

COGNITION AND CONSCIOUSNESS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE AND POSSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE IN SĀMĀKHYA PHILOSOPHY

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Knowledge provides the foundation to our daily life as well as to all our endeavours be it empirical or transcendental. Nothing could be accomplished without knowledge. Thus, knowledge is undoubtedly regarded as the most valuable asset by one and all. Philosophers too hold congruence at this point; however, there seem to be innumerable debates among them regarding the nature of knowledge. To be more precise, the contention extends to the fact that what at all could be designated as knowledge. The Sāmkhya philosophical system seems to pose as one of the most intriguing schools in this context, as its very philosophy is founded on the fact that the consciousness (*puruṣa*) is essentially non-related (*asambaddha*), immutable (*aparīṇāmī*) and perpetually and universally the same (*kūṭastha*). These attributes indicate the fact that consciousness can never be related to anything. So the question comes up that if the consciousness does not relate with anything at all, then how at all cognition could be possible in case of Sāmkhya philosophy. Moreover, the notion of liberation in the concerned system is purely epistemological. Liberation, here, is nothing but the attainment of discriminatory cognition (*vivekakhyāti*) between the consciousness (*puruṣa*) and matter (*prakṛti*). However, if the attainment of knowledge itself is impossible for *puruṣa* then how can such a philosophical position be accounted for? Thus, it becomes imperative to study the nature of cognition and its apparent connection to consciousness to understand the intricacies of such a profound philosophical system.

According to Sāmkhya philosophy, the first evolute of *prakṛti* is *citta*. *Buddhi*, *mahattattva*, *antaḥkaraṇa* etc. indicate *citta*. *Citta* is a *taijas* element. *Taijas* elements, like water can acquire the shape of other objects. According to Sāmkhya philosophers, such transformation (*pariṇāma*) of *citta* or psychosis (*vṛtti*), that is, modification of *citta* in the form of other objects is termed as *jñāna*. It is to be noted that though the transformation of the *citta* occurs in the form of the object, yet the locus of transformation is the *citta* itself, since, the transformation must always reside in the transformed. Thus, in Sāmkhya epistemology *vṛttijñāna* is not located in the self (*ātman*), as opposed to other schools; rather it is a property of the *citta*.

The transformation of *citta* in the form of *jñāna* is of two types. One kind occurs inside the body, whereas the other occurs in the external world. The transformation of *citta* in the form of object that occurs in the case of inference and verbal testimony takes place inside the body. On the other hand, when the transformation of *citta* in the form of an object occurs through the eyes, that is, in case of perception, it takes place at the locus of the object itself (*viśayadeśa*). The eyes are situated in the body, but their rays reach the object outside the body and they get related. Similarly, the *citta*, along with the rays of the eyes, reaches the object and attains its form. Thus, *cittavṛtti* or the transformation of *citta* in the form of an object, be it internal or external, is always located in the *citta* as *jñāna*, and thus, *jñāna* is essentially internal.

Now whatever be the locus of the transformation of the *citta*, internal or external, the object of knowledge must then always possess a form, so that the *citta* may take up that form. Then, naturally, the question arises that, what would happen or how would the *cittavṛtti* be in case of abstract or formless objects of knowledge? Sāṅkhya replies that in those cases the *cittavṛtti* too would be formless or abstract; and that would also be termed as *viśayākāravṛtti* of the *citta*, that is, the transformation of *citta* in accordance to the object. Thus, it is interesting to note here that the term ‘*ākāra*’ in *viśayākāra*, *padārthākāra* or *arthākārapariṇāma* or *vṛtti* stands for a relation between the transformation of the *citta* and the object of knowledge, and does not strictly restrict itself to denote distinct forms of objects only.

Now the most important discussion in any school of epistemology concentrates primarily on perception. This is because perception is the direct means of cognition and provides a foundation for all other forms of knowledge. We too here restrict our discussion to understanding the concept of perception in Sāṅkhya philosophy to delve deeper into the concerned issue. We have already come to know that *jñāna* is a kind of *cittavṛtti*. Now, according to Sāṅkhya philosophers, the means of cognition, that is, *pramāṇa* too is nothing but a *cittavṛtti*. Thus, to distinguish perception (*pratyakṣapramāṇa*) from other kinds of *pramāṇa*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa provides the following definition of perception in the fifth *kārikā* - ‘*prativīśayādhyavasāyodr̥ṣṭāntrividhamanumānamākhyaṭam/ talliṅgaliṅgīpurvakamāptaśrutirāptavacanamtu*’¹.

In the *kārikā*, first of all, it has been stated that ‘*prativīṣayādhyavasāyodr̥ṣṭam*’. The term ‘*dr̥ṣṭam*’ indicates the objective or that which is being defined (*lakṣya*), and the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) consists in the term ‘*prativīṣayādhyavasāyah*’. ‘*Lakṣaṇa*’ means that which distinguishes the *lakṣya* from its similar as well as dissimilar entities (*saṁanāsamānajātīyavyavaccheda*). Here, the similar instances are that of inference etc. and the dissimilar ones are the pots, jars etc. The definition intends to distinguish *pratyakṣapramāṇa* from both the cases and establish its distinctness.

According to Sāṁkhya philosophy, an object (*viśaya*) is that which makes itself perceptible by providing the *citta* a transformation which corresponds to its form. *Prthivī* etc. are the external objects of cognition, whereas the internal objects are pleasure, pain etc. All these are capable of imparting their forms to the *antaḥkaraṇa*, that is, *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*. However, there are entities which are not perceivable by ordinary human beings. They being supra-sensory or the like can only be perceived by the *yogins*. For instance, the five subtle entities referred to as *pañcatanmātra* are only perceptible to the *devatā* and the *yogins*. Hence, the term ‘*viśaya*’ is intended to include all the objects, including the empirically perceptible as well as the supra-sensory ones. From here it can be said that the term ‘*prativīṣaya*’ means that which is directed or which intends to be transformed towards these objects (‘*viśayamviśayamprativartateiti prativīṣayam*’²). Here, the term ‘*vṛtti*’ means ‘*sannikarṣa*’, that is, relation. Thus, the intended meaning of the term ‘*prativīṣaya*’ is a sense organ which can have a relation with each of the objects.

In such a sense organ, termed as ‘*prativīṣaya*’, there occurs an *adhyavasāya* (*adhyavasāyaścabuddhivyāpārojñānam*), that is, a transformation of the *buddhi* in the form of cognition takes place in that sense organ. This is termed as ‘*dr̥ṣṭa*’. When the sense organ comes in contact with the object, the *antaḥkaraṇa* takes up its form. It is argued that when the sense organ gets transformed into the form of the object, then the *antaḥkaraṇa* also takes up that form. Hence, the *karaṇa* or the instrument towards *cittavṛtti* should be the sense organ itself. The relation (*sannikarṣa*) between the sense organ and the object is the *viśayākārapariṇāma*, that is, transformation into the form of the object on the part of the sense organ. Now, the cognition that is produced due to the *cittavṛtti* induced by the transformation of the sense organ into the form of the object is termed as ‘*adhyavasāya*’. The sense organs are specific in terms of their

relation to the type of object to be known by them. Thus, when the transformation of the sense organs (*indriyavṛtti*) occurs in the form of their relation (*sannikarṣa*) with the object, the *citta* which essentially consists of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, then the suppression of *tama guṇa* occurs and consequently, the *sattva guṇa* undergoes *sāttvikaparīṇāma* which is then termed as *adhyavasāya*, *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* and *jñāna*. The *adhyavasāya* is referred to as *dṛṣṭa* or *pratyakṣapramāṇa*.

Now, Vācaspati Miśra analyses the definition of perception and states the significance of each of the consisting terms. In the definition, '*prativīṣayādhyavasāyah*', the term '*adhyavasāya*' is incorporated into the definition to prevent the fallacy of over coverage into dubious cognition (*samśaya*). *Samśaya* is defined as *ekadhārmikaviruddhanādharmaprakārajñāna*, that is, where the cognition of various contradictory properties occurs in the same locus, thus producing the cognition of the form '*ayamsarpaḥnavā*'. Thus, such cognition is always devoid of certainty. Since '*adhyavasāya*' and '*niḥścaya*' are synonymous, the term '*adhyavasāya*' has been included in the definition to prevent the over-coverage into *samśaya*, that is, to emphasize on the certainty of knowledge.

Now, the term '*viśaya*' has been included in the definition to distinguish such cognition from *viparyaya*, that is, illusions. The term '*viśaya*' indicates the cognition of a noun qualified by an adjective. However, in the case of illusions there cannot be any such cognition as it is a fact that illusions are always about unreal entities (*asadviśayaka*). Thus, the significance of the term '*viśaya*' in the definition is to keep apart illusions from valid perceptual cognitions.

Next, the term *prati* has been included in the definition to leave apart *smṛti* (memory), inference etc. It is important to note here that in the statement '*viśayamviśayamprativartate*', the term *prati* does not indicate *indriyārthasannikarṣa* (sense-object contact or relation). Yet the verb *vartate* originating from the root '*vṛtu*' stands for relation (*sannikarṣa*) and hence that being grammatically related (*samāsabaddha*) to the term *prati*, the intended meaning (*lākṣaṇikārtha*) is the relation between the sense organ and the object (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*). Hence, it is said '*indriyārthasannikarṣasūcanāt*'. Thus, it is proved that the given definition is complete in terms of being free from the fallacy of over-coverage as well as by providing the distinctiveness to perception from similar instances like *anumāna* etc. and also from dissimilar instances like pot etc.

According to Vācaspati, pure consciousness or *puruṣa* is reflected (*anugraḥṛta*) by means of perception. That is, when the conscious *puruṣa* gets reflected on the instrument (*pramāṇa*), namely, the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*, then the cognition of the form ‘I know’ occurs, which is also known as *abhimāna*. *Abhimāna* is the result of *antaḥkaraṇavṛttipramāṇa* with the reflected consciousness on it. According to Vācaspati, *buddhitattva* or *antaḥkaraṇa* are unconscious as they all are evolutes of unconscious *prakṛti*. Just as a jar produced from clay is unconscious, similarly, the evolute of unconscious *prakṛti*, like, *antaḥkaraṇa* is essentially unconscious too. Following the same analogy, it may be argued that *cittavṛtti* and *adhyavasāya* are also unconscious as they, in turn, are produced from unconscious *antaḥkaraṇa*. Similarly, the other transformations of *buddhitattva*, like pleasure, pain etc. are also unconscious. The only conscious entity is *puruṣa* and that is essentially unrelated to all these transformations, like, pleasure etc. *Jñāna*, *sukha* etc. are all properties of *antaḥkaraṇa* and that is their locus. However, *puruṣa* is reflected in that *citta* itself. As a result, due to the non-discriminatory cognition between *puruṣa* and *citta*, the properties like, cognition, pleasure etc. which are there in the *antaḥkaraṇa* appear to be that of the *puruṣa*, and thus, usages like ‘I am the knower’, ‘I am the enjoyer’, ‘I am happy’, etc. occur. Thus, the term ‘*anugraha*’ in ‘*anenayaścetanāśakteranugrahastatphalaṃ pramābodhaḥ*’³ as explained so far indicates the usage of the properties of the *citta* as the properties of the *puruṣa* itself.

Now here, naturally, the question comes that since *puruṣa* is essentially unrelated (*asaṅga*), then how can its *abhimāna* or I-usage be justified at all? And if we admit such usages then the essence of *puruṣa* would be contradicted. The following discussion show how the process of cognition has been explained in Sāṃkhya philosophical system as well as the essence of *puruṣa* has been retained.

Like any other philosophical system, in Sāṃkhya philosophy too, the term ‘*pramā*’ is attributed with special significance. The etymology of the term ‘*pramā*’ shows that it is composed of the root ‘*mā*’ meaning knowledge with ‘*pra*’ prefix and with suffix ‘*an*’ added to the root and then another suffix ‘*tāp*’ along with it. Thus, the meaning of the term ‘*pramā*’ comes out to be valid or perfect cognition. The following example would help to explain the concept of *pramā*. Let us consider that there is a jar in front of us. As soon as it comes in the proximity of the eyes or any other sense organ, the sense organ (*jñānendriya*) immediately takes up the form of

that jar. The *manas* or the internal sense organ helps in acquiring the form of the jar. When the complete form of the jar is acquired, the mind then transmits it to the *ahamkāra*. The *ahamkāra* then provides the form of *aham* to the jar; consequently, the complex formed is of the form ‘*ghaṭākāraaham*’. This complex then gets associated with the *buddhivṛtti*, and the *buddhivṛtti* acquires the form of the jar. Now, the property of jar-ness (*ghaṭatva*) in the jar (*ghaṭa*) is initially known as a universal property and then in relation to the individual jar. Finally, the *buddhivṛtti* associates the *aham* with the intermediary complex thus formed, and the cognition of the jar is produced. Hence, the complete form of the *buddhivṛtti* is ‘I know this jar’ (*ghaṭamahamjānāmi*).

Now, the above form of *buddhivṛtti* is essentially unconscious. However, such *buddhivṛtti* partaking the form of the object, due to its origination from *triguṇātmikāprakṛti*, essentially consists of *sattva guṇa* (*sattvaguṇānvita*), and hence it is extremely clear (*svaccha*) in nature. According to Vācaspati, such extremely clear *buddhivṛtti* immediately acquires the reflection of *puruṣa*. Now, according to Sāṃkhya philosophy, *puruṣa* is non-related (*kūṭastha*) and immutable (*apariṇāmī*). As soon as the reflection of *puruṣa* is received, due to its clarity (*svacchatā*) the form of the object is expressed. Such manifested form of the object is called ‘*pramā*’, that is, the perfect manifestation of the object through cognition. The instrument, however, behind this manifestation does not get manifested; that is called *pramāṇa*. According to *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, the expressed or the illumined form of the object, which is free from all kinds of uncertainty, fallacy or illusions and that which was not known before (*anadhigata*), such expression of an object is called ‘*pramā*’⁴ and the instrument (*kaṛaṇa*) of such cognition is called ‘*pramāṇa*’. However, the author of *Yuktidīpikā* and later on VācaspatiMiśra has stated that the unconscious *buddhivṛtti* is *pramāṇa*, whereas the illumined *vṛtti* of that *buddhi* itself is the *pramā*. There is no causal connection between the *pramā* and the *pramāṇa*; however, *pramāṇa* is the logical and necessary condition of *pramā*. It may further be stated that following the Sāṃkhya philosophical position, the difference between *pramā* and *pramāṇa* is only an apparent one, since; the *pramāṇa* requires the help of *puruṣa* or consciousness for its manifestation. To prove this, the Sāṃkhya philosophers admit that the cognition along with its cognates is generated due to the reflection of consciousness.

Now, if we admit the *pramā* to be located in *puruṣa* only, then *buddhivṛtti* is the *pramāṇa*. Again, if *pramā* is considered to be located in *buddhi* only, then the relation between the object and the sense organ (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*) is the *pramāṇa*. However, *puruṣa* is only the witness of *pramā* and never the knower. Nevertheless, if we admit *pramā* to be both in *puruṣa* and in *buddhivṛtti*, then the *pramāṇas* would be *buddhivṛtti* and *indriyārthasannikarṣa* respectively.⁵

It is interesting to note here that *puruṣa*, though essentially inactive (*niṣkriya*) and immutable, is attributed with functionality (*arthakriyākāritva*) in a certain sense. *Puruṣa* does not possess *arthakriyākāritva* like *buddhivṛtti*; however, when the *buddhivṛtti* that is transformed into the form of the object, gets reflected on the *puruṣa*, that itself constitutes the functionality of *puruṣa* in terms of knowing the object (*viśayagrahanarūpaarthakriyākāritva*). It should, nevertheless, be always kept in mind that the functionality of *puruṣa* etc. are not so in the literal sense of the term, these are mere usages. To explicate the position an analogy has been used as follows - 'japāsphaṭikayorivanoparāgahkintvabhīmānaḥ'⁶. That is, a crystal kept near a red china rose reflects the colour of the flower on it. That does not mean that the crystal has become red in colour, but merely appears to be so. Thus, it may be claimed that the reflection is also a transformation of *buddhi* and the reflection of the object on *puruṣa* is simply like the reflection of an object on water or a crystal.

Now, if the consciousness gets reflected on the transformed consciousness (*caitanyaṅvṛtti*) then the entire *buddhivṛtti* appears to be conscious. More so, it seems that the *buddhivṛtti* attained with consciousness is expressing the unconscious, material *buddhivṛtti*. Hence, the reflection of consciousness on *buddhivṛtti* is termed as 'caitanyaviśayatā', since, because of that, *buddhivṛtti* gets manifested.

Vācaspati considers two different forms of perceiving the reflection. One is about perceiving a part of the locus of the reflection, whereas the other is concerned with the perception of the reflection in its entirety (*sarvavyāpīrūpepratibimbadarśana*). He has kept in mind both the cases while expressing his views. The form of the object as attained by the *buddhivṛtti* is termed as *buddhiviśayatā*. Similarly, when the *buddhivṛtti* is being reflected on consciousness (*caitanya*), then the consciousness also appears to be of the form of the *buddhivṛtti*. Hence, the attainment of the form of the reflected one is nothing but 'viśayatā'. However, Vijñānabhikṣu here argues that the admission of two types of

viṣayatā, namely, *caitanyaviṣayatā* and *buddhiviṣayatā*, is futile, since, *viṣayatā* is one. The attainment of the specific forms of the respective objects of *buddhi* and *caitanya* is nothing but *viṣayatā* that is specific to the individual cases.

Now, Vācaspati Mīśra further states that when the reflection of *puruṣa* is received on the *buddhivṛtti*, transformed through the attainment of the form of the object, the *buddhivṛtti* does not get revealed, but cognition is produced and the cognition of the form of the object is also produced. Now the question arises that how at all the cognition of an object is produced? Even though the *buddhivṛtti* appears as conscious, but it is not capable of expressing an object. Again, *puruṣa* is ubiquitous, but it also does not possess the capability of manifesting an object on its own. For, if that would have been the case, then all the objects of the world would have been manifested simultaneously. Thus, Vācaspati Mīśra claims that the object itself is always non-perceivable. To refute such a position, Vijñānabhikṣu considers *buddhivṛtti* to be instrumental (*dvāra*) in attaining the form or the reflection of the object, and hence, according to Sāṃkhya position, perception of objects becomes possible.

So far it is evident that the idea of ‘*arthagrahana*’ is pivotal in understanding Sāṃkhya epistemology. Vijñānabhikṣu explains that the ‘*arthagrahana*’, that is, knowing the object can be on the part of the *buddhi* or on the part of the *puruṣa*. In terms of the *buddhi* possessing the cognition of the object, the *arthagrahana* means a definite transformation of the *buddhi*. Now naturally, the question would arise that whether in case of *arthagrahana* of *puruṣa*, a transformation of *puruṣa* would have to be admitted or not. *Puruṣa*, however, is essentially immutable (*aparīṇāmī*). So, *puruṣa* cannot possess the cognition of the object. Again, there can be another way of knowing an object, and that is the reflection of the object on *puruṣa*. The objects while being reflected retain their form.⁷ Hence, it may be claimed that ‘*viṣayagrahana*’ or ‘*arthagrahana*’, that is, knowing an object on the part of the *puruṣa* is nothing but its reflection on *puruṣa*. It does not involve any relation like contacts, etc. Here, again it has been argued that if the above claim is admitted, then *puruṣa* being ubiquitous, it would receive the reflection of all entities simultaneously. Hence, the cognition of all the objects would be produced at the same moment, but that is inadmissible. However, the refutation of the above objection is not quite found in the Sāṃkhya system. Thus, *arthagrahana* should indicate *ākāragrahana* that is,

acquiring the form of the object both in case of *buddhi* and on the part of the *puruṣa*. This, in a way, establishes the theory of mutual reflectivity (*anyonyapratibimbavāda*). In this context, it may be mentioned that Vyāsadeva, the author of *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*, also admits such a position.

Next, the obvious objection that springs up at this point is that if *puruṣa* is qualified (*abhimānī*) with properties like, cognition, pleasure etc., which are in essence properties of *antaḥkaraṇa*, then the true nature of *puruṣa*, that is, non-relatedness, indifference etc. would be hampered. According to the Sāṃkhya-cāryas, such never happens. They cite an example in favour of their position, as follows - if a person sees his reflection in a mirror which has got dirty spots on it, and says ‘*malināṃmukhaṃ me*’, then the actual face does not acquire those spots, in reality, it is only an apparent usage about the reflected face. Analogously, the properties of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, namely, *jñāna*, *sukha*, etc. express themselves or relate themselves to the reflected consciousness or *puruṣa* only, and not with the pure consciousness itself. Thus, the essential nature of *puruṣa* is never hampered, rather it is well retained.

In this context, Vācaspati Miśra also provides an analogy in consonance with the Sāṃkhya-view, which explains how the essence of *puruṣa* is maintained despite its *ābhimānika* cognition. He says that at night the moonlight expresses all the objects, but the moon itself does not have any light of its own. It cannot express itself or other entities. However, the moon expresses itself as well as all other objects with the help of the reflected sunlight on it. Here, the material, unconscious *antaḥkaraṇa* is analogous to the moon. It can neither express itself nor the objects like pot etc. However, when the reflection of the self-luminous (*prakāśasvabhāva*) consciousness is received on it, it expresses itself as well as the cognition of pot etc. that are related to it. Thus, the possibility of cognitive usages and the like in everyday life are properly explained.

Further, Vācaspati says that two things happen when the reflection of *puruṣa* is received on the *antaḥkaraṇa*. First, the unconscious *antaḥkaraṇa* being the locus or substratum of the reflection of the consciousness, it behaves as conscious, and its modification (*vṛtti*), namely, the *adhyavasāya* too becomes luminous (*prakāśasvabhāva*). Secondly, due to such reflection there occurs non-apprehension of the difference between *puruṣa* and *antaḥkaraṇa*, and consequently, *puruṣa* appears to be related to the properties like cognition, pleasure etc. which are there in the

antaḥkaraṇa. This position is further supported by the twentieth Sāṃkhyakārikā—
 ‘*tasmāt tat samyogātacetanamcetanāvadivaliṅgam/guṇakarṭṛtve ca
 tathākartevabhavatyudāsīnaḥ!*’⁸ According to the said *kārikā*, when the *puruṣa* and
 the *antaḥkaraṇa* etc. come in proximity, the *antaḥkaraṇa* behaves like a conscious
 entity and properties like agency etc. appear to be that of the *puruṣa*. Hence, by the
 reflection of *puruṣa* on *antaḥkaraṇa*, the respective attributes are mutually
 superimposed.

In this context, Vijñānabhikṣu states that though the *antaḥkaraṇa* behaves as
 the conscious due to the reflection of consciousness on it, yet the reflected
 consciousness located in the *antaḥkaraṇa* cannot lead to the I-usages of *puruṣa*,
 despite the apprehension of non-discrimination between consciousness and
antaḥkaraṇa and the subsequent superimpositions of the properties of *antaḥkaraṇa*
 on the reflected consciousness. Now, according to Vijñānabhikṣu, to explain the I-
 usages of the properties of the *citta*, the reflection of *antaḥkaraṇa* on *puruṣa* is also to
 be admitted. Such cognition or realisation as related to the self (*pauruṣeyabodha* or
upalabdhi) is termed as *pratyakṣapramā*, that is, valid perception. However, such
 cognition is located in *puruṣa* (*puruṣaniṣṭha*). Thus, Vijñānabhikṣu explains
 perception by admitting the mutual reflection between *puruṣa* and *antaḥkaraṇa*,
 thereby establishing the theory of mutual reflectivity (*anyonyapratibimbavāda*).

Vijñānabhikṣu cites the main argument in favour of his position from
Sāṃkhyasūtravacanabhāṣya as follows -
 ‘*antaḥkaraṇasyatadujjalitatvāllohadadhiṣṭhāṭṛtvam*’⁹, meaning that when we talk
 of the perception of the self (*ātmadarśana*) the object of that act of perceiving is the
 self itself. Then naturally the question comes up that who would be the agent of that
 action? Now the agent can be the self only and nothing else. This, however, would
 produce the difficulty of ‘*karṭṛkarmavirodha*’ as the same entity would be attributed
 with agency as well as object-hood. When the *buddhivṛtti* is reflected on the
 consciousness or self, then the *buddhivṛtti* itself as well as the form of the object
 attained by the *buddhivṛtti*, both are manifested by the self. However, the question
 remains that while perceiving an object when usage like, ‘I am perceiving’ occurs,
 then how does the cognition of the form of ‘I’ take place? The self cannot express
 itself, since, the self, being the object (*karma*) over here, its self-expressiveness

(*svaprakāśatva*) would bring about the fallacy of agent-object contradiction. Then how come the sense of ‘I’ or the cognition of *aham* is expressed?

In reply to this, Vijñānabhikṣu states that the reflection of consciousness that occurs on the *buddhivṛtti*, that reflection is expressed by the *puruṣa*. Hence, to establish the object-hood (*karmatva*) of ‘I’ it is necessary to admit the theory of mutual reflection, namely the reflection of consciousness on *buddhivṛtti* and that of the *buddhivṛtti* qualified with the form of consciousness (*caitanya-karagr̥hītabuddhivṛtti*) on the *puruṣa*. Herein lies the novelty of Vijñānabhikṣu’s theory of mutual reflectivity.

Now, Vācaspati refutes Vijñānabhikṣu’s position by claiming that there is only one reflection, that is, the reflection of consciousness on *antaḥkaraṇa*. He puts forward an example as follows - we find the reflection of the moon on the water of the lake, but not vice versa. The reflected moon on the surface of the water consists of wavy movements, some particles of dirt etc. These properties are there in the water which gets superimposed on the reflection of the moon. Similarly, the luminosity of the moon is also superimposed on the water surface, due to the same reflection. Thus, ‘the moon is throbbing’ or ‘the moon is dirty’ are only apparent linguistic usages which in no way affect the actual moon and are due to the attributes of the water itself. Thus, admission of mutual reflection between water and moon is not required at all, since, only the reflection of the moon on water suffices to explain the superimposed attributes of the throbbing and dirty appearance of the moon on the water as well as the manifesting power (*prakāśatvadharma*) of the water. Thus, Vācaspati Miśra maintains that just like the reflection of the moon on the water explains the superimposed attributes of both the water and the reflected moon, similarly, simply the admission of the reflection of consciousness on the *antaḥkaraṇa* explains the superimposition of the attributes of the *antaḥkaraṇa* on the reflected consciousness. For that, we do not need to admit another reflection, namely that of the *antaḥkaraṇa* on *puruṣa*. Just as the actual moon stays pure and unrelated, similarly for the pure consciousness as well. The reflected moon gets attributed by the properties of the substratum of the reflection; analogously the reflected consciousness acquires the properties of the locus of the reflection, that is, of the *antaḥkaraṇa* itself, and merely appears to possess those attributes on its own. Thus, there is no need to

admit mutual reflectivity, since, admission of only one reflection (*ekapratibimbavāda*), as state above, is sufficient to explain the thesis.

Now, Vijñānabhikṣu clarifies his stance against Vācaspati's views arguing from the Neo-Sāṃkhya position. He says that desire (*icchā*) is always on the same locus as that of the *buddhi*, that is, *buddhi* and *icchā* are co-located (*ekādhikaraṇastha*). So cognition is also the property of *buddhi*. Otherwise, we would have to say that one person would be attributed with *buddhi* while another with desire. That is, however, contradictory to our experience. Thus, it is to be admitted that the reflected consciousness on *buddhivṛtti* manifests the object. However, such a standpoint goes against the theory of mutual reflectivity. Vijñānabhikṣu had apprehended such objections beforehand and has provided several arguments to nullify the other positions and thus establish his theory.

First, Vijñānabhikṣu says that if the above position is admitted, then there appears clear inconsistency between the two Sāṃkhya aphorisms 'cidavasānobhogah'¹⁰ and 'akarturapiphalabhogā'nmādyavat'¹¹. Here, the term 'bhoga' stands for 'I am the knower of this object'. Such cognition ends up in consciousness. It is a common occurrence that the chef prepares the food and the master eats it. So if we overemphasize on the fact of co-located-ness of agency (*kartṛtva*) and enjoyership (*bhokṛtva*), the above two aphorisms become meaningless. Thus, the opponents' view is refuted. It is, however, important to mention over here that according to the classical Sāṃkhya, agency and enjoyerhood both are properties of the *prakṛti* in its different modes (*pariṇāma*), and can never be located in *puruṣa* owing to its essential indifferent (*ūdāsīna*) and inactive (*niṣkriya*) nature. Even then there does not arise any inconsistency in explaining the I-usages with the help of the reflected consciousness owing to the convincing explanation of VācaspatiMiśra's *sekapratibimbavāda*.

Secondly, if Vācaspati's views are admitted then it would be impossible to prove the existence of *puruṣa*. He says that if we try to establish the existence of the actual pure consciousness (*bimbacaitanya*) with the help of its reflection on *buddhivṛtti*, then inevitably there would be the fallacy of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśrayadoṣa*). Vijñānabhikṣu explains the fallacy elaborately as follows - according to Vācaspati, the reflection of consciousness is received on the *buddhivṛtti*. Now, if such a reflection is obtained, then there must be the existence of the actual

consciousness which is being reflected. That is none but *puruṣa*. However, here an objection may be raised that if the existence of *bimbapurūṣais* not established first, then how can the question of its reflection arise at all. Now, if it is claimed that from the reflection itself, the existence of *bimbapurūṣais* established and vice versa, then it is a clear case of the fallacy of mutual dependence. Thus, admitting VācaspatiMīśra's views make it impossible to establish the existence of *puruṣa*. Vijñānabhikṣu claims that the admission of *anyonyapratibimbavāda* saves us from such difficulties. The *puruṣa* is established as the knower. So to establish the existence of *puruṣa* we do not need to take refuge of the reflection. However, it is necessary to admit the reflection of the object of knowledge in the *buddhivṛtti* in *puruṣa* itself. It has been already discussed that for the knowledge of the self, the reflection of the consciousness on *buddhivṛtti* is compulsory; otherwise there would certainly be *karṣṇakarmavirodha*. Thus, Vijñānabhikṣu claims his position of *anyonyapratibimbavādato* be free from fallacies.¹² It could, however, be mentioned over here that the above fallacy of mutual dependence, as proposed by Vijñānabhikṣu, concerning establishing the existence of *puruṣa*, is not a tenable one as the existence of *puruṣa* has been logically and consistently proved in the seventeenth *Sāṃkhyakārikā*¹³ independent of any theory of mutual reflectivity. Thus, it is to be kept in mind that the reflection of the consciousness on the *buddhivṛtti* is held to explain the nature and the possibility of knowledge in the classical Sāṃkhya tradition, and not the existence of *puruṣa*.

The third argument analyses the expressive power of the reflected consciousness on *buddhivṛtti* in terms of expressing the object. If sunlight is reflected on water, that does not express the plants and animals that are there in the water but say if a fish enters into that part of the water which is illumined by the sunlight, then it being in contact with the sunlight gets immediately expressed. Analogously, the reflected consciousness in the *buddhivṛtti*, though it may express the *buddhivṛtti* itself, it cannot express the object of cognition. Just like the waves of water may be illumined by the sunrays themselves but it is not certain whether the same would happen in relation to the reflected sunrays; this is because it is not that well-established that reflected sunrays have the capacity of expressing other objects. This proves the fact that the reflection of consciousness is not the same as the consciousness itself, rather it is an insentient entity.¹⁴ Here again, another analogy might be put forward to show that the reflection of an illumined object could possess

the capacity of expressing other objects just as the actual object itself. We know that the sunrays are capable of expressing the objects in a room. Now if we keep a tub of water in that room and make arrangements for receiving the sunlight on the tub of water only, then also we would find that the other objects of the room are expressed due to the reflected sunlight on the water. Similarly, for the consciousness and its reflection on the *buddhivṛtti*.

Fourth, Vijñānabhikṣu says that when sand particles, water vapour etc. come in contact with the extremely luminous sunrays, they are expressed in such a manner that we have experiences of mirage. So it is evident that the admission of reflections of *buddhivṛtti* and object (*viṣaya*) on consciousness (*caitanya*) for their expression is consistent.¹⁵ The third and the fourth arguments show the refutation of *caitanya pratibimbavāda* and the establishment of *anyonya prativimbavāda* respectively. However, such contention of the Neo-Sāṃkhya is not quite accepted by the classical Sāṃkhya due to their extreme articulation in their system to maintain the non-related essence of the pure consciousness.

In the fifth and final argument, Vijñānabhikṣu again cites the aphorism ‘*akarturapiphalabhogo ’mādyavat*’¹⁶ to argue against the co-located-ness (*sāmānādhikarānya*) of knowledge and desire. He says that one can be the enjoyer of the fruit of an action despite being not the agent of that action. Like in case of cooking, the chef is the agent of the action, while the master is the enjoyer of the fruit of that action. Thus, it is clear that even if there is non-co-located-ness (*vaiyādhikarānya*) in the case of knowledge and desire, no inconsistency (*anupapatti*) occurs. Again, in case of every individual, it is equally experienced by all that during an action the *manas* plays the role of determination (*saṃkalpa*) and the body directs the movement of its parts. The *buddhi* and the body are different from each other, and so one performs the task of determination while the other acts. So here also we find that the determination or ascertainment (*saṃkalpa*) and action (*kriyā*) are in different loci. In this way, it is possible to explain one entity as the locus of knowledge and another as that of the desire. Thus, Vijñānabhikṣu’s theory appears to be a more logical one. However, it is to be kept in mind that if the phenomenon of cognition and specifically that of I-usage could be clearly and convincingly attained by considering Vācaspati Mīśra’s *śekapratibimbavāda*, then keeping in view the principle of logical parsimony, it is sufficient to admit that theory only and hence, the theory of mutual

reflectivity is rendered futile. Moreover, admission of the reflection of the qualified *buddhivṛtti* (*caitanyapratimbaviśiṣṭaantaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) on the *bimbacaitanya* itself leaves a room for considering the second-order reflection to be one kind of transformation of *puruṣa*, which is in no way tenable with regard to the Sāṅkhya philosophical system. However, regarding the immutability of *puruṣa*, if one considers a somewhat less rigid view, then the mere reflection of the qualified *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* on the *bimbapuruṣa* itself might not appear to be a transformation of *puruṣa* at all. An analogy might help to clarify. Let us consider the case of a mirror where various things are reflected at different points of time. Those reflections, however, do not modify the nature of the mirror. It simply continues to exist as a mirror, that is, an object which has got the reflectivity power. Similarly, in case of the *bimbacaitanya*, if it is considered simply as the reflector of the qualified *buddhivṛtti* or in other terms as a mere witness of it then, Vijñānabhikṣu's position could be considered without hampering the essence of the *bimbapuruṣa*. Thus, the theories of reflectivity as proposed by VācaspatiMiśra and Vijñānabhikṣu both in their respective ways help to resolve the cognitive issues related to I-usages, provided the notions are applied in a very cautious and articulate manner.

In favour of his position, Vijñānabhikṣu further argues that according to Sāṅkhya philosophy, consciousness is a substance and it is ubiquitous. Moreover, it being eternal, it is always in contact with all the entities simultaneously. Here, it might be argued that just like the sunrays express all the objects that are in contact with it, similarly, all that is in contact with the ubiquitous consciousness, be simultaneously expressed. However, there is not much convincing answer to that. Thus, the issue somehow stands that how can then the *buddhivṛtti* transformed into the form of the object be expressed?

According to Sāṅkhya philosophers, objects are expressed from time to time and not always. Vijñānabhikṣu terms it as '*kādācitkatva*'.¹⁷ It means 'sometimes'. We know that it is essential for *buddhi* to acquire the form of the object, for its cognition to be produced. Similarly, if *puruṣa* expresses the *buddhivṛtti*, then it should also be essential for the *puruṣa* to acquire its form. But *puruṣa*, according to the *śāstras*, cannot undergo any transformation, yet for the sake of explaining the methodology of cognition, *puruṣa* too must receive the reflection of the *buddhivṛtti*. In this context,

there are proofs from *Smṛti* as well, that establishes the fact of reception of reflection by *puruṣa*; and the *Smṛtivākya* is as follows:

‘*tasmiṃściddarpanesphāresamastāvastudṛṣṭayah/
īmāstāḥpratibimbantisarasīvataṭadrumāḥ*’¹⁸

At this juncture reflecting from Sāṅkhya position, the process of cognition of I-ness (*aham*) can be traced as follows - in case of *ahamākāra* cognition the *buddhivṛtti* acts as the special cause (*karaṇa*). The reflection of the consciousness is being received by the intellect (*buddhi*). The causal efficacy (*kāraṇatā*) of *buddhi* lies in the fact of receiving the reflection of the consciousness. Now, the *buddhivṛtti* which has attained the reflection of consciousness is the cause towards *ahamākārajñāna*. Here, the cognition of the form of cognition (*jñānākārajñāna*), that is, *cidābhāsa* is there in *buddhi* itself. The object of this *cidābhāsa* which is there in *buddhi* is *aham*. Thus, *buddhi* gets associated with attributes like *jñānāśrayatva* (= *jñātrtva*) and *ahamākāraviṣayāśrayatva* in definite order. Thus, in *buddhi* we find the co-located-ness of *jñānāśrayatva* and *ahamākāraviṣayāśrayatva*, and due to such co-located-ness there occurs non-discriminatory mode of cognition in *buddhi* between the *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* of the cognition. Thus, the mode of *buddhi* that is produced is I-ness-associated-knower-ship (*jñātrtvaviśiṣṭaaham*) and accordingly the usage produced is ‘I am the knower’ (*‘ahamjñātā’*).

Now, on further analysis, we might say that valid cognition (*pramā*) is not a property of *buddhi*. This is because, when *puruṣa* is reflected on the *pramāṇa*, that is, on the *buddhivṛtti*, there appears an identity or non-discrimination between the consciousness and the *buddhi*. Due to such identity, the properties of *buddhi* get superimposed on *puruṣa* and consciousness is also superimposed on *buddhi*. Thus, the reflected consciousness on *buddhivṛtti* appears to be the knower. Another analogy has been shown here that when the moon gets reflected on the waves of the river water, the reflection of the moon quivers on the water surface; then ordinary usages like, ‘The moon is quivering’ (*‘candraḥkampate’*) occurs, which shows the imposition of the properties of the reflected moon on the actual moon. Similarly, usages like knower (*jñātā*) or ‘I know’ (*‘ahamjānāmi’*) are simply imposed on pure consciousness. Such usages are referred to as the *‘pauruṣeyabodha’* (the cognition of *puruṣa*); however, such is not a true property of *puruṣa*, it is a mere imposition. In this context, other commentators also maintain that *‘buddhivṛttyāsahaaviśiṣṭaḥ’*¹⁹

meaning that the apparent *pauruṣeyabodha* is nothing but the *buddhivṛtti* itself. VācaspatiMiśra, however, admits here that if we conceive of the idea of *pauruṣeyabodha* as the compound that is obtained through the imposition of the properties of *buddhi* on the reflected consciousness on it, then we arrive at an inconsistency. The reflected consciousness is not the *puruṣa* itself, rather it being insentient, can never manifest the *buddhivṛtti*. Thus, the reflected consciousness does not have any expressive capacity.²⁰ Hence, here we find that both VācaspatiMiśra and Vijñānabhikṣu agree with the view that the reflected consciousness cannot possess the same status and capacity as the actual consciousness, and hence, its accountability for the I-usages is a matter of extreme philosophical concern.

Now, we know that Vijñānabhikṣumaintains that the reflected consciousness is not like the pure consciousness itself. It does not possess any capacity to express objects. According to him, the expression of objects constitutes functionality (*arthakriyākāritva*). This is his main contention. From this part, we enter into the discussion on *pramā* following the neo-Sāṃkhya namely, the followers of Vijñānabhikṣu. According to them, *pramā* is of two types— the *buddhivṛtti* in the form of an object (*viśayākārabuddhivṛtti*) and the reflection of that *buddhivṛtti* on *puruṣa*.²¹ The instrumental or specific cause (*kaṛaṇa*) towards the first kind of *pramā* is the eyes or other sense organs while that of the second part is the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*. In this context, it has been clarified by other commentators like BālarāmaUdāsīna, that the eyes etc. are the *kaṛaṇa* of *pramā*. However, it is important to keep in mind that here, *kaṛaṇa* is defined as ‘*yenakriyākriyate tatkaṛaṇam*’, meaning that which is responsible for the occurrence of the action. Further, BālarāmaUdāsīna states that the *buddhivṛtti* acts both as the *pramā* and the *pramāṇa*. The reflected consciousness on *buddhivṛtti* acts as the knower (*pramātā*) and the consciousness which has received the reflection of the *buddhivṛtti* on it, is then the witness of the *pramā* only (*pramāsākṣīmātra*).

VācaspatiMiśra and other philosophers, however, have not admitted two types of *pramā*. According to them, when the sense organs get associated with their specific objects under their modes (*svavṛtti*), then the *tamaguṇa* diminishes (*abhibhava*) and the *sattvagūṇa* becomes extremely intense (*udbhava*). Such a state of the *buddhivṛtti* associated with the intense *sattvagūṇa* is called *adhyavasāya*. Thus, the *buddhivṛtti* in the form of the object constitutes the *pramāṇa*. When such

buddhivṛtti receives the reflection of consciousness on it, then that *buddhivṛtti* gets imposed on the reflected consciousness; and that is the *pramā*. *Pramā* is due to *pramāṇa*. Thus, it is evident that the superimposed properties of the *buddhivṛtti* on the reflected consciousness is referred to as the *pramā*, and not simply the properties of the *buddhivṛtti* itself.

Finally, we can cite the view of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī²² in the context of our discussion throughout. According to him, the *buddhivṛtti* delimits (*avacchinna*) the *puruṣa* or the supra-sensory consciousness, and superimposes its properties and attributes on it. Whatever is imposed on *puruṣa*, that gets manifested. It is to be kept in mind here that Vijñānabhikṣu has also talked of such an argument in his text *Pravacanabhāṣya* through the analogy of the mirage in a desert. From here it might be claimed that the theories reflectivity are mere representations of the cognitive process, however, they all emphasize somehow or the other on the fact that reflections of the *buddhivṛtti* should be received on the supra-sensory consciousness only, and not on the reflected consciousness which acts as its representative.

The entire discussion carried out thus portrays that the view of *ekapratibimbavāda* bears in it the apprehension of the non-attainment of the cognition of the *bimbapurūṣa* itself and accordingly, all sorts of I-usages would be based on the mere reflection of the consciousness and not the actual consciousness itself. This is because however closely the reflection might resemble the actual, yet it can never be the actual itself. Such has been admitted by Vācaspati Miśra too as we have found above. On the other hand, the admission of *anyonyaprativimbavāda* is not possible without considering a restricted sense of the functionality (*arthakriyākāritva*) of *puruṣa* as held by Vijñānabhikṣu. However, such meticulous analysis into the issues involved in case of cognitive usages in Sāṃkhya philosophy finally proves that the views held by various philosophers regarding the nature and possibility of knowledge in the Sāṃkhya system are consistent with the epistemological and metaphysical position of the essence of *puruṣa* as admitted in Sāṃkhya philosophy, and convincingly establishes the cognitive usages of I-ness with regard to the reflected consciousness, be it one-sided or mutual (in a restricted sense as discussed above), and at the same time retains the essence of *puruṣa* as the perpetually and universally unaltered consciousness (*kūṭasthasvabhāvacaityanya*).

References:

- ¹ *Sāmkhyakārikā* 5, *Sāmkhyakārikā* of Īsvaraḥṛṣṇa, *Sāmkhyatattvakaumudī* of VācaspatiMīśra, Narayan Goswami (edited), 3rd edition, Sanskrit PustakBhandar, Kolkata, 1406 (Bengali year), p. 45.
- ² *Ibid.* p. 46
- ³ *Ibid.* p. 47
- ⁴ *asandigdḥāvīparītānadhigataviṣayā cittavṛttih, bodhaścapauruṣeyaḥphalāmpramaḥ*’, *Sāmkhyakārikā* 5, *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.
- ⁵ *atra yadīpramārūpāphalāmpuruṣaṇiṣṭhamātramucyatetadābuddhivṛttirevapramāṇam// yadi ca buddhiniṣṭhamātramucyatetadātūktendriyasannikarṣādīrevapramāṇam// puruṣastupramāśākṣyaivanapramātāiti// yadi ca pauruṣeyabodhobuddhivṛttiścobhayamapīpramocyatetadātūktamubhayamevapramābhedenapramāṇambhavati//*, 1/87, *Sāmkhyapravacanabhāṣya* of Vijñānabhikṣu in *Sāmkhyadarśanam*, JanardanShastriPandeya (edited), 1st edition, MotilalBanarsiDass, Delhi, 1989. Henceforth, *Sāmkhyapravacanabhāṣya*.
- ⁶ *Sāmkhya-Yogadarśana Pramāṇatattva*, Dr. Narayan Kumar Chattopadhyay, Bijan Publishers, Kolkata, 1988.
- ⁷ *arthākāratayaivārthagrahaṇasya buddhisthaleḍṣṭatvenatāmbinasāmyogaviśeṣamātreṇārthabhānasyapuruṣe ’apyanaucityāt// arthākārāsyavārthagrahaṇaśabdārthatvācceti// sacārthākārahpuruṣeparīṇāmonasambhavatītyarthātpratibimbarūpaevaparyavasyātīdik//*, 1/99, *Sāmkhyapravacanabhāṣya*.
- ⁸ *Sāmkhyakārikā* 20, *Sāmkhyatattvakaumudī*, p. 193.
- ⁹ *Sāmkhyasūtra* 1/99, *Sāmkhyasūtra* in *Sāmkhyadarśanam*, DurgacharanSāmkhyavedāntatīrtha (edited), Central Book Agency, Kolkata, 1360 (Bengali year).
- ¹⁰ *Sāmkhyasūtra* 1/104, *Ibid.*
- ¹¹ *Sāmkhyasūtra* 1/105, *Ibid.*
- ¹² *na ca pratibimbānyathāpapattiyābimbabhūtaḥpuruṣaḥsyetsyatītvācyam// anyo ’nyāśrayātpṛthagbimbāsiddhau ca tatpratiyogitayābimbāsiddhiriti// asammate ca jñātrtayāpuruṣasiddhyānantaramātasyajñeyatvānyathāmupapattiyāpratibimbāsiddhaunānyo ’nyāśrayaḥ//*, 1/99, *Sāmkhyapravacanabhāṣya*.
- ¹³ *saṃghātaparārthatvāt triguṇādiviparyayādadhīṣṭhānāt// puruṣo ’astibhokṭṛbhāvātkaivalyārthampravrṛtesca//*, *Sāmkhyakārikā* 17, *Sāmkhyatattvakaumudī*, p. 169.
- ¹⁴ *atha buddhigatacicchāyārūpeṇasambandhenabimbasyaivajñānāmatucitau buddhipratibimbaṅkalpyatāityetāvanmātreccatratāśayovarīyeta// tadapyasatsūryādeḥsvpratibimbarūpasambandhenajalādītatsthavastubhāsakatvādarśanāt// kiraṇāirevatadubhayabhāsanāt//*, 1/99, *Sāmkhyapravacanabhāṣya*.
- ¹⁵ *marumarīcikādautusvādhyantajalādībhāsakatvamdrṣṭamevetidrṣṭānusāreṇāsmābhiścitaubuddhipratibimbaevasarvārthabhānahetutayāsambandhaḥkalpitaiti//*, 1/99, *Sāmkhyapravacanabhāṣya*.
- ¹⁶ *Sāmkhyasūtra* 1/105, *Sāmkhyasūtra* in *Sāmkhyadarśanam*, DurgacharanSāmkhyavedāntatīrtha (edited), Central Book Agency, Kolkata, 1360 (Bengali year).
- ¹⁷ *ato ’arthabhānasya kādācitkatvādyupapattaye ’arthākātaivārthagrahaṇamvācyambuddhautathādrṣṭatvāt, buddhāvapi hi saṃyogamātrasyārthagrahaṇatveatīndriyasyāpyarthasyabuddhigrāhyatvaprasaṅgāt//*, 1/4, *Yogavārttika, Vyāsabhāṣya. Yogavārttika* of Vijñānabhikṣu in *Pātañjaladarśanam*, JivananadaVidyasagar Bhattacharyya (edited), Siddheshwar Press, Kolkata, 1897.

¹⁸*Yogavāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa*, referred to from *Sāṃkhya-YogadarśanaPramāṇatattva*, Dr. Narayan Kumar Chattopadhyay, Bijan Publishers, Kolkata, 1988.

¹⁹*Ibid*, p. 32.

²⁰*citer pratisamkramāyāstadākārāpattausvabuddhisamvedanam//*, 4/22, *Pātañjalasūtra, Pātañjaladarśanam*, JivananadaVidyasagar Bhattacharyya (edited), Siddheshwar Press, Kolkata, 1897.

The *Vyasabhāṣya* of the above *sūtra* is ‘*aparīṇāminī hi bhokṛṣaktirpratisamkramā ca pariṇāminyarthepatisamkrāntevataadvṛttimanupatī,*

tasyāścāprāptacaitanyopagraharūpāyābuddhivṛtteranukāramātratayābuddhivṛtyaviśiṣṭāhi jñānavṛtirākhyāyate//, *Ibid*.

In the above commentary it is also important to consider the view of Pañcaśikhācārya in the said context, as follows – ‘*napātālamna ca vivaramgīrīnāmnāivāndhakāramkuṣayonodadhinām// guhāyasyāmnihitambrahmaśvāśvatāmbuddhivṛttimaviśiṣṭāmkavayovedayanteiti//*, *Ibid*.

²¹‘*tathā*

cāntaḥkaranavṛttirindriyavṛttidvārārthasannikṛṣṭābhavatitataindriyavṛtyāsāhārthakārāpariṇ amatesācārthākārāvṛttirguṇarūpāsarvātmanām vibhutve ’apisvasvāmīnyevātmanipratibimbate nānyatra, anādisvasvāmibhāvasyapratibimbaniyāmakatvādanyathā’atiprasaṅgāt//, *Sāṃkhyatattvārthadīpanam* of Bhāvāganeśa, *Sāṃkhyasamgrahaḥ*, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, 1969, p. 53.

²²*Bhāṣya* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā*, Damodar Mukhopadhyay (edited) Kolkata.