

# **The Escalating Chinese Dominance in Nepal: A Byproduct of India's Diplomatic Failure?**

Saurav Bhaumik

## **Abstract**

*The Indo-Nepal relationship is indeed meandering through a very critical phase. The erstwhile bond which the two nations have shared is now on the verge of a fracture, largely catalyzed by India's diplomatic failure in Nepal. In other words the Indian diplomats were unable to strategize its international policies to promote and maintain peace in the land locked country, which can be imputed to India's endogenous tactical failure in Nepal. It becomes evident from the inherent contradiction that subsists within India's foreign policy and its' failure to maintain its' internal stability vis-à-vis the Maoists. On one side India virtually waged a war against the Maoist activities within its' polity, but at the same time it grossly failed in inhibiting Nepali Maoist connections with the like minded Indian Maoist Organizations. The threat lies with the fact that the political impasse between India and Nepal can be effectively utilized by China, to serve their own strategic and diplomatic interests. This discourse will constitute a critical analysis of India's foreign policy in Nepal. In pursuance of the same the paper will strive to present a comprehensive forecast of the impending strategic threats which India might confront from China in the long-run.*

**Keywords:** Diplomacy, Insurgency, Maoism, Reciprocity, Monarchy

## **1. Introduction**

A set of assertions seems imperative to streamline the dialectic focus of the present discourse. Nepal's quest for stability and economic development was largely dependent on India, which to an extent can be attributed to its adverse geographical location. In this context Professor Surya P. Subedi argued that unlike islands, atolls and peninsulas, which are natural features of the earth's surface, being landlocked is the result of a political process. National borders are drawn by people and not nature (Subedi, 2005). Contrary to popular belief, the problem of being land locked is political rather than geographic; requiring strategic solutions to the problem. It can have a tremendous negative impact not only on commerce but also on other economic activities. As a result of this the political independence of the concerned state might get jeopardized. Nepal being a landlocked state is a case on this point. It is pertinent to state that the country practically bought all its consumer goods including weapons and other strategic materials from India in the past (Mihaly, 1963). Nepal shared an amicable relationship with India since time immemorial (Caroe, 1960). However, the intense bonhomie shared by the two nations gradually culminated to a potent international political conflict. The repeated failure on the part of India to mitigate the political tumult in Nepal has complicated the country's internal politics for the past two decades (Mishra, 2004). The Maoist insurgency

is one such endogenous source of dissonance. Indian diplomats have repeatedly failed in their endeavors to arrive at a stable solution to the deepening political impasse. Instead, the Indian ventures have crafted a route for serious strategic ramifications to effectuate in the long run; which can inadvertently act as a serious detriment to the relationship between the two nations.

Problem lies with the fact that on one side the Indian government strictly denounced Maoist activities and categorically termed it as an activity that comes within the realm of international terrorism. On the contrary; the porous India-Nepal Border has served as a potential Maoist route for the further establishment of Maoist activities in Nepal. Under the given situation the Maoist insurgency in Nepal has been one of the most successful insurgencies in the world (Mishra, 2004). The Maoists have seriously deterred the Indian policies towards Nepal for the last few years and are now shaking hands with China. These insurgents, who fought a long civil war against the monarchy, now control most of the important public posts in Nepal. It is evident from the phenomenal rate of inclusion of Maoists into the governing coalition, in post monarchical arrangement in 2008 (Cartwright, 2009). The continuous political turmoil has generated resource conflicts in Nepal. Research revealed that the Nepali population faces several resource related conflicts concerned with appropriation, distribution and control. These conflicts are further linked with other social and political issues that make the situation even more complex (Upreti, 2004). From a prognostic contemplation on the issues raised; it can be rationally inferred that China is tactically utilizing the degrading political fracture between India and Nepal, which is evident from the increasing Chinese influence within Nepal's political substratum over the past few years. The recent hike in the Chinese investments in Nepal manifestly substantiates the aforesaid contention. Furthermore, the growing links between the Nepalese Maoists and China can create a daunting security concern for India. The core objective of the paper will be to probe whether the increase of Chinese intervention in Nepal over the past few years is a consequence of India's diplomatic failure in the country. In pursuance of the same; the paper seeks to address the possible complexities and associated security concerns which can result out of it.

## **2. The Maoist Insurgencies In Nepal: The Possible Strategic Ramifications** ***The Economic Backdrop***

Nepal due to its geographical location, serves as a buffer zone locked between two apparently hostile nations, i.e. India and China. The vulnerable geographical position of Nepal made it impossible for it to establish trade linkages with other nations. For this reason, the country had been economically dependent on India. Unfortunately, the aid from India did not boost its international trade linkages substantially, for which there was a severe economic meltdown in the country (Taneja & Pohit, 2001). Nepal is dependent on India as the source of access to

the sea through the major port in Calcutta; a situation creating a certain degree of vulnerability, although Nepal's exports are modest and the economy has gone from bad to worse (Shrestha, 2011). This brings us to one of the highly publicized international issues of 1980-1990. The crisis was regarding the fact that Nepal wanted to conclude a separate Treaty of transit with India, whereas India wished to conclude a separate Treaty dealing with all matters of bilateral trade and transit (Subedi, 2005). The Indian government's action on transit was in contravention of the Barcelona Statute on Freedom of Transit, 1921<sup>1</sup>. Interestingly, both India and Nepal are parties to the Convention on Transit Trade of landlocked countries of 1965. Nepal's Bilateral Treaty had expired and India was reluctant to renew it unless Nepal undertook democratic reforms. The expiration of this Treaty isolated Nepal economically and crippled its economy at a time when the government was confronted with mounting opposition from the "panchayat" system. Soon the international communities joined India in pressurizing the king for democratic reforms and improve Nepal's human rights record (Joshi & Mason, 2007). However, it was not executed properly due to some fundamental loopholes in the structural dynamics of India's foreign policy. India's foreign policy towards its immediate neighbours came in for an overall review and re-orientation as danger to its security and national interest, after the border war with China in 1962. The danger from the side of Nepal also started causing concern in the wake of a series of virulent anti-Indian campaigns, allegedly launched with the connivance of the then Nepalese authorities (Suhrawardy, 1996).

### ***2.1 The Tacit Cooperation between India and the Nepali Maoists in the past***

The Indian democratic experience is unique, especially in the context of South Asia, where forces challenging democratic forms of government have generally triumphed (Chakravarty, 2006). But India confronted some major strategic problems regarding the democratic reforms in Nepal. The Maoist insurgents in Nepal tacitly received moral support from India for a considerable period of time. In a way, this becomes critical to the extent that; India at its policy level has persistently deterred Maoist activities both within and outside the country. And notwithstanding, the anti Maoist policy initiatives taken by the Government, the Nepalese Maoists received continued moral support from India. It must be noted that most of the terrorism and insurgency related problems in India have cross border linkages. A number of recent reports revealed that Nepal's Maoist insurgents were involved in smuggling drugs from India to raise money in order to buy arms. In addition to that the Nepalese Maoists carried out illicit cross border arms trade with India (Nayak, 2008). The Maoist insurgents also received military training on Indian soil (Gul, 2002). The open border and socio cultural similarity of the people on either side of the border made quite easy movement to acquire arms and ammunitions and other necessary materials from the Indian market. The free movement of the Maoists in the Indian territory and their

organizational activities and political coordination with Indian rebel communist groups was certainly a matter of concern for India. The porous border served as sanctuaries to the Maoists and other criminal actors for treatment, hideouts and encouraged kidnapping for ransom, human trafficking, drug trafficking, cross border robbery, smuggling of forest resourced and de-stabilizing the local labour market (Dhungna, 2006). The threat intensified with the formation of the CCOMPOSA (Co-ordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations)<sup>2</sup>. For the past few years the Maoist leaders have been moving freely across the border, holding meetings with senior Nepalese politicians on Indian soil, without Indian agencies apparently knowing about it (Shrestha, 2006). India has also supported the electoral process that brought the Maoists to power in early 2008.

The foregoing discussion manifestly exemplifies the gross mismanagement by India to stabilize its sensitive border relations with Nepal. India has been a passive spectator, without taking strict action against such criminal activities. It can be argued that there had been a concealed cooperation between the Indian rebels and the Nepali Maoist insurgents. India shook hands with the Nepali Maoists to overthrow the monarchic power, who had an antagonistic relationship with India. It was easy for the Indian Government because the persistent economic stagnation combined with deficiencies in political development; it became impossible for the vast majority of Nepal's people to participate in public political processes and institutions. Many of them looked for an alternative vision of political transition, which Maoist leaders provided (Czarnecka, 2005). Since 1996, India started funding Nepali Maoists to fight against the state. Most of their leaders were backed up by the Indian government. Surprisingly, India never helped the government of Nepal in arresting those leaders and extraditing them in Nepal. Interestingly, India justified it on the basis that it wanted to abolish the autocratic regime under the monarch and establish parliamentary democracy in the country (Lohani, 2011). It can be categorized as a diplomatic overture on the part of India. By ousting the monarch; with the aid of the Maoists, India wanted to establish her hegemony more firmly over Nepal's internal politics. But unfortunately, the Indian diplomats grossly failed in their attempt which ultimately culminated to severe repercussions from both the factions. Though not explicit, the cooperation which was prevalent between the Maoists and India had indirectly resulted in the gross failure in India's peace process in Nepal. The aforementioned discussion should be analyzed in the light of the 12 Point Agreement engineered by India that directly brought the Maoists into the political mainstream (Bhatta, 2012). India's mediatory role in the 12 Point Agreement has brought immense dissatisfaction among the Nepali nationals. This is because the Maoist Government had brought nothing but corruption and economic maladies. With more than 12,000 deaths in nine years, a home-grown Maoist insurgency, reinforced by ethnic and socioeconomic cleavages, has resulted in high levels of political violence and

human rights violations in Nepal (Mitchell et al., 2006). In this way the Nepali nationals have lost absolute faith in the Indian administration due to the proliferation of Maoist activities in Nepal. It is therefore evident that India will possibly face serious threats from an acute growth of Maoist insurgency within its territory. History illustrates that the Nepalese insurgents received considerable shelter and cover in India during the days of insurgency (Mishra, 2004). Quoting intelligence reports, the Times of India claimed that the People's War Group was planning to create a Compact Revolutionary Zone from Hyderabad to Kathmandu, taking Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Jharkhand into its area of influence with the help of other outfits (Mishra, 2001).

### ***2.2 Failure on the part of India to establish a democratic peace process in Nepal.***

As discussed earlier, India has repeatedly failed in the establishment of a stable democratic peace process in Nepal. The fundamental errors in the Indian foreign policy vis-à-vis Nepal, largely aggravated the aforesaid problem. In addition to it a major catalyst was the ongoing crisis in Nepal's relations with India. Assessments of Indian security policy was traditionally developed on the direct military threat to India from Pakistan and China, or on the indirect impact of superpower intervention in South Asia. However, since much of New Delhi's day-to-day diplomacy is preoccupied with South Asian problems, New Delhi exhibited increased willingness in the late 1980s to assert India's greater power directly and dramatically in smaller neighbouring countries (Hagerty, 1991). Therefore, the power politics played by India was erroneous. This is because the political edifice of Nepal was sensitive and the entire polity went through a phase of transition. Therefore, instead of stabilizing the situation and structuring the foreign policy to ascertain a democratic peace process within Nepal, it entered into certain fundamental conflicts with the country. Noted scholar Sudipta Kaviraj is of the opinion that, a fundamental transformation of the relations which constitutes the political world could not happen overnight. It is primarily the result of interconnecting rational decisions taken *ad hoc*, with short term objectives in mind. It happened due to the flux in the government apparatus in the general field of Indian politics (Kaviraj, 2010).

### ***2.3 The Possible Chinese Advance and the Impending Security Threats***

In the context of the foregoing discussion, it must be noted that unlike India, the Chinese leaders have valued good relations with the ASEAN states. ASEAN is even considered as one of the poles in the multi-polar power transfiguration in the Asia Pacific region (Cheng, 1999). At the level of national interest the ever expanding Chinese military presence in Tibet exercised a deep influence on India's previous policies in China (Ganguly, 2012). After the *Gurkha* conquest of Nepal in 1769, China and Nepal came into active political contact with each other for the first time in 1791. That was during the Nepal-Tibet war. However, a

Treaty was concluded in 1792 between Nepal and China because political scientists are of the opinion that the provisions of the 1792 Treaty and the subsequent Nepalese missions to China would readily give an impression as if Nepal was a vassal of China for a long period. The affable relationship between Nepal and China was inevitable post 1950 due to the changed political conditions in the north of Nepal. The Nepal-Tibet Treaty was a great achievement for China, an important step towards the fulfillment of the Nepal policy. It brought a revolutionary change along the Tibetan frontiers of China (Ramachandran, 2003). The previous anachronism of Nepal being militarily inferior but legally placed in a superior position in relation to Tibet was done away with. Not only the traders and residents of Tibet but also the leaders and nationals of China were permitted to access Nepal on the basis of reciprocity. In some cases the nationals of China and Nepal could cross the Nepal-Tibet border without any passport or visa requirements. In other words, Nepal was completely opened to China on her own terms, a situation earnestly desired by her. China later tactically followed up by profuse offers of economic aid and goodwill which proved to be a master stroke of diplomacy by China (Kumar, 1963). The Chinese interest in Nepal took a U-turn in 2008, when bloody protests erupted on the Tibetan plateau. One of China's core interests in Nepal has been to minimize the political activities of Tibetan refugees, which China views as potential threats to its own security.

Though the Chinese did make it clear that it would not want to entangle itself within Nepal's internal political theatre, its pro active participation in Nepal's politics has increased over the past few years. It is interesting to note that earlier China did not have direct contact with Nepal. This paper proposes that the gradual advancement of China is a growing strategic threat for India, the primary reason of it being that India and China share similar goals in Nepal. This can indirectly lead to conflicting interests in the long run. By conflicting interests the author wants to stress on the economic interests of China and India in Nepal. One of the reasons for the Chinese intervention in Nepal was to mitigate the Tibetan agitation which invoked the anti China sentiments in Nepal. The Chinese had no doubt been quite successful to this end. China had developed links directly with Nepali security agencies and bureaucracy. Thus, reconstructing the initial argument, two contentious issues can be raised. The sole purpose for which China ventured into Nepal was to eradicate the anti China sentiments that prevailed within its polity. This can be further considered as the first limb of China's tactical interference in Nepal. The second vested interest on the Chinese counterpart was to maintain an affable trade relationship with Nepal. From the traditional notions of political theory there are different structures of hierarchy and anarchy. These different ways of organizing political power result in different consequences for actors. Again actors will behave differently depending upon how they are organized. So for example, within a domestic

hierarchical organization, political processes can be specialized because there are different branches and levels of government, these various government sectors are all highly interdependent on each other, and their overriding goal is to maximize the welfare of the citizens of the States. Moreover, security issues are never solved within the State system (Cynthia & Weber, 2010). Hence, China extended its hand to resolve the security and economic meltdown within Nepal. The Chinese interference served as a viable mean for Nepal to achieve its political end i.e. maximization of the welfare of its citizens. According to traditional sociologists, it is implicit in the normal use that societies should possess legal and administrative unity within well defined borders. It is associated with the distinctive forms of social integration associated with the nation state (Hall & McGovern, 2007). As John Hall argued, the economic development of late medieval cities was supported by a certain type of emerging state in which ‘a limit to arbitrariness’ was combined with ‘ever increasing infrastructural power’ (Hall, 1994). If civil rights, especially the rights of the minorities are safeguarded, it is the liberal constitutional state and not the democracy which achieves this.

### **3. The Chinese Interference and Possible Strategic Concerns for India**

#### ***The Implicit Maoist Support by China***

Hitherto, China has adopted an aggressive posture to weaken India’s hold on Nepal. It can be argued that China is not only courting the Nepalese Maoists, but also rendering political and material support to the Indian Maoist militants. Historical facts suggest that the Chinese never considered the Maoist insurgents as terrorists (Mage, 2007). Information served by the Intelligence Agencies stated that many Chinese centres have been identified in the *terai* region of Nepal that serve as hubs for the dissemination of Maoist Ideology. There have been reports that Indian Maoists are also visiting these centres and indoctrinating the youth who are later to be recruited as red rebels. These centres are also used for anti-India propaganda. New Delhi was potently dissatisfied because of Kathmandu's arms purchases from China in 1988-89, including anti-aircraft weapons. These constitute evidences of the “cultural exchange” initiatives that are part of the soft power component of China’s foreign policy (Jha 2010; Schmidt 2008). India interpreted the arms acquisition as a signal that Nepal viewed India as a hostile neighbor, and argued that Nepal had violated an agreement of 1965; between the two countries (Hagerty, 1991). From the aforementioned facts it is quite clear that the ulterior intentions of China, though not explicit, can be perceived from an in depth study of its strategies. Hence, China can be termed as a “sleeping volcano”. The communist giants never known for moral principles in its foreign policy sure enough stepped into the vacuum caused by the withdrawal of arms aid by India to Gynendra’s Royal Army (Banerjee, 2006). China is tactfully using Nepal as a transit point to spread their business across to South Asia. This is another reason for India’s discomfort,

because it is already inundated by Chinese goods. Maoists have increasingly been inclined towards China because of two commonalities. First, the political ideology and second is the common resentment against India. Political volatility within Nepal has proved to be a greener pasture for China. The leaders across different parties in Nepal require money to carry out their political interest. Thus, China can exploit the situation by bribing the Nepalese leadership to get the construction and other contracts. Such allegations have already been published in Nepalese newspapers.

Another important factor is that the Maoists in Nepal often fan anti-Indian sentiments to shore up their nationalistic credentials. India regarded Maoists as a tool to overthrow the monarchy. And without the Indian aid it would not have been possible for the Maoist front to overthrow the powerful and established monarchy. Previously the monarch of Nepal had immense power. Not even the communists dared to belittle the King or advocate a republic (Levi, 1956). India believed that it could always play the Maoists against Nepal. India was successful to this end (Cailmail, 2008). But it was utterly unwise on the part of India. Since 1994, the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) has gone through a number of radical transformations, shifting from a guerrilla warfare unit to a key democratizing force within Nepal politics. An expanding Chinese presence in Nepal should be alarming for India, given that India and Nepal share a fragile and porous border. This anti India sentiment can be skillfully leveraged by the Chinese, given the situation that Maoists are in power. For the true essence of the discussion it is important to note that China openly exhorted Nepali assertions of independence vis-à-vis India throughout the period till 1978. Intense anti-India propaganda was directed by China into Nepal (Ghoble, 1985). The Indians will however continue to be blamed, as their hands are tied in terms of growing China-Maoist implicit pact in Nepal. China has previously perceived monarchy as a stable, credible and dependable partner. Thus, the ousting of the monarch raised dissatisfaction within the Chinese front. China can also corner India economically by jeopardizing India's trade relations with Nepal. China has developed alternative trade routes in Nepal for its growth in trade and commerce in the Himalayas. It has been persistently aiding Nepal in building roads and investing billions of dollars in hydropower and telecommunications. It can be articulated that China's rising economic encroachment in Nepal can be a future threat to India's strategic interests. Nepal now regards China as a reliable friend, and therefore the strengthening of the bilateral ties between the two nations is quite natural. It can well be a foreign policy initiative of China to corner India in terms of security and economy.

The Maoists emerged victorious in the April 2008 elections, pursuant to which China adopted a wait and watch policy because it was not sure of their intentions. After all, the Maoists were backed by India and were catapulted to the

political centre stage only after a comprehensive peace agreement was executed, in which India had played a substantial role behind the scenes. Media reports reveal that after several interactions with Maoists leaders, China started to feel quite comfortable with the Maoist-led government. The Maoists' ideological linkages with China and their keenness to neutralize India's influence in the region have also made them an obvious choice for engagement. It has been reported that in their interactions with the Chinese, the Maoist leaders gave the impression that the future of democracy in Nepal could be guided by the example of the Communist Party of China. Indeed, there are many in Nepal who argue that the presence of the Maoist tag in the party name despite joining competitive politics indicates that the party may work towards a single party system in the future, given that dictatorship of the proletariat has prime of place in the Maoist lexicon. In fact, some hardline leaders of the party have suggested a people's republic similar to that of China on a number of occasions even after Maoists joined the political mainstream. These ideas might have encouraged China to attempt to consolidate its position in Nepal by continuously engaging the Maoists at the political, economic, military and social levels, and thus secure its strategic interests in the region (Holslag, 2009)

China has also previously submitted to Kathmandu a draft Sino-Nepal friendship treaty. The draft states that China will not attack Nepal and would respect Nepal's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Nepal would in turn recognize 'One China' policy and not allow its territory to be used for "anti-China" activities (Krishnan, 2013). The draft treaty in fact looks more like a strategic one that is tilted highly in favour of Chinese security concerns. China needs this agreement because it does not have confidence in the democratic arrangements and future governments in Nepal, and wishes to consolidate its position while the Maoists are in power. China has reportedly penetrated in the Nepali political system by gaining confidence of hardline communist leaders both in the CPN-UML and the CPN-Maoists<sup>3</sup>. It has also assured help in the modernization and integration of registered Maoist guerrillas into the Nepal Army

#### **4. Lines of Effective Indian Policy to Nepal**

Nepal is a country with immense resilience, having huge potential. Nepal's hydroelectric power itself is a huge source of optimism. However, this resource has to be utilized to uplift the economic standards of the people and currently that is happening at a satisfactory pace. Nepal needs huge investments, and experience shows that it is not likely to come readily from any country outside South Asia. As contented by Professor Surya P. Subedi, the natural market for Nepal's hydroelectric power in India and the investment required for it could come from India (Subedi, 2005). Therefore, India should strategically increase its investments in Nepal in certain specific sectors to gain Nepal's confidence, and at the same time it should monitor the Indo-Nepal border and take proper

measures to mitigate the criminal activities that has been happening for the past few years.

The development projects which are being bagged by China in India's neighbourhood can be taken by India as well. India too could be instrumental towards bringing prosperity and peace in her neighbour's territories. India should take steps to convince Nepal that India alone has the capability to ward-off extra-territorial security and military intervention, and save the landlocked country from further tumult. India can make it possible through diplomacy alone as the environment within the region has always been hostile to India. Hence, it is a serious foreign policy challenge before India to contain the Chinese encirclement of India.

## **5. Conclusion**

It is, thus, evident that the maintenance of peace process in Nepal had been a gross mismanagement by India. It has also opened a gateway for China to destabilize India. India had exhibited a strong deterrence against the Nepalese Maoists and even declared it as a form of terrorism. But implicitly it is India; that indirectly supported the Maoist insurgencies in Nepal to overthrow the monarchy. This inherent contradiction can act as an "*Achilles Heel*" for India in the long run. Though the Chinese intervention has not yet proliferated in India to an alarming extent. It is high time for our country to reconstruct its foreign policies in the Himalayas. The author has thus tried to initiate a venture to evaluate an imbroglio that lies at the core of Indian foreign policies in Nepal. Apart from that the Indian diplomats should also contemplate on the relevance of political value systems in an increasingly globalized world economic order. This becomes relevant in the context of Nepal-China trade relations. The paper intended to craft a fulcrum between India's strategic interests and international stability in South Asia vis-à-vis Nepal.

## **Notes:**

- <sup>1</sup> *Vide* Article 1 and Article 2 of the Treaty.
- <sup>2</sup> This committee was believed to be emerged out of a meeting of comrades from nine Maoists parties, organized in some place in West Bengal. Similarly in the course of time the Maoists of Nepal in coordination with the left extremist groups of India proposed to establish a 'Compact Revolutionary Zone' (CRZ).
- <sup>3</sup> Prior to Jhala Nath Khanal becoming UML Chief, a four-member Chinese delegation visited Kathmandu on May 10, 2008 and met Khanal and other Maoist leaders.

## References

- Banerjee, S (2006): "The 'Ides' of April: Lessons from Nepal", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 41(19).
- Bhatta, C.D (2012): "Reflections on Nepal's Peace Process", *International Policy Analysis*, Department for Asia and the Pacific Hiroshimastr, Berlin Germany.
- Cailmail, B (2008): "The Fall of Hindu Monarchy: Maoists in Power in Nepal", *Asia Visions*, 12(3).
- Caroe, O (1960): "The Geography and Ethnics of India's Northern Frontiers", *The Geographical Journal*, 126 (3).
- Cartwright, J (2009): "India's Regional and International Support for Democracy: Rhetoric or Reality?", *Asian Survey*, 49(3).
- Chakravarty, B (2006): *Forging Power: Coalition Politics in India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press).
- Cheng, J (1999): "China's ASEAN Policy in the 1990s: Pushing for Regional Multi-polarity", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 21(2).
- Czarnecka, J.P (2005): "No end to Nepal's Maoist rebellion", *European Journal of Anthropology*, 46
- Ganguly, S (2012): *India's foreign policy: Retrospect and Prospect* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press).
- Ghoble, T. R (1985): "China Nepal Relations and India", *Asian Survey*, 25 (5).
- Goldstein, J & Pevehouse, J.C (2011): *International Relations* (New Delhi: Pearson Publications).
- Gul, N (2002): "Question of Nepal: Political Instability and Maoist Insurgency", *Pakistan Horizon*, 55(3).
- Hagerty T. D (1991): "India's Regional Security Doctrine", *Asian Survey*, 31(4).
- Hall, J.A (1994): *Coercion and Consent: Studies on the modern state* (Cambridge: Polity)
- Hall, T & McGovern, J et al. (2007): *The Modern State: Theories and Ideologies* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press).
- Holslag, J (2009): *China and India: Prospects for Peace*, (New York: Columbia University Press).
- Joshi, M & Mason, T. (2007): "Land Tenure, Democracy, and Insurgency in Nepal: Peasant Support for Insurgency versus Democracy", *Asian Survey*, 47(3).
- Shrestha, S (2006): "India's Possible Role in the Future Peace Process of Nepal", in Shiva Dhungana's, *The Maoist Insurgency and Nepal- India Relations*, (ed), (Kathmandu: Friends for Peace Publication).
- Kaviraj, S (2010): *The trajectories of the Indian State: Politics and Ideas* (New Delhi: Permanent Black).

- Krishnan, A : “China, Nepal agree to deepen military ties”, *The Hindu*, July 25, 2013.
- Kumar, S (1963): “Nepal and China”, *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, 24 (1).
- Kumar, S (2011): “China’s Expanding Footprint in Nepal: Threats to India”, *Journal of Defence Studies*, 5(2).
- Levi, W (1956): “Politics in Nepal”, *Far Eastern Survey*, 25 (3).
- Lohani, P. C (2011): “Nepal’s Evolving Relations with India and China”, *ORF Discourse*, 5(7).
- Mage, J (2007): “The Nepali Revolution and International Relations” *Economic and Political Weekly*, 42(20).
- Mihaly, E. B (1963): “Developments in Nepal”, *The World Today*, 19(10).
- Mishra, D, “Nepalese Extremists Being Trained in Bihar”, *Times of India*, April 16, 2001.
- Mishra, R (2004): “India’s Role in Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency”, *Asian Survey*, 44(5).
- Mitchell et al., (2006): “Opportunity, Democracy, and the Exchange of Political Violence: A substantial Analysis of Conflict in Nepal”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50(1).
- Nayak, N (2008): “Maoists in Nepal and India: Tactical Alliances and Ideological Differences”, *Strategic Analysis*, 32(3).
- Shastri Ramachandran,S (2003): “Nepal as Seen from India”, *Indian International Centre Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No.(2), 2003, pp. 81-98
- Subedi, S (2005): *Dynamics of foreign policy and law: A study of Indo-Nepal Relations* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press).
- Suhrwardy, Z (1996): “India’s Relations with Nepal”, *Pakistan Horizon*, 49(1).
- Taneja, N & Pohit, S (2001): “India’s Informal Trade with Nepal”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 36 (25).
- Upreti, B.R (2004): “Resource Conflicts and Conflict Resolution in Nepal”, *Mountain Research and Development*, 24(1).
- Weber, C (2010): *International Relations Theory, A Critical Introduction* (New York: Routledge, Taylor Francis Group).