

Chapter- III

The Idea of the State:

The Third World Perspective with Reference to India

Introduction

The idea of the state as a moderate political organization was known to all societies of all times. Although history does have witness of stateless society, modern societies exist with the state. The modern state came into being in the European landscape only after the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. In this context Ashis Nandy (2003: 2) observes:

Though a contractual element between an apparatus of power and the general public had already entered civic space by the thirteenth century in parts of Europe, the treaty of Westphalia gave formal institutional status to the emerging concept of a state in Europe. But even then the concept would never have attained the power it latter did if the French Revolution had not underwritten it by linking the state or statehood, with nationalism.

The idea of the state that emerged through such historical processes possessed some distinguishing features. First, the new concept assumed a closer fit between the realities of ethnicity, nation and state. Secondly, it gave a more central role to the state in the society than the ancient regimes had done. Thirdly, it redefined the state as the harbinger and main instrument of social change, which in the European concept meant being the trigger for and protector of modern institutions associated with industrial capitalism. Finally, the concept of the nation state not only marginalized all other concepts of the state in Europe but also began to enter the interstices of public consciousness all over Asia, South America and Africa - the Third World. Thus, in most of the world today any reference to state usually means the modern nation state. All political arrangements and all state systems are now judged by the extent to which they serve, the needs of, or confirm to, the idea of nation state (ibid: 3, 5). The formation of modern state involved a kind of 'caging' process since it meant that, 'social interaction networks that started out largely as transnational or local in scope

became increasingly regulated at the national level' (Weiss 2001:11). Michael Mann argues that by nationalizing much of social life, nation states thus provided a sort of 'social caging' device that existed along side and gave structure to transnational networks. Taking into account a larger time frame contrasting pre-industrial and modern states, he says:

The 'Power' of the modern state principally concerns not "state elites" exercising power over society but a tightening state-society relation, caging social relations over the national rather than local, regional or transnational terrain, thus politicizing and geo-politicizing far more social life than the earlier states (Mann 1993: 61).

Thus the state became a focal or coordinating point for social activity. But this coordinating role of the state in social life has been put to question by the closing decades of the twentieth century. According to Linda Weiss,

The key political issue today is whether that state-society relation is dissolving, paving the way for global forms of government. Globalization theorists cite a number of tendencies-- largely economic, but also to some extent environmental, social and military – held to be displacing the domestic power of the nation state. But, much depends on whether, in general, the new transnationalism – in contrast to earlier forms – remains embedded in the system of nation states, or – as globalists would claim – bypasses it altogether (Weiss 2001:11).

However, many scholars argue that, a gain in power for non-state actors is not necessarily at the expense of state power. 'Rather than 'escaping' the territorial cage, much new transnational activity appears to be sustained by it. The state and the international system have come to provide not merely the stimulus for global competition and global co-operation, but also the structure that both enables and encourages it' (ibid: 12). In other words, the state persists.

The persistence of the state

Modern state has grown increasingly important in all societies and in every aspect of social life – politics, economics, ideology and maintenance of order. Given this increasing importance of the state, Martin Carnoy highlights the increasingly central role of the state in social and economic transformation.

The state appears to hold the key to economic development, to social security, to individual liberty and through increasing weapons "sophistication", to life and death itself. To understand politics in today's world economic system, then, is to understand the national state and to understand the national state, *in the context of the system* is to understand a society's fundamental dynamic (Carnoy 1984:3 emphasis original).

The role of the state in socio-economic transformation has remained significant in course of the capitalist development in the West. The state's role in developed capitalist societies, while remaining significant, was limited in the nineteenth century. This was a reaction to the strong mercantilist state that preceded the industrial revolution and as a result of great dynamism of private capitalism. However, writers like Allan Cochrane argues that although the new industrialists opposed the continued existence of 'irrelevant' and 'unnecessary' state activities, they did not meant a weak and powerless state.

Certainly, they turned a jaundiced eye on the state machine with a view to making its operation more rational and more efficient but they still had important work for state institutions to perform. In the nineteenth century, the state became a better organized, centralized and coherent force (Cochrane 1986: 71).

In the opening decade of the twenty-first century, it is argued that the sovereign state is unlikely to remain the main source of political authority in future. The globalists of different sheds seem to argue on the decreasing economic, political and cultural importance of nation states. The central role of the state, it is said, is being hollowed out from above as well as from below (Schuurman 2000:12). From the above the increasing importance of international political organizations which interfere politically and militarily in particular states relegated the state to weakening position. The national state is hollowed out from below by the growing phenomenon of local government, which seems to have become the example of what 'good governance' should be about. Globalization theorists point to a number of tendencies – largely economic, but also to some extent environmental, social and military – held to be displacing the domestic power of the nation state. All these have encouraged writers like Jens Bartelson to observe that the nation state is 'challenged by new forms of authority and community which transcended the inherited divide between the domestic and the international, and it will therefore ultimately be replaced by new forms of political life which know nothing of this distinction and what once followed from it. As a result of the corrosive effect of globalization, the state will eventually enjoy a fate similar to that of the tribe, the city republic, and the empire (Bartelson 2001:1).

The theory and the practice of modern industrial states in a globalized world clearly reveal that *laissez faire* doctrine (the motivating ideology behind the process of globalization) has been a pure rhetoric and every state has regulated the market and individual and collective social interest has always been the concern of the theorists of political economy and actual praxis of the Western states. Referring to Britain, where the 'rolling back of the state' thesis appeared in early 1980s, Andrew Gamble and Tony Wright (2004:1 emphasis added) unequivocally assert:

The state has not expanded very much, but neither has it contracted. Despite, the rhetoric of 'rolling back of the state' in the Thatcher years and New Right dreams of a return to the minimal state of Victorian times, the actual size of the state has remained remarkably constant. *It proved much easier to return public utilities from state ownership to private ownership than it did to make real inroads into the core spending programmes of modern state, and therefore to reduce the over all tax burden.*

Deepak Nayar (1997) finds it naive to write off nation-states as important players in the globalization game despite the fact that, in the imperial phase of globalization, nation state played a more important (economic and political) role than currently. According to him nation states still remain important in political and strategic terms. Linda Weiss, on the other hand, has found that the emerging regional arrangements have enhanced state capacity.

Thus rather than relinquishing their distinctive goals and identity, states may use collaborative power arrangements to create more real control over their economies (and indeed over) security. As such, it seems unfruitful to view these new coalitions through the lens of conventional win-lose logic. Viewed thus one sees merely gambits for shedding or dividing sovereignty. In many cases, however, such power sharing arrangements offer states greater infrastructural reach over their external environment; hence, in this sense an organizational means for building or enhancing state capacity (Weiss 2001:16).

It can be argued, therefore, that in spite of claims that the state shall cease the capacity to claim political authority, there is no sign of the state being eclipsed in favour of non-state entities determining decisions regarding the public goods. Prakash Sarangi (1996:1) argues in this context:

It is true that, the nature and role of the contemporary state are vastly different from what these used to be in the wake of the emergence of modern nation states. Some large states have disintegrated into smaller ones. Occasionally, smaller states have integrated into a large federation. Several issues traditionally decided by the states have become transnational in character. In spite of these developments, identity, the legitimacy and functioning of a political community are still determined by the characteristics of its state system. The role of the state has grown during last few decades instead of getting reduced.

This persistence of state may be ascribed to its association with the whole code of civilizational behaviour. Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol highlight the fact that states share historical persistence and continuity with many of the societal structures with which they are intertwined. 'That is, basic patterns of state organization and of the relationships of states to social groups often persist even through major periods of crisis and attempted reorganization or reorientation of state activities' (Evans *et al* 1985: 348). Indeed, state activity directly or indirectly influences a country's economic activity: 'Who produces, what is produced, how much is produced, how goods are distributed etc. The over all thrust of the developmental activity is determined by the state's policies. The law and order machinery, like the police or military, has expanded rapidly over the years. The state also sets the agendas of the countries value system through the media and the school system (Sarangi 1996: 2). Andrew Vincent argues that, the idea of statehood is wide enough and this involves the essence of state persistence.

Statehood not only represents a set of institutions but also a body of attitudes, practices and codes of behaviour, in short, civility, which associate correctly with civilization. Certainly there are some 'State sceptics' from various ideological positions, who have tried to formulate ideas on stateless societies, but on a more immediate level the state subtly penetrates much of our lives. We begin and end our lives within its confines. Thus, as well as being a complex concept; it is also an every day reality that we cannot ignore (Vincent 1987:2-3).

Despite this imposing role of the state, it is not a neutral institution. This has made the understanding of the state more complex and elusive. Thus, given the contemporary reality what the state should be like is an important facet of inquiry.

Conceptualizing the State

The term 'state' in its modern sense emerged in the course of sixteenth century as a normative concept focusing on the value of concentrating coercive power in the hands of a single public authority that could ensure order in any given territory. From this perspective, the state is supremely valuable and obedience to the state is regarded as the highest political obligation. It opposed the existing pluralism in politics – the strong position of church, the personal rule of kings and feudal lords (Watkins 1968: 150). With the emergence of capitalism in association with nation states in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the normative concept of state gradually

eroded. The values of individual happiness, equality, intellectual freedom, social justice and *laissez-faire* economy undermined the idea of obedience to the state as the highest form of political obligation. Thus, by the end of eighteenth century a descriptive concept of state gained prominence. It emphasized the unique character of the state as an institution and signed it out 'as the only one that is distinctively 'political' (ibid).

John Degnbol–Martinussen has identified four analytical dimensions of the concept of state in order to describe it as an institution. A particular conception of state may correspond to one of these dimensions or to a combination of two or more of them. These four dimensions are:

a) The state as a *product* of conflicting interests and power struggles, possibly also a reflection of a many-sided dominance which make it an agenda and discourse setting institution.

b) The state as a *manifestation* of structures which lay down the framework for its mode of functioning and impose a certain order on both the state and the rest of society and thus to some extent determine the behaviour of citizens.

c) The state as an *actor* in its own right, which by its form of organization and mode of functioning exerts a relatively autonomous influence on outcomes of conflicts and other processes in society.

d) The state as an *arena* for interaction and conflict between contending social forces (Degnbol–Martinussen 2001:28).

The first two dimensions resemble each other in that they both focus on the state as a product of the surrounding society. But they also differ in the sense that the first puts great emphasis on the role of social and political factors, while the second pays more attention to the economic structures' direct determination of the form and mode of functioning of the state. However, these four dimensions may be used to describe and compare different conceptions of state.

It follows, thus, that the modern state can not be taken to mean a single type of state – modern states come in a variety of shapes and sizes and they arrived by different routes. Their rise involved a long and complex series of processes, full of

twists and turns and paradoxes and subject to conflicting interpretation (Anderson 1986: 1). James Anderson has identified four historical processes and forms of politics which in various combinations underlie the rise of modern states. These processes are: 1) The emergence of modern democracy; 2) The spread of industrialization; 3) The evolution of nationalism; and 4) The growth of socialism (Anderson 1986: 4).

In stead of absolutism of different forms, most states now feel it at least necessary to claim to be democracies, what ever may be the reality. Modern states claim to be nation states in the sense that they represent a culturally distinct community – the ‘nation’. Even while the notion of nation is contested, ‘nation-state’ is widely accepted as a synonym of ‘modern state’. Modern states now preside over industrialized societies or ones they are attempting to industrialize. Finally, most modern states have been influenced by socialism either as a threat or promise (ibid).

Anderson claims:

All the four processes and forms of politics may not be prominent or present in particular cases, but some of them must be for a state to be considered ‘modern’. ... All four processes have to be considered in defining the meaning of modern, and their different combinations and interactions go a long way towards explaining the diversity of modern state forms (ibid).

Bert A. Rockman (1989: 177-178) observes that one of the difficulties with the state as an organizing concept is that its taxonomic possibilities seem virtually boundless. Different concepts of the state are useful to shed light on particular theoretical and practical problems, though it is not completely clear just precisely what comparative advantage the *state* as a concept provides. One problem around which these various concepts seem to converge, however, is that of state capability. He emphasized on three conceptions of the state to address the issue of state capability.

a) The state as an authoritative policy making system has to do with the internal configuration of authority relations between the agents of the state – its decision-making capability. This capability may be thought of as the political capability of the state and it most obviously reflects the formal constitutional order and the organization of institutions and behaviour that develops around it

b) The state as provider of collective and distributional goods has to do with its commitments – its scope, functions, size of activities and the way they are organized.

It is precisely this aspect of the state that is at the heart of the belief that the state is receding, that is, the notion that the scope of the state in producing social goods has reached its upper limit.

c) The state as a repository, creator, and mediator of societal interests performs the intermediary function, that is, defines the bargaining and control milieu for state society relations. These are interlocking yet causally ambiguous linkages between the first two conceptions and the third one (ibid: 178 –179).

Hall and Ikenberry put forward an institutional–functional concept of state which includes three elements.

First, the state is a set of institutions; these are manned by state’s own personnel. The state’s most important institution is that of the means of violence and coercion.

Second, these institutions are at the center of a geo-geographically bounded territory, usually referred to as a society. Crucially the state looks inwards to its national society and outwards to larger societies in which it must make its way; its behaviour in one area can often only be explained by its activities in the other.

Third, the state monopolizes rule making within its territory. This tends towards the creation of a common political culture shared by all citizens (Hall and Ikenberry 1997:1–2).

Biersteker (1990:480) has conceived the state ‘as consisting of those institutions of governance – the bureaucracy, the police , the military, the judiciary, the legislative assemblies – ordinarily identified as the apparatus of government and the system of order or domination they enforce, either through coercion or appeals to legitimacy’. The system of order enforced by the institutions of governance is not altogether unchallenged or unchallengeable, even though the modern state is associated with the capability or legitimacy of administration and control of a given territory through its monopoly over the legitimate use of force and over the extraction of taxes within the territory. Thus the state is not a unified, fixed or static entity, but rather it is territorial and it is partially constituted by the international system within which it resides (ibid).

Stuart Hall (1984: 1) argues that as the state is a historical phenomenon, it can be conceived more clearly in comparison with 'stateless' societies. There had been time, when 'the state' as it is known today did not exist. Order and social control were maintained by many means, other than that of a centralized authority or governmental organization. In this context the conception of the state provided by K. Roberts may be cited. He conceived the state in terms of

... the presence of a supreme authority, ruling over a defined territory, who is recognized as having power to make such decisions and generally maintain order within the state. Thus, the capacity to exercise coercive authority is an essential ingredient: the ultimate test of a ruler's authority is whether he possesses the power of life and death over his subjects (Roberts 1979: 32 cited in Hall 1984: 1).

The idea of the modern state is hard to date precisely since the word 'modern' is open to different interpretations. The most useful definition is not in terms of a chronological time scale, but rather in terms of when particular features of the state which are still recognizable in contemporary societies first appeared. Those features include states in which: (1) power is shared; (2) rights to participate in government are legally and constitutionally defined (3) representation is wide; (4) state power is fully secular; and (5) the boundaries of national sovereignty are clearly defined. A state form of this type emerged very unevenly across Europe (Hall 1984: 9–10).

Following Skocpol (1985:7) and Migdal (1988:4) in using a definition of the state Jeff Haynes favoured the Weberian view. The state is 'compulsory association claiming control over territories and the people within them. Administrative, legal extractive and coercive organizations are the core of any state.' The state has two distinctive functions, one is internally oriented, and the other externally focused. The first is to maintain political order, the second to deal with state and other external actors, such as the internal organizations like the United Nations (Haynes 1996:27).

Everywhere, the states are made up of sets of institutions employing large numbers of people to run their affairs. The state, however, theoretically has six attributes: (a) it commands, or at least aspires to command, *a monopoly of the legitimate use of force* within its domain; (b) it has *territoriality*, that is, rules over discrete geographic area; (c) it is *administratively* and *politically centralized*, that is, national control is co-coordinated exercised from a national centre, almost invariably the country's capital; (d) it seeks, or strives to retain, *a monopoly of sovereignty*, that

is, no other native centres of power will be allowed to challenge the state's centralized predominance;(e) it tries to extend or to maintain *the rule of law* over the entire area of its jurisdiction; (f) it desires to *regulate and oversee* economic development; both within its boundaries and in relation to the international economy (ibid).

With all these attributes, it seems that the state is a homogeneous entity with common purpose at all times and under all circumstances. Still it is often an entity riven by international tensions which serve to reduce its capacity for presenting a united front to outside forces both at home and abroad.

Following Alfred Stepan (1978: xi–xiv) and Theda Skocpol (1979: 29), Atul Kohli (1987: 21) conceived of the state 'as a set of administrative and coercive institutions headed by an executive authority'. According to him, this common view of state is not only consistent with the widely accepted Weberian position but also helps focus attention on those elements of the state – coercion, institutional identity and leadership authority – that enable political actors to play a significant role in civil society (ibid).

Nordlinger (1981), however, argues that to think of the state as an institutional arrangement is to reify the problem at hand. In his view it is preferable to conceive of the state in terms of individuals occupying public offices. However, his formulation leads to think of the state as little more than a collection of individuals with distinctive preferences and rules – the public as distinct from the private roles (Kohli 1987: 22). It detracts analytical attention from the quintessential political resource – coercion – the successful control of which enables state authorities to impose their preferences upon societies, while the conception of the state is clearly an abstraction, aimed at analytically distinguishing the structure and dynamics of political rule from that of civil society; it also refers to empirically identifiable institutions. When one talks of the state, therefore, one generally refers to the government, the bureaucracy and the armed forces, as having a collective interest, a unified goal and a specifiable rule vis-à-vis civil society. The state's interests and goals may or may not be co-terminus with those of social actors (ibid: 23).

Considering the historico-cultural width of the concept of state Hall and Ikenberry concluded that fully-fledged 'stateness' has been an aspiration for every state in history: 'Some states have moved a considerable way from aspiration towards achievement; this was especially true of European states at the turn of the century, as is evidenced by the fact that this composite definition is based upon statements of their social scientists. But to them this has not happened to the Third World states.

Most states of the contemporary Third World, in contrast, comprise, hope more than reality: their citizens often do not belong to a single culture, that is, they are not yet nation states, and they are only in the earliest stages of creating an apparatus of state machinery (Hall and Ikenberry 1997: 2).

The state and its role in socio-economic development

It is meaningful to discuss the role of the state in society because it refers to the role of identifiable political institutions and actions. Reification of the state is therefore minimized by keeping in mind that the concept of the state refers to identifiable institutions and that state actors do not always work as a cohesive force vis-à-vis civil society (ibid).

Taking into account the role of the state in socio-economic transformation of society, James A. Caporaso (1982: 105) has identified four major conceptions of the state.

The liberal conception

The liberal conception sees the state as a provider of goods the markets will not produce – defense, roads and public health – as well as the arbiter of the interest group process; it is not an interest group itself, nor does it serve the interest of any one social group. While all liberal thinkers agree on a concept of limited state, there is no unanimity among them as to whether such a limited state should necessarily be a minimum state. Indeed, the liberals are torn between their need for the state and their fear of it. They define the authority of the state and the liberty of the individuals as opposites, only to find that they can not dispense with either of them. It is upon the task of extricating themselves from this dilemma that the liberals have presented widely divergent version of the concept of state (Sarangi 1996: 9).

Thus, there are a number of possibilities of notions of state which portray liberal values. Prakash Sarangi (1996:170) has summarised some of them. Rawls's liberal egalitarian state provides several institutional mechanisms to protect individual's right to liberty and equality. These institutions, however, are shaped by the rational choice of individuals. Kothari's decentralized humanist state aims at the creation of a human polity which responds to the needs of the masses who have ultimate control over its functioning. Hayek's limited state based on spontaneous order is the closest to the classical liberal type of state. Though his state does not abdicate its responsibility in welfare activities, his position is that any expanded role in this sphere would compromise individual freedom. Nozick is a libertarian and his minimal state would almost accept no responsibility for providing income security except in case of past injustices.

The Marxist conception

The Marxist conception of the state provides a stark contrast to that of the liberals. To the Marxists the state is a historical category. To the extent the social division of labour develops and society is divided into classes, the state appears and its nature is defined; the members of the collectivity as a whole are denied the exercise of a certain number of functions; a small minority alone takes over the exercise of these functions (Mandel 1969:9). However, the view that the state is not simply part of the super structure and instrument of the dominant class has obvious sources within Marxist thought, especially the work of Gramsci (Calvert and Calvert 1996:86).

Thus Bob Jessop (1977:354–357) has identified at least six different concepts and approaches in classical Marxist texts on the state. These are: a) Marx originally treated the modern state (at least that in 19th century Prussia) as a *parasitic institution* that played no essential role in economic production or reproduction; b) Marx also discussed the state as *epiphenomena*, that is, simple surface reflection of the system of property relations and the resulting economic class struggles; c) A third approach treats the state as the *factor of cohesion* in a given society. As such it regulates class conflict predominantly in the interests of the dominant class; d) The state is also seen as an *instrument of class rule*, as captured by a dominant class ; e) A fifth approach treats the state as *a set of institutions*. No general assumptions are made here of its

class character. This approach focuses more on the empirical manifestations of the state apparatus; and f) the last approach examines the state as *a system of political domination*. This approach shifts the attention to the forms of political representation and state intervention.

Since the 1960's a number of scholars have tried to remedy this lack of a powerful analytical frame work for the analysis of modern state. Neera Chandhoke (1994:190) in this context has identified three theoretical moments of the Marxist idea of state.

Thus , the three moments of Marxist theory of the state are marked by a shift from the state as the representative of the dominant class, to the idea that the dominant class is not homogeneous and therefore the state has relative autonomy in managing the conditions between the dominant classes and between the dominant and dominated classes, to the comprehension that the state is penetrated by contradictions in society and therefore its tasks in reproducing the conditions of capitalist accumulation and controlling the class struggle can not be seen unproblematic.

John Martinussen (1991:17 has identified four major approaches to Marxist idea of state that have proliferated since the 1960's:

a) Ralph Miliband (1969) does not conceive of the state simply as an instrument of class rule. Rather, he draws attention to the complex links between the ruling classes and the state elites. Such an approach may be regarded as *instrumentalist* but in a form different from the classical conception.

b) The *structuralist* approach aims at explaining the state's form and mode of functioning using a number of categories of structural causality or modes of determination. Poulantzas emphasizes the societal determination in terms of class interests and class power but he also includes references to the structural limitations and the determination by the economic structures in the last instance. Eric Olin Wright (1978) among others has elaborated on this. The over all position here is that the main features of the class relations generate specific forms of state. Different types of class relations and of class power generate corresponding forms of state organization as well as corresponding mode of state intervention.

c) The *capital logic school* tried to forge a link between, on the one hand, the nature and development of capital and on the other hand, the forms and the functions of the state. This approach emphasizes the economic-structural determination of the

capitalist state's forms and functions. It constitutes the overwhelmingly German Marxist analyses.

d) The *statist* Marxism focuses upon the state apparatus and the autonomy of the state. The approach taken by Clark and Dear (1984) may be taken as the representative of this approach. They basically try to strike a balance between what in their view is a society-oriented reductionist approach and the approach which assumes complete state autonomy. In other words, the state is a lot more than an entity which concentrates and exercises class power that is located outside its apparatuses as in the structuralist approach.

Taking into account the various Marxist concepts of and approaches to state it may be said that their basic frame of reference is historical materialism. Thus, the state is not merely an entity or a set of institutions. But as the institutions – the state apparatuses- are conceived as integrated parts of the societal formation in its totality, the concept of state must comprise also the interrelations between the state apparatuses and societal structures and forces. Thus, the state concept here not only covers the state apparatuses but it also comprises two other analytically distinct but interrelated aspects, the societal determination of state forms and functions and the impact of state interventions and actions. What distinguish the concepts of different approaches are their emphases with respect to state autonomy and the ways in which they conceive of the societal determination (Martinussen 1991:18).

The Statist Concept

The 'Statist' concept provides 'the state for itself' interpretation. The state is conceived neither as an impartial arbiter of group claims nor as a vehicle of ruling class but rather as combination of individual careers and organizational interests that primarily self serving (Caporaso 1982:105). Indeed, the statist view conceives of the state 'as an actor that, although obviously influenced by society surrounding it, also shapes social and political processes' (Evans et al 1985: vii). According to this view, the state can be accorded analytical priority. Peter B. Evans et al (1985: viii) succinctly presented the statist position:

Clearly, the time has come to move beyond highly speculative theoretical debate, about whether the "modern state" or the "state in capitalism " has an independent impact on the course of social change. Heuristically, at least, it is fruitful to assume both that states are potentially autonomous and

conversely, that socio-economic relation influence and limit state structures and activities. The challenge for researchers is to identify, conceptualize precisely and explain variations through time and space. Well focused hypotheses must be formulated about the determinants of the effectiveness of state interventions, about unintended consequences of state activities and about impact of state policies and structures on social conflicts.

The advocates of statist view assume a significant degree of state autonomy. Eric Nordlinger (1988:881) has described 'the core of the statist perspective' as featuring:

- a) Public officials forming their own policy preferences ; and
- b) The state acting on these (and its own) preferences despite their divergence from those of the most 'powerful' private actors.

Nordlinger emphasizes that public officials are minimally influenced by social preferences. This is partly due to the ways in which they were educated and socialized as a separate group with its own norms etc. But it is also due to the manner in which the civil bureaucracy, in particular, functions. He further argues that government officials prefer policies that help structure and heighten their autonomy. And he is of the opinion that, they have sufficient resources and skills to translate their preferences into authoritative actions some of which will enhance the autonomy of the state. The chief reference groups for government officials are other officials 'whom they turn to for information, cues and guidance when considering opinions in the formulation, adoption and implementation of public policies' (ibid).

From the statist perspective Gordon L. Clark and Michael Dear have identified several points to be considered as requirement for a theory of state: a) The form of the capitalist state must be analysed in terms of its relationship with the political and economic structure of the wider capitalist social formation. b) Any theory should fully account for the appearance of and the necessity for a distinct political sphere in society, separate from the economic, social and cultural spheres. c) The necessity of state inventions should be examined particularly to identify the range of state production and reproduction functions needed for the maintenance of capitalist social relations, as well as the origin and purposes of supposedly "non-necessary" functions .d)Any theory should be able to describe and explain diverse functional arrangements of the state apparatus, in terms of both its, sectoral and spatial organization .e)It should

be possible to anticipate and analyze the historical evolution of concrete historical forms, functions and apparatus of state. f) Finally our theory should permit the generation of tractable analytical positions about the state in the real world (Clark and Dear 1984: 124). In this context, John Martinussen has suggested the addition of one further requirement. g) The analysis should locate the state in both national and global system and context (Martinnussen 1991: 32).

The nationalist conception

The nationalist conception sees the state as an organization where institutions mobilize social resources exclusively for national concern. Originally the term nation state was employed to distinguish modern states from earlier forms of political organization covering relatively small areas, such as tribes or city states. But now most modern states claim to be nation states – to represent a culturally distinct community, the ‘nation’ and while this claim is often contested, ‘nation state’ is widely accepted as a synonym of ‘modern state’ (Anderson 1986: 4).

However, in most cases the term ‘nation state’ is misleading one, for there is no exact correspondence between state and nation (Calvert and Calvert 1996:141). There are states with more than one nation (Britain), nations with more than one states (ethnic Albanians, Hungarians, Serbs etc), states with no definite national identity (Chad) and nations with no definite state (the Palestinian Arabs). The reason why the concept of nation state is so popular is that in nineteenth century Europe there emerged, with the concept of nationalism, the belief that the only appropriate basis for a state was the nation (ibid). Thus, ‘nation state’ may be seen as simply designating a unit approximating to the ideas of statehood as described by Michel Smith; ‘Sovereign, territoriality, authority and legitimacy, control of citizens and their actions’ (Smith 1992: 256). The elements express the international as well as the national aspect of nation statehood. Indeed, at its simplest, full penetration of the national area and the capacity to act as a single unit on the world stage might be taken as a starting point for some kind of definition and / or classification (ibid). As Boris Frankel observes, ‘Many societies or territories are recognized as being nation states’ but have no internal social unity, while others have unity but little or no independence (Frankel 1983: ix).

According to the nationalist conception, as the permanent expression of a national political community, the state demands the loyalty of members of the community, acts as final arbiter of class and group conflicts, monopolizes the legitimate use of force etc. Attempts to mobilize the 'nation' behind the state have contributed to populism and the aggrandizement of the military as symbol of the nation and guarantor of the state. The nationalist conception also confirms the affirmation of the enhanced power of the nation state as a central value and objective; insistence on the nation state as final arbiter and focus for allegiance, reliance on national symbols and traditions for the mobilization of popular support for development objectives (Wolfe 1996: 3,82).

Four models of twentieth century state

Pradip N. Khandwala has outlined four principal models of the state that have gained currency in the twentieth century: the interventionist welfare state; the 'reinvented' entrepreneurial state; the developmental state; and the World Bank model of the humane market friendly state.

(a) The interventionist welfare state emerged in the West after the Great Depression of 1929. Incomes and employment declined so much and so rapidly that there was fear of mass starvation even in such affluent countries as the United States and the United Kingdom. The prevailing governmental philosophy changed from *laissez faire* to state interventionism, in which government resorted to pump pricing to bolster aggregate demands during recession, promotion of economic activities including investment in infrastructure, various market correcting interventions and regulation, resort in some cases to price and wage controls and welfare measures. In the west, the idea of the welfare state took root after the Second World War, initially in the Scandinavian countries and the United Kingdom, and after 1960 in the United States and several others western nations. People wanted to be insured against the financial hardships of unemployment, illness, and old age, and it was found expedient therefore to adopt one welfare measure after another (Khandwalla 1999: 27).

(b) The critique of the welfare state paved the way for the entrepreneurial state in the West. The welfare state has come under attack. But it is not easy to scale down government spending – it means large loss of employment in the public sector, and

where welfare spending is proposed to be cut, political action against it by those who are poor, disadvantaged, and insecure those are the prime beneficiaries of the welfare state. This encouraged the thinking of the entrepreneurial state so as to eliminate waste, cut costs, increase efficiency, and give the customer – and the citizen – better value for money. Given the vast resources expended by the state and perceptions of its low productivity, making the state's operation business-like may have potential for enhancing productivity as well as accountability and service quality. Beginning in the 1960s, bringing corporate management into government, 'reinventing' the government, and the 'entrepreneurial state' have become the rallying cries of many in the West (ibid: 30).

David Osborne and Ted Gaebler (1992) enunciated some principle of 'entrepreneurial state' the government of such a state should: concentrate on catalyzing various social and economic activities; empower communities to serve themselves rather than itself get involved in community service activity; create competition in public service delivery so that customers get the best value of money; be transformed from being rules driven to being mission driven; be result oriented; concentrate on prevention, rather than cure; decentralize its operation; harness incentive and markets rather than controls and regulation to bring about desired changes etc.(ibid: 33-34).

(c) Many Third World countries that became independent in the 1940s and 1950s thought the socialist ideas of East Europe provided a better means of escape from poverty, inequality and inferiority vis-à-vis the West than *laissez faire* capitalism, and adapted these ideas to their circumstances even if they did not fully embrace doctrinaire socialism. Economic growth to raise living standard standards from abysmal poverty was a goal with wide appeal in these countries and since the private sector was not perceived to be strong enough, or trusted enough, the state became the main engine of economic growth. Thus, emerged the developmental state in the Third World. South Korea provides the best example. Basic features of such a state are: central planning; commitment to growth; import substitution and export promotion; control of the economy; public enterprise; promotion of big business and centralized government decision making etc.

(d) Since the early 1980s the World Bank and International Monetary Found have been principal external shapers, especially in the Third World countries. The conditionality attached to 'structural adjustment' adjustment loans have been based on a market friendly state. This stressed deregulation of markets, reduction of physical deficit to control inflation, lowering of taxes and tax 'reform' to reduce tax evasion devaluation to make exports competitive, lowering of tariff barriers to increase competition, incentives for foreign private investment, privatization of public enterprises, greater investment in infrastructure and human resource development, land reforms, safety net etc. The 1997 World Development Report entitled, *The State in a Changing World* outlined the latest World Bank vision of the good a state in a fair detail, and buttressed it with much anecdotal and some research material. The major premises and prescription of the World Bank articulated in this report were many: An effective state is vital of the provision of goods and services as well as the rules and institutions that permit markets to flourish. Without it sustainable development, both economic and social, may be impossible. For economic and social development, the state should not be a direct provider of growth but be a partner catalyst, and facilitator. This rules out centralized and comprehensive direction of economic activity characteristic of statist economies. On the one hand there is need to narrow the gave between demand on the state and its capabilities to meet these demands, on the other the state offload the rest, and involve citizen and communities in the delivery of basic public goods and services. It requires the enhancement of state capability, by providing incentives for public official to perform better while keeping arbitrary action in check by subjecting the state services to increased competition. Devolution of authority from the central government to regional and local government can be yet another affective route (Khandwalla 1999: 35- 44).

The ideological base of state concept

Taking into account, the multiplicity of the idea of state Boris Frankel highlights that 'the very concept of 'the state' is a highly loaded and ideological concept' (Frankel 1983: 1). States are often qualified or disqualified by a wide variety of adjectives: national, multinational, terrorist, rogue, poly-ethnic, theocratic, authoritarian, welfare, capitalist, socialist, develop mentalist, democratic, bourgeois and others. These

adjectives connect four different things: territoriality; the socio-cultural background of state's population; the ideological orientation of states; and the roles performed by them. These are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, it is the *nature* of the state which is at issue, not the entity called state as such. A state could be democratic, responsible and responsive. Conversely a state may be authoritarian and impervious to the needs and aspirations of its citizens (Oommen 2004: 108). This very nature of the state is expressed through state intervention in socio-economic transformation.

State Intervention

There is a broad consensus both popular and scholarly that the role of the modern state in the overall development process is considerable and that it has expanded since the Second World War. The variety of forms of state intervention is considerable and has become more elaborate over time. Thus, the conception of state intervention in development is closely related to the conception of the state itself. Atul Kohli, observes in this context,

State intervention is an important variable for the study of political and social change; the logic of state action in society can not be fully explained by reference to social conditions; political actions, especially patterns of state intervention, partly reflect political interests and goals; and political interests and goals are not always synonymous with the interests and goals of social actors The understanding of how and why state intervenes is thus inadequate as long as it remains tied primarily to the conditions of society and the economy (Kohli 1987: 18–19).

The idea of state intervention in the economy is not exclusively a contemporary one. Indeed, the idea that the state should emerge to ensure the safety of people, including the protection of their property, is one of the fundamental purposes for which it was constituted and its existence is justified in modern political thought (Held 1983: 4– 14). Utilitarians elaborated on the legitimacy of state intervention; also Marx challenged the impartiality of state intervention (Biersteker 1990: 479). The proposition that 'capitalism can not be counted on to provide full employment or even socially adequate capital utilization without state intervention is at the heart of all Keynesian analysis' (Schott 1982: 294). Liberal and Marxist theorists obviously differ on the degree of volition or autonomy they allow the state in its intervention, but the idea that, it chooses to intervene in the economy is common to both (Biersteker 1990: 479).

In the context of the Third World some more reasons are frequently adduced for state intervention in the development process. According to Hazma Alavi (1972) the post independence inheritance from the colonial state provided both the institutions and a historical justification for extensive state intervention in the economy in many parts of the developing world. In addition developmental performance has been virtually equated with legitimacy of the regime in many developing countries and has frequently made state intervention in the economy necessary for regime preservation. More over, the widespread concern with the issue of control that fueled economic nationalism in the immediate post-war decades simultaneously reinforced the expansion of state intervention. 'The pattern of state intervention is largely determined by the ideology, organization and class basis of the regime that controls state power' (Kohli 1987: 9). Biersteker has identified as many as six distinguishing forms of state intervention:

a) The state can attempt to influence the behaviour of private entrepreneurs positively through fiscal, monetary, investment and trade policies designed to promote, maintain or accelerate their activity.

b) It can attempt to regulate or constrain their behaviour (to influence them negatively) and direct their activity into socially acceptable production through consumer or environmental protections, worker safety programmes and wages legislation.

c) It can attempt to, mediate conflicts among capital and labour through corporatist or less structured forms of intermediation.

d) It can attempt to distribute (or redistribute) the social and economic product of capital through the use of substitutes, transfer payments, or industrial location policies.

e) It can attempt to produce goods and services itself, either by subsidizing the infrastructure necessary for an expansion of national production or by embarking on high risk or high capital projects through the financing and creation of state enterprises.

f) In some cases the state can attempt to plan and therefore rationalize the entire process through the establishment of a comprehensive planning process (Biersteker 1990: 480).

Biersteker argues that these six different forms of state intervention in the economy are not mutually exclusive and should be viewed more as a partial inventory than as a strict typology. They are also mutually exclusive in the sense that given policy packages or newly introduced economic programmes regularly combine several of them. The coherence of a given state's economic programme is contingent on the extent to which these forms of interventions are complementary.

Despite these difficulties, many disagreements and theoretical confusions over the nature of state and its intervention in the economy can be made clear by highlighting the different aspects of intervention across time and space. However, Biersteker has attempted to classify the national political economic regimes on the basis of forms of intervention in the economy into two broad categories:

1. The minimalist state regimes; and
2. The state capitalist regimes.

The minimalist state regime employs limited fiscal or monetary instruments and modest regulatory policies and distributing programmes, but tends to avoid corporatist mediation and eschews both production and planning. It describes well the post war economic regimes prevailing in the United States, Britain and other members of the organization for economic co-operation and development (OECD). *In the Third World 'one is hard pressed to come up with any historical examples of this regime, with the possible exception of territories like Puerto Rico and Hong Kong (Biersteker 1990: 482 emphasis added).*

The state capitalist regime is consistently interventionist which extends the classical Keynesian synthesis into extensive regulatory controls on production, elaborate corporatist structures, extensive distributive programmes, formal planning mechanisms and a major state role in production and capitalist accumulation. Forms of state capitalism can be found in many parts of the Third World during post-war period, most notably in Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria (after 1970), India and Indonesia. These are the countries in which import substitution industrialization was most

vigorously pursued; development strategy combined inward looking statism with populist social reform. It can be noted an infinite variety of forms and degrees of intervention can be found in between the minimalist state and state capitalism (Biersteker 1990: 482).

The nature of state intervention depends to a large extent on autonomy the state enjoys vis-à-vis society. The discussion of state autonomy productively leads one in the direction of making connection to the system 'above' the state and the society 'below' the state. This discussion rests on the assumption that states are very important institutions for the promotion of socio-economic development. Indeed, states are important for development and therefore it is important to discuss the parameters of state autonomy (Sorensen 1999: 87).

Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985: 68) argue that: (i) In order to undertake effective interventions, the state must constitute a bureaucratic apparatus with sufficient corporate coherence. (ii) A certain degree of autonomy from the dominant interests in a capitalist society is necessary not only to make coherent state action in pursuit of any consistent policy conception possible, but also because some of the competing interests in economy and society, even structurally dominant one's, will have to be sacrificed in order to achieve systematically required 'collective goods' that can not be provided by partial interests.

State autonomy

'State autonomy' as a concept describes a relationship— the state's relationship with society-- and is most clearly comprehended by focusing on the state's capacity to restructure social relations and mobilize social resources. As this is a concept that makes sense primarily in terms of the consequences of its presence – state autonomy is what it does – there is a real danger of treating state autonomy as an explanatory variable, while the proposed relationship may simply be true by definition. It is important, therefore to define, when a state will be deemed autonomous and to identify the resources and conditions that enhance or shrink a state's autonomy vis-à-vis society (Kohli 1987: 27).

According to Georg Sorensen (1999: 88) state autonomy is freedom of maneuver for state elites and their bureaucratic machineries. As noted by Skocpol

(1985: 9) a minimum of such autonomy means that states may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of the social groups, classes or society. Sorensen has added: 'Goals that are not simply reflective of the demands of external actors, such as the International Financial Institutions'. Maximum autonomy is a situation where states are completely independent of internal and external interests. Such a possibility is purely theoretical. But there have been situations approximating it (Sorensen 1999: 88). It is sometimes said that the state autonomy required for development is especially autonomy from classes and groups involved in zero-sum activities, that is, speculation, corruption, usury, and the like. That is, 'classes which derive wealth from unproductive activities or which are otherwise hostile to industrial development' (Hamilton 1987: 1243).

State autonomy from society, thus, refers to macro political-sociological condition whereby state authorities can i) insulate themselves from social demands in general, but specifically from the demands of propertied classes, and ii) utilize state power to consciously alter socio-economic conditions. An autonomous state thus contrasts with a reflexive or captured state, where state actions are largely controlled by social forces. Patterns of leadership and ideology, and the organization of state power, as well as control over productive property, are some of the important varying conditions and resources that affect state's capacity to act autonomously vis-a-vis society. As these variables are all continuous and vary in degree, so does state autonomy (Kohli 1987: 27).

Using the concept of the 'policy elite' offered by Marilee S. Grindle and John W. Thomas (1989; 1991), John Martinussen (1999: 4) highlights the complexity involved in describing actual degrees and types of state autonomy. The policy elite are the actors involved in formal policy making who act with some degree of independence from social pressure. But, the options available to them are constrained by external factors. The policy elite interact with these societal pressures in three components of the policy making: agenda setting, decision making and implementation.

From this perspective of the 'policy elite', there are four points that are involved in identifying the complexity, degree and type of state autonomy:

a) States differ considerably with regard to their societal embeddedness; the powers and interests that shape their mode of functioning; their legitimacy and authority; their capabilities and capacities and therefore with respect to their degree of autonomy. Policy elites act with varying degrees of independence from societal pressure and thus in different ways affect policies and outcomes; some policy elites play important independent roles, while others are narrowly constrained by state external conditions and organized interests.

b) Autonomy itself is a very complex phenomenon, referring to such diverse aspects as autonomy vis-à-vis specific societal groups and actors and autonomy to do – to act in various fields and ways. Autonomy further takes on different kinds of meaning when related, respectively, to the state as a whole, to its constituent parts, or to the policy elites.

c) There may be great differences from one policy area to another: A state may be able to act independently and effectively in certain areas, while in others it is unable to do so because of structural constraints or constraining influences from societal groups and other actors. A similar differentiation may apply to policy elites.

d) Finally, considerable differences may occur when we take a closer look at the various stages of the policy process. We may not find the same degree of autonomy for policy elites at all stages from agenda setting, policy formulation, through policy adoption, authorization and implementation to impact. Particularly at the impact stage, both the autonomy of policy elites and state autonomy in a broader sense are often severely limited in the sense that intended effects can not be brought about by state action (Martinussen 1999: 5–6).

Martin Doornbos points out that two important dimensions of the concept of autonomy, other than its internal and external aspects, are autonomy to do something and to maintain autonomy from something. He argues,

... as regards, the notion of 'autonomy' per se, in addition to the distinction between internal and external dimensions, two other aspects of the concept played a role in the perceptions concerned. These are per definition still valid, namely, first, autonomy as 'autonomy of action' or 'autonomy to' and second, autonomy in the sense of 'autonomy from' Janus faced, these aspects are closely connected, though analysts may choose to emphasize one side or another, depending on what particular aspects they seek to highlight. Thus, 'prime mover' notions of the state would stress the 'autonomy of

action dimension', while (neo) Marxists were more likely to focus on the extent of the state's 'autonomy from ...' i.e., from other powerful interests within the society and economy. Yet, both these notions of autonomy were state-focused, one viewing the state as the central initiator and instrument of development strategies the other meant to explain the state's role and position vis-à-vis different class forces and class contradictions. Both aspects are again important when assessing the transformations the state has been subject to within the context of global forces in more recent years: is not a few instances autonomy in either sense has shrunk to a bare minimum (Doornbos 1999: 29).

When contemplating the presence or absence of 'autonomy' or 'relative autonomy' of particular state, therefore it is quite likely that the phrase would be used to highlight different kinds of variables in different cases: external versus internal; autonomy from as opposed to 'autonomy to' as well as other contextually derived differences (ibid: 33).

According to the Marxists, state autonomy in a class society is always a relative matter. They insist on the limiting condition of state capacity by only discussing the 'relative' autonomy of the 'capitalist state', Kohli argues that a focus on limits can under estimate both the range and the significance of the state autonomy that does exist in class societies in general and in Third World cases specifically (Kohli 1987: 27). Indeed, a review of the debate on relative state autonomy in the 1960s through the 1980s does not produce a strong conclusion on the degree of autonomy available to policy makers in developing countries. Answers rely too heavily on the approach and the conception of the state adopted.

The appropriate degree of autonomy in terms of maximizing a positive contribution to development depends on historical circumstances. However, a study of the related works by many scholars (Evans 1995; Hamilton 1987; White 1984; Sandbrook 1985; and others) suggests that a very high degree of domestic autonomy may very well be counter productive in development terms; it can easily lead to predation. To be developmental states need to be embedded in society in the sense that it is immuned from the classes and groups involved in zero-sum activities, such as traditional agrarian power holders, foreign and domestic speculators. It also means building positive connections: 'Connections that privileged industrialists allow the developmental states to focus on a project of industrial transformation, to keep its involvement selective and to avoid having its bureaucratic capacities overwhelmed (Evans 1995: 234). In broader perspective, state ties to popular groups such as

associations of workers and peasants, are also important. 'In short, industrial ties tend to produce growth, broader popular ties tend to produce welfare, and both achievements can be counted as part of a broader development process. But, part of the state's problem is that there may be zero-sum groups in the state itself (Sorensen 1999: 91). Similarly, *external pressure* or constraint which reduces full autonomy of the state is *not in itself* negative or counter productive. It need not lead to underdevelopment. It can indeed lead to development. External pressure is in itself not the problem. It all depends on the concrete content of that pressure (ibid).

Embedded autonomy

According to Peter Evans, 'embedded ness' means that on the one hand, state elites and their bureaucracies are able to impose decisions on groups in society, for example the introduction of competition to improve efficiency and quality. On the other 'embedded ness' means connections which provide channels of information and which pave the way for effective implementation: 'Efficacious states combine well developed, bureaucratic internal organizations with dense public ties. The recipe works only if both elements are present (Evans 1995). In other words, the connections implied in 'embeddedness' contain a special kind of state power which has nothing to do with coercive power. It is sooner what Michael Mann has called infrastructural power, that is, 'the institutional capacity of a central state ... to penetrate its territories and logically implement decisions. This is power through society, coordinating social life through state infrastructures' (Mann 1993:59).

Relative autonomy

Marxist scholars acknowledge that a capitalist state has a certain degree of 'relative autonomy'. It is free from active control by members of the capitalist class or from the structural requirement of the capitalist economy. Relative autonomy is assumed necessary for the state to act on behalf of the capitalist class as a whole rather than of a particular segment of this class. Thus a relatively autonomous state is viewed acting as a factor of cohesion for the bourgeoisie and as facilitator of the bourgeois dominance over the economy and society (Poulantzas 1973; Off 1975; Gold *et al* 1975).

Hagen Koo (1984: 43-44) has identified some structural conditions of the Third World countries which seem to contribute to the relative autonomy of the peripheral capitalist state:

a) The peripheral economies typically contain more than one mode of production, capitalist, pre-capitalist and transitional ones. Marxist scholars agree that the state can assume greater autonomy when the mode of production is indeterminate and no one class holds the balance of power (Gold et al 1975, Trim Berger 1977, Hamilton 1981).

b) There is a historical condition that is related to strong state bureaucracy in those Third World countries that had colonial experience. In these societies as Alavi (1972) points out 'overdeveloped' state machinery had been created by the metropolitan power to control all the indigenous social classes. With independence, the post-colonial society inherits this over developed state apparatus and its institutionalized practices through which the operation of the indigenous social classes are regulated and controlled. 'The bureaucracy inherits that prestige of state power that is traditional in non-European societies and is strengthened by the experience of the colonial administration's power, which seemed absolute and by the fact that the petty bourgeoisie from which this bureaucracy stems has a monopoly of modern education and technical skill (Amin 1976: 345-346).

c) A relatively new pattern of dependent development in the periphery of the world capitalist economy has also strengthened the role of the states in peripheral nations. The most common characteristic of dependent development is a close collaboration of the peripheral state with both international capital and domestic capital – something that Evans (1979) calls a 'triple alliance'. But since the indigenous capital is ill developed, the state tends to assume the central role for solving bottleneck problems, developing the infrastructures, formulating favourable institutional frameworks and bargaining with multinational corporations. Furthermore, the state has now moved into areas traditionally controlled by private sector and has expanded its ownership of non-infrastructure enterprises. This has resulted in the new notions of

the 'entrepreneurial state' and state capitalism (Petras 1976; Berberoglu 1979; Sobhan 1979; Duvall and Freeman 1981).

The emergence of an entrepreneurial state usually does not represent an effort to transform social relations of production but just an effort to correct or overcome inadequacies in the functioning of the private sector. In any event, the rise of the self consciously interventionist and entrepreneurial states indicates the strengthening of state power in peripheral societies – based on his Brazilian pattern of development Evans (1979:11) argues:

If classic dependence was associated with weak states, dependent development is associated with the strengthening of strong states in the 'semi-periphery'. The consolidation of state power may even be considered a prerequisite of dependent development.

It is to be noted that the nature of state autonomy in a specific country is constrained and defined by the dependency situations in which it is embedded. Further, the post colonial state was originally created by the metropolitan state. But it is also important to note that the formation of modern state after independence was largely shaped by a new imperialist state through transplantation of the latter's legal and economic institutions through the so called leadership trainings and through multitude of trade, financial , and technical assistance (Petras 1978:51–52).As Koo Hagen (1984 : 45 – 46)notes:

The state in the periphery of the world capitalist economy is a creature of complex social and economic forces, internal and external, historical and contemporary. It is certainly in correct to caricature the dependent state as a puppet organization set up by an imperial power. Yet, it also seems too naive to believe that a strong government in the periphery can transcend the structural requirement of world capitalist economy. But one thing is certain, the role of the state is increasingly more important in determining the pattern of development and the evolution of social structure in Third World countries.

The Third World State

A general concept presents the state in isolation from its historical and social contexts. It stresses the general point that irrespective of the type of society and economy - agrarian or industrial, capitalist or socialist, developed or underdeveloped – all modern states share same features. 'The control of an executive authority over the means of administration and coercion gives the state in all societies considerable potential to mold socio-economic change' (Kohli 1987: 23). However, a study of

socio-economic change or development in particular region or country needs the study of specific types of states. It demands locating the state within its social and historical contexts. Thus, a discussion of the state in the Third World requires the specifying of state features in relation to Third World societies.

Further, while dealing with concepts of state with reference to its role in socio-economic transformation two factors are considered to be crucial: (a) The actual forms and functions of specific state apparatuses are not determined solely by contemporary economic structures and social forces. They also embody to some extent the structures and forces prevailing in earlier stages of its development. (b) Every societal formation at present is part of a larger international formation and is thus influenced by process structures and social forces in this larger system. From the point of view of a given society these structures and forces are extra-social (Martinussen1991:24).

Third world countries historically lacked political cohesion and economic dynamism. Consequently, being unable to resist the onslaught of colonialism they fell prey to it. Their failure at development was also historically rooted in their distinctive social and political traits. This twin societal and political failure in turn resulted from two interrelated historical conditions: brittle state structures that were over centralized or fragmented, and control of economic resources by non-productive groups. Once imposed on these polities, colonialism further stifled their developmental prospects (Kohli 1987: 24).

Only a theoretical formulation along such lines enables one to understand and explain the conspicuous discrepancy between on the one hand, colonial state apparatuses intervening in economic, and political and ideological processes in a manner furthering development and expansion of capitalism and, on the other hand, a colonial society dominated by pre-capitalist economic structures and characterized by the absence of any national capitalist class (Martinnussen 1991: 25).

An understanding of this discrepancy has led Hamza Alavi (1972) and others to describe the state apparatuses in colonial societies as over developed in relation to their intra-societal basis. These over developed state apparatuses were essentially taken over as part of the political set up in the dependent Third World countries. Therefore, the post-colonial states are also over developed. Alavi observes:

It might be said that the “super structure” in the colony is therefore “overdeveloped” in relation to the “structure” in the colony, for its basis lies in the metropolitan structure itself, from which it is later separated at the time of independence. The post-colonial society inherits that over developed state apparatus and its institutional practices (cited in Martinussen 1991: 26).

According to Atul Kohli, most Third World countries can be characterized as having a teleological orientation – an orientation to develop their societies and by the fact that productive resources within their boundaries are owned by private actors. Both of these characteristics are historically acquired (Kohli 1987: 24).

From the onset of state sovereignty, Third World state authorities are committed to planned socio-economic change. This goal of ‘deliberate development’ of one form or another is, moreover, widely accepted as legitimate by the politically relevant strata. It is in this sense that Third World states can be characterized as teleological - as having a telos, an ultimate end, namely, the end of development. Empirically, therefore, the role of state intervention in Third World societies tends to be rather large, and normatively, this is often viewed as legitimate, stemming from the teleological nature of these states (ibid :25).

The existence of a private property economy is not only a societal characteristics; it is also a political trait. Private property has a pro-found influence on the defining of the scope and the limits of state intervention in society. This influences also the nature of the state itself. What is central to an understanding of Third World states, is then, the inherent tension between the state’s commitment to ‘develop’ and ‘transform’ social structures on the one hand and on the other hand the private control of productive resources, limiting the scope of state intervention (ibid :26).

However, Kohli argues that, the characterization of Third World states by focusing on their teleological orientation and on their relationship to the means of production is an ideal typical characterization. In this manner the Third World states may be characterized as developmental capitalist states: developmental because of the state’s commitment to the goal of development and capitalist because this goal must be achieved by intervening in an increasing capitalist economy – an economy based on the private ownership of the means of production. This focus on the developmental and capitalist element of Third World states, according to Kohli, helps to direct one’s attention to the somewhat *neglected* but *crucial* issue of developmental studies: the

varying capacity of states to mobilize and control social actors as an explanation of varying developmental outcomes (ibid).

Neera Chandhoke (1998: 31) argues that the post-colonial state was located in a dual and contradictory historical legacy: (1) The first embodied the ideology and history of statism. This was based upon an elaborate system of control evolved by the colonial state. (2) The second was the freedom movement, which had challenged the authoritative conception of the 'political' laid down by the colonial state. The first had given the post-colonial elites a model of statism and the notion of the centrality of the state. The second gave to the people the idea that states can be challenged almost to a point where the existing state became irrelevant. This tension between two legacies constitutes the substance of post-colonial polities. However, the statist legacy came to dominate the political spectrum.

Bjorn Beckman points out that the post-colonial state emerged in the context of global contradiction between dominant and dominated positions in the world system. It became the focus of national aspiration and resistance even if neo-liberal and accommodationist forces often gained an upper hand. Still, in most cases, post-colonial nationalism was a real constraint on the integration of the world market in the post-colonial world. Nationalist aspirations were reinforced in the 1970's by the military victories of the national liberation movements in Vietnam, Central America and Southern Africa. UNCTAD and the non-Aligned movement asserted the right of the Third World economies to protect themselves politically against a world market (Beckman 1998: 48).

Martin Doornobs(1990: 180) has identified with reference to Africa, some basic features of the Third World states: (i) its post-colonial status, with all the implications this has for the evolution of 'civil society'; (ii) its a priori problematic relationship as regards its territorial jurisdiction; (iii) its heavy involvement in restricted resource base (usually primarily agricultural);(iv) its still relatively undifferentiated yet ethnically heterogeneous social infrastructure;(v) its salient processes of centralization and consolidation of power by new ruling classes; and (vi) its passive external context and dependency. Each of these characteristics has significantly conditioned the specific pattern of state formation.

Saul argues that, there are three points that define the Third World states: First, in colonizing Third World, the metropolitan bourgeoisie had to create a state apparatus that could control all the indigenous social classes in the colony, in that sense; the 'super structure' in the colony is overdeveloped relative to the 'structure'. The post colonial society inherits that overdeveloped state apparatus and its institutionalized practices. Second, the post-colonial state also assumes an economic role (not paralleled in the classical bourgeois state) in the name of promoting economic development. Third, in post colonial societies, capitalist hegemony must often be created by the state itself within territorial boundaries that are artificial once direct colonial rules is removed (Saul 1979: ch 8).

Cristopher Clapham (1985) argues that the Third World state is a neo-patrimonial entity. It is based formally on rational legal universal principles, but functioning, in practice, as a great vehicle of patronage and personal aggrandizement of power holder. 'What distinguishes the Third World State from its equivalents in other parts of the world is the combination of its power and its fragility. Of these two elements, the power is by far the more evident. What the state consists of in its most basic sense is a structure of control' (Clapham 1985:39). Thus, there is an inherent paradox in typifying Third World states. They are both strong and fragile at the same time. The strength of the state derives from the vast resources it has as it is to repress a civil society composed of a patchwork of heterogeneous cultural groups; its fragility arises from the fact that it is not deeply anchored in, in a cultural sense, in the society and is considered an alien being by many of its constitutive units. Consequently, the collapse of a ruling coalition and the end of a regime can severely strain the state system and may even bring its dissolution.

According to Jeff Haynes, the state which emerged from the colonial period in the Third World was often qualitatively different from those created in an earlier epoch in Europe. In Europe the nation created the state, whereas in the Third World it was necessary for the state to try to create the nation. Because of extant social and cultural divisions in many Third World countries, this was by no means an easy task. He argues that overtime many Third World governments became in increasingly more authoritarian in their attempts to build nation states (Haynes 1996:20).

In African context Martin Doornbos (1990:188) has pointed out some factors contributing to the erosion of state autonomy. These may well be referred to other Third World states: 1) Advocacy of privatization, and of increasing involvement of private enterprise in aid arrangements; 2) A significant diversion of aid funds via non-governmental organization and channels; 3) The formation of donor coordinating consortia, with corresponding national counter part 'front' organization, which have begun to assume major policy roles in, for example , the planning and disbursement of food aid; 4) The rapidly growing donor specialization and involvement in selected sectors / regions within African countries, facilitating a gradual shift of policy-preparation activities to European donor headquarters away from national sectoral co-ordinating ministries or organizations; 5) Donor preferences for working with autonomous non-bureaucratic corporate statutory bodies, believed to combine the advantages of public jurisdiction and private discretionary power and considered attractive because external agencies can establish close working relationships with them, thereby gaining direct influence; 6) The detailed specification of external parameters and prescriptions in national budgetary and policy processes; and 7) The introduction of highly advanced and sophisticated monitoring and evaluation methodologies, for which the national expertise available is often insufficient to constitute an effective counter part in the policy discussion and implementation concerned.

Joel S. Migdal (1988: 1- 41) looks at the capabilities of Third World states to achieve change which their leaders seek to realize in society through state planning, policies and actions. Strong states are those with high capabilities to penetrate society, regulate social relations, extract resources and appropriate or used them in determined ways; weak states are those lacking such capabilities. His main thesis is that Third World states represent a duality: whereas they are successful in penetrating society, they are rather ineffective in bringing about goal oriented change. The reasons for this in effectiveness are to be found in the fact that the values upon which the Third World state bases its social control are inherited from the colonial period. Only the ruling elite internalize the modernist values and norms of the colonial legacy. However, the experience and orientation of the elite is much less spread out in society than the

vastly diverse sets of beliefs and recollections upheld by multifarious units of the larger society. Thus, social control in many Third World countries is weak because state and society are not sufficiently interlaced by similar cultural values (Ahmed 1998:151-152).

Strong, weak and intermediate states

John Degenbol–Martinussen (1999: 17–19), using the strength of government, that is, the degree of autonomy has identified Third World states into three categories:

a) Strong developmental states have a well developed, coherent bureaucracy a homogeneous administrative culture and strong linkages between government and business (Evans 1989; 1995). South Korea may be cited as an example.

b) Weak states are those where non-institutionalized government prevails, where personalistic relationships and social networks take precedence over rules and where paramount leaders rule more in their personal capacity than in their capacity as office holders within the governmental setup (Jackson & Rosberg 1982; Sandbrook 1986). Weak states are weak in several respects--essentially at every stage of the policy process from demand aggregation over decision making and implementation to achieving the intended impact in society (Migdal 1988; Evans 1989). More especially, weak states are characterized by: 1) Low levels of legitimacy: decisions are not widely accepted as authoritative and binding upon all citizens. 2) They have very little capacity for independent analysis of their own development problems as well as for designing adequate strategies. 3) They have low capabilities to collect taxes and spend government revenue in a planned way. 4) Their administrative capacity is insufficient to implement decisions taken or policies adopted by the government. 5) They have very limited influence on the pattern of societal development in their countries. Most of the sub-Saharan African countries belong to this category.

c) The intermediate states stand in between the strong and the weak states. They have varying degrees of capabilities and capacities for policy implementation. Examples of such states are India, Thailand and Malaysia.

Strengths and weakness may vary from policy area to policy area as well as over time, but the variation from country to country appears to be the most significant, at least with respect to policies affecting industrial development.

In an analysis similar to that of Martinussen, Karen Barkey and Sunita Parikh (1991:534–541) present the third world states with reference to their roles in development. Using state-society relations as the central criterion they have identified four types of role of the state in development.

(a) *Strong state and weak society*

The strong state is the ‘bureaucratic authoritarian state’. It represents the ultimate trump of state over society. It has strength, autonomy and capacity. The initial autonomy of such states results from structural class conflict within society that can not be resolved without outside intervention, the state’s capacity to carry out its objectives is a product of its internal institutional structure as well as its ability to mobilize external resources such as expertise and capital. In this case where the state is directing economic growth, state autonomy and capacity both must be high for development to succeed. And the records suggest that states were indeed able to embark ambitious plans and carried them through at least in part. Examples of such states are Latin American countries such as Brazil, Chile and Peru; East Asian countries like Korea, Taiwan and others. While there is agreement that these states dominate their societies, the specifics of the state society compact vary across cases and affect the states ability to carry out its projects.

(b) *Strong State and Strong society*

In this case, the state is strong but the societal group is already strong or gaining strength vis-à-vis the state. In some countries such as Mexico, India, and Egypt the state’s prominent role in the economy is due to its political leadership during revolutions and independence movements; however, its autonomy is constrained by pre-existing societal formations. In others, such as the newly democratizing, post-bureaucratic authoritarian states, the state continues to maintain control over large parts of the economy. But it is increasingly challenged by a newly recognizing society asserting its right to political participation. These two types of states have strong internal capacity but their autonomy from society is restricted.

All scholars agree that in such cases the state plays a prominent role in economic development, but it confronts strong and highly organized societal groups with their own economic interests. But these scholars differ on the level of autonomy they accord to the state. For example, Kohli (1987) denies the Indian state any autonomy, arguing that it is weak and 'captured', whereas Bardhan (1984) argues that it is able to formulate goals and policy directions independently of the interests of propertied classes. Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) eschew the category altogether, characterize the Indian state as semi-autonomous or 'constrained' and treat it as a third actor that influences economic development along with labour and capital. All agree however, that the state is able to formulate and implement economic strategies with some success; its ability to carry them out fully is hampered by the societal pressures generated by a pluralist open society.

(c) *Weak state, strong society*

The weak state does not come into being as a response to economic crises, but is born-out of revolution, independence movement, or abrupt transfers of power (Claghy 1988). The society that the new state leads has been restructured by colonialism, but they had not usually engaged in direct state society interaction (Migdal 1988). This society enters the post colonial era as highly differentiated entities where traditional categories such as ethnicity, tribe and various cross cutting clientelistic networks predominate. Incipient classes based on shared economic interests have emerged during colonial rule, but the older categories continue to have mobilization potential (Kasfir 1984; Migdal 1988). Thus, the class based alliances that have facilitated economic development in the west are weak, while traditional social cleavages not usually associated with state-led, national economic growth strategies are strong.

Scholars agree that this type of states in Africa and Asia are weak but still retain some limited autonomy in two ways:

(a) It enjoys autonomy through its monopoly of force and internal societal divisions. Scholars point to Uganda and Chad as states that retain power through sheer coercion, using what Mann terms despotic power (Mann 1986; Jackson and Rosberg 1986). In states, whose monopoly of force is not absolute, however, such as Ghana and Cameroon (Forrest 1988, Azarya and Chazan 1987) internal societal conflict often

provides the opportunity for an autonomous state that can mediate between wearying factions (Kasfir 1984; Forrest 1988; Callaghy 1984; Azarya and Chazan 1987; Young and Turner 1985).

(b) The second source of autonomy is international context. The former colonial powers and MNC provides them with financial and political resources to enhance their autonomy (Kasfir 1984; Fatton 1988). Moreover the international systems needs for state as juridical categories also provide legitimacy to particular weak African states that might otherwise disintegrate (Jacksen and Rosberg 1986). Finally, unexpected discoveries of abundant resources or the sudden market demands for particular commodities can boost the state's autonomy so long as the state has mechanism to appropriate the wealth (Kasfir 1984; Parson 1984; Azarya and Chazan 1987).

Scholars point that in spite of possessing a degree of autonomy the weak state, relatively lack state capacity. The bureaucratic machineries of these states are often based on patronage and tend to be over developed in size, inadequate in expert knowledge and lacking in financial resources. The military also reflects traditional kin and clientelistic structures. As a result the bureaucratic and coercive apparatus of the state are unable to increase its capacity.

The low levels of state autonomy and the lack of capacity make it difficult to the state to direct economic growth. Some exceptions are the Ivory Coast, Kenya and Nigeria. The first two based on state directed agricultural capital and the last on oil. More consequently the states with little autonomy and capacity vis-à-vis their societies have been primarily concerned with ensuring that the ruling elite remains in power.

(d) *The rentier state*

The rentier state is distinguished from others by its resource structure. This state develops, acquires its autonomy and in turn makes economic policy as a result of the discovery and exploitation of a major resource. Its extractive apparatus either does not exist or is very weak. Neither does it have well developed administrative machinery. If its resource base dries up, its viability as state is severely threatened. Examples of such states are pre-revolutionary Iran, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and the like. Economic prosperity has helped these states dominate their

societies. Yet periods of Economic bust demonstrate their fragile hold over societal groups (Barkey and Parikh 1991: 539-541).

The Third World states in specific context

Marcos Kaplan argues that any study of Third world states requires a distinction between the situation in Latin America and that in Africa and Asia.

In the vast majority of Latin American countries the classic colonial period came to an end more than a century and a half ago, to be followed by the gradual development of the nation state. In most African and Asian countries (with exceptions such as China, Japan and possibly India), similar process did not begin until the mid-twentieth century. In addition to differences in the international context at the formative and initial development stage, there are also differences in the diversity of structures, the intermingling of systems, the types and degrees of development of classes within the nation and in their inter relations and links with the main actors in the international system. These are reflective in different forms, stages of development, of apparatuses and actions of the state (Kaplan 1986:276).

The study of the state in general, however, must take as its starting point those situations which are almost common to all countries: frequent large state intervention; transition from traditional colonialism to neo-colonialism; the adoption by political and administrative elites of a model of the state originating in the developed industrialized countries of the West. This external model of the state has been superimposed on forces, structures and process which differ from the premises of the original model. The local situations present the state with particular problems, without providing the resources and means with which to deal with them effectively. The state came into being and started operating under conditions of neo-colonial dependency, levels of growth and productivity were low, there was little progress towards the social division of labour classes hardly existed and if they did, they were fluid and weak; civil society and a properly organized and functioning political community were missing (Kaplan 1986: 276).

Ali Kazancil observes that the position of Third World state in relation to 'development' can be explicated with respect to its two basic functions, which are dialectically linked: (a) The Third World state is a relay in the process of surplus extraction and accumulation by the centre at the expense of periphery and (b) The Third World state is a structure of sovereignty, liberation and autonomy for peripheral societies (Kazancil 1986: 137).

The chances of economic development in the Third World depend on the capacity of the modern state to act more as a structure of sovereignty and autonomy than a relay in the world economy. It requires the Third World state to overcome, to its own advantage, the dialectical contradiction that opposes these functions. This contradiction is tied to the inegalitarian world economy and may well persist for as long as the latter operates (*ibid*).

The Indian state

The nature of the Indian state, especially in terms of its relationship with the society, has remained a theoretical challenge to scholars, ever since an attempt was made to place the Indian state under a typology framed within western political economy. Sanjib Basu (1985:196 *emphasis added*) nicely summarized the position:

From pre-Marxian Orientalists through Marx to Barrington Moore, India has been a typological curiosity in Western political economy and a challenge to the gradual internationalization of the terms of its discourse. *A major difficulty in classifying India within stages of world historical processes, or simply comparative social structure, has been the Indian state.* The notion of a state “above” society dates back to Western Enlightenment idealizers of “Oriental Despotism” (Turner 1978). Over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this idealization gave way--- along side the success of British colonization --- to a critical search for the roots of this elevation of the state in Indian social structure and material organization. The works of Hegel, Metcalf, Marx, Weber, Wittfogel, and Moore attempt to locate the explanatory for the asocial state and the seeming lack of historical development of civil society. Factors as diverse as the self-sufficient “village-republic”, the presence of dynasties rather than classes, a tributary system of government, state monopoly over irrigation resources, and the absence of dynamic political alliance between significant social strata capturing state power for a specific form of economic modernization have been proposed as explanations. One or more of these factors were held to account for the retarding continuity of significant social “space” or the hiatus between state and civil society in India --- a gap that had been overcome through the incorporation of the state during the development of Western civil society.

Even after independence in 1947, the nature of the Indian state has remained a moot point, surrounding decolonization. Thus, to both internationally oriented and South Asian social science, the focal point of debate is the preoccupation with the quality of state structure before and after 1947. Basu has put this *problematique* within the notion of the state-society as a characteristic of the Indian social structure. This, however, has been increasingly challenged by recent scholarship (*ibid*: 198).

The modern Indian state was established by the British to safeguard the class interest of the metropolitan capitalism. This was the basic social goal of imperialism

in India and this could not have been achieved without a powerful colonial state. The state was the only instrument to achieve development of capitalism in India, and thus it could not be an inert or passive state but a very active and preeminent state. The Indian capitalists had no one to look forward for their development except the state. The state in postcolonial situation was the repository of all basic tasks of capitalist development and these tasks were numerous which demanded a powerful state. Thus, it is not surprising that the Indian capitalist classes looked towards the state for the all major economic decisions, and agreed to a situation where politics started determining economics (Bhambhri 2001: 36).

The British Indian colonial state was not based primarily in the economic structures and not shaped primarily by the social forces in the colonial society. The conditions prevailing in British India merely modified the colonial state, the forms and functions of which were determined by the process structures and constellations of power in the British societal formation (Martinussen 1991:25) at the time of independence the Indian state did have the option of following any of the two competing models:

(a) one was the liberal (capitalist) democracy of the west and (b) the other was the socialist model of the eastern Europe (Oommen 2004:114-115). The state of independent India opted for what come to be referred as the 'third way' that is combining multiparty democracy with planned economy. However, it was the planned economy and associated state centrism which assumed saliency in the first quarter century of India's independence. The state intended to promote economic development with an accent on distributive justice and also initiated a series of measures to introduce an institutionalized people's participation (ibid: 115-116).

Indeed, after independence India started with a nationalist-democratic regime. While the nationalist element generally enhances state autonomy from economic forces-especially economic forces under foreign control – the democratic element of the regime tended to lay the state to organize social interests. Thus, the state in India wanted to retain its centrality not only in initiating planned economic development but also in promoting and sustaining the civil society. In doing so it attempted to fuse state, market and civil society. Over time, as anti-colonial nationalism fell into the

background, and interest groups competed for state resources, the autonomy of the state governed by nationalist regime typically declined (Kohli 1987:34).

The national state which succeeded the colonial state invariably started with adequate legitimacy as an agent of economic intervention and development. It had initiated a series of measures to achieve this objective. The two earliest measures were the instituting of the Planning Commission in March, 1950 and the passing of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, of 1950. The first was an instrument to initiate the process of long term economic development. And the second was intended to curb monopolistic tendencies and to avoid waste emanating from undesirable competition between private industrial houses (Panini 1995:35).

Nature of the Indian State

The nature of the Indian state, for almost two decades after independence, was not an issue that attracted serious attention. It was in the mid 1960s, as disillusionment with Indian planning grew and the notion of a 'crisis of Indian planning' spread, that the nature of Indian state began to be seriously addressed. It has been viewed by different scholars from different theoretical perspectives.

In the post Second World War decades, India virtually stood alone among the new nations in presenting a open system of parliamentary government, political stability along with economic growth. It was this remarkable 'Indian exceptionalism' that led Barrington Moore (1966) to devote an entire chapter to India in his influential study. According to Moore, agrarian societies with the entrenched 'feudalistic type' of social, economic, and political inequalities stood as an impediment to the rise of capitalist development: in contrast, a vigorous class of town dwellers or bourgeoisie was indispensable to democratic development. He concluded that since India lacked these basic requisites, 'peaceful stagnation' was the ultimate price of democracy in India.

Gunnar Myrdal advanced a 'broad institutional approach' to the study of economic development in the Third World. In his magisterial three-volume study that is 'mainly about India' Myrdal (1970:229) attributed India's inability to reconcile

economic development with redistribution to the exigencies of the nation's 'soft state':

The soft state is characterized by a general lack of social discipline. ... signified by deficiencies in ... legislation and, in particular law observance and enforcement, lack of obedience to rules and directives handed down to public officials on various levels, often collusion of these officials with powerful persons or group of persons whose conduct they should regulate, and, at bottom, a general inclination of people in all strata to resist public controls and their implementation. Within the concept of the soft state belongs also corruption.

Thus to Myrdal the soft states of newly emergent states (India being the classic example) simply lacked the institutional capacity and political resolve to promote urgently needed economic development (Sharma 1999:40).

Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) argue that Indian state is both weak and strong which has alternated between autonomous and reflexive relations with the society in which it is embedded. The strength of this state derives from the institutions and expectations it has nourished.

Having occupied the "commanding heights" of the industrial economy (basic and heavy industry and infrastructure) and nationalized financial institutions (banks and insurance companies) and monopolized long-term lending institutions, the Indian state came to dominate the country's industrial and finance capital as well as employment in the organized economy. In consequence, organized private capital and organized labor face a third sector, the state, whose control of capital, market power, and standing as employer overshadow theirs in the conduct of policy, politics, and market relationships (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987:23).

The result is a level of 'stateness' and administrative capacity that exceeds those in other Third World countries. On the other hand, the capacity of the state to penetrate the countryside and to influence the unorganized economy, particularly its agricultural sector remains attenuated. The rising levels of mobilization since the mid-1960s impinged on the relative autonomy that characterized the state in the Nehru era. More over, the deinstitutionalization of 1970s has diminished the state's capacity to make policy and manage conflict.

Thus, according to Rudolph and Rudolph, four particular developments have given concrete shape to state weakness: 1) governments led by Indira Gandhi deinstitutionalized the Congress party and state structures; 2) increasing levels of

political mobilization, embodied in demand groups that press for immediate and hand-to-fulfill demands have created an over load on the state; 3) unofficial civil wars among castes and classes have beset the country side; and 4) a new religious fundamentalism is exacerbating hither to latent or low-level social cleavages, making it difficult for the state to accommodate them (ibid: 6-7).

The concept of the weak-strong state has been supported by a theory of political economy of the 'command and demand polity' where the state is the third actor vis-à-vis the organized labour and capital. The state has been analyzed in terms of the conflict between the 'demand polity' in which social demands, expressed as electoral pressure dominate over the state and the 'command polity' where state hegemony dominates over society. The treatment by Rudolph and Rudolph of the state in the context of command politics goes beyond treatments of the state as potentially autonomous, by introducing the concept of the state as 'third actor'. Here the state not only provides order, justice, and security, enhances social goods and benefits, and reduces or eliminates social costs, but it also directly commands enough resources to be self determining, in a variety of policy arenas and historical contexts (ibid: 400).

Rudolph and Rudolph have denied the class character of the Indian state, asserting that the two economic forces that might support class politics - organized workers and private financial and industrial capital - are politically marginal. The state is the 'third actor' vis-à-vis capital and labour. Its dominance of capital and employment in the organized sector dwarfs their influence in the conduct of policy, politics and market relationships (ibid: 2).

According to Atul Kohli Indian state after independence, had been a weak and increasingly 'captured' state. The adoption of mixed economy, though by no means was inevitable, emerged as an alternative suited to the political and economic circumstances of India. State involvement aimed at developing a capitalist economy, therefore, reflected neither 'creeping socialism', nor behind-the-scene bourgeois control of political power. It rather reflected a tacit but mutually beneficial alliance of domination between political and economic forces, neither of which was strong

enough to mold the processes of social change in line with its own interests and ideals (Kohli 1987:65). Looking back at the 1950s and 1960s, Kohli asserted that the Indian state has been incapable of directing socio-cultural transformation in a manner capable of reconciling growth with distribution. As a consequence of this political incapacity the political authorities have entered into a tacit growth oriented alliance with the forces of private enterprise (ibid). Despite vocal commitments to create 'socialism', the Nehru years resulted primarily in the consolidation of newly won state power and in the initiation of industrialization by public support of the private sector. The lower classes did not gain much from this pattern of political intervention. The nationalist leadership, industrial and commercial classes, and the professional and bureaucratic groups were, however, all able to enhance their political and economic interests (ibid: 61).

This is specific pattern of state intervention resulted from the needs of nationalist-reformist leadership to preserve political power while presiding over a state increasingly captured by the socially powerful. The legitimacy of the new rulers was bound up with their promises to help India "step out from the old to the new". And yet the tools available to the leadership for facilitating this socio-economic transformation were few. Economic incentives and political compulsion are two mechanisms utilized by most states to involve socio-economic change from above. The INC was, however, already weak in its capacity to utilize the state's legitimate power as a means of social transformation. The compromises reached by the new leadership in the creation of a consolidated polity further weakened the interventionist capacities of the new Indian state (ibid).

Rajni Kothari (1990: 122-123) argues that the Indian state, especially in the immediate post-war decades, enjoyed autonomy:

We began with a model of nation-building in which the state retained a large measure of autonomy, intervened in the socio-economic spheres with its own agenda of social change, and was relatively free of class, caste and communal interests, at least at national and state levels. A concomitant of this was the autonomy of the political processes. Indeed, its primacy. It permeated different segments and levels of social reality and set priorities. If some areas were left uncovered, it was because our commitment to a democratic ideology and pluralistic society did not permit straitjacketing of the social order. Perhaps, locally, political leaders often found it expedient to operate through entrenched elites and available social structures. But neither of these prevented the state from pursuing its own policies (ibid: 124).

During the fifties, sixties and early seventies, politics was not an epiphenomenon. The state was not just an agent of the ruling class. In fact, there was no homogeneous ruling class. The term makes more sense today than it did then. The

prime actor was not some class but the state. Both the bourgeoisie and the landed gentry were weak and fragmented before the state. And the people saw the state as an instrument of liberation from social inequity (ibid).

Kothari, however, points out that since the early 1970s the erosion of the Indian state was taking root. On the one hand the elite view of setting up the 'commanding heights of the economy' and achieving a measure of self reliance through 'import substitution' was changed. Once their consumer needs were gratified through the setting up of an industrial infrastructure the elite had no use of state intervention in the economy. On the other hand, the international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank came forward with a whole package of liberalization, export orientation and technology transfer through collaboration with multinationals for modernizing the economy and enmeshing it in the global market (ibid: 123-124).

This convergence – of the shift in local industrial capital and the national elite's thinking on the role of the state; the slowly growing affinity of international capital for India, promoted in the main by the World Bank; and the will to withstand pressures for distributive justice within the country – set the stage for the Indian state to be conceived, for the first time, as an agent and collaborator of world capitalism. Not only did the state lose its autonomy from dominant interests; it also was willing to give up its erstwhile role of ushering basic social reforms. Meanwhile, public attention got focused on communal and religious issues, relegating the concern for justice and survival of the masses to the background (ibid).

With the decline in state autonomy there arose the problem of delegitimization. Kothari observes:

The new elite has been discrediting the state by drawing on left and liberal criticisms of the state and its agencies and by invoking the trade against government, bureaucracy, judiciary, Parliament, parties – are no longer considered efficient means for 'progress' and for the march into the 21st century. They instead have come to be looked down upon as impediments in that march, necessary perhaps for maintaining a democratic façade, but to be subsumed under the dynamic thrust of modern technology and management. The whole process of debureaucratizing the state apparatus, the switch from the public to the private sector to achieve new 'commanding heights' through new technologies; the growing importance of autonomous corporations – in dairying, forestry, bio-technology, atomic energy, telecommunications – that are accountable neither to the Parliament nor to the ministries, are all part of this massive shift from the state to the market, as the agent of the national development. The

marginalization of the masses the destitution of the poor and the exploitation of natural resources for private industrial needs are accepted as necessary costs that the nation must pay for progress , for achieving national power and for 'catching-up'.

Pranab Bardhan contends that the state is an autonomous actor in certain historical cases – for example Meiji Japan and India after independence. Here the state has been an important actor in shaping and moulding class power than vice versa (Bardhan 1984: 55-57). However, here Bardhan seems to be happier with Skocpol's concept of 'potential autonomy' than Miliband's or Poulantzas's concept of relative autonomy. In the first decades after 1947, the personnel of the state elite in India enjoyed an independent authority and prestige that made them both the main actors in, and principal directors of, the unfolding socio-economic drama of Indian development, though class constraints existed. Over time, however with strengthening of main proprietary classes, (the industrial and agrarian bourgeoisies) the autonomous behaviour of the state became confined more and more to its 'regulatory' rather than its developmental functions. Bardhan's third proprietary class is made up of the professionals by which he appears to mean the public bureaucracy, which he stretches to include public sector white colour workers. Bardhan sees the policy package of the Indian state as an expression of the coalition of these disparate groups. The government budget is seen as a gigantic mechanism for dispensing subsidies, overt and covert, to various sectors of the dominant coalition, whether through public employment, rationed credit, fertilizer subsidy or other sorts of subsidies.

Morris (1991) has examined the effects of the 'dysfunctional interface' between the state and public enterprise on the performance of the latter. He points out:

If we characterize that Indian state as a coalition of various groups – the big capitalists, the small capitalists and the middle classes, and the farmers, then it is well known that such a state has to make major compromises and adjustments, not just in terms of policy, but also in its implementation (cited in Jalan 1991: 7).

Lipton (1980) has explained the state action in the sphere of development in India in terms of urban 'bias'. Again Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975) have explained the state action in terms of 'rent seeking'.

Rasheeduddin Khan (1989: 42-45) describes the Indian state as a 'total state'. As compared with totalitarian state, the total state is not based on sheer terror and one party dictatorship. Rather, it refers to the unlimited range, extent and exercise of legitimate power by the state over the rest of society. In the Indian context it refers to four characteristics: (a) unlimited state authority over group and individual life; (b) the decisive impact of the state in determining the direction of national life; (c) the preponderant coercive power of the state in relation to the aggregative civil power available to collectivities of people, such as classes and cultural groups; (d) the role of the state as unified apparatus of politico legal hegemony of the dominant classes based on a multi-class electoral support, obtained periodically by the ruling parties. Khan's emphasis is on the over whelming nature of state power in India. He also lays stress on the capability of the state and the political system to control society effectively within the bounds of class hierarchy.

Francine Frankel (2005) looks at the historical contradiction between the transformative goals of development planning and the conservative forces of institutional democratic politics. Making a distinction on between political and social issues, she emphasized the difficulties confronting an accommodationist strategy of class conciliation in politics and a commitment to transformative goals in society within a democratic frame work. Frankel provides a quintessentially pluralist argument. She argues that the predilection of M. K. Gandhi for non-violence and an ideological preference for class conciliation and accommodation with the propertied castes and classes served to greatly limit the post independent state's capacity for fundamentally reform the hierarchical social structures or successfully implement reformist programmes.

Zoya Hasan (1989) explains the persistence of pre modern cultural values in politics as not simply a reflection of weak capitalism but 'the fact that the social and cultural force of pre capitalist forms is much greater in the political sphere than in the sphere of production' (Hasan 1989: 25). Indeed, it is in the political domain that pre capitalist nations have acquired the greatest salience in the recent decades, particularly in terms of determining national consciousness.

According to Barbara Harris-white (2003: 72) state intervention in the process of development takes place at the lower level of abstraction what she has termed as 'the actually existing state'. From this perspective the state is a set of institutions of political and executive control, 'a palpable nexus of practice and institution structure centred on government' (Abrams 1988 quoted in *ibid*). Harris-white has pointed out some significant features of the actually existing local state: (1) the porous nature of the boundary between the state and civil society; (2) the significance of the shadow state; (3) the importance of the private status of the officials; (4) the consequences of liberalization at the local level; (5) the depletion of the local state's resources and (6) fraud and tax evasion. She argues that these features are relevant to India's accumulation process (*ibid*: 88).

Niraja Gopal Jayal (2001) has identified six models of governance that seek to explain the nature of state intervention in India. They are unvaryingly state centred to the extent that regardless of whether they seek to roll back the state, reinvest the state, to control it or to banish it, their referent and point of departure remains the state. They are: (1) the rolling back of the context of economic reforms; (2) the challenge of social movements to the state; (3) control of the state by identity based political parties; (4) franchising the state through the contracting out of public service delivery to non-government organizations; (5) state-civil society partnerships, and (6) decentralization of state structures through initiatives such as the new Panchayat Raj Institutions. These are the visions of the state as expressed in six models of state intervention in the development front in India. They are suggestive of the multiple contradictions and pressures that beset state intervention as it is presently constituted.

According to the Marxists, the complexity of class formation, class configuration and class action are central elements for an understanding of the constraints on the state and capitalist transformation. A. R. Desai (1975) argues that the state which has evolved after independence is essentially a capitalist state. It represents the interests of the Indian capitalist ruling class and the major function of the state is to act as chief instrument of modernization on capitalist lines to project, develop, and defend a capitalist socio-economic formation. Mathew K. Kurian argues,

‘The state in India is an organ of class rule of the bourgeoisie and landlords, led by the big bourgeoisie which is increasingly collaborating with foreign finance capital in pursuit of the capitalist path of development’ (Kurian 1975:113). According to Byres (1998:69), this is the Marxist variant of the narrowly instrumental view of the state. Sudipta Kaviraj commented: ‘There has been in this literature a tendency to underestimate the political function of the state, and to view the state as merely an *expression* of class relations rather than a *terrain*, sometimes an independent actor in the power process (Kaviraj 1988: 2431 emphasis original).

Michal Kalecki (1972) attempted to identify the class nature of the state, in order to explain the *character* of the attempted capitalist transformation which differed qualitatively from ‘classical capitalism’. Kalecki pointed to ‘the weakness of the native upper middle class and its inability to perform the role of ‘dynamic entrepreneur’ on a large scale’ (Kalecki 1972:116), which distinguished the Indian case from *classical* capitalism. Hence, he presented the concept of ‘intermediate regime’. It is a ‘regime’ a ‘state’ or a ‘government’, which presents the interest of, and in which, therefore, ‘the role of the ruling class’ is performed by, two classes: the urban lower middle class and the rich peasantry – or two fractions of the one class, if the rich peasantry is considered as the rural fraction of the lower middle class (Kalecki 1972:115). It is an intermediate regime because it represents the interest of the classes that ‘stand between’ the proletariat and the bourgeoisie (Raj 1973:1191). Given this the basic investment for economic development must therefore be carried out by the state. This is state capitalism. Kalecki’s idea of the Indian state in the form of intermediate regime is intended as a way of distinguishing the non-classical capitalism and of clarifying the working of state capitalism (Byres 1998:63).

According to C. P. Bhambhri, India consciously chose the path of state capitalism based on import substitution, industrialization, and relative self-reliant development. A social consensus existed within the country that the Indian state has to be the engine of growth because the challenges of an underdeveloped economy are quite formidable and there was no other social institution which could play the role of accelerating economic growth with social justice (Bhambhri 2001: 192). The Indian

state was expected to be more than facilitating. 'It must be an active promoter of change, and the central agent of the massive accumulation called for: creating a large public sector, geared to capitalist development. It must initiate accumulation in its own name, decide upon the pattern of accumulation, with capitalist transformation in mind; and take steps to secure sources of accumulation (Byres 1998: 63).

Some scholars (Bhaduri 1983, Bagchi 1985) insist that India is dominated by *semi-feudal* structures. The capitalist representation is unacceptable. They stress the formidable obstacles to a full transition to capitalism constituted by semi-feudal structures and relationships. These latter are identified as being deeply entrenched in most of India's country side, with the exception of the prosperous areas of North-West. This argument comes nearest to the idea of a semi-feudal state.

Scholars subscribing to a subaltern approach subjected bourgeois politics and the nation state to sustained cultural critique. They argued that Indian democracy was the outcome, not of a national popular revolution, but a passive one carried out by the Gandhi-led Congress that enabled the bourgeoisie to establish its hegemony over the subaltern groups, but without ever frontally confronting them. Dealing with the state as an essentially contested concept, subaltern scholars spotlighted their attention outside the circles of elite politics, and emphasized the potential of the subaltern classes (artisans, poor peasants, landless labourers) and their ideologies of resistance in reshaping the state (Chatterjee 1986; 1993; 1998).

However the Indian state is conceived, over the past five decades the Indian state has vigorously sought to institutionalize "stateness" by expanding its power and reach beyond the social formation of which it is inextricably a part. Like other successor post colonial states it has demonstrated a formidable capacity for its own reproduction. The state has become a ubiquitous feature of the nation's political landscape, its jurisdiction and administrative-institutional presence reaching into the remotest rural hinterlands. Yet, the state's instrumental hegemonic trajectory and omnipresence have not made it omnipotent. To the contrary, the state's quantitative expansion has not been matched by a commensurate qualitative increase in autonomy and capacity (Sharma 1999:6).

Conclusion

Following Degnbol-Martinussen (2001: 28-29) the different approaches to state may be divided broadly in two groups: *society centred* and *state centred*. A society centred approach apriori assigns primacy to societal structures and social forces – economic structures, social classes or interest groups depending on the type of conceptualization of society. A state centred approach focuses on the actual behaviour of the state apparatus and its personnel. Without minimizing the importance of societal actors and variables, it is highlighted that the state can advantageously be accorded analytical priority (Clark and Dear 1984).

However, Joel S. Migdal argues that the actual practice of states lie in between the two (Migdal 2001:10-11). States engage in pitched battles with other powerful figures and groups with entrenched ways of doing things. Some times, the power of these other social formations is obvious, some times it is veiled. In either case, the struggles over revenues, other goodies, and which ideas should prevail are fierce and real. These are the battles among shifting coalitions over the rules for daily behaviour. These battles determine how societies and states create and maintain distinct ways of structuring day-to-day life – the nature of the rules that govern people's behaviour, whom they benefit and whom they disadvantage, which sorts of elements unite people and which divide them, what shared meaning people hold about their relations with others and about their place in the world. And processes also ordain the ways that rules and patterns of domination and subordination are challenged and change.

All societies have ongoing battles among groups pushing different versions of how people should behave. The nature and outcomes of these struggles give societies their distinctive structure and character. In this respect, states are no different from any other formal organizations or informal social groupings. Their laws and regulations must contend with other (ibid: 12).

Hasnat Abdul Hye (2001) argues that the traditional concept of the state has been undergoing changes in the cross current of globalization, localization, economic liberalization and privatization. Traditionally state has been defined as composed of only three official components parliament, judiciary and executive. The local government bodies, private sector and the civil society have been considered as the

external components of the state mechanism. Local bodies, private sector and civil society, on their part, either existed in their inchoate conditions or were considered to be simply non-existent at that stage. But the point is that the relative position of the different organs of the state changed with the passage of time and as a dependent variable of different cross cutting factors, the development of informal organs of the state gained impetus when the state through its formal agencies encouraged the private sector and the civil society to participate in governance. This process gives rise to new 'organs' of the state in terms of their social acceptance, autonomy and the resources which call for a redefinition of the state itself. So, redefined governance arises in place of traditional governance either because of deliberate politics pursued by the state in an evolutionary way or through an increasingly vibrant private sector and an expanding civil society including NGOs and other agencies as well.

Peter B. Evans attempts to unravel why some states have so successfully treated industrial transformations of their societies while others' records have been so abysmal. His answer lies in the particularity of institutional arrangements:

States are not generic. They vary dramatically in their structures and relationship to society. Different kinds of state structures create different capacities for state action (Evans 1979:11).

The general views on the role of the state have swung back and forth in the scholarly and policy communities. There was a near consensus during the 1950s and the 1960s that pervasive 'market imperfections' necessitated state intervention for promoting growth. Over time the focus shifted to state 'imperfections' and the 'Washington Consensus' of the 1980s argued for getting prices right, openness, and minimal state intervention. More, recently the pendulum has again swung back, at least some what:

On the one hand there is continuing recognition of the importance of macro economic stability and of getting some prices right, such as the exchange rate and food prices; on the other hand there is a growing recognition not only that sound policy making implementation require an effective state but also that effective state intervention is further needed to promote economic growth. The latter is important both for supporting emerging producers and for helping to build such basic economic capabilities as in restructured, an educated and healthy work force, and technological know-how (Kohli 2004: 3).

Indeed, in the early twenty-first century the state is required to be not only democratic but also effective. The state must have the capability to manage integration

into the global economy, and provide social and economic opportunity and security (WCSDG 2004: ix). There is a strong voice now in favour of renewed role for the state. In the dialogue of the Caribbean states, arranged by the WCSDG, in Barbados on 9th April, 2003, the Prime Minister of Barbados said, “We cannot leave people-focused development to serendipity of market forces. Rather than retreat, the state must forge a new smart partnership with the private sector and the institutions of civil society, (ibid: 18).

According to Ignacy Sachs, the current debate on the state addresses the wrong questions. Its starting point is the opposition between the state and the market but the fact remains that *any market must be regulated* by the state, especially if it is desired that the market economy should also fulfil a social function. The criticisms against statism, which rightly lash out at its excesses and the weight of the bureaucracy, oversimplify the problem by calling for *less* of the state, whereas the real point is that the state should be more efficient and at the same time cost less. It is fashionable to concentrate on state failures and overlook market failures at times equally numerous, as the market is incapable of grasping the long term and the interests of society. It is legitimate to propose a reduction of the role of the ‘Entrepreneurial State’, especially when the public sector consists of firms nationalized at a time when they were bankrupt and when the state by intervening, furthered the particular interests of some private groups having close links with the establishment. However, there still remain the functions of the developmental state, as in the example of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan and also functions of the regulating state (Sachs 2000: 32-33). The real issues for discussion, then, may not be states vs. markets but how states and markets can work together to promote growth, as well as the quality of state interventions – how state intervention help or hurt economic growth (Kohli 2004:4).

The theory and practice of modern industrial states clearly reveal that *laissez faire* doctrine has been a pure rhetoric and every state has regulated the market and individual interest and collective social interest has always been the concern of the theorists of political economy and actual praxis of the Western states. John Echeverri-Gent points out that American state is regarded as a liberal *laissez faire* state and American policy makers are quick to prescribe ‘the magic of market place’ as the key

to economic development. 'The history of American agriculture, perhaps the country's most internationally competitive sector, sharply contradicts this view. The economic and technological vitality of this sector has resulted from a history of extensive state intervention' (Echeverri-Gent 1995: 38). Amit Bhaduri observes:

The very existence of an organised market pre-supposes some basic economic role of the state which economic conservative conservatism prefers to overlook. Adam Smith was the first economist to provide systematic arguments against intervention by the state in functioning the market – which still serve as the basis of conservative economic ideology. At the same time, unlike modern conservative economists, Smith did not ignore the essential role that the state has to play for ensuring the very existence of organized markets (Bhaduri 1990: 261-287 quoted in Bhambhri 2000: 231).

Neither an international order nor global governance can be envisaged without the participation of national state. It is incumbent upon them and their governments to work out something in the nature of a 'political rationale', the expression of a 'collective compromise' that reconciles the criteria of a broad economic formula developed through awareness of the human and ecological costs, and the criteria of values that wins the support, albeit not unanimous, of the political community. (Bartoli 2000: 72). Thus, despite the assault on the state from a number of directions, it will remain central to the study of Third World development.

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