

CHAPTER-V

NORMS AND ROLE PERCEPTIONS OF THE OFFICIALS AND THE NON-OFFICIALS  
AT THE THREE LEVELS OF PANCHAYATI RAJ INSTITUTIONS IN THE MALDA  
DISTRICT

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### NORMS AND ROLE-PERCEPTIONS OF THE OFFICIALS AND THE NON-OFFICIALS AT THE THREE LEVELS OF PANCHAYATI RAJ INSTITUTIONS IN THE MALDA DISTRICT

#### 5.1 Norms and Role-Perceptions of the Officials :

In the Panchayati Raj Institutions there are two sets of actors, 'Officials' and Non-Officials', who are to work in realising the developmental goals of the institution. The two actors are placed in an institutional setting implying mutuality and reciprocity of relationships. The actors' perception of norms which guide their behaviour as well as the role they define or set for themselves has a significant impact upon the relation between the officials and the non-officials.

The administrative system is characterised by a set of institutional norms. In any administrative system, each actor considers to interpret the role from his own official-position in the institution as well as in relation to the various other role-incumbents in the institution. For example, a bureaucrat is exposed to two sets of influences. These emerge : (1) from the official-position that the bureaucrat occupies in the institution; (2) from the interaction with other actors in the institution.

What he himself thinks from his official-position and what he can actually do is influenced to a considerable extent by the norms which the institution to which he belongs has developed over the years. If the value-system of the bureaucrat is different from the universe wherein it operates the bureaucracy will either be ineffective in performing its duties or its functions will be overtly characterised by conflict and tension. Similarly if there is a great variation between the values of the political leaders and the values of the organization the realisation of systemic goal-achievement will suffer. Before analysing role-perceptions and normative referents of both the officials and the non-officials, it is essential to deal with the meaning and definitions of 'role' and 'norms'.

Let us consider first of all what 'role' is. "Role, a term borrowed directly from the theatre, is a metaphor intended to denote that conduct adheres to certain 'parts' (or positions) rather than to the players who read or recite them".<sup>1</sup> "Roles describe specific forms of behaviour associated with given tasks; they develop originally from task-requirements. In their pure or organisational form, roles are standardized patterns of behaviour required of all persons playing a part in a given functional relationships"<sup>2</sup>. Role describes the processes of cooperative behaviour and communication. It serves only to describe individual perception and socially relevant individual behaviour. Thus the concept of role stresses the shaping of

individual responses and behaviour by social expectations or socially imposed norms.<sup>3</sup>

Sociologists define role as a pattern of behaviour associated with distinctive social position.<sup>4</sup> Another author defines it as a part of status position which is made up of subset of norms.<sup>5</sup> A comprehensive definition of role is provided by Parsons : "The role is that organised sector of an actor's orientation which constitutes and defines his participation an interactive process. It involves a set of complementary expectation concerning his own action and those of others with whom he interacts".<sup>6</sup>

Several definitions of role are discussed above. For the purpose of this study role implies "a set of complementary expectations concerning his own action and those of others with whom he interacts".

From the developmental perspectives it is expected that the officials must be less adhering to administrative rules and regulations, subservient to non-officials. Furthermore, they must be flexible, goal-oriented, cooperative with the public and the non-officials. On the other hand, the non-officials in regard to the performance of their developmental role are expected to formulate policies affecting the universal interest rather than parochial and sectional interest.

Officials and non-officials occupy different sets of role-universe. The totality of their role-conception are not

relevant for the relationship between the officials and the non-officials. Only a part of their role-conception impinges upon the relationship between the two opposite sets of actors. So the study is interested to examine specifically those role-aspects which directly relate to the relationship between the officials and the non-officials at the three levels of Panchayati Raj institutions. This study seeks to analyse the officials' perception of role in regard to subservience to non-officials, safeguarding administrative autonomy, expediency and attitude in relation to power consideration. An attempt has also been made in this study to analyse the non-officials' perception of universalistic and parochial-role.

After independence, people expected that the government would expedite the process of development which had been hindered during the colonial rule. Administration is the obvious instrument to undertake the task of development and this raises the important question whether the administration is capable to cope with new and growing tasks of development.

The newly independent countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, which we may call developing, are confronted with the problem of development. Administration has been universally recognized and accepted as an important element for planning, energizing, promoting and accelerating the pace of development. So it is interesting to examine the general features of administration that can be observed in the developing

nations. Dube has tried to identify certain special features of the bureaucracies in the developing countries which have attained independence after a long experience of colonial rule. He has observed that the majority of the bureaucrats belonged to the privileged class of the society and they had different styles of living and modes of thought. They maintained partly traditional and partly modern culture and in this way they played their roles in an ambivalent manner. Power was the main source of attraction of the bureaucratic positions. Moreover, the bureaucrats were paternalistic in their attitudes towards the masses. The masses accepted the position and thought that the administration would provide a wide variety of small favours. Administrations were mainly concerned with regulatory and revenue functions.<sup>7</sup> Dube has also observed that the bureaucrats were trained in formal administrative procedure and routine and as a result, they performed stereotyped functions. They were self contained within the limited framework of their functions and procedural sets. Requirements prescribed for the official positions made the bureaucrats an instrument for implementing imperialist policies.<sup>8</sup>

Dube has further noted that the emerging ethos also hindered the bureaucratic activities. Though in theory basic change was desired, the rational organization of the system helped the bureaucrats to maintain the statusquo.<sup>9</sup> He believes that "sub-consciously the bureaucrat still perhaps believes in the

efficacy of the traditional approach to administration. New approaches are discussed and half heartedly accepted, but only in rare cases do they receive a fair trial".<sup>10</sup>

Heady has identified five important features of administration which can be found in the developing nations. These are :

"(1) The basic pattern of public administration is imitative rather than indigenous. (2) The bureaucracies are deficient in skilled manpower necessary for developmental programmes. (3) Bureaucratic activity is channeled toward the realisation of goals other than the achievement of programme objectives. (4) The wide discrepancy between form and reality is another distinguishing characteristic. (5) The bureaucracy in developing country is apt to have generous measures of operational autonomy, which can be accounted for by the convergence of several forces usually at work in a recently independent modernizing nation. Colonialism was essentially rule by bureaucracy with policy guidance from remote sources, and this pattern persists even after the bureaucracy has new master in the nation."<sup>11</sup>

From a different perspective, Hamza Alavi has also described the role of bureaucracy in a post-colonial country like India. He has observed that bureaucracy enjoys enormous autonomy in the post colonial state. In independent India the bureaucracy serves the interests of three propertied classes : the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the landed classes. The ruling Congress Party does not represent the interests of a

single class. It participates with the bureaucracy in mediating the demands of competing propertied classes and simultaneously participate with the bureaucracy to exercise state power to uphold the social order that permits the continued existence of those classes despite its proclaimed dedication to establish "the socialistic pattern of society". The Government of India's performance in regard to foreign capital is also different from the socialistic slogans of the Congress Party. The most important thing is that the bureaucracy actually enjoys the vast autonomous power behind the Congress political leaders.<sup>12</sup> He has again observed that the members of the bureaucracy and the military exercised power during the colonial period. During that period the bureaucrats acted not only in favour of the colonial masters but also they repressed the nationalist leaders and subordinated the native classes. During the freedom struggle they were on the opposite pole.<sup>13</sup> Alavi is of the opinion that "after independence, the same political leaders whom it was their task to repress were ensconced in office, nominally in authority over them. A new relationship of mutual accommodation had to be established."<sup>14</sup>

Politicians may seek favour from officials for getting certain things done for their supporters and in dealing with these activities their relationship vis-a-vis the bureaucracy is weakened. The politicians as brokers play their roles for official favours.<sup>15</sup>

It is important to examine the historical background and the evolution of political forces of a country to understand the nature of relationship between the political leaders and the bureaucratic military oligarchies. "For example, in India and Pakistan powerfully organised bureaucratic and military structures were inherited".<sup>16</sup>

In India, the traditional or executive type of administration was designed to fulfil all the legal requirements of governmental operations. This type of administration was confined to the maintenance of law and order, collection of revenue and regulating the national life in accordance with the statutory requirements.<sup>17</sup> Very often it is a question of organisation and structure, rules and procedures which may not fully suit the requirements of expeditious decision-making called for by developmental tasks.<sup>13</sup> If the bureaucrats are 'legal', 'rational', 'anonymus' and 'rule-bound' they will be rigid and officious in performing their role. It is important to have a look at the classical model of bureaucracy developed by Max Weber. Weber's bureaucracy possesses certain characteristics. The important characteristics are hierarchy, (i.e., arrangement of organisational personnel into a chain of authority and initiative between superiors and subordinates systematic division of labour (i.e., differentiation of functions on the basis of specialised skill among the officials at different levels), written rules (i.e., prescription of elaborate rules and procedures to govern the operations of the

office and the rights and duties of position incumbents), impersonality (i.e., discharge of official business according to standard norms or calculable rules), rationality (i.e., selection between alternatives on the basis of efficiency), rule-orientation (i.e., rigidly adherence of official rules, norms of conduct, and procedures).<sup>19</sup> The structural and behavioural characteristics generate certain 'dysfunctional' tendencies among the bureaucracies. Robert Merton held that rules originally conceived as means become an end in themselves and hence occurs displacement of goals.<sup>20</sup> The structural characteristics of bureaucracy, namely, 'rule', 'hierarchy', 'differentiation', etc. are closely related with the behavioural characteristics of 'objectivity', 'discretion' and formalism for the achievement of certain goals.<sup>21</sup> From the structural aspect it is obviously neutral. This means that the bureaucracy does not take any risk and initiative even when the situation so demands. Under such circumstances it remains passive and neutral. From the behavioural aspect, bureaucracy may be thought of as showing some functional or pathological symptoms which inhibit the realisation of goals. From the achievemental or purposive point of view it can be regarded as an "organisation that maximizes efficiency in administration or an institutionalised method of organised social conduct in the interest of administrative efficiency."<sup>22</sup>

The classical model of bureaucracy which applied to the Indian situation is affected by certain dysfunctional factors.

These are : lack of initiative, reluctance to delegate authority, sychophancy towards superiors, hostility among different professions, insistence on status and prestige symbols, non-responsiveness to public grievances, etc.

"Gradually, under the British rule, "according to Kochanek, "a model of government evolved which was ultimately to be accepted as the structure of government for independent India".<sup>23</sup> One important feature of this model was "the creation of a unified central administration based on the emerging principles of a modern bureaucracy recruited on the basis of open competition and merit".<sup>24</sup> Heady observes that "the recruitment policy is overly exclusive and that the IAS has a law and order orientation not well suited to a welfare state".<sup>25</sup> Paul H. Appleby observes that "the administrative system was designed to serve the relatively simple interests of an occupying power. This was not adequate for an independent India, and required systematic improvement"<sup>26</sup> Kochanek also shared a similar view. He points out that "the bureaucracy must be made more innovative, less subject to rapid expansion as a way of creating employment and must exercise self-restraint in its demands for higher incomes".<sup>27</sup>

In order to be an agent of change and to be responsive to the needs of the people, bureaucracy must be rationally structured, more functionally oriented (dysfunctions of classical bureaucracy need to be reduced if not eliminated) and should be

achievement-centred (through acceptance of different sets of norms).<sup>29</sup> The bureaucracy must be committed to developmental goals and thus it requires a new look, a new spirit, a new attitude and professional skill.<sup>29</sup>

Similarly, the politicians in the pre-independence days always considered the bureaucratic machinery and the political authority as an instrument for repressing the people and hence led agitations and demonstrations against this colonial regime for establishing common good of the people. After independence, it was required that the political leaders would change their attitudes, orientations and behavioural patterns towards the political regime and the administrative apparatus. As a guardian of political authority and transmitter of democratic values the leaders will now create conditions which may facilitate the role-performance of the officials. It is observed by some authors that "the politician is now expected to transmit democratic values to the populace, mobilize support for the programmatic values of the regime, and cooperate with the administrator ...".<sup>30</sup>

Two of the important functions of political leaders are the interest aggregation and interest articulation. They have to play their roles in two different realms. Firstly, as an elected member of the Panchayat, they try to articulate the needs and demands of the entire populace and bring them to the notice of

those who are intimately concerned with the decision-making in government bodies. Secondly, the political leaders have to strengthen the bases of representative politics. In order to safeguard their autonomous position they have also to mobilise support and get the needs and demands of their constituents fulfilled. In dealing with these activities they are concerned with parochial and sectoral considerations.

So the leaders insist on rapid and expeditious execution of development programmes within the time-frame of their elective tenure, either to fulfil their election pledges or to meet the demands of their own group for protecting their own positions in future, and for this they want simplification of rules and procedures. In these tasks, if they are confronted with the problems of delay or reluctance on the part of the officials, they may interfere in the day to day administration or go to the extent of creating pressure upon the official.

Let us now consider what the norms stand for. A norm is "a rule or a standard that governs our conduct in the social situations in which we participate. It is a societal expectation. It is a standard to which we are expected to conform whether we actually to do so or not".<sup>31</sup>

Again, a norm refers "not to the average behaviour of a number of persons in a specific social situation, but instead to the expected behaviour, the behaviour that is considered

appropriate in that situation. It is statistical only in the sense that significant number of people in a group regard it as a standard procedure".<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, it "is a specific guide to action which defines acceptable and appropriate behaviour in particular situations. The norms are enforced by positive and negative sanctions which may be formal or informal. The sanctions which enforce norms are a major part of the mechanisms of social control which are concerned with maintaining order in society".<sup>33</sup> Values and norms are inseparable. Values also provide specific conduct for individuals. Shared norms and values are essential for the operation of human society. Unless norms are shared members of society would be unable to cooperate or even comprehend the behaviour of others. Similar is the case with values.<sup>34</sup> Kahn and his colleagues (1954) identified "five dimensions of normative expectations which appeared to be characteristic of organizations as systems rather than of individual persons or roles. These included the extent to which supervisions are expected to show personal interest in an nurture their subordinates the closeness or general (universalistic standards), and the extent to which organization members are expected to strive strenuously for achievement and advancement".<sup>35</sup>

Various definitions of norms are given above. For the purpose of this study a norm is "a rule or a standard that governs our conduct in the social situations in which we participate. It is a societal expectations. It is a standard to

which we are expected to conform whether we actually to do so or not".

Regarding the normative referents of both the officials and the non-officials it is interesting to see whether the officials are flexible, cooperative with the public, goal oriented, development oriented, etc. For example, if the officials are respectful towards superiors, autonomous to their status, career-bound, rigid the realisation of developmental goals will suffer. Certain normative standards of behaviours were asked to officials to understand their actual behaviour. Again, the study is also interested to examine the officials' orientation towards official rules and procedures.

Similarly, the non-officials on the other hand, are expected to be oriented towards democratic norms. It means that they are expected to be guided by the universalistic criteria of decision making rather than to be swayed by parochial and sectoral considerations. So the study analyses the non-officials' orientation and commitment to democratic norms.

This chapter deals only with the officials' norms and role which have certain implications for 'systemic goal gratification'.<sup>35</sup> Norms have only two components : officials' practice of certain standard behaviour and officials' orientation to rules. Regarding officials' role-perception the study is concerned with (1) subser-vient-role; (2) autonomous-role; (3) expedient-role.

On the basis of an earlier work done by P.K.Samajdar,<sup>37</sup> on 'District Administration', certain normative standards of behaviour for officials are selected for the study. These are : to follow correct procedures even if the development programmes are delayed; to criticize the views of superiors if they do not suit the local conditions; to carry out the instructions of superiors to the best of one's ability; to keep personal consideration out of official matter; to maintain personal contact with the public; to work in the best interest of the department; to value the opinion of subordinate even if it is at variance with its own; to make quick decision; to cooperate with officials of other departments; to protect one's personal career. Officials were asked to state to what extent they actually practise these normative standard of behaviours. There are three categories of responses provided on each item. These are 'Very Much Practised', 'Practised' and 'Not Practised'. Officials' responses on the actual practice of certain normative standards of behaviours are presented in the table 5.1.

Table 5.1

Officials' Responses on the Actual Practice of Certain Standard Behaviours

Items	Very Much Practised	Practised	Not Practised
1. To follow correct procedure even if the development programme are delayed	T 16 (19.75)	18 (22.22)	47 (58.02)
	D 4 (19.04)	5 (23.80)	12 (57.14)
	B 9 (20.00)	10 (22.22)	26 (57.77)
	V 3 (20.00)	3 (20.00)	9 (60.00)

Contd ...

Table 5.1 (Contd...)

Items		Very Much Practised	Practised	Not Practised
2. To criticize the views of superiors if they do not suit the local conditions	T	5 (6.17)	10 (12.34)	66 (81.48)
	D	1 (4.76)	3 (14.28)	17 (30.95)
	B	3 (6.66)	5 (13.33)	37 (82.22)
	V	1 (6.66)	2 (13.33)	12 (80.00)
3. To carry out the instructions of superiors to the best of one's ability	T	25 (30.86)	34 (41.94)	22 (27.16)
	D	6 (28.57)	9 (42.85)	6 (28.57)
	B	14 (31.11)	19 (42.22)	12 (26.66)
	V	5 (33.33)	6 (40.00)	4 (26.66)
4. To keep personal considerations out of official matter	T	17 (20.98)	19 (23.45)	45 (55.55)
	D	4 (19.04)	5 (23.80)	12 (57.14)
	B	9 (20.00)	10 (22.22)	26 (57.55)
	V	4 (26.66)	4 (26.66)	7 (45.66)
5. To maintain personal contact with the public	T	26 (32.09)	25 (30.86)	30 (37.03)
	D	7 (33.33)	6 (28.57)	3 (38.09)
	B	15 (33.33)	14 (31.11)	16 (35.55)
	V	4 (26.66)	5 (33.33)	6 (40.00)
6. To work in the best interest of the department	T	24 (29.62)	30 (37.03)	27 (33.33)
	D	6 (28.57)	3 (38.09)	7 (33.33)
	B	14 (31.11)	16 (35.55)	15 (33.33)
	V	4 (26.66)	6 (40.00)	5 (33.33)
7. To value the opinion of subordinate even if it is at variance with its own	T	3 (3.70)	9 (11.11)	69 (35.18)
	D	1 (4.76)	2 (9.52)	18 (85.77)
	B	1 (2.22)	6 (13.33)	38 (84.44)
	V	1 (6.66)	1 (6.66)	13 (86.66)

Table 5.1 (Contd...)

Items		Very Much Practised	Practised	Not Practised
8. To make quick decision	T	11 (13.58)	16 (19.75)	54 (66.66)
	D	3 (14.28)	4 (19.04)	14 (56.66)
	B	6 (13.33)	9 (20.00)	30 (66.66)
	V	2 (13.33)	3 (20.00)	10 (56.66)
9. To cooperate with officials of other departments	T	14 (17.28)	17 (20.98)	50 (61.72)
	D	4 (19.04)	4 (19.04)	13 (51.90)
	B	8 (17.77)	10 (22.22)	27 (60.00)
	V	2 (13.33)	3 (20.00)	10 (56.66)
10. To protect one's personal career	T	36 (44.44)	42 (51.35)	3 (3.70)
	D	10 (47.51)	10 (47.61)	1 (4.76)
	B	20 (44.44)	24 (53.33)	1 (2.22)
	V	6 (40.00)	3 (53.33)	1 (6.66)

Totals may not be exactly cent percent (100) because of roundings.  
 Figures in the parenthesis indicate the percentages.

T : Total; D : District; B : Block; V : Village

Total number of Officials : 31  
 District Officials : 21  
 Block Officials : 45  
 Village Officials : 15

Table 5.1 shows that the officials at different tiers of the Panchayati Raj institutions responded more or less in the same way. If we rank the items on the basis of combining the first two

response categories, namely - 'Very Much Practised' and 'Practised' from high to low preferences, it is seen that the responses will rank as follows : to protect one's personal career (96.29 percent); to carry out the instruction of superiors to the best of one's ability (72.33 percent); to work in the best interest of the department (66.65%); to maintain personal contact with the public (62.95%); to keep personal consideration out of official matter (44.43%); to follow correct procedure even if development programmes are delayed (41.97%); to cooperate with officials of other department (38.26%); to make quick decision (33.33%); to criticize the views of superiors if they do not suit the local conditions (13.51); to value the opinion of subordinates even if it is at variance with its own (14.31%). Data relating to officials' actual practice on certain standard of behaviour suggest that they are career-bound and hierarchic. This is also confirmed when it is found in Table 5.2 that they are rule-oriented. Rules and regulations are an important parameters to protect one's personal career and to show due deference to their superiors.

Now we will turn over to the officials' orientation to the rules and regulations. Information collected on the officials' orientation to rules is presented in the table 5.2.

Table 5.2  
Officials' Orientation to Rules

Items		Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
1. Observance of all rules amounts to a lot of paper work but very little concrete work	T	45 (55.55)	8 (9.87)	9 (11.11)	19 (23.45)
	D	11 (52.38)	2 (9.52)	2 (9.52)	6 (23.57)
	B	25 (55.55)	5 (11.11)	5 (11.11)	10 (22.22)
	V	9 (60.00)	1 (5.66)	2 (13.33)	3 (20.00)
2. Administrative procedures offer enough scope for officials to exercise his personal initiative	T	10 (12.34)	15 (13.51)	23 (23.39)	33 (40.74)
	D	3 (14.28)	4 (19.40)	6 (23.57)	3 (33.09)
	B	5 (11.11)	8 (17.77)	13 (23.33)	19 (42.22)
	V	2 (13.33)	3 (20.00)	4 (26.66)	6 (33.33)
3. If an official can solve problem by ignoring the rules he should not hesitate to ignore them	T	32 (39.50)	10 (12.34)	27 (33.33)	12 (16.04)
	D	3 (33.09)	2 (9.52)	7 (33.33)	4 (19.04)
	B	18 (40.00)	6 (13.33)	15 (33.33)	6 (13.33)
	V	6 (40.00)	2 (13.33)	5 (33.33)	2 (13.33)
4. Rules should be strictly observed even if they delay the implementation of development programme	T	13 (16.04)	23 (23.39)	13 (22.22)	27 (33.33)
	D	3 (14.28)	5 (23.57)	5 (23.30)	7 (33.33)
	B	7 (15.55)	13 (23.33)	10 (22.44)	15 (33.33)
	V	3 (20.00)	4 (26.66)	3 (20.00)	5 (33.33)

Totals may not be exactly cent percent (100) because of rounding.

Keys : Total Number of Officials : 81; T : Total  
 District Officials : 21; D : District  
 Block Officials : 45; B : Block  
 Village Officials : 15; V : Village

Figures in the parenthesis indicate the percentages.

Combining two response categories 'Strongly Agree' and 'Agree', it is observed from the Table 5.2 that 62.25% of district officials agree with the statement "Observance of all rules amounts to a lot of paper work but very little concrete work". 66.66% of block officials and village officials also agree with the statement. This indicates that the officials at the three levels recognise rules and regulations as the prime guide to administrative behaviour and this in turn, may slow down the process of achievement. "Heavy paper-work left little time for field work, particularly for the extension staff where about one third to one fourth of the working time of extension staff is spent in various kinds of reports".<sup>33</sup> 67.13% of district officials, 68.83% of block officials and 66.66% of village officials disagree with the statement "Administrative procedures offer enough scope for officials to exercise his personal initiative". The reason perhaps may be the rigidity of rules and regulations. To do any job in their personal initiative would amount to entering into other's areas of jurisdiction. 47.61% of district officials, 53.33% of officials both at the block and the village level agree with the statement "If an official can solve problems by ignoring the rules he should not hesitate to ignore them". These views are relatively strong among the block and the village officials as compared to district officials. The reason may be that the block and village officials are directly involved in implementing programmes. This indicates

that half of the officials (51.34) want to ignore rules if this helps to solve the problem. This may happen when there are insufficient administrative rules and regulations regarding the solution of problems or the existing rules and regulations are silent or confusing or the officials may find that the observance of existing rules and regulations may either lead them to make wrong decisions or not to make any decision. About half of the officials do not want to ignore rules and regulations. These views are relatively strong among the district officials (52.37) as compared to block and village officials (45.66 & 46.66). These views indicate slow process of development of norms among the officials which help them in taking decisions in situations where the postponement of decision is a general rule because of either absence of existing rules and regulations or confusions in the existing rules and regulations or instructions. 42.35% of district officials, 44.43% of block officials and 46.66% of village officials agree with the statement "rules should be strictly observed even if they delay the implementation of development programmes". This suggests that the officials give primacy to rules and regulations because it may on the one hand, help to protect themselves against unreasonable pressures and influences and on the other hand, against politicisation of administration. Therefore, it is clear that the officials consider strictly adherence of rules and regulations as their prime concern even though it involves heavy paper-work and slowing down of developmental goals.

5.1.1 Role Perception :

An attempt is made here to find out whether the officials feel obliged to carry out decisions made by elected bodies or they do not accept obligations. Normally the officials carry out those decisions which are proper, just, and legitimate. Let us examine this from the table 5.3.

Table 5.3

Officials' Role Perception : Subservience to Political Leaders

Items		Must do	May or May not do	Must not do
1. Carry out decisions made by non-officials at the three levels.	T	64 (79.01)	12 (14.31)	5 (6.17)
	D	16 (76.19)	4 (8.89)	1 (6.56)
	B	36 (30.00)	6 (13.33)	3 (6.66)
	V	12 (30.00)	2 (13.33)	1 (6.66)
2. Carry out decisions made by non-officials which in your opinion may be unsound	T	12 (14.31)	12 (14.31)	57 (70.37)
	D	4 (8.38)	4 (3.33)	13 (61.90)
	B	6 (13.33)	6 (13.33)	33 (73.33)
	V	2 (13.33)	2 (13.33)	11 (73.33)
3. Take actions against a subordinate official on the insistence of non-officials	T	0 (0.00)	20 (24.69)	61 (75.30)
	D	0 (0.00)	5 (23.80)	16 (76.19)
	B	0 (0.00)	11 (24.44)	34 (75.55)
	V	0 (0.00)	4 (26.66)	11 (73.33)
4. Modify a policy decision on the advice of non-officials	T	3 (3.70)	24 (29.62)	54 (66.66)
	D	1 (4.75)	6 (28.57)	14 (66.66)
	B	2 (4.44)	13 (28.33)	30 (66.66)
	V	0 (0.00)	5 (33.33)	10 (66.66)

Keys : Totals may not be exactly cent percent (100) because of rounding.

T = Total; D = District; B = Block; V = Village.

Figures in the parenthesis indicate percentages.

Total Number of officials = 31

District " = 21

Block " = 45

Village " = 15

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It is seen from the Table 5.3 that 79.01 percent of officials feel obliged to carry out decisions made by non-officials.

Officials are more or less unanimous on the items containing officials' role-perception. However, on the question of officials' role-perception in the second item 70.37 percent of officials do not want to take action against subordinate officials on the insistence of non-officials.

It is interesting to note that 56.56 percent of officials refused to modify a policy decision on the advice of non-officials. The requirements of education and training for the officials may be considered one of the reasons for not modifying a policy decision on the advice of non-officials. The officials are trained in such a way that they do not take any risk or initiative. They follow stereotyped administrative procedures in their actions. The requirements of education also encourage the officials to protect their own position and status.

However 14.31 percent of officials are obliged to execute unsound decisions and 3.70 percent of officials are in favour of modifying policy decision on the advice of non-officials. The surprising features of the officials do not go to weaken our observation that the officials' negative orientation to representative politics is strong but may be considered as the beginning of a trend, however small, of subservience to non-officials. Moreover, the responses belonging to the category of 'May' or 'May Not' also indicate that at least a smaller number of officials are willing to accept the advice of non-officials and perform their role as subservient to non-officials.

Table 5.4

Officials' Role-Perception : Safeguarding Administrative Autonomy

Items		Must do	May or May not do	Must not do
1. Give some considerations to feelings of local groups in undertaking new programmes	T	17(20.98)	24(29.62)	40(49.38)
	D	4(19.04)	7(33.33)	10(47.61)
	B	9(20.00)	14(31.11)	22(48.33)
	V	4(26.66)	3(20.00)	3(53.33)
2. Occasionally compromise with local pressure groups	T	3(9.37)	24(29.62)	49(60.49)
	D	2(9.52)	5(23.57)	13(51.90)
	B	5(11.11)	13(28.83)	27(60.00)
	V	1(6.66)	5(33.33)	9(60.00)
3. Modify policy in the face of insistent popular demand	T	33(40.77)	32(39.50)	16(19.75)
	D	3(33.09)	3(33.09)	5(23.30)
	B	19(42.22)	13(40.00)	3(17.77)
	V	6(40.00)	6(40.00)	3(20.00)

(Contd..)

Table 5.4 (Contd...)

Items		Must do	May or May not do	Must not do
4. Turn down the demands of non-officials when it is against government policy even if it is in the interest of the district	T	30 (37.03)	30 (37.03)	21 (25.92)
	D	3 (33.09)	8 (38.09)	5 (23.80)
	B	17 (37.77)	17 (37.77)	11 (24.44)
	V	5 (33.33)	5 (33.33)	5 (33.33)
5. Take definite stand against any unreasonable demand which may come from local leaders	T	74 (91.36)	0 (0.00)	7 (8.64)
	D	19 (90.74)	0 (0.00)	2 (9.52)
	B	41 (91.11)	0 (0.00)	4 (3.38)
	V	14 (93.33)	0 (0.00)	1 (5.56)

Total may not be exactly 100 (percent) because of rounding.

T = Total; D = District; B = Block; V = Village

Figures in the parenthesis indicate the percentages

Total No. of officials = 31

District " = 21

Block " = 45

Village " = 15

As is seen from the Table 5.4 20.93% of officials feel it obligatory to consider the feelings of local groups in undertaking new programmes. Officials at the village level as compared to the officials at the block and district, are obliged to consider the feelings of local groups in undertaking new programmes. Only 9.37% of officials consider that it is their duty to compromise with local pressure groups occasionally. This probably indicates that they do not want the interference of local pressure groups

in the process of implementation of policies and programmes. What is surprising is that 40.74% of officials are in favour of modifying policy in the face of insistent popular demand. This impression indicates that officials are narrowly responsive to the popular demands and expectations. Again, 37.03% of officials are in favour of turning down the demands of non-officials when it is against government policy even if it is in the interest of the district. It reflects from the responses indicated above that the officials lack consensus among themselves. All these probably suggest that the Panchayati Raj administrative system is shrouded with old bureaucratic tradition. It is yet to orient itself towards representative politics in which bureaucracy is required to be sensitive to the popular needs and demands. However, 91.35% of officials stated that they are prepared to take definite stand against any unreasonable demands of local leaders. All these facts suggest that the administrative system is still not responsive to the expectations and demands of non-officials whose two main functions are articulation and aggregation of the local community.

Now we will turn to the officials' role-perception on the attitude to expediency in relation to power. So far our data show that the officials are rule-bound, conscious of their autonomous status, not responsive to the demands of non-officials, etc. So these orientation and behaviours encourage the officials to perform their role without hindrance and hence, they want to secure the goodwill and the support of powerful leaders or group of leaders. Information collected on the officials' attitude to expediency in

relation to power is given in the table 5.5.

Table 5.5

Officials' Attitude to Expediency in Relation to Power

Items		Must do	May or May not do	Must not do
1. Maintain good relations with those local leaders who have backing of the people	T	57 (70.37)	21 (25.92)	3 (3.70)
	D	15 (71.42)	5 (23.80)	1 (4.76)
	B	32 (71.11)	12 (26.66)	1 (2.22)
	V	10 (66.66)	4 (26.66)	1 (6.66)
2. Keep a powerful faction of local leaders satisfied if this helps implementation of Govt. programmes	T	40 (49.39)	27 (33.33)	14 (17.28)
	D	10 (47.61)	7 (33.33)	4 (19.04)
	B	23 (51.11)	15 (33.33)	7 (15.55)
	V	7 (46.66)	5 (33.33)	3 (20.00)
3. Consider favourably proposals of leaders enjoying public support even if these proposals are not sound	T	4 (4.93)	15 (18.51)	62 (76.54)
	D	1 (4.76)	4 (19.04)	16 (76.19)
	B	2 (4.44)	3 (17.77)	35 (77.77)
	V	1 (6.66)	3 (20.00)	11 (73.33)

Keys : Total may not be exactly 100 (percent) because of rounding.

Figures in the parenthesis indicate the percentages

Total no. of officials = 31

District " = 21

Block " = 45

Village " = 15

T = Total; D = District; B = Block; V = Village.

It is observed from the table 5.5 that 70.37% of officials feel obliged to maintain good relations with those local leaders who have

the backing of the people. 49.38 percent of officials want to keep a powerful faction of local leaders satisfied if this helps implementation of government programmes. This, however, does not go to show that the officials at the three levels will go all the way to maintain favourable relationship with political leaders. Inasmuch as it is expected that the officials find it difficult to change their attitudes and adapt themselves with the changing needs of the society they find out ways and means to protect themselves as well as to perform their role without hindrance and these considerations lead them to secure the support and the goodwill of the powerful leaders or group of leaders of course without sacrificing their self respect and independence and also without damaging their image. Only 4.93 percent of officials favourably consider the proposals of non-officials enjoying public support even if these proposals are not sound. In this case the insignificant number of officials seek the support of non-officials at the cost of their independence, self respect and image.

#### 5.1.2 General Observations :

The findings of the study suggest that the officials are prone towards administrative rules and regulations. 44.43% of officials at the three levels agree that 'Rules should be strictly observed even if the development programmes are delayed'. Moreover, 54.13 percent of officials at the three levels disagree with the statement, 'Administrative procedures offer enough scope

for officials to exercise his personal initiative'. This indicates that the officials think rules and regulations as general guide of administrative behaviour. Only a few officials at the three levels are subservient to non-officials. Officials are in favour of protecting their autonomous status and role. 91.36 percent of officials agree to take steps against unreasonable demands of leaders. 70.37% of officials maintain good relations with the local leaders in order to safeguard their autonomy. So the officials do not strongly admire for the introduction of the representative politics in the three levels of Panchayati Raj institutions. The changing structure and environment of Panchayati Raj institutions and the absence of any change of professional role to meet the changing needs led the officials to feel insecure and as a result, they seek the support of local leaders.

## 5.2 Norms and Role-Perceptions of the Non-Officials :

This section is concerned with the Non-Officials' norms and role-perceptions which have a direct impact upon the relation between the officials and the non-officials at the three levels of Panchayati Raj institutions. It was pointed out earlier that the relationship assumes an important dimension at these levels because it is here that the officials and the non-officials come into contact with one another in the process of formulation and implementation of policies. For instance, in the matter of

policy-formulation, officials collect and supply relevant information regarding the areas marked for development. The officials are obliged to provide information regarding policy-making for the non-officials. They also give advice to non-officials and make them aware of the consequences of their actions. The officials, in the course of providing information which constitute the bases for policy decisions, subtly influence the behaviour of non-officials either in the way of suppressing or providing excess information. The non-officials, on the other hand, bring certain issues before the officials for the welfare of the local community, and for this, they create pressure upon the officials. The officials sometimes submit to the pressures created by the non-officials and modify or change the implementation strategy.

Prior to independence, the non-officials constituted an insignificant part of the administrative system. The officials were empowered to manage the public affairs, maintain law and order and collect revenues; moreover, they were accountable for their actions to the administrative superiors. The non-officials during the British period distrusted the officials. They had also played an agitational role against the officials' actions which were detrimental to the interest of the people.

The new Panchayati Raj institutions which were made operative in West Bengal in 1973, have completely changed the role of the non-officials. The non-officials as the elected members of the

Panchayati Raj institutions, have to adopt policies in conformity with the goals of the Panchayat organisation. The non-officials, while formulating policies, try to keep in their minds the election pledges and in this way satisfy the needs and demands of the people within the Panchayat. The non-officials have to keep the Panchayat administrative system responsive to popular needs and aspirations for the realisation of systemic-goals. Again, the non-officials as the elected representatives of their constituencies, sometimes have to mobilise support in favour of their programmes in order to strengthen the bases of representative politics. As in the Parliamentary and State Assembly elections, so in the Panchayat elections, the leaders are elected on party basis from their respective constituencies. The non-officials, in order to satisfy the people of their own constituencies, have to articulate their needs and get their demands fulfilled. On some occasions, the non-officials have to fulfill the demands of the voters through their party supporters in order to seek re-election or to be in office in future and in these contexts they are concerned with narrow and partisan interest. In addition to these roles, the non-officials have to consider the bureaucratic structure as an important agency for the solution of problems of the people to the extent it adheres to systemic values.

It is now important to see whether the values of the non-officials conform to the values of Panchayat organisational set up or not. Generally, if there is great variation between the

organisational values and the values of the non-officials, the realisation of organisational goal is bound to suffer. "The higher the degree of non-congruence, the greater the possibility that tension and conflict will characterise the political process in the system".<sup>39</sup> In order to find out the dominant norms that guide the behaviour of the non-officials, this study seeks to analyse the (1) non-officials' concept of the representative-role; (2) the non-officials' orientation towards democratic ideals; (3) the non-officials' orientation towards the general interest as against their narrow and partisan interests. Let us now examine the data from the table mentioned below.

Table 5.6

Non-Officials' Reponse Towards Democratic Ideals

Items		Agree	Partly Agree	Disagree
1. Even if it delays development of the country adherence to democratic principles should be insisted upon	T	71 (34.52)	6 (7.14)	7 (3.33)
	D	14 (37.50)	1 (6.25)	1 (6.25)
	B	39 (34.78)	3 (6.25)	4 (3.69)
	V	18 (31.31)	2 (9.09)	2 (9.09)
2. If some misguided sections of the people do not listen to persuasion they should be suppressed in the interest of the country	T	72 (85.70)	6 (7.14)	6 (7.14)
	D	14 (37.50)	1 (6.25)	1 (6.25)
	B	40 (36.95)	3 (6.52)	3 (6.52)
	V	18 (31.81)	2 (9.09)	2 (9.09)

Keys : Figures in the parenthesis indicate the percentages.  
 Totals may not be exactly cent percent (100) because of rounding.

Total no. of officials	34;	T : Total;
District	" 16;	D : District;
Block	" 46;	B : Block;
Village	" 22;	V : Village.

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Table 5.5 presents that the two items apparently deal with contradictory situations. The first item states that democratic principles should be insisted upon even if the developments are delayed. The second item states that the misguided sections of the people should be suppressed in order to expedite developmental activities. The first item is concerned with adherence to democratic principles in respect of planned development. The second item is concerned with undemocratic ideals for expediting developmental activities. If the non-officials agree on the two items it can be said that there is inconsistency and contradiction. Our data point out that more than seventy percent of non-officials agree on the two items and hence, reveals that there is a fair amount of inconsistency and contradiction.

Now we will turn to the non-officials' perception of representative-role. In this context, it is found that there are three models described by the social scientists regarding the behaviour of the representative. These models are : (1) the Classical Rational Man model which conceives of the proposed courses of action against an objective standard of public

interest; (2) the Social Class Interest model that defines the role of the representative in terms of a person who acts according to dictates of norms and values acquired by virtue of class status; (3) Pressure Politics model which typifies the representative as passively moving according to the mechanical combinations of forces which happen to impinge upon him.<sup>40</sup>

In order to ascertain the dominant norms in the behaviour of the representative the Social Class interest model are not relevant for the study. The relevant models for the purpose of this study are : the Classical Rational Man model and the Pressure Politics model. The function and role-attributes of the representative can be understood from the relationship that he has with the people. The representative's perception of his role depends upon what he thinks such a relationship should ideally be. Different types of role-conceptions may emerge from the character of such relationship. These are : (1) There are some representatives who act independently of the wishes, opinions, aspirations, of the people they claim to represent. They do what they think best. They do not allow other's interference in their role-performance. This role-conception indicates that the actions of the representatives are influenced here not by externally determined standards of behaviour but by their own behaviours. Therefore, they themselves remain responsible for their actions.

(2) There are others who pay due deference to other's views and wishes. They take into consideration the views of people in

their role-performance by the people of their representative areas. Their standards of behaviours are externally determined and do not allow their convictions and judgements to interfere in their role-performance.

Variations may occur in each of these two types of representative-role conception. The non-officials may perform their role independently of their constituents and may perceive that there will arise a gap between what the people of the constituency think and what they think. The perception of this wide gap develops certain confusion in the minds of the non-officials. They think that their decisions will not receive wide acceptance from the people. These uncertainties and apprehensions constrained them in taking any decisions. There are others who think in terms of representative-autonomy and go to the extent of applying pressures on people in taking action. They come forward to mould public opinion in favour of their programmes.

In the second type of representative role-conception variations may also occur. The non-officials may allow the interference of people's wishes in their role-performance to the extent it conforms to the values of themselves. In other words, the non-officials accommodate the wishes and interest of the people of their constituents in their role-performances if it does not contravene with their own convictions. To put it differently, the non-officials will critically examine the wishes and demands of their constituents prior to implementing those.

These different role-conceptions discussed above are considered relevant for understanding the relationship between the officials and the non-officials. Now let us examine the data relating to non-officials' conception of the role of a representative from the table 5.7.

Table 5.7

Non-Officials' Responses to Representative-Roles

Items		Agree	Partly Agree	Disagree
1. A political leader should only implement the demand and expectations of the people and not act independently	T	47(55.95)	12(14.29)	25(29.76)
	D	9(56.25)	2(12.50)	5(31.25)
	B	26(56.52)	6(13.04)	14(30.43)
	V	12(54.54)	4(18.18)	6(27.27)
2. A leader is obliged to follow the wishes of the community even if he thinks the people are mistaken	T	37(44.04)	7(8.33)	40(47.61)
	D	7(43.75)	1(6.25)	3(50.00)
	B	20(43.47)	4(8.69)	22(47.32)
	V	10(45.45)	2(9.09)	10(45.45)
3. The most important thing for a leader is to follow his conviction even if this is different from what the constituency expects	T	60(71.42)	15(17.35)	9(10.71)
	D	11(68.95)	3(13.75)	2(12.50)
	B	33(71.73)	3(17.39)	5(10.36)
	V	16(72.72)	4(18.18)	2(9.09)

(Contd...)

Table 5.7 (Contd...)

4. If the leader is himself convinced of what is the best course of action he must try to implement even though he has to use some pressure on the people	T	74(83.09)	6(7.14)	4(4.76)
	D	14(37.50)	1(6.25)	1(5.25)
	B	40(36.95)	4(3.69)	2(4.34)
	V	20(90.09)	1(4.54)	1(4.54)

Keys : Totals may not be exactly cent percent (100) because of rounding.

Figures in the parenthesis indicate the percentages.

Total number of non-officials : 84; T : Total

District " : 16; D : District

Block " : 46; B : Block

Village " : 22; V : Village

From the table 6.7 it is observed that the non-officials are inclined towards maintaining autonomous role-perception. It is also true from the operational point of view. Almost 56 percent of non-officials agree with the statement that a political leader should only implement the demands and expectations of the people and not act independently. This indicates that they accept the demands and wishes of their constituents so long as it conforms to the conscience and values of the non-officials. But almost 30 percent of the non-officials do not feel obliged to implement the demands and expectations of their constituents and 14.00 percent agree only partially. But in view of the fact that almost 30 percent of the non-officials do not feel obliged to implement the demands and expectations of their constituents and

14.23 percent agree only partly, subservient orientation of the non-officials to the people of their constituents does not seem to be that strong. 44.04 percent of non-officials agree that they are obliged to follow the wishes of the community even if they think that the people are mistaken. But 47.61 percent of non-officials do not express agreement with the statement. This indicates that there is no agreement among the non-officials on this statement. This probably suggests that the non-officials' orientation towards subservient-role conception are not strong.

The last two items containing non-officials' responses to representative-roles point out more significantly that the non-officials consistently hold opinion in favour of representative autonomy. 71.42 percent of non-officials agree that the most important thing for a leader is to follow his conviction even if this is different from what the constituency expects. Again, 33.09 percent of non-officials agree in the active sense that "if the leader is himself convinced of what is the best course of action he must try to implement even though he has to use some pressure on the people". This indicates that the non-officials not only maintains the role of representative autonomy but also preserves autonomy by applying pressures on people if they themselves convinced of what is the best course of action.

From the above, it is observed that there is a marked tendency among the non-officials' responses towards the role of representative autonomy. If the favourable responses are categorised and

ranked from high to low preferences it will be seen that the non-officials indicate highest preference for 'autonomous-active role-perception of the representative'. Again, the non-officials are consistent in their behaviour on the item pertaining to the autonomous role-conception of representative. The behaviour of the non-officials is also influenced by their partisan versus universal identity. Generally speaking, if the non-official is more partisan in his attitude and behaviour he will try to take those actions where the interest of his party is involved. He will always try to promote the interest of his party than the interest of the people as a whole. He will always favour his party-men even if they are not in the correct path. He gives priority to the interest of his party even though it is not good of the community. Information collected on the non-officials' orientation towards partisan versus universal identity is presented in the table 5.8.

Table 5.8

Normative Referents of Non-Officials : Partisan Vs. Universal Identity

Items		Agree	Partly Agree	Disagree	Total
1. Use of unscrupulous means by a politician may sometimes be forgiven if they lead to the strengthening of his party	T	3(3.57)	6(7.14)	75(39.29)	
	D	1(6.25)	1(6.25)	14(37.50)	
	B	1(2.17)	3(6.25)	42(91.30)	
	V	1(4.54)	2(9.09)	19(86.36)	

(Contd...)

Table 5.8 (Contd...)

Items		Agree	Partly Agree	Disagree	Total
2. A political leader should always support his party-men even if their actions are sometimes unjustified	T	7(8.33)	4(4.76)	73(36.90)	
	D	1(6.25)	1(6.25)	14(37.50)	
	B	4(3.69)	2(4.34)	40(36.95)	
	V	2(9.09)	1(4.54)	19(36.36)	
3. A political leader should refrain from making proposals that may cause division in the party even if these proposals are important for the community	T	33(39.28)	12(14.28)	39(46.42)	
	D	6(37.50)	3(13.75)	7(43.75)	
	B	18(39.13)	6(13.04)	22(47.82)	
	V	9(40.90)	3(13.63)	10(45.45)	

Total may not be exactly cent percent (100) because of rounding.

Total Number of Non-Officials : 34; T = Total  
 Total " District Non-Officials : 16; D = District  
 " " Block " " : 46; B = Block  
 " " Village " " : 22; V = Village

Figures in the parenthesis indicate the percentages.

It is observed from the 5.8 that the non-officials had no excess of partisan attitude rather they were against supporting party-interest. In regard to the first statement only 3.57 percent of non-officials agree that the use of unscrupulous means may sometimes be forgiven if they lead to the strengthening of his party. But 99.23 percent of non-officials do not support this statement. This observation is again confirmed by the second statement. 36.90 percent of non-officials do not express agreement with the statement that "a political leader should always

support his partymen even if their actions are at times unjustified". It can be assumed then that the non-officials are not intensely partisan, though they belong to a party and elected on the party basis. They want to make a distinction between what is good and what is bad for the community. In other words the non-officials consider the partisan interest if it upholds the sanctity of the rule of the game.

It seems that the non-officials consider consensus in the party to be more important. If the non-officials lack consensus in the party it will affect the prospect of political stability. The data here suggest that in spite of the existence of several kinds of groups 39.28 percent of non-officials at all levels expressed their opinion against the proposal that may cause division in the party even if these proposals are important for the community. But 46.42 percent of non-officials disagree with the statement. This indicates that there is a low degree of agreement among the non-officials on the statement. 46.42 percent of non-officials are in favour of creating division in the party. 39.28 percent of non-officials and only partially 14.28 percent of non-officials do not consider the interest of the community important causing division in the party. This indicates that the non-officials though in a meagre sense value the strength of consensus in the party.

The discussions above suggest that the non-officials at all levels are not intensely partisan. Moreover, they do not want to

support his party-men on the issue which is unjust. So they do not take any action-programme to further the interest of their party in any unfair manner. They are sincere, obliged in obeying the sanctity of the rule of the game. Furthermore, 39.23 percent of non-officials do not want division in the party even when the proposal is important to protect the interest of the community.

Now we come to the analysis of the non-officials' role -perception in relation to administration which has an impact upon the relationship between the officials and the non-officials at the three levels of Panchayati Raj institutions. The non-officials' role-perception may be classified into two categories :

- (1) they may help the administration in taking best course of action. They may advise and cooperate with the officials against unreasonable demands of the public.
- (2) They may intervene when they think that it is necessary to protect the administration from ignoring public demands and in this context the officials be guided by their advice in implementing development programmes. The non-officials may also intervene when it is necessary to prevent the officials from crossing their role-boundaries and to maintain the right procedure or conduct if these are violated. The non-officials may seek intervention of higher authorities or they may take recourse to agitational-interventionist role. Let us now analyse non-officials' responses in this regard.

Table 5.9

Non-Officials' Role-Perception

Items	Must do	May or May not do	Must not do	Total
1. Advise officials about the best course of action	T 74(88.09)	7(8.33)	3(3.57)	
	D 14(37.50)	1(6.25)	1(6.25)	
	B 40(86.95)	5(10.36)	1(2.17)	
	V 20(90.90)	1(4.54)	1(4.54)	
2. Cooperate with officials in carrying out Government programmes	T 80(95.23)	4(4.76)	0(0.00)	
	D 15(93.75)	1(6.25)	0(0.00)	
	B 44(95.65)	2(4.54)	0(0.00)	
	V 21(95.45)	1(4.54)	0(0.00)	
3. Protect officials from public demands and unreasonable criticisms	T 78(92.85)	3(3.57)	3(3.57)	
	D 14(37.50)	1(6.25)	1(6.25)	
	B 44(95.65)	1(2.17)	1(2.17)	
	V 20(90.90)	1(4.54)	1(4.54)	

Totals may not be exactly cent percent (100) because of rounding. Figures in the parenthesis indicate the percentages.

T : Total; D : District; B : Block; V : Village

Total number of Non-Officials : 34

District " : 16

Block " : 46

Village " : 22

It is observed from the table 5.9 that more than 85 percent of non-officials at the three levels advise officials about the best course of action. More than 90 percent of the non-officials

cooperate with officials in carrying out government programmes. 37.50 percent, 95.65 percent and 90.90 percent of the non-officials respectively at the district, block and village levels feel obliged to protect officials from unjust demands and unreasonable criticisms.

It is found that there is a high degree of agreement among the non-officials on the issues of advising, cooperating and protecting the officials. This suggests that the non-officials help the administration actively for the realisation of organisational-goal. Moreover, they help the administration to the extent it does not cross the role-boundaries and ignore public demands which is just.

Information collected on the non-officials' responses about their constructive-interventionist role is presented in the table 5.10.

Table 5.10

Non-officials' Role-Perception : Constructive and Interventionist

Items	Must do	May or May not do	Must not do	Total
1. Strictly pursue a "hands off" policy vis-a-vis administration	T 28(33.33)	15(17.85)	41(48.30)	
	D 5(31.25)	3(18.75)	8(50.00)	
	B 15(32.60)	8(17.39)	23(50.00)	
	V 8(36.36)	4(18.18)	10(45.45)	

(Contd...)

Table 5.10 (Contd...)

Items	Must do	May or May not do	Must not do	Total
2. Keep a watch on administrative performance	T 75 (90.47)	4 (4.76)	4 (4.76)	
	D 14 (37.50)	1 (5.25)	1 (5.25)	
	B 42 (91.90)	2 (4.34)	2 (4.34)	
	V 20 (90.90)	1 (4.54)	1 (4.54)	
3. Bring to public notice all faults or flaws of administration	T 53 (75.00)	7 (8.33)	14 (16.66)	
	D 12 (75.00)	1 (5.25)	3 (18.75)	
	B 35 (76.08)	4 (8.69)	7 (15.21)	
	V 16 (72.72)	2 (9.09)	4 (18.18)	
4. Insist that officials be guided in their action by advice given by politicians	T 25 (29.76)	15 (17.85)	44 (52.38)	
	D 5 (31.25)	3 (13.75)	8 (50.00)	
	B 13 (28.26)	3 (13.79)	25 (54.34)	
	V 7 (31.31)	4 (18.18)	11 (50.00)	

Totals may not be exactly cent percent (100) because of rounding.

Total Number of Non-officials = 34

Total District " " = 16

" Block " " = 46

" Village " " = 22

Figures in the parenthesis indicate the percentages.

It is observed from the table that 31.25 percent and 32.60 percent of non-officials at the district and block level respectively feel obligatory to strictly pursue a 'hands off' policy vis-a-vis administration. But at the village level a comparatively higher percentage of non-officials consider it

obligatory though ultimately there is a low degree of agreement on this statement. However, almost half of the non-officials do not feel obliged to pursue 'hands off' policy in relation to administration. The absence of a high degree of agreement indicate that the non-officials do not perform only definite role of their role-sectors. About 90 percent of the non-officials at all levels feel it obligatory to keep a watch on administrative performance. This indicates that they always want to put a check on administration. This is also observed by the fact that about 75 percent of non-officials feel obliged to bring to public notice faults or flaws of administration. The reason may that the non-officials try to make the administration free from any evils of the system. If there is any ill in the system then it should be removed. Exposing the ill of the administrative system to the public they want to eradicate the ill of the system. In other words, in this way they try to link public opinion on these issues. Thus it seems that their unbiased and constructive role helps to grow public opinion in favour of the issues and strengthens the democratic political system. Again, to expose ill of the administrative system before the public and to create public opinion on these issues is one of constructive-legitimate functions of the non-officials. So the non-officials' responses to attract public notice to the ill of the administrative system indicate their willingness to play a constructive-interventionist role.

This is also evident from the fact that 52.38 percent of officials admit that they must not insist that the officials be guided in their action by the advice of the non-officials although 29.75 percent of non-officials insist on this. This indicates that more than half of the respondents do not want to make administration subservient to politics. The reason may be that if the non-officials get an upperhand in policy implementation they may not think it improper to exploit the administrative structure for furthering partisan interest for a temporary period. Moreover, it can not be expected that all the non-officials will be guided by legal-rational criteria of decision-making and committed to the orientation of efficiency in goal-gratification.

Let us now examine the non-officials' responses relating to agitational and interventionist role from the table 5.11.

Table 5.11

Non-Officials' Agitational & Interventionist role

Items	Must do	May or May not do	Must not do	Total
1. Interference when officials ignore peoples' demands	T 69 (32.14)	10 (11.90)	5 (5.95)	
	D 13 (31.25)	2 (12.50)	1 (6.25)	
	B 38 (32.50)	5 (10.36)	3 (6.25)	
	V 13 (31.81)	3 (13.63)	1 (4.54)	

(Contd....)

Table 5.11 (Contd...)

Items		Must do	May or May not do	Must not do	Total
2. Seek intervention by political lead- ers at higher levels for correcting administrative ills at the district/ block/village	T	65 (77.38)	12 (14.28)	7 (8.33)	
	D	12 (75.00)	2 (12.50)	2 (12.50)	
	B	35 (78.26)	7 (15.21)	4 (8.69)	
	V	18 (31.31)	3 (13.63)	1 (4.54)	
3. Support agitation against unjust government action	T	68 (30.95)	10 (11.90)	6 (7.14)	
	D	13 (31.25)	2 (12.50)	1 (6.25)	
	B	37 (30.43)	6 (13.04)	3 (6.52)	
	V	18 (31.31)	2 (9.09)	2 (9.09)	
4. Prevent officials from taking impro- per action by agitation etc.	T	63 (30.95)	8 (9.52)	8 (9.52)	
	D	13 (31.25)	2 (12.25)	1 (6.25)	
	B	37 (30.43)	4 (8.69)	5 (10.36)	
	V	18 (31.31)	2 (9.09)	2 (9.09)	

Keys : Figure in the parenthesis indicate the percentages.

Totals may not be exactly cent percent (100) because of rounding.

Total No. of Non-Officials : 34; District Non-Officials : 16; Block Non-Officials : 46; Village Non-Officials : 22.

T = Total; D = District; B = Block; V = Village.

Table 5.11 presents that there is no differences among the non-officials at the three levels in regard to the statement, 'interference when officials ignore peoples' demands'. 32.14 percent of non-officials at the three levels feel obliged to

intervene. More than 75 percent of non-officials feel it obligatory to seek intervention by non-officials at higher levels for removing administrative ills at the district, block and the village levels. 30.95 percent of non-officials at the three levels support agitation against unjust government action. Finally, 30.95 percent of non-officials at the three levels feel it obligatory to take resort to agitation in order to prevent officials from taking improper action.

Summing up the discussion on non-officials' normative referents and role-conception, it can be said that the non-officials were autonomous to their representative-role. They were not prepared to be guided by party's unjust demand rather they wanted to play a cooperative role with the officials. They viewed their role in terms of constructive-intervention, in order to remove the administrative ills of the system. Finally, they played an agitational-interventionist role against unjust and improper action of the officials.

NOTES & REFERENCES TO CHAPTER V

1. Lindzey, Gardner and Elliot Aronson (ed.), "The Handbook of Social Psychology", Volume One, Amerind Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1963, p.489.

In this book the authors also mentioned that "the conceptual bridge between social structure and role behaviour is the concept of role-expectations. Role-expectations are comprised of the rights and privileges, the duties and obligations, of any occupant of a social position in relation to persons occupying other positions in the social structure". p.497.

2. Katz, Daniel and Robert L.Kahn, "The Social psychology of Organizations", New Delhi, Willey Eastern Private Ltd., 1970, p.37.

"A role consists of one or more recurrent activities out of a total pattern of interdependent activities which in combination produce the organizational output. Role, unless otherwise qualified, will refer to a set of such activities within a single subsystem of the organisation and within a single office. An office (location) is a point in organisation space defined by one or more roles (and thereby one or more activities) intended for performance by a single individual. It locates the individual in relation to his fellows with respect to the job to be done and the giving and taking of orders". p.179.

3. Hans Raj Bhatia, "Elements of Social Psychology", Somaya Publications Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, p.131.

According to Kimball Young, as cited in Bhatia's 'Elements of Social Psychology' "In every society and every group each member has some function or activity with which he is associated and which carries with it some degree of power or prestige. What the individual does or performs is his role".

Sergent as cited in Bhatia's 'Elements of Social Psychology' defines it as "a pattern or type of social behaviour which seems situationally appropriate to him in terms of the demands and expectations of those in his group".

E.E.Jones and H.B.Gerard as cited in Bhatia's 'Elements of Social Psychology' combine the two aspects of role and define roles as "shared norms concerning the behaviour of certain persons in certain settings".

"The role-expectations have a normative or evaluative character. The occupant of a social position ought to do particular things in specified ways, and ought to hold certain beliefs instead of others. In role enactment an individual is expected to behave in particular ways in the sense that others believe he ought to do so. The 'ought' aspect of role expectations implies that approval or disapproval by other people is contingent on the nature and quality of one's role enactment. In short, role expectations are specifications for adherence in group norms". Lindzey and Aronson, "The Handbook of Social Psychology", p.501.

Role is defined as "the expectations that persons hold common toward any person who falls in a particular category by virtue of his position in social system", Secord, Paul F and Carl W.Backman, "Social Psychology", New York, McGraw Hill Book Co. 1964, p.457.

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5. Bertrand, Alvin L, "An Introduction to the Theory and Methods; Basic Sociology", Division of Meredith Publishing Company, New York, 1957, p.144.

"Group-members have in their minds certain sets of organized meanings and values called roles. It is these roles they direct toward others and it is roles, rather than separate expectations, that are internalized. Once a role is internalized an individual can direct his behaviour in accordance with it. Strictly speaking, a role does not refer to acted-out behaviour but to ideas in the mind". Rose, Caroline B, "Sociology the Study of Man in Society, Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc. Columbus Ohio, 1965, pp.44-45.

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3. Ibid., p.329.
9. Ibid., p.330.
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24. Ibid., p.45.
25. Heady, Ferrel, op.cit., p.359.

26. Appleby, Paul H, cited in Heady, Ferrel, Public Administration : A Comparative Perspective, op.cit., p.359.
  27. Kochanek, "The Indian Political System", op.cit., p.102.✓
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  31. Bierstedt, Robert, "The Social Order", Bombay, Tata McGraw Hill, 1970, p.209.
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