

# Maoists of Nepal: Their use of Nationalism

Mukunds Giri

## Abstract

*Nationalism is not an ideology, yet Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) used it to mobilise the masses. In using it they joined it with the programme of Mao's New Democratic Strategy, raising the stature of Nepalese nationalism near ideology if not to full-fledged ideology. This perhaps explained their success in leading the decade-long movement which started in 1996. Such tactics; however, lights up another area of research. If nationalism can be so changed, can ethnic movements similarly claim in their mobilising ability the presence of some form of programmes?*

**Key Words:** Nationalism, ideology, democracy, strategy

## 1. Introduction:

From its beginning in February 1996, the Maoist movement of Nepal was analysed by researchers and academicians alike. In trying to understand the movement, they identified all conceivable causes. To name a few, poverty and regional developmental disparity (Thapa & Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege: Nepal's Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2004*, 2012, pp. 58-64), failure to carry out land reforms (Joshi M. , 2010), the unitary structure of the Nepalese state (Pahari, 2010), tribal mobilisation (Sales, 2013; Lawoti, 2010), Indian support (Thapa, 2007; Lal, 2007), social, political and economic disparity between the Khas, (Brahmin-Chettri)- Newar combine, and the indigenous people of the kingdom (Thapa & Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege: Nepal's Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2004*, 2012, p. 74), similarity in geographical, economic and political situation in Peru and Nepal (Mikesell, 2007; Nickson, 2007), the unique method of Maoist recruitment (Eck, 2010; Motin, 2010), and the role of the student body (Snellinger, 2010), but they missed one. They did not analyse how the Maoists wove nationalism in their tactics. However, for such understanding one has to analyse the ideas of democracy and nationalism current among earlier communists of Nepal, because those ideas provide the basis on which later communists of Nepal developed their tactics. These later communists, mainly the ones whose ideas the Maoists inherited, developed the ideas and realised them as pairs to turn nationalism into a weapon of mobilisation. Since the birth and the evolution of these ideas are rooted in their documents and in the communist leaders' views, which were expressed in different periods of Nepalese political history, the course of this paper is anchored in historical contexts. There are two such contexts: one focuses on events related to 1950 revolt in Nepal; other, on events after 1960. The former explains when and why national consciousness grew among the communists of Nepal, and the latter helps to understand the facets of such consciousness bringing to life the implied

perceptions in the documents of the forerunners of the Maoists. These perceptions explain the nature of nationalism used by them as consciousness lifted near ideology. This paper intends to clarify how such change of nationalism to near ideology was achieved besides arguing that the Maoists inherited such nationalism to mobilise the masses implying, thereby, that their success was perhaps owing to the use of such nationalism.

## **2. Nepal's Past and the 1950 Revolt**

Until 1950, Nepal was under dual rule. The Shah Kings were the legal rulers, but actual powers were in the hands of their Rana prime ministers. As Hindus, the Ranas ruled the kingdom under dated principles of Hindu Shastras codified as *Mulki Ain* (literarily the law of the land). They helped them in the upkeep of a traditional, orthodox Hindu society which revered authority. So to maintain the orthodoxy, they entertained minimum external relation. During their regime, the kingdom was linked in a mutually beneficial relation with only Britain. Nepal supplied soldiers to Britain and the latter propped Rana regime both actually and symbolically (Sever, 1993, p. 192 and 197). However, from the 1<sup>st</sup> half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the Ranas faced challenges against their rule both within and outside Nepal. Outside Nepal the challenge emerged in the birth of the Nepal Rastriya Congress in Calcutta in January 1947. The following year saw the birth of Nepali Democratic Congress in Patna. Head quartered in Calcutta, it advocated the end of the Rana regime by any means even by violent insurrection (Singh, 1985, pp. 95-6). So, it organised “a private Army which later evolved into the *Mukti Sena* (Liberation Army) of the 1950 revolution” (Joshi & Rose, 1966, p. 68). Following these, Pushpalal and his friends formed the Nepal Communist Party (from now on NCP) in Calcutta in September 1949.

As 50s dawned various interests became active there. At one end the then Rana Prime Minister, Mohan Shamsher, to keep his power intact, was proving himself intolerant of liberal reforms, on the other, the parties in exile were all for the end of the Rana regime. Besides, Gupta observes that during the period one of the stated policies of India in her engagement with Nepal was “to strengthen her northern border against communist China’s expansionist policy in Tibet” (Gupta, 1964, p. 47). The coming together of these interests, as it becomes apparent later, paved the way towards the 1950 revolt. And the first sign towards such convergence of interests was visible in the coming together of the Nepali Democratic Congress and the Nepali Rastriya Congress in Calcutta in April 1950 to form the Nepali Congress. In September, it declared its objective: it decided to lead a liberation campaign in Nepal. But, before it could fix the date for such campaign events swayed its actions. On 6 November, King Tribhuvan along with his two sons took refuge in the Indian embassy only to be flown to Delhi on the 10<sup>th</sup>. So, from 11 November, it started its armed revolt mobilising its forces — the *Mukti Sena*. Within weeks, the *Sena* spread throughout the

western, southern and eastern part of the kingdom. Meanwhile, on 6 of December, the government of India made its intent clear: without bringing drastic changes it wanted to introduce democracy there. In line with its intent, on the December 1950, India put in a memorandum to the government of Nepal suggesting constitutional reforms. However, it did not go well with the Ranas. Nevertheless, after initial dithering, they agreed to negotiate with India. In the negotiations, they agreed to recognise Tribhuvan as the King of Nepal; to form a 14 member interim Cabinet, to hold an election for a Constituent Assembly by 1952, and to legalise the functioning of political parties both within and outside Nepal (Gupta, 1964, p. 48). Nevertheless, when the Congress rejected the settlement, India arranged a 3<sup>rd</sup> round of talks in Delhi in the 1<sup>st</sup> week of February 1951. Considering the political situation in Western Tarai, the talk hastily concluded on 12 February in the Delhi Accord. On 18 February, a Royal proclamation installed a new government in Nepal. And a week later, when the *Mukti Sena* refused to surrender in the Western Tarai their intransigence was quelled by the joint action of “Indian armed constabulary and Nepal state troops” (Gupta, 1964, p. 54).

### **3. Communist Perceptions:**

To the leaders involved in the revolt, the Accord carried different meanings. In Koirala’s understanding, it provided Nehru an opportunity to increase Indian influence in Nepal, when China had captured Tibet (Sharma, 2000, p. 138). But, Pushpalal’s assessments of the Accord or ‘compromise’, as he called it, had something more to say. His assessments viewed the accord as an instrument in Indian hand to extend her control and to establish her interests in Nepal using the Congress. These interests were: 1) to protect the interest of Indian monopoly capitalists, 2) to support anti-Chinese campaign in collusion with the Anglo-American imperialists to isolate Nepal from the socialist camp and 3) to check the progress of democracy in Nepal. For him the Accord was a compromise against Nepalese nationalism, independence and democracy for he stated:

The compromise placed the representatives of the capitalist class, the Nepali Congress in a rewarding position. This changed the political environment Nepal. In this changed environment ... The Indian government could protect its monopoly capitalists, attract anti-Communist forces towards it using anti-Chinese slogans, and keep Nepal under its political, economic and military influence. To support them are the Anglo-American imperialist. By the compromise these three forces ... have tried to keep Nepal away from the socialist camp, contain the growth of democracy, and to stymie people’s movement in Nepal. Thus, through the Delhi compromise they have countered Nepalese nationalism, independence and democracy (Gurung, nd, pp. 27-8).

In dubbing the Accord “a compromise between ... The King, the Rana Prime Minister’s family and the Nepali Congress” against Nepali nationalism, independence and democracy Pushpalal was influenced by the experiences of the communists in the 1950 revolt (Gurung M. D., nd, p. 8). According to him “Communists ... had participated in the revolt to ... convert the revolt into an anti-feudal and anti-imperialist movement”. So, when the movement began he says, “the peasants, the radical wings of the Nepali Congress and the communists made common cause to distribute the land to the peasants and punish the landlords and culprits through People’s courts”. This according to him was fuelled by the ruling Ranas, the King and the Nepali Congress as a sign of “rising tide of anti-feudal movement” in Nepal (Gurung M. , p. 10). So, “the feudal forces organised under the King decided to end the revolt into a compromise ... Hence Nepali Congress leaders, King Tribhuvan and Rana rulers entered into an agreement to stall the movement” (Pushpalal, 1997, p. 63). And since India was interested in checking “the growth of communism in Nepal because of the rise of communist China” (Pushpalal, 1997, p. 60) Indian government in the course of the movement “collaborated with the Nepali Congress and terrorised and jailed them” (Pushpalal, 1997, p. 61) and later “managed the Accord” (Pushpalal, 1997, p. 63). Then he says, “after the accord the communists raised their voices against it, but Indian police and Army, suppressed their voices” (Pushpalal, 1997, p. 63). These incidents, according to Pushpalal, changed the perception of political activists in Nepal. It changed their views regarding the class character of the King and the Indian leaders’ policies towards Nepal. Besides, it revealed to Nepalese revolutionaries and communists, in particular, that in the politics of Nepal the issues of nationalism and democracy are closely linked for he stated:

The hated Delhi accord introduced to the political activists of the nation the policy of compromise of the Nepali Congress leaders and the class character of the King. Besides, it also revealed that ... The policies of Indian leaders towards Nepal were in no way different from the imperialist Britain and were only in the interest of Indian bourgeoisie. If yesterday, the Nepalese revolutionaries considered Indian leaders as their own, today it dawned on them that for the liberation of Nepal they should depend only upon their own strength and a struggle ... From then onwards, there developed in Nepal the consciousness that the issues of Nepalese nationalism and democracy are closely linked. In developing it, in the forefront, was Communist Party of Nepal (Pushpalal, 1997, p. 64).

Explicitly, the statements made only two suggestions. First, they suggested when national consciousness and democracy became a part of the Nepal Communist Party vocabulary. Second, they suggested that the communists noticed a relation between democracy and nationalism in Nepal. But, there are implied suggestions

which need to be exposed for appreciating the communists' views on democracy and nationalism. And for such expositions three questions need to be answered. First, what did Pushpalal mean when he said the event changed communist's perceptions regarding the class character of the King? Second, how did the events mould communist perceptions about Indian leaders? And third, what did Pushpalal intend to convey by the use of the word 'liberation' in his statements? Were answers to these questions in any way related to their idea of nationalism? Considering the statements, if one infers that the communists perceived in the King and ordinary feudal then it would be at the cost of the analytical progress this work. For such understanding does not fully clarify the nature of feudal forces of Nepal in the perceptions of the NCP. The NCP in its 1<sup>st</sup> document had already perceived the feudal forces of Nepal as an ally of Nehru and of the Anglo-American imperialist by stating, "the Ranas can meet their Lord the Anglo-American imperialists ... and the Indian big business houses, the Tatas, the Birlas, the Singhanias whenever they wish ... They can meet Nehru to supply our youths to protect their wealth" (NCP., VS 2053 [1996], p. 47). Thus, the communists' changed perception regarding the class character of the King implied that before the Accord they had not classed the King among the Ranas, but after the Accord they began viewing him in the same category, feudal forces allied to external exploiters. As for understanding their changed view concerning Indian leaders the account must begin with communist's perceptions regarding the Anglo-American imperialist, because they noted an intimate relation between the two. For them the Anglo-American imperialists represented forces interested in "warding off capitalist crisis within their system by countering democratic and anticolonial movements raging in different parts of the world ... while inciting Third World war against Soviet Union and freedom loving socialist countries" (NCP., VS 2053 [1996], p. 57). In such design of the imperialist they noticed Nehru as their supporter. He supported them by allowing "Gorkha recruitment centres to operate in Ghoom [a Cantonment near Darjeeling] and Gorakhpur [an Indian town to the South of Nepal] after signing to 9 November 1947 treaty where the parties were India, Nepal and Britain" (Ibid., 58). Besides they perceived Nehru, as a leader of the Indian big business houses, which exploited Nepal while supporting feudal exploitation within for its first manifesto read:

Under the direction and protection of New Delhi government the Indian big industrial houses — Birlas, Singhanias and Chaudharias ... have opened jute, cloth and sugar Mills in Nepal. The Nehru government by itself has captured Kosi project. Today the major share in the capital invested in Nepal is of the Indian capitalists. These Indian looters are involved in looting cheap labour and natural resources of Nepal without any intention of industrialising Nepal. The Nepalese are under dual exploitation, the capitalist exploiters support feudal exploiters (Ibid. 58-9).

In sum, their arguments created a political configuration where the feudal forces of Nepal were aligned with Nehru, the leader of the Indian bourgeoisie, and with the Anglo-American imperialist. In this relation the feudal forces of Nepal received support from the external forces for their existence. In extending such support Nehru's intent was to exploit the Nepalese resources. And the aims of the imperialist were: a) to check the growth of democratic movement, b) to incite war against freedom loving socialist countries, and c) to recruit youths for their Army. So, Nehru's interest in checking the Democratic movement in Nepal, by implication, was guided by two considerations: 1) to ensure the continuity of Indian exploitation by keeping intact the feudal allies, and 2) to serve the imperialists who were interested in checking the rise of Democratic movement in Nepal, which perhaps included their concern stemming from the rise of communist China. Thus, after the Delhi Accord the communists began perceiving Indian leaders not only as exploiters, but also as enemies in their struggle against democracy—their changed view regarding the nature of Indian policies towards Nepal. But, the democracy which they advocated was not liberal democracy. Following new Democratic strategy they advocated 'complete democracy' or 'true democracy' which meant "a government representing Nepalese *Majdoor* (working class), peasants, middle class and national bourgeoisie, the true representative of the people" (Samyukta Morcha, VS 2008/3/23 [7 July 1951], p. 64). Therefore, when they perceived the external exploiters as enemy of democracy then they perceived them as enemies of four-class democracy. Plainly, this meant that they perceived them as enemies of the communists for whom liberal democracy was an anathema. However, concerning the use of the word liberation nothing can be guessed with certainty. Considering the nature of their perceptions, it may mean either the establishment of four-class democracy or the freeing of Nepal from the maze of feudal and the imperialist relations. And this leaves one guessing as to what nationalism meant to the communists of Nepal. However, this unanswered question, the use of nationalism and its relation with four-class democracy comes to life in the documents of the forerunners of the CPN (Maoist). Therefore, the next section is devoted to describing the political context where their documents were expressed. However, before passing on to the section it would be worthwhile here to mention that since the days of its formation the NCP perceived China favourably while denigrating Britain, America and India, in particular, for having imposed upon Nepal treaties with unequal terms. In case of India, such denigration gained momentum after 31 July 1950 when Mohan Shamsher, presumably to gain Indian support for his tottering regime, signed two treaties with India. These treaties were the Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the Treaty of Trade and Commerce and a Letter of Exchange, which formed an integral part of the treaties. In these treaties what seems to have irked the communists most were the "security relations and obligations" (Panday, 2000, p. 308), which the Letter of Exchange imposed upon Nepal. If Section II of the

letter barred Nepal from importing arms through the territory of India without her approval, Section IV bound Nepal into accepting Indian support in her developmental projects till such support from other countries proved more favourable in terms which they offered (Srivastava, 1996, pp. 151-2). According to Panday, in these treaties India took “the position that as far as the security line was concerned Nepal’s northern border was its frontier” (Panday, 2000, p. 309), a legacy of British perception. Further he writes, “it defined the relation as special relation ... and [expected Nepal] to show an unfailing understanding to this Indian interest” (Panday, 2000, p. 310). Time and again, Nepal has raised its objections against these provisions, but whenever it has asserted its position, as in 1989, it has suffered economic blockade. The provisions of the treaties are, therefore, a burning sore in the relation between the two countries.

### **3. Post-1960 political context: birth of NCP (Kendriya Nucleus)**

After the Delhi Accord, King Tribhuvan continued violating the provisions of the Accord: he repeatedly deferred the formation of a Constituent Assembly and managed the kingdom under hand-picked Ministries. After his death in 1955, his son, King Mahendra, followed suit. However, when political parties pressurised him for election he initiated the drafting of the 1959 Constitution of Nepal and slated general election on 18 February 1959. The election brought Nepali Congress to power with a 74 seat win in the hundred and 9 seated *Pratinidhi Sabha* (the Lower House). BP Koirala became the first elected Prime Minister of Nepal. However, the parliamentary experiment ended suddenly when, on 15 December 1960, Mahendra dismissed BP Koirala Ministry and jailed Koirala and other political activists. Then, on Friday, January 1961, he banned political parties within Nepal. From October 1961, the month when the King signed an agreement with the Chinese for the construction of Kathmandu-Kodar (gateway to Tibet) road, Congress activists, stationed in India, began cross-border raids to harass the King into reverting to parliamentary practices. These activities of the Congress, according to Joshi and Rose, were probably supported by Nehru (Joshi & Rose, 1966, p. 432). They peaked in September 1962 when India imposed an unofficial economic blockade on Nepal. However, it died down with the start of Sino-Indian border conflict in October 1962, when Nehru asked them to suspend their activities (Whelpton, 2005, p. 99). After the end of the conflict the King established Panchayat democracy or party-less democracy which, in name, hid his intent of centralising power in himself. Operating under such system, the NCP suffered numerous factions. In its Third Congress, held in April 1962, in Varanasi, the party “expelled 10 moderate members of Central committee — including Rayamajhi, Sambhuram Shrestha, Kamar Shah, DP Adhikari and PB Malla...” (Joshi & Rose, 1966, p. 453) In these expulsions the party arraigned Sambhuram Shrestha and DP Adhikari for supporting the King’s nationalist stance that is his tilt towards China, expressed in his understanding for the construction of the Kathmandu-Kodar road (Antar Zone Samanjasya Samiti, VS

2018 Falgun 25 [7/2/1962], p. 22). Then General Secretary of the party, Tulsilal Amatya, rejected Pushpalal's line, which was for the "re-establishment of parliamentary democracy" (Rawal, VS Paus 2047 [Dec/Jan. 1990/91, p. 59) with the support of the Nepali Congress and adopted a new strategy — the "National Democratic Strategy"<sup>1</sup>. The strategy aimed at "destroying the institution of the monarchy" (NCP, 1962, p. 49). The expulsions and the adoption of the new strategy triggered NCP's fragmentation throughout the 60s. In 1964/65, NCP (Rayamajhi) faction was born. It advocated national Democratic strategy, peaceful change, and reformed Panchayat without destroying the institution of the monarchy (NCP (Rayamajhi), VS 2021 [1965/66], pp. 1-3). This was followed by the birth of NCP under Pushpalal. It stuck to the New Democratic strategy condemning National Democratic strategy as Soviet sponsored and revisionists and advocated destruction of Panchayat system with the help of Nepali Congress. However, Tulsilal Amatya, the general secretary of the Third Congress continued as NCP (Tulsilal) holding fast onto the National Democratic strategy while rejecting Nepali Congress as fellow traveller in its march against the monarchy. Meanwhile, Khampa guerrilla raids into Tibet from Nepal's northern border, which had begun since 1967, remained unattended. And according to Whelpton the incident was rumoured to have been "supported by India and ... the CIA". Amid these circumstances, by the end of 1960s, King Mahendra released jailed communist activists Man Mohan Adhikari and Sambhuram Shrestha. Later, in 1971 he released Mohanbikram Singh and Nirmal Lama. In the open these leaders created Kendriya Nucleus in 6 December 1971 in Kathmandu (NCP (Masal), VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002], p. 196). The document explained that the Nucleus was needed to end disunity among the communist forces; and to create a centre, and to combat the strategies of other factions (NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002], p. 35). However, even this faction split in 1974. From then onwards NCP (Kendriya Nucleus) continued as "NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun [Fourth Congress]) and the other faction emerged as NCP (Man Mohan Adhikari) in 1979" (K. C, VS 2060 [2003/4], p. 113). Subsequently, fighting over minor tactical and organisational issues NCP (Fourth Congress) split into two factions. One faction "NCP (Mahsal) came into existence in Kartik 2040 [October/November 1983]" (K. C, VS 2060 [2003/4], p. 117) and the other continued as "NCP (Fourth Congress) from 10 Mangshir 2040 [26 November 1983]" (NCP., VS 2041 [1984/85], p. 1). Still later, probably in November/December 1985 NCP (Mahsal) split into NCP (Mahsal) and NCP (Masal)<sup>2</sup>. The former was a new faction and the latter, a continuation of NCP (Mahsal). These factions, barring the NCP (Man Mohan Adhikari) faction, were the forerunners of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). Out of these, two factions, namely "NCP (Mahsal) and NCP (Fourth Congress), along with Sarvaharabadi Shramik Sangathan came together in November 1990 and formed the Communist Party of Nepal (Ekta Kendra [Unity Centre]) announcing "similarity in their thinking" (NCP (Ekta

Kendra [Unity Centre], VS 2051/2/15 [25 June 1994], p. 1). However, the Centre is split in “May 1994” when the majority of the Central committee members forcibly pass the political proposal of the party. The majority group then evolved as the CPN (Maoist) and initiated People’s War in February 13, 1996 (CPN (Maoist), 1996, p. 2). Since, the parties which came together had similarity in their thinking, and since both the parties stood by the decisions of the NCP (Fourth Congress) (NCP (Mashal), VS 2047 Kartik [Oct/Nov. 1990], p. 13), which was a continuation of the NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), in the section that follows, their documents will be taken together in understanding the nature of nationalism which the Maoists inherited.

#### **4. Factions’ views on nationalism:**

After its formation, the Kendriya Nucleus picked up earlier communists’ concept of democracy and their perceptions regarding India, but with a difference. It viewed her as “the follower of British policy, which had sought economic exploitation of Nepal to turn it into its secure market”, while categorising as an “expansionist” (NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002], p. 1). Since such categorisation denigrated Indo-Nepal economic relations the reference was clear: it denigrated the relation fashioned by the 1950 treaties. In denigrating the relation, the Nucleus perceived India as a nation interested in a stunting Nepal’s economic growth and by that, the growth of Nepalese ‘national bourgeoisie’. This implied that by perpetuating such relation India ensured the non-development of the class which raised voices against the relation (p. 18). This served Indian interest, because it meant that for Nepal’s economic development she was constrained to look up to India for capital. So, in Nepal, the Nucleus perceived the influences of foreign capital, tout capital and tout bureaucrats helping India continue the economic exploitation of Nepal for it stated:

India has foisted upon Nepal unequal treaties, which have balked independent growth of Nepalese industries and the economy. She follows an expansionist policy towards Nepal as a result there is no growth of national bourgeoisie here. In today’s Nepal there are the influences of foreign capital, tout capital and tout bureaucratic class so Nepal is in semi-colonial stage. To keep Nepal in this state is in India’s interest. The interest is to exploit Nepal (Ibid.).

The other aspect which the Nucleus focused on while denigrating the expansionist character of India was the security relation that the treaties had shaped between the two nations. And its condemnation came to light when it accepted the King’s renewal of the treaties in 1971 by observing, “... the King has surrendered Nepalese sovereignty and independence by accepting the special relation ... and is in the process of selling Western Kosi channel to the Indian expansionist by renewing the 1950 treaties” (NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), VS 2059

Srawan [June/July 2002], p. 7). Thus, India was an expansionist on two counts: it sought the extension of both her economic and political interests within Nepal. And in her expansive design the Nucleus identified two external allies — one America and the other the Soviet socialist imperialist<sup>3</sup>. The former supported Indian exploitation in Nepal to fulfil “its goal of encircling China” (NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002], p. 7) and the latter “supported Indian political interest and the interest of her monopoly capitalists in Nepal to keep Soviet influence intact in the Indian subcontinent” (NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002], p. 1). In the design, the King and his Panchayat system supported them. The relation was identified as mutual: the external exploiters supported the feudal regime and its paraphernalia within, and for it the feudal regime either strengthened the hold of the foreign capital, or extended its political support to the exploiters (NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002], p. 16). In line with such perceptions the Nucleus, therefore, viewed the King’s inaction against Khampa revolt as his “help to the CIA ... to increase American influence” there, a support to the American design to encircle China (NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002], p. 7). Finally, the Nepali Congress fit in the web of the exploiters as a party representing the interest of both “the feudal forces [and the forces of] the tout bureaucratic bourgeois class, foreign capitalists and imperialists” (NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002], p. 18). It was, therefore, not a representative of the national bourgeoisie championing the cause of Nepal, but a class representing the interest of the Indian monopoly capitalists for the Nucleus noted:

National bourgeoisie in our country is in infancy. Even then this class is often found advocating the rights of an underdeveloped, landlocked state. It raises demands for unrestricted transit rights; objects against Indian tactics of economic pressure and its policy of considering Nepal as its common market. But, the Nepali Congress, far from supporting these causes of the national bourgeoisie, supports the interest of Indian monopoly capitalists. Hence, it is hilarious to count the Nepali Congress as the representative of the national bourgeoisie (Ibid.,).

However, what the Nucleus viewed as nationalism still remained elusive in all the above formulations except in its allusions to the events of October 1961. Alluding to the event, King’s agreement with China for the construction of Kathmandu-Kodar road, its document observed: “there is a contradiction between the Nepali Congress and the King. When the Congress raises demands for democracy, then the King raises issues of nationalism to protect his Crown. He opposes Indian expansionism ... for his own interest” (Ibid, 24). When this comment is read with its characterisation of China as “the dependable friend of Nepal ... ever ready to support Nepal in her struggle for economic independence

and democracy” (Ibid, 23), then its views on nationalism comes to the fore. It implies that for the Nucleus nationalism meant actions, which were opposed to Indian expansionism and on the flip side actions which were pro-Chinese. By extrapolation, nationalism, therefore, meant opposing Indian expansionist and all forces, which collaborated with her in her bid to expand within Nepal. These forces, by its logic, included the King when he supported the exploiters, and the Nepali Congress whose “demand for democracy, was only for increasing the influence of Indian expansionist in Nepal” (Ibid, 25). Thus, for the faction, nationalism essentially signified an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal stance with a penchant for serving the interest of the people. But, in its advocacy of nationalism there were no elements which it could invoke to reflect its pro-people orientation. Hence, time and again, the documents of these factions sought to bring together the ideas of nationalism and democracy. Initially, they pointed out that they should go hand-in-hand as campaign tools for mobilising the masses and for the party to emerge as an independent political force for it stated:

We have to struggle for both democracy and nationalism and while campaigning for democracy we must outperform Nepali Congress, and while campaigning for nationalism we must outperform the King’s campaign for nationalism... Usually, in the past when we struggled against either the King or the Nepali Congress we applied our main force against one of them while neglecting our struggle against the other as a result we could not evolve as an independent political force (Ibid, 28).

And later by arguing that if the party did not consider democracy and nationalism as ‘inalienable principles of revolution’ then Nepal will turn into another Sikkim for it stated:

Regarding nationalism there appeared two types of mistaken views. One type accepted the King’s leadership for the protection of nationalism; stressed on bolstering his status, thereby, strengthening nationalism the cost of democracy [four-class democracy]. The other type went on embracing the Nepali Congress’s position: it careened towards democracy [parliamentary democracy] little realising the threat to which the independence and sovereignty of the nation was exposed to as a result of such tactics. The advocates of the first type of views were all those who were expelled on account of their pro-King policies in the third Congress. The victims of the second type of view were all those who had ... In the third Congress put forward the proposal for the re-establishment of the dissolved Parliament, while nakedly towing the line of the Nepali Congress. However, the majority of the third Congress ...

took both democracy and nationalism as inalienable principles of revolution ... And the same has been the foundation of the second Congress. The political scenario of Sikkim help us to understand the danger underlying the tactics which seeks to segregate nationalism from democracy ... If one tows their line of Nepali Congress, then Nepal will turn into another Sikkim (NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun [Fourth Congress]), VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002]) (NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun [Fourth Congress]), VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002], p. 42).

Though the above statements proved confusing owing to the semantic confusion which they indulged in, yet it served their purpose of bringing together democracy and nationalism while invoking fear of Nepal's southern neighbour. It was the very fear which they had, in the name of nationalism, been using to mobilise the masses for such conclusion flows from its statements where it said: "in the past two decades India has repeatedly tried to limit our sovereignty and independence, but for our constant struggle against Indian reactionaries since the days of the Delhi accord there has not been an open attack on Nepal" (NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002], p. 23). Later, in June/July 1974 the NCP (Kendriya Nucleus) turned into NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun [Fourth Congress]). As heir to the principles of the Nucleus it subscribed to the strategy of New Democratic revolution. This revolution was expected "... to transfer land to the tillers ... nationalise the capital and industries which were in the possession of tout bureaucratic bourgeoisie ... annul all unequal treaties, and ... Equalise women's status with that of men, and give freedom and equal rights to ... the deprived sections of the society" (NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun [Fourth Congress]), VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002], p. 58). And the party felt that the above goals could be fulfilled only by "a government representing the interest of the people" (Ibid). This meant that the four-class democracy was sufficient to extricate Nepal from the clutches of imperialism and feudalism and help her realise her nationalism. However, nowhere the factions adopt this logic: logic which proceeds from democracy towards nationalism. On the contrary, they adopt the logic which proceeds from nationalism towards democracy. As an illustration of such logic let us take how another faction of this line, the NCP (Masal) explains the problem of *Janajatis* (nationalities) of Nepal. In explaining the problem, the faction states, "the problems of the various *Janajatis* are, in fact, problems falling within the ambit of nationalism" meaning, thereby, that the solution to the problem of *Janajatis* lay in the resolution of the problems of nationalism (NCP (Masal), VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002], p. 287). On this aspect their argument when paraphrased runs as follows: there are two types of nationalism. The first type advocates the interest of the ruling class; rationalises inequality and keeps the economy underdeveloped. It is therefore divisive. The other type advocates the

cause of the majority; of the exploited lot and is characterised by a developed economy where there is equality of opportunity. Therefore, economic development is necessary to move from the first type of nationalism to the second type. Such nationalism is cohesive, because it is based on equality of opportunity (Ibid 287-88). Read closely, their argument boils down to one variable, that is, economic development as a necessary condition for resolving the problems of the nationalities. However, given their understanding of nationalism, economic development of Nepal is possible only when Nepal is free from the clutches of the imperialists and their associates. This means, that even here, the line of argument proceeds from nationalism towards democracy. The question is why were they interested in connecting nationalism with democracy? The answer in their version is stated thus: “the question of nationalism should be connected with wider economic and political rights of the people, that is, with democracy; otherwise, nationalism would not receive the support of the people” (NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun [Fourth Congress]), VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002], p. 74). This means that for them, as tools for mobilising the masses, nationalism was more important than democracy. Hence, had they used the logic which proceeded from democracy towards nationalism then they would have turned nationalism into a function of democracy, and in its demoted state it would have lost importance as their tool of mobilisation. But, the question is why, at all, their idea of nationalism needed to be welded with economic and political rights of the people? This was because their nationalism already had the three attributes of ideology. It explained Nepal’s condition; it supplied them with tools to evaluate the condition, and it provided them, in its ‘orientative’ capacity, the tools to convince the masses that they were the exploited lot. However, it lacked the fourth element of an ideology, a political program. So they connected their idea of nationalism with democracy and elevated it to near ideology<sup>4</sup>. It was this form of nationalism which the CPN (Maoist), as the majority of the CPN (unity Centre), inherited and used as a powerful tool for mobilising the masses. A reflection of their idea on nationalism and democracy is implied in their leaflet which they distributed while initiating the People’s War in February 1996. The leaflet clearly indicated what their idea of nationalism meant. Besides, its content which castigated the nature of Nepalese state implied a call for the creation of an egalitarian society, indicating the intimate relation that they viewed in between nationalism and democracy for the leaflet said:

To maintain hegemony of one religion (i.e., Hinduism) language (i.e., nationalism) & nationality, (i.e., Khas) this state has for centuries exercised discrimination, exploitation and oppression against other religion, languages & nationalities and has conspired to fragment the forces of national unity that is vital for proper development and security of the country. On the contrary, it has been prostrating (sic) before the foreign imperialist and expansionists and repeatedly mortgaging (sic) Nepal’s honor &

sovereignty to them. The present state has been shamelessly permitting the foreign plunderer to grab the natural resources of Nepal and to trample upon our motherland. If this process is let to (sic) continue for some time to come it is no doubt to the patriotic, conscious and self-esteemed Nepalese that the very existence of Nepal will be in jeopardy (CPN (Maoist), 1996, p. 12)

Since, during that time the Maoists were leading the People's War their documents of the period, 1996-2004, do not elaborate their ideas, but an article brought out in their organ by one of their leaders, Com. Biswas argues about the inalienability of the idea of democracy and nationalism (Biswas, 1998). This proves that the CPN (Maoist) were using the same form of nationalism, nationalism welded with democracy and raised near to the level of ideology, to win the support of the masses.

### **Conclusion:**

The use of nationalism by communists is not an unreported fact, because it was used even in the context of China (Johnson, 1962). However, what is interesting is to note that when the use of ideology as a tool for mobilising the masses was on the wane worldwide (Schwarzmantel, 2008), the Maoists were using nationalism by transforming it near to ideology. This raises a question and opens up a new area of research. Do ethnic movements, in their capacity to mobilise masses, have in them similar program structure embedded in their appeal?

### **Notes:**

- <sup>1</sup> This strategy comes from the 1960 Statements of 81 Communist and Workers Parties meeting held in Moscow. It was recommended for Asian, African and Latin American countries, which had freed themselves from imperialism, but were still fighting against American imperialism and had remnants of feudalism to deal with. See Juan Fajardo, trans., *Statement of 81 Communist and Workers Parties Meeting in Moscow, USSR, 1960* (New York: New Century Publishers, 1961), Sec. IV, Web<[http://www.marxist.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/other/1960\\_statement.htm](http://www.marxist.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/other/1960_statement.htm)>Marxist.org: Sino-Soviet Split Document Archive. 29-5-2010.
- <sup>2</sup> The month is an approximation based on the reading of their documents.
- <sup>3</sup> After Soviet Union invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 the Communists of Nepal began characterising Soviet Union as Soviet Socialist Imperialist. And after the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 they began viewing the USSR as an ally of expansionist India.
- <sup>4</sup> See, (Ball & Dagger, 2009, pp. 4-9). An ideology performs four functions, namely, explanatory, evaluatory, orientative and programmatic.

## Bibliography

- Antar Zone Samanjasya Samiti. (VS 2018 Falgun 25 [7/2/1962]). Nepal Communist Partyko Tamam Party Sadasyaharulai Appeal [Keval Party Sadasyaharuko Lagimatra]. Np: Antar Zonal Committee.
- Ball, T., & Dagger, R. (2009). *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal*. New York: Pearson Longman.
- Biswas, C. (1998, May). People's War and the Problem of Development of United Front. *The Worker: organ of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)*, 45-7. Publication Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist).
- CPN (Maoist). (1996, June). March Along the Path of People's War to Smash the Reactionary State and Establish a New Democratic State! *The Worker: Organ of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)*, 11-15. Np: Publication Department Central Committee, CPN (Maoist).
- CPN (Maoist). (1996, June). Red Salute to the Immortal Martyrs of the People's War! *The Worker: Organ of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)*, 1-3.
- Eck, K. (2010). Recruiting Rebels: Indoctrination and Political Education in Nepal. In M. Lawoti, & A. K. Pahari, *The Maoist insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century* (pp. 33 – 51). London: Routledge.
- Gupta, A. (1964). *Politics in Nepal 1950 – 60*. Delhi: Kalinga Publications.
- Gurung. (nd). *Hamro Mul Bato*. Np: Np.
- Gurung, M. D. (nd). *Notes on the Communist Movement of Nepal*. Varanasi: Nepal Sahitya Kendra.
- Gurung, M. *Notes of the Communist Movement in Nepal*. Varanasi: Nepal Sahitya Kendra.
- Johnson, C. (1962). *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: the Emergence of Revolutionary China*. California: Stanford University Press.
- Joshi, B. L., & Rose, L. E. (1966). *Democratic Innovations in Nepal: A Case Study Of Political Acculturation*. California, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Joshi, M. (2010). Between Clientelistic Dependency and Liberal Market Economy: Rural Support for Maoist Insurgency in Nepal. In M. Lawoti, & A. K. Pahari, *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century* (pp. 92-111). London: Routledge.
- K. C, S. (VS 2060 [2003/4]). *Nepalma Communist Andolanko Itihas: Bhag 2*. Kathmandu: Vidyarthi Pustak Bhandar.
- Lal, C. K. (2007). Nepal's Maobadi. In D. Thapa, *Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal* (pp. 135-48). Kathmandu: Martin Chautari and Centre for Social Research and Development.
- Lawoti, M. (2010). Ethnic Dimensions of the Maoist Insurgencies: Indigenous Groups' Participation and Insurgency Trajectories in Nepal, Peru and India. In M. Lawoti, & A.

K. Pahari, *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century* (pp. 135-55). London: Routledge.

Mikesell, S. L. (2007). The Paradoxical Support of Nepal's Left for Comrade Gonzalo. In D. Thapa, *Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal* (pp. 35-41). Kathmandu: Martin Chautari and Centre for Social Research and Development.

Motin, M. (2010). Catchy Melodies and Clenched Fists: Performance As Politics in Maoist Cultural Programs. In M. Lawoti, & A. K. Pahari, *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: chosen in the Twenty-First Century* (pp. 52 – 72). London: Routledge.

NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun [Fourth Congress]). (2059 Srawan [June/July 2002]). Chautho Mahadhiwayshunbhitra Dekhapareyko Dakshinpanthi Avsarbado Singhawalokan: (2040 Salma [1983/84] Gorakhapurma Sampanna Teshro Rastriya Sammelan-Chautho Mahadhiwayshunpachiko Pratham Rastriya Sammelandwara Parit). *Rato Tarwar*, 183-94. Kathmandu: Kendriya Karyalaya, NCP (Masal).

NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun [Fourth Congress]). (VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002]). Kranti Ra Partyka Tatkalik Samasyaharu: (2031 Salma Asadma [June/July 1974] Varanasima Sampanna Chautho Mahadhiwayshunma Kendriya Nucleuska Secretary Com. Mohan Bikram Singhdwara Prastut Ra Parit Rajnitik Pratibedanko Rajnitik Khanda). *Rato Tarwar*, 36-80. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal), Kendriya Karyalaya.

NCP (Ekta Kendra [Unity Centre]). (VS 2051/2/15 [25 June 1994]). Nepal Communist Party (Ekta Kendra) Ko Ekta Mahadhiwayshundwara Nirwachit "Bhinnamat" Ka. Ke. Sa. Sa. Haru Tatha Rastriya Sallahakar Parishadka Adyakshadwara Sampurna Party Sadasyaharulai Appeal. Np: Rastriya Sammelan Ayojak Samiti, NCP (Ekta Kendra).

NCP (Kendriya Nucleus). (VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002]). Bartaman Antarastriya Ra Rastriya Paristhitika Biseshtharu: (2028 Sal Mangshirma [Nov/Dec 1971] Gathit Nepal Communist Partyko Kendriya Nucleusdwara Parit). *Rato Tarwar*, 12-17. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal), Kendriya Karyalaya.

NCP (Kendriya Nucleus). (VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002]). Deshka Rajnitik Shaktiharuko Bishlayshun: (2028 Sal Mangshirma [Nov/Dec 1971] Communist Partyko Kendriya Nucleusdwara Parit). *Rato Tarwar*, 18-29. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal), Kendriya Karyalaya.

NCP (Kendriya Nucleus). (VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002]). Karyakramsambandhi Rajnitik Prastao: (2028 Sal Mangshirma [Nov/Dec 1971] Gathit Nepal Communist Partyko Kendriya Nucleusdwara Parit). *Rato Tarwar*, 1-5. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal), Kendriya Karyalaya.

NCP (Kendriya Nucleus). (VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002]). Nepal Communist Partybhitra Dekha Pareka Bhadrakawharu: VS 2028 Mangshir [Nov/December 1971]. *Rato Tarwar*, 30-5. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal), Kendriya Karyalaya.

NCP (Kendriya Nucleus). (VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002]). Tatkalik Rajnitik Prastao: (2028 Sal Mnangshirma [Nov/Dec 1971] Gathit Nepal Communist Partyko Kendriya Nucleusdwara Parit). *Rato Tarwar*, 6-11. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal), Kendriya Karyalaya.

- NCP (Masal). (VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002]). Rajnaitik Pratibedan: (2041 [1984/85] Salma Ayodhyama Sampanna Ne. Ka. Pa (Masal) Ko Pachau Mahadhiwayshunma Kendriya Sangathan Samitika Mahamantri Com. Chitrabhadur K. C Dwara Prastut Tatha Parit). *Rato Tarwar: Dastabeja Biseshanka, Anka 2*, 196-219. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal) Kendriya Karyalaya.
- NCP (Masal),. (VS 2059 Srawan [June/July 2002]). Janajati Tatha Dalit Jatisambandhi Prastao: (2041 [1984] Sal Mangshirma [Nov/Dec] Ayodhyama Sampanna Ne. Ka. Pa (Masal) Ko Pachau Mahadhiwayshun Dwara Swikrit). *Rato Tarwar*. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal) Kendriya Karyalaya.
- NCP (Mashal). (VS 2047 Kartik [Oct/Nov. 1990]). Rajnaitik Pratibedan: (Pachau Mahadhiwayshun Pachiko Pahilo Rastriya Sammelanma Parit). Np: Kendriya Karyalaya, NCP (Mashal).
- NCP (Pushpalal). (nd). Nepal Communist Partyko Atharaha Barshako Krantikari Sangharshako Singhawalokan Awam Siksha (2025 Jestha [May/June 1968] Gorakhpurma Sampanna Bhayeko Teshro Aitihasik Sammelanma Com. Pushpalaldwara Preshit Tatha Ukta Sammelendwara Parit). *Pushpalal: Chaniyeka Rachana Bhag 3*, 1-98. Kathmandu: Pushpalal Smriti Pratisthan.
- NCP (Rayamajhi). (VS 2021 [1965/66]). Tesro Sammelanma Pesh Gariyeko Report. Np: Np.
- NCP. (1962). Rajnaitik Prastao: (Com. Tulsi Lal Amatya, Mantri, Antar Zone Samanjasya Samiti Dwara Praysit Ra Tritiya Mahadhiwayshundwara Parit) VS 2019 Baisakh 4 Gatay Dekhi 15 Gataysamma [16-27 April 1962]. Varanasi: Np.
- NCP., (VS 2041 [1984/85]). Hamra Mukhaya Matbhedharu Ra Party Phutka Karanharu (Pratham Rastriya Sammelandwara Parit Pratibedan), Nirmal Lama Paksha. Np: Kendriya Karyalaya.
- NCP., (VS 2053 [1996], Jeth [May/June]). Nagarik Swatantrata Sampurna Bargalal Awasykta Ataha Krantikari Nagarik Swatantra Samiti Banaw! [22/4/1949]. *Pushpalal: Chaniyeka Rachanaharu Bhag 1, 1*, 46-51. (M.-A. S. Pratisthan, Compiler) Kathmandu: Madan-Asrit Smriti Pratisthan.
- NCP., (VS 2053 [1996], May/June). Nepal Communist Partyko Pahilo Ghoshnapatra: 15 September 1949. *Pushpalal: Chaniyeka Rachanaharu Bhag 1, 1*, 53-66. (M.- A. S. Pratisthan, Compiler) Kathmandu: Madan-Asrit Smriti Pratisthan.
- NCP., (1962). Rajnaitik Prastao: (Com. Tulsi Lal Amatya, Mantri, Antar Zone Samanjasya Samiti Dwara Praysit Ra Tritiya Mahadhiwayshundwara Parit) VS 2019/1/4-15[16-27 April 1962]. Varanasi: Np.
- Nickson, A. R. (2007). Democratisation and the Growth of Communism in Nepal: A Peruvian Scenario in the Making. In D. Thapa, *Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal* (pp. 3-33). Kathmandu: Martin Chautari and Centre for Social Research and Development.
- Pahari, A. K. (2010). Unequal Rebellion: The Continuum of 'People's War' in Nepal and India. In L. Mahendra, & A. K. Pahari, *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century* (pp. 195-215). London: Routledge.

- Panday, D. R. (2000). *Nepal's Failed Development: Reflections on the Mission and the Maladies*. Kathmandu: Nepal South Asia Centre.
- Pushpalal, C. (1997). *Nepalma communist Aandolanko Sangchipta Itihas*. Kathmandu: Pushpalal Smriti Pratisthan.
- Rawal, B. (VS Paus 2047 [Dec/Jan. 1990/91]). *Nepalma Samyabadi Andolan: Udbhav Ra Bikas*. Kathmandu: Pairavi Prakashan.
- Sales, A. d. (2013). The Kham Magar Country, Nepal: Between Ethnic Claims and Maoism. In D. Thapa, *Understanding the Maoist Movement in Nepal* (pp. 59-88). Kathmandu: Martin Chautari and Centre for Social Research and Development.
- Samyukta Morcha. (VS 2008/3/23 [7 July 1951]). Jatiya Janatantrik Samyukta Morchako Ghoshna Patra. *Pushpalal Caniyeka Rachanaharu Bhag 4* (pp. 61-71). Kathmandu: Puhshpalal Smriti Pratisthan.
- Schwarzmantel, J. (2008). *Ideologies and Politics*. Los Angeles: Sage.
- Sever, A. (1993). *Nepal under the Ranas*. New Delhi: Oxford and IBH.
- Sharma, G. (2000). *Bisheshwar Prasad Koiralako Aatmabritanta*. Kathmandu: Jagadamba Prakashan.
- Shrestha, P. (1973). Nepali Jana Andolan Ek Samiksha. In *Pushpalal: Chaneaka Rachanaharu Bhag 1*. Kathmandu: Madan-Asrit Smriti Pratisthan.
- Singh, S. B. (1985). *Impact of the Indian National Movement on the Political Development of Nepal*. Delhi: Marwah publication.
- Snellinger, A. (2010). The repertoire of scientific organisation: Ideology, Identity and the Maoist Student Union. In M. Lawoti, & A. K. Pahari, *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century* (pp. 73 – 90). London: Routledge.
- Srivastava, L. P. (1996). *Nepal at the Crossroads*. New Delhi: Allied Publishers.
- Thapa, D. (2007). Erosion of the Nepali World. In D. Thapa, *Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal* (pp. 237-59). Kathmandu: Martin Chautari and Centre for Social Research and Development.
- Thapa, D., & Sijapati, B. (2012). *A Kingdom Under Siege: Nepal's Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2004*. Kathmandu: The Printhouse.
- USSR,. (1961). *Statement of 81 Communist and Workers Parties Meeting in Moscow, USSR, 1960*, Trans. (New Century Publishers) Retrieved 05 29, 2010, from marxist.org: Sino-Soviet Split Document Archive: <<http://www.marxist.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/other/1960-statement.htm>>
- Whelpton, J. (2005). *A History of Nepal*. Cambridge: Cambridge University press.