KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TASTE

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE CONCEPT OF *Disinterestedness* AND ITS BEARINGS ON RECENT INDIAN THOUGHT

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

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR PH. D. DEGREE UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF PROFESSOR SANAT KUMAR SEN, DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, AT THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

1992

PREPARATORY NOTE

The present project which is completed so belatedly was began when my eldest child started going to school. But despite honest intentions domestic chores and my indifferent health did not permit me persevere enough to make a significant headway. Years rolled by glancing through Kant's Critique of Judgment, often a sense of guilt overcame me. I had almost given up the hope that I should ever be able to do the work I had undertaken. In the mean time, my second child arrived, and soon after we moved to Shimla for a year as my husband joined the Indian Institute of Advanced Study as a Fellow. There I met my former teacher at Visva Bharati, Professor Mergaret Chatterjee, who was then the Director of the Institute. She instilled the faith in me that I had lost.

Coming down to the University of North Bengal I checked the matters with my Supervisor, Professor Sanat Kumar Sen. He was all gentleness and courtesy in inspiring me to pick up the lost threads. I feel immensely grateful to Professor Sen for not only encouraging me all along, but also for the freedom he granted me to think in my own way. I learnt a lot in this manner.

My father would have been happier to see the dissertation done, but he remained no more to see it. My mother of course is lovingly alive and would indeed be very happy to see that her naughty little daughter has at last done something of worth.

May I put on record a note of personal nature? I cannot ever adequately say what I have had from Pabitra Kumar Roy. He was once my teacher, and now the most loved person of my world, my husband. I leave it unsaid.

My two sons, Chandra Kirti and Ratna Kirti have not been able to make any sense of my preoccupation with the thesis, and bore more or less patiently the distressing fact that writing a philosophical work does not necessarily conduce to the display of a philosophical temper.

September 1992

Ratnabali Bhattacharya (Roy)

Ratnabali Bhattacharya Roy

Raso vai sah. Rasam hyevayam labdhānandī bhavati
Ko hyevānyāt kah prānyāt. Yadeṣa ākāsa ānando
na syāt

Taittirīya Upaniṣad

Range na vidyate citram na bhūmou na ca bhājane

Lankāvatāra Sūtra

Beauty in things exists in the mind which contemplates them.

David Hume

The most beautiful thing than we can experience is mystery.

Albert Einstein

Beauty is no phantasy, it bears the ever lasting meaning of Reality.

Rabindranath Tagore

Synopsis of the thesis entitled : "Kant's Critique of Taste with special reference to the concept of Disinterestedness and its bearings on Recent Indian Thought".

The thesis is intended to concentrate on Part One of the Critique of Judgment. This part of the Critique has exerted considerable influence upon writers as different in their philosophical persuasions as Schiller and Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Goethe and Coleridge. The development and extension of Kant's theory of taste could be shown be part of the on going work of aesthetics, not only abroad, but in recent Indian thought as well.

The thesis is divided into two parts :

Part I : The Historical Background to Kant's Aesthetics. The development of the concept of aesthetic experience can be shown from Shaftesbury of Kant. Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume and Kant all take for granted that a discussion of beauty, the sublime and taste are central to philosophical discussion. From their discussions there emerges a concept of aesthetic experience which, in one form or another, dominates subsequent aesthetic theory. It is worth while to reexamine some of the underlying commitments which inform the discussions of taste from Shaftesbury to Kant. In his correspondence as well as in the Ctitique of

Judgment Kant himself has referred to Hume, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson.

The Analysis of the Beautiful The question that Kant poses in Part One of the Critique of Judgment is : How are judgments of the beautiful are possible? Beauty is the central term in Kant's aesthetics, it is logically prior to all other aesthetic terms, such as totality, harmony, clarity, perecision, perfection, etc. Kant appears to maintain that the beautiful is the necessary filter, or category through which any work of art, or aspect of Nature, must pass in order to count as an object of taste.

It follows from the centrality of the beautiful in Kant's aesthetics that we should ask, how aesthetic evaluation in general is to be explained, since many aesthetic predicates or values presuppose the beautiful. Kant asks, how assertions of aesthetic worth are to be justified? And his answer to the question takes the form of an analysis, conceptual of a sort, which he calls, transcendental. Therein lies the origins of the Four "Moments".

The Theory of Reflective Judgment (Based on Kant's first introduction to the Critique of Judgment and the published introduction).

In this chapter following topics will receive special attention :

(a) Aesthetic and Reflective judgments.

(b) Pleasure and Subjectivity.

(c) The Singularity of Aesthetic judgment.

(d) The Necessity of Aesthetic judgment.

Disinterestedness: A chapter will be devoted to a consideration of the theme : The Disinterestedness of Aesthetic judgment. Along with it the notions of interest, concept and existence will receive clarification.

It will be argued that disinterestedness is the aesthetic analogue of Kant's notion of objectivity. An attempt will also be made to trace the notion of interest from the Critique of Practical Reason, and to see how does the notion gets transformed the third Critique.

As an outcome of this chapter it will be seen that when we use 'beautiful' and many other aesthetic predicates, we do attempt to ground publicly valid assessments of objects on peculiarly private feelings and responses. And in this respect Kant's critique of taste is addressed to a question importance : The justification of the inter-subjective validity of aesthetic judgments.

Part II : The intentions of the Critique of Judgment are various, and many of them are developed by thinkers of varied philosophical persuasions. A passing reference to them has already been made in the opening paragraph of this synopsis. In the present chapter an attempt will be made to find a conceptual connection between the notion of disinterestedness and the view called aesthetic deontology on the one hand, and disinterestedness and communication on the other.

(a) Aesthetic deontology or the view which finds expressed in Theophile Gantier's slogan l'antonomie absolute de l'art was enunciated by Frederich Schiller as a development of Kantian intentions. It was embraced by the French Romantists, who held that art does not prove anything, nor does it say anything, it simply expresses. If Kant's intention was to counter empiricism (mutatis mutandis, utilitarianism) in aesthetics (as he did in epistemology and ethics in the earlier Critiques) his notion of disinterestedness is then a formalist version of a non-consequentialist theory of art.

(b) Disinterestedness has something to do with a mode of being, a state of the self, and it presupposes an absence of egoistic privations. A disinterested state of awareness is non-

private, and hence communicable. Such a variant of the notion has been there in the Indian tradition. A bodhisattva's awareness is said to be disinterested, he is said to apperceive the world around ecolessly or without the intervention of the will, a la Schopenhauer. The Sahrdaya is one who has escaped the privations of the ego. It should be possible to say that a metaphysical conception of a non-private awareness or mode of being is presupposed by the critical notion of sahrdaya. In recent times K.C. Bhattacharyya's apotheosis of 'heart universal' as the locus of both aesthetic apperception as well as communication looks back to a willless, for that matter, disinterested, non-judgmental state of mind.

In K.C. Bhattacharyya there is a three tier mode of dissociation from the object of perception ensuring a fuller disinterestedness. His line of argument appears to be as follows: The more one is dissociated the more one is disinterested, and the more one is disinterested, the more one is on a spiritually subjective plane of being.

In Rabindranath Tagore one finds a non-naturalistic, non-utilitarian account of the creative art process and the ontology of the object. Many of the nuances of Tagore's thought are specifically Kantian, and this matter of conviction is woth developing as a philosophical exercise.

Concluding Remarks : Kant's view that what is called "aesthetic experience" is supposed to be non-practical, detached, contemplative, or "disinterested" links him with the tradition of aesthetic ideas in recent Indian thought, even though the metaphysical presuppositions have not been always similar.

The dichotomy that the literal is opposed to the metaphorical (Max Block, "Metaphor" in Contemporary Studies in Aesthetics, New York, 1968) is the product of the Kantian dichotomy between "determinate" and "indeterminate" concepts. Tagore's theory of poetry has much to contribute to the polarity, though with a significant difference. The traditional notion of vvānjanā vis-a-vis the literal mode of meaning finds a new relevance in Tagore's accounts of the matter. 'Why do we prefer suggestion to representation?' asks E.H. Gombrich (Art and Illusion, p. 385). An answer is to be looked for in Kant as well as in recent Indian Thinkers. Perhaps our preference has something to do with disinterestedness as a liberating experience.

C O N T E N T S

CHAPTER I

PART I

The Historical Background of Kant's Aesthetics

We do not come across any reference to "aesthetic experience" prior to the nineteenth century, but the concept has its foundation in the empiricism of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England. Under the influence Locke and a host of others, the decisive break with medieval ontology took a clear conceptual form. But for the purpose of aesthetic theory, the way that the primacy of "experience" developed created difficulties which have gradually isolated aesthetics from the mainstream of epistemology and ontology. In the eighteenth century this was not yet the case. Hutcheson, Hume, Burke, Hograth and Gerard all take for granted that a discussion of beauty, the sublime, and taste are central to philosophical discussion. From their discussions there emerges a concept of aesthetic experience which, in one form or another, dominates subsequent aesthetic theory. Thus it is worthwhile to reexamine some of the underlying commitments which inform the discussions of taste from Shaftesbury to Kant.

The history of the discussions of taste in the eighteenth century is very complex. Rather than trying to trace it in detail,

I propose to single out a series of significant points. At the beginning is Lord Shaftesbury, the pupil of John Locke. In the middle are Francis Hutcheson, who has Shaftesbury explicitly in view, and David Hume. Hume states the paradox of critical judgment - aesthetic judgments are subjective, but the critical judgments which follow from them cannot be subjective without committing us to absurdities and defeating our attempt to say what we hold to be objectively the case about some works of art - but essentially he evades it. At the end stands Immanuel Kant who sums up the movement. The initial question, then is how one gets from Shaftesbury to Hume and in the process commits aesthetics to a concept of aesthetic experience and taste which creates this paradox.

Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury) is a Janus figure. On the one hand he looks back to Neo-Platonism, and on the other hand he begins to use empirical concepts. Let us consider the concept of aesthetic experience itself. We find him endorsing a traditional hierarchy of forms[1] (first there are "dead forms", then the "forms which form, that is which have intelligence, action and operation", and finally the forms "which form not only such as we call mere forms but even forms which form", and at the same time Shaftesbury defends criticism. He distrusts introspection, and he defends a public

test of time. "The public always judges right, and the pieces esteemed or disesteemed after a time and a course of some years are always exactly esteemed according to their proportion of worth by those rules and studies"[2].

What I draw from this is that Shaftesbury, like the empiricists who follow Locke, finds "experience" the only reliable test. Further, he never separates his interests in art from his moral theory. Therefore, for Shaftesbury, experience and the tests it provides are matters of common judgments. His distinction between "private affection" and "public affection"[3] has a bearing on his opposition of uncritical introspection to critical judgment. He extends the necessity for critical reflection to practical judgment : "Nothing is more fatal, either in painting, architecture, or the arts, then this false relish, which is governed rather by what immediately strikes the sense, than by what consequentially and by reflection planes the mind, and satisfies the thought and reason"[4]. Shaftesbury does not of course consider how this reflection is possible. Unlike Locke he is not prepared to give up innate ideas. But what he does hold is instructives : character and judgment are shaped from experience by a process of critical reflection. Instead of experience writing on a blank slate of the mind, Shaftesbury finds the mind formed by a continual process from life's experience. The whole business of our lives is to correct our taste[5].

In contrast to Shaftesbury, Locke separates ideas in the mind from qualities in the object. He introduces a separation between ideas and the powers of objects which produce those ideas. Locke must try to distinguish the ideas of primary qualities which bear a real resemblance to their causes from the ideas of secondary qualities which do not have a real resemblance. Locke's empiricism is atomistic, and it opens a host of problems about how ideas are related to the real world which will trouble subsequent empiricists. Shaftesbury suggests a simpler and more holistic empiricism. Mind, character, and self are formed from experience; they are not ideas of something else but the sum of our existence. One can imagine Shaftesbury saying with Wittgenstein, "The world and life are one. I am my world"[6]. I am suggesting only that Shaftesbury, perhaps because he thinks of the mind as already furnished with ideas, is free to conceive of that mind as a whole as an empirical entity which is known as the sum of its own experience. A reflective aesthetic experience - good taste - is the means by which the mind knows itself. Taste is a sign of moral and aesthetic character, and the formation of taste, in practice, is the result of experience shaped by reflection.

In aesthetics, the direct consequence of following Locke is found in Francis Hutcheson. Hutcheson begins <u>An inquiry into</u>

the Originals of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue as a defense and explanation of Shaftesbury's principles. Shaftesbury provides grounds for Hutcheson's immediate sense of beauty. He also provides a statement of Hutcheson's theory of an internal sense : "to deny the common and natural of a sublime and beautiful in things" is "an affectation merely..."[7] Compare this to Hutcheson's claim "that some objects are immediately the occasions of this pleasure of beauty, and that we have senses fitted for perceiving it"[8]. But Hutcheson is concerned to take the sense of beauty in a different direction. The moral sense, he shows, has no relation to innate ideas[9]. For him, the moral and aesthetic senses produce ideas in the mind like those produced by the "esternal" senses of sight, taste, smell, and touch. They correspond to Locke's ideas of sense rather than ideas of reflection, and they have the same kind of immediate incorrigibility which other ideas of sense have. Hutcheson takes the internal sense to be a form of perception and its qualitative accompaniment is pleasure. Moral pleasure follows from good actions; aesthetic pleasure from beautiful objects. In both cases, the perception is an idea in the mind and the pleasure is likewise the experiencer's internal feeling. It may be recalled that Shaftesbury does not find pleasure a reliable sign of moral or aesthetic quality.

The significant point is that for Hutcheson, both external and internal sense are immediately reliable, if not wholly

incorrigible. External sense shows us the physical qualities of the world. Internal sense shows us the moral and aesthetic qualities of the same world. It appears that Hutcheson works out the internal sense on a strict analogy to Locke's ideas of sensation. Mistakes about beauty are due to a failure of perception or to accumulated associations. Beauty must be an objective correspondence of the mind to some external thing just as our ideas of sensible qualities are. Hutcheson thinks that he can identify the ideas which correspond to the qualities necessary for beauty in the same way that one identifies the ideas of colour which correspond to colour qualities : "The figures that excite in us the ideas of Beauty, seem to be those in which there is uniformity amidst variety"[10]. But equally, the presence or absence of those qualities is a matter of experience. "As to the universal agreement of mankind in their sense of beauty from uniformity amidst variety, we must consult experience"[11].

Hutcheson's concern is to defend the moral and aesthetic sense against charges that it is "interested" and thus capricious and subjective. He does so by providing an apparatus of sense which will place morals and aesthetics on the same footing as perception and by appealing to the common experience (the universal agreement of mankind).

Hutcheson does not spell out the requirements for internal sense. Alexander Gerard offers a concise argument along the same lines that the power of the mind which is called taste should be properly called a sense. Gerard's evidence comes from "the phenomenon of our faculties". A sense supplies us with simple perceptions; they are given immediately; and they are independent of volition. Gerard concludes : "These characters evidently belongs to all the external senses, and to reflection or consciousness, by which we perceive what passes our minds. They likewise belong to the powers of taste : harmony, for example, is a simple perception, which no man who has not a musical ear can receive, and which everyone who has an ear immediately and necessary receives on hearing a good tune"[12].

Gerard goes on to argue that an internal sense need not be ultimate. Internal senses may be based on external sensation. As Locke argued concerning secondary qualities, it is still the data of the senses - sight, etc. - which make possible perception. The ideas may belong to the mind and not be resemblances of the quality in the object, but that does not make the ideas unreliable. For Hutcheson, the perception may be either of the objects of sight or of the beauty of those objects. There is a quality of the object which has power to produce our felt perceptions of beauty. One does not require some new organ of sense

for an internal sense to be a sense. Gerard clearly follows Hutcheson here, but he is explicitly concerned to defend taste as a direct operation of the mind - a faculty of imagination independent of reason.

Hutcheson would be successful if he could maintain that beauty has the status of a simple idea of sense. The problem is whether he can do this. For there to be an aesthetic sense, it must not be reducible to the external senses, though it not be wholly independent of them. If it were, then beauty would become a complex product of reflection or an association of ideas, and thus a product of education. It would lose the qualified kind of objectivity as a simple idea of sense which Hutcheson seeks to win for it. To achieve this, Hutcheson attempts to follow Locke by treating aesthetic experience as something acquired directly and in discrete units from things. But there is no organ of internal sense. So, it is unclear how the ideas of an internal sense are to be identified. External sense can be defined causally. If we do not know the quality, we know the power that it has on us. A comparable hypothesis is not available for an internal sense. Thus, Hutcheson must supply some criteria for aesthetic qualities in the object even though he acknowledges that the pleasure we call beauty is an idea in the subject. He must supply some defining properties which link the idea - pleasure - to the object if the sense of beauty is not to lose the objectivity which simple ideas of sense can claim according to Locke.

The move to an experiential sense on a direct analogy with external senses ends by committing aesthetics to two theses : (a) The aesthetic sense is qualitatively distinct and not reducible to any other sense, and (b) there must be some qualitative characteristic which are uniquely aesthetic. The first thesis might be called the aesthetic experience thesis; it is most commonly conceived of as a uniquely aesthetic delight or pleasure. Much of subsequent eighteenth century British aesthetics is occupied with supplying alternatives to satisfy the second thesis.

How different is Hutcheson's concept of aesthetic experience from the kind of experience to which Shaftesbury refers? When Shaftesbury speaks of an immediate sense of beauty, the emphasis falls on "immediate". It is unmediated by interest, Secondly, the sense of beauty is not a sixth sense, because Shaftesbury is committed to Locke's process of acquiring experience. Shaftesbury's opponent is Hobbes. Shaftesbury wants to show that experience is public and that some senses are not restricted to Hobbes's individual interest. The moral and beautiful are themselves empirical evidence which Shaftesbury can cite against Hobbes, and his reference to a sense of these in men implies only that to be a man is not to be a brute living in a state of nature. What Shaftesbury shows us a different way of relying on experience. He points to all of the empirical evidence of character

being formed by aesthetic and moral taste, and the aesthetic has the priority because it is free of interest. Aesthetic taste is formed immediately, without the intervention of interest. Yet Shaftesbury allows fully for the need to reflect, judge, and correct taste. Rather than simple ideas of sense, Shaftesbury shows us an experience which is always public in some sense.

Shaftesbury is a long way from thinking that there is no disputing about taste. As we noted, a central motive for Shaftesbury's study is the correction of taste. He shows the neo-classical direction of his thought when he says that rules can be provided for the artist drawn from moral and historical sources. Ultimately, taste is a moral quality of character. The development of taste is one of elements in moral education. The enemy of taste is fancy (recall Tagore's distinction between Kalpanā and Kālpanikatā) which Shaftesbury generally condemns. An uncontrolled taste is the subject of fancy. A controlled taste grows from internal mastery of the self. Good taste is something to be established. It is subsequent to judgment, not the basis for judgment.

Much of David Hume's treatment of taste is consistent with Shaftesbury's, Hume begins by acknowledging a problem which finally leads to Kant's antimomy of taste. Agreement is only about generalities, and judgments of particulars vary from individual

to individual, nation to nation, and age to age in a way that seemingly cannot be reconciled. Hume's strategy is to provide enough qualifying factors to account for diversity of taste. These include practice, experience, and delicacy of taste. Whenever possible, matters of fact must be substituted for "sentiment". Only then can the appearance of disagreement be mitigated. Hume rejects Hutcheson's dependence on a unique sense as decisive in disputes about taste. Whereas for Hutcheson an internal sense provides empirical warrant for a form of aesthetic feeling. Hume's sketicism about "ideas" requires that only matters of fact will be sufficient for objectivity. It is not the feeling but the fact that many feel it which testifies to a standard of taste. "In reality, the difficulty of finding... the standard of taste, is not so great as it is represented.... nothing has been experienced more liable to the revolutions of chance and fashion than [the] pretended decisions of science. The case is not the same with the beauties of eloquence and poetry. Just expressions of passion and nature are sure, after a little time, to gain public applause, which remain for ever"[13]. Thus Hume comes around to a practical standard of taste based on public agreement and critical skill : "Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they

are to be found, is the true standard of taste"[14].

Hutcheson's dependence on a direct perception of beauty is maintained, and Hume acknowledges qualities in objects as the causes of sentiments of beauty; "Some particular forms or qualities, from the original structure of the internal fabric, are calculated to please, and others to displease; and if they fail their effect in any particular instance, it is from some apparent defect or imperfection in the organ"[15]. At the same time Hume never withdraws from his acknowledgment that beauty is not in the object but in the sentiment, and he seems to accept Hutcheson's kind of link between "ideas" and "objects : there are certain qualities in objects which are fitted by nature to produce"[16] the feelings of beauty and deformity.

But much of this agreement is superficial. Hutcheson follows Locke; qualities are powers. For Hume, qualities produce feelings according to the associations we establish with them. Thus one can identify aesthetic qualities only by examining practices relative to perceivers. Hutcheson distinguishes an "original or absolute" beauty from "comparative or relative" beauty. In Hume this distinction, like that between primary and secondary qualities, disappears. One can only compare actual judgments. Absolute beauty plays no role. For Hutcheson the internal sense needs no education, while Hume's taste must be

educated or at least acquired culturally, though some aspects of it may turn out to be universal to human-kind. The "facts" Hume has reference to are mostly facts about the judges and not about what is judged. Thus Hume shifts the ground for aesthetics from the aesthetic experience itself to the factors which form our perceptions. We have taste, but not a sense of taste in Hutcheson's use of "sense". This allows Hume to maintain a standard of taste without having to actually confront its subjectivity.

In many ways this moves Hume back toward Shaftesbury in practice. Hume defends the practice of criticism against the claim that anyone can judge as well as anyone else. He says, "the taste of all individuals is not upon an equal footing"[17]. This leads to link taste and understanding : "It seldom, or never happens, that of a man of sense, who has experience in any art, cannot judge of its beauty; and it is no less rare to meet with a man who has a just taste without a sound understanding"[18]. For Shaftesbury taste follows education and judgment, for Hume it is simply a phenomenal reality. It may need education and correction in a sense of refinement which Hutcheson's theory of direct sense did not allow, but Hume has no other basis for our aesthetic judgments than taste itself.

Hume conceives of experience itself in a Lockean fashion and so taste depends on a 'sentiment' or "idea" discrete in itself. His critique of the connections between "ideas" discrete in itself. His critique of the connections between "ideas" and that of which they are ideas and his skeptical doubts about inductive procedures apply to any individual judgment of taste. He acknowledges rules in art, but such rules are discovered, and they have the status of inductive generalisations, and are subject to the same doubts. The individual critic should be modest, Hume says, so that he can appeal beyond his own taste and perception to other judgments similarly formed. The joint verdict of ideal critics is the only standard. Only agreement over time can validate either the critic or his judgments.

We may judge the judges by matters of fact, but the aesthetic experience upon which their judgment is based is unique and mysterious. So to the question : how we know specific judgments, no answer comes from Shaftesbury. Hence aesthetic judgment is separated from empirical and moral judgments. A form of aesthetic attitude theory results from the antinomy to which Hume was led. And a notion of aesthetic subjectivity emerges from the attempts to escape the antinomy. It is held that aesthetic experience must be qualitatively different, and its qualities must have some defining characteristics. But the development of the theory of taste is unable to link an internal

sense to objective qualities. It seems to follow that the one who experiences must help to produce the qualitative difference. We are led from a sense of taste to the formation of aesthetic judgments by the beholder's attitudes.

The single most important concept which emerges is "disinterestedness". Shaftesbury opposes disinterestedness to private interest as part of his rejection of Hobbes's ego-centric position. Disinterestedness is one way that we know that private interest is not paramount. For example, Shaftesbury asserts that "in all disinterested cases the heart must approve in some measure of what is natural and honest, and disapprove what is dishonest and corrupt"[19]. The contrast to this disinterestedness is the kind of private pursuit of one's own ends which some senses of "interest" imply. Disinterestedness becomes a particularly important moral and aesthetic state since only then can the heart be trusted.

Shaftesbury is not rejecting "interest" as a legitimate motive for action, however. There are three levels of interest for Shaftesbury. There is a private interest which is good and natural. "We know that any creature has a private good and interest of his own, which Nature has compelled him to seek"[20]. We also recognize the public interest which follows. "Everyone discerns and owns a public interest and is conscious of what

affects his fellowship or community"[21]. And finally there are disinterested cases when the heart can be trusted to respond directly and rightly. The three are related, and the object is to discern one's own true interest. Public and disinterested judgments serve the cause of educating taste. Rather than opposing interested and disinterested judgment, Shaftesbury uses disinterested judgments as evidence that we have a true interest to be discovered beneath the shifting ground of pleasure and fancy.

Hume's use of the concept of interest is similar in many respects to Shaftesbury's. Hume separates morals from aesthetics. Morals should be founded in reason and nature of things, but aesthetics can remain a matter of taste. In "Of the Standard of Taste" he argues that moral precepts are already clearly identified by language itself. We know which sentiments to approve without need for maxims. But that is not the case in aesthetics. There the need for a standard of taste is essentially a need for a rule" by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled" so that one may know which sentiment is to be confirmed and which condemned.

Hume develops a contrast between public and private interest as part of a refutation of ethical egoism which he identifies with private interest[22]. But for Hume, as for Shaftesbury, the argument against self-love as the sole ethical

motive turns on the existence of a competing interest whose existence cannot be denied. This is a "general affection" which is aroused when no advantage or even presence of one's self is at issue. Also, as Shaftesbury does, Hume contrasts one's real interest with an imagined interest[23]. Hume then goes on to argue that public interest is not reducible to private interest. On the egoist's thesis of self-love the internal of the individual may be so identified with that of the community that one's concern for the public might be resolved into a concern for one's own happiness and preservation. To this Hume would say that the argument presupposes the existence of a public interest.

A public interest is virtually identical with dis interestedness provided disinterested sentiment is not understood as a lack of interest but as an interest which does not refer to the self. Even in art, it is a type of interest which is aroused. The Theater is an example of shared sentiment, not of absence of sentiment. Hume speaks of disinterested passion as an alternative to self-love. Even the egoist, Hume says, distinguishes the "vicious and merely interested" from the virtuous character. Disinterested benevolence is a sentiment that does not require any reference to the self to explain the phenomenon. It is a real public or communal interest free of any individual bonds.

This has considerable ethical importance for Hume, but he does not make the aesthetic extension which both Shaftesbury and Kant do. Both of them move from the aesthetic to the moral; Hume does not. For Hume, it is important to establish whether the moral sentiment is founded in reason and the nature of things. Aesthetic taste can remain merely a matter of sentiment. While it needs a standard, Hume does not claim the universality for it that Kant does. The closest that Hume comes to a Kant's sense of disinterestedness is in his list of the characteristics of true judges which includes a freedom from prejudice. A work of art "must be surveyed in a certain point of view". This point of view turns out to be the conformation of the interests of the audience and the work. It is a general view in which the critic must depart from personal bias, and considering himself as a man in general, forget, if possible, any individual being and his peculiar circumstances. Hume's critic, if he is a true judge, is a critic rather than a private person. His real interest is defined by that role, and the sentiment he feels will be correspondingly indicative of the judgment of the general view of human natures.

By the time Kant incorporates "disinterestedness" into the third Critique, the whole problem of aesthetic experience has shifted. Like Shaftesbury and Hume, Kant's use of "interest"

primarily concerns one's relation to the world and one's attitude. But Kant greatly widens the scope of disinterestedness. To be disinterested is to be without interest in the object's existence while an interested state involves one with the existence of the object. Thus disinterestedness does not pick out a class of general or public judgments. Both practical and conceptual judgments imply the presence of a prior intuition, and disinterestedness is characteristic of that prior phase. The "aesthetical judgments" precede the objective and practical. There is in Kant an interweaving of the cognitive and aesthetic. And yet his formulations provide the most telling sepration of aesthetic disinterestedness from the practical and conceptual realms. Once disinterestedness is made central, it completes the separation of the aesthetic from its primary phenomena - works of art - because it is not the work but the perceiver's pleasure which becomes the subject of aesthetics. If A disagrees with B about a work of art, they are really disagreeing about the kind of pleasure each has, and that is a function of the epistemological position of each observer. Kant assimilates aesthetic experience to all experience as its transcendental basis. Croce concludes, in that case, that anything is beautiful if it is known. Other attitude theorists make the attitude of the spectator the sole determinant of aesthetic judgment. Aesthetics really becomes a matter of how one looks at things.

The "First Moment" of the "Aesthetic of the Beautiful" culminates in the description of taste as "the faculty of judging of an object or a method of representing it by an entirely disinterested satisfaction or dissatisfaction"[24]. "Interest" is always connected to desire, and desire requires existence. To be disinterested then separates the judgment from the existence of its object. "We must not be in the least prejudiced in favour of the existence of the things, but quite indifferent in this respect, in order to play the judge in things of taste"[25]. The key point here is that disinterestedness has become the opposite of interest. The pleasure and satisfaction which accompanies interest has to do with the object and its existence. The object, Kant says, "gratifies" me[26]. That which can be called beauty, in which we take a disinterested pleasure, is altogether different; to be pleased by the beautiful is a wholly subjective, non-cognitive "feeling" for the object as it is contemplated. "Taste" in the beautiful is alone a disinterested and free satisfaction; for no interest, either of sense or of reason here forces our assent"[27].

While the disinterested contemplation is non-cognitive (because it precedes, logically, the cognitive phase), Kant ultimately links the aesthetic to both practical and theoretical judgments. But disinterested judgments of taste below wholly to the beautiful, and in so far as beauty itself provides the satisfaction in the subject, there can be no intermixture of interest.

While for Kant the aesthetic may eventually be the keystone upon which the practical and theoretical depend, the contemplation of the beautiful is not and, according to Kant, for a priori reasons, cannot be taken into either the practical or theoretical. When Kant comes to link the beautiful to the moral, the link can be only "symbolic"[28]. Thus any actual experience of an object as beautiful will be apart from all the other ways of experiencing that object. Since this aesthetic experience rests solely on the subject, it follows that if we wish to restrict contemplation to aesthetic contemplation, we must assume a "disinterested attitude" since anything else would belong to a practical or theoretical judgment.

The disinterested attitude in the third Critique may be looked upon as a direct consequence of the way of taking aesthetic experience which has emerged from the position of Hutcheson and Hume. For Shaftesbury, interested and disinterested awareness are two aspects of the same phenomenon. Far from making disinterestedness the sole possibility for aesthetics, Shaftesbury uses it only as evidence for finding where our real interest lies. Rather than three different pleasures (gratifying, pleasing, and esteeming), Shaftesbury finds only one pleasure - that of corrected taste. Kant moves the conceptual and practical to a different kind of judgment and leaves the manifestation of the aesthetic in art isolated. The solution which follows is that disinterestedness must be cultivated as a stance or attitude by the subject.

The shift from judgments about objects of taste to the beholder's vision takes place in another way. Shaftesbury's condern was for a public interest as well as a private interest. Kant begins from much the same point as Shaftesbury. Kant argues that there must be some subjective principle with universal validity which he calls a common sense. The ground for assuming a common sense is the universal communicability of feeling which cognition presupposes. The common sense is the necessary condition of non-solipsistic knowledge. It allows us to claim for taste a universality based on our feeling because we identify that feeling as common and not private. Thus Kant begins with the fact that our judgments of taste are universal and combines that with the necessary condition for knowledge that feeling be intersubjective. He concludes that a common sense must be presupposed. It relates taste to the cognitive powers by granting that when we appeal to "feeling" we are not appealing to our <u>own</u> feeling. The aesthetic ground for the judgment of taste must allow the universality of the judgment or it would be internally contradictory, so a common sense is at least presupposed.

Kant has shifted the ground for the common sense from Shaftesbury's position in a revealing way. Shaftesbury points to a public interest and universality of taste as a matter of observation. Hume agrees in this empirical judgment. Actual agreement on specific works, given enough time, emerges as an

observable fact. Shaftesbury finds a purely private interest contradictory on the grounds that it makes impossible the kind of pleasure that we do in fact have in objects of art and public benevolence. Kant's grounds for postulating a common sense have the skepticism of Hume in the background. It is not observation but the possibility of knowledge upon which Kant relies. What lies in between these two positions is the fragmentation of "observation" in the work of Hume. Shaftesbury takes it for granted that two observers see the same thing; he needs no argument for a common sense. He does need an argument for a common (or public) sense, however. It is important to him to link up expeirnce and community, therefore he does it by appealing to the facts of our experience. Where this is not mere sense, it is public as well as private, and from this follows not only moral but aesthetic agreement. Kant, on the other hand begins by stating the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. The universality of taste is a subjective feeling whose only claim to universality is via the common sense. Since empirically it is always possible that people will disagree, the resulting universal claim is only an "ought". But it is not a moral "ought" as it would be for Shaftesbury. It is an epistemological "ought", and the result is that the judgment of taste is only incicentally related to the actual experience of works of art. If I say that someone ought to find Hamlet profound, I can only be projecting my attitude as the common attitude. Shaftesbury's native view of experience does not isolate the judgment of taste in this way,

and Hume would check to see whether true judges have actually found Hamlet profound.

When Kant comes to resolve the antinomy of taste[29], he does not appeal directly to disinterestedness, a common sense, or an aesthetic attitude. He concludes that "the judgment has validity for everyone (though of course, for each only as a singular judgment immediately accompanying his intuition)"[30]. Thus we are forced back on an individual judgment and the possibility of assuming a stance and making the judgment ourselves. This must be set over against Shaftesbury's procedure of exposing the individual judgment to public scrutiny and Hume's inductive generalization over time. We have moved from Shaftesbury's concept of aesthetic experience as open, moral, and "common" in the sense of public to Kant's position which makes the aesthetic experience subjective, singular and common only as a necessary condition to knowledge. In Kant's theory as a whole, aesthetic judgment remains intersubjective because it is the foundation of cognition. But it has no practical side. Subsequent versions of aesthetic attitude and taste recover the practical by forgetting the cognitive limits.

Shaftesbury begins an empirical examination of art and taste which subsequently develops into what we know as aesthetics.

His empricism is holistic. Taste is a taste for actual works of art; aesthetics is an essential part of one's moral and epistemological practice, and judgments of taste are practical as well as personal. Hutcheson tries to place aesthetics on a Lockean basis. But the sense of aesthetic taste cannot be established on the same ground as other secondary qualities. The quest for specifically aesthetic qualities and identity criteria opens the way for the criticism of Hume and the reconstruction of Kant. Yet each move increases the separation of the subjective and practical aspects of aesthetics and makes it more difficult for aesthetic judgments to be related to other claims about knowledge and value. Modern aesthetic theories based on an aesthetic attitude and a unique aesthetic experience are heirs of this tradition.

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CHAPTER II

THE ANALYSIS OF THE BEAUTIFUL

Introduction

The Critique of Judgement may be broadly viewed as a work in which Kant attempts to reconcile the laws of Nature, as described in his first Critique, with the laws of freedom, as described in the second. Kant holds that the deterministic laws of physics can be brought into harmony with the unconditional commands of morality only if reason has the right to presuppose an underlying and fundamental purposiveness behind Nature.

Part One of the Critique of Judgment attempts to show how purposiveness is presupposed by aesthetic judgment. According to Kant, the beautiful, either in art or in Nature, must be conceived as if it were preadapted to bring about a certain kind of pleasure in persons constituted like ourselves.

Beginning with the assumption that human cognition is composed of three broad realms - understanding, judgment and reason - Kant holds that three faculties respectively correspond to them : the thinking faculty, the feeling of pleasure and

displeasure, and the faculty of desire. Understanding, which works in accordance with its own rules, supplies with a priori of Nature, by which knowledge of the empirical world is made possible. This knowledge, though exclusively based upon the world of appearances, or phenomena, is both objective and public. It is at least logically possible, so Kant argues, that there exists something behind, or other than, the world of appearances. He holds that there must be presupposed something other than appearances, a "supersensible substrate" - in order to bring the cognitive faculties into reciprocal harmony[1].

The faculty of understanding leaves the supersensible unddetermined, that is understanding can have no empirical acquaintance with it. When the understanding tries to determine the supersensible or to give a positive description of it, the road is opened to the vanities and sophistries of metaphysics.

The faculty of desire is as intrinsic to human nature as the faculty of understanding. From the phenomenal point of view, human beings are wholly determinant like any other object in Nature. Yet human beings sometimes blame, sometimes praise, each other's conduct, as well as their own. Kant assumes that as an ethical agent acting out of a pure sense of duty, a person must be construed as belonging both to the supersensible and to the phenomenal empirical realm. Moral responsibility and moral

worth cannot be explained, so Kant argues, in a deterministic world. Consequently, just as the supersensible lies behind the world of Nature, so the "supersensible substrate" is at the basis of the moral agent.

Although the understanding cannot give a positive determination to the supersensible, reason must nevertheless give a practical or moral determination to the "supersensible substrate" of humanity. The chief "Idea" of reason, according to Kant, is the freedom of the moral agent, that is, a self-determining agent acting in accordance with the universal principles of morality. The Critique of Practical Reason attempts to explicate the presuppositions of morality, or of freedom.

With the Critique of Judgment, Kant announces that he is bringing his "entire critical undertaking to a close"[2]. In this transcendental explication of judgment and of the faculty of pleasure and displeasure, Kant means to bridge the gulf that divides the supersensible from phenomena. Kant himself finds judgment "a strange faculty"[3], especially in its capacity of aesthetic judgment. Acting as the middle term between understanding and reason, and between the faculties of cognition and desire, judgment prescribes an a priori rule to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Judgment is sometimes employed by the cognitive, and sometimes by the desiderative faculties. So if

there is a rule peculiar to judgment which guarantees its autonomy and independence as a faculty, then the rule must not be derived from a priori concepts, for these are exclusively the province of understanding. To show the possibility of aesthetic judgment involves explicating its a priori rule. What makes judgment difficult to explicate is that it must furnish a rule which is "neither cognitive principle for understanding nor a practical principle for the will"[4], but an a priori rule for the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Such a rule must regulate affectivity without contributing anything to knowledge.

Then a priori laws of the understanding leave the supersensible undetermined. Reason, in its practical use in moral judgment, gives a determination to the supersensible by postulating freedom, etc. The faculty of judgment joins the other two faculties by supplying a general a priori principle of determinability of the supersensible.

Pleasure keeps Kant's three Critiques together. Pleasure is necessarily combined with desire[5], the attainment of every aim is coupled with a feeling of pleasure[6], but more importantly, it can also "effect a transition from the faculty of pure knowledge, i.e. from the realm of concepts of nature to that of the concept of freedom"[7]. For Kant, pleasure supplies the key to

aesthetic judgment. In the Second Introduction to the third Critique, Kant observes that pleasure also arises from comprehending how various empirical laws fall under a larger principle. Discovery of a law, says Rabindranath Tagore, is a liberating experience, it liberates us from the tyranny of facts. Moreover, according to Kant, aesthetic judgment is itself pleasurable because it involves the "free play" of the cognitive faculties. When judgment is neither purely conceptual, as in cognitive experience, nor bound to the realization of the good as such, as in moral judgment, the cognitive facilities are not employed in a determinant manner.

Kant links the pleasure of aesthetic judgment to the great underlying theme of the Critique of Judgment : the purposiveness of Nature. Aesthetic judgment "alone contains a principle introduced by judgment completely a priori as the basis of its reflection upon nature. This is the principle of nature's formal finality for our cognitive faculties in its particular (empirical) laws - a principle without which understanding could not feel itself at home in nature"[8]. The pleasure of aesthetic judgment arises from estimating or reflecting upon the forms of objects, either of Nature or of art. Such pleasure can be nothing other than subjective; yet, Kant claims, because aesthetic pleasure arises from free play of the cognitive faculties, it must possess a kind of intersubjective validity.

The purposiveness of aesthetic pleasure supplies Kant with two major themes of his "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment". "The Beautiful" and "The Sublime". For insofar as judgment reflects upon the forms of objects and their purposive adaptability to the cognitive faculties, the result is a "judgment of taste" or a judgment concerning the beautiful. Insofar as judgment reflects upon an object that violates the sensibility because of its immensity or even formlessness, judgment is reminded of its own finality as a free moral agent. The result is a judgment of the sublime.

Though both the beautiful and the sublime are based upon the feelings of pleasure and displeasure, the beautiful is linked to the understanding, while the sublime is linked to reason. The harmony between the faculties in aesthetic contemplation is universally communicable, so the moral feelings engendered by the sublime are also independent of cultural conventions and universally communicable. It is clear that Kant intends his analysis of aesthetic judgment to hold for any culture. He claims that his analysis is of "pure" judgment, that is, of judgment insofar as it is a faculty legislating a priori.

Later in this study it will be necessary to consider Kant's theory of reflective judgment, for now it might be helpful to notice that Kant defines "judgment" as the "faculty of

thinking the particular as contained under the universal"[9]. Judgment is "determinant" if a rule or law is given, under which the particular is subsumed. Judgment is "reflective" if the particular is simply given and a covering rule must be found. Determinant judgment avails itself of the pure concepts of the understanding. Judgment as determinant is guided by the understanding. Judgment as reflective is a higher point of view, a vantage point to consider the immensity of the number of empirical laws of Nature and the variety of the world. Laws appear merely contingent to the human knower. Reflective judgment thus furnishes itself with its own a priori principle that can be simply stated : All empirical laws of Nature must be ultimately construed and unified as if they were designed for human comprehension. Kant calls this principle "the finality of nature". It cannot be empirically proved, for it is presupposed by all experience. To deny the principle would leave man in a fundamental disharmony with himself, not "at home in nature" in Kant's nostalgic phrase.

A note on the term "aesthetics" : The word aesthetik or "aesthetics" does not occur in Kant's first essay on the subject, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime. This essay is far removed from his attempt in Part One of the third Critique to show that judgments of taste legislate a priori. When Kant introduces the word "aesthetics" into his

own philosophical vocabulary, he assigns it a meaning quite different from that given by Baumgarten, who coined the word[10]. In a footnote in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant appears to dismiss aesthetics as criticism of taste. Kant further states that because the so-called rules of taste are empirical, they cannot serve as a priori laws of judgment. Anticipating the essential theme of Part One of the third Critique, Kant says that "our judgment is the proper test of the correctness of the rules" rather than the reverse[11]. Although Kant never explicitly speaks of Copernican revolution of taste, parallel to his Copernical revolution in knowledge, his philosophical logistics are the same. Just as objects must conform to our categories in order to be possible objects of experience for us, so too the forms of objects must conform to our feelings of pleasure and displeasure to be objects of aesthetic judgment for us. A similar "revolution" is implied in Kant's ethical writings[12].

In the first Critique, Kant uses "aesthetic" as the title for his own treatment of the pure forms or intuitions of sensitility - space and time. These are the pure conditions of sensibility : all external appearances must be subject to the form of space, and both external and internal appearances must be given under the form of time.

Kant introduces the phrase "aesthetic quality" only in the Second Introduction of the Critique of Judgment : "That which

is purely subjective in the representation of an Object, i.e. what constitutes its reference to the Subject, not to the Object, is its aesthetic quality"[13]. But such a quality is different from the pure forms of sensibility. Whatever serves to determine the representation of an object for knowledge has logical validity. Although space is a subjective form of the sensibility, it is still a constituent of the Knowledge of things as phenomena. Kant also holds that qualities like colour and sound belong to objective knowledge. For Kant, "aesthetic quality" designates exclusively the affective side of a representation, insofar as the object is referred to the feelings of pleasure and displeasure. The beauty of objects of art and of natural objects have "aesthetic quality"; "But that subjective side of a representation which is incapable of becoming an element of cognition, is the pleasure or displeasure connected with it; for through it I cognize nothing in the object of the representation, although it may easily be the result of the operation of some cognition or other"[14].

If both sensuous pleasure and disinterested pleasure possess aesthetic quality, then two alternatives present themselves. Either the difference between the two sorts of pleasure is a mere matter of degree. So the aesthetic judgment is as private as judgments of personal preference. Or it may be argued that the difference is one of kind. So aesthetic judgment, though based upon the feelings of pleasure and displeasure, it is in

some sense, to use Kant's phrase, possessed of "exemplary validity". Kant claims that there is a difference in kind between the agreeable and the disinterested pleasure, or between judgments of sense and judgments of taste. The former state are mere likes and dislikes, and make no claims upon other persons' sensibility. The latter are based solely upon the form of an object and are universally legislative.

Kant's underlying concern is to determine who has the right to say that a given object is or is not beautiful. Such a question would not arise with the merely agreeable or sensuous. Yet simply because everyone's verdict concerning the beautiful is not taken on the same plane, and because some persons are said to be better judges of the beautiful than others, the question concerning the qualifications of the judge naturally arises. In the final pages of Part One of the third Critique, Kant writes, "In our general estimate of beauty we seek its standard a priori in ourselves, and, that the aesthetic faculty is itself legislative in respect of the judgment whether anything is beautiful or not"[15].

B. Kant's Problem of Taste

Kant's "critique of taste" is concerned with part of the general problem of transcental philosophy: How are synthetic a priori judgments possible? On Kant's view, the justification

of a judgment of taste requires a deduction of a synthetic a priori judgment. As for the judgment of taste he takes as a paradigm the judgment that a particular object, such as a rose or a painting is beautiful. In calling an object beautiful, we each express our own pleasure in it, yet go beyond the evidence furnished by that feeling to impute it to the rest of mankind, as the potential audience for that object. We presume that our feelings, just like our scientific theories and moral beliefs, can be the subject of publicly valid discourse. There can, of course, be no rule by which anyone should be compelled to acknowledge that something is beautiful, we are nevertheless entitled to respond to a beautiful object with a "Universal voice... and lay claim to the agreement of everyone"[16]. But the universal validity of our response to a beautiful object can neither be deduced from any concept of the object nor grounded on any information about actual feelings of others. Kant believes that it can be based only on an priori assumption of similarity between our own responses and those of others. Thus the presumption of aesthetic judgment can be defined if we can answer the question : "How is a judgment possible which, merely from one's <u>own</u> feeling of pleasure in an object, independent of its concept, estimates a <u>priori</u>, that is, without having to wait upon the agreement of others, that this pleasure is connected with the representation of the object in every other subject?"[17] We use 'beautiful' and many other predicates, we do attempt to ground publicly valid assessments of objects on peculiarly

private feelings and responses. Kant's critique of taste is thus addressed to a question of perrenial importance to aesthetics.

We have already observed that Kant's view on aesthetic judgment grew out of long reflection on the work of his British and German predecessors, whose theories Kant himself named "empiricism" and "rationalism" in the "critique of taste"[18]. Kant believed that empiricism in aesthetics (as represented by Hutcheson, Hume and others) explained aesthetic response as a purely sensory response to the stimuli presented by particular external objects. Kant believed that empiricism in aesthetics would obliterate the distinction that marks off the object of our delight in beauty from the merely agreeable, or reduce our pleasure in a beautiful object wholly to the gratification which it affords through charm of emotion. In other words, Kant thought empiricism explained aesthetic response as a purely sensuous response to the stimuli presented by particular external objects. It is also possible that empiricism in aesthetics would yield laws of aesthetic response. But Kant supposed that, even though these laws are generalisable upon the assumption that different subjects are, contingently, similarly organized, they could not command how we should judge. Such laws could only tell us how we do judge. The command of such laws could not be unconditioned[19]. If empirical laws of taste could not justify such a command, they could not also justify a judgment of taste, for in making such

a judgment one declares that everyone should give an object his approval and, like himself, declare it beautiful. In Kant's opinion, empiricism could establish only a contingent congruence among the pleasures of different persons. This would preclude any explanation of the intersubjective validity of judgments of taste, and justification of the claims they make.

As regards rationalism in aesthetics, Kant held that it denied any uniqueness to aesthetic judgment. Cartesian aesthetics demanded that concepts must be analyzed to render them "clear" and "distinct". "Clarity" attaches to a concept apparent to the attentive mind; "distinctness" attaches to a concept "so precise and different from all other objects that it contains within itself nothing but what is clear"[20]. It follows that feelings may share an attitude of reason, and it would thus appear that the beautiful is not wholly to be cut off from reason. Aesthetic feelings would belong to a realm of sensuous truth, indistinct and confused, but nonetheless "clear". In rationalism there is no real difference in either content or basis between aesthetic and cognitive judgment. On rationalistic theories, Kant held, the judgment of taste was really a disguised cognitive judgment, called aesthetic on account of the confusion that besets our reflection, indistinct conceptualization. And Kant could have further said that the question of intersubjective validity of judgment of taste could not arise within the framework of Cartesian aesthetics.

It will be easier now to see that the objective of Kant's own theory has to accomplish to solve the problem of taste. We take pleasure in beautiful objects and found judgments of taste on it. This has to be distinguished from both the gratification which we take in the agreeable object and the esteem which we feel toward an object which is good. Arguing in that manner Kant suggests that the problem of taste cannot be solved if we confuse aesthetic response with sensory gratification or conceptual evaluation. Aesthetic response cannot be understood in terms of either one of these quite distinct states of mind. If, like the rationalists, we conflate aesthetic response with a conceptual value (the beautiful as a confused perception of the good, a la Laibniz) the problem of intersubjectivity of judgments of taste may not even arise. And, if, like the empricists, we assimilate our pleasure in the beautiful, analogically, to our gratification in the agreeable, then the problem may be raised but can never be solved. For Kant, the point was both to raise and to solve the problem of taste. To do that he will have to provide an analysis of the judgment of taste which shows its essential connection to feeling, and then, retaining its essential subjectivity, discover an explanation of aesthetic response which allows its intersubjective validity.

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CHAPTER III

Kant's Theory of Reflective Judgment (Based on the first and the published Introductions to the Critique of Judgment)

In the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment and its first half, Analytic of the Beautiful, Kant places the problem of aesthetic judgment in a new context. It is no longer the problem of the universal validity of judgments of taste. In his letter to K.L. Reinhold (dated December 28, 1787; Zweig, Kant : Philosophical Correspondence) Kant treated the judgment of taste as a species of the more general class of what he called "reflective" judgments. In this context, the problem of taste is not formulated as a problem about judgments on works of art, but is instead treated as part of a general problem about a class of judgments on nature which are not completely grounded by the principles of understanding established in the Critique of Pure Reason. This association between aesthetic and reflective judgment is crucial for the interpretation of Kant's theory of taste.

Kant's Introduction to the third Critique begins with an architectoric consideration. It is meant to establish both a connection between our faculty of judgment and our ability to feel pleasure and displeasure and the existence of an a priori principle for judgment to use in this connection.

Kant divides the cognitive faculty of the mind into three parts. First, the capacity for knowledge of the universal - understanding. Second, the capacity for subsumption of the particular under the universal-judgment. And third, the capacity for the determination of the particular through the universal - reason[1]. Understanding and reason furnish a priori principles, the laws of nature and freedom. There remains the question of a priori laws for the faculty of subsumption, or judgment. This question is raised in the Preface to the third Critique, when Kant asks if judgment has a priori principles, and, if so, whether they are constitutive or regulative, and whether they give a rule a priori to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Kant suggests in the opening move of the first Introduction that if understanding and reason both furnish a priori laws, then by analogy, judgment, which mediates between the other two faculties, will likwise afford its special a priori principles[2].

Judgment must contain in itself an a priori principle, for otherwise it would not be a cognitive faculty.

Kant has defined judgment as the faculty of subsuming particulars under universals, or of applying concepts to intuitions. But places a qualification of his view, and says that whatever the principle of judgment is, it cannot be objective, that is, offer determinate concepts of objects. The understanding

furnishes concepts of objects, while the principles of judgment are not objective, or furnish "cognition of a thing". They do not specify qualities the presence or absence of which in a particular object may entail the predication of a determinate concept of it. The principles of judgement are to be some other sort of rule. They are regulative rather than constitutive. Only understanding is constitutive or capable of providing determinate concepts of objects. Only understanding has a "realm" of objects over which if exercises "legislative authority". The principles of judgment may have at best a "territory", a field of objects to which they apply without beging legislative[3].

Kant, in both versions of the Introduction to the third Critique associates the faculty of judgment with the feeling of pleasure by an argument by analogy. All the powers of the human mind, just as the cognitive faculty, may be, he says, divided into three : the faculty of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire[4]. The legislative principles for the faculty of knowledge are derived in general from the understanding, and the principle which is legislative for desire (the moral law) from reason. Since both these parts of the cognitive faculty contain a priori principles, Kant states that we may assume that judgment likewise contains an a priori principle of its own[5].

Kant points out that feeling of pleasure is independent of determination by the faculty of desire, and this feeling of pleasure rests not on merely empirical grounds but on an a priori principle. That is, there are cases of pleasure which are fundamental states of mind, and they cannot be explained by reference to understanding or desire. There are of course pleasures that are connected to the existence of an object in an "empirically knowable" way, and thus involve no a priori principle. Again, some pleasures are connected to the representation of objects a priori, their objects are seen under the concept of freedom. In this case, the pleasure follows immediately from the determination of the will. But the feeling of pleasure which is both connected to the representation of an object a priori and does not depend upon any practical law recommending the willing of such an object can be neither explained nor justified by reference to understanding or desire alone. It thus demands its own principle. And Kant adds that "judgment is always relative to the subject and produces no concepts of objects for itself alone". Alternatively he says that "the feeling of pleasure or displeasure is only sensitivity to the state of the subject".

What Kant has been attempting is a deduction of the existence of an a priori principle of pleasure from the bare outlines of a model of mind. He of course does not show that pleasure or displeasure is the only form of sensitivity to the

state of the subject. But by introducing the idea of a judgment about the state of the subject he does point the way to the deeper theory of an a priori judgment of taste which he ultimately offers.

In the two Introductions Kant expands on the definition of judgment (as the faculty of subsuming particulars under concepts given to it by the understanding) given in the first Critique. He now gives judgment a more general concern with matching particulars and universals. He describes two different ways in which judgment can operate ; depending upon whether it is first furnished with a universal or a particular, judgment may be "determinant" or "reflective".

"If the universal (the rule, principle, or law) is given, then the judgment which subsumes the particular under it is determinant"[6], Kant writes in the published Introduction. In the earlier version, he defines determinant judgment as the "capacity for making determinate a basic concept by means of a given empirical representation", suggesting that judgment in this form of its exercise supplies Schemata for concepts furnished by the understanding. On either definition, the faculty of determinant judgment is merely the capacity to apply concepts already given, particularly pure concepts, to appropriate particulars.

There is, however, a second possible relation between particulars and universals : that obtaining when the particular is given, but a universal has to be found for it. The capacity to respond to the situation defined by this relation is reflective judgment[7], and the products of such response, presumably, are reflective judgments. This, at least, is how Kant defines reflective judgment in the published Introduction. The first Introduction offers a more illuminating account. Here, Kant defines reflective judgment as "a capacity for reflecting on a given representation according to a certain principle, to produce a possible concept. But Kant goes on to intimate a broader interpretation. To reflect, he says, "is to compare and combine a given representation either with other representations or with one's cognitive faculties, with respect to a concept thereby made possible".

Reflective judgment still seems to be concerned with the search for a concept. But he now suggests two alternatives to the direct application of an already given concept rather than one. Reflective judgment may be concerned with certain relations among objects which are not immediately evident in the pure or empirical concepts individually applicable to them, but which obtain only among groups of such concepts; or it may be concerned with aspects of the relation between an individual object and a subject of cognition which are not represented by any given concepts at all. The latter possibility is Kant's ground for

treating aesthetic judgment as a species of reflective judgment. Kant ultimately uses the notion of a "possible concept" to connote the harmony between imagination and understanding, the general condition for the application of concepts. It may be noted in this connection that what it is for reflective judgment to compare and combine a given representation with one's own cognitive faculties is not immediately apparent, nor does Kant explain his suggestion. Instead he turns to give an account of the first form of reflective judgment as our capacity for detecting systematic connections among the diversity of our empirical concepts of nature. Even though Kant takes the problem of the gap between the categories and a systematically organized of interconnected body of empirical laws or concepts very seriously, we should not consider the matter, since it has very little or any obvious linkage with his theory of taste. The principle of systematicity is actually irrelevant to that theory. The problematic ascription of the property of systematicity to nature is not mirrored in the case of aesthetic judgment. The principle of taste makes no claim about either natural or artificial objects of taste, but concerns ourselves as the makers of such judgments.

We may note in passing that Kant presents the concept of "purposiveness" or "finality" as the characteristic concept

of the reflective judgment[8]. It is intended as a concept which can be directly predicated of objects, either individually or collectively. Thus the concept of finality is grammatically analogous to substantial and causal concepts. Kant defines an "end" of "purpose" as a concept of an object which "contains the ground of the actuality of this object", that is, which is causally responsible for the existence of the object[9]. "Finality" is defined as "the agreement of a thing with that constitution of things which is only possible according to ends". So, Kant implies, an object of a kind which possesses finality could come into existence only through action involving the representation of a concept, or through the agency of a being capable of being guided by concepts.

Then Kant introduces the special concept of the "finality of nature". Through this concept "nature is represented as if an understanding contained the ground of the unity of the manifold of its empirical laws". To say that nature is final is to refer to the ground of its systematicity. The concept refers only to the fact that even in its multiplicity nature is subsumable under a system of empirical laws. Finality is a concept of reflective judgment. Adaptation of nature to our cognitive faculties is presupposed a priori by judgment. It is contingent by the standards of the understanding. We ascribe to nature a transcendental purposiveness in respect of the subject's faculty of cognition without finding any actual reference to ends in the

products of nature. The first Introduction asserts that in judgment's presupposition of finality the end is posited not in the object but in the subject, and in fact in the latter's capacity for reflection[10].

We are just now at the point where we can begin to consider how the topic of aesthetic judgment is introduced into the general theory of reflective judgment. Kant's two Introductions open with a direct approach to the topic of aesthetic judgment, the attempt to link pleasure and judgment by means of their analogous positions in the trichotomies of the higher cognitive faculty on the one hand and the faculties of mind as a whole on the other. Kant begins his consideration of reflective judgment by maintaining that it might take either of two forms - to reflect is to compare and combine given representations either with other representations or with one's cognitive powers. The principle of systematicity is intended as the principle of the first form only of reflective judgment. It is the second kind of reflective judgment that is concerned with aesthetic judgment. Kant adds that reflective judgment can be applied to the representation of the individual object[11]. The second form of reflective judgment compares and combines a given representation with one's own cognitive faculties also leads to a perception of finality in the representation of individual objects. This is how Kant introduces aesthetic judgment into his theory : the basis of aesthetic response, the harmony of imagination and understanding,

is the result of the exercise of the second variety of reflective judgment, and beauty is the finality of an object in virtue of which it can occasion this response.

Kant contrasts reflection on the systematicity of a collection of empirical concepts with "simple reflection on a perception"[12], where it is not a matter of reflecting on a determinate concept but in general only a matter of reflecting on the rule of a perception in behalf of the understanding as a faculty of concepts. In this form of reflective judgment, one considers the comparison of the relationship in which imagination and understanding stand to each other in the faculty of judgment with that in which they actually stand in the case of a given representation. And such a comparison may lead to an aesthetic judgment, or a reflective judgment on the finality of an individual form.

If the comparison of an object with our own faculties in reflective judgment can produce pleasure in its beauty, what would then be the objects of aesthetic judgments of reflection? Is the apprehension involved in the aesthetic judgment of reflection directed toward natural objects alone, or to non-natural because it may sometimes appear that it is objects of nature rather than of art which are primary for aesthetic judgment. Such an impression may and often does arise, but it is certainly

misleading. It arises contextually, that is, from Kant's subsumption of taste under reflective judgment. But a careful reading of Section VIII of the first Introduction or Section VII of the published Introduction should settle the matter. We may now turn to that direction.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

Kant wrote two Introductions for the Critique of Judgment. The original introduction, now called the First Introduction (translated by James Haden, The Library of Liberal Arts, New York, 1965) was written 1789, while Kant was preparing the third Critique for publication. He seems to have come to the opinion that it was too long : hence he laid it aside and wrote a shorter version, which is the one now found prefaced to that Critique. In the First Introduction Kant's aim was to bring into focus the central concept, that of judgment in its several forms, and to show the overall unity of the entire critical philosophy.

Both the first and the published Introductions make important contributions to our understanding of the internal structure of Kant's Theory of aesthetic judgment.

We shall abbreviate the First Introduction as FI.

1. FI. II
2. Ibid., II
3. CJ III
4. FI III.

5. CJ III

6. Ibid., III

7. Ibid., IV

8. FI V. Bernard has "purposiveness", while Meredith has "finality".

9. CJ IV.

10. FI V.

11. Ibid., VII

12. Ibid., VII.

CHAPTER IV

Kant's Theory of Taste

We have seen that Kant describes "reflective judgment" which includes the aesthetic judgment as a species, as judgment of a particular in search of a universal concept or rule, and that he describes "determinant judgment" as that in which the universal is given and under which a particular is subsumed. Practical judgment, comprising utilitarian, prudential and ethical judgment, is determinate, that is we are in possession of a determinate concept concerning what is useful, prudential, or utilitarian, and we bring the concept to bear upon the particular situation. Even ethical choice presupposes a determinate rule : the Categorical Imperative. Briefly, the determinate rule of ethics requires each person to legislate his own moral maxim for all members of the moral community.

Cognitive judgment also presupposes determinate purposes, discoverable by empirical inspection or by rational analysis, as in chemistry or mathematics. But aesthetic judgment does not need a notion of what the object must be, or of its perfection, to feel disinterested pleasure. One can take aesthetic delight in some objects without knowing purely scientific things about them. "Hardly any one but a botanist knows the true nature of a flower, and even he, while recognizing in the

flower the reproductive organ of the plant, pays no attention to this natural end when using his taste to judge of its beauty"[1].

Let us then look for Kant's definition of taste. He defined it as "the faculty to choose in agreement with others, that which sensitively pleases"[2], and maintained that when one calls an object beautiful, "one declare [s] not merely [one's] own pleasure, but also that it should please others"[3]. Kant held judgments of taste as "generally valid"[4]. The Critique of Judgment defines the beautiful as "that which, apart from a concept pleases universally"[5], and taste itself as "the faculty of estimating what makes our feeling in a given representation universally communicable without the mediation of a concept"[6]. So to justify any talk of taste at all Kant has to demonstrate its universal validity; and to do this, he has to solve two problems : (a) that of explaining the pleasure of aesthetic response without assimilating it to any simple operation of sense or intellect, and (b) that of supporting the claims of taste without appealing to metaphysics.

Kant has offered a solution of the problem of taste in somewhat the following lines. The judgment of taste, i.e. the assertion that a particular object is beautiful - is an outcome of a complex mental process. It involves, in barest outline of

course, an exercise of reflective judgment in the estimation of an object. In this no concepts are involved, but the cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding are nevertheless involved. It leads to a response to that object, a special state of mind, which may be thought of as a harmony or free play of these cognitive faculties. This subjective state manifests its existence by the occurrence of a feeling of pleasure - the pleasure in the beautiful, or aesthetic response itself.

What is the source of the given pleasure? That the pleasure felt in the presence of a particular object is in fact due to the harmony of reason requires an empirical judgment, about its origin. This judgment is reached by reflection on the context and history of one's own mental state, and thus by an exercise of the faculty of judgment. Now this is distinct from that which first produced the felt pleasure in the object. And it is on the basis of the reflection on one's pleasure that a claim of taste is made. The attribution of a particular feeling of pleasure to the harmony of reason licenses the attribution of the pleasure to other persons. This is precisely a claim of intersubjective validity for the pleasure. And the extension of pleasure to others transforms the judgment of taste into a kind of a priori judgment. It rests on an assumption of similarity between oneself and others, and it goes beyond any past experience of agreement. The assumption is only a universal imputation, by

means of a judgment of taste, of a pleasure so produced. The requirement of intersubjective validity set by Kant's definitions of the concepts of beauty and taste imposes criteria for the evaluation of aesthetic response. Any feeling of pleasure, if it is to serve as a ground for calling its object beautiful must be regarded as universally and necessarily valid for any audience of the object. The explanation of aesthetic response as a harmony of reason, Kant supposes, makes it rational to base a public claim to validity on something so subjective as a feeling of pleasure. Kant uses this explanation also, for deriving the criterian of disinterestedness by means of which claims of universality and necessity for given pleasures may actually be justified.

Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment comprises both an analysis of the demands made by judgments of taste and an explanation of the nature of aesthetic response as to how such demands may be met. Underlying this theoy is a complex model of mind. It enables Kant to avoid assimilating aesthetic response to either sensory gratification (as the empiricists did) or the intellectual recognition of value (as the rationalists did), and yet to anchor the intersubjective validity of claims of taste on the intersubjectivity of knowledge in general. Kant is not an incognitivist as a theorist of taste. In short, Kant's solution for the problem of taste has two components, analytical and explanatory. The phenomenon of our pleasure in the beautiful is

isolated by Kant by analysis of the concepts of subjectivity and of the aesthetic.

It should be noted that harmony of reason or of the faculties is the result of aesthetic judgment of reflection. This is what Kant has presented in the Introductions, and he connects the problem of taste with the general theory of reflective judgment. According to him judgments of taste concern the pleasure produced by beautiful objects, and the exercise of reflective judgment can produce such a pleasure.

Section VII of the published Introduction approaches the topic of aesthetic judgment through the concept of subjectivity. The concept is a complex one, and it has some reference to the subject or possessor of knowledge. To call something subjective is to say that it depends upon the constitution of some subject for its existence for the way it appears. But representations which are ontologically subjective can nevertheless have a cognitive import that requires describing them as epistemologically objective. The forms of space and time are ontologically subjective, or are explained by reference to the subject, and yet these are necessary conditions of our representations of objects, they are valid of all the objects of our experience. This is the teaching of the Transcendental Aesthetic part of the Critique of Pure Reason. Space and time are "pure"

forms. But what about colours or pigments in a painting? Kant calls them "impure" representations in the sense that they are dependent upon the physiological constitution of the perceiver, hence colour sensations are to be included in our empirical concepts of objects. But the point is that what is ontologically subjective may also be epistemologically objective, or form part of "objective sensation"[7]. Sensations of pleasure and pain cannot be so incorporated into empirical concepts.

Objective validity (or "logical validity" as Kant calls it in the third Critique VII) is the availability of a representation for "the determination of the object (for the purpose of knowledge)". In the first Critique Kant pays little attention to the question of intersubjective validity. But he appears to have believed that intersubjective validity to be a consequence of objective validity. Colour sensations are said to be not the properties of things, they are "changes in the subject", and may be "different in different persons"[8]. In the Prolegomena Kant asserts that "objective validity and necessary universality (for everybody) are equivalent terms"[9]. In the Third Critique Kant separates the question of intersubjective acceptability from that of objective validity, and thus implies a complex division of the status of representations. Al representations may, of course, be regarded as ontologically subjective. But epistemologically, they may be objectively valid; yet they may

enjoy no form of validity. Again, they may be intersubjectively valid, without being objectively valid. So if aesthetic judgment is to be possible, there will have to be representations which are intersubjectively valid without being objectively valid. For Kant, the feeling of pleasure or displeasure is an element of the subjective side of representation which is not objectively valid. This feeling is the subject of aesthetic judgment. That which is purely subjective in a representation of an object, i.e., "what constitutes only its reference to the subject"[10] its "aesthetic quality" is instantiated by the feeling of pleasure and pain. Aesthetic judgment concerns the pleasure or pain occasioned by objects.

In Section VIII of the first Introduction, Kant opens by considering the term "aesthetic" rather than the concept of subjectivity, but arrives at the same result. He notes first that in a phrase such as "an aesthetic mode of representation" the word "aesthetic" connotes the subjective contribution of a form of sensibility to a representation, and is thus compatible with the objective validity of the representation. This usage - Kant's own in the first Critique - follows the Baumgartian tradition in which the aesthetic is the sensible component of Knowledge. In the second edition of the first Critique Kant suggested that we may grant a second sense to "aesthetic"[11]. Calling a mode of representation aesthetic may also express our intention of relating a representation not to the cognitive

faculty but to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. In this sense, Kant points out the aesthetic makes no contribution to the knowledge of objects, but concerns only a sensitivity on the part of the subject. What is aesthetic in this sense is purely subjective in ontological significance. Again, Kant connects the aesthetic with the subjective, and thus prepares to link aesthetic judgment with the non cognitive feeling of pleasure and pain.

The ambiguity of the term "aesthetic" does not attach to the phrase "aesthetic judgment". If we think of a judgment as a knowledge claim, we realize that senses alone can make no judgment. Intuitions are indeed sensuous, but an actual knowledge claim always involves the understanding. So an aesthetic judgment cannot be a knowledge claim based on sensible intuition alone. Hence reference to pleasure or displeasure is intended in the phrase "aesthetic judgment". Kant concludes that an "aesthetic judgment of an object" refers, grammatically, to a relation of a representation to an object, but is actually "a judgment conveying the determination of the subject and his feeling rather than of the object"[12]. An aesthetic judgment is one which concerns a feeling, presumably caused by a given object. Instead of making a knowledge claim about the object, it makes a claim about the feeling it occasions.

Kant next links these considerations to the theory of reflective judgment and argues that in making one kind of judgment about the pleasure occasioned by an object we are making a judgment about the relation of the representation of that object to our cognitive faculties. In the first Critique sensibility and imagination are distinct. In the third Critique imagination is "the faculty intuitions or presentations", and performs the functions assigned to both sensibility and imagination in the first Critique. Further, Kant holds that imagination and understanding are "mutually related". Ordinarily, the relation is "objective and cognitive", and it results in the understanding's assignment of some definite concept to an intuition presented by the imagination. We are not concerned with the relationship between the two faculties, but the knowledge claim which is the product of judgment. We are interested in a proposition rather than in the mental event of judgment itself.

But Kant argues that the same relationship can be viewed subjectively, i.e., we can also consider the mental state from which a cognition issues. We may be conscious of the mental state which is the effect of an object on our cognitive faculties. This consciousness is given by a sensation which is not itself predicated of the object. Kant adds the claim that there is a sensation which manifests the existence of the mental state of judgment itself rather than representing any property of the object judged.

Kant's next step is to forge a link between the faculty of judgment and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. The lack of objective reference on the part of the feeling makes it the appropriate sensory expression of the subjective side of judgment. To establish the independence of the feeling connected with the subjective side of judgment, Kant maintains that the subjective condition of judgment may obtain even when an actual cognition does not result. Kant writes that "a merely reflective judgment about a particular object can be aesthetic, however, if the judgment, with no concept antecedent to the given intuition, unites the imagination (which merely apprehends the object) with the understanding (which produces a general concept) and perceives a relation between the two cognitive faculties which forms the subjective and merely sensible condition of the objective employment of the faculty of judgment - namely, the harmony of the two faculties with each other"[13].

The following points emerge from Kant's statement : (a) that there is a subjective state in which the conditions of judgment are met; (b) the existence of this state may be perceived by means of a sensation (c) this state may obtain independently of the making of an actual knowledge claim about an object. This subjective state is the harmony of the cognitive faculties. The feeling by which it is perceived is that of pleasure. And the claim that it is the existence of this state which is manifest

in aesthetic response is the foundation of Kant's aesthetics.

Let us consider Kant's thesis that pleasure is the sensation linked to the harmony of the faculties. His argument appears to proceed as follows. An aesthetic judgment is one "whose predicate can never become cognitive, although it may contain the general subjective condition for a cognition". The evidence on which such a judgment is made can only be a sensation, otherwise it will not be an aesthetic judgment at all. And if the judgment is to be directed to the state of the subject rather than the nature of the object, the sensation on which it is based cannot form part of the concept of an object. Such a unique sensation is the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The ground of determination of an aesthetic judgment lies in a sensation immediately connected with the feeling of pleasure and pain. Such a sensation may be brought about in two ways. It could be caused directly by the empirical intuition of an object, without the involvement of any higher cognitive faculties at all. A report of such a sensation would be an "aesthetic judgment of sense". Or, it might be effected by the harmonious interplay of the judgment's two cognitive faculties. The expression of such a state would be an "aesthetic judgment of reflection".

Kant appears to assume that the feeling of pleasure and pain is the only feeling incapable of objective employment. This is an old assumption and may be found in Locke[14] as well as in

Berkely[15]. But that pleasure and pain are of subjective significance could use proof. Secondly, Kant's argument treats of a single feeling, and does not discriminate between pleasure and pain. It may be quite natural that pleasure and pain should be connected with the subjective state of our cognitive faculties. But Kant's argument does not show why only pleasure - and not merely pleasure or pain - should express a harmonious state of these faculties.

Kant opens Section VII of the published Introduction with the claim that what is purely subjective in a representative of an object is its "aesthetic quality" and thus the subject matter of aesthetic judgment. He then asserts that it is the feeling of pleasure or displeasure which is this "subjective side of representation" and thus the aesthetic quality. Then Kant employs his concept of finality. "The finality of a thing", he says, "is in no way a quality of the object itself". Finality is subjective when it is independent of or precedes any actual knowledge of an object. It precedes the cognition of an object even without any will to use the representation of the object for cognition. This makes the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and the property of finality both subjective sides of representation, and Kant connects the two. The feeling of pleasure and displeasure becomes the representation of that finality of an object which precedes any cognition of it : "the object is called final, only because its representation is immediately connected

with the feeling of pleasure, and this representation itself is an aesthetic representation of the finality"[16]. Kant is in fact linking the two phenomena, pleasure and finality, by their common status of subjectivity. If it is merely the fact of subjectivity which associates feeling with finality, why should it be just pleasure and not pleasure or pain which represents finality? Kant is here introducing the claim that our pleasure in the beautiful is linked to an aesthetic quality of finality. The connection of pleasure and finality, which is peculiarly a non-objective property, leads to the heart of Kant's theory.

A harmony between imagination and understanding causes a feeling of pleasure. An object is subjectively or formally purposive because by producing free play between the imagination and the understanding it produces pleasure. But why the harmony of the faculties arouse, or cause, a feeling of pleasure? Section VI of the published Introduction gives a general theory of the production of pleasure. It is in the light of this section that Kant's theory of the pleasure of aesthetic response and its production by the harmony of the faculties may be interpreted.

As Kant puts it, "the attainment of every aim is coupled with a feeling of pleasure"[17]. The same thesis is reiterated at the close of the Analytic of the Beautiful where Kant says that the accomplishment of any objective is invariably connected with delight. One should distinguish objectives and desires, and note Kant's view that the faculty of desire is not involved in every

one of our objectives. Kant's theory of pleasure depends on the view that each of the faculties of mind has the objective of producing the state which it is capable of producing, and the satisfaction of this objective, under certain conditions, produces pleasure. Kant states the funfamental presupposition of the Critique of Judgment's explanation of aesthetic response when he writes, in the Critique of Practical Reason, that "to every faculty of mind an interest can be ascribed, i.e., a principle which contains the condition under which alone its exercise is advanced".[18] In the second Critique speaks of pleasure connected with desire, while in the third Critique he links pleasure with reflective judgment, and the terminology of 'interest' is given up. However, the idea that each faculty has its own objective is crucial to the third Critique. Thus the attainment of knowledge is the fulfilment of the objective of the faculty of cognition, and ideally, the occasion of a pleasure which does not fulfil an objective set by desire. Correspondingly, the satisfaction of an objective set by the faculty of desire itself may be regarded as the cause of pleasure that does not involve the objectives of the faculty of cognition. And finally, the successful employment of the faculty of reflective judgment must also be seen as the occasion of a pleasure which is independent of the practical aims of the faculty of desire.

Let us now ask, what is the status of Kant's thesis that pleasure is always produced by the satisfaction of an objective?

Kant employs his statement as a law-like premise, but does not introduce the claim with an argument. The thesis cannot be analytic, for it does not say that whatever state persons are in on the attainment of their objective shall be called pleasure. The Thesis connects the attainment of objectives with a feeling of pleasure, and feeling is a single psychological spate, in some respects it is phenomenologically identical in all of its occurrences. Thus the thesis as a matter of fact, it must be synthetic, rather than analytic.

Is the thesis synthetic *a priori* or synthetic *a posteriori*? In the first Introduction Kant says that a definition of the feeling of pleasure "must be transcendental"[19], but he offers no transcendental deduction of his proposition. Nor is it any more clear how the adoption of the principle that the attainment of every objective produces pleasure could be a condition of the possibility of human knowledge. The possibility remains that Kant's theory of pleasure might be synthetic *a posteriori*, a law of human psychology, never disconfirmed, though conceivably disconfirmable. A law which links a specific feeling to a specific mental state should be empirical. But Kant is concerned with an *a priori* principle of taste, and in that case how does he introduce an empirical law into the foundation of his explanation of aesthetic response? The matter appears to be that Kant's defence for an *a priori* principle of aesthetic judgment has an ultimate limit in empirical psychology.

We have already noticed that the harmony of the faculties is the "sensible" as well as the "subjective" condition of knowledge. Accordingly knowledge may be looked upon from two points of view, the objective and the subjective. The objective point of view is the case when our goal would be the discovery or acquisition of true beliefs or objectively valid judgments. The goal of knowledge from the subjective point of view would consist in the synthetis or unification of our manifolds of intuition, however, achieved. The doctrine of Kant's first Critique is that there can be no synthesis of manifolds without objectively valid judgments. But it can also be said that from a psychological point of view the synthesis of a manifold is what produces an objective valid judgment. As the mental event which has knowledge at its outcome, this synthesis may be thought of as the subjective condition of cognition, and as itself a goal in cognition. Since the harmony of faculties is a state in which the subjective condition of knowledge exists without the use of a concept, and thus without any objective judgment actually being made, this state may be one in which a manifold of intuition, presented by the imagination, is unified, or at least, appears to be unified, without the use of a concept. Unification without a concept is of course contingent, and fulfilment of our aim in knowledge would be unexpected. It would thus be the occasion of a "noticeable pleasure".

The interpretation risked above may not have been a case of a fool's rushing in where even angels fear to tread. If we turn to the first edition account, in the first Critic, of the threefold synthesis, we will see that this includes all the aspects of synthesis except the actual application of a concept of the understanding to the manifold of intuitions[20]. The harmony of the faculties is then a state in which, somehow, a manifold of intuition is run through and held together as a unity by the imagination without the use of a concept. This account of the harmony of the faculties does not assign an active role to the understanding, but it does describe a state in which the imagination is in harmony with the understanding in the sense accomplishing everything that is ordinarily requisite for the successful relation of the understanding to a manifold of intuition.

The imagination in aesthetic response is in harmony with the usual requirements of the understanding, even though the latter does not apply any determinate concept in the state of free play. The imagination accomplishes its synthesis of apprehension on the manifold provided in a representation or by the form of a given object in empirical intuition. That is, the mind is ordinarily disposed to the harmony of the faculties by an object, which we may provisionally suppose is beautiful in virtue of this disposition.

Now to turn to these epistemological bearings on the concept of taste. In the section 9 of the Analytic of the Beautiful Kant describes the feeling of pleasure as the determining ground of the judgment of taste. The feeling is the mental state which presents itself in the mutual relation of the powers of representation". This relationship is one of "mutual accord between imagination and understanding, and is also called a relation of "free play", because no definite concept restricts these two faculties to a particular rule of cognition. The imagination in the third Critique is a faculty of intuitions. And taste as a subjective faculty of judgment contains imagination as a principle of subsumption. The ordinary relationship of the faculties, when marked by an absence of a concept, is not altered but for the "lawfulness"[21] of the imagination. There obtains combination of a manifold by the imagination, which schematizes without a concept[22]. Kant intimates that the unity of the manifold is represented by a feeling rather than a concept.

The concept of taste is finally a "faculty for estimating an object in relation to the free lawfulness of the imagination[23]. Taste is a state of the imagination, free and productive, such that aesthetic response is a state of "lawfulness without a lw". In short, for aesthetic response to occur the ordinary condition for cognition must be met without the imagination feeling constrained by consciousness of a rule.

So far we have given an account of Kant's theory of taste in general on the bais of the two Introductions. But what about his theory of taste for art in particular. For this purpose we shall have to turn to the third Critique itself. This we propose to undertake in the following chapter.

R E F E R E N C E S

1. FI II
2. Ibid.
3. CJ III
4. FI III
5. CJ, III
6. CJ, III
7. Ibid.
8. FI, V
9. Prolegomena, Section 19
10. CJ, VII
11. CPR, B 35, 36
12. FI, VIII
13. Ibid.
14. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk II, Ch 8, Section 18.
15. Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, First Dialogue.
16. CJ, VII
17. CJ, VII
18. Critique of Practical Reason
19. FI, VIII
20. CPR A98 and A100
21. CJ, Section 35
22. Ibid.
23. CJ, Section 22.

CHAPTER V

Harmony of the Faculties and Taste for Art

In a section toward the end of the Critique of Judgment Kant deals not with taste in general but with our taste for art in particular. Kant's discussion of our enjoyment of music bears directly on the question how the harmony of the faculties is incorporated into his theory of taste.

Kant considers the role of concepts in our response to music in the specific form of mathematical rules which might describe the relationship between the tones or individual representations constituting the manifold in an actual experience of music. Consciousness of such rules is not required for or involved in music's production of pleasure. He declares, "mathematics, certainly, does not play the least part in the charm and movement of the mind produced by music. Rather, it is only the indispensable condition of that proportion of the combining as well as changing impressions which makes it possible to grasp them all in one and prevents them from destroying one another, and to let them, rather, harmonize toward a continuous movement and quickening of the mind by affections that are consonant with it and thus [lead] to a comfortable self-enjoyment"[1]. If the enjoyment of music, as of any other object of taste, depends on the occurrence of the harmony of the faculties, then what we have here is a

lucid description of a pleasure produced by a unification of a manifold achieved without any consciousness of conceptually formulated rules. An explanation of the object's disposition to produce that harmony might involve reference to such rules (perhaps this is what Kant calls "indispensable conditions"). But the explanation of the enjoyment of the harmony turns on just the fact that the general cognitive objective of grasping a manifold and holding it together in the mind has been achieved without consciousness of constraint from any concept.

We have, in the foregoing Chapter, tried to show that harmony of the faculties is a state in which the subjective condition of cognition, the unification of the manifold of intuition, occurs without the use of a concept. We have also sought to establish that aesthetic response is the feeling of pleasure produced by this state of harmony between the imagination and the understanding. But the momentous issue is whether the state of harmony of the faculties is a kind of event such that its preparation extends through time, but its occurrence is momentary. This impression gets confirmed on several grounds. There is Kant's claim that the state of the harmony of the faculties produces and is manifest in a feeling of pleasure. The feeling is temporally discrete. Then the model of reflective judgment's accomplishment of a cognitive objective is used to interpret aesthetic response. An example of such an accomplishment is given by Kant as follows:

"the discovery ... that two or more empirical heterogenous laws of nature are allied under one principle that embraces them both "serving as the ground of a very appreciable pleasure"[2]. A discovery would seem to be an event, no matter how long it is in preparation, it is actually made in a single moment.

But it is peculiar to think of aesthetic response, our enjoyment of a piece of music or dramatic performance, of being anything like instantaneous. It seems natural to think of aesthetic response as temporally extended in a way that an event of accomplishment or moment, of fulfilment is not. What is important to notice is that Kant sometimes describes the harmony of the faculties as a temporally extended state. In calling the harmony a "play" of the mental powers "as quickened by their mutual accord", Kant definitely suggests that the feeling of aesthetic response as well as the fulfilment of the general objective of cognition without the employment of a concept are extended through time. They are like an activity rather than an act or event. Such a conclusion is also suggested by Kant's reference, in his discussion of music, to the production of "a continuous movement and quickening of the mind by affections that are constant with it and thus leads to a comfortable self-enjoyment". In such passages Kant describes what is clearly a unified but also a temporally extended psychological state.

There is no contradiction in interpreting the harmony of the faculties as an event, like a discovery, and yet also

describing it in terms of a temporally extended mental activity. The concept of accomplishment might be taken as that of a kind of event, and it also be thought of as that of a state of affair, obtaining through a period in which certain conditions are fulfilled. While there might be a particular moment at which a given manifold of intuition first comes to be unified, it may also be the case that the presentation or reproduction of a manifold occupies a period of time, and that the state of its unification can likewise be regarded as occupying that extended period of time. Such an explanation seems natural enough in the case of aesthetic response like musical performance and our enjoyment of it - both occupying and extending throughout that whole period.

But all manifolds of intuition, be they presented by objects like paintings or musical performances, are temporally successive. In the case of paintings, the manifolds exist complete from the first moment of intuition, in the case of music, they are successively intuited. The pleasure of aesthetic response depends upon an unexpected unification of a manifold. It obtains as long as the manifold continues to be presented and its unity retains its appearance of contingency. Yet is should be natural to suppose that the enjoyment engendered by that accomplishment as occupying a longer period of time. One continues to enjoy it in reflection upon its occurrence, and so on, even if the ground of pleasure is the occurrence of an act or

event. The pleasure it produces may be a continuous psychological state more akin to an activity. Music, said Shelley, "vibrates in memory". If the manifold presented by an object of taste is itself temporally continuous, then the response to it will be an extended and developing sense of its unity. Even if the manifold itself is fully unified at any given time, the pleasure it engenders may still be temporally extended.

R E F E R E N C E S

1. CJ, Section 53.

2. CJ, VI.

3. CJ, Section 9.

CHAPTER VI

Aesthetic Judgment And Its Criteria

The two Introductions of the Critique of Judgment have presented a complex picture of the relations between pleasure and reflection in the judgment of taste. Kant sought to establish a connection between our ability to feel pleasure or pain and our faculty of judgment; and the argument claimed a general connection between pleasure and judgment. Then Kant introduces the notion of reflective judgment as an ability to compare given representations with each other, and also with our own faculties. The theory of reflective judgment led to Kant's thesis that the pleasure we take in beautiful objects is a product of the contingent harmony between imagination and understanding which results from "simple reflection" on such objects.

Kant's view is that in making an aesthetic judgment, in calling an object beautiful one is not merely reporting an experience of pleasure. One is claiming that the pleasure one has felt is intersubjectively valid, or reasonably imputed to others. The analysis of the judgment of taste's claim to intersubjective validity remains to be defended in the Analytic of the Beautiful, the first major division of the text of the Critique of Judgment itself.

The criteria of universal and necessary validity is mentioned in the first Introduction. They state the content of the claim of aesthetic judgment, or are criteria by which this form of judgment may be distinguished from a mere report of one's response to any object. They do not justify the claim. Rather it is factors of disinterestedness and the form of finality which play required role. That a given feeling of pleasure is disinterested, and that it has been occasioned by the perception of the purposiveness of a given object's form are facts about it which may be used to assign it to the harmony of the faculties, and may be used to justify the claim of intersubjective validity for that pleasure. Universality and necessity, we might say, are defining criteria for the judgment of taste, and disinterestedness and the form of finality are justificatory criteria.

Universality and necessity are Kant's second and fourth "moments" of the judgment of taste. Dsinterestedness and the form of finality are his first and third moments. The second and fourth moments are derived from an analysis of the form of a judgment of taste, while the first and third moments are derived from the explanation of aesthetic response. It may be noted that Kant does not suggest that the four moments could be divided into two groups of differently functioning criteria. He simply offers a sequential discussion of four moments of the judgment of taste, each resulting in a "definition" or "explanation" (Erklarung)[1] of the beautiful. The discussion is organized

on the basis of an analogy to the fourfold division of judgments employed in the Critique of Pure Reason[2]. It seems that whole Analytic constitutes a single argument, beginning with disinterestedness, to be followed by subsequent stages.

There is a disanalogy between the analyses of cognitive judgments and aesthetic judgments. The term "moment" is not used in the first Critique, and does not seem to have a clear architectonic or methodological significance. The logical functions of cognitive judgment and the moments of aesthetic judgment do not describe analogous properties of judgments. The logical functions of judgment characterize differences in the content of judgments, or differences that may obtain between various judgments. The moments of aesthetic judgment, by contrast, do not describe differences in the possible contents of particular aesthetic judgments. The moments describe features of epistemological status common to all aesthetic judgments, the acceptability they claim to enjoy, the kinds of evidence on which they may be based, the positions from which they must be made[3]. Employing the categories of quantity, quality, relation and modality as logical functions of judgment, we can formulate a large number of formally different judgment types. According to Kant's analysis, only the model categories have anything to do with the epistemological status of judgments. They do not enlarge the concept to which they are attached as predicates,

only express the relation of the concept to the faculty of knowledge[4].

The situation is quite different in the case of aesthetic judgment. Kant insists that all aesthetic judgments have the same logical form. They all have the same quality, relation, and modality. "In their logical quantity all judgments of taste are singular judgments"[5]. Every aesthetic judgments makes the same assertion about its object, every aesthetic judgment is an assertoric singular affirmative categorical judgment. The four moments of aesthetic judgment do not characterize differences in the way in which the predicate "beautiful" may be attached to its subject. They characterize the epistemological status of such judgments. Only the moments of quantity and modality can be said to determine the content or meaning of aesthetic judgment's claim; quality and relation concern the evidence for making such a claim.

There is another point of notice. It appears that there is no intimate connection between Kant's final conviction that aesthetic judgment is no form of cognitive judgment and the division of four moments. The division was, for Kant, a long standing habit of thought, and he employed it inspite of the disanalogies between aesthetic judgment and cognitive judgment. Hence Kant's exposition need not be taken literally, and it may be misleading as well. For example, Kant begins his analysis of

aesthetic judgment with the feature of disinterestedness, and then proceeds to say that the second moment, i.e. the feature of universality can be deduced from the first. Now this is somewhat uneasy and invalid. From the fact that a delight is not caused by any interest or desire, it does not follow that it is valid for everyone. It might be accidental. Universality cannot be deduced from disinterestedness alone, nor does it follow that in requiring disinterestedness of a pleasure one is requiring that it be universal. One may be simply requiring a source other than interest, quite apart from any consideration of intersubjectivity validity at all. Disinterestedness provided evidence for a claim to universality in the actual practice of aesthetic judgment.

We now propose to make brief statements about universality, singularity and necessity of aesthetic judgment, and postpone our remarks about disinterestendess for the sake of a fuller discussion in the following chapter.

Universality of aesthetic judgment : For Kant, aesthetic judgment is always a reflective judgment. In the first introduction Kant defines an aesthetic judgment as one based on the feeling of pleasure, and points out that wo different kinds of aesthetic judgments are possible : an aesthetic judgment of sense and an aesthetic judgment of reflection. The former is the mere report or expression of a feeling of pleasure produced

"directly by the empirical intuition" of an object, or by purely physiological response to it. The aesthetic judgment of reflection is the judgment of taste, which "belongs to the higher faculty of cognition" and makes the "universal claim"[6]. In the case of the latter, since there can be "no definite concept of its determining ground, this ground can only be given by the feeling of pleasure so that aesthetic judgment is always a reflective judgment". That is, since two different kinds of judgment may be licensed by feelings of pleasure produced in different ways, reflection is needed to decide, in the case of a given feeling of pleasure, which form of judgment is actually in order.

The second moment of the Analytic of the Beautiful starts with the claim that "the beautiful is that which, without concepts, must be represented as the object of a universal delight"[7]. It goes so far as to assert that to speak of taste without assuming the possibility universal agreement" would be to say as much as that there is no such thing as taste"[8]. The second moment also introduces the concept of the harmony of the faculties into the body of the Analytic.

From an ontological point of view the object of aesthetic judgment is something subjective. Yet why do we use the grammar of objectivity? We adopt a grammatically objective mode of expression because we are in fact willing to claim the status of intersubjective validity for some of our feelings about

objects. Taking the use of the predicate "beautiful" for granted, Kant argues that, because there is a claim to intersubjective validity implicit in the predicate form itself, there must be a justifiable claim to intersubjectivity at the basis of judgments of taste. This is so even while beauty "is only aesthetic, and contains merely a relation of the representation of the object to the subject".

Kant supports the criterial role of the claim to universality on an appeal to linguistic usage. There is, he says, a difference in our linguistic expectations about the objects of such judgments, the agreeable and the beautiful.

According to Kant's analysis, the term "agreeable" allows indexing the term to particular users, or allows for expecting purely private validity. Correct usage of "agreeable" involves no claim on the agreement of others, for it permits the explicit denial of any such claim by the addition of the words "to me". With the term "beautiful", however, our linguistic expectations are quite different. There can be no object which is beautiful <u>for me</u>. If it merely pleases me, I must not call it <u>beautiful</u>. When someone "proclaims something beautiful, he imputes the same delight to others; he judges not merely for himself but for everyone, and then speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things"[9]. The claim to intersubjective validity

is a condition of the meaningful use of "beautiful". The universality of an aesthetic judgment is concerned with the epistemological fact of universal acceptability. And we may recall that in the first Introduction Kant said that universality, along of course with necessity, for distinguishing between aesthetic judgments of sense and reflection.

The claim to intersubjective validity is a condition on the meaningful use of "beautiful". Such a claim is what distinguishes the use of this term from a mere report of the occurrence of a feeling of pleasure in oneself. In calling an object agreeable, one merely reports the occurrence of such a feeling. In calling it beautiful, one goes beyond that to "impute" the pleasure to others as well, although on the basis of its occurrence in oneself. The permissibility of adding the index "to me" to "agreeable" shows that it is essentially private. Publicity is inherent in the meaning of "beautiful". It may also be noted that the distinction between private validity and intersubjective validity of response is analogous to that between subjective and objective sequences of representations in the first Critique. The latter is what judging of objects is all about, the former is what taste is all about.

The terms with which Kant expresses the criterion of universal validity suggest demanding or requiring something from someone, or imposing some kind of obligation on another.

Aesthetic judgment involves "a demand for validity from everyone", "a demand for subjective universality"[10]. It is also interesting to note that in passages outside of the second moment Kant uses apparently moral language to state the claim of taste. He raises the question of "how the feeling in the judgment of taste is attributed to everyone as a sort of duty", or "as if it were a duty"[11]. Again, we find that in declaring an object beautiful one intends that "everyone ought to give the object concerned his approval"[12]. Some commentators have argued that, for Kant, aesthetic judgment's demand for agreement is a moral claim, and requires a foundation in a moral justification[13]. Without disputing the argument that Kant has introduced a moral element into his analysis of the second moment, we may say that Kant may be asking moral language to convey the importance of finding a reason for making claims about the responses of others.

What is really the case? Does Kant describe the requirement of rationality or that of morality? Kant himself derives the second moment from the first. Does it mean that he means to support a moral demand on a requirement of disinterestedness? The disinterestedness of aesthetic judgment appears to separate it from morality. It should be unexceptionable to say that disinterestedness is the aesthetic analogue of the epistemological notion of objectivity. If that be the case, then Kant's intentions should concern epistemological grounds for a title of universality.

Again, Kant uses terms with cognitive rather than practical connotations in describing the claim of taste. For example, he says that aesthetic judgment is similar to logical judgment in that one can presuppose its validity for everyone. The judgment is presupposed valid for others. This means that its ground for determination may be presupposed to obtain for others as well. In other words, aesthetic judgment "presupposes" the feeling of pleasure in others, or attributes it to others.

To say that the feeling of pleasure can be attributed to others means that it is assumed to be communicable. What sort of claim is it? In sections 7 and 8 Kant makes it clear that the judgment of taste is a claim about the responses of others but not a prediction based on induction or deduction. It expects its confirmation from the accession of others, but is not defeated by evidence that others do not in fact agree. Kant introduces the metaphor of "universal voice" in the final paragraphs of section 8. The figure implies that one's feeling pleasure is a condition of concurrence in another's judgment of taste.

There is also the notion of "postulate" that Kant uses. He says that in judgment of taste "a universal voice in respect of delight without mediation by concepts"[14] is postulated. What is thus postulated is a possibility of an aesthetic judgment? One usage of "postulate" is to describe the principles of modality[15]. Another sense of the term is drawn from mathematics[16].

A third sense is employed in the second Critique in Kant's discussion of the idea of God, freedom and immortality[17]. A judgment of taste is not a postulate in neither of the three senses of the term. An imputation of pleasure or agreement in pleasure is an "idea"[18], i.e., a concept of objective but indeterminate validity. Its validity is indeterminate because it rests on two conditions the fulfilment of which is uncertain : (a) one's knowledge of both oneself and others, and (b) the indeterminate concept of the harmony of the faculties as the ground of aesthetic response. A person may say that an object x is beautiful only if he takes pleasure in x and believes that his pleasure in x is due to the harmony to which the perception of x disposes his imagination and understanding. The ascription of one's own pleasure in the harmony of the faculties can ground an imputation of it to others, or function as evidence for the assertion of a judgment of taste.

The Singularity of Aesthetic Judgment

Kant begins the Analytic with the definition of aesthetic judgment as "one whose determining ground cannot be other than subjective"[19], or one which is made on the basis of the experience of pleasure itself. Further we are told, both in Section 1 and the Introductions, that pleasure denotes nothing in the object, but is a feeling which the subject has of itself, as it is affected by the object"[20]. If this is so, then none of the ordinary concepts predicated of an object can express the fact

of its pleasurableness. And so "from concepts there can be no transition to the feeling of pleasure or pain"[21]. But then aesthetic judgment cannot be based on the subsumption of an object under a determinate concept. A fortiori, its claim to universal validity cannot depend on such a subsumption.

In Section 8 of the Analytic Kant has contrasted the universality of aesthetic judgment and ordinary logical universality. Aesthetic judgment is said to be independent of concepts : "a universality which does not rest on concepts of objects ... is aesthetic"[22]. Logical universality is simply the formal property of universal quantification. Objective universal validity is the quantity manifested in the propositional form "All Fs are G", and characterizes the content of a given proposition a part from its truth or acceptability. The universality of an aesthetic judgment, by contrast, is not an internal or formal feature of its content, but is its epistemological status, its imputability to or acceptability for all judges of subjects. This is why Kant calls it "subjective universal validity".

A logically universal judgment connects a predicate-concept to a subject-concept in such a way that the former is valid of any object falling in the extension of the latter. The extension of a subjectively universal judgment, by contrast, is not a class of objects, but the class of possible human judges.

Aesthetic universality does not connect a predicate with the concept of an object, rather it "extends [the predicate of beauty] over the whole sphere of the judging [subjects]"[23].

Aesthetic universality is not identical with logical universality because the judgment of an object's pleasurability is made independently of its subsumption under any concept, and cannot be implied by its subsumption under a concept. If the judgment that a given rose is beautiful cannot be inferred from the object's being a rose, then it is obviously not derived from a proposition of the form "All roses are beautiful". Nor need it be taken to offer support for such a proposition. Kant expresses this by saying that "with respect to logical quantity all judgments of taste are <u>singular</u> judgments". They are always of the form "This rose is beautiful". The referring expression "this rose" may serve to pick out the object of attention, but does not provide the basis for calling it beautiful.

The universality claimed by aesthetic judgment is the imputability of delight, and thus the validity of the judgment, for all subjects. Because aesthetic response is independent of the synthesis of manifolds under concepts, this validity cannot be inferred from the classification of an object under a concept. An aesthetic judgment is thus logically singular but subjectively universally valid. It asserts of a given object, and that object

only, that it may be expected to occasion pleasure in every subject responding to it.

Feelings of pleasure are not produced by the subsumption of objects under concepts, except in the special case of moral feeling. This is not to say that the content of aesthetic judgment does not involve any concepts. The concept of other persons will be already there. Again, the concept of beauty itself is employed in the expression of the judgment. All that Kant is arguing is that the subsumption of an object under a classificatory concept is not a basic for responding to it pleasurably or for validly imputing that response to another person.

The Necessity of Aesthetic Judgment : Ordinarily, universality and necessity are neither identical nor inseparable. True universal statements need not be necessarily true, for example, "All ravens are black" and "All bachelors are unmarried", how different they are. Again, necessarily true statements like "God exists" and "Socrates exists" are not universal statements. Yet in the first Critique Kant argued that the transcendental requirements of universality and necessity are co-extensive : "necessity and strict universality are ... sure characteristics of a priori knowledge, and are inseparable from each other"[24].

In the opening sections of the fourth moment Kant's description of the requirement of necessity is almost indistinguishable from his exposition of the demand for universality. He

associates different forms of aesthetic judgment with the three varieties of modality. A synthesis of pleasure with any representation is at least possible. To say that an object is agreeable is to say that it is actually causes pleasure to the speaker. But in the case of the beautiful, Kant says, we are concerned with a necessary connection to delight"[25]. It is not a "theoretical objective necessity", nor is it a practical necessity. It cannot also be a practical necessity. It cannot also be derived from the universality of experience, since no amount of empirical evidence can itself sustain a claim of necessity. Rather, Kant asserts, the necessity involved in aesthetic judgment can "only be called exemplary" : it is "the necessity of the assent of all to a judgment which is regarded as an example of a universal rule which cannot be furnished"[26]. Kant means that the ordinary consequences of knowledge obtain without the actual application of a concept.

There is another important point. Kant had said earlier (in Section 8) that the claim of taste is conditional. Now in Section 19 he amplifies the remark. Does aesthetic judgment retain an element of uncertainty? As Kant put it : "The should in aesthetic judgments ... is yet pronounced only conditionally. He suggests that one cannot in fact be certain that a given pleasure has been correctly attributed to a common ground, that is the harmony of the faculties. We may also say that Kant keeps the issue of the rationality of aesthetic judgment separate from

that of its certainty. Hence aesthetic judgments remain corrigible, that is one cannot show that there can be no errors in taste[27].

What taste actually calls for is necessary agreement in response. It can occur only under ideal conditions. Agreement alone is a sufficient condition for aesthetic judgment. It could be contingent. Again, disagreement does not mean that a judgment of taste is false. So it is not simply intersubjective validity which aesthetic judgment requires, but rather an agreement which is necessary, though under ideal conditions. What the judgment of taste requires as a condition of calling an object beautiful is that it occasion a pleasure which could be felt, and which under ideal conditions would be felt, by any human observer of an object, because it is produced by the object's effect on a ground common to all. And in attributing a pleasure to such a source, one is claiming that it is a pleasure which is in a sense necessary rather than contingent. A pleasure due to the harmony of imagination and understanding is a pleasure which one has just in virtue of possessing the faculties necessary for cognition. It is by assigning a pleasure such status that one makes rational its imputation to other persons.

Both the moments of universality and necessity place the same demand on the judgment of taste. If I say that an object x is beautiful, then, I can rationally expect that others

will take pleasure in it, unless of course I am mistaken in assigning my own pleasure to its proper source. This demand can be met only if the pleasure is attributed to a ground which is neither private nor contingent, but is instead a necessary constituent of human nature. The demand of taste can be met only by an object which disposes one's imagination and understanding to the harmonious state of free play. This is what Kant has called the "Key to the critique of taste".

The judgment of taste requires that one's delight in a beautiful object be regarded as having a "necessary relation" to that object. But the problem is that it cannot be known a priori that a given object is beautiful. So Kant insists that one's connection of pleasure to an object, a connection presupposed in judging it to be beautiful, can be made on the basis of actual experience of the object, or empirically. On the one hand, the delight which grounds an aesthetic judgment must be a necessary delight; but on the other, moral feeling excepted, no pleasure can be connected a priori with the representations of an object. Kant's point is that the predication of delight of a beautiful object is not a priori, it is not entailed by the predication of any determinate concept of that object. Pleasure cannot be connected to an object a priori for all judgments of taste are singular judgments. They do not connect their predicate of delight with a concept, but with a given singular empirical

representation.

While the feeling of pleasure cannot be produced a priori, one's reflection on one's pleasure can produce an a priori judgment, or the judgment of taste has an a priori element. Reflection one one's pleasure in an object can reveal that the feeling is due to a necessary rather than a contingent source, or a public rather than a private condition, even though it could not have been predicted in advance. Once having felt the pleasure, one can attribute it to the harmony of the faculties. On the basis of this attribution, the a priori judgment that the object is beautiful, that the pleasure it produces may be imputed to others, can be made. That I perceive and estimate an object with pleasure, is an empirical judgment. But that I find it beautiful, i.e. that I may impute that delight to everyone as necessary, is an a priori judgment.

The judgment that a given object is beautiful has both empirical and a priori elements. Insofar as it reports my own pleasure, it is empirical, for it depends on my expeirnce of the object. And insofar as it attributes my please to the harmony of the faculties, it is also empirical, being a judgment about a causal link in my mental history. But insofar as it takes the last attribution as a basis for imputing my pleasure to others, the judgment of taste is a priori. For it depends not upon actual experience of shared responses, but on the a priori assumption

that what occasions the harmony of the faculties is the same for all. Since the imputation of pleasure to others is part of the actual content of judgment of taste, the judgment not merely rests on an *a priori* assumption, but also makes an *a priori* claim.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. CJ Sections 5, 9, 17 and 22
2. CPR A70/B95, A80/B106
3. See Donald Crawford, Kant's Aesthetic Theory, p. 17. Also its review by Peter Gay in The Journal of Philosophy, 22, No. 3, 1975, 78-9.
4. CPR, A219/B266
5. CJ, Section 8, also Section 37
6. FI, VIII
7. CJ, Section 6
8. CJ, Section 7
9. CJ, Sections 6, 7 and 8
10. CJ, Section 40
11. CJ, Section 19
12. R.K. Elliott in "The Unity of Kant's 'Critique of Aesthetic Judgment' ", British Journal of Aesthetics, 8, No. 3, 1968, 244-259.
13. CJ, Section 6
14. CJ, Section 8
15. CPR, A218-219/B265-266.
16. CPR, A234-235/B287.
17. C Pr. R
18. CJ, Section 8
19. CJ, Section 1

20. CJ, Section 1.

21. CJ, Section 6.

22. CJ, Section 8.

23. CJ, Section 8.

24. CPR, B4.

25. CJ, Section 18.

26. CJ, Section 18.

27. Beck has argued that Kant's characterization aesthetic judgments as a priori leads to the false conclusion that there is no room for error in such judgments. See also Francis Coleman, The Harmony of Reason: A Study in Kant's Aesthetics, pp. 79-84. I shall make some remarks about the issue in Chapter VIII.

CHAPTER VII

The Disinterestedness of Aesthetic Judgment

The first moment of the Analytic of the Beautiful defines the "quality" of the judgment of taste. After having stated the claim that the judgment of taste is aesthetic, Kant moves on to say what the moment of quality requires. The title of the Section 2 asserts that "the delight which determines the judgment of taste is without interest". At the end of the Section 5 Kant writes that "taste is the faculty of estimating an object or representation by means of delight or aversion without any interest. The object of such a delight is called beautiful" . From Kant's statements it follows that a judgment of taste is a judgment of an object grounded on a delight in it without any interest. The fact that a particular pleasure is felt apart from any interest may be referred to as the disinterestedness of that pleasure. Thus the first moment requires that the judgment of taste be made by means of, or on the basis of, a disinterested pleasure.

It may be noted that Kant does not mention disinterestedness, what he says the judgment of taste require as regards its "quality" is absence of any interest. So the persuasiveness of Kant's argument will largely depend on the clarity of his conception of interest. Another point of importance is that Kant denies any

connection between interest and pleasure insofar as aesthetic response is concerned. In the case of the beautiful, says Kant, "no interest, whether of the senses or of reason, extorts approval". This implies that the pleasure in the beautiful does not create any interest in its object. The implication is made explicit in a footnote to Section 2, where Kant says that "in themselves judgments of taste found no interest at all".

It may be recalled that Kant distinguishes three kinds of delight. There is delight based on inclination, or delight in the agreeable; delight based on respect, or delight in the good; and delight based on favour or delight in the beautiful. Of these, Kant maintains that "favour" (Gunst), or the "taste in the beautiful" is the "one and only disinterested and free delight". The criterion of disinterestedness is then makes the same division of pleasures as the classification of pleasures into the agreeable, the good or the beautiful. Pleasures in the first two sorts of object are always connected to an interest. Only pleasure in the beautiful is free of such connection. In Kant's words, "neither an object of inclination, nor one which is imposed on us as a desire by a law of freedom, leaves us freedom, to make of any thing an object of pleasure". Both inclination and rational desire are connected with interest, and "all interest either presupposes a want, or calls one forth,

and as the determining ground of approval does not allow the judgment on the object to be free"[1].

Let us now turn to Kant's exposition of the argument for the disinterestedness of aesthetic response.

Kant defines interest as a "delight which we connect with representation of the existence of an object"[2]. Interest is defined as a kind of pleasure, rather than a ground of pleasure. If Kant's intention had been to isolate pleasures due to interest, then interest must be a source rather than a kind of pleasure. The next definition of interest occurs in Section 4, where it is defined as "delight in the existence of an object or action"[3]. And in Section 41, interest is said to consist in pleasure in the existence of an object"[4].

These definitions are either unhelpful in understanding Kant's theory of aesthetic response, or opaque. For Kant is the philosopher who introduced the idea that "being is obviously not a real predicate"[5], or that existence is not a genuine property of things. And this means that to link a pleasure solely to the existence of a thing is entirely uninformative. Since Kant's is a causal account of the objects of pleasure, the point remains that the mere fact that a thing exists does not itself characterize it or provide any ground for pleasure. Some information

about the properties of the object, or features of its existence has got to be linked to the notion of interest before any contrast with aesthetic response can emerge.

We may try to illuminate the concept of interest in the following manner. Kant defines the good as that "which by means of reason pleases through its mere concept". The good for something or the useful pleases only as a means, and the good in itself pleases on its own account. The good for something pleases because it is a means to something else which pleases. An object good in itself pleases without reference to any other object at all. But it pleases in connection with a concept. The concept of an end is there be it a pleasure in the good for something, or the good in itself. The former pleases because it is a means to something else which fulfils an end and the latter pleases because it itself fulfils an end. In either of its forms the good involves an end. And further, Kant points of our that it also involves "the relation of reason to willing, and thus delight in the existence of an object or action, i.e., some interest or other"[6]. Thus a connection between the good and interest in established by Kant. And we are to understand that no such connection obtains in the case of the beautiful.

Kant's argument is hardly straightforward, it is indeed quite complex, even complicated. When he contrasts the beautiful and the good he does not mention interest, rather he turns on

the question of connection to a concept. He appears to take a move from connection to a concept to connection to interest. But does he mean to suggest that our pleasure in the beautiful does not involve "delight in the existence of an object"?

To find something good, one must know "what sort of object the thing should be", and thus have a concept of it[7]. The good, then, not only pleases through its concept, but also cannot be seen unless classified under some concept. An object which is judged to be good is judged to be so because it is an instance of a certain concept or class of things, and it pleases as such is an instance. This is not the case in the judgment of the beautiful. A beautiful object can please, and be judged to be beautiful, without having any determinate concept applied to it, Kant illustrates this fact with several examples of objects which can please without consideration of any concept. Flowers, for example, "signify nothing, depend on no determinate concepts, and yet please".

Hence "the delight in the beautiful must depend upon the reflection on an object. Here is another point of difference between the good and the beautiful. Delight in the beautiful requires no determinate concept as in the case of good; but it does require some form of reflection, which is not required in the case of the agreeable. The idea of reflection is meant to

suggest the notion of reflection producing the harmony of the faculties without using any concept.

Kant has so far argued that the agreeable, the useful, and the morally good are all alike "in being invariably coupled with an interest in the object". This is because each of these may be an object of the will; and "to will something and to take a delight in its existence, i.e., to take an interest in it, are identical"[8]. If this is so, then that which is not an object of the will is not an object of interest, and if the beautiful is not an object of the will, then our pleasure in it is not connected with an interest.

Let us now turn to inquiring into the precise nature of the connection between delight and existence in the case of interest and the meaning of the concept of existence. We may begin with the Critique of Practical Reason, which was published two years before the Critique of Judgment. The second Critique equates an interest with any state of delight connected in any way with the existence of an object. Kant defines an interest as "an incentive of the will so far as is presented by reason"[9]. This definition involves two components : (a) it is a mental state which is an incentive, or furnishes a motive for action; and (b) it does this by means of the application of a particular concept to an object or action. A reasonable and or object of the will is given through reason, and reason works through

concepts. An interest may presuppose a delight in the existence of an object if its conceptualization acts as an incentive for the will by promising a delight in its existence. Or, one might say that in the second Critique interest is equated with the conceptualization of the object as promising delight than with the feeling of pleasure itself.

A passage in the Foundations of the Metaphysic of Morals appears to support the third Critique's definition of interest. There Kant defines interest as "that by which reason becomes practical, i.e., a cause determining the will"[10]. If a feeling of pleasure itself can determine the will to a particular action, then this definition may be taken to equate interest with such a feeling. We find that the concept of interest always involves a role for reason, and thus, a role for a concept of the object of the will. An earlier footnote in the Foundations defines interest as "the dependence of a contingently determinable will on principles"[11]. This is so, since reason, says Kant, gives the practical rule by which even the needs of inclination are to be aided. This suggests that even if an interest is founded on pleasure or expectation of pleasure, it cannot be equated with such a feeling of delight.

In another passage in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant defines an "object" as a "determining ground of the will".

And this is said to be "the conception of an object and its relation to the subject, whereby the faculty of desire is determined to seek its realization"[12]. A determining ground of the will is a conception of an object which offers a reason for efforts towards its realization, or toward its existence. In Theorem I of the second Critique, Kant specifies the relation to the subject which determines the will as "pleasure in the reality of the object". This phrase is synonymous with the third Critique's phrase "delight in the existence of an object". What is suggested may be put as follows. The reason for action toward the realization of an object is always a pleasure promised or predicted by the classification of the object under a determinate concept, as a consequence of its existence. Such a promise could be founded on past experience of a given sort of object as always accompanied by a feeling of pleasure. The feeling then is taken up into the empirical concept of that sort of object. Once this is done, thinking of a given object as of that sort would promise pleasure.

But there is a difficulty in the explanation of interest given above. Interest has not been equated with pleasure, but they are closely linked together. Such a conception of interest is unexceptionable in the cases of the agreeable, or the mediately good, which is a means to the pleasure of agreeableness. Difficulties would arise if such a conception of interest is

sought to bear upon the good in intself. The expectation of pleasure in the existence of the object of action is not the reason for acting. Moral interest is created by the subsumption of an object or action under the categorical imperative. The central contention of Kant's ethics is that the will both may and must be determined by reason alone.

It is worth noticing that in several places Kant has made it clear that moral law as well as pleasure gives rise to interest. In the Foundations he contrasts "pathological interest in the object of the action" with "practical interest in the action" itself. The former is based on inclination, on the expectation of pleasure from the object of the action. The latter involves "only the dependence of the will on principles of reason in themselves". The point for us is to ask : Is there any way in which a connection between the idea of interest as a formal incentive for action and the idea of interest as a conception of an object which promises pleasure in its existence may be preserved. Kant's theory of moral feeling as a subjective delight in moral action, and his concept of willing may be of help in this regard.

To take the concept of Willing first. Willing something is always willing the existence of something or state of affairs. Any incentive to will or realize an object is an incentive to

will its existence, even when that incentive is merely the formal conformity of the proposed willing to the moral law. In human beings moral willing is often connected with a feeling of pleasure, if brings about a "subjective feeling of satisfaction", which seems to be a feeling of pleasure. This is borne out by the first Introduction[13] to the Critique of Judgment, where the feeling which results from the "objective determination of the will" is treated quite unequivocally as a feeling of pleasure.

But moral feeling of pleasure does not depend on the actual existence of an object. It is a consequence of the correctness of one's act of Willing, and this does not depend on success in realising the object of the will. The pleasure that arises from morally correct willing is thus independent of whether or not a morally motivated action succeeds in its effect, and hence independent of the actual existence of the willed object. Willing is always willing existence. So the pleasure of satisfaction in moral willing is linked with the representation of the existence of an object. It is thus connected with willing this existence, though not causally dependent on it.

The connections between interest, pleasure, and existence are complicated. In the Metaphysics of Morals[14] Kant has suggested something of the complexity of the relations between pleasure, desire, and existence subsumed under the general concept of

interest. This might help us see what these connections are. First an interest is always a concept of an object or action which has a relation to the faculty of desire. It is a cognitive representation which is an incentive for that faculty. Second, an interest is always connected to the existence of an object, for an incentive of the will is always an incentive to will the existence of something. Third, interest is always connected to delight. An incentive to will something is either a promise of pleasure in its existence or the conformity of the object of the will to the moral law, the consciousness of which produces a feeling of or like pleasure. Delight either is promised in the real existence of something, and thus a reason for willing, or is a consequence of the willing.

On the explanation of interest as is found in Kant's moral writings, it may now be seen why aesthetic response is disinterested in origin, and differs from the pleasures in the agreeable and the good in being so. Interest is always a concept of an object, and the beautiful is the object of a judgment made apart from any concept of an object. Hence the beautiful must be the object of a judgment made apart from interest. An easy contrast may be drawn between judgments of beauty and goodness. A judgment on the goodness of an object depends on a particular conception of the object, and creates an interest in it through that conception. So judgments of goodness and of beauty are not

identical. The point is that judgments of the beautiful and the good are differentiated not on the connection of interest to existence, but its connection to concepts. And this is what Kant has argued in Section 4 of the Third Critique. The pleasure derived from a particular beautiful object is not associated with any general concept under which the object may be subsumed, and cannot be linked with the predicates defining such a concept. Aesthetic pleasure cannot be predicted of an object in virtue of its having the features picked out by any empirical object, and the representation of an object as having such features could not serve as an incentive by promising the pleasure of aesthetic response. While what makes something a painting or song may be determinable by concepts, what makes it beautiful is not. If we take pleasure in something not because it is a painting or song, but because it is a beautiful one. To put the case in Kant's terminology, no classification of an object under a determinate empirical concept is involved in its production of the harmony of the faculties, no inference to beauty may be drawn from any particular conceptualization of it. Hence beauty does not produce interest.

But there might be cases where one might have a desire to continue in the state of aesthetic delight. Or to put the matter in other words, can we not have a very definite desire for the continued existence and experience of a song already

judged to be beautiful? Kant's explanation of aesthetic pleasure precludes an interest in the beautiful only in the narrow sense of "interest". Again there may be pleasures other than that in beauty which should be called aesthetic. For example, someone might be interested in a certain form or genre, such as the Kheyal or historical novel. The classification of an object as falling into this form might be enough to promise him a certain pleasure in the object, even if he neither expects nor finds it to be beautiful. Further, the belief that a museum has a large collection of paintings by Nandalal Bose may be an incentive for going to visit it. These are cases of interest in so far as they are incentives to experience beautiful objects. So Kant's thesis that beauty produces no interest need not be taken in a broader sense.

A further inquiry into the criterial significance of disinterestedness may also be made. How can the judgment of taste have an ordinary empirical object or even, a rose, or a nightingale's song as its object, and yet be indifferent to its existence? In Section 2 of the third Critique Kant has contrasted "mere representation" of an object with its "existence". The judgment of beauty, he says, concerns only the effect of the former, agreeableness and goodness involve dependence on the latter. In opening Section 5, Kant expands on this contrast. The agreeable and the good involve a relation to the faculty of desire, and

because of this relation are attended with a feeling of delight, either pathological, or purely practical. Such delights are not determined "merely by the representation of the object", but rather by the represented connection between the subject and the existence of the object; "it is not merely the object, but also its existence pleases". Opposed to judgments on these objects, the judgment of taste is "contemplative". Kant argues that the contemplation which produces a judgment of taste is "indifferent with respect to the existence of an object". How, then, does our relation to an object in aesthetic response differ from a relation to its actual existence, or not involve such a relation?

Existence, we have learnt in the first Critique, is not a genuine predicate, since it adds no new property to the concept of an object of which it is asserted. If existence were a genuine predicate, then asserting existence of an object would ascribe a new predicate to it, and change its identity. There is of course, a difference between an actually existing object and a merely possible object, though not a difference in concept. A real object is always a part of the network of causal connections, a possible object is not. Kant explains aesthetic response as a relation between an object and the subject's feeling of pleasure. Other forms of delight, such as those in an agreeable or good object depend on connection to an object's existence.

A mere representation is not a concept of a possible object, because a representation is not a concept at all. And an actual object, as Kant says in the first Critique ("Postulate of Empirical Thought") is bound up with the material conditions of experience, that is, sensation. Now aesthetic response need not necessarily be free of any sensation of objects. Kant's examples of aesthetic objects, flowers and the like, are empirical, perceptual objects. Beautiful objects do exist, and are perceived in the same way as any other objects. But the laws that explain their perception cannot possibly explain why they dispose the imagination and understanding to the harmonious state of free play. The point is that experience of beauty depends the perception rather than conception of objects. But important is the fact that the delight of contemplation is dependent on the presence of an object just for its perception. Other delights depend on more than mere perception of the presence of their objects. When Kant uses existence as a criterion of interest, he intends thereby to distinguish disinterested from some interested pleasures. The delight we take in a beautiful object is purely contemplative, it requires no further relation to the object-consumption of it, possession of it, the ability to dispose of it, and the like. The thesis finds an eloquent expression in a song by Tagore:

> Fill your eyes with the colours that ripple
> on beauty's stream,
> Vain is your struggle to clutch them....
> Enjoy it in freedom[15].

Indifference to real existence is a condition for the judgment of veauty. For purposes of this judgment, whether an object is natural or artificial (a nightingale or a Grecian Urn in Keats' odes) and intentional (the Meghdut in Tagore's poem) is indeed irrelevant. In Kant's usage "aesthetic" is not synonymous with "artistic", but connotes only the subjective pleasure we take in objects. Judgments of beauty concern the mere representation of an object rather than any aspect of its causal history. Kant's thesis is only about the specifically aesthetic merit of beauty.

The criterion of disinterestedness has its application in the justification of a judgment of taste. Hence we may now ask the following question : How does one become conscious that a given pleasure is disinterested?

Kant appears to argue from disinterestedness to inter-subjectivity. Its criterial role in claiming intersubjective validity is stressed in Section 6 of the third Critique. He writes as if consciousness of disinterestedness were a necessary and sufficient conditions for aesthetic judgment. But what is of momentous significance is the form of this consciousness. Is the disinterestedness of a feeling of pleasure something which is felt?

Supposing that there is a special feeling of disinterested-ness, Kant suggests, in Section 6, that since there are no private

reasons for a given delight, a subject may attribute it to others. The judging subject, says Kant, "feels himself fully free in respect of the delight". According to Kant, pleasure cannot be a part of the concept of an object. Just as the freedom of imagination means the absence of any conceptual constraint on it, similarly, the freedom of pleasure is but its independence of any interest. Section 5 has advanced the idea that pleasure in the beautiful alone is the disinterested and free delight, and "favour the only free delight". It seems then that freedom and disinterestedness are different names for one fact. And freedom, in this context, is the absence of any connection between pleasure and interest. If the foregoing consideration are in order, then disinterestedness cannot be manifested by a special and characteristic feeling. The freedom pleasure is not a unique feeling which can be used as evidence for its disinterestedness.

Consciousness of disinterestedness is no an awareness of any phenomenologically unique feeling. Before we can say that a given feeling is disinterested, consciousness of the presence or absence other states of mind will have to obtain. They may be indicated as follows. What we have already noted concerning the concept of interest, consciousness of interestedness of a pleasure consists in the consciousness of a pleasure in an object. Interest is a concept of an object which offers an incentive for willing its existence. The concept of an object represents its existence the type of which is desirable. Besides the consciousness of the object, there has to be a judgment that the conceptualization

of the object is either the cause or effect of one's pleasure in it. It should now be possible to say that the disinterestedness of a pleasure would consist in an awareness of it without an accompanying awareness of any such concept, or without ground for any such judgment as to the cause or effect of the pleasure.

A judgment of disinterestedness is an indirect judgment linking a felt pleasure to the harmony of the faculties in virtue of the absence of evidence for certain other judgments about the cause or effect of that pleasure. This is so because, as Kant says, there is no consciousness of the harmony except for the pleasure itself, or no consciousness of the cause except through its effect. Where pleasure is caused by the subsumption of an object under a concept, we are conscious of the concept as well as the pleasure, and have the evidence for a causal link between the two. Where interest is the effect of pleasure, one is conscious of the interest as well as of the pleasure itself. There is a lack of a separate consciousness of the ground of aesthetic response, and that is why aesthetic judgment is the product of reflection.

Since the criterion of disinterestedness cannot be stated simply, except as requiring the absence of an interest, it establishes an indirect method by which reflection can proceed. Again, the distinction between the representation and the existence of an object may be said to possess criterial potential. If one

is taking pleasure in a reproduction of a work rather than in the physical presence of the work itself, may we not say that one's pleasure is disinterested. Yes, but not conclusively, because it would be possible to suggest that one's pleasure in the reproduction is also interested. Moreover, the criterion of connection to a concept cannot always be easily applied. For any object of which one is conscious, one sure to be aware of some a priori concept under which it falls, for instance substance. Even in Kant's own example, "This rose is beautiful", 'rose' is an empirical concept. Can one say that one would take pleasure in an object even if one did not know what is was? If one thinks one would be pleased by the object without knowing it to be a rose that would be reason to believe that the classification was not the ground of pleasure. The point is that aesthetic judgment is not likely to be grounded on a simple absence of concepts from the context of one's pleasure. Attributing the pleasure to the harmony of the faculties would then be a reasonable alternative.

In the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant has written : "who can prove by experience the non existence of a cause when experience shows us only that do not perceive the cause?"[16] If this insight of Kant's moral epistemology is taken as a clue, we might say that uncertainty of aesthetic judgments founded on the criterion of disinterestedness is fundamental. That a pleasure is disinterested cannot be established by incorrigible introspection. It requires hypothesis and conjectures about

causal connections in one's mental history. Now causal judgments are corrigible empirical judgments. A claim of disinterestedness requires the absence of interest. Can we prove beyond doubt that no interest has caused a given pleasure. If the search for an interest is a search in the network of one's own thoughts and associations, it is always possible that one has not looked long enough or in the right direction. Any pleasure may be caused by an interest which one has failed to notice. Interests are incentives, or motives. In his moral epistemology Kant has suggested that one can never be fully certain of what motives stand benind one's action, that in a search for motives, "even the strictest examination can never lead us entirely behind the secret incentives"[17]. Of course Kant does not mention this thesis in the Critique of Judgment, yet it is possible to suppose that does apply to the claim of disinterestedness of aesthetic judgment as it does for action. The problem of disinterestedness may also be said to be due at least in part to the general problem of empirical self-knowledge. We need not open the issue in the present context. But it will suffice to have noted the point. In short, disinterestedness functions as a criterion for judgments of taste by restricting the relation between subject and object to one of several that might cause pleasure or by limiting the subjective grounds of pleasure in such judgments. The absence of interest is the evidence one can have for the hypothesis that a given pleasure is due to the harmony of imagination and understanding.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. CJ, Section 5.
2. CJ, Section 2.
3. CJ, Section 4. An action may be an "object" of the will.
4. Crawford, Kant's Aesthetic Theory, pp. 38-41.
5. CPR, A598/B626
6. CJ, Section 4.
7. CJ, Section 4.
8. CJ, Section 4.
9. C Pr R, p. 82.
10. Quoted by Peter Gay in Kant and the Claims of Taste, pp. 183-4.
11. Ibid., p. 184.
12. C Pr. R , Section 2, Theorem I, p. 19
13. FI, III
14. FM, III, p. 79.
15. Poems, No. 80
16. FM, p. 37.
17. FM, p. 23.

CHAPTER VIII

The Object of Aesthetic Response

We have thus interpreted the moment of disinterestedness functioning as a constraint on the subjective grounds for ascriptions of beauty to objects. The "quality" of the delight in judgments of taste requires that only pleasures that originate independently of any interest in the existence of their objects are inter-subjectively valid, or imputable to everyone else. For Kant the absence of interest is the evidence for the hypothesis that a given pleasure is due to the harmony of imagination and understanding.

In the first moment of aesthetic judgment functions as a criterion for judgments of taste by restricting the relation between subject and object by limiting the subjective grounds for in such judgments, then the third moment considers "the relation of ends which are brought into consideration" in judgments of taste. There is a sense in which the third moment continues the argument of the first, and places restrictions on our subjective grounds for the approval of the "proper object for the pure judgment of taste". It also seeks to specify certain properties or even kinds of objects which license judgments of taste.

Kant, at the end of the third moment, offers the following definition of the beautiful : "Beauty is the form of the purposiveness of an object, so far as this is perceived in it without any representation of a purpose". A note on the terminology may be added at the beginning. The Bernard translation of the third critique has the word "purposiveness" for "finality", which occurs in the Meredith translation. Bernard has "purpose" where Meredith uses "end" . Peter Gay also prefers "finality" for Kant's Zweckmassigheit. We shall use "finality" as well as "purposiveness" interchangeably, "end" and "purpose" as equivalent expressions.

It appears that Kant intends to argue that aesthetic judgments must be based on pleasure occasioned by the perceptual form of objects. And he suggests further that aesthetic response must be occasioned by a specific range of perceptual forms, those which have the appearance of design. In short, the objects of pure judgments of taste are to be regarded as having the mere "form of finality". In the third moment Kant may be taken as arguing the following theses : (a) that the judgment of taste is a response to the "form of finality" in an object; and (b) that there is a connection between the form of finality and appearance of design on the one hand, and between the beauty of an object to its form.

In the published Introduction Kant has asserted that it is the form of objects which disposes the imagination and understanding to their harmonious cooperation[1]. Kant begins his argument in the third moment by intimating a concept of subjective or formal finality as that in virtue of which objects are beautiful. To appreciate the point of the argument, let us consider Kant's concept of "end" or "purpose" (Zweck). The basic sense of "finality" is derived from his definition of end.

Kant defines an "end" or "purpose" as "the object of a concept so far this concept is regarded as the cause of the object (the real ground of its possibility)"[2]. Since the definition is proposed according to transcendental requirements, it presupposes reference to nothing empirical. That is, in calling something an end nothing is said about its particular relation to motivation or desire. What is said is that a thing which is an end is the product of causality through a concept. Now finality is a property of the kind of object which can lead to the production of an end, or "the causality of a concept in respect of its object". Thus to attribute finality to an object is to attribute to it a certain kind of causal history. An object which is final is an object of a kind which can be produced only by a prior representation of itself, or one which has actually be so produced.

It should now be clear that no judgment about the finality of an object can ground a judgment of taste. Judgments of finality

are judgments about the causal history of objects. Such judgments employ determinate concepts. The doctrine of disinterestedness excludes such judgments from the basis of aesthetic response. If the objects of taste enjoy any finality, it must be somewhat different.

Two sorts of ends are referred to in Section II of the third Moment : objective end and subjective end. An objective end refers to an object represented as possible only on the basis of a certain kind of causal history. Since aesthetic judgment is not determined by causal considerations, the representation of an object as an objective end cannot determine the issue of its beauty. A subjective end is not an object with a certain kind of history, but rather, a certain aim, purpose, or interest that a person may have. Kant denies that the judgment of taste rests on a subjective end. To say that the judgment of taste rests on a subjective end is to say the judgment depends on seeing an object as fulfilling an interest of the person taking pleasure in it. This would be saying something about the causal efficacy or causal future of the object. It is to call it an end because it can satisfy an interest.

Now by denying that objects are judged to be beautiful because of their status as either subjective or objective ends, Kant intends to make a broader claim. But before we go on to state what the claim is, we may note a point of interest. Kant's

idea is that aesthetic judgment must disregard not only the effect of the actual existence of an object on its perceiver or audience, but its causal history in general, including its causal connections to its creator. One's pleasure in a beautiful object cannot be dependent on the perception of it as having been created in the intentional fulfilment of a concept. The role of a concept in its creation is not to be considered in aesthetic judgment of an object. An object of taste does not please as an object fulfilling a certain intention. If Kant's discussion of finality criticizes the assumption that a work's success in fulfilling its maker's intentions for it is itself a ground for aesthetic appreciation, then we have from Kant a criticism of one form of intentionalist fallacy[3].

What was the broader claim that Kant intended to make by denying that aesthetic judgment could be based on either subjective or objective ends? This consists in establishing a sense of "finality" implying no connection with the two kinds of ends. If a judgment of beauty can be determined neither by the agreeableness of an object as a subjective end nor by its perfection as an objective end, then "the delight, which we estimate as universally communicable without a concept, and which constitutes the determining ground of the judgment of taste, can be constituted by nothing other than the subjective finality in the representation of an object without any end (whether objective or subjective), consequently the mere form of fianlity in the

representation through which an object is given to us"[4].

The passage just cited is the source of the famous phrase (in Bernard's translation) "purposiveness without purpose". What is the "form of finality"? The expression "subjective finality" suggests that an object has the form of finality when it stands in a certain relation to a subject who perceives and enjoys it. The concept of subjective finality is established in the first Introduction[5] as well as in the published Introduction[6]. In both the texts, the subjective or formal finality of an object consists in its standing in a certain relation to a subject, namely, that of being able to dispose the imagination and understanding of the subject to their state of free play. The form of purposiveness of an object consists in its tendency to produce the harmony of the faculties. Such a tendency is purposive because the harmony of the faculties itself pleases as an unusual accomplishment of our general cognitive purpose. This means that a beautiful object does not please as a "subjective end" in reference to some specific desire or interest in the subject perceiving it. It pleases in reference to a more general aim on the part of subjects - the aim of cognition itself. It is on such aim Kant's entire theory of aesthetic response depends.

The enterprise of the Analytic of the Beautiful is inspired by the disanalogy emphasized between aesthetic judgment

and the empirical ones. Aesthetic delight does not stand in an ordinary connection to its object. It is, says Kant, linked to an "internal" and an "intrinsic"[7] causality. Our consciousness of pleasure in the beautiful is our sole direct consciousness of the ground of this pleasure. Kant asserts that as in the case of moral judgment the consciousness of the determination of the will and the feeling of pleasure are identical, similarly, in the case of aesthetic judgment, the consciousness of the free play of the faculties just is the consciousness of pleasure. In the case of aesthetic judgment, the recognition of the finality of an object does not require a causal judgment about the relation between pleasure and an end. It is given by the feeling of pleasure itself. Since the harmony of the faculties is the ground of the pleasure in the beautiful, the causality is "internal". Formal or subjective finality of the representation of an object disposes the faculties of imagination and understanding to the state of free play, and is thus internally causal in producing feeling of pleasure. From the Critique of Pure Reason we have learnt that the unification of our manifolds is the general subjective aim in cognition. This may be thought of as a "formal" end, the form of knowledge without its usual matter or content, specific empirical judgments. In the first Critique form is whatever is responsible for the unity of a manifold of perceptions[8]. Space and time are the a priori forms of intuition, and spatial and temporal structure the a priori and formal aspects of objects of experience. The form of appearance is what allows intuitions

to be ordered in cognitive relations. Space and time are such forms. In the case of aesthetic judgment, formal finality is the power of an object, or its representation - to satisfy a formal end or purpose. The formal finality of an object is a sort of causality - the power of an object to satisfy the general aim of cognition apart from any determinate judgment, or to occasion a free play between imagination and understanding.

We may indicate the notion of "intrinsic" causality. Intrinsic causality is the efficacy of the feeling of pleasure itself to produce a tendency toward its own continuation. In Section 12 of the third Critique Kant says that our pleasure in the beautiful resembles pleasure in the agreeable or good in involving "an intrinsic causality, namely, that of preserving the condition of representation itself and the occupation of the cognitive faculties without ulterior aim". This explains why "we dwell on the contemplation of the beautiful"[9].

The ways of Kant's thought are interesting enough. First he defines the notion of end in terms of causality. Objective ends are instances of causality through concepts. Subjective ends are instances of causality of interests. Then there is Kant's denial of causal considerations in aesthetic judgment. Lastly, he proposes the notions of internal and intrinsic causality. Of these two only internal causality is unique to aesthetic

response. Intrinsic causality is simply a general effect of any feeling of pleasure.

The fundamental idea of purposiveness without any concept of a purpose may be appreciated in the following manner. If we look at a flower, say a rose, we may have the feeling that it is, as we say, just right. We may have the feeling that it embodies or fulfils a purpose. At the same time we do not represent to ourselves any purpose which is achieved in the rose. We do not conceive any purpose at all. And yet in some sense we <u>feel</u>, without concepts, that a purpose is embodied in the flower. There is a sense of meaning, but there is no conceptual representation of what is meant. There is awareness or consciousness of finality, but there is no concept of an end which is achieved. The matter is expressed admirably by Richard Eberhart's phrase, the beautiful disrelation of the spiritual"[10].

Several further points may be made about aesthetic response in respect of its proper object. There is Kant's famous distinction between "free" and "dependent" beauty. The distinction is a consequence of his thesis that aesthetic judgment is not determined by the subsumption of its object under a concept. He asserts that "the judgment of taste, which an object is declared beautiful under the condition of a determinate concept, is not pure". Free beauty presupposes no concept of what the object should be. Dependent beauty does presuppose a concept

and the perfection of the object according to it. "Those of the first kind are called (self-subsisting) beauties of this or that object. The others, as dependent on a concept (conditioned beauty) are attributed to objects that are subsumed under the concept of a particular purpose"[11]. The general drift of Kant's meaning is clear enough. Some objects please apart from any concept, whether of a classification they instantiate or a purpose they fulfil. These are the objects which occasion aesthetic response and aesthetic judgment, which is pure "only if the person judging either has no concept of [an object's] purpose, or abstracts from it in his judgment"[12]. Other judgments of approval are judgments of object's compliance with particular concepts. These cannot be pure aesthetic judgments. Kant allows them to be called judgments of dependent beauty. Kant's examples are well-known. All music without words are free beauties. The Sun temple of Konarak would instantiate dependent or adherent beauty.

Dependent beauties may be either natural (e.g., "the beauty of a horse") or man made. In either case they serve a purpose and are judged according to a concept of what a thing should be in order to serve that purpose. These might please because they are judged to have perfections answering to the concepts of such purposes. Free beauties do not mean or represent anything. They do not stand in semantic or symbolic relationships to things outside of themselves. They do not depict or portrary

any content. But is it obvious that to depict or mean something is the same as to serve a purpose? Nor does it follow that if objects which serve purposes (such as Keats' Grecean Urn, the "Silent form" which teased the poet "out of thought") must be excluded from the proper objects of pure judgments of taste. Can works of art with content be never the objects of disinterested aesthetic response? It is one thing to use concepts to interpret the content or meaning of a work, while it is another thing to use concepts for the evaluation of objects subsumed under them. If it is the latter use of concepts that Kant demands to be excluded from aesthetic judgment, then there is hardly any reason to assume that representational art must be the object of less than pure aesthetic judgment.

Again, it seems to possible to argue that Kant equivocates the concept of representations. It is possible to distinguish two concepts of it : (a) to represent an end is to serve that end or instantiate the concept of it. Representation in this case would not be a semantical relation. (b) But to represent "an object under a determinate concept "may have nothing to do with purposes. It might be a case of portraying, depicting or referring to something, as may be done by music with words. Devotional iconolography might both illustrate and serve the purpose of worship. But the matter of representing an end in both function and content is surely contingent, since the two kinds of

representations are distinct. Judging that something illustrates, by its content, some end is quite different from judging it as an object which serves that end. It is only the latter that needs be excluded from our response to beauty. And if our argument has been in the right direction, then we should say that a restriction of pure aesthetic judgment to non representational art does not follow from Kant's theoury of aesthetic judgment.

Further, later on in the third Critique[13] Kant says that "a natural beauty is a beautiful thing, an artistic beauty is a beautiful representation of a thing". This amounts to attributing to fine art an exclusively representational function. In the theory of aesthetic ideas Kant supposes "beauty... in general may be termed the expression of aesthetic ideas. Here is revealed an assumption that the representation of concepts or themes is the characteristic purpose of art. The point is that Kant links beauty and representation very closely indeed, in spite of the examples of abstract art which he himself provides in Section 16. One may even suppose that representation in art is mimesis, yet to find something beautiful is quite different from finding it accurate, illustrative or informative. Heuristic art is frequently aesthetically indifferent. It also shows that successful representation is hardly a sufficient condition of any kind of beauty. Beauty and representation may be compatible but distinct features of a work of art.

A close reading of Section 16 of the third Critique might suggest that judgments of dependent beauty are not aesthetic judgments at all. One could ask if Kant's distinction was intended to be one between two kinds of beauty or between two kinds of judgments. This is a hard question, and no answer would be easy enough. Even H.W. Cassirer did not discuss Section 16 in his Commentary to Kant's Critique of Judgment. Whatever be the case it appears that Kant's distinction does not prepare us for this enlargement of his concept of beauty. Supposing that judgments of dependent beauty are indeed aesthetic judgments, then they are by no means pure ones, because they involve concepts, and these concepts do not determine our approval of their objects. Our delight in the Sun Temple at Konarak is connected with its in the past. But the concept of the purpose does not provide any rules by which the beauty of the building can be mechanically determined. The concept of its purpose may and does impose some constraint on the freedom of the imagination with respect to the appearance of a temple. Yet the imagination is not altogether crippled by this constraint, and pleasure may be produced by its free harmony with the understanding's demand for unity. Kant himself talks about the freedom of the imagination being "restricted"[13]. Now to be "restricted" is not bo be "determined". And if that be so, then our approval of dependent beauties is not fully determined by a concept. It is simply constrained or limited by concepts, or set within boundaries. Though not pure,

judgments of dependent beauties might no less be aesthetic judgments.

Kant has maintained that the freedom of the imagination is the necessary condition of aesthetic response. According to his explanation, aesthetic response is a synthesis of a manifold achieved without the use of any concept. Pleasure in the beautiful is then a response to the manifold presented by an object or its form. Thus it is a response to something which is independent of the imagination. Kant himself has said that "in the apprehension of a given object of sense [the imagination] is found to a determinate form of this object". If the object is to be found beautiful, its form is to be felt as one of the imagination could have designed itself[14]. The issue of the freedom of the imagination hence be stated be as follows. The freedom of the imagination lies in its freedom from constraint by concepts. The harmony of the faculties is to be produced by a manifold which is given to the imagination. It cannot be produced by any concept which is forced on the understanding in connection with the manifold.

Is the freedom of the imagination a negative condition? Or, what is the nature of circumstances under which the freedom of the imagination can actually obtain? Kant mentions abstraction

as a power of the mind by which it can free itself from the constraints of both sensation and concepts. But the mind is not always free to abstract, at least from the concepts which apply to objects. The knowledge that an object is a temple, or a work of art produced according to some intention (Dante for example, says that he wrote the Divine Comedy to lead his readers to the state of blessedness) appears to be such that if simply cannot be abstracted from for the sake of a pure judgment of taste. It may be true, as Crawford[15] suggests, that the distinction between free and dependent beauty depends upon the notion of abstraction. But it is not certainly true that Kant's position is we can abstract from any concept of a purpose determining the form of what we are considering. Rather there is an ambivalence in Kant's position.

It is an open question whether the judgment of art must always be a judgment of dependent beauty. Kant's references to abstraction are so few as to provide an adequate basis for an answer. But we can conjecture one. It is not just concepts of purposes which can constrain the imagination. In fact, any empirical concept can do that. Again, we are rarely given anything approximating pure design or composition. We are generally presented with forms embodied in such material qualities as colours and tones. The nature of sensation and empirical knowledge would preclude our finding many objects beautiful, since these might

constrain the imagination. If Kant does not mean to imply such a conclusion, then he would have to accord extensive power to abstraction to avoid the difficulty. And if the power of abstraction is broad enough, then it would allow free judgments on the beauty of works of art, and even of representational art. One reason for Kant's ignoring such a vital issue is that he addressed himself to constructing a transcendental rather than empirical aesthetic theory. The question whether we can always abstract from certain sorts of concepts is not a transcendental question, but an empirical one. Kant would say that exposition of taste in terms of how things are judged cannot command how they should be judged[17]. However, it remains unexceptional to say that Kant's transcendental theory of taste is hardly sufficient to produce substantive constraints on the proper objects of aesthetic judgment. Without a fuller theory about abstraction from concepts no criterial distinction between objects which must be regarded as free beauties and those which must be seen as dependent beauties can never be hoped for. Kant's search for justificatory criteria oriented toward the objects rather than subjects of taste is less satisfying than his attempt to derive concrete criteria for aesthetic judgment as in the case of his discussion of disinterestedness.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

The major thesis of the Third moment of the Critique of Judgment is the claim that aesthetic response is a response to the form of objects, and thus to an aspect of them. This suggests that any object may be beautiful regardless of what kind of object it is. But some paragraphs of Sections 16 and 17 suggest that certain kinds of natural objects are intrinsically fit to be objects of pure aesthetic judgment, and that certain kinds of man made objects are intrinsically unfit for such a role. We have argued that Kant's aesthetics cannot place a priori limitations on our search for natural or artistic beauty.

1. CJ, VII
2. CJ Section 10
3. The intentionalist fallacy is the view that an author's intentions determine the meaning or interpretation of a work of art, and not its aesthetic merit. William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley, "The Intentionalist Fallacy" in Wimsatt, The Verbal Icon, Louisville, University of Kentucky Press, 1954, p. 3.
4. CJ Section 11
5. FI, VII.
6. CJ, VII.

7. CJ Section 12.

8. CPR, A20-21/B35.

9. CJ Section 12.

10. Richard Eberhart, "Virginia" in Oscar Williams, The Pocket Book of Modern Verse, New York, 1954, p. 459.

11. CJ Section 16.

12. CJ Section 16

13. CJ Section 16

14. CJ Section 22.

15. D.W. Crawford, Kant's Aesthetic Theory, Wisconsin, 1974.

16. CJ Section 15.

17. CJ Section 29.

PART II

CHAPTER IX

The Indian Concept of Disinterestedness

While tracing the historical background of Kant's aesthetics (in Part I, Chapter I) we had occasion to notice that the concept of disinterestedness was intended to be used with a moral concern. The conceptual passage to disinterestedness was marked by a transformation of private interest into public interest. It was at Kant's hands that the concept underwent a metamorphosis and acquired the aesthetic dimension. Whether a similar phenomenon can be noticed in the Indian tradition remains to be ascertained.

It is not easy to find a notion in Sanskrit equivalent to Kant's "disinterestedness". Whatever terms are there, they are primarily ontological, i.e., are descriptive of an ethical achievement on the part of the human self. Terms like anāsakti, nirmamatva, etc., indicate states of the self, or its attainment of a poise. These terms imply a non-egoistical mode of being. According to the tradition, a non-egoistic mode of being is at once moral and aesthetic. It is moral because by attaining to such a mode of being the self transcends its privations and becomes capable of participating in the affairs of the world spontaneously.

It is aesthetic since in such a poise the self enjoys a freedom which is blissful. The good and the beautiful, Subha and Sobhana are complicative notions. There is some truth in the relationship. In Kant the good and the beautiful stand in a symbolic relationship, the beautiful is the symbol of the good[1]. We shall cite two instances to indicate the closer connection between the aesthetic and the moral in the Indian tradition. The Samyutta Nikāya narrates that once Ānanda had remarked that only the half the holy life had to do with lovely. The Buddha said, "Say not so, Ananda, it is the whole, not the half of the holy life"[2]. In the present century Rabindranath Tagore has written persuasively enough : "Beauty is good in its fullness as fullness of Beauty is Good incarnate"[3]. It may be mentioned that the Greeks had a univocal term Kalos for both the good and the beautiful[4].

In the Indian tradition disinterestedness is a property of a self, which is creative either morally or aesthetically, and a quality of a class of judgment. When Kant says that the judgments of taste are aesthetic, that is, they relate to the subject, and if disinterestedness is a quality of such judgments, then it becomes possible to say that the judging subject enjoys itself in its disinterestedness. Even though there is great insight in Kant's ideas, yet it should be borne in mind that "subject" is an epistemological notion, while "the self", which dominates all Indian discussions of the matter, ancient or modern,

if frankly ontological. It is arguable that if the self abides in a disinterested mode of being it can freely enter into a relation of empathy with its other, and hence universalizability in the moral and communication in the aesthetic domains become possible. A bodhisattva's is a disinterested awareness, he can feel the joys and sorrows of others as if they were his own. And interestingly enough, the grades of his consciousness, such as vimalā, prabhākarī or arcismatī, etc. are aesthetic paradigms. A bodhisattva is disinterested in the sense of a mukta, a departicularized consciousness which can freely relate itself with everything as though the barriers between itself and its others had fallen away. Such a mode of being, according to the tradition in India, is the prerequisite of both morality and art. Keats wrote in one of his letters : "If a sparrow came before my window, I take part in its existence and pick about the gravel". In a disinterested or mukta mode of consciousness there is a deliberate suspension of individuality, an utter submission to the real, a complete absorption in the object as it is, so as to breathe its life and enjoy its form.

The theory of perception employed in the Critique of Pure Reason distinguishes form and matter. In the opening paragraphs of the first Critique's Transcendental Aesthetic Kant breaks up appearance into formal and material constituents. Pure representations contain nothing belonging to sensation. The appearance which corresponds to sensation is matter, and

form is whatever is responsible for the unity of a manifold of perceptions. The matter of appearance is given by sensation, its form lies ready for the sensations a priori in the mind. This leads to a doctrine of abstraction according to which the formal aspects of the representation of objects can be separated from the matter of sensation. The above theory of perception is presupposed in Kant's aesthetic theory. His notion of the "form of finality" is the aesthetic analogue of the epistemological notion of the form of appearance. We have already dwelt on Kant's thesis that consciousness of disinterestedness is indifferent to existence as well as concepts. A development of this thesis is to be found in Croce's notion of intuition as preconceptual.

The non-conceptual nature of disinterested consciousness is an interesting affair. The Buddhist theory of perception emphasizes a mode of awareness which is non-conceptual, and hence non-judgmental. It is an apprehension of the real, as it is (yathābhūta), without involving concepts, and therefore does not hazard an inference. Buddhists argue that to classify or to subsume the given real under concepts is to get involved in an inferential process. It implies that one goes beyond the the primary datum of experience. Technically it is called nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. The point now is that if disinterested consciousness is an awareness only of the formal aspects of objects such that delight could be taken in them, then there may be a conceptual link between Kant's notion of disinterestedness

in aesthetics and the Buddhist theory of pratyaksa as Kalpanāpodham[5] Kalpanā is the activity of thought by which a name is given to the object. The real with which we come into contact is inexpressible, and what we express has concepts for its province. The given is the unique, the known is the typical. The object of perception is like itself, Svalaksana. It may be thought that in the disinterested mode of consciousness the real is not twisted out of its shape to make it into an object of knowledge. Kant appears to deny the possibility of nirvikalpaka pratyaksa, since he says that perceptions without concepts are blind, and concepts without perceptions are empty. But the Prolegomena[6] distinguishes judgments of perception and judgments of experience. The third Critique's notion of disinterestedness, indifferent as it is to concepts, may plausibly be looked upon as intended to establish the aesthetic svalaksana as its proper object[7]. Our contention is not altogether unwarranted. Carritt's perceptive remark is worth citing in this context. "Kant continually seems be striving, but from which he always recoils, the aesthetic activity is the intuition of an individual as it is in itself, transcending or escaping the concepts both of science and of historical existence, and further this individual is in the last resort a state of our own mind"[8].

The problem of aesthetics in India has mostly been conceived of as a problem of meaning. There has been a search for meanings beyond individual words and beyond grammatical

forms, meanings that are miraculously revealed in great literature. It is argued that disinterested consciousness, bhagnā varanā cit, reveals fleshes of insight beyond meanings already stabilized in etymology and grammar. One of the chief offices of poetry is to be engaged in finding linguistic expressions for meanings as yet unexpressed. Interestingly enough, Kant has a view of poetry which is akin to the concept of poetry mentioned above. In Section 53 of the Critique of Judgment Kant writes that poetry "expands the mind by setting the imagination at liberty" and offers "a wealth and thought to which no verbal expression is completely adequate", and thereby it rises "aesthetically to ideas". Poetry, for Kant, is "a sort of schema for the supersensible", it considers and judges nature "as a phenomenon in accordance with aspects which it does not present in experience either for sense or understanding". This idea of poetry is based on Kant's theory of aesthetical idea. An idea, according to Kant, is a representation referred to an object. These are principles of such reference. But no object is ever adequate to the idea. If an idea is referred to an intuition according to the principle of the harmony of the cognitive powers, the idea is aesthetical, since the principle is subjective. As Kant says, "An aesthetical idea cannot become a cognition because it is an intuition (of the imagination) for which an adequate concept can never be found"[9]. Such ideas are "inexpenible representation of the imagination", that is they cannot be reduced to concepts.

We may now turn the concept of poetry as Vyāngya or dhvani, which we have said to have a striking resemblance to Kant's idea of poetry. Meaning in poetry is said to be two-fold, direct and oblique. It is said that the two meanings are though often interrelated, yet the direct meaning is subordinated to the oblique. The former suggests and reinforces the latter. The oblique meaning is the soul of poetry, it informs the words and sentences that constitutes its body.

Let us see how this position is established. Ānandavardhana says that words have a fixed meaning attached to them. It is this meaning which is employed in the transactions of history, science and philosophy, in the daily life as well. The scientist or the historian of the philosopher or the man in the street wants to express or prove something. But beyond this his words do not express any personal connotation. The artist who always expresses a personal view of things has to impact his own meanings into words. To do this he must take note of the convention. The greatest poet is the greatest servant of the language, said T. S. Eliot. He merely transforms the given reality, linguistic, factual or historical. Shakespeare's Antony and Cleopatra is based on history, but it is original by virtue of the new meaning read into the common materials. The image of the flame is invoked by writers of Sanskrit poetics. It will help to elucidate the relation that poetry has to life. If a lamp is lighted in a dark

room it not only discovers itself but helps us to see everything else that is inside the room. Similarly the olique meaning which is the soul of poetry. If we read Antony and Cleopatra, we appreciate the Antony and Cleopatra in the drama. This appreciation also knits us to life, because we get a portraiture of the emotional and moral problems that assail us.

How is it that we are affected by the emotions and moral problems of the Antony and the Cleopatra in Shakespeare's drama? Surely something is projected beyond them, something which was in Shakespeare and our appreciation. All these combine to evoke a meaning that is much beyond the individual characters. It is this total meaning in which all may have share which is the source of beauty or rasa.

It is of course easier to say what rasa is not. It is not like anything in real life, it is in this sense un-earthly, alaukika. Aesthetic emotions are not subject to change, it is said, they are stable. The Rāma of the Rāmāyana is indifferent to existence, has nothing to do with the Rāma of real life. The emotions they evoke are different. The nightingale Keats has celebrated in his Ode was 'mmortal', "was not born for death". That is the reason why rasa is said to be enjoyed, relished or tasted than produced or created. To aesthetic emotion nothing in

real life can be likened. The only ground for accepting it is that it is experienced. And so, art does not lead to any action. Art is pure enjoyment or contemplation. As Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya has put the matter, a tragedy may be heart-rending, but it does not break our hearts. We do not weep over rather commemorate a tragic incident. According to the Indian tradition, the impersonality of art is the central thing in it. The first act of Kalidāsa's Sakuntalā describes a deer flying for life. The beauty of description is, indeed, derived from the representation of fear, but whose fear? One might ask. If it is only the alarm of the deer, we should have nothing to do with it. If the fear is ours, of the poet and his readers, we should run away like the deer or at least feel perplexed and should experience an incipient impulse to flight. But we have no such tremour the feeling of fear depicted in the scene is impersonal fear. We are with the deer and yet away from it. This is the miracle of emotions in art.

However, to say that aesthetic emotions are sui generis is not to mean that it is unrelated to life. They are the same emotions that we feel in real life and that is one of the links binding art to life, only they suffer a change as they pass through the transforming process of art. Works of art may be said to schematize, as it were, aesthetic feelings, which inheres in such works and is independent of them.

The connection between rasa and oblique meaning may now be indicated. The Mahābhārata narrates many mighty incidents, but its total meaning is vairāgya or renunciation. So says Abhinavagupta[10]. But what does this mean? It means that if such be the meaning of poetry, then whatever goes to constitute the body of poetry such as plot or character or technique, etc., can have no finality of their own. They are significant if so far as they serve to realize the intended rasa. When the rasa is realized, it is enjoyed equally by the poet and the reader, that is to say, it is partly independent of the former. Often the intended meaning is different from the meaning conveyed. The emotion embodied in poetry is not the poet's personal emotion. The poet may feel the emotion or idea deeply enough, but he needs a detachment to compose poetry. Poetry is not letting loose of emotion, but as Eliot has suggested, it is an escape from personality. It is only an emotion which transcends the limitations of a personal 'affect' so that it can be enjoyed as an aesthetic state. That is why the oblique meaning of a passage can have an existence independent of the one intended by the speaker. The poet half discovers and half creates his meanings.

How are the direct and the oblique meanings related? This issue, in a way, touches on Kant's distinction between free (or pure) and adherent beauty. Are they related as the effect on the cause, or as ends on means? Does direct meaning have a regulating effect on the poem? If so, then rasa can not be as

alaukīka as it is claimed to be. It may be noted that Ānandavardhana lays greater emphasis on the link with the direct meaning and Abhinavagupta on the alienness of obliquity. In this respect Kant's notion of free beauty resembles Abhinavagupta's accent on the alaukikatva of rasa.

One may even ask whether the distinction between pure and adherent beauty exists at all. In Section 48 of the third Critique, Kant says that in calling a woman beautiful we simply mean that nature represents in her form the purposes of a woman's form. We do not know the purposes of nature in human form. If, as Kant appears to think, female beauty were to be classed rather with animals and churches, yet we cannot say that in any of these beauty is proportionate to the fulfilment of purposes, unless among those purposes we include beauty. Are we not to distinguish between the 'beauty' of mother figurines such as the Venus of Laussel[11] and that of Botticelli's Venus? We are to, and we do. Why? Because beauty and perfection is so intimate at times that the value of the one may depend in part on the value of the other. One need not always be asking what the picture is 'of', or what the poem is 'about', and getting in reply words which express concepts. Such a notion of expression in art would be lamentably prosaic. In point of fact, every work of art creates the concept or standard by which, if by any, it must be judged.

"The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven
And imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name"[12].

Morris Weitz[13] has argued that theories in matters of art are doomed to failure. Aestheties teaches us what to look for and how to look at it in art. Likewise, with regard to the relationship of direct meaning to the oblique, we may say that the one is separable from the other, neither is directly meaning completely submerged in what it projects, it may continue to be appreciated along with the oblique meaning. Their relation may be appropriately likened to the grace or loveliness proceeding from woman's beautiful features. The nameless grace is not disembodied, it is not only to be relished but also to be valued.

It will have been noticed that disinterestedness and impersonality are bound together by a conceptual link. Indeed, they are modes of the spirit in man, its autonomy and independence. And that is why rasa has time and again, been described in such terms of spiritual release as Svaprakāsanandacinmaya or bhagnāvarana cideva rasah. The concept of meaning as Vācya demarcates the domains of theory and practice, but meaning as pratīyamāna or vyānga is boundless, niravadhirvyānga arthah.

Correspondingly, the self in its poise of disinterestedness or impersonality is in a state of release from the confine and demands of objective knowledge and utility. It is not for nothing that Tagore held that literature is a continual commentary on the Upanisadic text, rasovaisah[13].

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. CJ, Section 59.

2. Quoted in P. Roy, Notes Towards Understanding the Problem of Buddhist Art and Tibetan Religious Paintings, Centre for Himalayan Studies, Special Lecture V, University of North Bengal, 1984.

3. Rabindranath Tagore On Art and Aesthetics, ed. P. Neogy, Orient Longmans, New Delhi, 1961, p. 5.

4. Classical Dictionary, p. 295, Everyman's Library, London, 1934.

5. Vinītadeva's Nyāyabindu-tīkā, tr. M. Gangopadhyaya, Indian Studies, Calcutta, 1971, p. 7. Kalpanā Viyuklām.

6. Part Two, 297-298, p. 45 of L.W. Beck's edition, The Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1950.

7. Bauddha-tarka-bhāsā says that perception is that which reveals the nature of the object of perception; artha-Svarūpa-saksātkāri hi jnānam pratyaksam iti. Kalpanā is said to arise from vāsanā of desire hence it is interested, that is, it seeks satisfaction in its object. Disinterestedness can be a mark of aesthetic perception when it is not so conditioned.

8. E.F. Carrit, The Theory of Beauty, Methuen & Co. London, 1948, p. 106.

9. CJ, Section 57.

10. Commentary, Locana, on Dhvanyāloka, 5 Udyota 4, Vairāgya janana tātparyam.

11. Landmarks of the World's Art : Prehistoric and Primitive Man, Paul Hamlyn, London. Ed. Andreas Lommel, p. 35, illustration 14, The Venus of Laussel (C 15,000-10,000 B.C.) is a female nude. The distended flesh and pendulous breasts represent a generalised type of childbearing woman, and stress fertility.

12. A Midsummer Night's Dream, Act V Scene I.

13. "Saundaryabodh" in Sāhitya. Visva-Bharati, Calcutta. Since for Tagore the aesthetic and the spiritual are congruent domains, he invokes the same Upanisadic text in connection with the nature of consciousness attaining cosmic dimension. See "Visvabodh" in Sāntiniketan.

CHAPTER X

The Concept of Disinterestedness in Recent Indian Thought I

In the foregone Chapter we tried to look for a concept of disinterestedness within the Indian tradition. We found that disinterestedness has been understood or conceived of in terms of impersonality, non-attachment or non-egoity. These are all poises of the self, achievements of spiritual nature, and essentially liberating states of experience. It is also noticed, in endorsement of Hiriyanna's observation, that philosophical thinking has moulded the theory, if not the practice, of art in India. But it must not be surmised that aesthetics has been a hand-maiden of philosophy, it has worked independently. What is interesting is that both aesthetics and philosophy (by which we mean darsana proper) had a shared vision of the human enterprise : to attain detachment from the lure of the sensuous, to rise over gratification as well as nausea or boredom. A serene and disinterested contemplation of the facts of life has been held to be the end of art experience, Poetry, said Robert Frost, is 'momentary stay against confusion'. The idea has been familiar one in India. A part of the meaning of 'disinterestedness' in Kant is indifference to existence. Bhatta-Tauta makes it clear that there is no real existence of sense objects at all in art;

Visayābhāvato nātra rāgasyābhyasagādatā ! Prajnākaragupta, commenting on a passage in Dharmakīrti's Pramānavārtika asks the connoiseur to be an onlooker instead of an involved participant; tatasthatvena vedyate tatvenāvedanam bhavet[2].

We had occasion to observe that in Kant's case disinterestedness was used as referring to judgment, while in India, the aesthetic experience[3] has been held, since Abhinavagupta, to be something immediate, not indirect[4]. It is produced by art, and it is detached, pure, not involved, does not arouse our everyday concerns but takes us away from them. It is universal or completely objective, marked by universalization or transcendence of particularity.

In the present Chapter I shall be concerned with the ideas of aesthetics and art in recent Indian Thought. The story of recent Indian thought is a fascinating one. It is a narrative of cultural adjustment and assimilation in a creative way. Our thinkers have moved back and forth between antiquity and modernity. This movement is valuable for our cultural identity, and hence deserves a closer study.

Rabindranath Tagore is a renaissance figure in recent Indian thought. His phenomenal creativity needs no mention. His thoughts on art and aesthetics as well as his philosophical

ideas are no less interesting for their fertility and modernisation of the tradition. Sri Aurobindo has been acclaimed as an original thinker, and his views on language derive their viability from his general position concerning the evolution of human consciousness. Art and more specifically the language of poetry, for Sri Aurobindo, are on the ontological ladder, and hence occupy a position of immense significance for man's spiritual destiny. Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's essay "The Concept of Rasa" is at once a continuation and modification of the thesis of poetry as dhvani. And the position held in the essay presupposes Bhattacharyya's concept of subjectivity. He may be taken to have argued for marking the aesthetic experience off on the basis of the notion of spiritual subjectivity. Aesthetic experience is freedom through feeling distanced away from its object. In point of fact, Bhattacharyya's "The concept of Rasa" is a valued contribution to the body of scholarship on the literature rasa. We propose, in this and the following Chapters to see how Tagore, Sri Aurobindo and Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya have formulated the notion of disinterestedness, and how far their ideas serve to bridge up the philosophical cultures of the East and the West.

Rabindranath Tagore

Speaking from the point of view of the history of aesthetic thought in India, there converge in Tagore two distinct notions

of art experience. The position of Abhinavagupta is well known. He stressed the point of universalization or transcendence of particularity. The individual, in course of aesthetic experience, forgets himself and thereby attains the highest happiness. The essence of rasa is that it is tasted, does not go beyond tasting. This line of thinking is there in Tagore, but with a difference, the polarity of I and Thou perhaps never gets lost, as it seems to be the case with Abhinavagupta. After him, the theory of Bhoj is the most important contribution to aesthetics providing an experimential basis to the discipline. Instead of universalization, Bhoj maintains that the highest aesthetic experience is a supreme form of self-assertion, ahamkāra[5]. This might be described as self-realization, the fullest development of the individual instead of his absorption into the universal. The opposition between Bhoj's and Abhinavagupta's theories depends on a metaphysical question of the nature of the self in relation to which the aesthetic experience, assertion or transcendence would take place. It may now be remarked that a dialetic of transcendence and ascertion, the surplus in man and personality keep alternating in Tagore's theory of art. His concept of 'the surplus in man's characterized by transcendence, while the idea of 'personality' is marked by assertion of the creative self. Borrowing Tagore's own phrase, we could say that a 'creative unity' of the two notions characterizes his philosophical thinking. In support of the contention we may provide a definitive statement : Personhood (aham) is man's most valued dimension

of his being. The fact that man is a unique centre of consciousness, irreducibly apart from everything that he is conscious of, is what constitutes man's ontological freedom in a negative manner. Creativity transforms the alienation into a harmony (Sāmanjasya) with the Universe. The transcendence, which for Tagore is the essence of the spiritual (ādhyātmika), does not nullify the uniqueness of the self, rather enriches it by a greater comprehensive awareness. Tagore calls it Visvabodha, which is at once ethical and aesthetic. In numerous passages of the Sāntiniketan series of essays Tagore has expounded the dialectics of transcendence and assertion. "The I am in me realizes its own extension, its own infinity whenever it truly realizes something else .... That fact that we exist has its truth in the fact that everything else does exist, and the "I am" in me crosses its finitude whenever it deeply realizes itself in the "Thou art". This crossing of the limit produces joy, the joy that we have in beauty, in love, in greatness"[6]. What is of value in a work of art is the 'realizing'. This is true of art as of life, where and when it is truly creative.

The harmony of the within and the without is creativity, and this is possible only if the self assumes or achieves a disinterested stance. How this takes place may be understood when we consider Tagore's concept of men as an 'angel of surplus'. The surplus in man can be interpreted as a distinct plane of human existence. It is free from the pressure of biological

impulses, and the propensity to apply moral categories. In contrast to such planes as the biological and the moral, which are strictly speaking planes of action, the surplus in men is primarily contemplative or visionary. At other levels of consciousness man is highly pragmatical, and governed by the principles of expediency and utility. Tagore believes that by actively modulating his relationships with the world man can advance from quantity to quality, from fact, to truth, from necessity to choice, from utility to self expression. All human creativity has its source in the surplus.

Tagore conceives of art as an encounter of the self with its other. Art is a bridge across the chasm which alienates the individual from the world around. Now if art is a process of delineation, then the intentionality of human consciousness maps onto a non-solipsistic world. The world as revealed to the aesthetic consciousness in man's true world. Tagore distinguishes between experience as such and one's own consciounsess of experience. The consciousness of experience is a reflective order of awareness which may integrate the emotions that are often at variance with each other. What Kant called 'a many coloured and diverse a self'[7] is no self at all. Selfhood is "a self-conscious principle of transcendental unity"[8]. Selfhood is an achievement, a creative unity, and this is what makes man a person. The act of integrating the emotions occurs at a higher level of consciousness, one might almost say that Tagore is talking about a suspension

of the natural standpoint in order to arrive at selfhood or personality. And we may add that Tagore's notion of disinterestedness arises from the possible experience of suspending the natural standpoint with regard to our ordinary emotions.

For Tagore, emotions are the principle means of man's unification and harmonization with the world. They have a referential or semantic function. They may unite us with the world, they may also alienate us from it or from one or more of its objects. That is, there are positive as well as negative emotions. Through the positive one, Tagore tells us, the world becomes a part of our personality. If this world were taken away, he continues, our personality would lose all its content. It is notable that all emotions, positive as well as negative enjoy a similar status, because the reflective level of awareness is disinterested. It may be the case that Tagore sets a higher value on the unificatory function of the emotions than on their alienating function. Yet the point is, that the emotions, positive and negative, are just 'entertained' at the reflective level, and this could make us realize the world as more fully and richly real than normal experience.

There is a good deal in the account above that should recall rasavāda of Abhinashgupta. There is of course a difference. The case of tasting one's state of consciousness charged with delight is not denied by Tagore, but this delight is delight in

self-expression, and expression for Tagore is always communicative. A clarification of self-consciousness is simultaneous with a deepening of world-consciousness. Hence the so-called indifference to existence as one comes across in Kant's notion of disinterestedness is not much there in Tagore. 'The consciousness of the real within me seeks for its own corroboration the touch of the Real outside me. When it fails the self in me is depressed'[9]. This is something like insisting on outer criteria for inner processes. We may support our interpretation by referring to a remarkable passage[10] where Tagore raises the issue concerning the mode of existence of a work of art. He asks on what does rasa or aesthetic experience depend in order to attain its perfection. He mentions a three-fold locus of a work of art, say a poem. First, there is the body of the poem made up of the laws of prosody and words. Secondly, there is the cognitive dimension of a poem. Great literature has something in it which satisfies our thinking and awareness of the way facts stand to one another. No distortion of truth can give us a deeper and permanent satisfaction. Lastly, there is the locus of emotions or feelings (bhāva). Our encounter with departicularized feelings gives us delight. A worthy work of art satisfies our intellect our hearts and our entire human nature. Anything short of this distorts the experience by making it a matter of the surface alone. Tagore says that the aesthetic experience, just as our moral life, should be, regulatively guided by the three values[11] of hrī (modesty), dhī (intellection) and srī (beautitude) corresponding to the three levels on which

w work of art of permanent significance survives. The three values are of ancient coinage. Hrī is mentioned in Buddhist ethics as hiri in Pali; dhī is Vedic in its association with Savitā, the principle of intellectual and spiritual illumination; while Sri connotes not only beauty but also goodness. What Tagore speaks of as the perfection of the aesthetic experience in terms of the three strata existence of a work of art has a good deal in common with Kant's notion of the satisfaction[12] of the powers of the mind - the cognitive faculty, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire. It is quite clear that Tagore's demands are exacting ones, since for him the perfection of the aesthetic experience cannot remain impervious to theoretical and practical dimensions of human awareness. It is no less important to note that Tagore, even though he is a protagonist of the autonomy of art, glides into the view, which another Kantian, Friedrich Schiller had called, art for life's sake.

The import of Tagore's idea of perfection of the aesthetic experience is disinterestedness. In its absence, the aesthetic experience would degenerate into sentimentalism, a distortion of rasa. Tagore does not look upon the aesthetic experience as anything other than the spiritual, or deepening of the consciousness, and he images the artist as an ascetic[13], who is not uninterested with anything around him, but disinterested, that is in harmony with his within and without. 'Harmony' is Tagore's

word for freedom. It is freedom from a habitual mode of reaction or sentimentalism. Beauty, he says, brings our instinctive urges under control, and thereby liberates us. It is, for Tagore, is revelatory in nature. Significantly enough Tagore states his definition of beauty in connection with relating his religious experience[14]. It is marked by an "expansion of consciousness" when the "screen of the commonplace" is lifted from the face of things, and thus their "ultimate significance" is intensely realized. To discover beauty is to receive "a direct message of spiritual reality".

As Tagore wants us to understand, disinterestedness is not impersonality, for it is the 'personal man' who is the artist, because he is capable of disinterestedness. Science is the domain where impersonality is the king. Science deals in abstractions, and emotions, 'the elements of personality' are carefully removed from its world. Facts, clarity and truth-value govern this area of human enterprise. To know about a rose, is different from what one <u>feels</u> about it. When a rose is touched by our emotions, it is not only itself, "but ourselves also"[15]. By "feeling it, we feel ourselves". It is the "taste-value"[16] of a rose that matters in art. Kant's point about the indifference to concepts is there in Tagore as well. He says, "We <u>know</u> a thing because it belongs to itself". The function of art, then, is to find out the uni ue in terms of human imagery, to evoke in our mind the deep sense of reality. 'Reality' in Tagore's usage is what Kant

would call 'aesthetic' i.e. related to the subject, Hence Tagore's distinction between facts and reality is significant. Facts are impersonal, while "Reality is human"[17]. A botanist's rose is not that through which one might express one's love. It needs to be "touched" as Tagore has put it, by one's emotions to become a reality[18].

Now it is in respect of our emotional life that disinterestedness is invoked by Tagore. The role of disinterestedness in our moral life is widely spoken. We may take the Buddhist notion of upekkhā as an example. Upekkhā or equaminity is said to be a blessed disposition. In the context of Buddhism, it is never understood as a state of total insensitivity to values and persons. It is taken as connoting a balance of mind marked by a beyondness with regard to uncertainties and struggles of ordinary life. Upekkhā is a sort of analysis of the self by the self. As freedom from self-confinement, upekkhā results in clarity, translucency and universality. It overcomes all sense of separateness and in closedness, and results in the quality of interconnectedness and the ability to join with others by overcoming all sense of separateness either in time or space. Tagore's idea of good life incorporates much of the Buddhist notion of upekkhā, and it may be noted that his own interpretation[19] of the message of the Buddha emphasizes the positive teachings such as the notion of metta or loving-kindness.

What does disinterestedness have to do with the aesthetic attidue? For Tagore the domains of the aesthetic and the moral are not sharply distinguished, and in either case an overviewing of our natural feelings and will are required in order to achieve creative unity or harmony. Union or harmony is a value of Reality, and is the principle of creativity. An overview of our natural feelings and will is possible only, if we are capable of taking a 'distant view' of things, as Hume[20] called it. A 'distant' view is a disinterested view. As Tagore has suggested we touch Reality by actively or creatively modulating our relationship with the world, and thus we undergo a 'Second birth'[21] into 'the extra-natural world'[22]. Tagore's point is that a disinterested state of mind along is capable of bringing our freedom of will in harmony with the freedom of other wills, 'the rhythm of wills'. Now the case with the aesthetic attitude is different, the spiritual process undergone in our moral and aesthetic lives is the same, a self-exceeding, transitively reaching onto the other. The problem of art, as Tagore argues, is not creation of beauty, but self-expression[23] so as to touch other selves. Art is essentially communicative. An illumination of our feelings, an expansion of consciousness mark as well the twin domains of the spirit, that of goodness and beauty.

The overviewing of our emotions is disinterestedness, and in this imagination comes to our aid. This point may be appreciated

if we bear in our mind that there is a centrality of emotions and the imagination in Tagore's philosophical ideas. The role of imagination in Tagore's thought is as important and crucial as it is in Kant. For Kant, inspite of his reason oriented apparatus such as the understanding or the law, a priori principles, etc., imagination has remained inescapable all through his Critiques. In the first Critique, the imagination is said to be a mysterious power of nature at work with the understanding. Without it schematism cannot take place. In the second Critique the notion of the Kingdom of ends is the gift of the imagination. In the third it is the free play of the imagination and the understanding - the harmony of the two cognitive faculties is the delight we take in the beautiful. What is significant is that Kant, in the third Critique, refers to the imagination as one of the cognitive faculties, the other being the understanding.

There is a respectable tradition in Philosophy which does not shy away in according place of importance to imagination. Plato's such dialogues as the Ion, the Apology, and the Meno hint at a faculty in men which cannot be reduced to rule and measure, something that could be called inspiration, imagination or even aspiration. Even A.N. Whitehead in his Process and Reality, has spoken of 'imaginative generalization'.

Tagore looks upon the imagination as belonging to the core of human awareness. It appears to be almost identical with what

Tagore has elsewhere called the surplus in man. Its import is ontological, or, as Professor B.K. Matilal has remarked, imagination or surplus is the ontology of human hopes and values. Imagination is a projective functions of the mind, and is the source of the 'might be's and 'might have been's, 'ought's and 'should be's. It is the zone of freedom over and above the logical understanding. It should be understood that, for Tagore, the imagination is not fancy, rather it is a state of consciousness as Sartre[24] has argued : an imaginative consciousness is a consciousness of an object as an image and not consciousness of an image. A non-imagining consciousness the understanding, 'engulfed in the existent', while imaginative consciousness entertains the possibles. Hence Tagore reminds us that in order to understand man as a creative being, we "must realize not only the reasoning mind, but also the creative imagination"[25].

We may now suggest that but for the imagination disinterestedness is possible. What Hume had called the 'distant view of things' can have its source in our passional life, but modulated by the imagination. As a principle of synthesis, as in Kant, the imagination relates the data of the senses to the possible. Whatever cannot be Schematized, be it an idea of Reason or an idea of the imagination, has to be 'symbolically' apprehended. The symbolic, says Kant, is a form of intuiting[26]. Such imaginative apperception can only be disinterested, since it is free from the exigencies of the biological, the merely practical, and the 'tyranny of facts'.

Even if we take Kant's notion of disinterestedness as indifference to concepts and existence, it follows that disinterestedness is an imaginative mode of considering possibilities. There is a conceptual link between being interested and being determined by, what Sartre has called, 'existents'. So the surplus or the imaginative mode of being is freedom, Negatively, it is freedom from habit, from taking facts for truth, from expediency and the naturalistic ways of thinking. Postively, or rather creatively speaking, freedom, in terms of imagination, is "the atmosphere of the infinite", which "emancipates our consciousness from the bond of separateness of self". The religion of Man is no less the religion of an artist.

Now Tagore's is a process anthropology. It spells out gradual unfolding of consciousness, level after level, anke anke caitānyer prakāsher pālā [27]. Through a disinterested imaginative mode of awareness man engages himself in an adventure of discovering his "own far-off ineffable image". So 'man' is a horizon concept just as 'the infinite' is. Art, simultaneously with religion and morality, is a matter of aspiration, an intense emotional drive towards the ideal of perfection. The spiritual unity of life and aspiration, the dialectic of the finite and the infinite, according to Tagore, is what characterizes man's civilization. There is a sense in which the concept of man is subsumed under the concept of man in the context of Tagore's philosophical ideas. In another sense, there is no philosophy of art at all in Tagore except an account of man's creative,

spiritual ontology[28]. Therefore what man does elsewhere is no less creative than what he does in art. And everywhere disinterestedness, for Tagore, is a necessary condition for creativity. Disinterested is "freedom of consciousness".

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Kāvyaprakāsa, ed. S.P. Bhattacharya, Calcutta, 1959, p. 9.
2. Op. cit., p. 330.
3. A fairly precise equivalent for rasa is 'aesthetic experience', See R. Gnoli, The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta, Rome, 1956.
4. Warder, A.K., The Science of Criticism in India, The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, 1978.
5. Raghavan, V., Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāsa, Madras, 1963.
6. Tagore, R., On Art & Aesthetics, ed. P. Neogy, Orient Longmans, New Delhi, 1961, p. 47.
7. CPR, B 134
8. Tagore R., The Religion of Man, Unwin Books, London, 1970, p. 75. (henceforth RM).
9. Ibid., p. 82.
10. These values are incorporated in the Candī. Hrī occurs as vījamantra, and mentioned as lajjā, dhī as buddhi, and Srī has an equivalent in Kānti.
11. First Introduction, XI.
12. RM, Chapter VI, p. 58.
13. Tagore, R., Personality, Macmillan, London, 1965, p. 16. (henceforth P).
14. Ibid., p. 20.
15. RM, p. 84.

16. P, p. 16.

17. A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford, BK III, p. 583.

18. P, p. 81.

19. Ibid., p. 19.

20. RM, p. 15.

21. CJ, Section 59.

22. Punascha, No. 5.

23. It may sound startling, but in nonetheless true.

CHAPTER XI

The Concept of Disinterestedness In Recent Indian Thought II

In the present and the following Chapters we shall continue our inquiry into the concept of disinterestedness in recent Indian thought. We shall consider two thinkers, Sri Aurobindo and Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya. In this cahpter we take up Sri Aurobindo.

Sri Aurobindo

Sri Aurobindo is a personality of diverse dimensions, a propounder of an original integral metaphysics, an innovator of a new genre of poetry, a literary critic of unexcelled insights, and as is well known, a yogi. But Sri Aurobindo, inspite of everything, always considered himself as a poet. Commenting on Sri Aurobindo's political career, Tilak had said that his was "the politics of yoga". We may adapt Tilak's adage, and say that Sri Aurobindo's aesthetics is the aesthetics of yoga.

Yoga, for Sri Aurobindo, is ascension of consciousness to higher and more integral levels. In the evolutionary adventure of consciousness, to be more evolved is to be more consciousness. Sri Aurobindo's has been a metaphysics of consciousness in ascent. And he places art on the ontological ladder.

Sri Aurobindo's contribution to philosophy of art consists in the following directions : (a) an interpretation of Aristotle's notion of Katharsis in terms of the concept of Cittasuddhi; (b) reinstating the Vedic concept of the poet as a seer; (c) formulating the concept of the poet as a seer; (d) formulating the concept of poetry as mantra; and finally, indicating that the high office of art consists in purifying the natural emotions by beauty. We shall begin by considering Sri Aurobindo's interpretation of the notion of Katharsis as Cittasuddhi.

The notion of Katharsis occurs in Aristotle's definition of tragedy in the Poetics[1]. The first point to note is that with the notion of Katharsis Aristotle could be taken as throwing out an answer to Plato's argument that poetry inflames the passions[2]. In the Politics[3], Aristotle has dealt more elaborately on Katharsis in connction with the benefit of music in working off emotional frenzy. Katharsis has been variously interpreted, as a Hippocratic metaphor, as a religious, and even a moral metaphor. The metaphor, whatever interpretation one may be inclined to endorse, always suggests the purgation or expulsion of something harmful. In the context of art-experience it implies the purification or aesthetic depersonalization of our usually selfish emotions. Katharsis, as Butcher[4] has suggested, has something to do with the dignity of tragic experience and its enlargement of our souls.

Now the notion of chittasuddhi belongs to the vocabulary of yogic discipline, and Sri Aurobindo, in discussing the uses of art[5], focusses on the purificatory power of art-experience and assimilates Katharsis to chittasuddhi. According to Sri Aurobindo, Citta is the mind-stuff, it is the locus of "the primitive animal emotions". Further, citta is mapped higher than prāna, and above it there is manas or mind. Beyond the manas is the buddhi, or though proper, which when perfected, is independent of the desires, the claims of the body and the interference of the emotions. Above the buddhi is spirituality, of which all the others are "coverings and veils"[6].

The mapping in terms of yogic psychology is important in the context of Sri Aurobindo's thinking is important, since man has to undergo the evolutionary process from citta to spirituality. There are three uses of art, the aesthetic, the intellectual, and the spiritual. The aesthetic use of art lies in cittasuddhi. Sri Aurobindo writes, "Aristotle assigns a high value to tragedy because of its purifying force. He describes its effect as Katharsis, a sacramental word of the Greek mystries, which, in the secret discipline of the ancient Greek Tāntriks, answered precisely to our cittasuddhi, the purification of the citta or mass of established ideas, feelings and actional habits in a man"[7]. He continues, "Aristotle was speaking of the purification of feelings, passions and emotions in the heart through imaginative treatment in poetry..."[8] This is, says Sri Aurobindo, what

constitutes the justification of the aesthetic side of art. "It purifies by beauty", and "beauty is the appointed road by which mankind as a race must climb to God"[9]. The problem then is : how to reach to vidyā through avidyā ? How to attain to bliss unalloyed by self-regarding emotions? The answer is cittasuddhi.

We may then suggest that disinterestedness is the result of cittasuddhi, a state of the self. Sometimes Sri Aurobindo uses the term 'impersonal' for 'disinterested' as in The Future Poetry. The notion of impersonality is explained by Sri Aurobindo in terms of the categories of essence and accidence. The essence of beauty is timeless, whereas the personal is the "time element". The time element is the accidental, and it "limits and deflects our judgment"[10]. We may note that in saying this Sri Aurobindo rings almost Kantian. He continues, "a crowd of accidental influences belonging to the effect of time and the mental environment upon our mentality exercise an exaggerated domination and distort or colour the view of our mental eye upon its object"[11]. What we should notice is that a concept of "pure" aesthetic judgment is being implied by Sri Aurobindo. To get at "the eternal true substance" of art is to have our aesthetic response pure, direct and hightened, beyond the accidents brought in by the time element or the personal. The impersonal, for Sri Aurobino, is the locus of creativity as well as appreciation. Aesthetic communication is possible only if the personal or the ego is transmuted and chastened into the spate of impersonality.

We find in this account a metaphysical spelling out of the traditional notion of Sahrdaya "the impersonal enjoyer of creative beauty in us responding to the impersonal creator and interpreter of beauty in the poet"[12].

Citta or the heart, says Sri Aurobindo, may either be directed downwards, i.e. to the satisfaction of the senses and the vital desires, or upwards through intellect to the Spirit. In disinterestedness or when the citta is purified, "the heart works for itself"[13]. The heart, working for itself enjoys "the poetry of life", that is the delight of emotions. And art is a powerful agent toward that end. In point of fact Sri Aurobindo is pointing to a truth not only about art, but also of life. Shelley in his "Defence of Poetry" has remarked that, Greek tragedy teaches self-knowledge. Schopenhauer called it "enfranchisement from the passions"[14]. Hegel considers the theory that art experience mitigates the passions. The brutality of passion consists in its selfishness and engrossingness, in the identification of the self with a narrowly limited interest. Art makes man aware of himself, and by putting him into a spiritual instead of a brutal relation with his feelings it delivers him from their tyranny.

What is significant in Sri Aurobindo's treatment of disinterestedness is that it is not the terminal point of aesthetic enterprise, rather it is only an opening to the Spirit. The Spirit is an ontological term in Sri Aurobindo's scheme of thought.

It is at once the nisus and the destiny of human development. "The spirit is that in which all the rest of the human being reposes, towards which it returns and the final self-revelation of which is the goal of humanity"[15]. With these words Sri Aurobindo is looking back to the Kena and the Taittirīya texts on rasa and ānanda. It may be recalled that the twin chapters on 'delight of existence' in The Life Divine are but metaphysical amplification of the Upanisadic insights.

Disinterestedness, for Sri Aurobino, is freedom. It is freedom in the sense of being the master of one's responses to the world's contacts. Pleasure, pain and indifference are 'obligations of habit', they are not the true values of experience. But it is possible to take delight 'impartially' in all experiences. Our oridiary responses are reversible, since the more we refuse to be dominated by our nerves and body, the more we draw back from implication of himself in our physical and vital parts, the greater is our freedom. This is elimination of the accident and seizing the essence or rasa. And how that is possible is described by Sri Aurobindo in the following terms : "If we could be entirely disinterested in mind and heart and impose that detachment on the nervous being... the true essential taste of the inalienable delight of existence in all its variations would be within our reach. We attain to something of this capacity for variable but universal delight in the aesthetic reception of things as represented by Art and Poetry, so that we enjoy there the Rasa or taste of the sorrowful, the terrible, even the

horrible..., and the reason is because we are detached, disinterested, not thinking of ourselves... but only of the thing and its essence"[16].

But the delight disinterestedness makes possible for us to experience is larger than the merely aesthetic, it is in Sri Aurobindo's term, "supraaesthetic". So Sri Aurobindo prepares us for another aesthetics, the aesthetics of "objectless delight"[17].

According to Sri Aurobindo, all creation is self-manifestation, "the poet, artist or musician when he creates does really nothing but develop some potentiality in his unmanifested self into a form of manifestation"[18]. Now this logic of creativity is an imprecise image of "The delight of coming into manifestation"[19] at the heart of, what he calls, "the original Existence". So it is "the delight of being". Now since consciousness is the very nature of the original Existence, the delight of being is "the delight of the rhythm of consciousness"[20]. These are fertile metaphysical notions, and axiomatic to Sri Aurobindo's thinking. The conceptual links obtaining between consciousness and delight on the one hand, and disinterestedness on the other are important for appreciating Sri Aurobindo's account of the creative psyche. It is to that story we may now turn.

Sri Aurobindo brings his concept of mind to bear upon the issue. "The intellect is not the poet, the artist, the creator within us; creation comes by a suprarational influx of light and

power which must work always by vision and inspiration"[21]. Sri Aurobindo's argument is that mind is not purely a logical power, its operations are impaired by sub-rational forces like desires, passions, associations, prejudices and prejudgments. These are egoistic, and determined externally by objects. Wherever delight mind might take in its objects would be interested, i.e., not indifferent to existence, as Kant had suggested. Further logical mind can only construct, it can not creative. Hence a supramental orientation of mind will not only purify it, but will also increase its power and dimension. And this is what the aesthetic consciousness seeks to do. The point then is that Sri Aurobindo's concept of mind takes a good account of the projective mental power called the imagination. This fact sets him a part from the tradition led by Hobbes, and recently given currency by Ryle. The creative process is complex enough, and it does not consist in problem solving or reshuffling of discrete elements of atomic contents and experienced forms into other combinations. In "Abt Vogler", Browning says that "out of three sounds" the musician frames "not a fourth sound, but a star". This is creativity, but is it possible? "Thought", says Sri Aurobindo, "is composed of two separate sides, judgment or reason and imagination, both of which are necessary to perfect ideation"[22]. Aesthetic consciousness breaks through the mechanical operations of the mind by taking hold of mental operations. Without it the self-perfection of the mental being that man is, would remain incomplete.

The mind, says Sri Aurobindo, stands between a super-conscience and an inconscience and receives from both these opposit powers. Owing to its intermediate status on the ontological ladder the mind can only deal with actualities, and the imagination is the mind's way of summoning possibilities. The imagination figures "the ''may be's and 'might be's of the Infinite"[23]. It is not radically illusory, "as the mind ascends towards the truth-consciousness, this mental power becomes a truth imagination"[24].

Now given the office of the imagination as Sri Aurobindo has suggested, it only remains to be said that creativity is an affair of freedom, not only from desires and passions, habitual reactions and prejudices but also from mechanical mental operations and constructions (vikalpas), illumined by intimation of 'the rhythm of consciousness' on delight of being. The true of eternity has its roots in heaven above and its branches reach down to earth, says the Katha Upanisad. Apropos of the masterly image we can say that, for Sri Aurobindo, the roots of art are above. A search for such roots marks Sri Aurobindo's aesthetics off from others.

Sri Aurobindo has written insightfully on the plastic arts of India in The Foundations of Indian Culture. "A seeing in the self", he says, is the method of art in India. He appears to be in line with the view that vyāngya is the intention of art.

Sri Aurobindo's notion of vyāngya is "most subtly and variably the shades and turns and teeming significances of the inner self in its manifestation"[25], Contrasting the Greek and the Indian sculpture he remarks that the Indian artist stresses something behind, something more remote to the surface imagination, but nearer to the soul, and subordinates to it the physical form. A spiritual higher intuitive vision is what Sri Aurobindo demands from art. This line of thinking reaches its height in The Future Poetry.

Of all the arts Sri Aurobindo attaches most importance to poetry. Reasons may not be far to seek, since consciousness is the watch-word of Sri Aurobindo's thought, words or speech lie in a direct relation to it. Language is the house of being, said Heideggar. What Sri Aurobindo has achieved in the Hymns to the Mystic Fire, and what he says in The Future Poetry may entitle us to remark that Sri Aurobindo's is the Vedic view of art. He characterizes his notion of art as intuitive and interpretative. In course of explicating the intuitive-interpretative notion of art Sri Aurobindo has developed a version of dhvani based on disinterestedness in the sense of freedom from our infrarational propensities, and an ascent towards suprarational dimensions of being.

For Sri Aurobindo, the epistemology of art is intuitive. And more importantly intuition is a category of 'Vedantic

knowledge'. It is described figuratively as a "door in us that swings open upon the splendour of a truth beyond"[26]. Intuition is the messenger from the super-conscient. In the chapter titled "The Ascent Towards Supermind" in The Life Divine, Sri Aurobindo mentions the fourfold potencies of intuition : revelation, inspiration, immediate seizing of significance, and correspondence to truth. It is also pointed out that intuition functions by transforming the mind, the heart, life and the sense. And it is by the transformation that they are integrated. We may now say that, for Sri Aurobindo, some kind of intuitive seeing is always at the back of the imaginative vision of the artist or the poet. If 'intuition' is a direct spiritual perception, then it is obvious that intuitive seeing is the method of art, and art has to be a creative interpretation of the truths of existence. Such an interpretation, Sri Aurobindo says, gives us beauty, then a deeper reality of things, and finally, opens new realms of being. If art is creative interpretation of the truths of existence, them it would consist in looking beyond the surface and the moment, in changing the life values into soul values[27]. This he calls, "essential aesthesis", the soul's pleasure in the pure and perfect sources of feeling. Sri Aurobindo incorporates much od dhvanivāda, but it should be noted that he extends theory further till it is reposed on the road to ontology.

What is notice worthy in Sri Aurobindo's account of art and its method and the creative process is that he unfailingly

draws attention to transmutation, purification or Katharsis whenever he talks about art and its significance for man. We have noted earlier that there are Sri Aurobindo's equivalents for disinterestedness. Rasa, according to him, is the essence of spiritual emotion, and it can be tasted only if the spirit is disinterested, i.e. by transcending the vital and the sensational. To be disinterested, for Sri Aurobindo is to be in such a state of being as to be able to see "another face of things and reveal quite another side of experience"[28].

It is also remarkable that the notion of disinterestedness, in Sri Aurobindo, is wider enough than the aesthetic, understood in the ordinary sense of the term. It is brought in by way of his exploration of the concept of human personality.

Aurobindo often draws our attention to the subliminal[29] nature of the aesthetic inspiration. The subliminal soul in man, he says, is open to the universal delight. Man's surface existence, in his view, is a system of responses of which man is not the master. It is nervous and sensational, enslaved to habit, egoistic, and marked by an inability to seize the essence. To look for the essence of a thing, i.e., rasa, in its contact with oneself is the mark of delight, says Sri Aurobindo. But when, instead of seeking the essence of a thing, one looks to one's nervous responses like pain or pleasure or indifference, rasa, is apprehended in its dwarfed or perverted form.

In order to appreciate Sri Aurobindo's notions of delight and disinterestedness in terms of his 'essential aesthetic' it should be borne in mind that he mentions two orders of delight, 'delight of being' and 'delight of becoming'. The delight of existence or being is objectless delight. And it is in and through the delight of becoming that the delight of being enjoys a formative modality. The delight of being is totally reflexive[30], while the delight of becoming is transitive. The latter always has, for itself, an object, which is in a way the cause of a delight experience. The notion of 'objectless delight' is a paradigm of disinterestedness or impersonality. This comes close to Kant's idea of our delight in the beautiful, which is independent with regard to the existence of an object, it is said to be 'pure' or 'free', since neither reason nor sensation forces our assent.

The disinterestedness of aesthetic delight, explains Sri Aurobindo, is a case of the subsumption of the delight of becoming under that of being. When the usual objects of delight are transformed into "reflectors"[31], one enters the state of experiencing 'objectless' delight, for which the other name is 'impersonality' or 'disinterestedness'. It is solely on the basis of a metaphysics of the self that disinterestedness of the aesthetic attitude can be established. The self alone can grasp or taste the essence of things. The Atharva Veda describes the self that delights in the essence of things as follows:

akāmo dhīro amṛta Svayambha rasana tṛptaḥ[32].

Accordingly it follows, for Sri Aurobindo, that disinterestedness in respect of one's Knowing, feeling and nervous responses are the necessary conditions for seizing the essence of things. The chief value of poetry, or for that matter, of all the finer arts[33], lies in the fact that they constitute an aesthetic device for developing the capacity for variable but universal delight in the reception of things. In art and poetry, through an imposed or even consciously cultivated detachment from egoistic sensation and universal attitude, it becomes possible for one part of our self-divided nature to seize the essence of things. One could say that the part of our self that delights in or seizes the essence of things is deathless, just as vyāñjanā is the superior dimension of meaning of poetic discourse.

The point that emerges is that aesthetic apprehension ushers in a change in consciousness. This thesis is parasitic upon Sri Aurobindo's concept of mind or his critique of mental operations. As he says, human mind reaches beyond itself, since mind is 'a power of Ignorance seeking for Truth'. In order that it may fulfil itself, the human mind, by its acts of self-exceeding, links itself with higher grades of consciousness.

There are two marks of going beyind the given range or scale of mind, impersonality and universality, to exceed the personal ego, and non-limitation by the habitual limiting point

of view. These two mark off aesthetic experience just as they do any spiritual one. Spirituality of an experience consists in the fact that in and through it one discovers one's own self. The self as the absolute conscious existence is free, i.e., self-possession and delight are its essential properties. Sri Aurobindo links creativity in the arts to the creative nature of the self. Delight and freedom are said to be the two attributes of self-expression. The argument then is that delight of existence is, and ought to be, our real response in all situations. This is the demand of the new aesthetics proposed by Sri Aurobindo. If it be possible to discover the real nature of self as the self-delight of being, then the habitual mode of our living could be altered. With the widening of consciousness there would occur an expansion of aesthetic values. Since art and poetry go a long way towards discovering man's authentic self, aesthetic culture is a part, a very important part indeed, of spiritual experience. Art is man's lien on the Absolute.

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6. NVA, p. 4.
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10. The Future Poetry (hereafter FP), p. 38.
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14. The World as Will and Idea, III.
15. NVA, p. 19.
16. The Life Divine (hereafter LD), p. 101.
17. LD, p. 93.
18. LD, p. 105.
19. LD, p. 106.
20. LD, p. 106.
21. The Human Cycle, p. 159.
22. NVA, p. 5.
23. LD, p. 391.
24. LD, p. 392.

25. The Foundations of Indian Culture, (hereafter FIC), p. 255.

26. LD, p. 64.

27. FP, p. 233.

28. FP, p. 205.

29. Sri Aurobindo uses the term 'subliminal' in the sense of a consciousness larger than what he called the surface existence. It is not what Freud has called the unconscious.

30. LD, pp. 86-87 "all absoluteness is pure delight .... our original being is ... a self-possession whose other name is self-delight..."

31. LD, p. 93.

32. Atharva Veda, X.4.44.

33. According to Sri Aurobindo, the essential office of the arts is cittasuddhi, but not all the arts do it in the same, or in the same measure. He distinguishes sculpture painting, music and literature in NVA, IV and FIC Chapters on the arts.

CHAPTER XII

The Concept of Disinterestedness in Recent Indian Thought III

Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya

The concept of detachment, in a sense, forms the very basis of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's philosophical thought. The subject, or the speaker as it 'incarnates' in the world 'I', discovers itself inasmuch as it detaches or frees itself from the object. The subjective is speakable, but not a meant content as the object. The word 'this' is taken by Bhattacharyya as the symbol of an object or 'what is meant'. The subject and the object are, for Bhattacharyya, ontological polarities. The subject is known in itself, not as related to object, but as dissociated from the object.

Bhattacharyya has characterized his philosophical position as spiritual psychology. One of the tasks of this manner of philosophizing is to explain the modes of freedom or subjectivity. And the modes of subjectivity are the modes of 'freeing oneself from the modes of objectivity'. There are three modes of subjectivity, according to Bhattacharyya. There is, first, bodily subjectivity in which the body, as observed and felt, represents the subject in relation to the environment. The feeling of freedom is the feeling of 'the detachment from the object', and

the first given feeling is the feeling of the body, and subjectivity is rooted in this feeling. Secondly, there is psychic subjectivity. Bhattacharyya distinguishes 'image' from 'thought'. The idea of an object which cannot be defined or concreted into image is thought. It is detached from objectivity. Lastly, we have spiritual objectivity. Thought, in Bhattacharyya's idiom is 'the unobjective something about the object'. But feeling, he says, is purely subjective, there is no referene to object. Feeling is the positive consciousness of detachment from meaning.

We have hazarded above an almost turncated account of the contents of Bhattacharyya's rich intricate and sophisticated ideas as may be found in The Subject as Freedom[1]. Our idea has been to introduce his notion of rasa, which, he says, can only be understood through feeling and in terms of feeling. Since rasa is a phenomenon that occurs in spiritual subjectivity, it was required that some idea of Bhattacharyya's analysis of the modes or grades of consciousness be prefaced to our discussion. In the present chapter we shall focus our attention on his essay, "The Concept of Rasa"[2] in order to see how does Bhattacharyya formulate the notion of disinterestedness in the context of æsthetic experience.

We may begin by making some clarificatory remarks. First, let us take Bhattacharyya's notion of feeling. He abstracts away every trace of cognitivity or objectivity from the feeling mode of consciousness. Feeling, he says, is the positive consciousness of detachment from meaning, Bhattacharyya presents a radical thesis. In Kant's usage 'aesthetic' means reference to the subject. The logic of the beautiful, as Kant had construed it, is such that it is not a predicate. Our feeling of pleasure in the beautiful is so de-intentionalized that if attains a reflexive character by referring to the speaker, or the speaker who makes a singular judgment with the pseudo-predicate 'beautiful'. And the pleasure is identified with the harmony or free play of the cognitive faculties. Bhattacharyya schematizes the affair differently. He appears to search for an ontology of the subject, and finds its core in feeling, which is completely free from objectivity. Sri Aurobindo's notion of 'objectless delight' comes as a parallel.

Secondly, Bhattacharyya agrees with Kant in holding that the aesthetic judgment is not a logical judgment. But Bhattacharyya has different reasons for asserting the non-logical character of the aesthetic judgment. His essay, "The Concept of Value"[3] presents an analysis of the relation that obtains between an object that is valued, and the value that is ascribed to it. Beauty is referred to the rose, but it is not known as the character of the object. The rose is not felt as one with beauty,

but beauty is indeed felt as one with the rose. Beauty, as Bhattacharyya puts it, is a floating or free adjective of the rose. One might recall what Shelley had said in "Hymn to Intellectual Beauty", that beauty visits its objects with "inconstant wing". Value, for Bhattacharyya, is a reflective feeling. The reflective character of feeling consists in the fact that value is not felt as other than the object, but the object is felt as other than the value. Hence it follows that aesthetic valuation is not a logical judgment. The linguistic expression of such valuation may bear the semblance of information, though, as feeling, it is an exclamation in disguise.

We may now turn to Bhattacharyya's notion of rasa. He says that the word rasa means two things : essence and what is tested or felt, and that the aesthetic conception of rasa combines both the senses. When he says that Bhattacharyya deflects both from Anandavardhana as well as Abhinavagupta. We have remarked earlier that for Anandavardhana direct and oblique meaning are intimately connected. Abhinavagupta argues for a detachment of the oblique meaning, the vyāngya from the vācya or the direct meaning. Yet Bhattacharyya is a continuator of dhvani school, of course with a difference. Abhinavagupta's accent on the meaning of poetic discourse is not there is Bhattacharyya. His dialectic of feeling is projected to effect a freedom from meaning.

Bhattacharyya's aesthetic philosophy is based on what may be called a dialectic of feeling. Feeling, he says, does not mean anything but itself. It can only have an unmeant content from which it is not distinguished. That is, content and consciousness determine each other in feeling. And hence, while defining the concept of rasa in the aesthetic content, Bhattacharyya remarks that rasa combines both the essence and what is tested in the form of an indermination of content and consciousness. Bhattacharyya considers the aesthetic consciousness as 'the feeling par excellence'. There is freedom from meaning, since the meant or significantly speakable content is indistinguishably fused with consciousness. The felt value cannot be spoken about without reference to the feeling.

Aesthetic feeling, according to Bhattacharyya, is a feeling of the third-order, the first one being the natural feeling. The natural or primary feelings are characterized as 'object-immersed' feelings. A 'feeling of a feeling' is a higher order feeling, it is freer, and more so would be the feeling at the third level. The feeling of sympathy is taken as an instance of a 'feeling of a feeling'. Bhattacharyya describes the feeling at the third level as 'a duplicated sympathy'. Such a feeling is described as 'spiritual' and 'contemplative'.

Bhattacharyya's inquiries into the working of human consciousness reveals the fact that there are levels of experience,

and also that from the point of view of each higher level the entire content of the lower level gets reoriented, it comes to be viewed in a new perspective altogether. The attitude at each higher level is more subjective than the level transcended. It should be noted that for Bhattacharyya, the word 'spiritual' is adjectival upon the ontological substantive called 'subjectivity'. The degrees of the one corresponds to that of the other, and hence, regression into subjectivity parallels to progression into freedom. The grades of subjectivity are but a graduated process of 'dropping of self-consciousness'[4], i.e., a process of being freed from the personal or private dimensions of experiences. This is how the notion of disinterestedness comes to be formulated in Bhattacharyya's thought.

Let us now try to understand the notion of 'duplicated sympathy'. The contrast between an emotional reaction and an aesthetic reaction to a play is illustrated very clearly in the scene of a play within a play in Kṣemīsvara's Naiṣadhānanda, Act VI[5]. Nala, incognito, is sitting with Rtuparna in the audience seeing a play about the terrible experiences of Damayantī, his wife. Rtuparna has an aesthetic experience, but Nala instead reacts emotionally, though Rtuparna keeps reminding him that it is a play and is puzzled at his strange excitement. Perception produced by art does not arouse our everyday concerns but takes us away from them. It is a detached perception of the

emotion of others.

According to Bhattacharyya when an object is aesthetically enjoyed, the subject and the object are so indistinguishable as to affect each other mutually, the object seems to have a value, and the subject feels attracted to it. Now to take the case of sympathy. To sympathise with a person is to feel him feeling. Bhattacharyya's logic of 'sympathy' might recall Hume's notions of 'sympathy' and 'compassion'. It is well known that Hume explains the possibility of enjoying tragedy on the basis of the twin principles[6]. Hume's epistemological scheme that ideas can be converted into impressions could be of some significance in understanding Bhattacharyya's notion of sympathy.

For Hume the problem is how a passion or feeling "in the mind of one person, and afterwards appears in the mind of another"[7]? The manner, of their appearance, says Hume, is "first as an idea, then as an impression". Sympathy denotes the causal part of the phenomenon, while compassion stands for the emotive awareness of the state of the other mind. It may be said that what Hume means by the twin principles of sympathy and compassion is encapsulated by Bhattacharyya by the single term 'sympathy'.

But the question of importance is : How does sympathy relate itself to freedom? In order to retain its aesthetic character sympathy has to retain freedom, or its detachment from

its object. The Buddhists argue that karunā is not emotionalized identification with other's suffering. To "lose" onseself in concern for another is mere sentimentality. The ideal compassionator is like a physician rather than a fellow mourner. He fully appreciates the suffering of the patient, but does not give way to emotional sympathy for that patient. Instead, emotionally self-controlled, he analyzes the diseased condition and prescribes for it in a detached impersonal manner. There may be something of the Buddhist understanding of karunā in Bhattacharyya's notion of sympathy through its ascending modes of freedom.

Feeling, to speak negatively, is unobjective, i.e., it does not bear any reference to objective fact. Accordingly, the feeling of sympathy is free from the object of feeling sympathized with. The consciousness of the object of sympathy implies a detachment of the conscious subject. But there are further steps to freedom, and it is possible that feeling can be emotionally contemplated in a detached manner. This happens in the case of duplicated sympathy, i.e. sympathy with a person's sympathy. The feeling of sympathy in this case is felt as dissociated from its character 'as a given felt' and is realised as self-subsisting value.

Bhattacharyya distinguishes 'expression of an object' from 'object'. In the case of duplicated sympathy, the expression of an object, for example, the beauty of a rose, is a self-subsisting reality to which the object is a symbol. As detached from the

object, it enjoys an eternity. Beauty of an object appears to be seen, but it does not manifest as the quality of an object, in neither of Locke's senses of the term 'quality'. Beauty, says Bhattacharyya, is a 'transcendent expression', detached from the object. An object of art is said to be beautiful by looking upon it as a symbol of the aesthetic value. The under-structure, the thingness of the work of art is nothing that matters to aesthetic consciousness.

Bhattacharyya's concept of sympathy has a further mode of distancing. It is a degree higher than or further removed from dupoicated sympathy. Bhattacharyya presents this case in terms of the following example. A spectator contemplates a grand parent watching his grandchild playing with a toy. There obtains a triadic relation. The child enjoys its toy; the grand parent sympathises with the child's joy. The spectator, in his turn, contemplates on the grand parent's sympathy. In the grand parent's heart the child's feeling is reflected as an eternal emotion. And the spectator's interest lies in contemplating the impersonal emtoion. In Bhattacharyya's scheme of detachment the personal nature of feeling is, by degrees, impersonalized. And inasmuch as it is impersonalized, it becomes freer from its object. It is noticeable that in Bhattacharyya's triadic scheme the parents of the child are dropped from consideration since the parents, as they are related to the child by care and condern, are likely to fail in distancing themselves so as to sympathise with the child's joy in its purity. A grand parent, on the contrary, stands in a freer relation to the child, and can therefore duplicate the

sympathy felt by the parents at the joy of the child.

Ingenious as Bhattacharyya's triadic schema is, there are interesting literary parallels to it. According to the conventions of Bengal Vaisnavism the readers of the poems that celetrate the Śṛngāra pf Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa are to contemplate the emotion in a detached manner as though it were nitya, or timeless experience. That is, the reader would have to poise himself to the point of the spectator of Bhattacharyya's tridic schema. It is not enough to undergo a mental experience which detaches one from personal concerns. Rather one should have in view Radha's feeling of love for Kṛṣṇa as reflected in the poet's mind or presented in the poem. It is only then that an experience of unselfish, impersonal and free delight would become possible. In a poem entitled "The Unheeded Pageant" in The Crescent Moon Tagore has spoken of the play of a child being joyfully witnessed by the mother. In course of the poem the mother's experience is gradually lifted up to cosmic dimensions. The child's play is so generalised as the Sun, the sky and the wind watch over the scene. "The world keeps her seat by you [the child] in your mother's heart. He who plays his music to the stars is standing at your window with his flute"[8].

The epistemological point involved in the aesthetic experience is a distinction between two mental acts, those of imagining an object as actual, and imagining it as imaginary. The case of the former is plain enough, an object is imagined as presented to an actual feeling. The latter is of deeper aesthetic

import. Bhattacharyya says that to imagine as object as imaginary is to have the object imagined as what would be imagined by another person having the actual feeling. Aesthetic response or enjoyment is not the feeling of the enjoyer on his own account, but involves a dropping of self-consciousness.

To bring home the point, Bhattacharyya employs his triadic schema, of three levels of feeling, contemplative, symthetic and primary. He does this with the help of an explanatory model of three persons having three types of feelings. No person with a taste for drama would ever imagine Othells or Lear as actual persons. In course of our enjoying these tragedies what we do, according to Bhattacharyya, is that we imagine some one imagining Othells or Lear as actual persons. The imagined person is a variable locus of a feeling, a "felt-person-in-general", or the Heart Universal, as Bhattacharyya calls it. He remarks that the aesthetic feeling" is contemplated as reflected in or sympathised with by this Heart Universal and the person who contemplates the feeling merges his personal or private heart in his ubiquity"[9]. It appears that the mythic ontology of the Heart Universal is something like the Platonic Idea in which the particulars participate and thereby become possible bearers of the ideal predicate. Analogically, Bhattacharyya suggests that feelings, through the filter of the Heart Universal, lose their private character and get eternalised.

The notion of eternalisation of feelings is an important point. Eternity is one of three features of an object aesthetically apprehended, the other two being expression and detachment from fact. One may recall that Keats said that the "silent form" of the Grecian Urn "tease us out of thought as doth eternity"[10]. Or, as Rabindranath Tagore says of the "form" of the aesthetically apperceived object "gathering light/Through the dark dimness of Eternity"[11]. What Bhattacharyya means by 'eternity' is a matter of transfiguration of feelings, sort of a release from their spatiotemporal determinations. Bhattanayaka spoke of Sādhāranīkarana or universalization of experience. A feeling, freed from personal dimensions, becomes universally shareable. It may be the case that Bhattacharyya's point about the eternity of the object of aesthetic experience is congruent with Bhattanayaka's thesis of Sādhāranikarana.

It is noticeworthy that Bhattacharyya explains the interrelation of the three levels of feeling in terms of his explanatory model of three persons. Schematically the model could be presented as under.

A	B	C
The aesthetic Subject :	The Heart Universal :	The Third person
The first person	The second person	Primary feeling
contemplative	sympathetic	Expression
feeling	feeling	
Eternity	Detachment	

The point made by Bhattacharyya is significant. It is that the aesthetic subject can live on three different emotional levels at the same time. The grade of contemplative feeling comprehends both sympathetic and primary feelings, and hence it is, says Bhattacharyya, feeling par excellence. A similar point was made by Roger Fry, when he said that in art we not only experience the feeling, but also watch it.

The process of gradual disentanglement from fact may also be noted. At the level of primary feeling there is no distinction between feeling and the object of feeling. It is "object-immersed feeling". Now there may obtain two alternative attitudes, objective and subjective. Classicism in art celebrates the objective attitude. It recommends a lapse of self-feeling, the object is perceived sharply out-lined, "the expression adjectival to it". A recent protagonist of classicism, T.S. Eliot has said that poetry is not letting loose of emotions, but an escape from personality[12].

Bhattacharyya may be taken as clearing grounds for a Romantic theory of art, or a variety of attitude theory in which the response of the beholder assumes momentous importance. He speaks the subjective attitude, reminiscent of Kant and Abhinavagupta. If the subjective attitude, i.e. "the feeling attitude" prevails with the subject, the object, Bhattacharyya says, would get indefinite. In other words, the object gets dissolved in the subject's feeling. The world is sucked into the

subject, as it were, is the case of obverted empathy. Shelley, in his "Hymn to Apollo" says, "I am the eye through which the world beholds itself". Or where Tagore sings "I feel that all the stars shine in me"[13], we have instances of the objects dissolving in the subject's feeling. "The feeling here becomes subjectively real; it stands by consuming the object"[14]. Bhattacharyya's theory extends the Einfuenlung theory by rendering the aesthetic experience not only a protection of the self, but equally an introjection of objects.

There are, or could then be, two "directions of object-feeling", and accordingly, sympathy may also take two forms. When A sympathises with B, the distinction between A the sympathiser and B, the person sympathised with is not lost. A may either feel through B's heart in feeling out towards B. And A feels his detachment from B. It may also be the case that A feels B's feeling as his by "assimilating or drawing in" B's feeling. Bhattacharyya calls these the projective and the assimilative types of sympathy. In both the cases the sympathiser feels his freedom.

The forms or types of sympathy can have to corresponding directions. When an object is enjoyed as beautiful, the object is related to the aesthetic value as its symbol. The relation between the symbol, the object, and the aesthetic value may obtain in a two-fold manner. The 'fact-character' may remain in the symbol, and the value is expressed as its "transcendent

significate". The canvas and the pigments are the facts of a character, while the painting that is enjoyed is enjoyed is their transcendent significate. This is much like G.E. Moore's thesis that non-natural qualities manifest through the natural ones[15]. Or, what Tagore said, a poem has its grammar and vocabulary, and it exceeds all its parts and transcends all its laws[16]. Bhattacharyya calls it to be the case of transfiguring the fact into a value. Art of this nature is "dynamically creative". But there remains another possibility when the facticity, as Heideggar has put it, of the symbol gets evanescent, and the value symbolized float, to quote Bhattacharyya, "as in a dream in the ether of the heart and nowhere in space and time"[17]. Art-experience or rasa is like that. It is contemplative in nature.

The two modes of aesthetic enjoyment, creative and contemplative, are subtly distinguished by Bhattacharyya. The point of his distinction is that in either of the modes there obtains freedom through the feeling of enjoyment, but differently. In one case, "there is freedom in spite of enjoying contact", in another, there is "enjoyment or reality in spite of detaching freedom"[18]. The spectator, undergoing art-experience, is either purusa-like, as in Sāmkhya, or sāksī - like as in Vedānta. But are the two modes so sharply distinguishable? Can we not say that the two modes alternate in one and the same persons's experience? And, if they are distinguishable at all, do they not interpenetrate? There appears to be a sort of ontological hide and seek

between freedom and the object aesthetically enjoyed in so far as Bhattacharyya's account is concerned. Does enjoyment ensure freedom? That appears to be Bhattacharyya's apprehension. And in order to ensure freedom different grades of feelings and modes of enjoyment are deciphered into experience. No loss of freedom can be properly aesthetic. Art-experience is the search for freedom through feeling. It should of course be borne in mind that Bhattacharyya's notion of enjoyment is much that it precludes absolute detachment of the subject from the object. The self in its aesthetic poise is essentially an enjoying state of being, a delight-self as Sri Aurobindo called it. Or, what Bullough has termed as "the psychical distance"[19], i.e. neither over distanced nor under-distanced from the object is that which Bhattacharyya has intended to bring house with his notion of aesthetic enjoyment. Whether the enjoyment is creative or contemplative, freedom persists. But the distinction he has proposed need not be taken as an exclusive disjunction. Tagore, for example, in his "Religion of an Artist"[20] explains the notion of 'creation' both as a "freedom from any biographical bondage", and "representing a personal reality". In fact a unity of the two processes constitutes creativity. Bhattacharyya's notion of 'duplicated sympathy' parallels closely to Tagore's idea, even though the distinction between creative and contemplative enjoyment appears to dichotomize the organic wholeness of creativity and appreciation.

It should be observed that Tagore writes from the point of view of the creator, while Bhattacharyya voices the beholder's view of art-experience. But must we suppose that the processes of creation and contemplation need fall apart? Not necessarily, even if they are conceptually distinguishable. Tagore often invokes the Upanisadic images of two birds, one that merely looks on, while the other is found in the reactive attitude. And this is done in order to drive home the idea of the unity of contemplation and creation. There may also be another consideration to offer.

Indeed the distinction between the two modes of enjoyment is difficult to make, however they might differ in terms of concepts. In course of a perceptive essay, "Some Reflections on Art"[21], Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya has brought about a perspicacious extension of the seminal ideas of Bhattacharyya. We may once look to that direction hoping if we could get clear about the distinction between creative and contemplative modes of enjoyment.

According to Professor Bhattacharyya, even though creation and appreciation occur in the field of free, autonomous emotions, yet creation sublimates the primary feelings in the way of the <u>will</u>, whereas appreciation does that in the way of <u>cognition</u>. The appreciator looks at art from the point of view of the work of art itself, he surrenders himself to its ontology, as one does to God. But such a viewing is looking at the work of art in retroscpect, in the way of cognition. The creator has a 'different

breathing', as Rilke[22] remarks in one of his sonnets. He moves concretely, brings something into being. He does not simply look at an object, as the appreciator does. This of course does not amount to saying that cognition has no room in creation. Cognition and will in creation figure as internal dimensions of an autonomous feeling or subjectivity par excellence, called rasa. The processes of creation and appreciation are equally enlivening, and their overlap is hardly ever denied. What binds the two into a unity is the ubiguity of autonomous feelings in both the creator and the appreciator. And one may add that autonomous feelings get embodied in terms of a work of art. And it is there the creator and the connoisoeur meet each other, as if one speaks and the other hears through the created object. This is a novel explanatory model which encapsulates the creative and the contemplative modes of enjoyment in terms of speaker-hearer relation subsisting between the creator and the appreciator highlighting their 'essential appreciator highlighting their 'essential humanity'[23]. The identity of feeling is freedom in enjoyment.

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PART III

CONCLUDING REMARKS

We now propose to offer some general and critical remarks on some of the considerations made in Parts I and II. Let us begin with Kant, and then we shall pass over to the recent Indian thinkers. A. I. Kant used the term 'disinterested' to denote the impersonal character of the aesthetic consciousness, and it remains one of the best short descriptive formulas of the aesthetic attitude. In our opening chapter we have tried to show the British ancestory of Kant's ideas. But difficulties present themselves in regard to Kant's acquaintance with British writers on aesthetics. Kant alludes to Hume, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Burke; but it is never clear precisely to which of their works he is referrring. It is not known, for example, which of Hume's works on taste or the fine arts Kant actually read. Yet to the student of the history of ideas it is tempting to relate the concept of taste, handed down from Shaftesbury to Hume, with its subsequent transformation at Kant's hands. The history of a concept is a rewarding enterprise to pursue and this is what we intended to do in the opening chapter of Part I.

2. Recently it has become fashionable to consider the Part One of the Critique of Judgment in the light of phenomenology. It is no doubt true that it has been concerned with the nature of of the aesthetic consciousness. Yet his concern has been marked

by an epistemological stant. He appears to be no less concerned about the possibility of a particular type of judgment, i.e. the judgment of Taste, which he says, is reflective and aesthetical. It is indeed arguable that what Kant does in Part One of the third Critique is analytic aesthetics. He asks, how are judgments of the beautiful possible? Or, how aesthetic evaluation in general is to be explained. For Kant's neo-classic philosophic temperament, 'beauty' is the central concept of the aesthetic, just as the concept of cause is central to his theory of Knowledge. Kant teaches us to ask how assertions of aesthetic worth are to be justified. Is it possible to give an analysis of aesthetic sensibility such that judgments of value do not emerge as mere reports of subjective feeling, but lay claim to universal agreement? Are there certain presuppositions of the aesthetic that might support its claim to autonomy? Although Kant's kind of analysis is of a special sort that he calls "transcendental" or "critical", his aim has been similar to that of many twentieth-century writers on aesthetics. Analysis or philosophical clarification having been Kant's sole purpose, his elucidation of aesthetic concepts can certainly be called analytic aesthetics.

3. We have noticed that many of the issues raised in the Part One of the third Critique have their origin in the first as well as Kant's writings on ethics. The distinction of form and matter is a case at hand. In the Foundations (or the Groundwork)

Kant's interest is in the non-empirical or the "pure". A "pure" moral action is one committed exclusively out of the pure sense of duty. A similar parallel holds in the case of aesthetic judgment. Many non-aesthetic or adventitious interests often overlay or belie our perception. It has appeared to us that for Kant, purity is evidently an ideal, 'disinterestedness' is a regulative notion. Though there are clear cases, however, rare, of action done from a "pure" sense of duty, or of "pure" aesthetic judgment, even these should not be called indubitable. Such cases can be contrasted with mixed actions or aesthetic judgments. Kant's explanation of erroneous aesthetic judgment is an integral part of showing how aesthetic judgments can be veracious.

Kant may be taken to believe aesthetic judgment or belief to be a kind of knowledge claim. We may accordingly like to ask whether such judgment could be erroneous. How can a "pure" aesthetic judgment, as defined by disinterestedness, universality, necessity, etc., be mistaken? To begin with, it is possible that one does not know how to use "beautiful" or some other word characteristic of aesthetic discourse. But it would be a case of ineptness in language, and not an error in aesthetic judgment. Another trivial way of making a mistaken aesthetic judgment would be in using the wrong name or title of a work.

But a more serious and interesting source of error follows from Kant's distinction between "pure" and "dependent" beauty.

Aesthetic judgment might err by confounding the two sorts of beauty. The former presupposes no concept of what the object judged actually is, or ought to be, whereas the latter depends upon criteria of perfection. Confusion of "pure" with "dependent" beauty is a confusion of reference. Judgments based upon mere sensation, emotion, utility, morality, etc., are mistaken. A judgment of "dependent" beauty is a disguised intellectual judgment of perfection. Essences or determinant concepts are not to shape aesthetic judgments, because such concepts are no more than atrophied conventions or reveal lapses of creativity in search of new expression.

Another source of erroneous aesthetic judgment follows from Kant's distinction between "autonomy" and "heteronomy" of taste. Taste must be "autonomous", for it is not worth having if it is not one's own. Genuine aesthetic judgment must be based one one's own sensibilities. When we permit someone to take over our moral conscience, we forfeit our dignity; and when we permit someone to dictate our taste, we lose part of our individuality. Heteronomy of taste is always a report upon other persons' sensibilities, for example, those of a great critic. Most forms of heteronomy are based upon what is accepted by someone of note who holds sway over the socio-aesthetic scene. Other forms of heteronomy draw their strength from a small elite or coterie.

A paradox surfaces in Kant's account of erroneous aesthetic judgment in terms of confusions of reference and heteronomy of taste. Kant maintains that aesthetic judgment cannot be based upon determinate concepts. If aesthetic judgment is, say, about style or genre, then such judgment would be, for Kant, not "pure", but either technical or even theoretical judgment. In effect, judgment based upon definite or determinate knowledge of artistic style or genre would involve judgment of "dependent beauty". On the other hand, if determinate concepts are not required in aesthetic judgment, the danger of confusing form with subjective mood and feeling might become greater.

Kant would concede that aesthetic judgment of "dependent beauty" does involve determinate concepts. And hence "non pure" aesthetic judgments may be erroneous because of inadequate or false belief. But whether aesthetic judgment of "free beauty" might not be erroneous in some way is also a question of importance. Given that "pure" aesthetic judgment must be founded solely upon disinterested pleasure and form, it might be asked whether such pleasure be known by introspection or reflection. Introspection is hardly an infallible avenue to self-knowledge. When Kant says that aesthetic judgment is "reflective", what does he really mean? He means not "introspecting", but simply subsuming a particular representation under the feelings of pleasure or displeasure. An explanation of the source of error for "pure" aesthetic judgment may be given according to what Kant has said in

the Foundations, namely, that the "strictest examination" of our own motives can never lead to the absolute certainty that our motive was the "pure" good will. Similarly one can never be certain that any perception or judgment is free from all empirical admisture. Kant himself describes sensations, emotions, and determinate concepts as hindrances to pure judgment of form. He opposes the sensuous to form as he opposes inclination to duty. The restriction of "pure" aesthetic judgment to form is an ideal. It may be unexceptional to say that aesthetic form is an analogue of moral duty. Parallels between the two are striking; both are pure ideals and universally binding. Just as introspection of motives might well disclose motives other than duty, so reexamination of the aesthetic object might disclose much that is gratuitous and sensuous rather than formal.

4. One might feel uneasy over Kant's account of non-conceptual nature of aesthetic judgment. We cannot describe an object as art unless we know it as intentional 'under a definite concept'. We may not know how that intention was realized. Yet our judgment on the beauty of the work cannot be determined by the rule or concept by which the object is constructed. So either we describe it merely as a beautiful object, or we must use the concept or rule determining its production and fail to judge its beauty. In the first case, the process becomes separate from and arbitrary to the experience of beauty. In the second, we seem unable to judge that it is a work of art that is beautiful. Both

alternatives are unsatisfactory because they preclude an understanding of fine art, its production, or its nature. Is there a way out?

5. Disinterestedness is the criterion "by which particular feelings of pleasure may be decided to have the requisite status for justifying a judgment of taste'. To decide that our's is an aesthetic judgment, we consider whether our pleasure may not have been caused by an object rather than being the experience of a judgment and its relation to cognitive faculties. If the judgment is disinterested i.e. if our pleasure arises from the judgment alone and so is free of interest, then we may identify it as a disinterested aesthetic pleasure. That is, our actual aesthetic judgments are made on the basis of reflection on disinterestedness. It is a reflection we must carry out for ourselves and which recommends itself to others. A subject's certainty in his own case becomes a crucial issue, and we must acknowledge this difficulty. Disinterestedness is not self-evident characteristics of objects or experience. It does not appear to us in consciousness in the way our experience of pleasure or pain does. That it is possible to justify the exercise of aesthetic judgment transcendentally does not mean that we cannot be mistaken. Kant proposes that only another's experience of his own aesthetic judgment can go to conform a subject's own singular judgment. To understand aesthetic judgments we must not only explain what the source of our pleasure is, but also anticipate other's judgments by seeing

that the source of our judgment is a common one. To make a judgment is a claim about what we should look for in subjects for them to be suitably like ourselves. In making a judgment of taste its subject is also recommending a point of view from which to regard subjects.

Hence communication governs judgments, since an interest in making aesthetic judgments is a consequence of living in society. Fine art, says Kant, is humaniora, the faculty of being able to communicate universally one's inmost self[1]. Art brings our subjectivity into the public sphere, it treats subjects as rational and feeling ends in themselves. Beauty promotes enlightenment. Aesthetic judgments are based on a subjective feeling, and as beauty denotes our experience rather than objects, aesthetic experience is to be understood as a relation between subjects. Tagore reminds us that the word sāhitya for literature has its origin in sahitatva or togetherness of men as feeling ends. Beauty is an experience of mind in judgment rather than a quality of objects.

6. Kant's interest in the aesthetic is centred upon the beautiful, his concern with aesthetic autonomy also centres upon judgments of taste. It may be noted that for Kant, judgments of the sublime are not autonomous; they are founded upon morality. The autonomy of aesthetic judgment refer uniquely to "pure" aesthetic judgments of taste. Kant's idea of ethical autonomy is

well-known. Are there parallels between his conceptions of ethical and aesthetic autonomy?

One might argue that there is a tension between form and enjoyment in Kant's aesthetic. Insofar as aesthetic judgment is "pure", it is autonomous, but at the cost of empty formalism. Insofar as aesthetic judgment rests upon sensuous interests, it is enjoyable but at the price of heteronomy. Similarly, do the postulates of practical reason undermine the absolute autonomy of the moral agent? This is another tension. But the tensions seem resolvable, both in Kant's aesthetics and in his ethics. What gives a moral agent autonomy is his legislating the moral law for himself, a law that he has his self constructed and imposed upon his behaviour evinces his superiority over inclinations. Likewise, aesthetic judgment is autonomous because it imposes forms of the understanding and imagination upon the sensible manifold. The "matter" of such judgment is not hostile to, or incompatible with the "form" of aesthetic judgment. Autonomous aesthetic judgment organizes and "informs" the sensible manifold. In a similar way, the freedom and autonomy of the moral agent do not reside in his power to subvert sensuous feelings or happiness, but rather in his ability to order sensibility and inclinations in the light of moral law. Kant in his Lectures on Ethics says that "to renounce happiness is to differentiate it from morality in a transcendental and unnatural way"[2]. Autonomous aesthetic judgment must spring from one's own sensibility, just as autonomous ethical judgment is produced from one's own will.

No judgment of taste is determined by either concepts or precepts, and yet we find Kant differentiating autonomy and isolationism : "Taste ... is among all faculties and talents the very one that stands most in need of examples of what has in the course of culture maintained itself longest in esteem"[3]. Aesthetic judgment is autonomous by being familiar with the classics, though not dominated by them. There is no need to cut ourselves off from what critics or qualified persons might say about a work of art.

Kant does not argue that art should not be enjoyed. He maintains instead that enjoyment and natural attraction cannot be the determining grounds of aesthetic judgment. In his ethical theory, Kant does not oppose duty to inclination but contrasts them. One might actually enjoy doing what one believes to be obligatory. Yet the motive of the action, if it is to have moral worth, can only be the sense of duty, not desire for our own pleasure or even that of other persons. In his aesthetic theory a similar contrast is drawn between aesthetic discernment of form and enjoyment.

97. Kant's aesthetics has a human message. The aesthetic points to man's dual nature, sensuous as well as rational. Sensuous passivity gratifies or stimulates, whereas aesthetic judgment brings about the play of the mental faculties, which results in a peculiarly human or intellectual pleasure. Aesthetic judgment recalls, as does the ethical, one's superiority to

sensibility and the phenomenal world. Just as moral duty recalls the individual to his citizenship as a free agent in the super-sensible world, so contemplating aesthetic objects unites the world of Nature with the world of reason. It is as if disinterested pleasure quieted man's phenomenal will. This is how Schopenhaner has interpreted Kant's teaching. Judging aesthetically places one outside the phenomenal world of cause and effect, the habitat of ordinary perceptual judgments. Art is a vehicle of "will-less" perception[4].

B.1. We may now turn to the recent Indian thinkers, who share a good deal of family resemblances with Kant's idea of aesthetics as the analysis of aesthetic effects, or the study of the effects produced by the contemplation of Nature, works of art, or even experiences of life itself. Kant is often described as having propounded an 'attitude theory' of art, based upon the feature of the aesthetic impression called 'disinterestedness'. It is introspective in nature. All the thinkers we have considered in Part II of the present dissertation have shared the belief that it is the inward world, of which the external circumstances are but the reflection, which is essentially the world of aesthetic culture. And from this inner world, aesthetic culture is carried over not only into material features of our existence, but also transfused into our spiritual needs and strivings. Our whole psychic life is permeated with this mysterious aesthetic culture. There has been a long tradition in India of such a sensitiveness

to life. A Samkarācārya considered composing of a poem as an worshipful act[5]. Culture, as distinct from learning, education in the fullest sense, pure humanity, with what is best and without what is worst in human nature, rests fundamentally upon such an education of the heart, upon such an aesthetic philosophy of life.

Edward Bullough, in his essay "The Modern Conception of Aesthetics"[6] has described Vedanta as the philosophy of the aesthetic type. One is exhorted in Vedanta to bracket, as it were, the domain of the Vyāvahārika, so that one's encounter with one's deeper self as a state of bliss be possible. The Vyāvahārika is the domain of the natural standpoint, the empirical, the pragmatic and the biological. Now to the aesthetic consciousness the entire meaning or import of the experiences of the Vyāvahārika order of being is transmuted. Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself becomes an end in itself. The concept of rasa is inteded to make room for an aesthetic interpretation of experience.

2. Indian thinkers, especially Tagore and Sri Aurobindo do not seem to argue from a division of the human psyche into willing, thinking and feeling. Of course there are modes of consciousness such as the practical or the scientific. These are attitudes of the consciousness. One may say that science represents a construction of the universe in terms of causality, while ethics is the interpretation of existence in terms of finality. The

scientific attitude is retrospectively explanatory; the ethical is prospective. The aesthetic attitude rests in the object it contemplates without transcending it either forwards or backwards. It is, we may say, neither retrospective nor prospective, but immanent. The delight of the aesthetic consciousness is possessed inwardly.

The Indian point of view is inclined to the idea that every thought, every emotion, every act of will implies the other two. The convergence of the yogas, as in the Bhagavad Gītā, is a decisive instance. And this is true not only of Art, but of Nature and Life when these are viewed aesthetically. The immanent contemplativeness of the aesthetic attitude is the magical wand which invests all things it touches with a charm and interest which, considered as products of antecenent causes, or as means to a purpose, they cannot possibly possess. Tagore insists that beauty reveals itself only when the screen of the commonplace is lifted from the face of things.

3. Most of the objects we encounter in our daily life "are eclipsed by the shadow of our own self"[7]. The aesthetic object, in so far as it is aesthetic, is temporarily severed from its relation to, and its bearing upon, our practical self. The centre of gravity is, so to speak, shifted from the personal ego to the thing contemplated. Disinterestedness implies objectivity. The personality is lost in, and spontaneously surrendered to, the object, only to live with twofold vigour and intensity in its contemplation. This is the meaning of aesthetic objectivity : "the

disinterested perception of the real"[8], as Tagore has said. Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya would agree with the poet's insight that in aesthetic experience "reality is presented to us on the pedestal of its own absolute value"[9].

4. It is distinctive of recent Indian thought that the category of the real is invoked in connection with aesthetic experience. For Tagore, it is the real which is the object of aesthetic experience. And since aesthetic experience is of the nature of delight owing to its "self-possession" as Sri Aurobindo has suggested, it is the real, rather than truth, that can be contemplatively enjoyed. Bhattacharyya's remark that the real alone can be enjoyed[10] bears perspicaciously upon the issue.

What does it mean to say that the real can be enjoyed? In Tagore we find an explication of the category of the real. The real is the absolute for aesthetic experience or attitude. There is the Cartesian primacy of the personal experience with which Tagore starts : "The reality of my own self is immediate and indubitable to me"[11]. But there has to be an outer criteria for the inner state : "whatever else affects me in a like manner is real for myself, and it inevitably attracts and occupies any attention for its own sake, blends itself with my personality, making it richer and larger and causing it delight"[12]. The passage just cited illustrates how and why it is possible to take delight in the real, since it is the objective obverse of the self in

feeling. The self and the real stand intimately related in feeling, while in knowledge they stand apart. A feeling of difference through, though subordinated to the feeling of identity, and as a result, delight arises or mutatis mutandis beauty emerges.

The real, it may be said, does not exist apart from consciousness, and thus it is intensional. But truth, as Bhattacharyya has suggested, is freed from its reference to consciousness. The real, then, is always real to someone's consciousness. "Reality, in all its manifestations, reveals itself in the emotional and imaginative background of our mind. We know it, not because we can think of it, but because we directly feel it"[13]. Since truth subsists apart from consciousness it is not enjoyed, but the real is.

The real is the individual apprehended in creative intuition. Kant's thesis that aesthetic judgment is always singular; Croce's idea that art is the knowledge of the individual; and Cassirer's view that beauty consists in the sympathetic vision of things, are all pointers to the category of the real in art-experience.

It is also notice-worthy in this connection that the category of the illusion is never used by Indian thinkers. In the West art is customarily regarded as illusion. It may have been a sort of a hangover of the Platonic tradition. Art is said to exist in imagination, and a lot of things such as images, streams, illusions and hallucinations exist in imagination. To

say that something exists in imagination is to talk of a manner or form of existence. It is an ontological question. One of the many reasons for considering the art object as illusory may be stated as the following. Clive Bell[14] said that significant form evokes emotions that are different from the emotions of ordinary life. Susan Langer[15] points to the detachment from actuality, or the otherness as indicative of the very nature of art. They appear to argue that the illusoriness arises partly from the fact that the art object is cut off from the mundane world of practical desires. Alexander[16] also speaks of 'the beautiful' as in a certain sense illusory. The features, he says, are impute in art to the material do not belong to it, are in general foreign to it. The marble which looks alive is itself a block of stone.

The word 'illusion' has an air of uneasiness about it. Paul Ziff was right in pointing it out that we are deceived by illusion but we are not deceived by a work of art. What is of more interest to us is that the non-practical character of art does not entail the fact that it is illusory. The word lokottara is used by the Sanskrit writers, but none of them ever suggests that art is an illusion. On the contrary, the very fact that art and its experience is lokottara is taken to constitute an order of reality higher than the Vyāvahārika or the practical. Kant's idea that the aesthetic judgment is not logical but reflective somehow manages to rescue art experience from the illusoriness traditionally ascribed to it in the West. He relates it, of course,

within the framework of his epistemology, to a dimension of the noumena by turning art into the symbolical mode of apprehension of the manifold.

5. Both Tagore and Bhattacharyya are important continuators of the theory of einfulung. Tagore's notion of the anubhuti aspect of the aesthetic experience, are pointers towards the case. Aesthetic experience, for Tagore, is essentially an "education of sympathy"[17], and the delight that art gives us is the delight of realising ourselves outside us. Its other name is unity, which Tagore says, is the property of the soul.

The theory of einfulung seeks to establish that delight in beauty is a joyous feeling of sympathy. Perception of beauty is a kind of apperception, i.e., a real psychic feeling into the object of experience. And creation in art is sympathetic symbolism. The aesthetic character of an object is not a quality of that object but rather an activity of our ego. Lippo[18] has pointed it out that "aesthetische Einfulung" is not only indifferent to the question of truth and falsehood, but further, can only be felt in aesthetic contemplation, when we are completely released from the practical interests and momentary moods of ordinary life. The point is that there occurs a detachment of the aesthetic emotion from the self. A banishment of the egoistical impulses is the necessary, if not sufficient, condition of aesthetic experience, a contemplative attitude saturated by feeling.

The contemplative character of the aesthetic experience implies that there is no attempt to alter the object either for the acquisition of knowledge, or for the attainment of some useful purpose. It is simply enjoyed. The very absence of concern is disinterestedness that is delight. The Sanskrit term līlā connotes it.

A theory of appearance issues from the disinterestedness of the aesthetic experience. Disinterestedness of the artistic spirit transforms the world of everyday experience into a world of appearance. The German word Schein, employed by Schiller in his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, connotes 'appearance'. It is improperly understood as 'illusion'. An appearance is a pure spectacle of an unique individual. Descartes, it may be mentioned, had noticed in Discourse on Method[19], that in painting only the chief of all the different faces of a body is selected to let the light fall on, and it is allowed to appear in so far as it can be seen while looking at the principal one. A transformation of this kind is to be regarded as a consequence and a corollary of genuine aesthetic detachment. If appearance or symbolism is to be regarded as an ultimate and irreducible feature of our experience of beauty, then disinterestedness is the key consciousness.

Tagore provides us with a theory of appearance that observes special mention. He says, "when you deprive truth of its appearance,

it loses the best part of its reality"[20]. Elsewhere he had remarked that "art is maya"[21]. Maya is not illusion, but truth as it appears to us. It is the real, encountered in the aesthetic experience. Let us recall what the Isa Upanisad[22] says, the face of truth is covered as with a brilliant shield, as with a golden ligd. The essence and the image do not fall apart, rather it is the essence which throws out the form as a symbol of itself. Māyā is appearance, but not illusion; it is rooted in truth. It has the "taste-value"[23] of existence. The real, as Tagore says, is truth made humanly significant, brought within the range of human emotions. When we can modulate our relation with the truth of existence, i.e., when it becomes possible for us to look at it disinterestedly, our experience of life yields delight. Such has been Tagore's non-illusionistic and aesthetic interpretation of the concept of māyā .

6. Tagore, Sri Aurobindo and Bhattacharyya have all subscribed to attitude theory of art. An attitude theory of art concentrates on the beholder's response. The attitude theory was significantly formulated by Kant, and Schopenhauer followed, making disinterestedness a central element of the aesthetic experience. Later thinkers such as Croce, Bullough and others have defended versions of the aesthetic attitude theory within the Western tradition.

A highly developed aesthetic attitude theory is found in the Locāna of Abhinavagupta. For him, the essence of the aesthetic

lies not in any feature of the aesthetic object, but in the spectator's consciousness or mode of perception. A special mental state is at least a necessary, if not also sufficient, condition for aesthetic experience. Tagore, Sri Aurobindo and Bhattacharyya have subscribed to their respective versions of the aesthetic attitude theory. But there is a difference between the Western and the Indian versions of the aesthetic attitude theories. No Indian version of the theory distinguishes the creator's and the beholder's experiences. The notion of Sahrdaya transitively connects the one with the other. It appears that the aesthetic experience could not occur in a solipsistic universe. A non-solipsistic framework has to be presupposed only if the aesthetic experience is universalizable. Universalizability of the aesthetic experience is not an affair of judgment alone as in Kant, rather the unity of disinterested consciousness implies that such a mode of being is of necessarily universal import. The dropping of self-consciousness renders the experience universal, distributively identical with the creator's as well as the beholder's.

7. There have been challenges to the thesis of disinterestedness. Nietzche, for example, challenged it. In his Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzche has rediculed the idea of disinterestedness as "mystical" and "witchery"[24]. But the rejection has been due to a serious misunderstanding. The principle of disinterestedness simply signifies that the creative or contemplative moment is not overshadowed by organic or practical interests such as appetite for

food, or acquisitive desire, religious or speculative issues. No one seriously maintains devotion that beauty awakens in the soul, and the spirit of selfless service are not part and parcel of the truly artistic vision. Disinterestedness involves absorption in the aesthetic experience itself, all alien and irrelevant interests are excluded. It is in this sense that the aesthetic attitude may be described as disinterested.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. CJ, Section 60.
2. Lectures on Ethics, tr. Louis Infield, p. 78.
3. CJ, Section 32.
4. Schopenhauer, A., The World as Idea, Section 41.
5. Saundaryalaharī, Verse No. 100.
6. Aesthetics, p. 80.
7. Tagore, R., The Meaning of Art, New Delhi, 1983, p. 8.
8. Ibid., p. 9.
9. Ibid., p. 9.
10. Studies in Philosophy, Vol. II, "The Concept of Philosophy", p. 176.
11. On Art and Aesthetics, p. 73.
12. Ibid., p. 73.
13. Ibid., p. 73 "... reality is the definition of the infinite which relates truth to the person. Reality is human", p. 76.
14. Art, Chatto and Windus, 1914, p. 4.
15. Feeling and Form, 1959, p. 46.
16. Beauty and Other Forms of Value, Macmillan, 1933, p. 36.
17. Personality, p. 116.
18. As referred to by Listowel in A Critical History of Modern Aesthetics, London, 1933, p. 69.
19. Part V.

20. Verse no. 15. It should be interesting to look at Sri Aurobindo's commentary on it.

21. Personality, p. 20.

22. Beyond Good and Evil, pp. 48 and 163.

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