

Challenge of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Its Origin, Causes and Effects

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Abstract

The origin of Boko Haram is a subject of great deal of debate and discussion. The fact is that the insurgency is posing severe challenge before the Nigerian State. It has led to numerous killings, attacks and loss of property worth billions of naira. These activities over a period of time are increasing. To understand the increasing momentum of the movement, the paper incorporates various theoretical perspectives, the study of which enables one to identify the factors-economic, political and psychological, which have created fertile ground for the emergence of the movement and also in accelerating its pace; which has serious implications both at the domestic as well as at the international level.

Key Words: Boko Haram, origin, economic, political, psychological, effects

1. Introduction

The recent killings in the north-east part of the country and similar killings in the past has led to the loss of life of thousands of innocent people and have destroyed properties worth billions of naira. For a number of years the group was treated as an internal Nigerian problem. However, this is not so in the present times as the study of Boko Haram's illicit and armed activities shows that they are increasingly taking place across the country's borders. When more than 200 girls were kidnapped in the town of Chibok in April, 2014, it was clear that neighboring countries and international community would need to co-ordinate their efforts (Barna, 2014, pp.5). According to Emmanuel Oladesu-

Since the end of the civil war no calamity of enormous proportion has befallen the fledgling nation-state more than the harrow unleashed by the dreadful sect-Boko-Haram. Many lives have been lost, property worth billion of naira have been destroyed. Nobody is insulated from the attack, government officials and buildings traditional rulers, police and military formations and church worshippers are target. On the daily basis there is panic... (Aro, pp.2).

The insurgents have moved from arming themselves with primitive weaponry to becoming a well armed insurgency. This becomes so much a matter of concern for the Nigerian government that in May last year Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in 3 of Nigeria's North-Eastern states including Borno. According to the President, the Boko Haram group constitutes a direct threat to Nigeria's very existence.

Owing to severe challenge the movement is posing before the Nigerian state it becomes pertinent to understand the causes which have created fertile grounds for giving dynamism to the movement. To identify the factors responsible for the growth of the movement, the present study has incorporated certain theories that explain the reasons for the outbreak of insurgency. But before examining these theories, the paper studies the origin and growth in intensity of Boko Haram. The paper also tries to understand the effects of Boko Haram insurgency and response to it at the national and international level.

2. Origin of the Boko Haram Movement and Growth in its Intensity

The very origin of Boko Haram is a matter of great deal of debate and discussion amongst scholars. This primarily arises owing to the confusion about the exact dates and who the actual founder of the movement was. Some scholars like Adibe trace its origin to the year 2001 or 2002. Others like Madibe traces its origin as early as in 1995 and argues that one Lawar Abubakar, who later left for further studies at the University of Medina, Saudi Arabia, actually founded the Boko Haram sect. Under Abubakar, the sect was known as Sahaba. According to Gusau, the origin can be traced to an evangelical group formed by Muslim students at the University of Maiduguri, Borno State, who reportedly felt dissatisfied with the Western education (Alozieuwa, 2012, pp:1-2).

Muhammed Yusuf to whom the formation is now generally ascribed assumed leadership after Abubakar's departure and "indoctrinated the sect with his own teachings, which he claimed were based on purity" (Alozieuwa, 2012, pp:2). Yusuf's notion of "purity" and teachings were inspired by the works of Ibn Taymiyya, a fourteenth century legal scholar, who preached Islamic fundamentalism and is considered a "major theorist" for radical groups in the Middle East (Alozieuwa, 2012, pp:2).

The obscurity surrounding its true origin explains why initially the sect had no specific name as its members attracted several descriptions where they operated based on the perception of the local population. Such names include Taliban and the Yussufiyyah. The sect soon became formally identified as Ahulsunna wal'jama'ah Hijra – 'Congregation of Followers of the Prophet involved in the Call to Islam and Religious Struggle'. The name Boko Haram is derived from the sect's anti-Western posturing, literally meaning 'Western education (book) /civilization is sin' (Alozieuwa, 2012, pp:2). According to a Newswatch magazine, in 2004 a substantial number of students in technical colleges in Maidiguri and Damaturu tore up their certificates of education and left their studies to join up for Quranic lessons and preaching(Farrell, 2012, pp:2).

What is noteworthy about the period between 2002 and 2009 is the fact that Mohammed Yusuf is believed to have successfully gained a huge followers of an age group between 17 and 30 years old. Many poor families and unemployed

youths from Northern Nigeria as well as neighboring countries such as Niger, Chad and Cameroon enrolled in Yusuf's religious complex which included a mosque and school used for ideological propagation. Boko Haram initiated social programmes aimed at helping the impoverished and the indigent. The group's rhetoric appeared to be populist. The movement benefitted immensely from the immediate post September 11 global context which was characterised by al-Qaeda's anti-western avowals calling for universal jihad. Inspite of widespread condemnation against September 11, terrorist attacks in the United States there was a prevailing mood among numerous young Muslims in the northern Nigeria which drew inspiration from the "guts" that Osama Bin Laden personified. The ensuing military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq commenced in 2001 and 2003 respectively coincided with diffuse events in Nigeria that in advertently created the ideal environment for Boko Haram to capitalize on.

It is important to briefly draw attention to another historical detail that may have also fed into the contemporary dynamics of support for Boko Haram's rise and insurgency. Prior to British colonization, the current region of north-eastern Nigeria was a territory under the sovereign control of the Bornu-Empire, composed of a majority of Kanuri- Muslims. However, the imposition of British control contributed to an increased allegiance of the local people to the Bornu Sultanate as well as profound dissatisfaction with the activities of the British authorities. It can be argued that this fuelled the rise of fundamentalism among the Kanuri people and later generated sympathy and popular support for Boko Haram.

The movement over a period of time has picked up its momentum. In 2009, after the death of Mohammed Yusuf, the movement's radicalization and extremism were accentuated under the leadership of Abubaker Shekau, who took over as head of the organization's core faction. Since Boko Haram reemerged in 2010, the intensity and scope of its attacks has grown and its international linkages have also been strengthened. (Barna, 2014, pp.7). Under the leadership of Muhammed Yusuf in the years between 2003 and 2009, Boko Haram concentrated its attacks mostly on the security forces and the police as well as against politicians, chiefs and other representatives of the state. Since 2010, state installations have been targeted on a large scale for instance, the December 2013 attacks on an air force base in Maiduguri in which two helicopters were burnt down and that on Yobe prison in June 2012 freeing 40 inmates. Besides targeting the Nigerian state, the supporters of Boko Haram movement have also attacked the Western institutions, most notably the United Nations headquarters in Abuja in August 2011. This was the first suicide bombing attack that killed 21 people. The increasing sophistication of the attacks indicated assistance from international networks, especially al-Shabaab (which operates in the Horn of Africa).and al-Qaeda Terrorist attacks in Abuja also reflects the increasing

geographical reach of the organisation. Fanning out from its stronghold in Maiduguri and Borno State, over the last five years, Boko Haram has also carried out attacks in the north eastern States of Kano, Yobe Adamawa and Bauchi. There is ongoing debate as to whether the movement has ambitions to increase its activities outside Nigeria, as its activities are on an increase in neighboring countries.

Since 2010 Boko Haram has also targeted banks and money conveys to fulfill their economic needs. The group has also attacked people in markets, bus stations, schools and universities. As per an estimate, the death toll as a result of Boko Haram activities is over 22,000 between July 2009 and July 2014 which includes 2000 deaths in 2014 (Barna, 2014, pp.8-9)

The increasing influence of Boko Haram therefore directs one to focus on some theories, the study of which enables one to trace certain factors that created conditions for the emergence and spread of the insurgency.

3. Theoretical Understanding of the Boko Haram Insurgency

Unlike the Niger Delta militancy which preceded Boko Haram, and which reflected its desire for a separate state from Nigeria for decades of neglect by the Nigerian state and multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta region, Boko Haram has refrained from articulating and formally presenting its grievances apart from its declared desire for the strict interpretation of Islamic Law in Nigeria.

Inspite of the complexity of the nature of the movement, one can incorporate certain theoretical perspectives, the study of which can facilitate the task of identifying the factors that have ignited the insurgency. These perspectives based on the review of the available literature can broadly be divided into two categories-one which lays focus on the internal conditions and the other that stresses the role of external forces in giving form to the movement. The former looks at socio-economic factors as well as deep seated political religious differences in the Nigerian society and the latter category characterizes the problem as part of global Islamic jihad and focuses on the sect's links with international terror groups such as al Qaeda or its affiliates as al Shabaab or the al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahreb. Within this external category, there is another view that views it as conspiratorial- to achieve the predicted disintegration of Nigeria. The conspiratorial thesis has within it the sub-theme that Nigeria is being targeted by envious and troubled neighbors. The details of the theoretical understanding follow:

3.1 The Relational/Vengeance Theory:

Relational theory attempts to provide explanation for violent conflicts between groups by exploring sociological, political, economic, religious and historical

relationships between such groups. The belief is that cultural and value differences as well as group interests all influence relationships between individuals and groups in different ways. Thus, a number of conflicts grow out of a past history of conflict between groups that has led to the development of negative stereotypes, racial intolerance and discrimination (Faleti, 2006, pp: 54-55). ‘The differences in value invariably creates the “We” and “Others” dichotomy.’ The fact that “others” are perceived as different makes us feel they are entitled to less or are inferior by reason of [...] values. This disrupts the flow of communication between us and them and to that extent, twists perceptions that we have about each other’ (Faleti, 2006, pp: 55).

The state and other members of Nigerian society who are targets of Boko Haram’s violence may indeed find it difficult to understand the sect’s penchant for bloodletting. On the one hand, the former group becomes in the context the “We” and all efforts are being to secure it from savagery of the “Others”, the Boko Haram members. On the other hand, the latter group bond either by the common purpose of fighting the “unbelievers” for Allah or feeling of deprivation or both sees the remaining members of the Nigerian society as the “Others”. As a result mutual antagonism exists and can be violently expressed. On the part of Boko Haram, killings of members by government security forces-the “Others” attracts reprisals from it, the “We.” The retaliatory attacks against Muslims in the Gonin Gora area of Kaduna state by an irate mob following the multiple suicide attacks on churches in the state on Sunday June 17,2012 highlights the vengeance thrust of the “we” and “others” psychology. In this instance, the avengers-the Christians constituted the “we”, while the Muslims became the “Others”. The establishment of Alfurqan Islamic School, solely dedicated to the teaching of ethics opposed to Western civilization in Jalingo, capital of Taraba, a North Eastern state in Nigeria, exemplifies an effort to institutionalize the “we” and “others” dichotomy. More significantly nearly every decade of Nigeria’s contemporary history is replete with violence and conflicts that have religious undertones. Prior to Nigeria’s Civil War, thousands of Southerners Igbos of Christian orientation were killed by northern Hausas (Muslims) in 1966. In 1991, over 200 mostly southerner Christians, lost their lives while over 20 churches were burnt by Muslims reacting to news of a planned visit by German Christian evangelist Reinhard Bonnke to Nigeria. The 2000s ushered Nigerians into the bloodiest decade in which thousands have died as a result of Christian Muslim clashes and terrorist violence instigated by Boko Haram. Religion in some cases thus appears to be the language of politics exploited by both state and non-state actors towards ends that are essentially parochial (Olojo, 2013, pp.8). The relational/vengeance perspective therefore has provided a useful explanation of the Boko Haram (Alozieuwa, 2012, pp:4).

3.2 The Human Needs/ Socio-Economic Theory

The socio-economic perspective of the Boko Haram challenge in Nigeria, essentially attempts to de-emphasize the interpretation of this being a particularly Muslim or northern crisis. The perspective which identifies social conditions for the violence is anchored on the human needs theory of social conflicts. Its central thesis is that all human beings have basic needs which they seek to fulfill and failure caused by other individuals or groups to meet these needs could lead to conflict. The theory is similar to the frustration-aggression theory of violence which posits that aggression is always a consequence of frustration. According to the theory, relative deprivation is a perceived disparity between value expectation and value capabilities and that the lack of a need satisfaction- defined as a gap between aspirations and achievement generally- relies on the psychological state of frustration and aggressive attitudes emerging from it (Midlarsky, 1975:pp.29).

This perspective has its largest proponents from the intelligentsia and is particularly viewed by some foreign governments of countries like the USA and Britain as explanations for the problem. Nigeria's socio-economic indexes seem to validate the assumption of human needs theory. The socio-economic factors being adduced as the root causes of violence in Nigeria include unemployment, especially among the youth, poverty and a deteriorating standard of living, especially in the north. Hence for Jean Herskovits , 'it was clear in 2009 when the insurgency began that the root cause of violence and anger in both the north and south of Nigeria is endemic poverty and hopelessness' (Alozieuwa, 2012, pp.4). The existence of very high incident of poverty in Nigeria is generally seen as a northern phenomenon. Poverty is higher in the Boko Haram infected regions of the North-East, North-West and North Central. A study by Charles Soludo shows that the three northern regions has an average poverty incidence of 70.1% as compared to 34.9% of the South. In comparison with the southeast and south west zones, which have relative poverty rates of 67% and 59.1% respectively, the north- east and north west have higher figures of 76.3% and 77.7% of relative poverty (Olojo, 2013, pp.6-7). Thus 70% of the people living in the north live below one dollar per day (Alozieuwa, 2012, pp: 5).It is this high level of poverty that pushes people to become members of Boko Haram. In May 2013, the Nigerian government released dozens of women and teenagers previously detained as relatives of suspected Boko Haram members. Among the youths were individuals who confessed of previously accepting payments of 5000 Nigerian Naira from Boko Haram militants, who in turn provided them with kegs of fuel to set schools ablaze in Maiduguri, Borno State. This is indicative of the economic desperation expressed by thousands of youths who have been rendered vulnerable by the shortcomings of Nigeria's leadership over several decades. The high conflict potential therfore could indeed be a function of frustration caused by economic deprivation.

3.3 The Corruption Theory

The worsening intolerable levels of poverty in Nigeria are caused by reckless high level of corruption in the country. As rightly asserted by Adetoro that corruption has taken deep roots in the Nigerian society as the country was ranked 90th most corrupt nation in the world in 2001 (Adenrele, 2012, pp.24). Virtually all the Nigerian ministries and agencies are known for their corrupt practices with Police ranked as the most corrupt among them. This explains why the Boko Haram insurgency is equally aggravated by law enforcement agencies ‘complicity’. According to the Saturday Punch of 25 February 2012, the Nigerian General Inspector of Police and a Deputy Commissioner of Police had to be dismissed for negligence and conspiracy in the escape of one of the arrested leaders of Boko Haram. Even when it was reported that the explosives being used by the Boko Haram sects were stolen from warehouses in Sokoto, Borno, Bauchi and Gombe States in northern Nigeria, the security men were found culpable and the matters were not reported to the Police (Adisa, 2012). Similar ideas were expressed by Johnson (2011) who reported that 100s of extra-judicial killings and illegal public executions of Boko-Haram sects by the Nigerian Police as shown in Al-Jazeera television were allowed to go uninvestigated and unpunished as reported by Amnesty International. Utebor (2012) reported that a two term former Head of State and President of Nigeria, General Olusegun Obasanjo tagged the National Assembly political office holders as ‘rogues’ and ‘armed robbers’ due to their corrupt impetus especially in the oil scandal in Nigeria. This corroborated the earlier allegation of the Nigerian Central Bank Governor against Nigeria’s political office holders, who are less than 1% of the total population, for appropriating more than 25% of the national budgets to themselves. Consequently, it is logical to state that the reckless popularity of corruption in Nigeria created the platform for Boko Haram’s agitation for Sharia law in the country (Adenrele, 2012, pp. 24).

3.4 The Political Feud Theory

In political terms, the Boko Haram phenomenon is perhaps more interesting because of the specific historical context in which it is occurring. First, while other Muslims may want to dissociate themselves from its activities, Boko Haram remains an Islamic movement. It is also occurring in a multi-religious political setting in which religion itself is a major factor in determining the distribution of political power. Second, its emergence was preceded by intense political bickering between some mainly political actors in the north and counterparts in the south in the period leading to the electoral victory of President Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian and southerner. In a political environment in which the power of incumbency is a major factor in determining electoral success, the fact that the victor in the contest superintended over the machinery of the state at the time of the election is a critical variable in conveying a sense of fair play or otherwise to the losing side. Through ingenious political engineering by the Nigerian power elite, a power sharing arrangement

was devised which rotates central power between the north and south. After eight years in the south under Olusegun Obasanjo's presidency power had returned to the north in May 2007 under Yar'Adua's presidency and was supposed to remain there for another eight years. Despite the constitutional provision that guarantees his succession by his deputy, Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner, the north was sour for having 'lost' power again to the south by virtue of Yar'Adua's death in May 2010 barely three years into office. The sense of loss, manifested in the tension in which Nigeria was soaked in the pre-2011 general elections period (Farrel 2012, pp:1-2)

The political feud perspective is premised primarily on the argument that while the extra-judicial killing of the leadership of the Boko Haram in 2009 could have triggered a violent confrontation with the state, the severity that the violence has now assumed is the fallout of a fierce political battle in 2011. The outcry at that time resonated around forcing Jonathan to give up his 2011 presidential ambition to allow for a return of power to the north.

3.5 The Islamic Theoretic State Theory

The Boko Haram sect has hardly masked its intention to bring down the Nigerian government, the Kufur system, and ultimately Islamize Nigeria. Total Islamization of Nigeria under the Sharia law has always been the motive behind various religious riots in Northern Nigeria. This motive has a long history and can be traced back to the era of jihad of Usman Dan Fodio. According to Farouk (2012), the Boko Haram insurgency only believed in the Quranic verse which states that "Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors" (Adenrele, 2012, pp.21). Lengmang (2011: pp.101) notes the allegation that some segments of the northern Muslim population may be unhappy with the compromise of state-level shari'a coexisting side by side with a secular federal system. Hence, although this segment may arguably be small, they are increasingly becoming radicalized and more willing to periodically express themselves through violence. In a statement issued by Boko Haram in Maiduguri on April 24, 2011, Suleiman (2011) reported that their objectives were to abolish democracy and institute Sharia law as they claimed to be fighting for justice and Islamization of Nigeria. Alzawahiri, one of the spokesman of the Boko Haram group submitted that: "we would continue to fight until Islam is well established and the Muslims regain their freedom all over Nigeria. We would never be ready to compromise and we don't need amnesty. The only solution to what is happening is for the government to repent, jettison democracy, drop the constitution and adopt the laws in the Holy Quran" (Suleiman, 2011, pp.50). To re-echo their interest in Islamisation of Nigeria, Usigbe (2012) reported that President Jonathan was recently threatened to embrace Islam or resign. According to the report, a leader of the sect known as Abubakar Shekau submitted in the youtube video that:

“I call on you President Goodluck Jonathan, you should abandon this ungodly power, you should repent and forsake Christianity, including Obama ...” (Usigbe, 2012, pp.1).

Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria hold the vision of global political Islam, which is the overthrow of all worldly government and the enthronement of an Islamic theocratic state (Alozieuwa, 2012, pp: 8).

3.6 Conspiracy Theories

The conspiracy theories attempting to explain the Boko Haram crisis can be divided into two broad categories: one focusing on internal factors and other on external factors. Internal factors may include the disgruntled northern power elite who, having lost power are bent on bringing down Nigeria under a southern leadership. External factors may include powerful western states like the United States or neighboring African states envious of Nigeria’s progress and stability.

From the above brief discussion of various theories, one can identify certain factors that can explain the Boko Haram insurgency. These can be categorized under broad categories- economic, social and political. In the present paper, it is the economic and political factors that have been considered significant in explaining Boko Haram insurgency. It is these factors that create ground for the strengthening of social factors like religion and ethnicity. But for proper understanding of the role of economic and political factors one also needs to focus the psychological factors, the incorporation of which facilitate a better understanding of the reasons for the emergence of Boko Haram. The details of these factors follow:

Economic Factors

The economic disparity that prevails at both individual and regional level has created viable conditions for Boko Haram. The disparity existing at individual and regional level has a long history and can be traced back to the colonial period when the Britishers pursued differential policy. At the individual level differences have been created by factors like education. The southerners with better education than the northerners have experienced upward economic mobility while the northerners have lagged behind. In the creation of these economic differences the Britishers had a big role to play. By pursuing the policy of indirect rule, they did not make any attempt to bring changes in the Northern part. They were reluctant to introduce western education in the Northern part for they did not want any threat to their domination to emerge as had developed in the Southern region. The result was that the Northern region was left behind the Southern region in terms of education. One can get an idea of the variation between the two regions in terms of primary and secondary education from the 1962 Annual Digest of Education Statistics published by the Federal Ministry of Education. According to this, in 1962 there were 359,934

children in the Northern primary school and 1,266,566 children in the Eastern region. At the secondary level, there were 7,995 students in the North and 32,712 students in the East (Africa Diary, 1964, pp: 1832). The two regions North and South also differed in terms of enrollment of university students. For during 1966-67, the percentage of university students in the Northern part and the Southern region was 9% and 43.7% respectively (Rimlinger, 1976, pp: 43).

Persisting educational inequalities between different regions and ethnicities are now expressed in terms of states or zones. The Nigerian federation is currently made of 36 states which are then informally grouped into six zones-North-West, North-East, North-Central, South-West, South-East and South-South. The imbalance at all levels of education between these zones continues despite several government policies and programs. In 2000-2001, for instance the number of candidates seeking admission into the university showed that out of 36 states, the 6 states with largest number of candidates were all from the south; on the other hand, the 6 states with the least number of candidates were all from the north (Mustapha, 2004). The consequence of these educational disparities has been that the number of educated is higher in the Southern part than the Northern part. This disparity has two repercussions- a) the southerners were eligible for better economic opportunities as compared to the less qualified northerners and b) owing to lack of skills the northerners had to depend on the southerners who migrated to the north owing to the availability of economic opportunities. These two factors have played a vital role in generating a feeling of "relative deprivation" amongst the northerners. The idea of relative deprivation as propounded by scholars like T.R.Gurr, implies "actors" perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations and value capabilities. According to Gurr, value expectations generally stands for the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled and conditions of life which they think they are capable of getting and keeping. The discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities creates ground for the emergence of the frustration which then is released in the form of aggression (Gurr, 1970, pp: 24). The psychological theories that gained significance during the 1960's therefore are very significant in enabling one to understand the reasons for the emergence of the Boko Haram movement.

Besides the disparities at the individual level, the differential policies pursued by the government at the regional level have also contributed to the emergence of feeling of frustration amongst the northerners.

At the time when the nation attained its liberation there existed three important geographical regions- North, East and West. Between these regions, there prevailed numerous differences in terms of area, population prosperity and ethical composition. In terms of area, it is the Northern Region which is the largest followed by the Western region. If one sees the different regions in terms

of population, then it is the Northern region which is the largest; second was the Eastern region and then was the Western region. The variation between the regions also prevailed in terms of prosperity. The Northern region is the poorest while the other two regions are rich in resources like cocoa in the West and oil in the East (Forrest, 1993, pp:21). If one sees the regions in terms of ethnic composition, then one can conclude that each region is associated with the predominance of one particular ethnic group. In the Northern region it is the Hausa-Fulani; in the Western region, it is the Yorubas and in the Eastern region, it is the Ibos.

If one studies the economic development of the country in terms of industrialisation, one finds the concentration of industries in Lagos and low level of industrial development in the peripheral part of the country-North-East, North-West, Kwara and South-East (Rimlinger, 1976, pp: 50). The various studies therefore point out that manufacturing establishments are concentrated in several locations in the south with very few locations in the north.

The regional disparities prevailing have therefore created a ground amongst the northerners in generating amongst them a feeling of relative deprivation. The frustration generated by such deprivations has been played a vital role in giving momentum to the Boko Haram movement.

Besides the economic factors, one needs also to focus on certain political factors too in understanding the Boko Haram.

Political Factors:

What has been seen in the case of Nigeria that after its liberation in 1960, the reins of power has shifted in the hands of those rulers who have given more significance to the regions to which they belong and in the process they have sidelined the national interest. This gets clearly reflected in the way they formulated various policies. In the early years of liberation, power was vested in the leaders who basically hailed from the northern part of Nigeria. The northerners therefore greatly benefited from the policy of favoritism that was followed by the policy makers. The Prime Minister, a Northerner used his authority in such a way that the northerners occupied important position not only in the central government but also in the federal services. The Chairman of the Federal Republic Service Commission was a northerner. The permanent secretaries also belonged to the same group. In 1964, 14 of the 37 Nigerian employed as High Commissioners, Ambassadors and Charge-d'Affairs were Northerners, 3 of the 8 members of the board of the Nigerian Coal Corporation, 4 of the 11 Nigerian Railway Corporation and 6 of the 16 permanent secretaries were northerners (Nnoli 1978, pp:196).

Hence the northerners were in a position to exercise their domination not only on the basis of their merit but owing to the policy of favouritism that was pursued by their “own men” in the government. If one studies the political history of Nigeria, one finds that by and large the power has stayed in the hands of the leaders who basically hailed from the northern part of Nigeria. But inspite of have had the opportunity to produce majority of the Presidents and head of state, a careful analysis of their policy indicates that they have left the region barren thus arrested development. There is general failure of governance especially in the northern Nigeria. The region lags behind others on nearly all indices of human development. But the northern leaders have done nothing. In fact, they have exploited the ignorance of their people and have encouraged the traditional practices so that they can continue to rule without the poor masses challenging the status quo. They send their children to school abroad and upon returning home the kids take up important positions in government, big corporations or the private sector. Lacking skills or education or money, the almajiris and the talakawa continue to be used as pawns in the hands of the northern elites and politicians and have no chance of breaking free from this cycle of subjugation. The subjugation on the other is continued by employing all sorts of tools. One such tool is the Supreme Council of Sharia in Nigeria, which was formed in 1999. The policy pursued by the leaders therefore has facilitated the activities of Boko Haram (Raymond, 2013, pp: 1-2).

The northern elites therefore by using religion have succeeded in establishing a strong hold over the masses, who obey them without posing any question. So whenever this power has shifted from the northerners to the southerners, it has not been viewed positively by the northerners. This can well be seen in the present times. The shifting of power in the hands of Goodluck Jonathan has created lots of restlessness amongst the northerners. During his tenure that the Boko Haram activities have picked up great momentum because northerners perceive him as unresponsive to their needs.

The study of the above mentioned factors, therefore indicates that the movement which has accelerated its pace, is a product of not just one factor but numerous factors which are economic or political in nature and which have been given further momentum by the psychological factors.

4. Effects of Boko Haram and Response to it at National and International Level

The year 2009 has proved to be a critical year in the evolution of Boko Haram. A local dispute in Maiduguri between the police and members of the sect over the enforcement of a relatively insignificant motorcycle law led to riots and eventually to the burning down of a number of police stations. During a five day uprising more than 700 people were killed in clashes in Bauchi, Maiduguri and Poliskum.

In 2010 and after a period of relative tranquility, Boko Haram, under the new leadership of Iman Abubakar Shekau began a much more violent campaign against the federal state. Shootings and assassinations became an almost daily occurrence and the government again responded by deploying a large number of the security forces to the areas affected. Yet even though curfews were imposed throughout the area and many people were arrested. Boko Haram appeared to operate largely at will and indeed with a high degree of impunity. In one high profile event in September 2010, upto 200 Boko Haram militants were involved in an attack on a prison in Maiduguri. The militants managed to free over 700 people, including 150 of their own members. Boko Haram finally came to the attention of many international media outlets when a spokesperson telephoned the BBC to claim responsibility for a suspected suicide car bombing on 26 August 2011 at the United Nations Headquarters in Abuja. That attack left at least 18 people dead.

(Farrell, 2012, pp: 2) The killings by the supporters of the Boko Haram have increased over a period of time and thus have become a matter of concern for the present government owing to its serious implications. Some of these are-

4.1 Security Problem

The insurgency of Boko Haram in Nigeria have posed serious security challenges to Nigeria in the sense that people have been denied the freedom of movement due to fear of attack from members of Boko Haram particularly in some parts of Northern Nigeria where Boko Haram have taken over through planting of bombs as well as brutalized attack on innocent souls. These attacks have been not from Boko Haram alone but some groups are also using the presence of Boko Haram to go with their personal and ethical agenda through brutalizing people. Besides killing, kidnapping have also been used by some groups of people hiding under Boko Haram (Aro, pp: 9).

The activities of the Boko Haram in Nigeria therefore has led to palpable fear among the citizenry and high sense of insecurity due to regular loss of life and damage to properties and infrastructures on account of bombing and reported cases of assassination. The recent attack by the sect reflects clearly that the sect has no regard for any establishment including security, international agencies, press, private individuals, emirs, churches and mosques. It has left the impression that nobody is safe. The insecurity generated also has the tendency to breed religious unrest because of multitude of attacks on churches and of recently on Muslim prayer grounds. The inability of government to address the challenge posed by Boko Haram has led to the general belief that everybody needs to have his or her own security coverage. This will further compound the problem associated with proliferation of light arms.

4.2 Economic Effects

The militancy has slowed down the national economic growth and development since no investors would prefer to invest in a crisis ridden nation. It further compounded the problems associated with the relocation of Multinational Companies to safer territories in Africa like Ghana due to infrastructural decay. It has also contributed to near collapse of tourism industry as the nation loses huge foreign currency that could have accrued from this sector.

Boko Haram has led to the reduction of people's consumption of products from Northern Region because of rumors that members of Boko Haram are planning to send poisonous product from their region to other parts of Nigeria. This has negatively affected the business. Some of the businessmen had to close down, some of them had to retrench their workers and others had to cut down in the number of hours of operation.

The insurgency has had impact not only on the business but has also led to the migration of people. For the first time the country is experiencing migration where it is not the southerners alone that are migrating from the north but also the northerners on account of insecurity. The migrants therefore are putting additional pressure on the host communities in term of infrastructure and security challenges. Besides this, most of the migrants from the north are in their productive age and farmer and traders by profession. This has its serious consequences as their abandonment of their profession will have an effect on the food production. The food scarcity has led to the rise of prices of food items and vegetables and has also compounded the problem of food importation. According to Okpaga, Chijioke and Eme, Nigeria spends over 10 billion dollars on importation of four food items alone including sugar, wheat and rice(Alao, Atere and Alao,2012,pp.9).

The migration has also contributed to the problem of unemployment and aggravated the problem of poverty.

Besides affecting the individuals, the Boko Haram Insurgency has also drastically reduced government derivation from the affected region due to restiveness in those places as well as reduced investment and growth of business in the affected places. According to the World Investment Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the lull in business activities caused by insecurity in Kano State alone has cost the Nigerian economy 1.3 trillion naira as a result of attacks by the Boko Haram group (Aro,pp:6)..

4.3 Political and Social Effects

Politically, the movement has affected the performance of government and its ability to deliver service to its citizens while social effect on the other hand connotes its effect on society and people's ways of life. The insurgency has

reduced drastically the government's days of performance in the affected areas. The confusion created by Boko Haram has prevented the President to fulfil the larger parts of his promises.

The social effect of Boko Haram has been that the activities of Boko Haram have made some Nigerians who are serving the Nation under the scheme of National Youth Service Corp to reject posting to some part of Northern Nigeria(Aro,pp:8), thus creating social division between regions.

4.4 Effect on Diplomatic Relationship

The Boko Haram insurgency has seriously affected the relationship between Nigeria and other Nation of the World. The bombing coupled with kidnapping and hostage taking with or without demand for ransom particularly of foreigners has affected its relationship with other countries. Sometime back United States of America had warned her nationals not to go to some states in Nigeria (Aro, pp:9)

The Boko Haram Insurgency have evoked serious responses both at the national and international level. In March, 2013, Nigeria's National Security Advisor, Mohammad Sambo Dasuki announced a new strategy of the federal government focusing on a relatively soft stand relating to counter insurgency the aim of which was to prevent further radicalization of the local population through wide ranging co-operation with faith based organisations, local government bodies and traditional government structures. Following the strong public reaction to the kidnapping of school girls in April, 2014, the Minister of Finance, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala announced the government's new financial stimulus to the counter-insurgency effort which now includes a 'Marshall Plan' for northern Nigeria, in addition to more funding and recruitment of soldiers and international efforts to cut off Boko Haram's funding. The international community in particular has stressed the importance of a non-military solution to the situation in the north.

The Nigerian government has also adopted a number of legal measures in the wake of Boko Haram's terrorist activities including the 2013 proscription notice which officially declared the acts of Boko Haram illegal and labeled them as acts of terrorism.. In April 2013, President Jonathan set up a special committee, officially titled the committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North. Its recommendations included the establishment of an advisory group for dialogue with Boko Haram and a victims support fund (Crisis Group Africa Report N.216, 2014, pp.20).

Besides, the concern and efforts of the national government, the International response to the security crisis in Nigeria has been intensified following the Chibok abductions. Countries like United States, China, Israel, the United

Kingdom and France have provided assistance for locating the kidnapped girls. The United States President dispatched a team to provide military, law enforcement and intelligence assistance at the beginning of May 2014. To tackle the Boko Haram problem and to find solutions to the problem, several conferences and summits have been held in Europe including one on 17th May, 2014 in Paris and the other in London on 12th June, 2014 under the auspices respectively of President Francois Hollande and Prime-Minister David Cameron (Crisis Group Africa Report, N.216, 2013, pp.20). The summit brought together the heads of state of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger and other regional players with a vested interest in addressing the security threat. The Paris Summits outcome was a joint declaration of war on Boko Haram as well as plans for better information sharing and cross-border co-operation. This declared co-operation advanced further in July 2014, when Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon committed to provide 700 troops each to create for the first time a joint regional force to tackle the crisis. The international community has also branded Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation.

The African Union condemned the activities of Boko Haram and the regional bodies like the Economic Community of West African States spoke out against the organisation condemning its activities and called for greater regional co-operation, especially information sharing to effectively fight the terrorist groups. The increasing interest of the neighboring states in particular reflects the spillover effect that has become increasingly visible in the wake of the cross-border population movements.

The Nigerian government secured the UN Security Council's blacklisting of Boko Haram on 23 May, 2014. This has led to travel bans, freezing of assets and other measures. Similarly, the European Union under Regulation No. 583/2014 (entering into force on 29 May, 2014) added Boko Haram to the lists of persons, groups and entities which are covered by the resolution of freezing of funds and economic resources.

The European Parliament in its newly elected 8th legislature took a strong stance against Boko Haram and the overall insecurity crisis in Nigeria. In resolution 0024/2014 which was adopted in July 2014, Parliament not only condemns the attacks and killings but urges the government of Nigeria to address the root causes of the insurgency including the lack of efficient and impartial judiciary (Crisis Group Africa Report N.216, 2014, pp.21)

5. Conclusion

The multitude implications of the Boko Haram insurgency should be taken by the government seriously. The government needs to take serious measures to tackle the movement. The problem of poverty and unemployment amongst the

youth need to be addressed by the government for poverty and unemployment intensifies the inclination to commit crime. The government needs to adopt a peaceful approach to understand the motivating force and reason behind actions and adopt measures ranging from consultation or peaceful intervention rather than excessive militarization to dilute the tension and conflict. The government should direct its efforts to get the cross section of Northern Emirs and prominent individuals involved in a genuine dialogue with the leaders of the group. In doing so the government should not shy away from punishing those found guilty. The government should adopt an effective measure to ensure homeland security. There is a need to formulate policy that involves the traditional rulers and local notables in the running of local government for local policing. The grass root implementation of security policy will not only make every village or town secured but will in turn lead to the building of a secured nation. The peaceful approach of the government accompanied by practical solutions addressing the root cause of the movement can go a long way in providing a viable solution to Boko Haram.

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