

State, Religion and Civil-Military relations in Pakistan: A Historical Outlook

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Abstract

This paper attempts to analyze the civil-military relations in Pakistan through a historical narration. The typical structure of the Pakistani state gives the military and the bureaucracy dominance over its polity and society since its birth. An attempt has been made to explain the civil-military relations during the democratic period and military regimes separately. The Pakistani military is viewed as important for the security and survival of Pakistan. Long years in power enabled the military to influence civilian institutions of the state and society and established presence in all sectors of the society.

Key Words: Civil-military Problematique, Overdeveloped State, Military-Bureaucratic Oligarchy, Islamization

1. Introduction

The study of civil-military relations is imperative for understanding the nature and dynamics of politics in post-colonial states in Asia, Latin America, and Africa in general and Pakistan in particular. After the end of the Second World War many states got independence from the colonial masters. Many newly independent states were politically unstable and fell in the hands of military dictators, one party rules and autocratic regimes. In twentieth century armed forces became the integral and inevitable part of nation's political system and it no longer remains aloof from politics in any nation (Kukreja, 1991:18). In post-colonial states, military became pre-occupied with domestic political stability rather than external insecurity.

In post-colonial societies military either assumed political power or exerted significant influence in collaboration with political elite and bureaucracy. In many post-colonial Asian states, there have been successful military regimes in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand and Turkey. The case of post-colonial African states is not different but similar. There were successful military takeovers in Algeria, Burundi,

Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, Togo, Uganda and Upper Volta. The military intervention in Latin America became one of perennial issues and made lasting imprint on the state and society. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Peru are amongst Latin American countries affected by military coups. In Europe, Greece and Portugal have undergone military coups (Rizvi, 2000:15-16). The role of military in politics in post-colonial societies is a unique feature in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The special position of military often coupled with bureaucracy has become too common phenomenon in post-colonial societies.

The post-colonial states had weak democratic traditions and limited experience of running democratic institution. They inherited the administrative structures developed by their colonial masters. The priority for the colonial state was to build up the military and bureaucracy for the maintenance of law and order in the colony rather than developing representative political institutions. In this process the military and bureaucracy naturally occupied dominance. The elite sections of the society were inculcated into the military and bureaucracy. This led to the formation of mutual interest among military, bureaucracy and elite sections of society to continue the colonial structure in the post-colonial era. Mathew Joseph C says that,

The Pakistan state is a fine example of a typical Third World/post-colonial state. Colonialism has not allowed any particular social class to develop independently and stake claim on the institution of the state at the end of the decolonization process....The inability of the social classes to stake a claim independently on the state resulted in the domination of the bureaucratic –military oligarchy in Pakistan (Joseph C, 2007:81).

In Pakistan, military is the most powerful institution which is capable of influencing major policy decisions and to hold the country together in crisis situations. Pakistan underwent four military coups in 1958, 1969, 1977 and 1999. Military generals attempted coups by invoking ‘national interest’ as the primary reason for military takes over. A major section of Pakistani people also believes that military is the only capable institution that can give stability to the country. Civilian institutions are very weak and are not capable to assert its control over the military.

Pakistani society is facing two grave dilemmas when it comes to civil-military relations. Civilian authority wants to exert effective control over the military to avoid coups and to ensure the strengthening of democratic institutions. **If the military is**

weakened in order to ensure that it will not turn on society itself, it may face defeat on the battlefield. Especially Pakistan considers India as the foremost threat to territorial integrity and invoking security threat from India to consolidate military power in Pakistan. The dilemma Pakistan society is facing how to minimize the power of the military and thus make civilian control more certain without sacrificing protection against external enemies (Owens, 2010:271).

This paper will try to examine the ‘Civil-Military problematique’ (Ibid: 263), in Pakistani society. During crisis situation Pakistani military increasingly getting involved to stabilize the situation as it is the last resort that people can trust. In Pakistan, military is already well established and will again try to protect their vested interest. It is famously said about Pakistan that, “Every state is having an army, but in Pakistan, army is having a state”. This paper contains two parts. The first part is divided into six sub-parts according to the chronological order and included, the theoretical aspects of civil-Military relations, Pakistani state structure and colonial legacy, civil-military relations under democracy and military regimes. Conclusion forms the final part.

2. Military and State: A Historical Development of Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan

2.1 Civil-Military Problematique

Civil-military relations broadly refer to the interaction between armed forces of a state and the society. The basis for the study of civil-military relations is a fundamental dilemma for all states called “civil-military problematique”. The states must create a strong army to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity from external security threats as well as ensure that this same military establishment will not turn against the state itself. The theories of civil-military relations are arising out of this fundamental dilemma, how to overcome this? What are the effective means to ensure civilian control over military establishment? What is the appropriate role of military in a society? What degree of military influence is appropriate for a given society? (Owens, 2010:264).

Three parties are involved in ‘civil-military problematique’: the citizens, the civilian governmental authorities and the uniformed military. They bargain each other to get

its due share in the given polity. In liberal democracies the bargaining is more or less balanced due to the apparently equal representation given to three parties. But in reality in liberal democracies the bargain is an outcome of an ‘unequal dialogue’. However in liberal democracies civilian supremacy over the military establishment is unquestioned (Ibid.). Unlike democratic states, in authoritarian states, the role of the people is minimal and the bargaining is highly tilted towards the military. National stability is one of the major goals of the political systems of authoritarian states.

2.2 Colonial Legacy and the Structure of Pakistani State

The Pakistan’s ‘overdeveloped’ administrative and military institutions can link to the colonial practices of emphasizing the requirements of law and order rather than popular representation (Talbot, 1999:54). This tradition of ‘Viceregalism’ that was prevalent in the North West India and British approach towards the region as a security state further adds to the conservative pro military nature of the Pakistani society (Ibid: 55). Ian Talbot says, “In sum, in much of what was to become Pakistan, a tradition of bureaucratic authoritarianism or Viceregalism was deeply rooted. Its hallmarks were paternalism, wide discretionary powers and the personalization of authority.” The special relationship existed between the peasantry and the army in the rural Punjab holds the key to military dominance in independent Pakistan (Ibid: 64). The post-colonial Pakistan state has maintained the main features of the British administration in North West India.

The typical structure of the Pakistani state gives the military and the bureaucracy dominance over its polity and society since its birth. The military and bureaucratic dominance in Pakistan is explained differently by scholars. “There are three narratives on Pakistani state” (Joseph C, 2009:55). The Pakistani state as a ‘migrant state’ forms the first one and advanced by Boris Wilke, Mohammad Waseem and Christophe Jaffrelot. According to these scholars the initial phase of Pakistani state was dominated by the *Muhajirs*.¹ Due to their numerical inferiority the *Muhajir* dominated state elite preferred a vice-regal form of political structure over a democratic one. Due to their higher education standard, *Muhajirs* dominated the civil bureaucracy and on the other hand, the Punjabis and Pakhtuns monopolized the military in Pakistan

¹ Muhajirs are the Urdu speaking Muslims who migrated to Pakistan from the Muslim minority provinces which became part of India during the time of Partition of the Indian Subcontinent.

(Ibid:56-57). Boris Wilke observes that, “As a class of traders, industrialists and civil servants, the *Muhajirs* needed a functioning state apparatus which was able to maintain the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence and give some degree of predictability to social and economic life” (Ibid:56).

In the partition exigencies and war with India over Kashmir, the political leaders and bureaucracy highly leaned towards the military to settle the question of national stability and territorial integrity. The co-optation of Punjabis and Pakhtuns into the migrant state, transformed the power structure. The *Muhajir* dominated bureaucracy was marginalized by the Punjabi dominated military (Ibid:57). The initial dominance of Punjabi and Pakhtun dominated military continued in the Pakistani politics and society.

The second narrative forwarded by Pakistani Marxist scholar Hamza Alavi and supported by Hassan N. Gardezi and Feroz Ahmad. According to this narrative Pakistani state is an ‘overdeveloped state.’ The colonial masters created highly efficient bureaucracy and military system for the administration and exploitation of the colony. Colonizers prevented the growth of indigenous bourgeoisie and used the bureaucracy and military to suppress the anti-colonial struggles (Joseph C, 2007:73). At the time of independence the colonies had three propertied exploiting classes, the indigenous bourgeoisie, the metropolitan neocolonialist bourgeoisies, and the landed classes. Alavi observes that,

A weak and underdeveloped indigenous bourgeoisie is unable at the moment of independence to subordinate the relatively highly developed colonial state apparatus through which the metropolitan power had exercised dominion over it. However a new convergence of interests of the three propertied classes, under metropolitan patronage, allows a bureaucratic-military oligarchy to mediate their competing but no longer contradictory interests and demands. By that token it acquires relatively autonomous role and is not simply the instrument of any one of the three classes. Such relatively autonomous role of the state apparatus is of special importance to the neocolonialist bourgeoisies because it is by virtue of this fact that they are able to pursue their class interests in the post-colonial societies (Alavi, 1973:145).

The inability of any particular social class to control the state resulted in the domination of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy in Pakistan. This highly developed system of bureaucratic-military oligarchy was the by product of colonialism, and the neocolonial metropolitan bourgeoisie control the state by using the same system.

The third narrative on Pakistani state tends to view it as a classic example of a Bonapartist state.² The Bonapartist state functions “as independent from, and superior to, all social classes, as being the dominant force in society rather than the instrument of the dominant class” (Ibid:146). The state in Pakistan is a good example of Bonapartist state where no social class is capable enough to assert itself and control the state. The state “assumes the character of an umpire or mediator between the conflicting class interests of various social classes” (Joseph C, 2007:73).

2.3 Ascendency of Military-Bureaucratic Oligarchy and Destruction of Democracy

Due to the exigencies of its formation, military in consonance with the bureaucracy assumed important role in Pakistani politics and society. The Pakistani state came into being through extremely difficult conditions and faced serious domestic and external pressures. Ayesha Jalal observes that,

While India inherited the colonial state’s unitary central apparatus without seriously rupturing its links with the lower rungs of the administration, Pakistan had to construct an entirely new central government before it could begin coordinating the affairs of the provincial, district and local levels of society (Jalal, 1995:18).

The imperative of state security and a strong state apparatus were given importance over the need to create participatory political institutions. The military was the major benefactor in this situation because it provided an organized system to solve the internal and external security problems. The senior military officers became powerful actors in the decision making process and a key determinant of national priorities in consensus with senior bureaucracy (Rizvi, 2000:1-2). It gave military an opportunity to exert effective control on the state machinery and sidelining the civilian institutions. The opportunistic alliance between military and bureaucracy stalled the constitution making process and tried to hold on power without seeking a mandate from the people. Stephen P Cohen observes that, “The Pakistan Army is a hostage to its origins” (Cohen, 1983:1). Rizvi also observes that,

The military was integral to state-building from the beginning and it was viewed as central to state survival. This strengthened the position of the military in the polity and its senior commanders began to perceive themselves as the guarantors of state survival, a self-image that

² Marx devised the concept of Bonapartist state to describe the state established by Louis Bonaparte in France after the coup in 1851. He had taken control of the French state not as the representative of the bourgeoisie; on the contrary, he acted against its immediate interests. In the process, the state presided by him acquired considerable political autonomy.

was reinforced over time as the civilian governments, overwhelmed by the problems of governance, increasingly sought the military's support for administering the state (Rizvi, 2000:6).

National stability is the primary objective of Pakistani rulers and military which override their commitment towards the establishment of representative institutions and political processes. Since independence, political elite in Pakistan found it difficult to evolve a broad based consensus on the fundamental features of the political system. The federalism and autonomy of provinces, the Islamic state, the national language, and the electoral system and several other constitutional issues delayed the drafting of effective constitution (Rizvi, 1989:55). This gave the basis for the role of military in Pakistan in collaboration with senior bureaucracy. State survival became the primary objective of Pakistani rulers and military, which tried to create strong and assertive federal government, high defense expenditure, and emphasis on monolithic nationalism which alienated other regions (Rizvi, 2000:1).

The death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1948, barely thirteen months after the creation of Pakistan, the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951 created leadership vacuum. The absence of mass based political parties aggravated the situation. The Muslim League, which served as the vanguard of the freedom struggle, utterly failed to transform itself from a nationalist movement into a national party. Due to political fragmentation and absence of democratic process, the bureaucratic-military oligarchy successfully gained control over the state machinery. On the other hand the bureaucratic-military oligarchy increased control over state machinery due to fear of losing the already gained supremacy, by hampering the political parties and politicians, to deter potential challenges from the political class. Jalal observes that,

It was the interplay of domestic, regional and international factors during the last forties and fifties – particular, the links forged with the USA – that served to erode the position of parties and politicians within the evolving structure of the Pakistani state by tipping the institutional balance towards the civil-bureaucracy and the military (Jalal, 1995:54).

In the post Jinnah-Liaquat period, the appointment of Ghulam Muhammad, a former bureaucrat belonging to Indian Audit and Accounts Service, as the Governor General in October 1951, who was succeeded by another bureaucrat-cum-military man, Iskander Mirza, in August 1955, set the stage for the ascendancy of the bureaucracy-military oligarchy in Pakistan (Rizvi, 2000a:5). General Ayub Khan was appointed as the defense minister by Ghulam Muhammad in 1954 and offered to take over the administration of the country and he refused (Rizvi, 2000:71). This bureaucratic-

military alliance engaged in making alliance with feudal, industrial and commercial elite to derail the democratic process, and manipulated the rivalries among political leaders. In 1954, the then Governor General dissolved the first constituent assembly and dismissed the government and this act was legitimized by the Federal court blocked the fate of democracy in Pakistan (Rizvi, 2000:5). Alavi observes that “In the first phase politicians and political parties, who provided a facade of parliamentary government, were manipulated by them and were installed and expelled from office as it suited the bureaucratic-military oligarchy” (Alavi, 1973:150).

After the inauguration of the constitution in 1956, to the suspension of it by general Ayub Khan in 1958, Pakistan had four Prime Ministers. The bureaucratic-military oligarchy changed governments at their will and installed unpopular individuals in the office. The military and the bureaucracy were almost controlling the entire affairs of the state and the political class was marginalized. Due to the fear of losing the gained supremacy after the elections in the affairs of the state, the bureaucratic-military oligarchy decided to take the direct control over the state apparatus. The facade of parliamentary democracy ended in Pakistan in October 1958. Until 1962 the regime governed under martial law with Ayub as commander-in-chief, chief martial law administrator and president of Pakistan at the same time (Jalal, 1995:55). Ayub followed the British colonial policy of co-optation and collaboration of the Punjabi federal bureaucracy and army and turned towards local propertied classes in provinces, by extending state patronage in return for their tacit support for military rule (Ibid:56).

For the legitimization of military dictatorship, “Ayub Khan resorted to planned disengagement and a careful transition to civilianize his military rule” (Rizvi, 2000:10). In 1962 Ayub formally withdrew martial law, allowed certain parties to function in restricted domain of his new political order. Alavi says that, “the bureaucratic-military oligarchy needed politicians, who fulfill a complementary role, and by 1962 the politicians were put to work again in a parody of democratic politics under Ayub Khan’s system of ‘Basic Democracy’.” (Alavi, 1973:153). The political and constitutional arrangements of Ayub Khan reflected the army’s organizational ethos of hierarchy, order, discipline and neglected democratic and participatory considerations (Rizvi, 2000:9). He tried to legitimize military rule through the introduction of Basic Democracy system and civilianization of the military rule by co-

option of the political elite. The careful construction of political system through constitutional and political engineering, exclusion of dissenting voices, holding of non-contested referendums, local bodies election, and non-party elections at the provisional and national level, Ayub continues to rule as a civilian president (Ibid:10).

The socio-economic changes brought by Ayub in Pakistan were even more destructive. During Ayub, the military was able to extend its influence to other sectors of the society. His policies gave senior military and civilian officials privileged access to agricultural land, urban property, business and industrial licenses and top posts in public corporations. It created another intermediate class who is dependent on the state apparatus (Jalal, 1995:58). In the mid 1960s, the Ayub regime policies of inequality increasingly came under attack from the political parties. In May 1967, four political parties – the East Pakistani based Awami League, the Council Muslim League, the Jamat-i-Islami and the Nizam-i-Islam – formed the Pakistan democratic movement and demanded reintroduction of parliamentary system, direct elections, and federal structure with devolution of powers to the provinces (Ibid:60). The agitation led by Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Awami League continued until Ayub's resignation and handing over the power to General Yahya Khan in March 1969.

General Yahya Khan displaced Ayub and declared martial law in the wake of political crisis in 1969. He promised to conduct free and fair elections and restore the powers to elected representatives. The military and the bureaucracy in Pakistan had no intension in transferring power to political class, especially to the demand of Awami League for more provincial autonomy. He abandoned the One Unit scheme and conducted the Pakistan's first national election based on universal suffrage in December 1970. In the aftermath of the elections, Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Bangla Bandho (Brother of Bengal) emerged the largest party in East Pakistan, and in West Pakistan, the PPP led by Bhutto, the Quaid-i-Awam (Leader of the Masses) emerged victorious (Talbot, 1999:185). The military and the bureaucracy were resisting to accept the peoples democratic verdict and delayed the transfer of power to elected representatives and led the country to bloody civil war that culminated in to the break up of Pakistan (Rizvi 2000a:9).

In this first phase of military-bureaucratic ascendancy and the sidelining of political class that subsequently led to the destruction of democracy in Pakistan. The absence of effective political class and parties to dominate the affairs of the state were occupied by the military and bureaucracy. General Ayub Khan changed the state and societal system that manages to retain the dominance of non-elected institutions that constantly make hindrance to the emergence of effective political class in Pakistan. The military-bureaucratic system that enjoyed the fruits of power was not ready to devolve it in the wake of elections. That led to the destruction of Pakistan's territorial unity and underlined some basic fallacies of military rule.

3. Glimpse of Democracy and Islamization of the Polity

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto emerged as Pakistan's president on 20th December 1971, replacing General Yahya Khan. After the military debacle in East Pakistan, the military had no option but transfer power to elected representatives of West Pakistan. The Pakistan military increasingly came under attack for the failure in East Pakistan and its reputation lowered into the lowest ranks since independence. The strong political base was the major source of strength for the new PPP government. Unlike Ayub Khan's military take over, the Supreme Court of Pakistan declared that the Yahya Khan's assumption of power on 25th March 1969 was illegal and unconstitutional (Rizvi, 2000:209). It was a historic moment conducive to assert the civilian supremacy over military and bureaucracy.

Bhutto had tried to curb the power of the military and the bureaucracy. He instituted number of measures to reduce the long term influence of both the unelected institutions. He restructured the military high command and reduced the tenure of chief of staff to three years. He created a Federal Security Force (FSF) in October 1972 to assist police in the maintenance of internal law and order. The 1973 constitution contained a number of clauses to discourage any future military intervention. The third schedule included an oath which serving members of the military were to take forswearing any political activities. Article 245 defined high treason for any attempt to subvert the constitution 'by the use of force or show of force or by other unconstitutional means' (Talbot, 1999:223). But the radical change to the civil-military configuration of power in Pakistan was never happened rather Bhutto relied more on army and civil service to run the state and keep the law and

order. To quell the riots over the Urdu-Sindhi controversy in 1972, Bhutto used the military. Again to suppress the Baluchi insurgency over the suspension of provincial governments of Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province (NWFP) in 1973, he called on Army. It gave the military a new opportunity to assert its influence on the state (Malik, 2008:166).

The Pakistani state and the defense establishments concern over security and the territorial integrity was more or less similar to the earlier period. Given the post-1971 security concerns, Pakistani state was bound to maintain a strong and efficient military. Pakistan's defense expenditure rose by over 200 percent during the Bhutto era. With the huge money spending on the military modernization and the use of Army in Baluchistan from 1973-77 to deal with the tribal insurrection returned the Army to a political role (Talbot, 1999:224). The use of military in Baluchistan to quell the uprising eroded Bhutto's power vis-à-vis military. Once again, like his predecessors, Bhutto and his PPP failed to make the transition from a popular movement to a modern party of government. The weak institutionalization of PPP was a crucial factor in the regime's inability to provide a counterweight to military and bureaucracy. The absence of viable independent democratic institutions and parties resulted in the re-emergence of military and bureaucracy with the support of Bhutto's opposition coalition (Ibid:244).

In the chaotic situation that undergone after the elections, the PPP was accused of rigging the elections by the nine party coalition, Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) formally launched in January 1977. The protest against the malpractices in the elections transformed into a country wide agitation against Bhutto government. In response to the agitation Bhutto called on military and imposed martial law in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore. The Army was given wide powers to restore law and order. The Army chief was invited to cabinet meetings and the military high command was briefed regularly by the government regarding the course of negotiations between government and PNA (Rizvi, 2000:236-37). By leaning heavily towards the military for the survival of the government, it was well understood by the military high command that, Bhutto government's popular appeal has eroded.

In the political deadlock between PPP and PNA, in July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of Army Staff declared martial law throughout the country and took over as

Chief Martial Law Administrator. The popular leader, Bhutto was accused in a criminal case and finally hanged by the Zia regime. Zia suspended the 1973 constitution, federal and provincial cabinets were dissolved. He ruled for eleven years-the longest tenure of military rule in Pakistan's history. He is often identified as the person most responsible for turning Pakistan into a global center for political Islam. He made Pakistan an Islamic state and nurtured the jihadist ideology that now threatens to destabilize much of Islamic world (Huqqani, 2005:131).

The martial law regime of Zia-ul-Haq also showed the limits of military rulers to create viable and representative political institutions and socio – economic justice (Rizvi 2000a: 9). After assuming power he made a statement that “My sole aim is to organize free and fair elections which will be held in October. Soon after the polls, power will be transferred to elected representatives – a solemn assurance that I will not deviate from the schedule” (Ibid: 28). He succeeded in consolidating the power and presided over longest martial law in Pakistan's history from July 1977- December 1985 (Ibid: 28-29). He tried to meet the legitimacy crisis through islamization by gaining the support of Islamist parties like Jamaat-i-Islami. It further intensified the already deteriorated social and economic disparities among ethnic and religious sectarian groups.

The Zia regime initiated the process of Islamization to get legitimacy for the continuation of military regime. Joseph C writes, the Islamization process in Pakistan was a “response of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy which controls the Pakistan state towards the legitimacy crisis precipitated by the military coup in 1977” (Joseph C, 2010:21). The Zia's Islamization process was in a way, the extension of his predecessor. The 1973 constitution reiterated Pakistan's identity as an Islamic Republic and for the first time recognized Islam as the state religion of Pakistan. Bhutto formed the Council of Islamic Ideology to give advice to the national and provincial governments to keep their legislations in accordance with Quran and Sunna (Shaikh, 2009:95). The appeasement of the Islamic right wing political parties by the Bhutto regime prepared the ground for the rightward shift in Pakistani politics under Zia.

The Zia's Islamization process affected four areas, economic policies, judicial reforms, the introduction of an Islamic penal code, and a new educational policy

(Joseph C, 2010:23). Due to the Islamization process, militarism and sectarianism became more entrenched in the Pakistani society. Zia was an ardent believer of Islam, the Islamization of the military was his mission and adopted Islamic teachings as its guiding principals (Ibid:34). He welcomed the Islamic organizations like Tableeghi Jamaat and the Jamaat-i-Islami “to make in-roads into the Army, something anathema in the past” (Rizvi, 2001:207). The Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was also influenced in radicalizing the Pakistani military. Like his predecessors, Zia leaned towards other power centers to counter the constitutional sources of legitimacy. Unlike Ayub who relied on civil bureaucracy, Zia appealed to Islamic parties and Islamization of polity as the counterweight against the political class. In due process, he installed military officials in key positions within civilian administration, semi-government organizations and autonomous organizations and there by militarizing the polity (Bose & Jalal, 2004:195). Mohammad Waseem says, “The political context is shaped by the continuing crisis of civil-military relations, which helped bring Islamic parties and groups onto the political stage as a counterweight to the constitutional sources of legitimacy” (Waseem, 2007:147).

The cold war politics in general and the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 in particular are watershed events in the history of Pakistan. The United States supported and aided the Zia’s military regime which in turn strengthened him in domestic matters. Pakistan became a frontline state in the U.S strategy to contain the Soviet expansion. It gave Zia’s military regime to continue to derail from the promises of holding elections and transfer of power to political class. The renewed American economic and military aid and international support for the regime enhanced the power of Zia *vis-à-vis* political class (Huqqani, 2005:140).

Zia’s parliament in exchange for lifting of martial law passed the eighth amendment which empowered the president to dismiss an elected prime minister and parliament without any obligation to senate or Supreme Court. Since 1985 the Eighth Amendment was used five times to oust prime ministers and dissolve elected national and provincial assemblies (Bose & Jalal, 2004:195). Zia vanished into air in August 1988, leaving a militarized polity and sectarian society. He cultivated orthodox and conservative Islamic forces as a counterweight to political adversaries. He succeeded in perpetuating the existing ethnic, linguistic, religious-sectarian divisions in society

which fragmented the political class (Rizvi, 2000:273). These divisions among political class and the society at large made transition to democracy difficult.

4. Democracy in the Shadow of military: 1988-1999

The election process and democratic institutionalization was constantly hampered by the military-bureaucratic system. The Eighth Amendment was continuously used for dismissing the elected governments. Zia's legacy of divided polity, Islamization, sectarianism, and regional disparity haunted the successor elected governments. Syed Vali Reza Nasr observes that the Zia's legacy of the 'gradual sacralization of the national political discourse...did not favor the PPP whose myopic emphasis on secular politics and the polemic of democracy restricted its maneuverability in a religiously charged polity' (Nasr, 1992:523). From 1988 to 1999, the Pakistani military was playing the role of an umpire in highly polarized and divided political and social classes. The Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif's regional and economic policies are constrained by the priorities set by the military during the Zia era. The sectarian and religious forces unleashed by the Zia, the influence of Islamic political parties in Pakistan, regional disparity... increasingly came to trouble the democratic regime's stability. Both the governments endorsed the use of irregular forces in Kashmir and Afghanistan to endorse the military objectives. The political space achieved by the Islamist parties under the patronage of Zia, was continued by both Benazir and Sharif (Shaikh, 2009:168-169).

The power of the political classes was largely limited by the unelected institutions. On matters which concern the national security such as Afghan crisis, defense expenditure and service conditions Army exerted a veto on government policy (Talbot, 1999:293). Jalal observes that,

A state structure geared to high defense expenditure and dominated by the non-elected institutions – namely the military and civil bureaucracy – cannot easily concede the ascendancy of the elected institutions – parliament in particular. Despite the holding of general elections in 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997, the recurrence of dismissals of prime ministers and dissolutions of the national assembly showed that the institutional imbalances within Pakistan's state structure were resilient (Bose & Jalal, 2004:197).

The post-Zia military elite were acted as a remote control and exerted power behind the scenes and brokered a deal that ensured the unity of anti-PPP political forces under the leadership of Sharif. The anti-PPP political forces quickly regrouped to form Islami Jamhoori Ittihad (Islamic Democratic Alliance IJI) to put up a formidable

challenge to PPP in the 1988 elections. The military's Inter Service intelligence (ISI) was secretly involved in creating an alliance of right-of-center and Islamic parties to prevent PPP to sweep the 1988 polls (Nasr, 1992:523). The marginal victory of the PPP in 1988 elections reduced the Benazir's political space to effectively curtail the already dominant military and bureaucracy. The defense budget was sacrosanct and the army retained a veto in vital foreign policy and security matters. The armed forces were able to enforce this veto through their allies in the bureaucracy led by Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Zia's successor in the office of the president who enjoyed the power to dismiss elected government through eighth amendment (Talbot, 1999:292). The structural crisis of the Pakistani state continuously retarded the development of elected political institutions. The bureaucratic and hierarchical non-democratic institutions were heavily influenced Pakistan's democratic transitions. S Akbar Zaidi analyses the democratic interregnum of 1988-1999, he says,

The Power to decide who was worthy of being in government throughout the 1990's, rested with groups and forces who had no tradition, experience or interest with democracy. This charade of who held real power in Pakistan came to an unambiguous end on October 12, 1999 (Zaidi, 2005:5176).

In the democratic period between, 1988 to until the military coup by General Pervez Musharraf, the Army and Bureaucracy retained their predominant influence in the policy making and constantly retarded the political class from coming to power. The 'overdeveloped state' structure of Pakistan is a constant impediment in the institutionalization and development of democratic institutions in Pakistan.

5. The Last Military Rule? 1999-2008

The October 1999 military take over justified by Musharraf, as averting the deliberate attempt by the civilian government to undermine its professional and corporate interests. Soon after the military coup he proclaimed that 'the armed forces have moved in as a last resort, to prevent any further destabilization. I have done so with all sincerity, loyalty and selfless devotion to the country...This is not martial law, only another path towards democracy' (Kundi, 2003:31). He succeeded in consolidating the power and ruled Pakistan for many years. The creation of National Security Council in 2004 was an attempt to cement the constitutional role of military. He tried to civilianize the military rule by careful constitutional and political engineering and co-option of the political elite (Rizvi, 2000:31).

During his regime the individual and corporate interests of the military further entrenched and consolidated in Pakistani state. This era witnessed hundreds of retired military personnel filling in key positions in bureaucracy, semi-governmental organizations and educational institutions. The supremacy of civil-military alliance ‘in the form of successive military regimes transformed them from a state institution into a ‘political class’ with significant economic interests ties especially to the acquisition of agricultural land....a trend that intensified under General Zia’s government and later vigorously encouraged by Musharraf’ (Shaikh, 2009:139).

The United States war on terror has greatly influenced the Musharraf government’s foreign and domestic policies. Like his predecessor, Musharraf obtained legitimacy and stability through the US military and economic aid. Unlike previous military regimes, Musharraf’s regime was supported by large sections of middle classes and political actors. His policies alienated the religious sections of the society and they distanced themselves from the government on account of supporting the US foreign policy (Zaidi, 2005:5177).

The national and provincial elections of February 2008 in Pakistan’s rejected the Musharraf’s one man rule and once again reiterated the promises on parliamentary sovereignty, independent judiciary, media and political dialogue with dissidents. In the elections, PPP and PML-N became victorious and pro-Musharraf factions suffered significant losses. On March 2008, the PPP leader, Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani unanimously elected as the country’s prime minister. Once again people of Pakistan rejected the supremacy of unelected institutions and reiterated their faith in democracy and parliamentary sovereignty.

6. Conclusion

The long years of direct and indirect military rule enabled them to penetrate the major sectors of the state and society. It is no longer an army that functions only to protect sovereignty and territorial integrity but an army which desires to re-shape and re-establish Pakistani politics. Farzana Shaikh says,

By ignoring the implications of Pakistan’s unresolved national identity and the lack of consensus over the role of Islam, they fail to explain how the military emerged as a major force attempting not only to determine the national interest but to define the very meaning of Pakistan (Shaikh, 2009:147).

The conventional notion of healthy civil-military relation is characterized by the separation of civil and military domains for minimizing the power of the military to make civilian control more certain and at the same time strengthening the military for state survival from external enemies. This traditional way of analyzing civil-military relation is no longer possible in the case of Pakistan. Any analysis of Pakistan's civil-military relations should start from the notion that, military is a powerful component of the decision making process, it no longer completely aloof from politics, serve as the guardians of the idea of Pakistan. The organizational strength, internal cohesion, discipline, the Punjabi – Pakhtun composition of the army all add to the strengths of Pakistani army. The civilian government is increasingly dependent on army for keeping internal law and order, above all survival of the state.

The military penetrated the major sectors of the state and the society, government and semi-government institutions, the private sector, industry, agriculture, education, communication and transportation. Unlike civilians, military's discipline, internal cohesion and professionalism strengthened its attributes. The military's professional and corporate interests, the socio-economic background and orientations of the officers all are important factors that provided strength to military. The interaction across boundaries, the international connections enable the military to influence and gain strength. Above all it gains strength from the organization and its significant presence in all sectors of government and society. The Pakistan army's strong regional cohesion, the Punjabi-Pakhtun composition of the army has been a source of power. The already existing institutional imbalance further eroded due to the acquisition of modern technology and organizational skills by the army and weak, incoherent political institutions.

The Pakistan experience clearly shows that, it is easy to take political power from fragmented and infighting civilians by a professional and disciplined army, but there is no guarantee that military will heal the economical, social and political problems that haunted their civilian counterparts. In all four occasions – 1958, 1969, 1977, and 1999 army moved out of bar racks and displaced civilian governments without facing any serious challenges. Once military rulers came to power, they were successful in restoring the law and order situation but later they confronted the serious socio-economic issues which faced by civilian predecessors. The political dilemma faced by the civilians and military regime is identical in nature. The organizational skills and

mighty coercive power at their hands further give confidence to expand the goals of the military coup. In the post-coup period, military rulers have to seriously think about civilianizing their regime through careful constitutional and political engineering with civilian political elite. Rizvi says about the paradox military ruler's face,

Pakistan's military rulers face a paradox. On the one hand, the military is gradually acquiring most, if not all, of the features of a "ruler-praetorian" military by its repeated interventions in politics since the 1950s. On the other hand, the emotional and ideological commitment to democratic process and civilian supremacy over the military is still strong in society (Rizvi, 1984:537).

The military stands out as a distinctive institution having highly organized and disciplined, more accessible to modern technologies and control over coercive apparatus comparing to the civilian institutions. Unlike any other state institution it operates in an international context. The professionalism, internal cohesion, and discipline distinguish it from the society. A strong military is viewed as important for the security and survival of Pakistan. Long years in power enabled the military to influence civilian institutions of the state and society and established presence in all sectors of the society.

Any analysis which ignores the importance of military and the historical and cultural conditions of Pakistan will be narrow and unlikely to yield good results. The analysis needs to be historicized, contextualized and explained according to the changing dynamics of internal and external political, regional, economical and social conditions which forms the core of the nature and behavior of the civil-military relation in Pakistan. The solution for civil-military problematique should come from an equal dialogue between civil and military institutions. Only a gradual and steady process can result to stabilize the civil-military relations.

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