

## CHAPTER I

### PART I

#### The Historical Background of Kant's Aesthetics

We do not come across any reference to "aesthetic experience" prior to the nineteenth century, but the concept has its foundation in the empiricism of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England. Under the influence Locke and a host of others, the decisive break with medieval ontology took a clear conceptual form. But for the purpose of aesthetic theory, the way that the primacy of "experience" developed created difficulties which have gradually isolated aesthetics from the mainstream of epistemology and ontology. In the eighteenth century this was not yet the case. Hutcheson, Hume, Burke, Hograth and Gerard all take for granted that a discussion of beauty, the sublime, and taste are central to philosophical discussion. From their discussions there emerges a concept of aesthetic experience which, in one form or another, dominates subsequent aesthetic theory. Thus it is worthwhile to reexamine some of the underlying commitments which inform the discussions of taste from Shaftesbury to Kant.

The history of the discussions of taste in the eighteenth century is very complex. Rather than trying to trace it in detail,

I propose to single out a series of significant points. At the beginning is Lord Shaftesbury, the pupil of John Locke. In the middle are Francis Hutcheson, who has Shaftesbury explicitly in view, and David Hume. Hume states the paradox of critical judgment - aesthetic judgments are subjective, but the critical judgments which follow from them cannot be subjective without committing us to absurdities and defeating our attempt to say what we hold to be objectively the case about some works of art - but essentially he evades it. At the end stands Immanuel Kant who sums up the movement. The initial question, then is how one gets from Shaftesbury to Hume and in the process commits aesthetics to a concept of aesthetic experience and taste which creates this paradox.

Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury) is a Janus figure. On the one hand he looks back to Neo-Platonism, and on the other hand he begins to use empirical concepts. Let us consider the concept of aesthetic experience itself. We find him endorsing a traditional hierarchy of forms<sup>1</sup> (first there are "dead forms", then the "forms which form, that is which have intelligence, action and operation", and finally the forms "which form not only such as we call mere forms but even forms which form", and at the same time Shaftesbury defends criticism. He distrusts introspection, and he defends a public

test of time. "The public always judges right, and the pieces esteemed or disesteemed after a time and a course of some years are always exactly esteemed according to their proportion of worth by those rules and studies"<sup>2</sup>.

What I draw from this is that Shaftesbury, like the empiricists who follow Locke, finds "experience" the only reliable test. Further, he never separates his interests in art from his moral theory. Therefore, for Shaftesbury, experience and the tests it provides are matters of common judgments. His distinction between "private affection" and "public affection"<sup>3</sup> has a bearing on his opposition of uncritical introspection to critical judgment. He extends the necessity for critical reflection to practical judgment : "Nothing is more fatal, either in painting, architecture, or the arts, than this false relish, which is governed rather by what immediately strikes the sense, than by what consequentially and by reflection planes the mind, and satisfies the thought and reason"<sup>4</sup>. Shaftesbury does not of course consider how this reflection is possible. Unlike Locke he is not prepared to give up innate ideas. But what he does hold is instructives : character and judgment are shaped from experience by a process of critical reflection. Instead of experience writing on a blank slate of the mind, Shaftesbury finds the mind formed by a continual process from life's experience. The whole business of our lives is to correct our taste<sup>5</sup>.

In contrast to Shaftesbury, Locke separates ideas in the mind from qualities in the object. He introduces a separation between ideas and the powers of objects which produce those ideas. Locke must try to distinguish the ideas of primary qualities which bear a real resemblance to their causes from the ideas of secondary qualities which do not have a real resemblance. Locke's empiricism is atomistic, and it opens a host of problems about how ideas are related to the real world which will trouble subsequent empiricists. Shaftesbury suggests a simpler and more holistic empiricism. Mind, character, and self are formed from experience; they are not ideas of something else but the sum of our existence. One can imagine Shaftesbury saying with Wittgenstein, "The world and life are one. I am my world"<sup>6</sup>. I am suggesting only that Shaftesbury, perhaps because he thinks of the mind as already furnished with ideas, is free to conceive of that mind as a whole as an empirical entity which is known as the sum of its own experience. A reflective aesthetic experience - good taste - is the means by which the mind knows itself. Taste is a sign of moral and aesthetic character, and the formation of taste, in practice, is the result of experience shaped by reflection.

In aesthetics, the direct consequence of following Locke is found in Francis Hutcheson. Hutcheson begins An inquiry into

the Originals of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue as a defense and explanation of Shaftesbury's principles. Shaftesbury provides grounds for Hutcheson's immediate sense of beauty. He also provides a statement of Hutcheson's theory of an internal sense : "to deny the common and natural of a sublime and beautiful in things" is "an affectation merely..."<sup>7</sup> Compare this to Hutcheson's claim "that some objects are immediately the occasions of this pleasure of beauty, and that we have senses fitted for perceiving it"<sup>8</sup>. But Hutcheson is concerned to take the sense of beauty in a different direction. The moral sense, he shows, has no relation to innate ideas<sup>9</sup>. For him, the moral and aesthetic senses produce ideas in the mind like those produced by the "external" senses of sight, taste, smell, and touch. They correspond to Locke's ideas of sense rather than ideas of reflection, and they have the same kind of immediate incorrigibility which other ideas of sense have. Hutcheson takes the internal sense to be a form of perception and its qualitative accompaniment is pleasure. Moral pleasure follows from good actions; aesthetic pleasure from beautiful objects. In both cases, the perception is an idea in the mind and the pleasure is likewise the experiencer's internal feeling. It may be recalled that Shaftesbury does not find pleasure a reliable sign of moral or aesthetic quality.

The significant point is that for Hutcheson, both external and internal sense are immediately reliable, if not wholly

incorrigible. External sense shows us the physical qualities of the world. Internal sense shows us the moral and aesthetic qualities of the same world. It appears that Hutcheson works out the internal sense on a strict analogy to Locke's ideas of sensation. Mistakes about beauty are due to a failure of perception or to accumulated associations. Beauty must be an objective correspondence of the mind to some external thing just as our ideas of sensible qualities are. Hutcheson thinks that he can identify the ideas which correspond to the qualities necessary for beauty in the same way that one identifies the ideas of colour which correspond to colour qualities : "The figures that excite in us the ideas of Beauty, seem to be those in which there is uniformity amidst variety"<sup>10</sup>. But equally, the presence or absence of those qualities is a matter of experience. "As to the universal agreement of mankind in their sense of beauty from uniformity amidst variety, we must consult experience"<sup>11</sup>.

Hutcheson's concern is to defend the moral and aesthetic sense against charges that it is "interested" and thus capricious and subjective. He does so by providing an apparatus of sense which will place morals and aesthetics on the same footing as perception and by appealing to the common experience (the universal agreement of mankind).

Hutcheson does not spell out the requirements for internal sense. Alexander Gerard offers a concise argument along the same lines that the power of the mind which is called taste should be properly called a sense. Gerard's evidence comes from "the phenomenon of our faculties". A sense supplies us with simple perceptions; they are given immediately; and they are independent of volition. Gerard concludes : "These characters evidently belongs to all the external senses, and to reflection or consciousness, by which we perceive what passes our minds. They likewise belong to the powers of taste ; harmony, for example, is a simple perception, which no man who has not a musical ear can receive, and which everyone who has an ear immediately and necessarily receives on hearing a good tune"<sup>12</sup>.

Gerard goes on to argue that an internal sense need not be ultimate. Internal senses may be based on external sensation. As Locke argued concerning secondary qualities, it is still the data of the senses - sight, etc. - which make possible perception. The ideas may belong to the mind and not be resemblances of the quality in the object, but that does not make the ideas unreliable. For Hutcheson, the perception may be either of the objects of sight or of the beauty of those objects. There is a quality of the object which has power to produce our felt perceptions of beauty. One does not require some new organ of sense

for an internal sense to be a sense. Gerard clearly follows Hutcheson here, but he is explicitly concerned to defend taste as a direct operation of the mind - a faculty of imagination independent of reason.

Hutcheson would be successful if he could maintain that beauty has the status of a simple idea of sense. The problem is whether he can do this. For there to be an aesthetic sense, it must not be reducible to the external senses, though it not be wholly independent of them. If it were, then beauty would become a complex product of reflection or an association of ideas, and thus a product of education. It would lose the qualified kind of objectivity as a simple idea of sense which Hutcheson seeks to win for it. To achieve this, Hutcheson attempts to follow Locke by treating aesthetic experience as something acquired directly and in discrete units from things. But there is no organ of internal sense. So, it is unclear how the ideas of an internal sense are to be identified. External sense can be defined causally. If we do not know the quality, we know the power that it has on us. A comparable hypothesis is not available for an internal sense. Thus, Hutcheson must supply some criteria for aesthetic qualities in the object even though he acknowledges that the pleasure we call beauty is an idea in the subject. He must supply some defining properties which link the idea - pleasure - to the object if the sense of beauty is not to lose the objectivity which simple ideas of sense can claim according to Locke.

The move to an experiential sense on a direct analogy with external senses ends by committing aesthetics to two theses : (a) The aesthetic sense is qualitatively distinct and not reducible to any other sense, and (b) there must be some qualitative characteristic which are uniquely aesthetic. The first thesis might be called the aesthetic experience thesis; it is most commonly conceived of as a uniquely aesthetic delight or pleasure. Much of subsequent eighteenth century British aesthetics is occupied with supplying alternatives to satisfy the second thesis.

How different is Hutcheson's concept of aesthetic experience from the kind of experience to which Shaftesbury refers? When Shaftesbury speaks of an immediate sense of beauty, the emphasis falls on "immediate". It is unmediated by interest. Secondly, the sense of beauty is not a sixth sense, because Shaftesbury is committed to Locke's process of acquiring experience. Shaftesbury's opponent is Hobbes. Shaftesbury wants to show that experience is public and that some senses are not restricted to Hobbes's individual interest. The moral and beautiful are themselves empirical evidence which Shaftesbury can cite against Hobbes, and his reference to a sense of these in men implies only that to be a man is not to be a brute living in a state of nature. What Shaftesbury shows us a different way of relying on experience. He points to all of the empirical evidence of character

being formed by aesthetic and moral taste, and the aesthetic has the priority because it is free of interest. Aesthetic taste is formed immediately, without the intervention of interest. Yet Shaftesbury allows fully for the need to reflect, judge, and correct taste. Rather than simple ideas of sense, Shaftesbury shows us an experience which is always public in some sense.

Shaftesbury is a long way from thinking that there is no disputing about taste. As we noted, a central motive for Shaftesbury's study is the correction of taste. He shows the neo-classical direction of his thought when he says that rules can be provided for the artist drawn from moral and historical sources. Ultimately, taste is a moral quality of character. The development of taste is one of elements in moral education. The enemy of taste is fancy (recall Tagore's distinction between Kalpanā and Kālpānikatā ) which Shaftesbury generally condemns. An uncontrolled taste is the subject of fancy. A controlled taste grows from internal mastery of the self. Good taste is something to be established. It is subsequent to judgment, not the basis for judgment.

Much of David Hume's treatment of taste is consistent with Shaftesbury's, Hume begins by acknowledging a problem which finally leads to Kant's antinomy of taste. Agreement is only about generalities, and judgments of particulars vary from individual

to individual, nation to nation, and age to age in a way that seemingly cannot be reconciled. Hume's strategy is to provide enough qualifying factors to account for diversity of taste. These include practice, experience, and delicacy of taste. Whenever possible, matters of fact must be substituted for "sentiment". Only then can the appearance of disagreement be mitigated. Hume rejects Hutcheson's dependence on a unique sense as decisive in disputes about taste. Whereas for Hutcheson an internal sense provides empirical warrant for a form of aesthetic feeling. Hume's skepticism about "ideas" requires that only matters of fact will be sufficient for objectivity. It is not the feeling but the fact that many feel it which testifies to a standard of taste. "In reality, the difficulty of finding... the standard of taste, is not so great as it is represented.... nothing has been experienced more liable to the revolutions of chance and fashion than [the] pretended decisions of science. The case is not the same with the beauties of eloquence and poetry. Just expressions of passion and nature are sure, after a little time, to gain public applause, which remain for ever"<sup>13</sup>. Thus Hume comes around to a practical standard of taste based on public agreement and critical skill : "Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they

are to be found, is the true standard of taste"<sup>14</sup>.

Hutcheson's dependence on a direct perception of beauty is maintained, and Hume acknowledges qualities in objects as the causes of sentiments of beauty; "Some particular forms or qualities, from the original structure of the internal fabric, are calculated to please, and others to displease; and if they fail their effect in any particular instance, it is from some apparent defect or imperfection in the organ"<sup>15</sup>. At the same time Hume never withdraws from his acknowledgment that beauty is not in the object but in the sentiment, and he seems to accept Hutcheson's kind of link between "ideas" and "objects : there are certain qualities in objects which are fitted by nature to produce"<sup>16</sup> the feelings of beauty and deformity.

But much of this agreement is superficial. Hutcheson follows Locke; qualities are powers. For Hume, qualities produce feelings according to the associations we establish with them. Thus one can identify aesthetic qualities only by examining practices relative to perceivers. Hutcheson distinguishes an "original or absolute" beauty from "comparative or relative" beauty. In Hume this distinction, like that between primary and secondary qualities, disappears. One can only compare actual judgments. Absolute beauty plays no role. For Hutcheson the internal sense needs no education, while Hume's taste must be

educated or at least acquired culturally, though some aspects of it may turn out to be universal to human-kind. The "facts" Hume has reference to are mostly facts about the judges and not about what is judged. Thus Hume shifts the ground for aesthetics from the aesthetic experience itself to the factors which form our perceptions. We have taste, but not a sense of taste in Hutcheson's use of "sense". This allows Hume to maintain a standard of taste without having to actually confront its subjectivity.

In many ways this moves Hume back toward Shaftesbury in practice. Hume defends the practice of criticism against the claim that anyone can judge as well as anyone else. He says, "the taste of all individuals is not upon an equal footing"<sup>17</sup>. This leads to link taste and understanding : "It seldom, or never happens, that of a man of sense, who has experience in any art, cannot judge of its beauty; and it is no less rare to meet with a man who has a just taste without a sound understanding"<sup>18</sup>. For Shaftesbury taste follows education and judgment, for Hume it is simply a phenomenal reality. It may need education and correction in a sense of refinement which Hutcheson's theory of direct sense did not allow, but Hume has no other basis for our aesthetic judgments than taste itself.

Hume conceives of experience itself in a Lockean fashion and so taste depends on a 'sentiment' or "idea" discrete in itself. His critique of the connections between "ideas" discrete in itself. His critique of the connections between "ideas" and that of which they are ideas and his skeptical doubts about inductive procedures apply to any individual judgment of taste. He acknowledges rules in art, but such rules are discovered, and they have the status of inductive generalisations, and are subject to the same doubts. The individual critic should be modest, Hume says, so that he can appeal beyond his own taste and perception to other judgments similarly formed. The joint verdict of ideal critics is the only standard. Only agreement over time can validate either the critic or his judgments.

We may judge the judges by matters of fact, but the aesthetic experience upon which their judgment is based is unique and mysterious. So to the question : how we know specific judgments, no answer comes from Shaftesbury. Hence aesthetic judgment is separated from empirical and moral judgments. A form of aesthetic attitude theory results from the antinomy to which Hume was led. And a notion of aesthetic subjectivity emerges from the attempts to escape the antinomy. It is held that aesthetic experience must be qualitatively different, and its qualities must have some defining characteristics. But the development of the theory of taste is unable to link an internal

sense to objective qualities. It seems to follow that the one who experiences must help to produce the qualitative difference. We are led from a sense of taste to the formation of aesthetic judgments by the beholder's attitudes.

The single most important concept which emerges is "disinterestedness". Shaftesbury opposes disinterestedness to private interest as part of his rejection of Hobbes's ego-centric position. Disinterestedness is one way that we know that private interest is not paramount. For example, Shaftesbury asserts that "in all disinterested cases the heart must approve in some measure of what is natural and honest, and disapprove what is dishonest and corrupt"<sup>19</sup>. The contrast to this disinterestedness is the kind of private pursuit of one's own ends which some senses of "interest" imply. Disinterestedness becomes a particularly important moral and aesthetic state since only then can the heart be trusted.

Shaftesbury is not rejecting "interest" as a legitimate motive for action, however. There are three levels of interest for Shaftesbury. There is a private interest which is good and natural. "We know that any creature has a private good and interest of his own, which Nature has compelled him to seek"<sup>20</sup>. We also recognize the public interest which follows. "Everyone discerns and owns a public interest and is conscious of what

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affects his fellowship or community"<sup>21</sup>. And finally there are disinterested cases when the heart can be trusted to respond directly and rightly. The three are related, and the object is to discern one's own true interest. Public and disinterested judgments serve the cause of educating taste. Rather than opposing interested and disinterested judgment, Shaftesbury uses disinterested judgments as evidence that we have a true interest to be discovered beneath the shifting ground of pleasure and fancy.

Hume's use of the concept of interest is similar in many respects to Shaftesbury's. Hume separates morals from aesthetics. Morals should be founded in reason and nature of things, but aesthetics can remain a matter of taste. In "Of the Standard of Taste" he argues that moral precepts are already clearly identified by language itself. We know which sentiments to approve without need for maxims. But that is not the case in aesthetics. There the need for a standard of taste is essentially a need for a rule" by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled" so that one may know which sentiment is to be confirmed and which condemned.

Hume develops a contrast between public and private interest as part of a refutation of ethical egoism which he identifies with private interest<sup>22</sup>. But for Hume, as for Shaftesbury, the argument against self-love as the sole ethical

motive turns on the existence of a competing interest whose existence cannot be denied. This is a "general affection" which is aroused when no advantage or even presence of one's self is at issue. Also, as Shaftesbury does, Hume contrasts one's real interest with an imagined interest<sup>23</sup>. Hume then goes on to argue that public interest is not reducible to private interest. On the egoist's thesis of self-love the internal of the individual may be so identified with that of the community that one's concern for the public might be resolved into a concern for one's own happiness and preservation. To this Hume would say that the argument presupposes the existence of a public interest.

A public interest is virtually identical with disinterestedness provided disinterested sentiment is not understood as a lack of interest but as an interest which does not refer to the self. Even in art, it is a type of interest which is aroused. The Theater is an example of shared sentiment, not of absence of sentiment. Hume speaks of disinterested passion as an alternative to self-love. Even the egoist, Hume says, distinguishes the "vicious and merely interested" from the virtuous character. Disinterested benevolence is a sentiment that does not require any reference to the self to explain the phenomenon. It is a real public or communal interest free of any individual bonds.

This has considerable ethical importance for Hume, but he does not make the aesthetic extension which both Shaftesbury and Kant do. Both of them move from the aesthetic to the moral; Hume does not. For Hume, it is important to establish whether the moral sentiment is founded in reason and the nature of things. Aesthetic taste can remain merely a matter of sentiment. While it needs a standard, Hume does not claim the universality for it that Kant does. The closest that Hume comes to a Kant's sense of disinterestedness is in his list of the characteristics of true judges which includes a freedom from prejudice. A work of art "must be surveyed in a certain point of view". This point of view turns out to be the conformation of the interests of the audience and the work. It is a general view in which the critic must depart from personal bias, and considering himself as a man in general, forget, if possible, any individual being and his peculiar circumstances. Hume's critic, if he is a true judge, is a critic rather than a private person. His real interest is defined by that role, and the sentiment he feels will be correspondingly indicative of the judgment of the general view of human natures.

By the time Kant incorporates "disinterestedness" into the third Critique, the whole problem of aesthetic experience has shifted. Like Shaftesbury and Hume, Kant's use of "interest"

primarily concerns one's relation to the world and one's attitude. But Kant greatly widens the scope of disinterestedness. To be disinterested is to be without interest in the object's existence while an interested state involves one with the existence of the object. Thus disinterestedness does not pick out a class of general or public judgments. Both practical and conceptual judgments imply the presence of a prior intuition, and disinterestedness is characteristic of that prior phase. The "aesthetical judgments" precede the objective and practical. There is in Kant an interweaving of the cognitive and aesthetic. And yet his formulations provide the most telling separation of aesthetic disinterestedness from the practical and conceptual realms. Once disinterestedness is made central, it completes the separation of the aesthetic from its primary phenomena - works of art - because it is not the work but the perceiver's pleasure which becomes the subject of aesthetics. If A disagrees with B about a work of art, they are really disagreeing about the kind of pleasure each has, and that is a function of the epistemological position of each observer. Kant assimilates aesthetic experience to all experience as its transcendental basis. Croce concludes, in that case, that anything is beautiful if it is known. Other attitude theorists make the attitude of the spectator the sole determinant of aesthetic judgment. Aesthetics really becomes a matter of how one looks at things.

The "First Moment" of the "Aesthetic of the Beautiful" culminates in the description of taste as "the faculty of judging of an object or a method of representing it by an entirely disinterested satisfaction or dissatisfaction"<sup>24</sup>. "Interest" is always connected to desire, and desire requires existence. To be disinterested then separates the judgment from the existence of its object. "We must not be in the least prejudiced in favour of the existence of the things, but quite indifferent in this respect, in order to play the judge in things of taste"<sup>25</sup>. The key point here is that disinterestedness has become the opposite of interest. The pleasure and satisfaction which accompanies interest has to do with the object and its existence. The object, Kant says, "gratifies" me<sup>26</sup>. That which can be called beauty, in which we take a disinterested pleasure, is altogether different; to be pleased by the beautiful is a wholly subjective, non-cognitive "feeling" for the object as it is contemplated. "Taste" in the beautiful is alone a disinterested and free satisfaction; for no interest, either of sense or of reason here forces our assent"<sup>27</sup>.

While the disinterested contemplation is non-cognitive (because it precedes, logically, the cognitive phase), Kant ultimately links the aesthetic to both practical and theoretical judgments. But disinterested judgments of taste belong wholly to the beautiful, and in so far as beauty itself provides the satisfaction in the subject, there can be no intermixture of interest.

While for Kant the aesthetic may eventually be the keystone upon which the practical and theoretical depend, the contemplation of the beautiful is not and, according to Kant, for a priori reasons, cannot be taken into either the practical or theoretical. When Kant comes to link the beautiful to the moral, the link can be only "symbolic"<sup>28</sup>. Thus any actual experience of an object as beautiful will be apart from all the other ways of experiencing that object. Since this aesthetic experience rests solely on the subject, it follows that if we wish to restrict contemplation to aesthetic contemplation, we must assume a "disinterested attitude" since anything else would belong to a practical or theoretical judgment.

The disinterested attitude in the third Critique may be looked upon as a direct consequence of the way of taking aesthetic experience which has emerged from the position of Hutcheson and Hume. For Shaftesbury, interested and disinterested awareness are two aspects of the same phenomenon. Far from making disinterestedness the sole possibility for aesthetics, Shaftesbury uses it only as evidence for finding where our real interest lies. Rather than three different pleasures (gratifying, pleasing, and esteeming), Shaftesbury finds only one pleasure - that of corrected taste. Kant moves the conceptual and practical to a different kind of judgment and leaves the manifestation of the aesthetic in art isolated. The solution which follows is that disinterestedness must be cultivated as a stance or attitude by the subject.

The shift from judgments about objects of taste to the beholder's vision takes place in another way. Shaftesbury's concern was for a public interest as well as a private interest. Kant begins from much the same point as Shaftesbury. Kant argues that there must be some subjective principle with universal validity which he calls a common sense. The ground for assuming a common sense is the universal communicability of feeling which cognition presupposes. The common sense is the necessary condition of non-solipsistic knowledge. It allows us to claim for taste a universality based on our feeling because we identify that feeling as common and not private. Thus Kant begins with the fact that our judgments of taste are universal and combines that with the necessary condition for knowledge that feeling be intersubjective. He concludes that a common sense must be presupposed. It relates taste to the cognitive powers by granting that when we appeal to "feeling" we are not appealing to our own feeling. The aesthetic ground for the judgment of taste must allow the universality of the judgment or it would be internally contradictory, so a common sense is at least presupposed.

Kant has shifted the ground for the common sense from Shaftesbury's position in a revealing way. Shaftesbury points to a public interest and universality of taste as a matter of observation. Hume agrees in this empirical judgment. Actual agreement on specific works, given enough time, emerges as an

observable fact. Shaftesbury finds a purely private interest contradictory on the grounds that it makes impossible the kind of pleasure that we do in fact have in objects of art and public benevolence. Kant's grounds for postulating a common sense have the skepticism of Hume in the background. It is not observation but the possibility of knowledge upon which Kant relies. What lies in between these two positions is the fragmentation of "observation" in the work of Hume. Shaftesbury takes it for granted that two observers see the same thing; he needs no argument for a common sense. He does need an argument for a common (or public) sense, however. It is important to him to link up experience and community, therefore he does it by appealing to the facts of our experience. Where this is not mere sense, it is public as well as private, and from this follows not only moral but aesthetic agreement. Kant, on the other hand begins by stating the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. The universality of taste is a subjective feeling whose only claim to universality is via the common sense. Since empirically it is always possible that people will disagree, the resulting universal claim is only an "ought". But it is not a moral "ought" as it would be for Shaftesbury. It is an epistemological "ought", and the result is that the judgment of taste is only incidentally related to the actual experience of works of art. If I say that someone ought to find Hamlet profound, I can only be projecting my attitude as the common attitude. Shaftesbury's native view of experience does not isolate the judgment of taste in this way,

and Hume would check to see whether true judges have actually found Hamlet profound.

When Kant comes to resolve the antinomy of taste<sup>29</sup>, he does not appeal directly to disinterestedness, a common sense, or an aesthetic attitude. He concludes that "the judgment has validity for everyone (though of course, for each only as a singular judgment immediately accompanying his intuition)"<sup>30</sup>. Thus we are forced back on an individual judgment and the possibility of assuming a stance and making the judgment ourselves. This must be set over against Shaftesbury's procedure of exposing the individual judgment to public scrutiny and Hume's inductive generalization over time. We have moved from Shaftesbury's concept of aesthetic experience as open, moral, and "common" in the sense of public to Kant's position which makes the aesthetic experience subjective, singular and common only as a necessary condition to knowledge. In Kant's theory as a whole, aesthetic judgment remains intersubjective because it is the foundation of cognition. But it has no practical side. Subsequent versions of aesthetic attitude and taste recover the practical by forgetting the cognitive limits.

Shaftesbury begins an empirical examination of art and taste which subsequently develops into what we know as aesthetics.

His empiricism is holistic. Taste is a taste for actual works of art; aesthetics is an essential part of one's moral and epistemological practice, and judgments of taste are practical as well as personal. Hutcheson tries to place aesthetics on a Lockean basis. But the sense of aesthetic taste cannot be established on the same ground as other secondary qualities. The quest for specifically aesthetic qualities and identity criteria opens the way for the criticism of Hume and the reconstruction of Kant. Yet each move increases the separation of the subjective and practical aspects of aesthetics and makes it more difficult for aesthetic judgments to be related to other claims about knowledge and value. Modern aesthetic theories based on an aesthetic attitude and a unique aesthetic experience are heirs of this tradition.

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