The origin of language has not only been discussed in Contemporary Western philosophy but also been discussed in traditional Indian philosophy. That is why it is very challenging to observe whether there is any relationship between these two different schools from the perspective of language or not. And this chapter tries to accept the challenge by introducing some dialogue between Bhartṛhari’s thought and postmodern Western deconstructionist Jacques Derrida’s thought. In Indian and Western thought, they both tried to reach language from some non-linguistic sources; such as imitative sounds and interjectional sounds. It is clear that language is always present. There are two extreme views about language: the relation between words and their meaning is either created by human beings or language as a-priori, created by God or supreme power. If we follow the Mīmāṁsa philosophy in India, they believe that the words and their relation with meaning are a-priori, impersonal, eternal and un-derived. But Buddhist philosophy challenged Mīmāṁsa’s view of language as eternal. According to them language always expresses vikalpa or some imaginary constructions and it never accesses the real meaning. They believe that all the languages even the Vedic languages are constructed by a human (human creation). Even the language which we used in our daily life does not give exposure to the real meaning.

There is a quite surprising link between deconstructionist Jacques Derrida’s Grammatology and these two views of Indian philosophy about the origin of language. Such as, Derrida does not believe in idealizing of language like Buddhist, which always typified in traditional thought. Another point is, like Buddhist, he concentrated his analysis on the subject of linguistic experience. However, there is some link between his and Buddhist thought but Derrida finds in his analysis that his thought is more compatible with Bhartṛhari’s Vyākarana viewpoint. It is because in many points Vyākarana defense the Mīmāṁsa doctrines. Derrida’s analysis about Buddhist thought, his engagement with the Indian philosophy of language introduced a new forum, from where Indian philosophy get engaged with Contemporary Western philosophy and literary criticism.
Derrida has discussed a lot about Western heritage, especially about ‘logocentric’, where language has been expressed as a-priori experience. On the basis of his analysis, he criticize Plato, Aristotle, Kant even Saussure. In traditional thought, we have always seen that mind has an immediate relationship between voice and breath, which reflects ‘logos’ naturally. Here our mind observes the things through natural resemblance. Thus when we speak something, then the relationship which is created between speech and mind is called conventional symbolization. Due to this, a traditional thought expressed through spoken language. They believe that spoken language is the first conventional symbolization and inner reflection of the divine logos. So, speech is very closed to the reflected presence or logos of the things itself. But writing is the second conventional and it is the technical representatives of speech. According to them, writing does not improve one’s wisdom and memory. Writing can never be a part of wisdom. In this perspective, writing is downgraded. Due to this reason, in the classical Western thought speech is meant as the origin of language, which symbolizes the divine of a clear mental reflection. But writing can never come towards the divine- it keeps away from the divine. This discussion is very near to the Indian traditional Vyākaraṇa viewpoint. In Vyākaraṇa it is been mentioned that the spoken Veda is only the real word which mirrors the Brahman, and via spoken Veda, we come to know the Brahman, and dharma or duty. Even through the Vedic mantras, we remove the karmic ignorance. Like Socrates, Vedic Sanskrit tradition mentions that writing is meant for them who are dull to remember. The reason is writing never perfectly represented the spoken word. So, it is always secondary. Thus for both the Greek and Vyākaraṇa viewpoints, language always originates through the divine of the natural reflection – which first symbolized by speech and secondly, by writing. However, convention is related within the formulation of speech and writing. And these conventions are totally dependent on ‘logos’ in the mind for both their power and meaning. These two traditions understood the language through its transcendental origin. But for Derrida logocentric approach locates the essence within the interior, which is very close to voice and breathe, but not close to the writing which is exterior.

When Derrida discussed about Rousseau and Saussure he observed that they follow the same classical logocentric pattern. They both gave importance to the interior of language as essence and also holding within the ontology of presence and logic of identity. But Derrida criticized the thought of Rousseau and Saussure that language as an exterior and criticized the Buddhist position that language is unable to engage the real. Derrida tried to find a way to move out from this debate. He never accepted the Buddhist position where language is
considered as an imaginary construction (vikalpa). According to him, the origin of language is not only symbolized by speech rather it can be in the writing. For him a writing which is both interior and exterior.

According to Indian thinkers language always primarily expressed through the spoken word (vāk). But this definition of language never identifies it with the written signs which are merely phonetic copies of the speech or spoken sounds. In Indian philosophy, the distinction between word (śabda) and sound (dhvani) is a basic discussion. And if we identify them then, we have to take physical sound like the word, which is a category mistake. Derrida agrees with this contention and remarked that the whole Western metaphysics from Plato to Rousseau and Levi-Strauss when they identified logos or language with the speech or spoken word. But here they made a category mistake. Here Derrida wanted to go in opposite direction and identified the essence of logos or language with writing. He criticises both the logocentric position and Buddhists philosophy. When he described language as writing, he tried to mean written words are prior to the spoken reflection of the inner logos as well as language is not only a sort of writing or external speaking as suggested by Buddhist. Here Derrida wanted to attempt self-analysis or deconstruction of language. According to him, deconstruction exposes the mistake of a reductionism in either outward to conventional sign or inward to the divine logos. To escape all philosophical oppositions, he precisely states that “language is not merely a sort of writing ‘but’ a possibility founded on the general possibility founded on the general possibility of writing.”

146 For him, writing is characterized as both inner and outer words within dynamic interrelationship. There are some similarities between Derrida’s thought with Bhartṛhari’s language, which he described in his Vākyapadīya. In the traditional Indian philosophy either it Hindu or Buddhists, used to correct the written text with the oral words because oral words are carefully memorized and passed down from succeeding generations. Therefore, Derrida’s proposition, writing is not secondary rather it is prior to spoken word is quite incredible. For him, writing is not just a computer program or the inscription of words on a paper but it includes the neuronal traces in the brain, which Freud identified as ‘memory’. Derrida suggested DNA as writing, which is present in all living substances. Here his aim is to counter one of the terms over the other, to escape the system of metaphysical opposition, which has dominated Indian philosophy.

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146 See, Harold Coward, Derrida and Indian Philosophy, 1990, p- 50
To elaborate the critique of metaphysics, Derrida followed Nietzsche and Heidegger in Western and Nāgārjuna in Indian philosophy. By the critique of metaphysics he does not mean only the western philosophical tradition but everyday languages and thoughts as well. According to him, the western thought has always been structured in terms of dichotomies: presence vs. Absence, good vs. Evil, identity vs. Difference, man vs. Women, being vs. Nothingness, speech vs. Writing and soul vs. Body. Here the second term is always corrupted than the first term. That is why these two terms are placed in a hierarchical order which always gives priority in the first term both in quality and time. Therefore some of the Indian and Western philosophy has always answered about the question of the nature of being in terms of presence.

Derrida’s critique of metaphysics mainly focused on the privileging of the spoken words over the written words, which has similarities with the Indian thought. Here Derrida’s translators Barbara Johnson summarized: “The spoken word is given higher value because the speaker and listener are both present to the utterance simultaneously. There is no temporal or spatial distance between speaker, speech, and listener, since the speaker hears himself speak at the same moment as the listener does. This immediacy seems to guarantee the notion that in the spoken word we know what we mean, mean what we say, say what we mean, and know what we have said. Whether or not perfect understanding always occurs in fact, this image of perfectly self-present meaning is, according to Derrida, the underlying ideal of Western culture.”

For Derrida, the belief about the self-presentation of meaning (logos, reason, speech, and the word of God) from the Greek time is ‘logocentrism’. From this perspective when speaking is impossible, for example: those who are unable to speak, then writing is used as a secondary representation of speech. Because when the writer puts his thoughts on the paper he is distancing himself from the immediacy of speech and when someone reads the paper that time he stays far away from the writer even after writer’s death. Derrida sees all of these as a corruption of the self-presentation of meaning. Through his critique of logocentric position neither he tried to reverse this value system and showed that writing is superior to speech but his attempts were to dissect the whole system of metaphysical opposition from where the debate between speech vs. writing was grounded. In doing so he finds that both speech and writing is structured by distance and difference. For him, the experience of meaning is itself

an experience of difference. And Derrida showed that this difference is to inhabit the heart of what appears to be immediate and present. For him, the difference is present also in the structure of the unconsciousness. He showed in his commentary on Freud’s mystic writing-pad. “The apparent experience of a unitary self-presence of meaning and consciousness is found to arise from the repression of the differential structures from which they spring.” And his deconstruction of logocentrism is dependent on différance and the différance is a characteristic of speech as well as writing in both space and time.

But before the discussion of this topic in detail, it is necessary to express that, in Indian philosophy, there are some schools which are perfectly fit into the logocentric category. Such as: the orthodox traditions or Āstika darshana namely Saṃkhya-Yoga, Vedanta and Nyāya schools. These schools are structured in terms of dichotomies or polarities where the second term of the pair is considered as lower status.

They venerate speech over writing theory. However, in Western philosophy, this theory is more strongly used. But there is a kind of school such as Chinese who gave value to the phonetic speech and writing over non-phonetic language. In Indian philosophy, Pānini’s grammar or Āstādhyāyī was based on the sound of spoken Sanskrit, which was the prime candidate for Derrida’s phonocentrism. And this phonocentrism opens up all criticisms about logocentrism. The negative status about writing in the Western is paralleled with Indian tradition, where written texts are judged unreliable. In Vedic text, writing was also ritually polluted. The Orthodox or Āstika schools except for Grammarian school share the same logocentric biases about being and speech against writing which was located by Derrida. But heterodox school or Nāstika was unable to escape from Derrida’s net. Jainism shares the soul matter dialectic thought strongly and agreed with Buddhism, language as merely conventional which cannot touch the real.

Derrida attack this detachment of speech from the real, basically Mādhyamika’s negation about speech into silence. For him, it is the most extreme logocentric position. However, he not only criticized the logocentric position but any philosophy where between two opposite word, priority was given to the first term over the other. But only the Grammarian school which was formulated by Bhartṛhari, able to escape from Derrida’s deconstructive net. Because both Derrida and Bhartṛhari agreed that philosophy is connected with language but the literary analysis is more important over the logical analysis. For Derrida, philosophers are

148 Ibid, p-54
able to impose their various conceptual thought by suppressing or ignoring the disruptive effects of language. In *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari describes Grammar as the “purifier of all the sciences”, which is possible through the use of correct forms of language and through which philosophic or another kind of knowledge can be obtained. So, both Derrida and Bhartṛhari crossed the barrier between philosophy and literary criticism. Although they both believe that all knowledge comes through language, it does not mean that language depends on something like the logos, *Brahman* and God. Is there any source or ground of language, beyond or outside of the language? The reason given by Bhartṛhari is that the absolute truth is *Śabdatattva* or the Word Principle, which is not beyond or apart from language. Through deconstructing the viewpoint that dominated metaphysics basically a separate, presence or being is reflected immediately in speech. Regarding the above Derrida’s answer is negative. By finding writing as *différance* he deconstructs some arguments that were presented at the time of Plato, Rousseau and other philosophers.

He found some evidence for his ‘deconstruction of Platonic view and said “While presenting writing as a false brother – traitor, infidel, and simulacrum – Socrates is for the first time led to envision the brother of this brother, the legitimate one, as another sort of writing: not merely as knowing, living, animate discourse, but as an inscription of truth in the soul,”149 This kind of writing which is written on the learner’s soul, called *arché-writing* or *trace*. And for both speech and external writing, it is seen as the dynamic source. In *Philebus* Socrates mentioned that the sound which we speak first is one that possesses a different and unlimited variety of sounds. For Derrida, difference and relation are irreducible and designated by Plato as writing. Here Derrida observed that though the wisdom of Socrates is originally spoken but these all come to us after his death. His disciples recorded his writing later. By a critique of linguistic theory especially Saussure’s theory Derrida establishes the need for *arché-writing* or the inner *trace*. Saussure mentioned that, in the natural bond of the sense or concept (signified) to the spoken word, the basis of language is found, from where the written image was contaminated. He finds, the source of linguistic value is ‘difference’ and suggests that by an analogy to both the content and form of writing, language can be best understood.

But for Derrida, this movement of difference is the *trace* or *arché-writing*, which contains the possibility for all written and oral language. Writing and speech are the expressions of the same language. But *arché-writing* does not depend upon writing or sound; rather it is

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149 Ibid, p-58
dynamic, expressive *différance* and it is the condition for such writing and sound. However, it
does not exist but it is a previous possibility of all expression (content expression,
signified/signifier etc.). In place of the term *trace* or *arché-writing*, Bhartṛhari used the term
Word-Principle or Īśābdatattva. For him, the Word Principle or Brahman is the beginningless
or endless and which is divided by its inherent power. Particularly, Word-Principle shows
itself in the expressive activity of language, by the sequencing power of time or Kāla.
According to the Śaṅkara’s understanding of vivartate, these activities are seen as a real
manifestation but not as a merely apparent. Like Śaṅkara, Bhartṛhari never spoke writing in
terms of causality. But it emphasizes an extraordinary activity through which this multiple
universes are manifested from the one word Īśabdatattva or Word-Principle.

So, for Bhartṛhari as the Word-Principle, Brahman is an expressive reality and intrinsically
dynamic. He used the notion of a beginningless *trace* like Derrida which is inherent in
consciousness. Unlike Derrida he discussed about the trace of speech in relation to previous
birth which has no beginning called pratibhāgamvā or the residual *trace* of speech. Another
point is, like Derrida Bhartṛhari sees, as the conditioning of all psychic experience the
inherent *trace* consciousness of language from deep sleep to dreams and to ordinary
awareness to mystical states. But the difference is that only in this stage (dream stage) the
*trace* or seeds of language stays in a more subtle manner. Evidently, Derrida’s development
of Frude’s thought is easily accommodated within Bhartṛhari.

As Derrida finds behind the experience of unchanging self or presence, logos, the
psychological mechanism is to be the suppression of the experience of difference within the
psyche. That is why Bhartṛhari rejects some Indian schools, which equalized the experience
of presence or self with something external to language and consciousness. According to both
Derrida and Bhartṛhari, the experience of self is the unhindered experience of *arché-writing*
or Īśabdatatva, which is manifested in the temporal dynamic of language. And in
Vākyapadīya, he used the term āgama, when he referred to writing. The way Socrates in his
‘Phaedrus’ discussed about the opposition between speech and writing debate, Bhartṛhari did
not discuss in the same way rather he only gave some passing reference about writing and
identified texts as apauresaya(without author). And āgama is used as a text, which is
composed by writers in contrast to Vedic texts or Śruti (said to be without author). Derrida’s
discussion is not about the contrast between spoken and written but the important case for
Derrida is between texts, which considered to be without any author and whose authors are
known. Though the *Vedas* may be written but they are eternal consciousness. They are not dependent on any human author but the criterion manifestation of the *Śabdatattva*.

However, Bhartrhari agreed with Derrida on a point that the benefit of *āgama* is when the author or teacher dies, their words continue as the basic seed for the formation of next traditions. So, it is undoubtedly clear that for Bhartrhari, texts are composed by authors and authorless speech which both are manifestations of the *Śabdatattva*. They both find some common cause against those who maintain that it is not possible to capture reality through language or who locate the absolute outside of language. It is the pure possibility of difference for both, which manifested as language and the intrinsic difference of *arché-trace* allows the articulation of speech and writing. This *arché-trace* manifested into the opposing forms of outer sound image and inner concept. Here through the use of a technical term ‘sign’ Derrida refers to the whole, where ‘signifier’ refers to the spoken and articulated image and ‘signified’ refers to the abstract concepts. In the case of Bhartrhari, he indicates the whole through the use of the technical term *sphota* where *artha* refers to the meaning or concept and *dhvani* refers to the spoken or articulated image which is parallel to Derrida.

So, according to both of them, *sphota* or sign (linguistic whole) has an inherent force which produces the double manifestation of *artha* or signified (inner meaning) and *sphota* or signifier or *dhvani* (spoken sound). However sign and *sphota* cannot be experienced as a pure presence, they are irreducible. To describe *Veda*, Bhartrhari in his *Vākyapadīya* used two terms; one is *prāptyupāya* (the means for the attainment of *Brahman*) and the second is *anukāra* (symbolization of *Brahman*). It suggests the dynamic activity of the Word-Principle. *Vṛtti* clearly explains the verse, when the Vedic seers spell the mantras which are the standard case of word making activity. According to pure Sanskrit language, the *mantras* are the conjunctions of some certain powerful seed character. And in a psychosomatic structure vibration or rhythm arise in a corresponding psychic state. But in producing an immense progeny of language these sounds can be differentiated. When poetry finds its full vision in language, then it should be deconstructed to recover its original power for signification.

It appears in Derrida’s thought, when he referred to the book which is in its ordinary form (prose book) as the corpse of language which is exited from the delimiting of the multi-significant roots followed to its logical conclusion and the word power has been exhausted. His aim about deconstruction is to get back to the poetic and metaphoric language, where the power for signification has not been used. Bhartrhari notes that language separates and
divides. In the end, this necessary process is the source of confusion. But his solution is not to reverse or deconstruct the process of differentiation; rather this has to be controlled by the imposition of strict grammatical rules. And through this solution the power of mantras convey knowledge. With other grammarians, Bhartṛhari claimed that “to have uncovered the pure forms of the correct unfolding of the patterns of differentiation inherent in the Śabdatattva and symbolized (anukāra) in criterion form in the initial speaking of the Vedas.”

But for Bhartṛhari Veda is not a direct description of the Śabdatattva, the Brahman. Through the dynamic idioms of language, Vedic revelation provides the inherent action of the Śabdatattva. In general, he privileged towards the scripture and the Veda in particular. But Derrida did not agree with Bhartṛhari’s thought. He criticized the notion of the Veda as manifesting anukāra or original linguistic form of arché-writing. Another important point is, they both locate the real in Śabdatattva or arché-writing and that is not separated from manifested language. But according to Śaṅkara, the assessment of māyā have epistemological status but not ontological. For him, language and the Veda transcended for Mokṣa (spiritual realization) but according to Bhartṛhari it is in language which makes a union with the Śabdatattva, is realized.

For Derrida, there is no longer any origin or source. And representation is just a shadow. More clearly it is mixed with what it represents to the point where one speaks as one writes. So, reflecting images, pools and the infinite reference from one to the other, have no longer any sources. These all are split in itself. According to him, the sensitive deconstruction of the illusions of presence, permanence is the means for the realization of the whole. But his aim is to understand the whole as a manifestation of the inherent difference of the trace. In short, we are deconstructing the language in our own consciousness, in our own speaking and thinking. We ourselves are the text which we deconstruct. It is the process of self-realization and of becoming self-aware. That is why Derrida said that there is nothing outside the text. Bhartṛhari also observed that the analysis of linguistic experience is nothing but an examination of the nature of our own consciousness. Just like Derrida explained consciousness as writing or trace, similarly, Bhartṛhari explained it as Śabdatattva. But the difference between them is Bhartṛhari never gave privilege in one scripture or book. He clearly described that the Veda is the means for the realization of Brahman. It is not a book;
rather it is the true manifestation of the *Sabdatattva* but Derrida deconstructs all scriptures, all texts.

*Bhartrhari* explained the science of grammar as the door or path to obtain the spiritual realization. He thought that the individual inner experience of language as involving an inner transformation and it is parallel to Derrida’s thought about Grammatology as the science of writing before the speech and it contains the power to change the individual’s self-awareness in speech. His Word-Principle, *Sabdatattva*, primarily is an ontological principle and secondarily it is epistemological. Like Derrida his analysis about the inner experience of individual is not similar to the *Saṅkara’s māyā* or superimposition of epistemological forms nor as the logos model or the static presence of set of divine forms or words but it lightens up as an inner form or word which is primarily productive of activity and secondarily productive of knowledge.

After discussing the above position it may be observed that Derrida’s movement of language is a continuous sequencing of the trace or *arché-writing* into the written and spoken words, which is to be thrown back again and again in a continual deconstructive reverse. Similarly, in *Bhartrhari’s* thought, we have seen the same implosion-explosion cycle. According to him, the *Sabdatattva* manifests in itself objectively and the same Word-Principle manifests itself within each individual’s experience of language. Here the words and letters are subordinate to the sentence. So, understanding of the sentence is possible when it’s all words taken together evoke a flash of *sphota* or *pratibhā* (illuminations). *Pratibhā* or illumination is already prefigured within the consciousness. According to *Bhartrhari*, the activity of *Śabdatattva* is when the individual’s word meaning has been understood separately, a flash of understanding takes place that is the meaning of a sentence, which is assembled by the meanings of the individual words. This is something indefinable or *avicāritā* and never explained to others as such but experienced by everyone within himself. It brings about a kind of amalgamation of the individual’s word meanings and it covers the whole sentence as it was earlier which its object becomes. This flash of understanding or *pratibhā* is an insight into the whole meaning and form of *Śabdatattva*. *Pratibhā* is the nature of one’s inner self or *Śabdatattva*. So, *Pratibhā* and *Sabdatattva* are the two sides of the same coin.

Another point is that the science of Grammar for both *Bhartrhari* and Derrida enables one to experience language as something more than epistemological in function. When we speak then something impels us to do some action or dharma. However, the acting, speaking, and
writing of the word for Bhartṛhari are the means of spiritual realization or yoga. Here Derrida gave only some hint in this direction. For Derrida, the secondary manifestation of the trace is theological. Here his rejection of metaphysics and theology is rooted in Bhartṛhari’s observation. And this dynamic interrelatedness of language cannot be described by an agent. For both this kind of description was a reduction of the dynamic interrelatedness of all experience to some things or ideas.

A common conclusion arises from some different religious roots that the correct practice and understanding of language results in a teleological transformation of experience. If we see Derrida rigorously deconstructs all philosophy, theology and ordinary languages which objectify our experience into unreal presences and false God. In his essay: Of An Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy, suggested that deconstruction has a prophetic goal. Here the word ‘apocalyptic’ is considered as a transcendental condition of all experience itself of all discourse and of every trace. He suggested that The Apocalypse of John as an exemplary revelation of that transcendental structure. This example has two characteristics. He recognizes the theme of the ‘Johannine Apocalypse’ as the recurrent and imperative ‘come’ of the text. The word ‘come’ evokes both; one is imminent coming of the Lord and another is imperative coming, where after listening to the word ‘come’ hearer comes quickly. So the call beyond logos or being cannot come from any voice, which is given by any person, but it itself comes from beyond being. According to Derrida, the word ‘come’ is plural in itself and oneself. For Derrida, its content is its resounding imperative tone and this calls forth action from us. Another characteristic of that example is the imperative ‘come’ and ‘come’ from beyond being within oneself never close. So, we realized that the action of coming to the call never ceases. The above are fits within the prophetic impulse. Derrida reformulated this prophet as a critique of all idolatrous (worship of idols) use of language. So the prophetic hearing of the call always translates into action. It has some open-ended future which calls us to become to an end, which is simultaneously a new beginning.

Here if we compare Derrida’s thought with Bhartṛhari’s observation, then we realize that like Derrida, Bhartṛhari’s science of grammar also is a call to action. He reinterprets Vedic dharma as the dharma of the Śabdatattva or the Word-Principle. This means that the dharma is the essence of one’s consciousness. It is no longer outside of the Veda, one’s self or one’s language. Thus, in conclusion, it can be said that like Derrida ‘come’ becomes the inner voice of language, ‘come let us go’, Bhartṛhari thought that the Vedic dharma as the Word-Principle within the individual consciousness or Śabdatattva becomes the dharma of correct
language. For him, the task of the traditional Vedic discipline of grammar and the purification of speech becomes a means for the inner spiritualization.

So, we can say that this comparative study between Bhartṛhari’s philosophy and Derrida’s deconstructive Grammatology has identified lots of important points which have some substantive contact with Derrida’s thought and some traditional Indian thought. The analysis of these contact provided both Western and Eastern comparison. This highlights the error of the previous interpretation and demonstrated some new insights on both sides.

Through this comparison, we learn some important points of common emphasis on both sides. Firstly, language is beginningless and it is coextensive with consciousness. The second point is, through time, language is grounded in its dynamic sequence, which takes the form of the dynamic interrelatedness of the cosmos. And this interrelatedness conveys an imperative call for action, which is suppressed by our egocentric creation of concepts. Through this stage, we can identify ourselves as true presence.

Thus, both Derrida and Bhartṛhari deserve a higher place in the philosophical arena. Here they both tried to purify or deconstruct language by linguistic criticism or Vyakārana, and both Indian and Western philosophy needed their deconstructive and purifying task to continue their philosophical endeavour.