

CHAPTER -5

INDIA VS CHINA AND PAKISTAN: SECURITY PERCEPTION AND STRATEGIC OPTIONS

Perception is the process of acquiring, interpreting, selecting and organizing sensory information, while idea is defined as something "that potentially or actually exists in the mind as a product of mental activity" therefore perception and idea are treated as synonyms. Security perception is hereby a state actor's ideas about security that is its recognition and interpretation of security. Since security perception is an idea of nations, it is necessary to analyse the role idea play is articulating threat.

The threat perception is an important ingredient in determining the security parameters of any state specially one surrounded by nuclear states. India has fought conventional wars' in the past with its two nuclear armed neighbours China and Pakistan. Moreover, India found itself in a precarious situation where it was threatened by China's overt and Pakistan's covert nuclear capabilities with their common interests to deter India. India locates its rationale for the 1998 nuclear test in the so called threat from China heightened by alleged Sino-Pakistan strategic level nuclear and missile collaborations. This chapter attempts to analyse China and Pakistan nuclear policy and examines as to what extent India's security perception vis-s-vis China and Pakistan has been a factor determining the Indian overt nuclear option and further analyses India's strategic option.

5.1 CHINA'S NUCLEAR POLICY

Geostrategically the People's Republic of China (PRC) is Asia's largest mainland state dominating Pacific Ocean sharing common land and maritime borders mostly disputed and unsettled with states in Northeast, in Southeast and South Asia enjoying its military superiority in the region. China is the first Asian state to go nuclear in 1964 and fifth nuclear power of the world. At present it is possess world's third largest nuclear arsenal comprising nuclear triad force.

Despite economic and resource limitations in early years, China chose to develop

a costly nuclear arsenal. As many factors have influence China's nuclear ambitions the most significant nuclear aspirations being— search for identity, prestige, security and technology (Malik, 1994, p.316). The evolution of China's nuclear weapons program, can be tracked down to the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the man behind China's nuclear aspiration was Mao Zedong who stressed China's need to develop nuclear weapons for self defence. Infact, Mao believed that China should acquire nuclear bombs to balance Westen power and argues that if more countries acquire nuclear weapon the less the chance for nuclear war emphasizing the power to deter adversaries.

Moa's vision of China as a major power of the world developed and well armed, and the leader of the Communist world¹could be realised only if China can defend its sovereignty, territorial unity and independence. Imperialism and hegemonism were considered the biggest threat to China's national interest and Moa considered imperialist United States as a major threat. A document drafted by Communist Central Committee headed by Moa on 8 January 1949 entitled "The Current Situation of Our Tasks" highlighted China's concern over United States involvement in supporting Chiang Kai-Shek during the 1946-1949 Civil war and did not rule out the possible future military intervention by United States. The continuous support by US to Chiang Kai-Shek nationalist government in Taiwan and its refusal to recognize PRC was seen as a major challenge to the security of Chinese territory and to the stability of the new communist regime. Mao suspicion of US intentions can be justified on the ground that US on several occasions had considered using or rather arguably threatened to use nuclear weapon against China during and after the Korean war and had even deployed nuclear-armed B-29 bombers to Guam in 1951 for possible use against targets in China.² From the outset China's nuclear weapons programme was circumscribed by firm political boundaries.

Mao defined the limits of nuclear weapons himself in 1956, stating that China's nuclear arsenal will be limited in numbers and that its purpose would not be to seek global or even regional dominance, but rather to boost Chinese courage and to scare others, this statement was the first conceptual inkling of what would later come to serve as the core of China's policy of minimal deterrence (Neill, 2011, p. 27). Despite emphasis on self reliance China had to take assistance from former Soviet Union to develop nuclear weapons.³Six cooperative agreements⁴ resulting to New Defence Technical Accord, was

signed between two countries in 1957 which bounded Soviet Union to provide prototype nuclear device to China (Lewis, 1988, p.39). The agreements covered a relatively complete industrial system for nuclear research and production which attributed to the all round development of nuclear research and infrastructure setup in China. Along with blueprints, technical materials, equipments and assistance, a large number of Soviet nuclear scientist and specialists were sent to China to supervise and assist China's nuclear programme.

According to Marshal Nie Rongzhen, who headed China's strategic programs during the 1950s and '60s said that the agreement worked out quite well in the initial two years but the assistance was short lived. Among various reasons⁵ for Soviet withdrawal from the agreement the most important one was PRC's bombardment of Jinmen (Quemoy) near Taiwan in 1958, which caught Moscow off guard. Soviet President Khrushchev decided to revoke the Sino-Soviet agreement to deliver an atomic bomb teaching model to China and formally terminated the agreement in 1959 citing the Geneva test ban negotiation as the reason for not been able to provide a prototype nuclear device, blueprints, or technical data and assistance to China anymore. Soviet abrupt withdrawal from the agreement had a deep impact on China. With the sense of betrayal the annoyed Chinese leaders became more determined to develop nuclear weapon indigenously. The first indigenously build Chinese nuclear bomb was code named as "596 project" as a reminder of the 1959 when Soviet had withdrew its support to China's nuclear program. The code name clearly demonstrated China's "indignation" toward the Soviet Union (Lin 1988, p. 132).

The complete withdrawal of Soviet advisors in 1960 and the turmoil of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) campaign complicated Chinese efforts to develop a nuclear and ballistic missiles. In particular, the Chinese faced great difficulty in producing adequate amounts of fissile material, particularly plutonium.⁶ The financial and technical constraints created divisions within the Chinese leadership with regard to pursuing nuclear programs. In 1961, the controversy was resolved during a meeting of the Politburo at Beidaihe, which gave more importance to nuclear weapon program at the expense of conventional forces. The arguments that favour the continued spending on

nuclear programs were linked with the development of “sophisticated weapons” with Chinese national economic development.

China exploded its first atomic bomb on 6, October 1964 and subsequently a hydrogen bomb was tested in June 1967. The Chinese government promptly issued a doctrinal statement that outlined the major features of China’s declaratory policy. They declared the test as the achievement of the people of China and rationalised the test as a means to strengthen their national defence opposing US imperialist policy of nuclear blackmail and threat. It stated that China’s nuclear weapon are for self defence and has no intention of using them. Its main purpose is to deter the enemy. The statements indicated that the purpose of China’s nuclear weapons was defensive, and referred to the broader goals of safeguarding world peace and promoting disarmament. Most importantly, the statement articulated the no first use pledge, which remains the major doctrinal statement describing the structure of Chinese nuclear forces. Subsequently, it made an unconditional commitment toward non use of nuclear weapon against non-nuclear states.

It was not until the publication of its Defence White Paper of 2006 that China stated its “nuclear self-defence strategy”. This is guided by five principles: (i) Deterrence of nuclear weapons use or nuclear blackmail directed against China; (ii) ensuring the survivability of its own nuclear weapons and be able to carry out a second strike in the event of a nuclear attack; (iii) relinquishment of nuclear first use; (iv) a centralised command for nuclear weapons; (v) nuclear weapons only to be used against key targets. Over the period of time China has continued to modernised its nuclear arsenal, due to the secrecy of its strategic program, it is a difficult task to accurately estimate China’s nuclear arsenal. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists estimated that China had approximately 400 nuclear warheads in 1999,⁷ but the organization downsized the arsenal to approximately 200 warheads in 2006.⁸ Nonetheless, analysts like Hans Kristensen are confident that China is actively increasing its arsenal, with the 2008, 2010, and 2011 reports listing an increase to 240 warheads,⁹ while the 2013, report described another increase to 250 warheads.¹⁰ The recent report, 2016 describes adding up of 10 warheads tallying to 260.¹¹ These increases would make China the only UN permanent Security Council member nation actively expanding its nuclear arsenal.¹²

5.2 INDIA'S SECURITY PERCEPTIONS ABOUT NUCLEAR CHINA

India China relation started on a positive note. Nehru considered China as India's sister in history (Nehru, 1942, p. 28). India and China's civilization sisterhood laid the basis for modern day friendship based on 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai' or India China brotherhood. For both Nehru and Gandhi, India and China were vital to the maintenance of peace in Asia. For Nehru, China and India were predisposed to peace and cooperation "Ancient societies like India and Chinatends to concentrate on the cultivation of those virtues which made the individual less self-centred and willing to cooperate - tact, poise, balance were essentials" (Jaffrelot, 2003, p.64).

India became the first country in the world to recognise the communist government of China and even took to championing its case for recognition by the United Nation. Nehru reasoned that the Chinese Communists party rise to power was less for victory for communism than a win for Chinese nationalism and Asia's resurgence (Maxwell, 1972, pp. 87-88). However the Indian perception started to change when in 1950 China's invasion of Tibet was the first incident to produce unease for the Indian Government which provoked public demonstration against the Chinese. Nehru was initially adamant that China's claim was limited to suzerainty and not sovereignty. Despite facing domestic criticism from the parties sympathetic to the Tibetans, from those who wanted to continue the British policy of using Tibet as buffer state and others who saw this as the first indication of the looming threat of Chinese expansionism, Nehru eventually continued with his public advocacy of India -China friendship.

Moreover India had come to terms with Chinese sovereignty in Tibet, it was made clear in the trade agreement signed in April 1954 which was called the 'Agreement between India and China on trade and intercourse between Tibet region of China and India'. This agreement established the relations between India and China that were to be carried out according to the principles of peaceful Co-existence or Panchsheel. Despite Nehru's attempts to cover the emerging cracks on India-China friendship another discursive construction of China as expansionist and aggressive began to gain ground. Other Indian leader like Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel saw the threat emanating from China's communist ideology¹³and was adamant about China's expansionist tendencies. Patel

wrote in a letter to Nehru in 1950 that a strong and united communist China posed a threat to India's north and north east frontiers as well as to parts of Assam and Burma. According to Mullik the Chinese would not stop with overrunning Tibet but would "come right up to the borders of India and also claim those parts of northern India, Bhutan, northern Bhutan etc. which has been shown in Chinese maps as coming under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Emperors" (Mullik, 1971, p. 109). Still, Nehru remained unconvinced by these arguments and whatever suspicions he had of China's aggressive tendencies, he repudiated the idea that they would be directed against India and ruled Chinese invasion of India.

By 1959, the correspondence in border issue between India and China had intensified as China started adopting less friendly and more strident language in its condemnation. For instance the border dispute intensified when China completed the Sinkiang-Tibet Highway in 1958, grading 204 km through the disputed area in Aksai Chin at the north western area, the Tibetan revolt in 1959 and the decision of Indian government to grant political asylum to Dalai Lama and mutual accusation of territorial encroachment damaged India China relation. In a letter from Chinese Foreign Secretary, China accused India of interfering in its internal affairs by playing an objective role of encouraging in Tibetan rebel. India reacted with hostility to what was perceived as the statement's threatening undertones. The reply from Foreign Secretary but drafted by Nehru went on to say that India had avoided interference in China's internal matters and would continue this policy, but that this did not mean that it would discard or vary any of their own policies under any pressure from outside (India, 1954-1959, p. 77) This was the first appearance of Indian threat perception of China as a bully that was trying to push India into subservience. Tension was further heightened in September when a letter from Chou En-Lai made what Nehru thought were vast claims on Indian territory, it was the Konga Pass incident of October 1959 that finally convinced Nehru of China's hostile intention in which a small detachment of Indian police officers became involved in a shooting incident with Chinese troops. Chinese and Indian accounts of what transpired at Konga Pass are contradictory with each side accusing the other of shooting first. However for Nehru, the incident had confirmed his worst fears about China which was expressed in his speech to Indian parliament in November 1959, arguing that China had

developed a "sensation of greatness" early in history and thought it was natural for other countries should pay tribute to them (Nehru, 1961, p.367). He said, China had an "inherent tendency to be expansive when she is strong". While considering China's growing strength and its "abnormal state of mind" created by revolution, China posed a definite danger to India. He vowed to keep seeking a peaceful solution but if India's 'honour 'and 'integrity of its territory' was at stake then China cannot barter India's self-respect and honour (Nehru, 1961, p.363). Nehru had initially sought to build a common anti-colonial identity based on ancient civilisation links between China and India, but this was shaken by China's invasion of Tibet. Although Panchsheel was initiated as an attempt to restore the latter, by end of 1959 it had become evident that this would not be sufficient.

Chou En-Lai visited India in April 1960 and repeated the Chinese proposal that the status quo be maintained along the actual line of control pending negotiations. However in the Indian perception China had taken on all the characteristics of a colonial other which made India once again reject the Chinese proposal and in November 1961 took the decision to become more active in defending what it considered to be Indian territory (Hoffmann, 1990, pp. 88-92). Indian government resolved to avert Chinese advancement any further and decided to develop its presence in Aksai Chin by establishing post and patrols. Defence Minister Krishna Menon later refuted the idea that this constituted a forward policy (Mullik, 1971, p. 318) The Indian leadership remained confident that India's military activity would not lead to an escalation in conflict. Moreover there was a genuine conviction among civilian officials that if China were to react with force to India's forward moves, the army would be able to cope with it, despite the indication to the contrary from military personal who had warned Nehru of numerical, logistical and tactical problems involved in executing the forward policy (Hoffmann, 1990, pp. 98-100).

The belief of India that it was in full control of the situation on the Sino-India border was shattered on 10th of October 1962 when a Chinese assault unit confronted an Indian platoon near Tseng Jong on the eastern side of the border. The Indian patrol managed a retreat but not before suffering casualties. (Hoffmann, 1996, pp. 152-153) On 20th October the Chinese began their full assault attacking various Indian posts in the North

eastern Frontier Agency and in Ladakh with the intention of taking all that India had gained through its forward policy and with the goal of pushing Indian troops back to China's 1960 claim line, which was considerably further behind the 1959 actual line of control. After a month of hostilities the Chinese had achieved their immediate military objective, it was more of a demonstration of Chinese military strength. They announced a cease-fire on 21st November and on 1st December began withdrawing troops. China's ceasefire plan was tacitly agreed by India although it refused to accept China's demarcation of the line of control, but was forced to tolerate it.

However in Colombo Conference which was organised to discuss the India-China situation by Srilanka and several other non-aligned states, China refused to agree the proposal which called China to give up territory occupied after the 8th September 1959 which to China was seen as legitimising India's earlier forward policy. Likewise for India, the China's line of control did not align with either a customary boundary or the pre-war administrative reality (Hoffmann, 1996, pp. 226-8). Without the means or inclination to challenge it, India has mostly abided by the Chinese line of control since 1962 with relatively few major incidents.

“Militarily the Chinese victory was complete, the Indian defeat absolute”¹⁴ which altered the security environment with a everlasting impact left on India’s security psyche. These events generated a radical change in Indian perceptions of China, India could no longer rely on friendly overtures to inhibit China which forced Nehru to re-evaluate Indian security. Calls for the developments of nuclear weapons were made in the Indian Parliament by Bharatiya Jana Sangh as part of India's long term defence effort against China.¹⁵ Though Nehru resist these demands and the nuclear program continued on its peaceful track, however the fact was obvious that India was lacking in security. After the humiliating defeat in 1962 border war India fears Chinese 'policy of expansionism' on other territorial claims as China still occupies 38,000 sq km. of Kashmir and claims another 90,000 sq.km. in Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (Hindu,31 July 2003). New Delhi has been very cautious whenever the Chinese have collaborated with India's neighbours, in fact China had settled border issues and signed agreement with Nepal (1960), Burma (1960) and Pakistan (1963) (Kerttunen, 2009, p. 107).In addition the close

cooperation between China and Pakistan, confirmed in 1963, when China has acquired 5,180 sq.km. territory of POK under the Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of 1963,¹⁶ which indicated growing security collaboration against Indian interests, this further increased India's threat perception towards China and its feeling being surrounded by a hostile neighbourhood (Frey, 2006, p. 112.).

Against the backdrop of the still sore wound of 1962 defeat, a nuclear dimension was added to Sino-India hostility when the Chinese tested on 16 October 1964, becoming the first Asian power to detonate a fission weapon. China's nuclear breakthrough alarmed India which broke Indian illusion that its nuclear technology was ahead of China. Moreover, India now had to face nuclear foe along with territorial foe which India perceived as an unfavourable power imbalance.¹⁷ Chinese explosion set off an unprecedented six weeks of nuclear debate in India and brought a shift in action in India's nuclear program. Those who advocated nuclear weapon argued that the only way to deter China from further military aggression or nuclear blackmailing was to acquire nuclear weapon for itself. The 1964 Lok Sabha debate on foreign and nuclear policy centred on general notions of the new strategic environment (Cohen2001, p.161).

Indian PNE in 1974 (code named Buddha Smiled) was the result of a decade of contemplation about the nuclear weapon that originally began in reaction to China's nuclear test. Eight days after the Chinese test, Bhabha on All India Radio warned about future possibility of Chinese nuclear attack on India and to deter threat India should opt for bomb because India's nuclear capability could only deter nuclear attack and he signalled that India could manufacture nuclear bomb in just eighteen months (Perkovich, 1999, p. 67). Indian disappointment was further aggravated by positive reaction to the Chinese test by other developing countries.

In 1965 Indo-Pakistan war the most disturbing aspect for India was China's diplomatic support throughout the conflict to its new found ally Pakistan, moreover on 8th September China sent an open diplomatic note to India threatening "grave consequences" if India proceeded with military action against Pakistan. Further on 17th September China directly threatened Indian position on the Tibet border. Though, India firmly resisted Chinese pressure but nuclear armed China presented India with a security threat that could not be ignored. Following year Chinese successfully launched a nuclear

weapon tipped missile and on 17 June 1967, China exploded a thermonuclear device and became 'very belligerent' - moving troops into disputed area, the Government of India expressed that China had caused 'grave concern' to it and heightened Indian apprehension about China's nuclear blackmail and intimidation. India cited 'China problem' as its great concern during the NPT negotiations, further Chinese nuclear test during the NPT negotiation aggravated Indians concern which was highlighted when External Minister, M.C Chagla, referring to China declared in Lok Sabha (1967) that India was "under continuing menace of a country which had already exploded an atomic bomb, and we will certainly bear in mind this vital factor" while considering India's policy towards the NPT (Chakma, 2005, p.208). India's rejection of NPT in 1968 bears this concern about China's building sophisticated nuclear arsenal which India perceives as a threat to its security.

In the early 1970's when China launched their first satellite the debate about India acquiring the bomb intensified as Chinese could use tactical nuclear weapon in a limited Himalayan confrontation. Further Indian perceives that it signifies Chinese persistence to build a ballistic missile capability that could hit at distant Indian targets. A strong demand for India to build nuclear weapons to meet the Chinese threat was made on many occasions as such, seminar conducted by Indian Parliamentary and Scientific Community to access the implication of Chinese growing missile delivery capability for Indian national security. The survey by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion projected a growing high threat perception about China's nuclear and missile capabilities among Indian publics.

As in 1965, New Delhi was subjected to China's verbal warning during third Indo-Pak war, it did not intervene militarily but did give a moral and material support to Pakistan during the 1971 war. This certainly increased India's threat perception, since the memory of the 1962 defeat was still fresh there was some apprehension about what Beijing might do. The final Indian invasion of East Bengal was delayed until the winter season, though there was no prospect of a ground attack by China across the frozen Himalayas (Cohen, 2001, p. 136). In the words of John Garver, "in this high stakes card game India was the only player without nuclear weapons" (Garver, 2001, p.322). This fact might have remained in Indira Gandhi's mind when she gave approval for nuclear test in

1971. Another important event which had immense impact on India's sense of security on the subcontinent as in 1972, when China deployed its first nuclear capable missile DF-3 with a range of 1250km, long enough to reach India¹⁸ it represented the first modern missile threat to all cities in India from its neighbour. Indian security vis-a-vis China was reduced significantly by this new development as deployment of modern intermediate range missile was pivotal which enabled China to immediately and easily threaten India. Following these events chronologically Prof. Chakma rightly points out that the 1974 PNE was a culmination of India's search for a nuclear strategy against a growing nuclear security dilemma precipitated by the Chinese nuclear weapon programme (Chakma, 2005, p. 208).

Apart boarder dispute, Chinese nuclear cooperation with Pakistan continued to constrain Sino-India relation, in fact Raj Menon hinted that the 1983 nuclear test at Chinese Lop Nor test site was actually a Pakistani test (Menon 2000, pp. 95-97). In 1986 tension mounted between India and China when North-eastern Frontier Agency was made a state of Arunachal Pradesh of the Indian union. China protested this Indian move as large part of the Chinese claimed territory lies in Arunachal Pradesh and demanded concession. Parallel to Brasstacks, India began exercise "Chequerboard" on the north eastern Himalayan border with China, there was also a Chinese intrusion at Sumdorong Chu at the India- Bhutan -Arunachal Pradesh junction near Thagla Ridge.(Cohen 2001,p.148) This led to large deployments of armed force on both sides of the border which brought China and India to the verge of war.

The structural change that came with the end of cold war in the international system in 1990's intensified India's security concerns. China growing alliance with Pakistan aggravated India's strategic anxiety. The magnitude and level of Sino- Pak relations and its implication for Indian security was a grave concern for India as it perceived threat not only from China Pakistan alliance to counter balance India but also from China's effort to provide Pakistan with nuclear know how to produce bomb.¹⁹ Beijing's has actively helped Islamabad by providing it with a test designed of a nuclear warhead, M-9 and M-11 ballistic missile, fissile material, nuclear plants, missile components and ring magnet for enriched uranium (Newstime, 27 June 2002). To add up in 1993 and again in 1995, China conducted a series of nuclear tests and installed of CSS-

5s medium range missiles in Tibet, with a range of about 1,333 miles, which was seen as targeting India (*Indian Express*, July 11, 1997). This development, contributed to intensify the existing South Asian security dilemma substantially from the Indian point of view. In such a circumstance, India had to pursue an independent and self-reliant defence posture that involved nuclear weapons.

It is against this background India demonstrated its *Shakti* (strength). India became a self declared nuclear weapon state after testing five nuclear devices during May 11-13, 1998 in the Pokhran range. The rationale behind the test can be determined from the letter by Prime Minister Vajpayee to President Bill Clinton following India's nuclear tests in May 1998, in which he clearly cites China without mentioning the overt nuclear state. He wrote about the complexities involved in the deteriorating security environment, especially the nuclear environment faced by India and the compulsions of circumstances confronting India to make overt its nuclear capabilities.²⁰

In addition to Vajpayee's letter, India's Defence Minister, George Fernandes made a series of public comments about China being India's "number one threat" and explicitly mentioned as the motivation for developing nuclear weapons (Perkovich, 1999, p. 415). China strongly reacted when PM Vajpayee's letter to President Clinton was leaked. The Chinese President, Jiang Zemin stated that the rationale behind India's nuclear test was to establish hegemony in South Asia. China was more upset about being labelled as the primary motivation for India developing a nuclear capacity than at the tests themselves.

The overt nuclearisation of India has not decreased its security perception with regard to China as it is evident from the incidents that followed in the post-Pokhran era. First, India's nuclear status has not deterred China infact it refuses to recognise India as a nuclear state. A sort of 'cold war' rivalry between the two nuclear neighbours continues to effect its relations. China's rapid modernisation of its nuclear arsenal and deployment of new advance strategic weapon has infact increased Indian apprehension. Eminent strategist B. Chellaney in 2000 pointed how China is conducting massive expansion of its missile capabilities and one of its new missiles the Dongfeng (DF) has the capability to

target any part of India. China is the only state among the five nuclear powers who is conducting massive modernisation of its nuclear arsenal and deploying its nuclear fore

Second, China has mostly resolved its border dispute with its neighbour except India, which is seen as a strategy to keep India engaged. No solution to the border dispute between India China seems possible in immediate future. Reports of Chinese intrusions across the Sino-Indian border keep appearing time and again. China's growing claims along the LAC has enhanced India's concern about its territorial integrity. Moreover China is already in control of 35,000 Km of Aksai Chin in the west and further claims Arunachal Pradesh in the east referring to it as "Southern Tibet"²¹ In 2003 Chinese troop incursions into Arunachal Pradesh were reported by the *Times of India* as 'Arunachal is Not a Part of India: Beijing's Difference of Perception.'²² Political analysts viewed it as per acute development, especially in light of Vajpayee's China visit. Even though China has resolved most of its border disputes with other countries, it is hesitant to move ahead with India on border issues. Regardless of continuous talk between the two countries no substantive results have been seen. The territorial dispute of unresolved boundaries is the most important issue that, from an Indian perspective, has hurt the Sino-Indian relationship the most. Further the rapid expansion and modernization of China's transport infrastructure across the border has accelerated India's concern and India is bound to respond to China's build-up of infrastructure.

Third, China has been pursuing the policy of containing India and further tries to balance India by forging strategic alliance with immediate Indian neighbours by providing military assistance and investing in developmental projects. To a certain extent it had been successful in encircling India "with Pakistan in the West, Tibet in the north and Bangladesh and Myanmar in the east." (Karnad, 2008, p. 135) Former Chief of the Indian Navy Admiral Arun Prakash writes that China has created 'right around us what are best described as "weapon client states": Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan' (*Indian Express*, 2007). The annual Ministry of Defence reports from 1998 to 2007 expressed concern about China's rising defence budget, its aggressive posture and military build-up in Tibet and along the Indian border, and the strengthening of its strategic strike force.

Rumel Dahiya and Ashok Behuria perceive that the progress between China and India is too little and too slow. Some Indian analysts have argued that China has become less interested in resolving the boundary dispute and has recently become more assertive about its claims on Arunachal Pradesh, and particularly Tawang. They argue that China is uncomfortable with a rising India as a connection can be seen between the cementing of India-US relationship in 2005 and the hardening of China's position on Tawang and Arunachal Pradesh.

They support their argument by citing China's strong objection to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to the disputed territory Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh. China condemned India for giving permission to Dalai Lama to visit Tawang, In June 2009 China objected the approval of the loan for the project in Arunachal Pradesh by Asian Development Bank. Furthermore during Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to India in 2006, Chinese Ambassador went to the extent of directly calming Arunachal Pradesh as part of China. All this indicate China's strong resentment against India (Dahiya & Behuria, 2012, p. 60). The Chinese stand on India's aspiration to become a member of Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) is quite alarming. China explicitly stated on 1st November 2016 that it does not support India's bid for NSG membership until general rules are formulated to include other non members of NPT. This clearly indicated that China is keen to include Pakistan joining the group if India makes it to NSG and for this reason China prefers to wait for until conducive situation is created to facilitate Pakistan entry.²³

5.3 PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR POLICY

The 1998 Indian nuclear tests followed by Pakistani nuclear test shook the Indian sub-continent as a result the tests made the world and in particular South Asia more dangerous place. The Pakistan nuclear program was more as an equalizer in context of its traditionally inherent hostile relationship with India. Since Pakistan nuclear postures and policy was India reactive, not surprisingly it followed the suit when India decided to go nuclear. However the bitter sour relationship between the two neighbour has a long history. The 1947 partition of British India into two independent states of India and Pakistan was the base of the hostile relationship which shaped the security environment

of South Asia. The mass migrations across the borders resulted in deaths of thousands of people which have a deep impact till today. The difference in divided economy and military asset and disputed territories especially Kashmir has been the bone of contentions between India and Pakistan which led then to war in 1948.

Akhtar Ali considers security and prestige as the motives behind Pakistan's quest for nuclear weapons, however India as a threat to Pakistan national security and its nuclear activities have moulded the Pakistan nuclear programme from civilian to military oriented. Pakistan nuclear programme commenced in 1954. The program was a civilian and peaceful program for much of its early history. With technical aid from the U.S. Atom for Peace program²⁴ and following extremely successful public exhibitions of nuclear power, the Pakistani nuclear program evolved gradually over the next decade (Abraham, 2009, p. 5). In Weiss opinion, initially Pakistan seemed to have been seeking only civilian nuclear capabilities. Its civilian nuclear programme began with participation in the US Atoms for Peace initiative. Indeed it was not until after the Eisenhower administration launched its "Atoms for Peace" programme in December 1953 that Pakistan's leadership sought to develop a small nuclear research programme (Weiss, 2003, pp. 34-44). By October 19, 1954, while announcing the establishment of an Atomic Energy Research Organization, the Minister for Industries, Abdul Qayyum Khan said that without delay Pakistan will embark on nuclear research and development of nuclear energy for civilian purpose considering the enormous progress other states are making by utilizing nuclear energy. In 1956 Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) entrust with responsibility of establishing research institute for peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Until 1960's Pakistan failed to undertake necessary measures to establish a nuclear infrastructure due to administrative, financial constraints, poor training facility, and shortage of skilled manpower. It was inconceivable in the absence of trained scientists, engineers and technicians to pursue nuclear energy and nuclear programme. Moreover the instable political environment with frequently changing government with seven Prime Minister in eleven years delayed nuclear development in Pakistan.

Along with Atom for Peace project India bagged nuclear agreement with Canada who helped India with 40 mw Canada-India Reactor (CIR) which proved to be a turning point in South Asian nuclear proliferation. PAEC considered it to be a significant breakthrough

for India and became increasingly apprehensive when India completed the reprocessing plant. Pakistan expressed its concern to Canada over the fact that India would use CIR for nuclear production which indeed came true when India tested in 1974.

By the early 1960s, India, by vigorous indigenous efforts and with considerable foreign assistance, made substantial progress in building a formidable nuclear infrastructure. More importantly, it had established a technological base, which could allow India to begin a nuclear weapons programme or at least a nuclear explosives project if they needed. As a matter of fact, India launched its nuclear explosive project in 1965 after Chinese nuclear test and India's growing interest in nuclear option was a great concern to Pakistan. This perception was further accentuated when Indians began to debate whether it was necessary to build nuclear weapons to counter China.²⁵ Indian chief nuclear scientist Homi Bhabha's assertion that India could detonate a nuclear device in eighteen months sparked enormous concern in Pakistan.

In 1965 the seed for future India -Pakistan nuclear confrontation was sown as the fear that India's nuclear weapon programme would alter the balance of power drove Pakistan to initiate the second war against rival India. Within Eighteen years of partition, India and Pakistan fought their second war over disputed Kashmir territory in 1965. The Pakistan trained guerrillas tried to seize Kashmir -Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, infiltrated Pakistani military into Jammu and Kashmir to force an international resolution over the disputed territory, and to persuade local Kashmiri people to rise up against an unfavourable Indian rule. However the Indians successfully curbed the infiltrators and held territory heretofore occupied by Pakistan. Following an Indian victory, the war ended with a cease-fire called by United Nation which was formalised at the Soviet-mediated Tashkent meeting in January 1966.

For Pakistan, the traditional notion of its conventional military inferiority vis-a-vis India was revisited by this conflict. Pakistan's military was incapable of regaining control of Kashmir. Pakistan's membership in Western defence alliances, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) proved to be of no use in its war against India. The Primary motive of Pakistan to join US sponsored defence alliance was to counter India's security threat (Mahmood, 1995, p. 6).

Its immediate impact was to reduce reliance on the US for Pakistan's national security. Pakistan slowly drifted away from SEATO and finally withdrew from it in September 1972, although it remained in CENTO. Being disillusioned with the US, Pakistan cultivated closer relationship with Beijing(Chakma, 2002, p. 882). Bhutto argued that a defence against India was needed, and the desire for the bomb would allow Pakistan "to walk tall" in the international arena and enhance its security.²⁶

Pakistan had signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963 but it is unclear why it did not ratify the treaty, however this can be seen as the first divergence from the path of nuclear non-proliferation. Though Pakistan played a constructive role during the NPT negotiation and considered it as an initial step to eliminate nuclear weapon. It had actively participated in all the efforts made to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons and also took some initiative in this regard.²⁸ But Indian refusal to sign the Treaty created dilemma for Pakistan, it was apprehensive about India- later the, Pokhran I of 1974- confirmed Pakistan's suspicions, even though voted for the treaty, Pakistan decided not to sign the treaty until India does so. The only possible reason might have been that it was a clear manifestation of Pakistan's growing concern over India's nuclear potential and decided to retain the option to develop nuclear weapon.

Several events in 1970's motivated Pakistan's nuclear programme. The first was the Pakistan's defeat in 1971 war with India which led to the creation of a new country Bangladesh. The event forced Pakistan to reassess its security policy, in fact it motivated political decision to embark on nuclear weapon program to deter India. The second development was the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 which reinforced Pakistan decisions to acquire nuclear deterrence capacity as the earliest.

It was not until Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to power in mid- December 1971, that a rigorous effort was made towards developing a nuclear weapons program following the loss of East Pakistan. Due to political dissent and overall ill-treatment of East Pakistanis following the 1971 elections in Pakistan, a civil war was ignited. By early December a military conflict eventually ensued due to Indian interference in Pakistani affairs. While India provided financial support to assist the Mukti Bahini Bengali Liberation Movement, Pakistan felt that such efforts were to weaken or dismember Pakistan as it suffered a great loss when East Pakistan became an independent nation, Bangladesh, as a result, an

environment of distrust ignited years of endless animosity between two adversaries (Shazia Rana, pp. 15-16). Pakistanis extracted bitter lessons from that defeat. First, they concluded that, India's target was either to destroy Pakistan or force it to rejoin India and establish Akhand Bharat (undivided India). Second, Pakistan could never match India's conventional military superiority which was evident from the three consecutive defeat it faced since 1948. The consequent break-up of Pakistan induced a deep sense of insecurity in the minds of the Pakistani decision-making and political elite. As a consequence an era of 'new defence thinking' began in Pakistan, which was a direct stimulus to the Pakistan nuclear development. Mr. Bhutto immediately after becoming president took initiatives to build nuclear force which indicated a new policy direction. Bhutto was motivated by a desire for Pakistan to deal with India's conventional military advantage and demonstrate a capability to build its own bomb Bhutto personally took charge of Division of Nuclear Energy Affairs and rendered the activities of the PACE more secretly, as the M.A Khan new PACE chief who replaced I. H Usmani was answerable to PM only. A separate Ministry of Science, Technology and Production were set up.

Pakistan's quest for nuclear weapons was further spurred by India's nuclear explosion in 1974. Though India claimed it to be a 'Peaceful Nuclear Explosion' (PNE) with no military implications²⁹ it left a lasting psychological impact on Pakistan. However the test demonstrated that India was capable to develop nuclear weapons if it wished to. This also strengthened the resolve of Pakistan's leadership to counter the emerging Indian nuclear threat by developing atomic bomb of its own. Following day Pakistan's Prime Minister Z.A Bhutto declared India's nuclear explosion to be a fateful development and threatening as well and declared that Pakistan was determined not to be intimidated. On May 22, PM Gandhi wrote a letter to Bhutto assuring that India remains committed to the "policy of developing nuclear energy entirely for peaceful purpose and the explosion had no military, political foreign policy implications".³⁰ Bhutto responded with a letter saying that "it is a question not only of intentions but of capabilities".³¹

Pakistan reinforced its nuclear weapon programme as it has used both the plutonium and uranium routes to acquiring nuclear capability. Pakistani scientists started to lay the groundwork for the development of a covert military nuclear program that sought to obtain a plutonium reprocessing plant from France. The reprocessing plant by

separating fissionable plutonium from the spent reactor fuel could facilitate Pakistan in launching on a nuclear weapon programme, this caused anxiety in USA, on the ground that Pakistan might redirect the plant to acquire nuclear weapon capability. However France succumbed to the US pressure in 1979 and unilaterally backed out from the deal.

General Zia-ul-Haq's government, who took over the Pakistan Government through a military coup in July 1977, opted for the uranium route in the late 1970s. Zia-ul-Haq's regime was completely successful in its clandestine efforts to secure classified designed of a centrifuge-based uranium enrichment plant and in obtaining a number of critical sub-system, components and materials.³² However a great leap forward was when AEC was able to illicitly secure Dutch blueprint of an ultracentrifuge for uranium enrichment through A.Q. Khan, who had worked at an enrichment plant in the Netherlands, made use of his Dutch connection to procure various sensitive materials and equipments from European and North American sources. Upon adoption of the uranium enrichment method, it appeared more promising compared to plutonium approach in Pakistan's quest for nuclear weapons capability. This signified the urgency that Islamabad felt to acquire nuclear weapons. At this stage, Pakistan began to explore aggressively new means of acquiring nuclear raw materials primarily uranium (Chakma, 2002).

The two incidents in particular had a great implication on Pakistan's nuclear programme in 1980's. First there were a rumour of an Indian pre-emptive strike on Pakistan's nuclear installations at Kahuta and the small reprocessing facility at PINSTECH in Rawalpindi, which reinforced Pakistan's determination and accelerated its efforts to acquire a nuclear retaliatory capability that would prevent India from undertaking such a strike, in particular, geared up its clandestine uranium enrichment programme. By 1982, it had enough centrifuges to produce enriched uranium for six nuclear weapons annually (Hart, 1982, p. 134).

Second, an Indian military exercise along the Pakistani border in 1986-1987, further solidified Pakistan's defence posture. Between December 1986 and March 1987, the Indian armed forces conducted a series of military exercises, the biggest in Indian history, codenamed Brasstacks. The exercises, conducted in the Rajasthan desert along the Indo-Pakistani border, set off alarm bells in Islamabad, as a counter measure, the Pakistani armed forces announced their own plan of winter military exercises in

November and December, codenamed Saf-e-Shikan (later renamed as Sledge Hammer) and moved its force in the direction of India's then troubled Punjab. Military tension between the two countries soon intensified substantially, almost to the brink of another major war. The crisis was formally defused when President Zia-ul-Haq flew to India to attend an India-Pakistan cricket match. However Brasstacks lead to the weaponization of both countries' nuclear programme.³³ After taking the office as President of the United States, Jimmy Carter invoked the Glenn-Symington Amendment³⁴ and suspended economic and military aid to Pakistan for its suspected development of nuclear weapons in January 1979. However Soviet invasion of Afghanistan dramatically changed this course, Pakistan's geopolitical importance as a frontline state became invaluable to the US, in an attempt to contain the expansion of Soviet power and influence in South Asia. In 1981, the Reagan administration began to provide substantial amounts of economic and military assistance to Pakistan. However, Pressler Amendment Act of 1985³⁵ suggested that the U.S. policy of seeking to contain the Soviet Union was proceeding at the expense of nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

Both Presidents Reagan and Bush (senior) administration continued to provide military aid to Pakistan until 1989, on the grounds that it would be conducive to enhancing the security of Pakistan and thereby reduce the incentive for that country to go nuclear. While Washington turned a blind eye to Islamabad's nuclear programme, Pakistan steadily proceeded with the development of nuclear weapons as armed conflict against Soviet troops continued in Afghanistan. Pakistani scientists working at Kahuta prepared a number of nuclear designs and cold tested them' in 1983-84. In 1985, Pakistan began to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium and was "ready to go for a hard test" (Bakhtiar and Abbas 1998). On the domestic front after President Zia death on a plane crash while returning from U.S. Pakistan moved towards a long waited election, in November 1988, Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) formed the minority government. She inherited a nuclear weapon program controlled by an army that was likely to resist any effort to constrain it. However US State Department reported about Pakistan's clandestine procurement of nuclear technology and material from private westerns firms. Incidentally, this was also the time when Pakistan obtained blueprints for nuclear warheads from China. Since June 1976 Pakistan concluded a secret agreement

with China for collaboration in nuclear weapon technology. Thereafter, China played a very active role in helping build up Pakistan's nuclear and missile capabilities, as the invasion of Afghanistan had brought Pakistan and China even closer and helped foster a common Sino-Pakistani interest to drive the Soviet force out of Afghanistan.

By 1989 Soviet forces completely withdrew from Afghanistan, which had a great implication on US-Pakistan relations, a year later in 1990 Washington ceased assistance applying the Pressler Amendment. President Bush (senior) could not certify to the US Congress that Pakistan was not manufacturing a nuclear explosive device, which led to the complete suspension of aid. Pakistan had allegedly been fabricating enriched uranium metal strips needed for the production of nuclear explosive devices which was then overlooked when US needed Pakistan to counter Soviet. The Pakistani felt betrayed and abandoned by US, such outcome facilitated a Pakistani reassessment of the country's dependence on external powers for its own security and eventually provoked Pakistan to expedite its nuclear programme (Chakma, 2002, p. 897). Despite claims to the contrary, Pakistan did not cease uranium enrichment in the aftermath of the US sanctions imposed in October 1990. However by that time Pakistan was developing its weapon delivery capability by producing various missile systems, initially from China, and later from North Korea.³⁶ Consequently, by 1998, Pakistan was credited with the ability to produce at least 15-20 nuclear weapons.³⁷

Until early 1990, Pakistan pursued a two-track policy. On one hand, it systematically sought to develop a clandestine nuclear weapon capability, and on the other hand it systematically put forward variety of proposal for regional denuclearization which gave it the moral high grounds against India. The proposal included mutual bilateral inspections of each other's facilities, third party verification, the conclusion of a bilateral treaty to give up nuclear weapon, mutual and simultaneous signature of the NPT, and the establishment of South Asian nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) (Praful Bidwai, Achin Vanaik, 1999, pp. 216-217).

After the end of cold war era, Pakistan faced a dilemma whether to pursue a military nuclear programme against extreme international pressure to roll back its nuclear programme or continue with the program and face the consequence of economic sanctions from US. While coping with this dilemma the Kashmir dispute in 1990-

Pakistani involvement in the Kashmir insurrection- brought India and Pakistan very closer to a third war. Pakistan used a putative nuclear capability as an umbrella to protect its assistance to the Kashmiris³⁸. During this crisis, Pakistan was suspected to have assembled a 'crude nuclear device' which it was ready to use in the wake of the war. India also reportedly prepared itself to counter a Pakistani nuclear attack if war occurred. This incident was an evident that Pakistan was determined to possess nuclear weapons. Moreover, the Pakistani dilemma ended here, the outcome of the crisis reassured Pakistani leadership that with nuclear weapons, Pakistan could prevent the possibility of an Indian conventional or nuclear attack in future. It even would be able to avoid a possible Indian nuclear blackmail. It paved the way for Pakistan's reliance on nuclear weapons for its security. (Chakma, 2002, pp. 903-906).

Stephen Cohen points out that the important consequences of the 1990 crisis was that the other state began to look carefully at India-Pakistan as 'war-and crisis-prone states' who were suspected to possess nuclear weapon. This became evident in 1998 when the two states exploded their nuclear weapon with a total 11 test that shook the sub-continent followed with the Kargil crisis in 1999, the first incident after overt nuclearization of India-Pakistan. Pakistan defence posture gradually hinged upon nuclear weapon, in August 1994 PM Sharif in public meeting disclosed that Pakistan possesses atomic bomb. This revelation came in the wake of Clinton Administration's major nuclear non-proliferation initiative for South Asia to 'cap, reduce, and roll back' India and Pakistan's nuclear programmes. In 1996 Islamabad linked its position on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to India's position. In Pakistan's view, without India's signature on the CTBT, its own signing of the treaty would be suicidal in view of India's superior conventional and nuclear capabilities. Pakistan's decision not to sign the CTBT was also influenced by India's 'near nuclear test' incident in late 1995, as US agencies had detected India's preparation of the Pokhran test site for a nuclear device explosion. In response to India's test preparations, Pakistan also undertook preparation for a nuclear test. US satellite photos reportedly revealed evidence of Pakistan's preparation for nuclear test at the Chagai test site, though Pakistan dismissed the report as speculation (Chakma, 2002, p. 909).

Just two weeks later after India's nuclear test- Pokhran II, Pakistan, as expected responded to India's five test by detonating six nuclear device near Chagai in Baluchistan on 28 and 30 May 1998. It was a political decision that Pakistan took to conduct its nuclear tests while ignoring all pressure from the world. According to Rodney Jones, nuclear weapon was seen in Pakistan as a source to strengthen its security (Jones, 1997, p.212). However, the overt nuclearisation by the two unfriendly neighbours in South Asia ended the long held ambiguity by India and Pakistan.

5.4 INDIA'S SECURITY PERCEPTIONS ABOUT PAKISTAN

India's relations with Pakistan has seen more low than high points since the descend of the erstwhile British Empire in 1947, which divided this natural geo-political region into two major states with a congenital conflictual relationship that hovers like a spectre on the Indian subcontinent. Mistrust between India and Pakistan has its roots in the historical legacy. The very establishment of Pakistan was resented by many Indian leaders like the then President of Indian National Congress J. P Kripalani had warned that India had not given up its claim of a united India and later after independence, Home Minister Sardar Vallabhai Patel had said that sooner or later the people of India and Pakistan shall be united to become one country as it was before. On the Indian interpretation Jinnah's vanity, short sightedness, and religious ardour were the main attributes for united India. India considered partition to be unnecessary and tragic but it was essentially complete. Pakistan on the other hand felt that the Indian are un-reconciled to the division of the sub-continent and favours reunification with force. Pakistan considered partition as inevitable and necessary but it was fundamentally incomplete mainly because a Muslim majority state, Kashmir remained with India.³⁹

Kashmir has been the bone of contention between the newly formed states, locked into a rivalry emanating out of the struggle to control Kashmir. The conflict over Kashmir involved both territory and the national identities of India and Pakistan. For India, the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which is multi-religious but predominantly Muslim, is a central pillar of the secular Indian nation-state.⁴⁰ For Pakistan Kashmir should be putative part of Muslim state in South Asia. As a consequent two neighbours have fought three wars in 1947-48, 1965 and 1999 and twice in 1990 and 2001-2002

border dispute have threatened to escalate into nuclear conflict. India has a volatile border with Pakistan and is wrestling with Pakistan sponsored terrorism in Kashmir.

Kashmir was the central objective of the first two India-Pakistan wars in 1948 and 1965. In 1947 with Pakistani military arm support the Pathan tribesmen from North Western Frontier mounted an invasion of J&K that alarmed Maharaja Hari Singh who asked for an Indian intervention to stop the raiding tribesmen from taking Srinagar (Ganguli, 2002, pp. 16-17).

Along with the request for Indian help, he signed the Instrument of Accession of Kashmir to Indian Union, on Prime Minister Nehru's promise of Indian troops to suppress an uprising. Later the issue was referred to United Nations and on December 1948 a cease fire was accepted by both the states. The important significance of Indo-Pak War were, first was the division of the J&K state between India and Pakistan, the second was the internecine struggle for its control that viles relations between the two countries till today and the third, was consistent Pakistani policy of claiming popular discontent in Indian Kashmir and using non-military personnel with crucial support from the Pakistani military to change the status quo (Sinha, 2008, p. 66).

In between India felt direct threat when US and Pakistan signed Mutual Defence Agreement on May 19, 1954 as President Eisenhower gave extended military assistance Pakistan. The growing Pak-US military alliance especially the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO)⁴¹ was seen by India as a dangerous pursuit aimed at attaining parity with India. P.M Nehru amplified his concern in a letter to his Chief Minister in which he argued that U.S aid would change the balance of power in the region and exacerbate threats against India. As the U.S Government clearly did not understand Pakistan's intention and badly underestimated the possibility that Pakistan officials were playing on U.S anticomunist policy to establish a security relationship aimed at rivaling India (Perkovich, 2002, pp. 23-25). Meanwhile in 1956 the China and Pakistan had started exchanging good friendly atmosphere as China's stance on Kashmir was never against the Pakistani aspirations. In the wake of India's deteriorating relation with China followed up with relatively poor performance in border war in 1962, Pakistan was encouraged to attempt another military venture in 1965. The spectre of the two front wars raised its head for the first time and it also opened a new

chapter in the India-Pakistan relations, with China as a new power centre (Nayar, Paul, 2003, p. 80).

In order to balance Kennedy's tilt towards India, who thought of India as a key factor in South Asia and the growing tension between itself and United States. Pakistan responded by tilting towards China and started enhancing its friendship with China. In 1961, Pakistan voted for People's Republic of China (PRC) into the United Nations and publicly votes in favour of pro-PRC positions on Tibet and Taiwan.⁴² In December 1962, China and Pakistan announced an agreement provisionally demarcating their border and negotiated a border agreement in Kashmir by early 1964, during Foreign Minister Bhutto visit to Beijing he signed the border agreement with China, this agreement angered the Indian leadership, which was still reeling from the effects of the 1962 border war following this was another major development which came as a shock to India was Chinese nuclear test in October 16, 1964. The alarmed India was concerned over developing warmth in Chinese-Pakistani relation and relatively felt threatened by Nuclear China.

The second war between India and Pakistan began on August 5, 1965 with a plan code named Operation Gibraltar, when Pakistan infiltrated several thousand guerrillas in a hope to spark an uprising by Muslims (discontented Kashmiris) in the Kashmir valley. Followed by Operation Grand Slam, the second part of the plan was to cut off Kashmir from India. It is believed that Bhutto thought that the time was now or never to solve the Kashmir issue in Pakistan's favour. After ten days of fighting the 1965 war ended in a stalemate. The war followed by the Tashkent Declaration on 10th January 1966,⁴³ Soviet Union initiated a peace agreement between India and Pakistan and called for both side to withdraw their forces to their prior held position. However the security threat from aggressive Pakistan who fails to recognize the legal accession of Kashmir with India was evident, its constant support for terrorist in Kashmir and liberation of Indian Kashmiris is seen in New Delhi as a coercive measure by Pakistan to get hold of Kashmir by any means, to add to these the Chinese came to Pakistani rescue with arms transfers as well as by rattling India's Northern frontier with troop movements and threats and strident vocal support for Pakistan in international forum (Sinha 2007, p. 86-89). The Central Intelligence Agency memorandum while describing the series of stealthy reports

stipulated a possible secretive China Pakistan mutual defence agreements. This added up to India's increasing security perceptions at the possibility of a two front assault by China and Pakistan, particularly as a durable military partnership had developed between the two countries. Actually, from 1966 to 1980, China gave more than US\$630 million to Pakistan's conventional arms development, which represented about 33% of aggregate arms provided to Pakistan from outer sources amid this period. By 1982, more than 65 percent of the hardware in Pakistan's air based armed forces and 75 percent of the equipments in its tank divisions came from China (Zhiyong, 2009, p. 158). The transfer of missile and nuclear technology from China to Pakistan added to a deterioration of the security condition of India.

In 1971 East Pakistan came forth as a sovereign state due to the arrogant and unjustifiable treatment by West Pakistan. It was a Bangladesh Liberation War for Bengalis in West Pakistan. Operation Searchlight declared by President Yahya on March 25, 1971 was a military break down against the hard-headed Bengalis, with the intentions to take the land and not the people of East Pakistan. This brought about a huge number of refugees spilling into India, Mrs Gandhi made an attempt to draw the world's attention to the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan and the enormous deluge of displaced person in India. India over and over requested that the Pakistani Government to stop from its destructive activities and check their conduct before the Indian armed force was sent in. In response to Indian support for Bengali dissidents, West Pakistan conducted airstrikes on Indian airfield on December 3, 1971 code-named as Operation Chengiz Khan. Mrs. Gandhi drove the Indian military to triumph over Pakistan after an eight month build-up. Indian force pulverized an outnumbered Pakistan Army unforeseen in East Pakistan and the war successfully ended after the Eastern Command of the Pakistani Armed Forces marked the Instrument of Surrender, on December 16, 1971. The war had been devastation for Pakistan, which had lost the greater part its populace and territory. The fall of East Pakistan prepared for 1972 Simla Accord between India and Pakistan. The agreement set out the standards to oversee their future relations. It bound the two states to settle their disparities by peaceful means through reciprocal arrangements. The agreement additionally changed over the 1949 UN cease fire line to a legal international Line of

Control between Pakistan and India until the point when future negotiations could yield a solution, anyway it didn't influence the status of the disputed areas (Kamal, 2013, p. 27).

As in 1965, India was verbally warned by China in the 1971 war. Since the memory of the 1962 defeat was still fresh there was some apprehension about what Beijing might do. The final Indian invasion of East Bengal was delayed until the winter season as the prospect of a ground attack by China across the frozen Himalayas was minimal (Cohen, 2001, p. 136). However, far more disturbing to the Indians were the movements of the U.S aircraft carrier USS Enterprise- a show of force- the ship that skirted the southern edge of the Bay of Bengal which had a profound impact on Indian security thinking and found it to be offensive. Throughout this turmoil, the United States remained protective of its Pakistani ally. Perkovich cites Kissinger who explained that the carrier group was deployed "ostensibly for the evacuation of Americans, but in reality to give emphasis to our warnings against an attack on West Pakistan...we also wanted to have forces in place in case the Soviet Union pressured China"(Perkovich, 1999, p. 164). The Indian perception of threat from Pakistan has also inextricably related to the Indian assessment of the extent of external support Pakistan could obtain at any particular point of time to deter India.

1974 is the year of India's first nuclear test which was termed as a "Peaceful Nuclear Explosion" with no military connotations. India became the first nuclear regional power in the Sub-continent. The Indian nuclear strength subverted Pakistan's defence and forced them for equal response. In Indian account it is Pakistan's defeat in Bangladesh war of 1971 alone and not India's development of nuclear capability that triggered Pakistan's nuclear proliferation. Pakistan's determination to acquire nuclear weapons was evident from a secret January 1972 meeting convened by Bhutto to launch the Pakistani nuclear weapon program. Pakistan was willing to "eat grass" to acquire nuclear parity. It is important to mention that Indian nuclear test was still two years away. Bhutto was motivated first by a desire for Pakistan to deal with India's conventional military advantage and demonstrate a capability to build its own bomb. Second, as a civilian leader he saw nuclear program as a way of trumping the political power of the Pakistani army, instead the program fell under the control of the military which was consequently emboldened both against India and against Bhutto. Third, Bhutto's ambition for the first

Islamic world's atomic bomb was driven by a desire to bring back hope to a disheartened country after it was defeated in the 1971 war. It was India who had no choice but to react to Pakistan's proliferation and build up a nuclear arsenal to protect its security interest (Frey, 2006, p. 81).

The backlash of Bangladesh war had serious consequences for Indian security. In 1975 Pakistan accelerated its drive to acquire its nuclear weapon capability which New Delhi perceives it with the sole purpose of using against it, India immediately reacted with outrage to the American offer of military sale to Pakistan as US state Department announced that Pakistan was eligible to buy up to \$100 million in conventional arm. Mrs. Gandhi declared that the renewed arms sale policy amounted "to reopening of old wounds."⁴⁴ Following year, growing Indian uneasiness and security concern can be rationalised from certain incidents that followed as Pakistan concluded a secret agreement with China for collaboration in nuclear weapon technology. By 1977-1978 Indian officials also detected Pakistan' clandestine procurement effort in the United Kingdom and Germany and concluded that a bomb making effort was well underway. In 1979 Pakistan loomed as a most real threat to India as signs of an imminent Pakistani threat were unmistakable as the American intelligence notified Congress that Pakistan was commissioning the Kahuta centrifuge plant and was well on the road to producing bomb-grade uranium. Washington invoked the Symington amendment and withdrew economic and military aid to Pakistan on non-proliferation ground. The implication registered loudly in India, where the press trumpeted the threat of an "Islamic bomb". The Hindustan Times noted, "since there is sufficient evidence that the Pakistani nuclear programme is being financed by Libya and Saudi Arabia there is every likelihood of Libya gaining access to nuclear bombs made in Pakistan."⁴⁵ The trajectory of Islamic Bomb proliferation in the India-Pakistan context can be evidenced from the headlines of October/December 1985, which read "Islamic Bomb: How Far?" (*The Hindustan Times*, 5 Oct 1985), "Pak Bomb Foreign Financed: PM" (*The Times of India*, 9 October 1985), "Pak Bomb not an empty threat: PM (*The Times of India*, 26 October 1985).

U.S-Pakistan relation during Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was nothing short of dramatic for India, it placed Pakistan in a more advantageous position than India in ensuing Cold War equation. It further boosted the course of Pakistan's nuclearization

when arm transfer to Pakistan was renewed as sanctions were uplifted.⁴⁶ Washington overlooked Pakistan's nuclear programme because of its geostrategic importance to help U.S drive Soviet expansionist intention in South West Asia. India's conventional military superiority was eroded as billions of dollars were pumped in by US in the form of economic and military aid to Pakistan including the most advanced aircraft U.S possessed F-16 fighters, which constituted a major qualitative increase in Pakistan's capacity to threaten targets in India. India was left with no option then to upgrade its nuclear weapon potential.

By late 1983, India perceived a number of threats emanating from Pakistan, beside the ongoing signs of Pakistan's growing nuclear capability, the most immediate problem was the fear that Pakistani intelligence agencies were supporting the separatist Khalistan movement by Sikh in Punjab. India countered Pakistan by supporting dissident elements in the southern Pakistani state of Sindh, tension abated by February 1984.⁴⁷ As Indian struggle to settle the event in Punjab concerns over U.S role in Pakistan and its implication for India's security was reignited, as in the midst of rumours and reports about United States ready to provide atomic umbrella to Pakistan as it provided to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) member countries. India fear was compounded when, on October 10, 1984 U.S Ambassador to Pakistan Dean Hinton said that the United State would be "responsive" if India attacks Pakistan. Indian apprehension about U.S-Pakistan threat can be ascertain from Indira Gandhi address to Indian Army commanders on October 11, 1984 and said that Pakistan's nuclear programme had brought about a qualitative change in India's security environment. She added that the United States continued to supply Pakistan with military equipment despite "evidence compiled by Americans themselves about Pakistan's nuclear program." This perception intensified that Indian nuclear self-restraint was more than US and Pakistan deserved (Perkovich, 2002, pp. 257-258). However further development like, in March 1985 India Today reported that Western German court convicted a German businessman for smuggling a complete uranium hexafluoride manufacturing plant to Pakistan between 1977-1980. The report by the American ABC television network on Pakistan's successfully conduct of a "cold" implosion test- firing a complete implosion system with an inert natural uranium core, made India more concern about Pakistani Nuclear bomb

and suspect that Pakistan would soon detonate a nuclear device had deep impact on India's nuclear perception.

In 1986 an ambitious yet ineffectively managed Indian military exercise Brasstacks endeavor to test Pakistan's defence and the response from its partners, particularly United States and China. However it prompts an unforeseen crisis between two opponents which drove the Indo-Pakistani atomic rivalry to a new level. Over the span of the crisis debilitating remarks by A.Q. Khan to an Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar about the possibility of the use of Pakistani nuclear weapon in case of crisis. The main objective of the interview was to communicate a nuclear deterrence signal to India. To substantiate the threat to dissuade India by Pakistan's nuclear capacity may have been made amid the Brasstacks crisis (Bajpai et al 1995, p. 6) As Pakistan made it obvious that it had atomic weapon and would not hesitate to use them if there should be an occurrence of an Indian military assault on it.

Indian reaction can be ascertained from President Zail Singh statement that "India too could make a nuclear bomb if needed and that the neighbouring countries trying to destabilise this nation should take note of it"(Times of India, 30 March 1987). K.C Pant the then Defence Minister told the Lok Sabha on April 27, 1987 that, "the emerging nuclear threat to us from Pakistan is forcing us to review our options...I assure the house that our response will be adequate to our perception of the threat" (Perkovich, 1999, p. 248). However a nuclear exchange was no longer a vague future scenario and India considered it as a real threat which had to be dealt with efficient and prompt manner. From 1988 to 1990 India pushed towards a full- fledged nuclear arsenal accelerated.

Since late 1980's when Pakistan acquired nuclear capability it has pursued a proxy war in Kashmir without fear of Indian retaliation. This proxy war had been described by Sumit Ganguly (1995) as 'stability-instability paradox.' It has been clear that since inception of Pakistan's nuclear programme Pakistan has sought for nuclear weapon umbrella under which it can prosecute its proxy war in Kashmir without the risk of Indian military retaliation.⁴⁸ It is Pakistan's strategy to 'bleed India with a thousand cuts' and force India to come to terms over Kashmir. The Kargil Review Committee Report states that by 1980, Pakistan's strategy had been "more explicitly directed at grabbing Kashmir at a time when the Indian Government was weak and vacillating and, in their view, liable

to be paralysed by Pakistan's nuclear deterrent."⁴⁹

The 1990 crisis stemmed directly from the outbreak of a secessionist ethno-religious insurgency in Kashmir which facilitated the Pakistani infiltrators to join forces and Pakistani military to aid the Kashmiri insurgents. The crisis escalated as Pakistan Government started a high profile protest to an extend that on March 13, 1990 PM Mrs. Bhutto travelled to Pok Pakistan occupied Kashmir and pledge "thousand year war" to liberate Kashmir from India. The aggressive attitude of Pakistan leaders put enormous pressure on India, PM V.P Singh replied by wondering whether the war would last for thousand hours but signalled that the people of India should be psychologically prepared for war and warned Pakistan that they cannot take Kashmir without a war. The exchange of hostile rhetoric took place and both countries mobilized force on the border. Pakistan decision makers also allegedly considered resorting to the use of nuclear weapon and threatened India with nuclear consequences. The Indian threat perception of Pakistan nuclear blackmail during the 1990 crisis can be ascertain from Subrahmanyam who suggested "that the Pakistani attempted nuclear blackmail in May 1990, when the Pakistani backed insurgency in Kashmir was at its peak" (Singh, 1998, p. 44). India had not initiated this crisis, and its behaviour was cautious and defensive, in contrast to that in Siachin and Brasstacks. The important consequence of the 1990 crisis was that India and Pakistan were war and crisis prone and were likely to be possession of nuclear weapons which were effecting their political and strategic decision.

Pakistan's Ghauri missile test on April 6, 1998 caught India by surprise which had disturbing implications for India, if Ghauri could truly achieve its range (1500 km with a payload of 700kg) then Pakistan for the first time had the capacity to deploy a nuclear warhead to most of the major Indian cities. Indian Army, speaking in the aftermath of Pakistan's new Ghauri IRBM test, formally reiterated the need for a 'strategic deterrence' capability to counter the emerging nuclear and missile challenges to India's security (*The Hindu*, April 21, 1998). Moreover Ghauri test might have cleared the doubts if any behind India's rational to conduct a nuclear test as the missile allowed Pakistan to threaten Indian urban centers with nuclear weapons. Though overt threatening moves were not made but the ability was present for the first time. As the Government after the test in May 1998 said that the nuclear environment in India's neighbourhood had

necessitated the test and emphasized that national security interest were paramount. India also wanted to reassert technological and strategic military superiority over Pakistan.

1998 is the year of overt 'Nuclearization of South Asia'. The eleven nuclear tests in total, five conducted by India and immediately Pakistan responded with six test after two weeks time demonstrated a nuclear weapons capacity of two rival states that have fought multiple wars since 1947. Pakistan was motivated by the effort to equalize India's conventional superiority and felt the nuclear weapon were the only viable option to prevent India from achieving a 'preponderance of power'. In response to Pakistan's nuclear test the Indian Ministry of External Affairs clarified that "as evolution of events makes clear, it was India that was obligator to react to a progressive build up of nuclear weaponry and missile in [the] neighbourhood. Pakistan's nuclear weapon predated [India'] and was built after years of clandestine acquisition."⁵⁰ Moreover India and Pakistan's objective of overt nuclearization was the idea that bombs were meant to act as a deterrent, to maintain regional security.

The 1998 Pokhran II test did not deter Pakistan from launching its military adventure in Kargil sector in 1999. The armed conflict between nuclear neighbours with strategic undertones seemed imminent when Pakistan sponsored Jihadis occupied territory on the Indian side of LOC leading to Kargil crisis.⁵¹ India's reaction was massive and intense, it was seen to be too provocative in nature. The Pakistani forces could not withstand the intense military counter-offensive by India, which consisted of up to 30.000 soldiers supported by heavy artillery and fighter jets. However the conflict did not escalate into a nuclear war, however after six months Pakistani forces had withdrawn to their LoC mainly due to immense international pressure. The main aim of the Pakistani strategy was to bring international focus on the Kashmir issue in its favour,⁵² but this strategy failed miserably and turned out to be rather embarrassing for Pakistan. For India Kargil came as a strategic and tactical surprise highlighting lack of strategic assessment, coordination and executive power (Pant 2007, p. 247).

Two years later once again India and Pakistan deployed thousands of soldiers along their respective border during the Twin peak crisis referring to two incidents during the period that threatened to a full-fledged war between two nuclear states. The Twin Peak Crisis is also known as Operation Parakram, which was an Indian effort to deter

Pakistan through coercive diplomacy.⁵³ India ran out of patience when on the December 13, 2001, a small group of militants armed with explosives attacked the Indian parliament. Although the attack failed and the perpetrators were killed in an intense fire fight with security forces before they managed to reach the parliament, but the symbolic value was huge and public outrage was enormous. India claimed that the attack was structured by the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed and blamed Islamabad for sponsoring the groups. The Indian Government immediately issued orders for a full force mobilization along the Indian-Pakistan border, the Operation Parakram, with the aim to exhibit Indian limits and to threaten Pakistan for continuing its support to anti-Indian militants. However, militants continued to cross the border, and then the terrorists struck once again in May 2002 and tensions flared once again. The terrorist attacked a para military camp in Jammu killing the families of the Indian military men which brought the rival states once again to the brink of war. Further Pakistan tested several nuclear capable missiles and publicly reaffirmed their commitment to the first use of nuclear weapons.⁵⁴ Subsequently, the Indian Prime Minister stated that "the time has come for a decisive battle" (Raghavan, 2009:251-252). The worried US pressured both side into refraining from further action. Although the situation was stable at the end of June, the Indian troops did not stand down until October 2002. The operation was politically and militarily a disappointment to India as political end and militarily means did not meet (Pant 2007, p. 248). To fill this gap Indian army formulates a war doctrine called 'Cold Start' in April 2004 which is the Indian response to the limited and insurgency operations Pakistan has managed to conduct under her nuclear umbrella.

Indian threat perception and security concern vis a vis Pakistan has not minimized even after overt nuclearisation of both the countries, infact India has been subjected to several Pakistani backed insurgency and terrorist attacks during the last two decades. India become more cautious in her relation with Pakistan and claimed it to be the "nursery of global terrorism." Many other terror incidents were associated to Pakistani based militants' counts, as the 2000 suicide attack on the Red Fort in New Delhi, Mumbai blasts in 2006, and the Mumbai attacks in 2008. It is a unique perception of threats that led the then Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee say that India suffered from a "security deficit" and declared that India "live in a dangerous

neighbourhood, few other countries in the world face the full spectrum of threats to their security as India does, from low intensity conflicts to an unfriendly nuclearized neighbourhood. Our response to such an environment has been anything but militaristic.”⁵⁵

Though Pakistan had supported US war against terrorism in its western border with Afghanistan but it had put little or rather no effort in dismantling the terrorist infrastructure on its eastern border with India. India has been a victim of Pakistani sponsored terrorist attack. The National Institute of Counter Terrorism of United States of America has calculated that between 2004 to 2007 total 3,674 people in India have lost their lives in a terrorist attack which is only second to Iraq in the same period, additionally in 2010 India has lost 1,120 lives in terrorist attack. With increasing terror incident Indian Government has been more apprehensive about the use of neighbour's territory to launch attacks on India and has repeatedly urged Pakistan to stop supporting jihadi and terrorists.

A trust deficit has always dominated India-Pakistan relation moreover it has suffered from a huge trust deficit from 1999 and little or failed effort to enhance their relation. India's deep rooted antagonism about Pakistan make her believe and still consider Pakistan (other) as a reckless, adventurist and untrustworthy state which India perceives as a threat to its national interest and security.

5.5 A RATIONALE FOR INDIA'S NUCLEAR OPTIONS

India became a nuclear weapon power in the wake of testing five nuclear devices in May 1998. The deliberate self imposed restraints by India for two and a half decade, subsequent to having first shown nuclear ability in 1974 which was a 'peaceful nuclear explosion' is one of a kind which showcases India's steady aversion to nuclear weapons. The justification behind the test can be determined from the letter by P.M. Vajpayee to President Bill Clinton following India's nuclear tests in May 1998, in which Vajpayee expounded on the complexities associated with the weakening security condition, particularly the nuclear condition faced by India and the compulsions of circumstances confronting India to make overt its nuclear capabilities.

India's relations with Pakistan and China are integral to its strategic concerns.

These two neighbours of India have fought five wars with it, India- Pakistan fought in 1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999 and India-China in 1962. Two major structural factors reflect India's nuclear analytics, one being the threat emerging from nuclear armed China and the other ascending from Pakistan's missile and nuclear programme and India's hostile relationship with Pakistan. China is to a great extent considered by key strategic thinkers as the clearest and most convincing incentive force regarding India's nuclear development. After the Indo-China war in 1962 and China's first atomic test two years in 1964, the bilateral relation between two states remained hostile with unresolved border dispute to a great extend and India is engaged strategically in balancing China's superior military power. In its relation with archrival Pakistan notwithstanding four wars, India and Pakistan have likewise approached war on no less than two other occasions in 1986-87 amid India's military exercise Brasstacks and afterward again in 2001-02 after the terrorist attack on Indian parliament on December13, 2001. The province of Kashmir remains a focal and militarized dispute between the two states. Further the Sino-Pakistan axis as "all weather friends" to deter India were perceived as a great concern and a challenge to India national interest and security.

From the early days of independence India was apprehensive about the use of nuclear weapons and technology for military purpose but favoured the peaceful use of atomic energy for development purpose. However to a lesser degree India conceived that nuclear weapon technology may have a role in national defence if efforts for nuclear disarmament failed. India's nuclear establishment was set up under the close guidance of atomic scientist Homi Bhabha, accountable to the Prime Minister with very limited accountability to the parliament or any other national institutions. Despite Nehru's public resistance to nuclear weapons, Bhabha sought to build a completely indigenous nuclear process with scope for weaponization should the need arise. Herein, effectively, lay the foundations of the strategy of keeping India's 'nuclear option' open.

Border issues are India's main national-security concern. Nearly 7,000 kilometers of its 16,500 km land border is disputed either with Pakistan or China. India began to develop nuclear weapons in the mid-1960's partly in response to its humiliating defeat in 1962 over border disputes -which remain unresolved till date- revealed the limitations of India's conventional military capabilities and after the Chinese first nuclear test in

October 1964, the Chinese nuclear bomb accelerated India's threat perceptions considering future nuclear blackmailing. India also cites the indirect danger presented by China's export of nuclear-weapon technology and delivery systems to countries in the region. Chinese assistance in Pakistan nuclear and missile programme is of specific concern. In the wake of India's deteriorating relation with China, Pakistan was encouraged to attempt another military venture in 1965. The prospect of the two front wars raised its head for the first (Nayar, Paul, 2003, p. 80). A possible Sino-Pakistani front has been a recurring worry for Indian strategists since the mid-1960s, when a nuclear-armed China threatened to enter the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war on Islamabad's side. India was subjected to China's verbal warning during third Indo-Pak war, though it did not intervene militarily but did give a moral and material support to Pakistan during the 1971 war. Indian strategists have contended that in a situation of nuclear asymmetry a nuclear armed state may threaten or blackmail a non nuclear weapon state without any fear of retaliations. For this reason India remains subject to Chinese nuclear blackmail in future has enhanced India's threat perceptions as the asymmetrical capabilities needed to be corrected with an overt nuclearisation.

Nehru's successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri (1965-66) reacted guardedly to an enhanced threat perceptions from China, as a outcome India embarked on its first endeavour to acquire a nuclear weapon capacity through the subterranean nuclear explosion project (SNEP) approved in December 1965. But publicly, P.M. Shastri opposed the development of nuclear weapons, despite the demand coming from inside his own Congress Party. After coming to power Indira Gandhi immediately shelved her predecessor's subterranean nuclear explosive project (SNEP) but the first serious strategic development that brought a change in Indira Gandhi's nuclear stance was the Chinese test of a thermonuclear weapon on 9 May 1966 which enhanced China's capability to hit target deep into India. In reaction to this development she announced in the Lok Sabha that in addition to 'peaceful' uses of atomic power, India would increase nuclear technological know-how and other competence and further indicated that she would pursue Shastri's policy of developing nuclear explosive technology (Chakma, 2005, p. 207).

By 1970's India engaged in a rapid conventional military buildup and in 1974 Buddha Smiled. This was basically triggered by the demonstration of China's nuclear weapons capability in 1964 and the nuclear intimidation by the US in 1971, when the USS Enterprise, a nuclear armed aircraft carrier, was sailed into the Bay of Bengal and the perceived threat from China-Pakistan axis during the 1971 Indo-Pak war definitely played a major role in India's decision to test. For the Indians, however, the 1971 intrusion was a form of gunboat diplomacy. The presence of the USS Enterprise in Bay of Bengal during 1974 Indo-Pak was definitive in emblematic affront. Most importantly, it is recognized as a military and a nuclear threat to India. Consequently Indian strategists have contended for submarine equipped with nuclear or customary missiles.

In 1974 India entered into the nuclear club with a single successful test but immediately declared it to be a "Peaceful Nuclear Explosion" with no military intentions and refrained from following up with nuclear weaponization programme. The 1974 nuclear explosion established India's capability to make nuclear weapons and its policy since then not to go nuclear provided a concrete shape to its nuclear policy called 'nuclear option approach' or 'ambivalent approach'. It has been considered by Indian decision makers as the best available option in order to respond to India's security requirement and the nurture of military strategic need. The Government of India and others supporters of 'nuclear option strategy' considered it to be the most prudent policy having access to nuclear technology and having nuclear weapon capability, keeping the option of acquiring the nuclear weapon when required and at the same time not compromising with its commitments to nuclear disarmament.

By sustaining the posture of nuclear option open which involved maintaining a large strategic establishment to produce fissile materials, design nuclear weaponry, and develop various delivery systems, while simultaneously continuing to refrain from any public decision to create and deploy a real nuclear arsenal. This peculiar approach, which consisted of developing some components of an arsenal while desisting from creating the arsenal itself—and, indeed, publicly denying the intention to create such an arsenal is derived from India's calculated assessment that "preserving the option," would provide deterrence advantages without imposing any of the costs and risks associated with actually deploying nuclear weaponry in the context of an overt assertion of India's

nuclear status. Such a posture also had the advantage of underscoring India's sovereign right to create such an arsenal at some point in the future if national security considerations so warranted, while in the interim requiring that Indian strategic policy simply preserve, both legally and technically, the capability to formally deploy nuclear weapons should that become necessary.

India's first nuclear test faced severe international condemnation, with severe penalties that stopped nuclear technology transfers as well as foreign aid. India reacted with restraint in the 1970s, while never abandoning the moral rhetoric justifying its peaceful explosion and its call for universal disarmament. In 1983 Indira Gandhi, launched the Integrated Missile Development Programme an expansion of the "nuclear open door" with no intention to incorporate nuclear weapon into the framework of national security. After Mr. Gandhi, Morarji Desai (1977-79) opposed nuclear weapons on moral grounds by publicly rejecting it, yet at the same time he acknowledge the broad parameters of India's stance to the nuclear weapon option.

Until the mid-1980s, India's stand on nuclear option was not predetermined. Meanwhile, Pakistan had been following a dual track nuclear possession policy through a network of espionage and illegal transfer of sensitive nuclear technology from Europe, America and China. Reports began to appear that China had delivered a nuclear bomb design to Pakistan in 1983. The clandestine nuclear program of Pakistan and its successful enrichment of uranium weapon enhanced debate in India with regard to overt nuclearisation.

The perceived Pakistan nuclear threat made India adopts a more active defence in support of its nuclear option. C. Subramaniam, the Defence Minister in Charan Singh Government in an address to the National Defence College, New Delhi, in October 1979 hinted at the prospects that India might be compelled to go nuclear before long and identified Pakistan as the most likely stimulant in India's defence strategy in the next decade.

The China threat surfaced briefly in the early 1980s following the PLA incursion into Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh, up to seven kilometers into Indian territory. This action resulted in both sides mobilizing but fortunately did not erupt into conflict. Nevertheless, then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered a serious review of

India's overall defensive posture with regard to China so as to prevent future PLA intrusions. Road communications infrastructure along the LAC was purposely kept in an underdeveloped state as part of a 'scorched earth' policy to prevent the rapid intrusion of the PLA into the plains of Assam in the northeast, much like in 1962. This policy forced India to fortify its strong military presence right up to the LAC because the terrain, weather, and infrastructure prevented any large-scale Indian build up during the warning periods.

At the same time then army chief General K. Sundarji ordered the mobilization of nearly ten mountain divisions along with the Indian Air Force commonly known as Operation Chequerboard. Three of the divisions were deployed in Wangdung area (Arunachal Pradesh) close to the border in order to test India's defensive posture against a Chinese ingressions.⁵⁶ Soon a conscious decision was made to adopt what is now called the 'forward posture', which entails moving forward and occupying positions on the LAC to prepare for any surprise Chinese attack. This policy led to new defence works being undertaken, in addition to the redeployment of combat support elements and activation of several abandoned forward advanced landing grounds. While all these developments did for a short time induce tension between New Delhi and Beijing, they were soon overshadowed by other events on both sides of the border, including Operation Brass Tacks during November 1986–March 1987 a major India-Pakistan military stand-off (Sahgal, pp. 287-288).

The next stage in India's accession of nuclear capabilities is connected to certain new developments unfavourably effecting India's security. In 1990, the ever growing alliance between China and Pakistan which prompted China to test Pakistani nuclear weapon at the Lop Nor test site increased India's apprehension. The due to its location Pakistan became the front line state against Soviet force in Afghanistan brought fresh apprehension to India's security think tank. It become clear that US had turned blind eye towards Pakistan's clandestine procurement of nuclear weapons because of Pakistan's importance in the war against Soviet. This collided with transfer of power in Pakistan from civilian government to military though coup which was considered by India to be more evil. Today, Pakistan is the only nuclear equipped state where it is the military and not the civil and political authority that is in control of its nuclear arsenal. By the mid-

1980s, India was convinced of a Pakistani nuclear programme and a Sino-Pakistani nuclear and missile nexus. Yet Rajiv Gandhi authorized the actual development of weapons only in 1989, when his proposal for universal disarmament was ignored by the nuclear states. According to V. S. Arunachalam, Rajiv Gandhi was totally against nuclear weapons yet he "did not want India to be found wanting in a crisis either"(Chengappa, 2000, p. 304). In spite of confirmation of Pakistan's nuclearization with Chinese assistance, India did not change its nuclear policy significantly rather there was a remarkable continuity in India's policy of nuclear option (Basrur, 2001, p. 187).

As 1990's unfurled, it turned out to be clear that the nuclear choice was imposed on India as an outcome of a several geopolitical developments. First, U.S. emerged as a sole super power after Soviet disintegration which seriously limited India's strategic space. Second, growing concern over Pakistan's progressing nuclearization which at last provoked the US to force sanctions and new reports of Chinese covert nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan. Third, India's concern increased when the indefinite extension of NPT in 1995 perpetuated the division between nuclear have state and nuclear have- not states with a threat to utilize the U.N. Security Council to authorize and to punish those nations who oppose the universalisation of the NPT. This would have placed India in state of permanent strategic vulnerability to nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail. Moreover the signing of CTBT in 1996 which India conceived to be discriminating would have foreclosed India's option to test its nuclear arsenal and develop credible deterrent. These developments implied that in the absence of its independent nuclear deterrent India would never develop credible assurance of its security which would increase its vulnerability against its adversaries.

Furthermore, the ever expanding Chinese economy which helped fuelled its rapid nuclear and conventional weapons modernization programme, its navel expansions, its closeness with Myanmar and its willingness to launch lethal missiles on Taiwan and the lack of democratic process all attributed towards considering China a threat to India's long term national and security interest. Against this background nuclear weapons probably offer to review India's insecurities, as these developments represented further opening of the nuclear door to an incremental response to the perception of growing external threats.

5.6 CONCLUSION

It is against this background that a choice was made by India in May 1998 to test its 'Shakti' (strength). The nuclear test was a major step in maturing India's nuclear weapon capabilities and affirmed India's determination to deter threats from states antagonistic to it. India wanted to ensure an environment conducive for its development which is enunciated in India's Draft Nuclear Doctrine and later in its official Doctrine adopted in 2003. To sum up, the historical fact finding technique helps us to locate India's threat perception and security concern vis-a-vis China and Pakistan and the rationale behind India's overt nuclearisation. The 1998 test was the outcome of a decade long evolution in strategic thinking which was influenced by the increasing complex and hostile security environment faced by India.

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² NWD, p. 326.

³ NWD, p. 327.

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²⁴ Addressing to the United Nations General Assembly, December 8, 1953 U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower, in his "Atoms for Peace" speech, declared that "experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world."

²⁵ Chakma points out that in the last week of November 1964, Lok Sabha held its first debate on foreign affairs after the Chinese nuclear test. Three alternative motions on nuclear policy were introduced for debate: one called for immediate production of an atomic bomb; a second one called for embarking on 'nuclear-based defence installations in the country'; and a third concerned reorienting foreign policy in light of the Chinese bomb.(Chakma, p. 201)

²⁶ Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali.(1969). *The Myth of Independence*. USA: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 117-8. Retrieved from <http://www.scribd.com/doc/2430601/Myth-of-Independence>

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²⁸ In 1966, Pakistan initiated a proposal for a conference to discuss the security of non-nuclear weapon states. Subsequently a conference was held in Geneva in 1968. India opposed it on the ground that it would affect the efforts that were in progress in Eighteen-nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) on the NPT draft treaty. Pakistan argued that bringing the non-nuclear weapon states together was complementary rather than contradictory to other ongoing negotiations on disarmament and arms control. Pakistan maintained that ENDC was not adequate representative body to consider the issue of the security of non-

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²⁹ Pakistan's nuclear program, code named Project-726, resulted from the development of India's nuclear program. Project-726 gained urgency after India detonated its first nuclear weapon in 1974

³⁰ Chakma, Bhumiitra. (2002). Pakistan Nuclear Programme: Its sources and Motivations. *Modern South Asian Studies*, 36(4) , p. 888

³¹ Ibid.

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³⁴ Glenn-Symington Amendment prohibits any kind of aid to be given to countries that import uranium enrichment equipment or technology after 1977, where this equipment is not monitored by the IAEA.

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