

PART III

CONCLUDING REMARKS

We now propose to offer some general and critical remarks on some of the considerations made in Parts I and II. Let us begin with Kant, and then we shall pass over to the recent Indian thinkers. A. I. Kant used the term 'disinterested' to denote the impersonal character of the aesthetic consciousness, and it remains one of the best short descriptive formulas of the aesthetic attitude. In our opening chapter we have tried to show the British ancestry of Kant's ideas. But difficulties present themselves in regard to Kant's acquaintance with British writers on aesthetics. Kant alludes to Hume, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Burke; but it is never clear precisely to which of their works he is referring. It is not known, for example, which of Hume's works on taste or the fine arts Kant actually read. Yet to the student of the history of ideas it is tempting to relate the concept of taste, handed down from Shaftesbury to Hume, with its subsequent transformation at Kant's hands. The history of a concept is a rewarding enterprise to pursue and this is what we intended to do in the opening chapter of Part I.

2. Recently it has become fashionable to consider the Part One of the Critique of Judgment in the light of 'phenomenology'. It is no doubt true that it has been concerned with the nature of of the aesthetic consciousness. Yet his concern has been marked

by an epistemological stant. He appears to be no less concerned about the possibility of a particular type of judgment, i.e. the judgment of Taste, which he says, is reflective and aesthetical. It is indeed arguable that what Kant does in Part One of the third Critique is analytic aesthetics. He asks, how are judgments of the beautiful possible? Or, how aesthetic evaluation in general is to be explained. For Kant's neo-classic philosophic temperament, 'beauty' is the central concept of the aesthetic, just as the concept of cause is central to his theory of Knowledge. Kant teaches us to ask how assertions of aesthetic worth are to be justified. Is it possible to give an analysis of aesthetic sensibility such that judgments of value do not emerge as mere reports of subjective feeling, but lay claim to universal agreement? Are there certain presuppositions of the aesthetic that might support its claim to autonomy? Although Kant's kind of analysis is of a special sort that he calls "transcendental" or "critical", his aim has been similar to that of many twentieth-century writers on aesthetics. Analysis or philosophical clarification having been Kant's sole purpose, his elucidation of aesthetic concepts can certainly be called analytic aesthetics.

3. We have noticed that many of the issues raised in the Part One of the third Critique have their origin in the first as well as Kant's writings on ethics. The distinction of form and matter is a case at hand. In the Foundations (or the Groundwork)

Kant's interest is in the non-empirical or the "pure". A "pure" moral action is one committed exclusively out of the pure sense of duty. A similar parallel holds in the case of aesthetic judgment. Many non-aesthetic or adventitious interests often overlay or belie our perception. It has appeared to us that for Kant, purity is evidently an ideal, 'disinterestedness' is a regulative notion. Though there are clear cases, however, rare, of action done from a "pure" sense of duty, or of "pure" aesthetic judgment, even these should not be called indubitable. Such cases can be contrasted with mixed actions or aesthetic judgments. Kant's explanation of erroneous aesthetic judgment is an integral part of showing how aesthetic judgments can be veracious.

Kant may be taken to believe aesthetic judgment or belief to be a kind of knowledge claim. We may accordingly like to ask whether such judgment could be erroneous. How can a "pure" aesthetic judgment, as defined by disinterestedness, universality, necessity, etc., be mistaken? To begin with, it is possible that one does not know how to use "beautiful" or some other word characteristic of aesthetic discourse. But it would be a case of ineptness in language, and not an error in aesthetic judgment. Another trivial way of making a mistaken aesthetic judgment would be in using the wrong name or title of a work.

But a more serious and interesting source of error follows from Kant's distinction between "pure" and "dependent" beauty.

Aesthetic judgment might err by confounding the two sorts of beauty. The former presupposes no concept of what the object judged actually is, or ought to be, whereas the latter depends upon criteria of perfection. Confusion of "pure" with "dependent" beauty is a confusion of reference. Judgments based upon mere sensation, emotion, utility, morality, etc., are mistaken. A judgment of "dependent" beauty is a disguised intellectual judgment of perfection. Essences or determinant concepts are not to shape aesthetic judgments, because such concepts are no more than atrophied conventions or reveal lapses of creativity in search of new expression.

Another source of erroneous aesthetic judgment follows from Kant's distinction between "autonomy" and "heteronomy" of taste. Taste must be "autonomous", for it is not worth having if it is not one's own. Genuine aesthetic judgment must be based on one's own sensibilities. When we permit someone to take over our moral conscience, we forfeit our dignity; and when we permit someone to dictate our taste, we lose part of our individuality. Heteronomy of taste is always a report upon other persons' sensibilities, for example, those of a great critic. Most forms of heteronomy are based upon what is accepted by someone of note who holds sway over the socio-aesthetic scene. Other forms of heteronomy draw their strength from a small elite or coterie.

A paradox surfaces in Kant's account of erroneous aesthetic judgment in terms of confusions of reference and heteronomy of taste. Kant maintains that aesthetic judgment cannot be based upon determinate concepts. If aesthetic judgment is, say, about style or genre, then such judgment would be, for Kant, not "pure", but either technical or even theoretical judgment. In effect, judgment based upon definite or determinate knowledge of artistic style or genre would involve judgment of "dependent beauty". On the other hand, if determinate concepts are not required in aesthetic judgment, the danger of confusing form with subjective mood and feeling might become greater.

Kant would concede that aesthetic judgment of "dependent beauty" does involve determinate concepts. And hence "non pure" aesthetic judgments may be erroneous because of inadequate or false belief. But whether aesthetic judgment of "free beauty" might not be erroneous in some way is also a question of importance. Given that "pure" aesthetic judgment must be founded solely upon disinterested pleasure and form, it might be asked whether such pleasure be known by introspection or reflection. Introspection is hardly an infallible avenue to self-knowledge. When Kant says that aesthetic judgment is "reflective", what does he really mean? He means not "introspecting", but simply subsuming a particular representation under the feelings of pleasure or displeasure. An explanation of the source of error for "pure" aesthetic judgment may be given according to what Kant has said in

the Foundations, namely, that the "strictest examination" of our own motives can never lead to the absolute certainty that our motive was the "pure" good will. Similarly one can never be certain that any perception or judgment is free from all empirical admixture. Kant himself describes sensations, emotions, and determinate concepts as hindrances to pure judgment of form. He opposes the sensuous to form as he opposes inclination to duty. The restriction of "pure" aesthetic judgment to form is an ideal. It may be unexceptional to say that aesthetic form is an analogue of moral duty. Parallels between the two are striking; both are pure ideals and universally binding. Just as introspection of motives might well disclose motives other than duty, so reexamination of the aesthetic object might disclose much that is gratuitous and sensuous rather than formal.

4. One might feel uneasy over Kant's account of non-conceptual nature of aesthetic judgment. We cannot describe an object as art unless we know it as intentional 'under a definite concept'. We may not know how that intention was realized. Yet our judgment on the beauty of the work cannot be determined by the rule or concept by which the object is constructed. So either we describe it merely as a beautiful object, or we must use the concept or rule determining its production and fail to judge its beauty. In the first case, the process becomes separate from and arbitrary to the experience of beauty. In the second, we seem unable to judge that it is a work of art that is beautiful. Both

alternatives are unsatisfactory because they preclude an understanding of fine art, its production, or its nature. Is there a way out?

5. Disinterestedness is the criterion "by which particular feelings of pleasure may be decided to have the requisite status for justifying a judgment of taste'. To decide that our's is an aesthetic judgment, we consider whether our pleasure may not have been caused by an object rather than being the experience of a judgment and its relation to cognitive faculties. If the judgment is disinterested i.e. if our pleasure arises from the judgment alone and so is free of interest, then we may identify it as a disinterested aesthetic pleasure. That is, our actual aesthetic judgments are made on the basis of reflection on disinterestedness. It is a reflection we must carry out for ourselves and which recommends itself to others. A subject's certainty in his own case becomes a crucial issue, and we must acknowledge this difficulty. Disinterestedness is not self-evident characteristics of objects or experience. It does not appear to us in consciousness in the way our experience of pleasure or pain does. That it is possible to justify the exercise of aesthetic judgment transcendently does not mean that we cannot be mistaken. Kant proposes that only another's experience of his own aesthetic judgment can go to conform a subject's own singular judgment. To understand aesthetic judgments we must not only explain what the source of our pleasure is, but also anticipate other's judgments by seeing

that the source of our judgment is a common one. To make a judgment is a claim about what we should look for in subjects for them to be suitably like ourselves. In making a judgment of taste its subject is also recommending a point of view from which to regard subjects.

Hence communication governs judgments, since an interest in making aesthetic judgments is a consequence of living in society. Fine art, says Kant, is humaniora, the faculty of being able to communicate universally one's inmost self¹. Art brings our subjectivity into the public sphere, it treats subjects as rational and feeling ends in themselves. Beauty promotes enlightenment. Aesthetic judgments are based on a subjective feeling, and as beauty denotes our experience rather than objects, aesthetic experience is to be understood as a relation between subjects. Tagore reminds us that the word sāhitya for literature has its origin in sahitatva or togetherness of men as feeling ends. Beauty is an experience of mind in judgment rather than a quality of objects.

6. Kant's interest in the aesthetic is centred upon the beautiful, his concern with aesthetic autonomy also centres upon judgments of taste. It may be noted that for Kant, judgments of the sublime are not autonomous; they are founded upon morality. The autonomy of aesthetic judgment refer uniquely to "pure" aesthetic judgments of taste. Kant's idea of ethical autonomy is

well-known. Are there parallels between his conceptions of ethical and aesthetic autonomy?

One might argue that there is a tension between form and enjoyment in Kant's aesthetic. Insofar as aesthetic judgment is "pure", it is autonomous, but at the cost of empty formalism. Insofar as aesthetic judgment rests upon sensuous interests, it is enjoyable but at the price of heteronomy. Similarly, do the postulates of practical reason undermine the absolute autonomy of the moral agent? This is another tension. But the tensions seem resolvable, both in Kant's aesthetics and in his ethics. What gives a moral agent autonomy is his legislating the moral law for himself, a law that he has self constructed and imposed upon his behaviour evinces his superiority over inclinations. Likewise, aesthetic judgment is autonomous because it imposes forms of the understanding and imagination upon the sensible manifold. The "matter" of such judgment is not hostile to, or incompatible with the "form" of aesthetic judgment. Autonomous aesthetic judgment organizes and "informs" the sensible manifold. In a similar way, the freedom and autonomy of the moral agent do not reside in his power to subvert sensuous feelings or happiness, but rather in his ability to order sensibility and inclinations in the light of moral law. Kant in his Lectures on Ethics says that "to renounce happiness is to differentiate it from morality in a transcendental and unnatural way"². Autonomous aesthetic judgment must spring from one's own sensibility, just as autonomous ethical judgment is produced from one's own will.

No judgment of taste is determined by either concepts or precepts, and yet we find Kant differentiating autonomy and isolationism : "Taste ... is among all faculties and talents the very one that stands most in need of examples of what has in the course of culture maintained itself longest in esteem"³. Aesthetic judgment is autonomous by being familiar with the classics, though not dominated by them. There is no need to cut ourselves off from what critics or qualified persons might say about a work of art.

Kant does not argue that art should not be enjoyed. He maintains instead that enjoyment and natural attraction cannot be the determining grounds of aesthetic judgment. In his ethical theory, Kant does not oppose duty to inclination but contrasts them. One might actually enjoy doing what one believes to be obligatory. Yet the motive of the action, if it is to have moral worth, can only be the sense of duty, not desire for our own pleasure or even that of other persons. In his aesthetic theory a similar contrast is drawn between aesthetic discernment of form and enjoyment.

7. Kant's aesthetics has a human message. The aesthetic points to man's dual nature, sensuous as well as rational. Sensuous passivity gratifies or stimulates, whereas aesthetic judgment brings about the play of the mental faculties, which results in a peculiarly human or intellectual pleasure. Aesthetic judgment recalls, as does the ethical, one's superiority to

sensibility and the phenomenal world. Just as moral duty recalls the individual to his citizenship as a free agent in the supersensible world, so contemplating aesthetic objects unites the world of Nature with the world of reason. It is as if disinterested pleasure quieted man's phenomenal will. This is how Schopenhauer has interpreted Kant's teaching. Judging aesthetically places one outside the phenomenal world of cause and effect, the habitat of ordinary perceptual judgments. Art is a vehicle of "will-less" perception⁴.

B.1. We may now turn to the recent Indian thinkers, who share a good deal of family resemblances with Kant's idea of aesthetics as the analysis of aesthetic effects, or the study of the effects produced by the contemplation of Nature, works of art, or even experiences of life itself. Kant is often described as having propounded an 'attitude theory' of art, based upon the feature of the aesthetic impression called 'disinterestedness'. It is introspective in nature. All the thinkers we have considered in Part II of the present dissertation have shared the belief that it is the inward world, of which the external circumstances are but the reflection, which is essentially the world of aesthetic culture. And from this inner world, aesthetic culture is carried over not only into material features of our existence, but also transfused into our spiritual needs and strivings. Our whole psychic life is permeated with this mysterious aesthetic culture. There has been a long tradition in India of such a sensitiveness

to life. A Samkarācārya considered composing of a poem as an worshipful act⁵. Culture, as distinct from learning, education in the fullest sense, pure humanity, with what is best and without what is worst in human nature, rests fundamentally upon such an education of the heart, upon such an aesthetic philosophy of life.

Edward Bullough, in his essay "The Modern Conception of Aesthetics"⁶ has described Vedānta as the philosophy of the aesthetic type. One is exhorted in Vedānta to bracket, as it were, the domain of the Vyāvahārika, so that one's encounter with one's deeper self as a state of bliss be possible. The Vyāvahārika is the domain of the natural standpoint, the empirical, the pragmatic and the biological. Now to the aesthetic consciousness the entire meaning or import of the experiences of the Vyāvahārika order of being is transmuted. Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself becomes an end in itself. The concept of rasa is intended to make room for an aesthetic interpretation of experience.

2. Indian thinkers, especially Tagore and Sri Aurobindo do not seem to argue from a division of the human psyche into willing, thinking and feeling. Of course there are modes of consciousness such as the practical or the scientific. These are attitudes of the consciousness. One may say that science represents a construction of the universe in terms of causality, while ethics is the interpretation of existence in terms of finality. The

scientific attitude is retrospectively explanatory; the ethical is prospective. The aesthetic attitude rests in the object it contemplates without transcending it either forwards or backwards. It is, we may say, neither retrospective nor prospective, but immanent. The delight of the aesthetic consciousness is possessed inwardly.

The Indian point of view is inclined to the idea that every thought, every emotion, every act of will implies the other two. The convergence of the yogas, as in the Bhagavad Gītā, is a decisive instance. And this is true not only of Art, but of Nature and Life when these are viewed aesthetically. The immanent contemplativeness of the aesthetic attitude is the magical wand which invests all things it touches with a charm and interest which, considered as products of antecendent causes, or as means to a purpose, they cannot possibly possess. Tagore insists that beauty reveals itself only when the screen of the commonplace is lifted from the face of things.

3. Most of the objects we encounter in our daily life "are eclipsed by the shadow of our own self"⁷. The aesthetic object, in so far as it is aesthetic, is temporarily severed from its relation to, and its bearing upon, our practical self. The centre of gravity is, so to speak, shifted from the personal ego to the thing contemplated. Disinterestedness implies objectivity. The personality is lost in, and spontaneously surrendered to, the object, only to live with twofold vigour and intensity in its contemplation. This is the meaning of aesthetic objectivity : "the

disinterested perception of the real"⁸, as Tagore has said. Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya would agree with the poet's insight that in aesthetic experience "reality is presented to us on the pedestal of its own absolute value"⁹.

4. It is distinctive of recent Indian thought that the category of the real is invoked in connection with aesthetic experience. For Tagore, it is the real which is the object of aesthetic experience. And since aesthetic experience is of the nature of delight owing to its "self-possession" as Sri Aurobindo has suggested, it is the real, rather than truth, that can be contemplatively enjoyed. Bhattacharyya's remark that the real alone can be enjoyed¹⁰ bears perspicaciously upon the issue.

What does it mean to say that the real can be enjoyed? In Tagore we find an explication of the category of the real. The real is the absolute for aesthetic experience or attitude. There is the Cartesian primacy of the personal experience with which Tagore starts : "The reality of my own self is immediate and indubitable to me"¹¹. But there has to be an outer criteria for the inner state : "whatever else affects me in a like manner is real for myself, and it inevitably attracts and occupies any attention for its own sake, blends itself with my personality, making it richer and larger and causing it delight"¹². The passage just cited illustrates how and why it is possible to take delight in the real, since it is the objective obverse of the self in

feeling. The self and the real stand intimately related in feeling, while in knowledge they stand apart. A feeling of difference through, though subordinated to the feeling of identity, and as a result, delight arises or mutatis mutandis beauty emerges.

The real, it may be said, does not exist apart from consciousness, and thus it is intensional. But truth, as Bhattacharyya has suggested, is freed from its reference to consciousness. The real, then, is always real to someone's consciousness. "Reality, in all its manifestations, reveals itself in the emotional and imaginative background of our mind. We know it, not because we can think of it, but because we directly feel it"¹³. Since truth subsists apart from consciousness it is not enjoyed, but the real is.

The real is the individual apprehended in creative intuition. Kant's thesis that aesthetic judgment is always singular; Croce's idea that art is the knowledge of the individual; and Cassirer's view that beauty consists in the sympathetic vision of things, are all pointers to the category of the real in art-experience.

It is also notice-worthy in this connection that the category of the illusion is never used by Indian thinkers. In the West art is customarily regarded as illusion. It may have been a sort of a hangover of the Platonic tradition. Art is said to exist in imagination, and a lot of things such as images, streams, illusions and hallucinations exist in imagination. To

say that something exists in imagination is to talk of a manner or form of existence. It is an ontological question. One of the many reasons for considering the art object as illusory may be stated as the following. Clive Bell¹⁴ said that significant form evokes emotions that are different from the emotions of ordinary life. Susan Langer¹⁵ points to the detachment from actuality, or the otherness as indicative of the very nature of art. They appear to argue that the illusoriness arises partly from the fact that the art object is cut off from the mundane world of practical desires. Alexander¹⁶ also speaks of 'the beautiful' as in a certain sense illusory. The features, he says, are imputed in art to the material do not belong to it, are in general foreign to it. The marble which looks alive is itself a block of stone.

The word 'illusion' has an air of uneasiness about it. Paul Ziff was right in pointing it out that we are deceived by illusion but we are not deceived by a work of art. What is of more interest to us is that the non-practical character of art does not entail the fact that it is illusory. The word lokottara is used by the Sanskrit writers, but none of them ever suggests that art is an illusion. On the contrary, the very fact that art and its experience is lokottara is taken to constitute an order of reality higher than the Vyāvahārika or the practical. Kant's idea that the aesthetic judgment is not logical but reflective somehow manages to rescue art experience from the illusoriness traditionally ascribed to it in the West. He relates it, of course,

within the framework of his epistemology, to a dimension of the noumena by turning art into the symbolical mode of apprehension of the manifold.

5. Both Tagore and Bhattacharyya are important continuators of the theory of einfutung. Tagore's notion of the anubhuti aspect of the aesthetic experience, are pointers towards the case. Aesthetic experience, for Tagore, is essentially an "education of sympathy"¹⁷, and the delight that art gives us is the delight of realising ourselves outside us. Its other name is unity, which Tagore says, is the property of the soul.

The theory of einfutung seeks to establish that delight in beauty is a joyous feeling of sympathy. Perception of beauty is a kind of apperception, i.e., a real psychic feeling into the object of experience. And creation in art is sympathetic symbolism. The aesthetic character of an object is not a quality of that object but rather an activity of our ego. Lippo¹⁸ has pointed it out that "aesthetische Einfutung" is not only indifferent to the question of truth and falsehood, but further, can only be felt in aesthetic contemplation, when we are completely released from the practical interests and momentary moods of ordinary life. The point is that there occurs a detachment of the aesthetic emotion from the self. A banishment of the egoistical impulses is the necessary, if not sufficient, condition of aesthetic experience, a contemplative attitude saturated by feeling.

The contemplative character of the aesthetic experience implies that there is no attempt to alter the object either for the acquisition of knowledge, or for the attainment of some useful purpose. It is simply enjoyed. The very absence of concern is disinterestedness that is delight. The Sanskrit term līlā connotes it.

A theory of appearance issues from the disinterestedness of the aesthetic experience. Disinterestedness of the artistic spirit transforms the world of everyday experience into a world of appearance. The German word Schein, employed by Schiller in his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, connotes 'appearance'. It is improperly understood as 'illusion'. An appearance is a pure spectacle of an unique individual. Descartes, it may be mentioned, had noticed in Discourse on Method¹⁹, that in painting only the chief of all the different faces of a body is selected to let the light fall on, and it is allowed to appear in so far as it can be seen while looking at the principal one. A transformation of this kind is to be regarded as a consequence and a corollary of genuine aesthetic detachment. If appearance or symbolism is to be regarded as an ultimate and irreducible feature of our experience of beauty, then disinterestedness is the key consciousness.

Tagore provides us with a theory of appearance that deserves special mention. He says, "when you deprive truth of its appearance,

it loses the best part of its reality"²⁰. Elsewhere he had remarked that "art is maya"²¹. Maya is not illusion, but truth as it appears to us. It is the real, encountered in the aesthetic experience. Let us recall what the Isa Upanisad²² says, the face of truth is covered as with a brilliant shield, as with a golden ligd. The essence and the image do not fall apart, rather it is the essence which throws out the form as a symbol of itself. Māyā is appearance, but not illusion; it is rooted in truth. It has the "taste-value"²³ of existence. The real, as Tagore says, is truth made humanly significant, brogght within the range of human emotions. When we can modulate our relation with the truth of existence, i.e., when it becomes possible for us to look at it disinterestedly, our experience of life yields delight. Such has been Tagore's non-illusionistic and aesthetic interpretation of the concept of māyā.

6. Tagore, Sri Aurobindo and Bhattacharyya have all subscribed to attitude theory of art. An attitude theory of art concentrates on the beholder's response. The attitude theory was significantly formulated by Kant, and Schopenhauer followed, making disinterestedness a central element of the aesthetic experience. Later thinkers such as Croce, Bullough and others have defended versions of the aesthetic attitude theory within the western tradition.

A highly developed aesthetic attitude theory is found in the Locāna of Abhinavagupta. For him, the essence of the aesthetic

lies not in any feature of the aesthetic object, but in the spectator's consciousness or mode of perception. A special mental state is at least a necessary, if not also sufficient, condition for aesthetic experience. Tagore, Sri Aurobindo and Bhattacharyya have subscribed to their respective versions of the aesthetic attitude theory. But there is a difference between the Western and the Indian versions of the aesthetic attitude theories. No Indian version of the theory distinguishes the creator's and the beholder's experiences. The notion of Sahrdaya transitively connects the one with the other. It appears that the aesthetic experience could not occur in a solipsistic universe. A non-solipsistic framework has to be presupposed only if the aesthetic experience is universalizable. Universalizability of the aesthetic experience is not an affair of judgment alone as in Kant, rather the unity of disinterested consciousness implies that such a mode of being is of necessarily universal import. The dropping of self-consciousness renders the experience universal, distributively identical with the creator's as well as the beholder's.

7. There have been challenges to the thesis of disinterestedness. Nietzsche, for example, challenged it. In his Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche has ridiculed the idea of disinterestedness as "mystical" and "witchery"²⁴. But the rejection has been due to a serious misunderstanding. The principle of disinterestedness simply signifies that the creative or contemplative moment is not overshadowed by organic or practical interests such as appetite for

food, or acquisitive desire, religious or speculative issues. No one seriously maintains devotion that beauty awakens in the soul, and the spirit of selfless service are not part and parcel of the truly artistic vision. Disinterestedness involves absorption in the aesthetic experience itself, all alien and irrelevant interests are excluded. It is in this sense that the aesthetic attitude may be described as disinterested.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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3. CJ, Section 32.
4. Schopenhauer, A., The World as Idea, Section 41.
5. Saundaryalaharī, Verse No. 100.
6. Aesthetics, p. 80.
7. Tagore, R., The Meaning of Art, New Delhi, 1983, p. 8.
8. Ibid., p. 9.
9. Ibid., p. 9.
10. Studies in Philosophy, Vol. II, "The Concept of
Philosophy", p. 176.
11. On Art and Aesthetics, p. 73.
12. Ibid., p. 73.
13. Ibid., p. 73 "... reality is the definition of the
infinite which relates truth to the person.
Reality is human", p. 76.
14. Art, Chatto and Windus, 1914, p. 4.
15. Feeling and Form, 1959, p. 46.
16. Beauty and Other Forms of Value, Macmillan, 1933, p. 36.
17. Personality, p. 116.
18. As referred to by Listowel in A Critical History of
Modern Aesthetics, London, 1933, p. 69.
19. Part V.

20. Verse no. 15. It should be interesting to look at Sri Aurobindo's commentary on it.
21. Personality, p. 20.
22. Beyond Good and Evil, pp. 48 and 163.