

## **Nehru's Idea on Geo-Politics: Reflections on the Indo-China Relations**

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### **I. Introduction**

India since its independence had thrice been in full-fledged war and once it has been in a major border skirmish with its neighboring state. However, among these incidents one which entirely changed the face and vision of Indian foreign policy its outlook about the geo-political considerations was the war of 1965 also famous as the Sino-Indian War. There have been various interpretations and myth centering round the war to some it was a blow to the Nehru's concept regarding national security and his foreign policy that that probably never really recovered from where as to some scholars this war opened a new paradigm of real-politics in India's foreign policy. However, the actual evaluation and diagnosis of the war for a long point of time and even till today remains still a dark mystery its reason remains for the unavailability of the records for the period to the public. A major difficulty one comes across, while dealing with the subject and the relevant events of the period is that though there is a wealth of details, yet most of the people concerned were unable to put it together into a comprehensive hypothesis. This has resulted in anecdotal accounts and mutually contradictory versions which one comes across while understanding the war of 1965. Where on the one hand scholars like Neville Maxwell and his books 'India's China War' takes a pro-Chinese stand and blames India for the historic debacle; on the other hand, strategist scholars like Lt-Gen. Kaul's 'The Untold Story' and Mullik's 'Chinese Betrayal' gives a completely diametrically opposite stand point of the war. The process of understanding is further complicated by the fact that most of the authors had been either relying on their own memories or the memories of others who had given them the information. The present paper is an attempt to move deeper in the analysis of the events and try to find out what compulsions and obligations were playing in the policy making of Nehru which led India to move ahead in the War and in find to really look out

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what policy Beijing adopted that ultimately led to the so called Himalayan Blunder.

## **II. Birth of the Relations and the War:**

In 1947 China, wracked by civil war, was in what appeared to be death throes and no conceivable threat to anyone. The Indian Government made its initial assessment of the possibility and potential of a threat from China and found those to be minimal, if not non-existent. First, there were geographic and topographical factors, the great mountain chains which lay between the two neighbours and appeared to make large-scale troop movements impractical. More important, the leadership of the Indian Government - which is to say, Jawaharlal Nehru - had for years proclaimed that the unshakable friendship between India and China would be the key to both their futures and therefore Asia's, even the world's. In his remarkable speech during the debate on foreign affairs in the Lok Sabha on 30 September 1954, Nehru said: 'Leaving these three big countries, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and China, aside for the moment, look at the world. There are many advanced highly cultured countries. But if you peep in the future and nothing goes wrong - wars and the like - the obvious fourth country is India.'<sup>2</sup> He added that 'Countries like China and India, once they get rid of foreign dominations and internally disunity, inevitably become strong; there is nothing to stop them.'<sup>3</sup> Nehru believed that being the third and fourth powerful nations of the world India and China the amicable cooperation between the two would make them the champion of world peace and human progress.<sup>4</sup> However the new leaders in Beijing were charier, viewing India through their Marxist prism as a potentially hostile bourgeois state. But in the Indian political perspective war with China was deemed unthinkable and through the 1950s New Delhi's defense planning and expenditure expressed that confidence. Moreover, by the early 1950s, the Indian government, which is to say Nehru and his officials, had shaped and adopted a policy whose implementation would make armed conflict with China not only 'thinkable' but inevitable. April 24<sup>th</sup> 1954 the signing of

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<sup>2</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal; *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches; September 1946-April 1961*; (New Delhi; 1961) pp 305

<sup>3</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal; *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches; September 1946-April 1961*; (New Delhi; 1961) pp 305

<sup>4</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal; *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches; September 1946-April 1961*; (New Delhi; 1961) pp 307

the *Panchsheel Agreement*<sup>5</sup> in Beijing between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and an Indian government delegation gave a solid start to this relationship of mutual trust. This agreement along with some fruitful 1950s border negotiation, marked the zenith of India-China relations, celebrated by the slogan *Hindi-Chini-bhai-bhai* (India and China are brothers).

But despite such cordial and friendly beginning the course of relationship between the two Asian neighbours took a complete different turn in the subsequent days to come. With the advent of Cold War, China began to see India as threatening its perceived leadership of the Third World. Controversies soon emerged regarding the Indo-Tibetan border and the Sino-Indian border in general. Two areas were of particular concern: the eastern sector (145,000km<sup>2</sup>), which the Indians called the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and which the Chinese viewed as South Tibet; and the western sector (34,000km<sup>2</sup>), which included most prominently the Aksai Chin plateau, bordering Kashmir, Xinjiang and Tibet. Despite solving the problem through diplomatic negotiations and talks Nehru government decided upon the opposite approach. India would through its own research determine the appropriate alignments of the Sino-Indian borders extend its administration to make those good on the ground and then refuse to negotiate the result. Barring the inconceivable - that Beijing would allow India to impose China's borders unilaterally and annex territory at will - Nehru's policy thus willed conflict without foreseeing it. Through the 1950s, that policy generated friction along the borders and so bred and steadily increased distrust, growing into hostility, between the neighbours. By 1958 Beijing was urgently calling for a stand-still agreement to prevent patrol clashes and negotiations to agree boundary alignments. India refused any standstill agreement, since such would be an impediment to intended advances and insisted that there was nothing to negotiate, the Sino-Indian borders being already settled on the alignments claimed by India, through the historical process.<sup>6</sup> Meanwhile in March of 1959, following an uprising against Chinese rule in Tibet, Dalai Lama fleeing to India created

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<sup>5</sup>Panchasheel embodied five core principles - respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence which formally envisioned "peaceful coexistence"

<sup>6</sup>Appadorai, A & Ranjan, M.S; *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*; (New Delhi; South Asian Publishers Pvt Ltd.; 1985) pp 119-121

significant tensions between the two nations.<sup>7</sup> Some analysts have stated that, during the late 50's the US Central Intelligence Agency and Chiang Kai-shek's agents financed and trained Tibetan rebels within the Indian Territory.<sup>8</sup> Things turned out to be worse when again in the year 1956, the Communist Party of China promulgated its first official map of China and the surrounding area, rejecting the McMahon line (first demarcated by the British colonial authorities in 1914) showing large swathes of Indian Territory within the borders of China. The Indian government reacted angrily, accusing the CCP of arbitrarily extending China's borders. This became personified by ongoing border disputes between the two sides, beginning in 1959 with Chinese incursions into Ladakh and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA).<sup>9</sup> In due course, these tensions between the two led to Sino-Indo war on October 1962, which ultimately resulted in Indian defeat and large stretches of its territory being occupied by Chinese forces till date. On October 12, 1962 Nehru proclaimed India's intention to drive the Chinese out of areas India claimed. That bravado had by then been forced upon him by the public expectations which his charges of 'Chinese aggression' had aroused, but Beijing took it as in effect a declaration of war. The 1962 war almost brought an end to the much expected diplomatic and economic relations between Beijing and New Delhi; instead bolstering the positions and relations between Pakistan and China in the region. India-China relations remain bitter during this entire period due to frequent border skirmishes - such as at Nathula on the Sikkim- Tibet border in September 1967 and at Somdurong Chu in 1987.

### **III. Exploring the Reasons and the Rational of the War and Justifying Nehru's policy:**

Before analysing Nehru's forward policy and this stand on the Sino India war it's very much essential to have an insight of Nehru's perceptions regarding India's national security problem. Various group of scholar have

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<sup>7</sup>ArshedTanwir; *China Factor: In India Pakistan Relations: A Review*; Journal of Politics and Governance; Vol-3; No-4; October-December 2014; pp 106

<sup>8</sup> John W. Garver, *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2001), p.60-61

<sup>9</sup>Achary, Alka; 2008; *China & India: Politics of Incremental Engagement*; (Delhi; HarAnand Publication Pvt Ltd.; India;) pp.31-34; and Lamb, Alastair, *The McMahon line: a study in the relations between India, China and Tibet, 1904 to 1914*, (London, OUP; 1966); pp 42

a variety of mixed and diametrically opposite version of the reasons of war. Basically if looked in details one can find out that there are two major views regarding the war one group which believes that it was the initiation of Nehru and his officials Menon whose blunt decision actually instigated the war. Whereas on the other side the group believes that it was the Chinese betrayal after the signing of the PanchSheel and its rejection and dejection of the historical border lines between India and China considerably was the real factor that led the Himalayan war. The paper is keenly interested in actually dealing with the arguments of the first group of scholars blaming Nehru and its officials. Actually there has been a strong misconception about the actual chronological interpretation of the facts and data of the war that had led to the development of a story which makes the Nehru group an instigator in the war. However, there were various factors which were running in the entire scenarios that actually led Nehru to undertake the policy that he adopted in the war to counter the Chinese aggression. Some of the issues are discussed below.

Firstly, it was Nehru Gandhian outlook and liberal Fabian internationalist outlook which conditioned him against contemplating the use of force as an instrument of policy in international relations. As early as 1934, while discussing Gandhi's article 'Doctrine of the Sword,' Nehru clarified his own position in his autobiography- 'we are moved by these arguments, but for us and the National Congress as a whole the non-violent method was not and could not be, a religion or an unchangeable creed or dogma. It could only be a policy and a method promising certain results, and by these results it would have to be finally judged.'<sup>10</sup> Nehru's disking to the use of violence and war was further more reinforced in his speech in October 1940 the Congress Working Committee when he said that 'Free India would, therefore, through all her weight in favour of world disarmament and should herself be prepared to give a lead in this to the world.'<sup>11</sup> But however the gory trail of partition and the following princely state dispute, the war of 1948 and the adamant and audacious approach and outlook of Beijing with regard to the border issue do led Nehru to change its course of action yet although he was never in the favour of using arms as means of resolving disputes. It was evident when on August 11, 1951 Nehru declared: 'I have ruled out war as a measure for the easing of Indo-Pakistan relations, but I

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<sup>10</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal; *An Autobiography*; (London; 1936) pp 84

<sup>11</sup> Prasad Bimal; *The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy*; (Calcutta, 1946); pp 185

cannot rule it out independently or unilaterally.’ In the same speech he said ‘Trenches are dug for the people who expect an invasion. Whatever happens, India is not going to be invaded. Even if there is war, do you imagine that we will wait idly to be invaded? Certainly not’<sup>12</sup> Although Beijing and New Delhi signed the famous PanchSheel but yet India’s deputy Prime minister Sardar Patel knew that the Chinese commitment to the treaty would hardly ensure a safe border, peace and friendly relations with its neighbours. Initially refuting the stand of Patel on calling China as a ‘potential enemy’ in the context of China’s liberation of Tibet, Nehru’s idealism however was broken when Delhi received a rude reply, criticizing India as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet.<sup>13</sup> It was evident when on July 4, 1954 in his letter to the Pradesh Congress Committee Nehru wrote: ‘how can we put faith in such declaration (Panchasheel)? In international affairs we can never be dead certain and the friends of today might be enemies of tomorrow.’<sup>14</sup> Thus a man of idealism and believer of non-violence and world peace through brotherhood and cooperation on the whole, Nehru’s attitude must be summed up as one who wanted to avoid war, who abhorred it, yet who would not hesitate to fight to defend his country’s interest. Once in a speech in Rajya Sabha on 1959 exposing Government of India’s policy of making adequate preparation to meet the Chinese challenge Nehru spoke: ‘From the very first day, the problem about our frontier was before us. The question was whether we should raise it in an acute form at that stage. We decided not to... we felt that we should hold by our position and that the lapse of the time and events would confirm it, and by the time the challenge came, we should be in a much stronger position to face it. It is not as if it was not thought about.’<sup>15</sup> Although in any situations, the options available determined the action to be taken; in such a situation in which India was economically and military weak, the best course was to follow a friendly

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<sup>12</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal; *India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches; Vol II*; (New Delhi; 1967) pp 195

<sup>13</sup> Brigadier J.P Dalvi; *Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962*; (Bombay; 1969); pp 489-495

<sup>14</sup> *LokSabh Debates*; Vol. VII, Pt II, 29 September 1954; col. 3683 as quoted in Appadorai, A & Ranjan, M.S; *India’s Foreign Policy and Relations*; (New Delhi; South Asian Publishers Pvt Ltd.; 1985) pp 116

<sup>15</sup> *Rajya Sabha Debates*; Vol. XXVII, cols., 1983-1985; pp 248-249 as quoted in Appadorai, A & Ranjan, M.S; *India’s Foreign Policy and Relations*; (New Delhi; South Asian Publishers Pvt Ltd.; 1985) pp 116

approach which would enable the country, at any rate, to postpone the Chinese challenge but India believing on the ideals of the world peace and hoping for getting the support of the western powers resorted the forward policy toward the Chinese aggression which reflected a shift from Gandhian attitude to a western liberal statesmen outlook.

The second factor which led India to move ahead for the war was its *Hindi-Chini-bhai-bhai* myth, which was responsible for the inadequate preparedness against China. Despite considering China as its very cordial neighbour, the communist mentality of Chinese rulers always looks India with suspicion. At the same time continuous publication of the border maps by China showing a complete dejection of the Mc Mohan Line, NEFA and the illegal occupation of Aksai Chin region further reinforced the faith and believe of Nehru about the duality of Chinese authorities in Beijing. This ultimately led to the change in the attitude of Delhi towards China. Scholars like Mullik in his book 'My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal' and Frank Moraes in his book 'Witness to an Era' has rightly showed that since from the beginning Nehru had his reservations with China. In 1952 when he went as a member of Cultural delegate to China, Nehru in his briefing said: 'Never forget that the basic challenge in South East Asia is between India and China. That challenge runs along the spines of Asia. Therefore, in your talks with the Chinese keep it in mind. Never let the Chinese patronize you.'<sup>16</sup> In the similar tone when again in 1954 at the time of his Peaking visit Nehru categorically states that 'some day or other these two Asian giants, where bound to tread on each other' corns and come into conflict, and that would be a calamity for Asia. That was an eventuality which we should all strive hard to avert.'<sup>17</sup> Moreover meanwhile by this point of time the border issue has already been generated and the authorities and Beijing indirectly showed their keen interest in sabotaging New Delhi. Thus against this background it was somewhat amusing to hear the assertions of various people that Nehru did not countenance any thesis regarding the likely Chinese hostility towards this country.

Thirdly, the policy of Non Alignment which was in the making at that time had two important components; to stay clear of the cold war politics and attempt to promote decolonization. This was not an easy option since

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<sup>16</sup>Moraes, Frank; *Witness To An Era*;(London, 1973); pp 220-221

<sup>17</sup>Mankekar, D.R.,*The Guilty Men of 1962, 110*(Bombay, 1968) Nanda 8 pp 107

following the Cominform line laid down by Andrei Zhadnov, it was decided in the Calcutta conference of the Asian communist parties early I 1948 to initiate insurgencies in various countries of Asia; in Philippines, Malaya, Indonesia, Burma and India. This was also the time when India was experiencing considerable difficulties in regard to Kashmir, integration of Princely states in the Indian Union and the rehabilitation of millions of refugees in the aftermath of partition. Moreover, there was also considerable pressure in the country for India to join the western block. Faced with the hostility of China , the cold and indifferent attitude of the Soviet Union and the hostility of the United States and the western bloc which supported Pakistan, no Prime Minister of India could have remained indifferent to the consideration of national security; and certainly not Jawaharlal Nehru In 1945, replying to Gandhi, who insisted on the 'Hind Swaraj' model, for the for the future India; Nehru said: 'The question of independence and protection from foreign aggression, both political and economic, has also to be considered in this context. I do not think it is possible for India to be really independent unless she is technically advanced country.'<sup>18</sup> Therefore to justify Nehru's action in the wake of the border dispute, it appears that he have decided to adopt a policy which would contribute to India's national security by bringing about a mutually countervailing balance of forces in this part of the world.

The fourth factor which justifying Nehru's standpoint in the 1962 war was however a bit utopian in nature. Nehru despite being aware of the caliber and potential of the neighboring nation hardly considered it as a serious threat. It was evident since when in 1944 Nehru once had come to the conclusion that in the post-war world there would be only four great power; the United sates, the Soviet Union, China and India, Britain would be a fifth power if it manage to salvage part in its crumbling empire.<sup>19</sup> Thus it was evident that since long before the war Nehru had the vision that China and India are in equal footing and it also became relevant when despite being warned and advised by his official not to undermine China Nehru went ahead with his Forward Policy in the LOC during the war. Nehru had

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<sup>18</sup> Norman Dorothy eds; *Nehru, The First Sixty Years*; (Bombay; 1965); Vol. II ; pp 179

<sup>19</sup> Munshi K.M; *Bhawan's Journal*; February 26, 1968; Vol-XIII as quoted in B.R.Nanda's edited book *India's Foreign Policy : The Nehru Years*; (Vikas Publishing House; New Delhi; 1976) pp 109

decided, well before this and irrevocably as it turned out, that India would never agree to negotiate its borders. And the Longju clash was not accidental but reflected the Indian approach to borders that was later to be named, from the British imperial vocabulary, the “forward policy”, involving here the unilateral amendment of McMahon’s alignment in accordance with Indian convenience. India was treating the territory it claimed as ipso facto (by reason of that claim) Indian territory. By mid-1961, the forward policy of using force, non-violently, to extrude the Chinese from the tracts of territory claimed by India, was beginning to bite in the Western border sector. Indian patrols, conducted now by the Army rather than armed police, were challenging Chinese posts and probing for positions from which to dominate and sever their lines of communication. The unyielding granite in India’s diplomatic refusal to negotiate had been personally felt by Zhou in his abortive summit meeting with Nehru in April 1960. It now began to occur to the Chinese leadership that India might deliberately be making itself an enemy of China – and even be bent on provoking hostilities. Nehru’s going ahead with this policy was based on assumptions. He was of the belief that China would not oppose Indian patrols and border outposts out of fear of an India backed by both the United States of America and Soviet Union. The summer of 1962 saw only intensification of that situation. Beijing increased the minatory tone and heat of its diplomatic warnings and made its threats of counterforce more open. Delhi’s replies continued to be insouciant and intransigent, Nehru being confident in the assurances from his Intelligence chief and courtier generals that the Chinese were bluffing and would never dare hit back at India. For their part too the Chinese were uncertain about India’s motives and ultimate intention.<sup>20</sup>

Fifth Factor which led the historic debacle of India in the war was the ill-prepared army and the overconfidence that got reflected in the Indian officials toward China. The official Indian version of the war states that: ‘In the years 1959-1960, LT General S P PThorat, GOC-in-C Eastern Command, had made an appreciation about the magnitude of Chinese threat to Indian borders in the Eastern Sector and had made projections about his requirements to meet that threat. But the Army HQ as well as the Defence Minister paid little heed to Gen Thorat’s appreciation. It was not even

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<sup>20</sup> Maxwell, Neville; *China’s India War: How the Chinese Saw the Conflict*; (May 2011)

brought to the notice of the Prime Minister.<sup>21</sup> To top it all, irresponsible and jingoistic statements by the political leadership precipitated matters and gave a handle to the Chinese to attack Indian posts in 'self-defense'. Then Home Minister of India, Lal Bahadur Shastri, declared on February 4, 1962 that "If the Chinese will not vacate the areas occupied by her, India will have to repeat what she did in Goa. She will certainly drive out the Chinese forces. Nehru also gave a statement on October 12, 1962, that he had 'ordered the Indian Army to throw the Chinese out.'<sup>22</sup> Driving out the Chinese forces was an optimistic declaration by the political leadership but the ground situation was different. Indian Army was logistically weak and ill-prepared to take on the superior Chinese forces that were well trained in mountain warfare. According to military analysts, a series of factors led to Indian Army's debacle. The Indian intelligence apparatus in the Himalayas was lacking. They had no clear indication of Chinese strength, mobility and tactics, especially the human wave attacks, states a report. Roderick MacFarquhar, in his book *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Vol. 3: The Coming of the Cataclysm 1961-1966*, blamed the Indian intelligence community for not properly analysing Chinese domestic and diplomatic developments. According to him, they relied on CIA briefings, newspaper account and dispatches from the Indian embassy in Beijing about China's economic crisis, its split with the Soviet Union, and the Taiwan crisis. Depending on these reports, Indian political, army and intelligence leadership concluded that China will not react aggressively to India's 'Forward Policy'.

## **V. Concluding Observations:**

The war of 1962 although is regarded as one of the darkest era of the Indian Foreign policy is however regarded by scholar as a game changer for the Indian foreign policy and its military preparedness. The war brought a new paradigm of realism and real-politic in the Indian scenario. This was evident with the developments that we noticed in the post war era. The following issues clearly justifies the point of my analysis and also proved

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<sup>21</sup><http://www.quora.com/How-responsible-was-Nehru-for-the-Indian-defeat-in-the-Sino-Indian-Indo-Chinese-War> (Tuesday, August, 14 2007 (New Delhi)

<sup>22</sup>1962 India China War, Role of Indian political and military leadership; <http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/threads/1962-india-china-war-role-of-indian-political-and-military-leadership.10061/>; (May 7; 2010)

the fact that how the Himalayan debacle proved as a lesson for a developing country like India.

- **Evident of Lal BahdurSashtri, Indira Gandhi and the 1965, 1971, 1999 War:** Lal BahdurSashtri and Indira Gandhi who succeeded Nehru, was a strong epitome of such outcome. Successors of Nehru gave a strong impetus to the Indian foreign policy, the war of 1965, 1971, India's strong point onTashkent andSimla Agreement and the bravado victory of Operation Vijay in 1999 clearly implicated the fact that how the defeat in the war of 1962 actually proved to be a boon of realism for India and its policymakers in domestic and international stages.
- **Within 10 Years of China becoming Nuclear power India turned into a Nuclear Nation:** Despite getting defeated in the war and followed by two other major wars India maintained a strong zeal of empowering its arsenal and soon within ten years of the war its came up as a nuclear nation joining the nuke club.
- **Strengthened the defense:** Nehru had a vision that India-the champion of non-violence and peace in the world must not resort to focus more on arms and weapons and this proved to a strong miscalculation for its part in the area of 1962. The post war period his successor gave strong thrust for upholding the development of such issue and as such there was seen a great rise in strengthening the defense of the nation.They realized the very fact of statecraft and warfare of Kautilya and did not undermine their potential threats. This was evident in the rise of the defense budget that showed a tremendous rise in the graph gradually after every financial year.

FINANCIAL YEAR	ACTUALS / ALLOCATION	PERCENTAGE INCREASE OVER EARLIER YEAR
1996-1997	29505.08	9.86
1997-1998	35277.99	19.57
1998-1999	39897.58	13.10
1999-2000	47070.63	17.98
2000-2001 (RE)	54460.91	15.70

2001-2002 (BE)	62000.00	13.84
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Source: India's Military Budget

(<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/budget.htm>)

- **Adoption of the attitude of No-First Use attitude:** The forward policy adopted by Nehru and Menon the war of 1962 was regarded by some scholars especially NevilleMaxwell as one of the major causes of the defeat. Later when Henderson and Brooks came up with the reports italso validities the same grounds which finally made the Indian policy makes rethink about their views. India after turning up into a nuke nation made it clear about its policy of 'No-First Use' in the defense relations and military outlook. This policy was not only a mere compulsion of the internationalmilieu but rather in find one can see how the war, the 'forward policy' and India's adamant and unplanned attitude in the war shaped its policy.
- **Shedding off the essence of NAM and facing the tune of Reality:**After getting defeated in the war and realizing the very diplomacy of the world powers, the successors of Nehru maintained a very strong essence in creating apathy toward the super power in genera and USSR in particular the Friendship Agreement with USSR and the bilateral and multilateral level summits and talks with US clearly validated the fact that how the post 1965 India was on the mood of moving ahead keeping a strong balance with the two super blocks and also maintaining the very essence of the NAM. Its deep interest in regional solidarity and cooperation got reinforced with the creation of SAARC which untimely led India to adopt a more global and acceptable image not only regionally but even globally. Its foreign policy started focusing more on diplomatic terms rather than on discreet ways of resolving disputes with its neighbours may it be Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh or Nepal. The Himalayan blunder although where on one hand brought a wrath of debacle in the Indian foreign policy but on the other its far reaching consequence and lesson proved tobe as the most promising and fruitful development for turning the foreignpolicy of a developing nation like from a unplanned pillar to a strong edifice.

Moreover, for a Prime Minster of a rising nation being a staunch believer of non-violence an advocate of universal brotherhood and peace when the

question of maintenance of national integrity and security and the dilemma of nation building arrive decision are bound to get diverted. Moreover, facing with the predicament of a neighboring nation who gets supported by the strong west and is always in the mode to settle its scores with India, the international pressure to leave up the policy of non-alignment and an undemarcated and unacceptable border issue problem with an super power in making nation, Nehru's decisions and action in the war was very much rational and cogent.