds us the position of

Locke. Locke in fact says that ‘every word is the sensible mark of idea’<sup>41</sup>. Even we have noticed the same perception in Heraclitus as well. Thus, in one sense the root of the classical or descriptive theory of reference as developed by Russell, Frege, Church, Lewis and Searle actually ingrained or deeply rooted in the antiquity. The causal theory of reference that has been developed by Kripke, Putnam and Donnellan tell us that knowledge of causal relations associated with baptismal ceremony is the basis on which speakers refer.

According to Katz the conflict between classical and causal theory of reference actually started in the middle of 20<sup>th</sup> century with the appearance of the understanding paper written by Donnellan. In fact, Donnellan in his paper has attempted to dig out the weak spot of the classical theory of reference. According to Katz, the classical theory of reference has mainly concentrated on the development of two important things. First, it has attempted to explicate on what basis the speakers while inter-personal communication has fixed inter-subjective criteria for applying words in their language. While developing the referential theory of meaning, Russell and other classical thinkers hold that the meaning of a linguistic expression is determined on the basis of its referent. Or more specifically it can be said that the philosophical meaning of a sentence would be determined on the basis of its reference independent from the sentence. The extra-linguistic reference of a linguistic expression or a sentence would be the determining criterion of measuring the meaning of the sentence. In this regard, the classical thinkers give importance on the referential connection between *the sentence and what it refers to*. That means, the referential connection constitutes the meaning of the sentence under consideration. In this regard Katz says, “The classical theory is supposed to do two things. It is supposed to explain how the speakers

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<sup>41</sup> John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, ed. P. Nidditch, Oxford University Press, 1975, III, ii, I.

have fixed, intersubjective criteria for applying words in their language, and it is to account, on the basis of this explanation, for necessary truth in terms of criteria inclusion.”<sup>42</sup>

According to the classical theory, the sentence “Bachelors are unmarried” expresses a necessary truth because these two words are synonymous. Now, if the terms ‘Bachelors’ and ‘unmarried’ are synonymous, one word can be substituted or replaced by other. Even great German philosopher Immanuel Kant has recognized this statement as analytic on the basis of the principle that all identical statement without exception must be analytic. Quine in his article “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” has criticized Kant. According to Quine, by introducing analytic statement on the principles, such as, (i) the predicate term is overtly or covertly contained in the subject term and (ii) the denial of an analytic statement leads to a contradiction, Kant, like Carnap, introduces a *dogma* in philosophy. According to Donnellan, the most notable weak spot of classical theory of reference is that the criterion that has been adopted for identifying necessary truth cannot, at the end, support the burden of a doctrine of necessary truth.

Classical thinkers, by and large, conceive that meaning determines reference or more specifically it can be said that the reference of the sentence in turn constitutes the meaning of the sentence. How do we determine the reference of a word? In this regard, it can be said that if the user of language knows the meaning of the word under consideration, he or she, in turn, *ipso-facto* comes to know how to use it to refer. This position of the new-classical theory of reference is very close to the pragmatic interpretation of language whether the use of language in general can be treated as the determining factor of knowing the meaning of language. We think that the classical position that *meaning determines reference* can be acceptable as a theory if the meaning

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<sup>42</sup>J. J. Katz, “The New Classical Theory of Reference”, included in *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language*, edited by P. A. French, T.E. Uehling, Jr. Howard K. Wettstein, University of Minnesota, Morris, 1977, p.103.

of a word is supposed to be the necessary and sufficient conditions for determining its reference. What then is the meaning of a word? In this regard, Frege says that meaning of a word is nothing but *a mode of linguistic presentation* represented as a set of characteristics which are supposed to be necessary and sufficient conditions of determining the reference of the word. Now, if the user of language comes to know the meaning of a word, he would, in turn, identify what the word actually refers to; he can equally come to know by virtue of analyzing the meaning of sentence, whether the sentence is a necessary truth or not.

The weak point of the classical theory of reference, Donnellan claims, is that while determining the reference of the word (sentence) with the help of meaning the classical thinkers actually preconceived *a preexisting relationship* between the meaning of the sentence and the reference of the sentence. As a result, it can be objected by saying that in the real sense the classical theory of reference says nothing to explain in what sense the so-called meaning of a word can fix the criterion for a word's application in advance. Here conceiving or fixing preexisting meaning of language actually demands *a priori criterion* for supporting a doctrine of necessary truth. If it does, then the classical theory definitely invites *a philosophical trouble*. One cannot set an a priori criterion in the process of linguistic analysis. It is indeed circular to say that a criterion C is part of the meaning of a word W just in case "W is C" is necessarily true. Donnellan then goes on to say that without the anticipation of necessary truth, the classical theory would fail to dig out a subtle distinction between the *semantic criteria* and the *empirical criteria* of the following sentence, such as:

(c1) creature with a heart has a hollow muscular organ whose rhythmic contractions act as a pump to circulate blood

(c2) creature with a heart has a kidney

We think preconceiving a priori criterion for determining necessary truth is a philosophical dogma. Quine has shown that such philosophical dogma is not tenable. Philosophical analysis of language should be transparent, flexible and in this process, there is no need for conceiving *a priori criterion whatsoever*. According to Donnellan, even though it would be a matter of fact that ‘Whales are mammals’, is a necessary truth to the classical theory of reference, but considering the gravity of the analysis of language, it would be prudent for us not to consider this sentence in any determinate fashion. The sentence ‘Whales are mammals’ is indeterminate. According to Donnellan, it is indeterminate because “the decision as to which it is would depend upon our being able to say now what we should say about certain hypothetical cases.”<sup>43</sup> Following Quine we can say that to determinate a sentence as a necessary or contingent truth in the sphere of linguistic philosophy is a misnomer because it actually hinges on the analysis of language. Here one can take *translation manual* to identify a sentence as a necessary truth. However, Quine shows us that any form of translation manual is indeterminate.

Donnellan divulges the criticisms raised by Kripke and Putnam against the classical theory of reference. According to them there underlies a priori demand within the classical theory of reference for identification of meaning. However, Donnellan, following Kripke and Putnam, goes on to say that there is no point of assuming a priori specification of criteria for identification of meaning. In this regard, they have mentioned a few counter examples through which they intend to show that instead of a priori criteria one should lay emphasize on certain *hypothetical cases* which are contingent in nature. As a result, they intend to say that the classical theory of analytic truth within the sphere of linguistic analysis or in the process of analysis of language

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<sup>43</sup> K. Donnellan, “Necessity and Criteria”, *Journal of Philosophy*, vol.59, 1962, p.43.

does not bear any notable difference from truths based on matters of contingent fact. Let us consider the following examples after Kripke and Putnam.

Gödel discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic

According to the classical theory of reference, this statement is presumably supposed to be a necessary truth. However, Kripke has intuited it in other way round. Kripke imagines that an unknown mathematician, namely, Schmidt, really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic, but Gödel took the credit. Gödel is the man to “Gödel” applies but not the person who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic. The same perhaps will happen in other cases as well. We think that causal theorists, such as, Donnellan, Kripke, and Putnam not only criticize the classical theory of reference, they at the same time offer an alternative approach known as the causal theory of reference. Theoretically the causal theory of reference has been conceived as the *antithesis of the classical theory of reference*. It is regarded as the anti-thesis because it appears or stands on opposite assumption that ‘all criteria of application are grounded in extra linguistic matters of fact- stereotypes concepts from empirical science, and information about baptismal ceremonies’. The classical theory of reference in some sense or other hinges on a priori concept as we have noted in the case of proposition expressing necessary truth. On the contrary, by giving emphasizes on *stereotypes and baptismal ceremony*, the causal theory of reference finds its foothold on *aposteriori matters of scientific or qua-scientific facts* in which words become the names of their referents. Thus, the tussle between the classical and the causal theory of reference is immanent as both views stands on conflicting philosophical foundation and one theory can only be survived by way of denying the other.

## The Aim of New-Classical Theory

The main philosophical contention of New-Classical theory is to *synthesis* both the classical and causal theory of reference. According to the new-classical theory of reference, the contradiction between the classical and causal theory of reference arises mainly for the fact that the classical theory of reference actually takes *rationalist approach to meaning* whereas the causal theory of reference favors its *empiricist approach to language*. The rationalist approach to language actually hinges on an *a priori criterion* whereas the empiricism approach of language actually hinges on *a posteriori criterion*. Thus, there we observe two distinct accounts of meaning which are conflicting in nature. As we start from the classical theory of meaning, it is presumed to be *thesis* and as the causal theory of reference appears as the criticism of the classical theory of meaning, it is supposed to *anti-thesis*. According to the classical theorists, natural languages as historical products has gradually been shaped generation after generation on the basis of experience with what the previous generation believes and also knows the use of words. As a result, there is no point of constructing a rationalistic account of meaning which in turn would make a separation between a priori account of meaning and a posteriori account of meaning. Searle's account in this regard is particularly relevant. Searle, being a proponent of classical theory of reference, goes on to say that the statement 'Aristotle never existed' is based on false conventional statements or presuppositions those have been raised in supporting the statement under consideration. However, which statement or presupposition is wrong with regard to this statement perhaps may not be clear. This is mainly for the fact that what precise conditions constitute the criteria for applying "Aristotle" is not yet laid down by the language even though it would perhaps be true to say that a cluster of properties, i.e., the mode of presentation of the object to which they refer can adequately determine the reference of the object under

consideration. According to Searle, the sense of a proper name, the mode of presentation in Frege's sense, to be something like most of its conventionally presupposed entities. In the case of Aristotle, cluster of properties, such as, the properties of 'being the teacher of Alexander' are chosen by classical theorists because they expressed the kind of widely known fact which would be extremely useful for identifying a historically well-known figure. That is how the sense of a proper name adequately determines its reference.

According to Katz, Kripke, being a leading proponent of causal theory of reference, does not agree with Searle's classical account of reference. Kripke's examples show that the classical theorist cannot have it both ways. It makes no more sense to talk about a logical connection holding in loose sort of way than it does to talk about being a little bit pregnant. According to Katz, either a property or set of properties is part of the sense of proper name or not. If a property or set of the property is supposed to be the part of the sense of proper name in our desired sense then the classical theory is up against the counter-examples given by Kripke. In a situation like this it would seem clear that situations can be imagined in which 'a sufficient number of the controversial presuppositions' fail. Contrary to that, if a property or set of properties is not part of the sense of proper name then the classical theory has no longer any account of how proper names refer. Searle thinks that an elastic sense-reference distinction actually helps him to have an account of the reference of proper names without having to face the counter-examples expounded by Wittgenstein.<sup>44</sup> According to Katz, Kripke actually uses Wittgenstein's insight and in turn bounces the elasticity of Searle's distinction past its breaking point.

The main contention of the new-classical theory is to make a contrast between classical and new-classical theory first and then to show how the difference between the classical and the new

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<sup>44</sup> See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford, 1953, pp.36-37.

classical theory enables to overcome the objections raised by the causal theorists against the classical theory. First, the new-classical theory differs from the classical theory in the sense that unlike the classical theory of reference, the new-classical theory of reference takes an uncompromised rationalistic stance on natural languages. As a result of that it enables to overcome the contradiction or dichotomy appears in the classical theory. If we carefully study this theory, it seems to me that it actually takes this stance by adopting or by way of anticipating Noam Chomsky's rationalist theory of grammatical structure. Chomsky has introduced a scientific grammar and named it as Transformational Generative Grammar (in short TGG). It is purely structure oriented. It has two structures, what Chomsky calls 'phrase structure' and 'deep structure'. Phrase structure is superfluous in nature; the real structure of TGG is the deep structure where the elements of sentence are perfectly manifested.<sup>45</sup> Thus, it can be said that Chomsky's theory enormously helps the new-classical theory to overcome the contradiction appears in the classical theory of reference. Donnellan actually raised so many objections against the classical theory of reference and by taking the clues from Chomsky's intensionalist theory of meaning; the new-classical theory of reference has overcome these philosophical muddles. The new-classical theory of reference actually supplies the principle for distinguishing sense and reference, semantic structure and extra-linguistic belief, meaning and use. This has been completely forfeited by the classical theory of reference.

The new-classical theory of Katz gives more emphasis on the theory of meaning unlike the classical theory of meaning. According to this theory, the grammar of language contains a semantic component as well as a syntactic and phonological component. The meaning of a sentence can be measured with regard to both semantic, syntactic and phonological component

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<sup>45</sup> Noam Chomsky, *Reflections on Language*, New York, 1975, p.56.

and the classical and causal theory of reference have been guilty of giving importance on either one of these. Alternatively, it can be said that just as the syntactic and phonological components are an explication of *sentence of language*, so as the semantic component is an explication of *meaning of sentence of language*. The semantic component actually explicates the speaker's semantic competence, i.e., speaker's knowledge of the compositional structure of sentence meanings. Accordingly, it can be said that the semantic component is a theory of how an ideal speaker who knows the syntactic and phonological structure of a language can know the meaning of its infinitely many sentences. It can equally be said that the semantic component takes the form of rules that generate semantic representations. Semantic representations are held to be formal in the sense that the mode of presentation or meanings of the sentences are assigned to them. That means the assignment of semantic representations to a sentence must foresee each semantic property and relation of the sentence irrespective of envisaging whether the sentence under consideration is meaningful or meaningless, ambiguous or not ambiguous; whether it is synonymous with other sentences or not and so on. Accordingly, it can be said after the new classical theory of reference that the true semantic description of a language is supposed to be the semantic component whose rules predict each semantic property and relation of every sentence in the language.

In this regard one can mention the *intentionality theory of meaning*. The intentionality theory of meaning autonomously gives rise to a principle of distinguishing semantic from non-semantic information. This distinction corresponds to the distinction at the phenomenological level between speech, sounds and noise. Such distinctions actually lie submerged in the philosophical presumption that the so-called grammatical structure in question eventually fixes the properties and relations of sentences at that level. The sound configuration of a sentence determines its

rhymes, alliterations, etc., and the meaning of a sentence determines relations, ambiguity, etc. As semantic representations that successfully envisage semantic properties and relations will correctly represent the meaning of the sentence to which they are assigned, the full set of semantic representations will draw the semantic distinction very similar to the full set of phonological representations draws the distinction between speech, sounds and noise. Thus, one can formulate the intentionality theory of meaning just as: Language gives us the information of the world and the information of sentence or language here is semantic information. The semantic information of language is intimately associated with the semantic representation of the linguistic expression. Here the semantic representation of the linguistic expression is the true semantic description of the language that represents information as part of the meaning of that linguistic expression.

The central point of new classical theory of meaning is that it does not demand to extensional notions like applicability or truth to say what the meaning of a word is. The new classical theory thus enables to avoid an appeal to its theoretical definition of meaning that is required to postulate semantic properties and relations comprehensively. We have seen in the previous sequel that the classical theory of reference in the true sense of the term attempts to equate meaning with the characters that are necessary and sufficient for application. Here the concept of truth commits it to using relations between language and the world (reality) and this in turn causes a difficulty that has been well exposed by Donnellan. However, the new classical theory of reference enables to overcome it. Here instead of using extensional structure for determining the meaning of a word, the new classical theory of reference uses only intentional structure and pays due importance on the internal properties and relations to the sense structure of the language. The insights of the new classical theory of reference is that it emphasizes more on the

conditions of reference of terms in analytic sentences that are fixed in the same way as are those of quantificational structures in logical truths. The conditions for a sentence like “If someone is not happy, then not everyone is happy” are fixed a priori because they are fixed on the basis of judgments or on the basis of the very meaning of the sentence under consideration. More, succinctly, it can be said that they are fixed on the basis of the judgments about the internal grammar of sentence rather than on the basis of experience. If we carefully examine then it can reveal to us that the conception of meaning that has been underlying in the new classical theory puts the fixing of the conditions of reference in connection with analytic sentences on the same equilibrium. For example, the conditions for a sentence like “Bachelors are male” are fixed a priori because they are fixed on the basis of judgment or on the basis of the very intentional meaning or the internal grammar of the subject and the predicate terms of the sentence under consideration. If anybody comes to know the very meaning of the terms, such as, ‘Bachelor’ and ‘male’, he comes to know without experience that the sentence or judgment under consideration is a priori in particular.

Thus, the immediate advantage of the new classical theory of reference is that here the conception of meaning clearly avoids the counter-examples against the classical theory of reference as raised by Kripke and Putnam. According to the new classical theory of reference, we can comprehend an a priori account of the relation between subject and predicate concepts because here the propositional structure of a sentence is completely independent of the facts about applicability and contingent truth. Accordingly, the counter-examples that have been raised by Kripke and Putnam are irrelevant to the new classical theory. This is mainly for the fact that like the classical theory of reference, they do not have the proper form to be counter-examples to claims that a sentence has analytic propositional structure. Such claims, in fact, do

assert that the sense of the predicate in a sentence like “Cats are animals” is part of the sense of its subject. As a result, anything falling under the later concept must fall under the former. Putnam criticizes it. He claims that ‘cats’ fall under neither. For him something that is not an animal cannot be a counter-example to an assertion about a certain kind of animal. What we learn from Putnam’s example is that the so-called denotative conditions of words are acquired inductively *from experience with acts of reference*. Accordingly, it can be said that connections like that between the conditions for ‘cat’ and the conditions for ‘animal’ are generalizations from past experience. It is learnt from the past experience that objects to which uses the ‘cat’ have referred were objects to which uses of ‘animals’ have referred. If the denotative conditions can be apprehended in this way and also determines from where the relations between the objects comes from as we have seen in the example under consideration after Putnam, then Donnellan’s observation is that ‘there is no reason, a priori, why our present usage should legislate for all hypothetical cases’ is clearly true. There then is no point of talking analyticity. Only extensional relations based on causal or conditional reasons counts the most. The distinctive feature of such extensional relations is that if it holds for some cases conceivably hold for all cases as well. Adoption of this approach requires a replacement of empiricist assumptions with its rationalist counterpart. It would help us to reveal why such example might fail against analyticity claims generally. As far as rationalist assumptions are concerned, it can be said that how the denotative conditions of words are acquired. How acquisition of connections is like that between the conditions for ‘cat’ and ‘animal’ are logical connections between senses determined by innate principles of semantic structure. They are logical in the same sense in which sentences like “If someone is not happy, then not everyone is happy” expresses logical connections. Thus, it seems to Katz that Putnam actually fails to see the proportions of the conflict when he replies against

the possibility of intentional semantics. According to Putnam, intentional semantics is ‘bad linguistics’<sup>46</sup> because for him the explanation of how we can say ‘Cats are robots’ is simply an all-purpose explanation of how we can say anything. According to Putnam, Katz’s theory predicts that “Cats are robots” is deviant, while “There are not (and never were) any cats in the world”<sup>47</sup> is nondeviant, in fact standard, in the case described. The epithet “bad linguistics” as used by Putnam is just like a Jew scolding a Christian for eating pork for what Putnam calls “an all-purpose explanation of how we say *anything*”. According to Putnam, it is only such an empiricist assumption about language and its use. The point that needs to be addressed here is that if intension lists are correct in thinking that the best theory of semantics of English implies that the sense of ‘animal’ is part of sense of ‘cat’, and that ‘animal’ and ‘robot’ are antonymous, and hence that ‘Cats are robots’ is taken to be deviant. If “Cats are robots” is deviant, then on what basis people do presume such contradictory assertion? What actually has prompted to do such assertion? According to Katz, in connection with the contradictory sentence, there is the special problem of explaining the contradiction pragmatically. It thus inquires how a charitable interpretation of the speaker’s intentions would accord the utterance of “Cats are robots” in question the meaning that the things people had been calling cats is in fact really robots. In this regard Katz says, “The utterance of “Cats are robots” in question is what someone might be expected to say who wished to convey the awful discovery about the things we had thought were cats.” Therefore, there is no point of saying that “Cats are robots” is clearly a genuine deviant sentence like “Charity drink procrastination”. According to Katz, what makes it possible to use “Cats are robots” to break the news is that, being meaningful, the hearer

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<sup>46</sup> H. Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, included in *Language, Mind, and Knowledge*, ed. By K. Gunderson, Minneapolis, 1975, p.162.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 162-163.

understands its sentence meaning to be too transparent a contradiction for the speaker to intend the utterance to receive no pragmatic interpretation.

According to Katz, Putnam equates nonconformity or deviance along with the need of contextual construal, but Katz reveals that there is no sentence that would not require contextual construal in some situations. Even it may perhaps be the case that contextual construal in most appropriate situations need not deviate from the semantical rules of language. Non-deviant sentences like “He is the life of the party” require contextual elucidation when used incongruously or paradoxically. Further it would be the case that the requirement for contextual construal or reading does not even coincide with situational deviance. For example, Katz says, that if we use “The train in Spain falls mainly in the plain” out of the blue while one involves in a serious discussion about one’s child accident, the utterance would be treated as situationally deviant. It is no longer be treated or constructed to fit it with the ongoing discussion. Having said this, we have a different perception altogether when we say that “Cats are Robots”. Like the previous example, here we do not find any serious problem. Here, hearers can construct it to express the news that the things we have been referring to as cats are really robots. What Katz here insists is that even though Putnam is relatively correct in assuming that the assertion that ‘there are not (never) any cats in the world’ is non-deviant, but his criticism of this prediction is not sound. According to Katz, if ‘cat’ means ‘feline animal’, there can be nothing semantically deviant sentence or situationally deviant about its use. However, instead of this, if we begin with the assumption that the stereotype reflecting the observable features of cats is the meaning of ‘cat’, we can conclude that in such a case the use of the sentence, so to speak, is situationally deviant. Of course, it may perhaps be the case, Katz opines, that Putnam’s empiricist assumptions commit him to taking the meaning of ‘cat’ to be some inductive generalization from that uses of ‘cat’

have referred to everyone's experience. Putnam, in fact, bypasses the very meaning of the 'cat' as he does not give importance or takes no notice on the step from the fact that it is everyone's experience that 'uses of 'cat' have referred to the instantiations of our stereotype to the conclusion that such and such things are the reference of 'cat' and the stereotype conditions are its meaning. It hides with the philosophical perception that our knowledge in general and our denotative knowledge in particular comes from our experience. The semantic hypotheses of language are based on innate conceptual universals and such innate based hypotheses are much more philosophically richer than experience. For rationalists, the language learner's hypotheses about the referents of words impose logical connections between denotative conditions not found in experience.

Katz, however, does not think that rationalism is correct. Rather what he intends to say at this juncture is that the linguistic issue about the nature of semantics is logically prior to the philosophical issue between rationalism and empiricism. This so happens because the truth about the linguistic issue is part of the basis for deciding the philosophical issue. Both rationalism and empiricism are integral part about the structure of the system used for acquiring knowledge. Katz here brings the concept of 'black box' and then goes on to say that the input of black box is linguistic information about the use of language and whose output is a semantic description of the language. The pertinent question with which both empiricists and rationalists are engaged is: how much of the output is part of the system in its initial state? According to Katz, even though it would be pertinent for empiricist assumptions to guide Putnam in theorizing about meaning and reference, his arguments for views about meaning and reference ought not to be defending on such assumptions. Katz continues by saying that there is no point of assuming or so to speak arguing as Putnam does, from a premise about past references to robot spy devices with the word

'cat' to the conclusion that such mechanisms actually constitute the reference of 'cat'. Even if it would be the case that every single referential use of the word 'W' is a use referring to X, it does not follow that X is the referent of 'W'. According to Katz, up to a certain point in history, the word 'witch' was used to refer to ugly, frightening women but never to refer to women with super natural powers having devil power. Having said this, the referent of 'witch' is not ugly frightening women. Even though it is not vivid in the real sense of the term but it can easily be established. Of course, one may rely on one standard refutation of the theory of meaning on the basis of which one may be able to equate the meaning of a word with its referent. According to this position, 'witch' and 'warlock' would be synonymous on the fact that they have a null extension. As a result of that it can be assumed that no ugly frightening women can be the referent of 'witch'. Katz defends it even with regard to the concept of possible-world. In this regard Katz says that in possible-worlds where there is a non-empty set of ugly frightening women and a disjoint nonempty set of women with supernatural powers, it is the members of the latter set, not the members of the former, who are the referent of the 'witch'. According to Katz, the case Putnam imagines is one in which each reference to a 'cat' is a reference to a robot spy device because each of these things is *a robot spy device*. However, Putnam in fact fails to realize such cases because it becomes obvious that the notion of the reference is in some sense independent of what its past referential uses picked out.

This actually brings out the second major difference between the new-classical theory and the classical and causal theories. The insight of new-classical theory is to explicate the so-called purely grammatical account of meaning to make a distinction between the *referent of an expression and the referent of an expression on a use of the expression*. The referent of an expression is associated with language and the referent of an expression on a use of the

expression is associated with a context. The former is known as ‘type-reference’ and the latter is known as ‘token reference’. While outlining the very definition of type-reference Katz says:

*“X is the type referent of the expression ‘W’ just in the case X has each of the properties expressed in the best hypothesis about the meaning of ‘W’ in the language; if nothing has each of these properties, the expression ‘W’ has null type reference.”*

Katz then narrates his position with regard to type-referent as stated above. According to Katz, in the actual world there are no women with supernatural powers and as a result of that the type-reference of the word ‘witch’ is void or null. The same is true about ‘warlock’. However, in possible-worlds the type-reference of ‘witch’ is not null or empty but women with supernatural powers. Again in the actual world the token reference of ‘witch’ on the various successful denoting uses of the word is non-empty. Katz then goes on to say that in the case of token reference, non-semantic information like stereotypes plays an important role in picking out the object referred to as a referential act. It is also to be noted that the token reference need not swerve from the type referent. When someone refers to a policeman with the use of ‘policeman’, the token reference converges or unites with the type reference of ‘policeman’ even though the speaker actually intends to pick out the policeman solely on the uniform stereotype. Thus, there remains the possibility of divergence and convergence in our use of language and it enables us to reconstruct the important distinction ordinary linguistic philosophers made between standard and non-standard uses of language. A standard referential use of an expression is a use on which its token referents are members of the set of type referents, and on the contrary, a non-standard use is one on which the token referents are outside the set.

According to Katz, the distinction between type reference and token reference actually leads to the third difference which states that the new-classical theory differs from the classical theory in rejecting the latter's fundamental tenet that *meaning determines reference*. The distinction between type reference and token reference renders the tenet oblique. Here we have two independent claims of which one states that meaning determines type reference and the other states that meaning determines token reference. The new classical theory adheres to the view that meaning determines type reference and it does not pledge the later. We think many theories are guilty of the failure of recognizing that a theory can subscribe to the former without subscribing to the latter.<sup>48</sup>We are now in a better position to revisit Putnam's fantasy. We see better what is involved in references to robot spy devices with the word 'cat'. According to Katz, the token referents of these uses of 'cat' are nothing but electronic contraptions. On the other hand, the type referent of 'cat' is null. People before discovered the truth had the false belief that anything that looks like an animal is an animal. On the basis of this sort of belief along with their stereotype of cat's function as the criterion of their token references, they referred to non-cats with the word 'cat'. However, when people came to know the truth that the previous referential uses of 'cat' were non-standard uses and did not token refer to cats. Therefore, one may assume that successful references to robots using the word 'cat' are nothing more than token reference under a false semantic description.

The fourth distinction between the neoclassical theory and the classical theory is that the former does not claim that proper nouns have a meaning in the language. Classical theory holds that proper nouns have a meaning in language and it goes back to Frege. In fact, Frege's conception of sense was not theoretical and as a result of that it is not delimited to intentional structure. It

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<sup>48</sup> Donnellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions", *Philosophical Review*, 65, 1966, pp.285-304.

reflects a primary concern with reference because Frege works with the philosophical conviction that the sense of an expression is the description under which the expression is applied to objects. Sense, Frege vehemently claims, is a projection of reference.<sup>49</sup> It means that proper nouns are applied to objects in the world under specific descriptions. In fact, unlike the other semantics, Frege distinctly claims that proper nouns have sense like *common nouns*. He, of course, does not forget to note that unlike common nouns the descriptions that constitute the sense of proper nouns differ widely from speaker to speaker. In this regard, Frege says “The sense of a name like ‘Aristotle’ might, for instance, be taken to be the following: the people of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. Anybody who does this will attach another sense of the sentence “Aristotle was born in Stragira” than a man who talks the sense of the name teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Stragira.”<sup>50</sup> Unlike Frege’s account of classical theory, the new classical theory holds that the sense of an expression is those concepts the expression is associated *with the language that determine the semantic properties and relations of all the sentences in which the expression appears*. According to this theory since the meaning of an expression determines its semantic properties and relations, an expression that is found to have no semantic properties or relations can have no meaning. Thus, the so-called meaning of an expression actually coincides with the semantic properties and relations and accordingly one can reformulate the question whether proper nouns have meaning by asking question whether they have semantic properties and relations. The classical theory firmly believes that the answer to this question would be negative, i.e., proper nouns do not have meaning without semantic properties and relations.

Let us further illustrate this point. Generally, common nouns like ‘general delivery’ and ‘general admission’ can be questioned by asking either “What is it” or “What does it mean?” Proper

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<sup>49</sup> See Frege, “Sense and Reference”, ‘.60.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. p.58.

nouns, on the contrary, can be questioned only by asking who or what it is. Moreover, questions like ‘Who is Colonel Morton?’ or ‘What is General Electric?’ are alright, but questions like “What does ‘Colonel Morton’ mean?” or ‘What does ‘General Electric’ mean?” are odd. These divergences are explained on the basis of the assumption that common nouns have a meaning whereas proper nouns do not have a meaning.

The fifth difference between classical and the new classical theory is that unlike the former the latter denies the assumption common to the classical and causal theories. It denies that the speaker’s semantic basis for referring with proper and common nouns is the same. The classical theory concedes the use of common nouns as the model of reference and accounts for the referential use of proper nouns in accord with this model. The causal theory runs the other way around. It concedes the use of proper nouns as a model of reference generally and accounts of the referential use of common nouns in accord with this model. Thus, it seems that both the classical and causal theories accept that the reference of common nouns and the reference of proper nouns have a homogeneous grammatical basis: meaning in the case of classical theory and beliefs about the world in the case of causal theory.

The neoclassical theory distinctly deviates from the other two theories by claiming that reference has a homogeneous grammatical basis. Accordingly, it accuses the classical theory of *gaining homogeneity* at the expense of making false claims about the meaning of proper nouns. It equally alleges the causal theory as well of gaining homogeneity at the expense of making false claims about the meaning of common nouns. The underlying assertion is that proper nouns have no meaning are also arguments that common nouns have a meaning. However, in making a heterogeneity claim, the neoclassical theory asserts that a speaker’s use of common noun relies on knowledge of what the nouns means in the language. But the point is that his or her use of

proper name does not have such semantic knowledge on which to rely. This claim from grammatical perspective is straightforward. The semantic component explains the grammatical meaning of sentences using a *dictionary* and a *projection rule*. The projection rules explain how the senses of sentences are a function of the senses of their elementary syntactic parts.

However, the most pertinent question at this juncture is: how does the neoclassical theory develop a uniform account of reference on a heterogeneous grammatical basis? Here Katz offers us a solution. In this regard he insists on the underlying theory of *semantic competence* to show that type reference comes under this theory. On the basis of this he then develops a new model of how speakers use common nouns to token refer and as a final step he tries to show how the use of proper names can be brought under this model without jeopardizing it. Here one needs a theory of sense competence arising out of structural definitions. There are various forms of structural definition. Structural definition helps us to whether a sentence is meaningful or ambiguous or synonymous. Accordingly, it can be said that a sentence is semantically anomalous when it is assigned no semantic representation. An expression is meaningful just in case it is assigned one semantic representation. A sentence is ambiguous just in case when it is assigned two or more semantic representations and finally, a sentence is synonymous with another sentence if and only if they are assigned the same semantic representation. Thus, the sentence and its semantic representation counts the most of designating whether the sentence under consideration is anomalous or meaningful or ambiguous or synonymous or not. Here one has to emphasis on semantic properties and relations of sentence to the semantic representations assigned to them. Here one comes to know the sense of a sentence just by way of knowing what sentence properties and relation it has.

In the case of semantically anomalous sentence, we are no longer in a position to say that such sentence is true or false in any possible world. This so happens because there is no type referent. A meaningful nominal may or may not have a type referent in a possible world and a meaningful sentence is true or false in some possible world. In the case of ambiguous nominal there may have more than one class of type referents and as a result of that an ambiguous sentence expresses more than one truth or falsehood in some possible worlds. Finally, in the case of synonymous nominal we have a common type reference and as a result of that synonymous sentence may express the same truth or falsehood in every possible world. The semantic representation further incorporates the definitions for analyticity, contradiction and semantic entailment as well. Accordingly, it states that an analytic sentence is secured against falsehood and true when the proposition it expresses is a statement. A contradiction is fortified against truth and falsity when the proposition it expresses is a statement and a sentence is semantically entailed by another is implied by it and also substitutable for it in any non-translucent context. All these segmentally extended definitions lead to a theory of semantic competence. Thus, a theory of semantic competence developed out of semantic representation of various sorts helps the speaker to know about the referential structure of the sentence. It is too complex and difficult to set up. However, the most notable salient feature of this theory is that it challenges Frege's claim "that a full theory of language requires both a theory of compositional structure for intentions and one for extensions." Here each sentence and each of its constituents, receives a set of semantic representations illuminating its sense.

We think that the new classical theory's account of type reference is part of the grammar's account of the speaker's semantic competence. Here token reference can be taken into account as the semantic part of the theory of performance. Accordingly, the theory of token reference is thus

be treated as an explication of the performance principles underlying the speaker's ability to use the language to refer to things in actual speech situations. Following Putnam's 'robot-cat case', we may say that the token reference is based not only on the meaning of words but also on extragrammatical beliefs about the world. In fact, it seems to us that the taken reference to robot spy devices with the word 'cat' depends on both the meaning of 'cat' in English and extragrammatical beliefs about the underlying cause of their anima like appearance and behavior. Thus, our model of token reference in a sense will demand that such reference actually hinges on meaning stereotypes, scientific knowledge, and other factual beliefs. This position of new classical theory certainly goes against the causal theory of reference as developed by Kripke and others. Kripke, for example, does not agree with the perception that there are really two concepts of metal, such as, a phenomenological one and a scientific one. Kripke's argument proves that a property like yellow cannot be an essential property of the stuff that 'gold'. He does not argue against independent linguistic concepts. Rather Kripke like Putnam takes it for granted that linguistic concepts are really the same kind of concepts as scientific concepts. The only difference, if there be any, is that scientific concepts do possess more sophistication than linguistic concepts. According to Katz, they take this for granted because they fail to make a sharp language distinction. For Katz linguistic concepts and scientific concepts are different in kind, but not in degree as Kripke and Putnam felt. Linguistic concepts comprise the meanings of the sentences we use to communicate in a language, whereas scientific concepts comprise the theories we use to explain the behavior of things in the world.

Still we can say that Kripke's causal theory may fit into the new classical theory. We presume that the notion of the bearer of a name is not a semantic primitive. If it happens to be the case then how can it be explicated in semantic theory? According to Kripke, this so happens because

‘an initial baptism takes place’.<sup>51</sup> As a result of that an object may be named by ostension on the reference of the same may be fixed by a synonymous description. Kripke says, “When the name is “passed from link to link,” the receiver of the name must intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it.”<sup>52</sup> However the problematic area of Kripke’s position is to substantiate the implementing aspect of his theory. One has to work out the notion of a baptism so that it can cover the range of cases it desires to cover. Kripke conceives proper names as rigid designator. However, it seems to us that there may have semantically empty proper nouns which can obtain a meaning within a sentence. The derivative meaning of proper name receives in the sentence in which it occurs *through fail-safe procedure* for the use of that proper name. The derivative meaning of a proper name will contain the concept of the bearer of the name. It involves a cross-reference of the encyclopedia entry for the bearer of the name. The encyclopedia entry makes sense only if the bearer of the name falls under each of the concepts in the conjunction of the descriptive contents. As a result of that the speaker can make use of these concepts in constructing a fail-safe procedure for the use of a proper name.

We have started with the proposal that the new classical theory becomes a synthesis of the classical and causal theory of reference. In this sense, there is nothing wrong in claiming that the new classical theory that has been appeared as a synthesis of classical and causal theories, gives us the picture of higher truth. The new classical theory tries to cohere or so to speak minimize the philosophical gulf between the classical theory and the new classical theory. Even in some cases it establishes a bridge between classical and causal theories of reference.

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<sup>51</sup>Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, p.302.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. p.302.