

BOOK-REVIEW

Ratna Datta Sharma: *Nyāyadarśane Nigrahasthān*, Jadavpur University, Kolkata in association with Mahabodhi Book agency, Kolkata, 2011, price: Rs.400/-

The book under review has got five sub-divisions, viz, Preface, Introduction, content, sixteen chapters on different topics and Bibliography.

In 'Preface' the author gives an analysis of the circumstances under which she had to undertake this work and shows her indebtedness to various Professors, colleagues, scholars etc for the successful completion of the book.

The introductory portion of the book deals with the enumeration of the sixteen categories and their philosophical significance in attaining 'Highest Good' (*nihśreyasa*) with special reference to the category of *nigrahasthāna*. She deals with some philosophically significant points like the concept of philosophical reflection (*vicāra*) and its varieties. In exercising such reflection she has carefully discussed the situations under which a particular school fails to substantiate its position leading to the probable points of defeat called *nigrahasthāna* along with some examples. Though Gautama has made a mention of twenty-two varieties of *nigrahasthāna*-s, it has to be taken as infinite, all of which cannot be discussed. All the logicians of Bengal and Mithila were deeply influenced by Udayana and hence there is an indirect bearing of Udayana in the philosophical writings of them particularly on *nigrahasthāna*. This type of philosophical deliberation is based on two principles- disseminating correct knowledge to others and achieving victory over the opponents. For this reason we have to follow certain rules without which the philosophical rejection can never be done.

The first chapter is concentrated on the concept of *nigrahasthāna* and the situations under which it can be raised. The author has given an explanation of the definition of *nigrahasthāna* which runs as follows: '*Vipratipattirapratipattiśca nigrahasthānam*'. The word '*vipratipatti*' means the opposite cognition, i.e., knowing an object in such a way which is not its actual nature. The term '*apratipatti*' means the non-beginning of the cognition of an object. The second chapter deals with twenty-two types of *nigrahasthāna*. Of them some are originated from *apratipatti* and some from *vipratipatti*. The *nigrahasthāna*-s like *anamubhāṣana*, *ajñāna*, *apratibhā*, *vikṣepa*, *matānujñā*, *paryanuyojyopakṣaṇa* belong to the former while the rest belongs to the latter. The third chapter is very much interesting in the sense that it contains the nature of *nigrahasthāna* as depicted in the *Carakasamhitā*. We were unaware about the fact that the *Carakasamhitā* which is nothing but a book of medicine is the storehouse of logical tools like *nigrahasthāna*. To Caraka the deliberation of texts, if discussed in the evening with mutual understanding, is called evening discourse (*sandhyā-sambhāṣa*). If the discussion is held being annoyed with each other, it is called *vigrhya sambhāṣa*. The fourth chapter is chiefly concentrated on the critical study of the view of Uddyotakara on

nigrahasthāna. To him the real cause of defeat is *nigrahasthāna* (*nigrahasthānāni parājayavastuni*). There does not arise any question of victory or defeat in the case of *vāda* type of debate, because it is meant for unveiling the truth (*tattvabubhutsu kathā*). Hence there is question of raising any point of defeat in the case of *vāda*. Uddyotakara is of the opinion that the inability to understand the desired meaning of the teacher and disciple involved in the debate is the point of defeat. That which is considered as an impediment of determining the intended meaning is called *nigrahasthāna*. The view of Vacaspati Misra, the author of *Tātparyaṭīkā*, on the theory of *nigrahasthāna* is philosophically significant and hence it has discussed in a threadbare manner in the fifth chapter. The faults and arguments given by proponent and opponent are taken as mental ascriptions by the Buddhists, which is denied by Vācaspati. To him all these belong to the category of real, but not imaginary. The repetition of a word and meaning has been admitted by him as a separate category of *nigrahasthāna*. Udayana in his *Nyāyaparīśiṣṭa* has thrown some light on the concept of *nigrahasthāna* which is also worth-pondering. To him the person whose ego is in tact while taking part in debate is not a good debater. The removal of ego of the participating opponent by a person whose ego is in tact is *nigraha* in the form of defeat. It is interesting to note that Udayana has elaborated at large different types of *nigrahasthāna* in the form of meaningless (*nirarthaka or anarthaka*). The author has left no stones unturned in delineating the nature of *nigrahasthāna* as per Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *magnum opus Nyāya-mañjarī*. Refuting the view of Dharmakīrti Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has emphasized two-fold *nigrahasthāna*, viz, *vipratipatti* and *apratipatti*. He has developed a critique of *adoṣodbhavana* as admitted by Dharmakīrti. If he undertakes the meaning of the term ‘*adoṣodbhavana*’ in the sense of presenting something as a defect which is not a defect at all and in the sense of not raising any kind of defect then it would be acceptable to Jayanta. He again has shown his reservation in admitting the Buddhist view on denying *nirarthaka* as a special type of *nigrahasthāna* and shown that it has to be taken as a separate type of *nigrahasthāna* without paying any heed to the Buddhist who believes that the meaningless statements are used by the insane people.

Bhāsarvajña who is commonly known as a follower of a particular group of the Naiyāyikas (*Naiyāyikaikadeśī*) is believed to have a separate view regarding *nigrahasthāna*. He has developed a critique of Dharmakīrti in his *Nyāyasāra*. Bhāsarvajña has given the concept of ‘repetition’ (*punarukti*) in two senses- repetition of a word without any necessity or to use a synonymous word. But Dharmakīrti opines that the repetition of the meaning is really a repetition, which has not been admitted by Bhāsarvajña. An attention has also been given to definition and varieties of *nigrahasthāna* as brought into focus by Baradarāja in his *Tārīkīkarakṣā*. He has interpreted the word ‘*ca*’ (meaning ‘and’) incorporated in the *sūtra* 5/2/7 and given an analysis of some other non-conventional *nigrahasthāna* which are taken into cognizance by the particle ‘*ca*’. To support Udayana in case of *pratijñāhāni* and to admit various *duṣanahāni* Baradarāja has shown his originality and philosophical contribution. The views of Keśava Mīśra and Mañikantha have got commendable influence on the author as well as other scholars. Mañikantha has refuted the view of Udayana who is of the opinion that if someone wants to convey something with the pronoun, it leads to a particular type of *nigrahasthāna* called *ananubhāṣaṇa*. These apart, Mañikantha has given an account of various types of *matānujñā nigrahasthāna*, which is completely

different from conventional idea. The views of Sankara Mishra (in his *Vādi-vinoda*), Vācaspati Mishra (in his *Nyāya-tattvāloka*) Viśvanātha (in his *Gautamīya Sūtravṛtti*), Jayarāma (in his *Nyāyasiddhāntamālā*) and Rādhāgovinda Goswami (in his *Nyāyasūtra-vivaraṇa*) have been carefully discussed, critically adjudged and shown their contributions for the development of the concept of *nigrahasthāna*. In the concluding portion the author has made some evaluative statements about the views expressed by different scholars. To him among the Naiyāyikas the view of Udayana is original, contributive and followed by the later scholars, because he categorically pointed out that the question of *nigraha* arises only in the context of debate. She has dealt at length regarding the nature of *nirarthaka*, a form of *nigrahasthāna*. No one will show any venture to use such sentence particularly at the time of debate. But Udayana wants to justify it as *nigrahasthāna*, because an individual may use a sentence signifying nothing (*avācaka*) leading to the situation of having *nirarthaka nigrahasthāna*.

The book is the result of untiring effort of the author to collect all texts in Indian tradition and giving a free Bengali exposition of them. After going through the book one can have an idea why *nigrahasthāna* has been considered as a separate category by the Naiyāyikas and how it is essential for the attainment of this-worldly and other-worldly wellbeing (*nihśreyasa*) as endorsed by the Naiyāyikas. After noticing its encyclopedic value a serious researcher can easily understand the value and role of *nigrahasthāna* in the phenomenon of philosophizing. If an individual becomes aware about all types of points of defeat, he will try to avoid these in his debate, which may lead him to the attainment of personality development and communicative skill even in the modern world. This positive gain in life may be described as this-worldly wellbeing. The language is non-technical and lucid as far as practicable. The names of some Naiyāyikas like Jayarāma, Rādhāgovinda Goswami etc are found for the first time appearing in the list contributors to the development of the notion of *nigrahasthāna*.

The book would have been better, had there been no printing error, no repetitions and no technicality. It is true that sometimes it is very difficult to avoid technicality if the main flavor of the texts is retained. But it is also necessary to present the technical words in a non-technical way for understanding of the scholars having less knowledge of Sanskrit. Moreover, there should have been 'Index' at the end of the book to easily locate various concepts within a shorter period of time.

In spite of this the book is a pioneer one in so far as the concept of *nigrahasthāna* is concerned. I believe it will be an immortal work of the author presented to the future generation working on Indian Philosophy.

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