

CHAPTER-4

INDIA'S NUCLEAR BEHAVIOUR

The argument from the realist is mainly based on the concepts of national security, national interest and relative security, though there is difference among them. They more or less share a common understanding of these terms, which are based on conceptualizations made by state officials (except in the case of neoclassical realists, in view of their inclusion of domestic politics). The ruling principles of the world of international politics that is anarchy and the self-help system are objective facts and they are given. Since realities exist 'out there' to be discovered, realism does not leave much room for change in basic principles and concepts. On the other hand, constructivism proposes quite a different way of analyzing world politics and its bases. According to social constructivism, all the actors and relations among them are socially constructed. These actors do, however, have certain identities, and their national interests are shaped around these identities. Social Constructivism gives importance to the interaction between international actors, and develops state interests, state identity and how they change with interaction.

In constructivism, the social factors rather than the material factors have greater weight in world politics. The world is understood as a continuing process of interaction between agents and structures and they are mutually constituted. Constructivists emphasize socially constructed nature of actors and their identities and interests in understanding states' behaviour. The Chapter starts with the concept of national interest and national identity and examines how India's national interest and identity is constructed with regard to its nuclear status. It aims at analytic construction and explains the sources of state preferences in foreign policy, its stands on non-proliferation regime and examines the intersections of India's economic growth and its nuclear capabilities.

4.1 THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL INTEREST

National interest usually refers to foreign policy which generally implies an idea of preferences for the policy that is best for a nation as a whole (Danilovic, 2008, p. 557). There are three different usages of the idea: first, as an analytic construct to describe and explain the sources of state preferences in foreign policy; second, as a criterion for evaluating particular strategies or courses of action; and third, as a justification for foreign policy decisions taken by policymakers to mobilize domestic support (Danilovic, 2008, p. 557). According to Frankel there are two fundamentally different approaches to the analyses the concept, represented by the “objectivists” and the “subjectivists” (Frankel 1970,p. 16). The former assumes that national interests can be objectively defined with the help of some certain criteria, whereas the latter interprets it as a changing set of subjective preferences, like the study of decision-making in foreign policy analysis (Frankel 1970, p. 17). This objective/subjective dichotomy is important and meaningful for the conceptualization of the national interest. The objectivist approach is best presented by the realist school and the subjectivist approach can be represented by the decision-making approach to foreign policy analysis and the constructivist approach.

The realist conceptualization of national interest is that the concept is viewed as an objective reality defined in terms of military and economic power, while ignoring its subjective aspects. In fact, the national interest does not exist independent of perceptions. According to Charles Beard ideas and material interests cannot be separated and an interest is also an idea which involves human perception and interpretation (Beard, 1935, pp. 157-158). Constructivism gives a supportive explanation to the subjective aspects of national interest ignored by the realists. For constructivists, national interest is a social construction and the concept is also seen as an important explanatory tool in international politics. Constructivism emphasizes the subjective aspect of state preferences and the impact of international structures which is understood in terms of shared values, transnational collective identities or norms of behavior, on state preferences. According to constructivism, national interests are not just “out there” waiting to be discovered they are constructed and constituted by social interaction and defined in the context of

international and domestic norms and values. According to Finnemore "states are socialized to accept certain preferences and expectations by the international society in which they and the people who compose them live" (Finnemore, 1996, p.128). She focused on the normative processes which define the national interest by examining the roles of international organizations in institutionalizing and propagating cultural norms in the international system, for example, the role of the IAEA in redefining the ways that nuclear weapon states approached nuclear proliferation problems by institutionalizing new non-proliferation norms (NPT). It is clearly evident that international norms are socially constructed through international institutions and are able to reshape state interests by the ways in which states "endogenize" these norms as their foreign policy preferences.

Alexander Wendt attempted to conceptualize national interest (Wendt, 1999, pp. 233-238). Agreeing with the distinction of objective interests and subjective interests, he used an objectivist approach to answer the normative question of what states should do. He refers objective interest as a need or functional imperatives which is essential in reproducing identity and subjective interest refers to beliefs that actors have about how to meet their identity needs (Wendt, 1999, pp 231-232). In Wendt's view, many state interests are social constructions of the international system. However, national interest in his definition refers to objective interests. According to Wendt, states have certain objective national interests that are used in turn to define their subjective interests. These objective interests are the reproduction requirements or security of states. He defined them as "physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem"(Wendt, 1999, pp. 233-238). Physical survival is the survival of a state-society complex, of which the preservation of territory is at the center, autonomy refers to state's sovereignty to exercise control over the allocation of resources, economic well-being is the maintenance of the mode of production in a society and the state's resource base and collective self-esteem refers to a group's need to feel good about itself, for respect or status (Wendt, 1999, pp. 235-236). These four national interests are common to all states if states are to reproduce themselves, though they may on occasion have contradictory implications that require prioritization. In this respect, national interests are a selection mechanism and their real significance lies in the fact that they direct states to try to

understand them, to interpret their implications for how subjective interests should be defined (Wendt, 1999, p. 237).

4.2 NATIONAL IDENTITY

National identity relates to the psychological foundation for behaviour patterns of a nation-state and entails the purposes, roles and images that a nation-state pursues and projects in the international arena. Once established "national identity may be expected to provide a reasonable basis for expectations concerning that nation's future comportment" (Dittmer & Kim, 1993, pp. 30-31). Moreover, it should be understood as "an ongoing process or journey rather than a fixed set of boundaries, a relationship rather than a free-standing entity or attribute" (Dittmer & Kim, 1993, pp. 13).

The concept of identity is one of underlying factors of constructivism, as states, in constructivists' eyes, are kinds of entities to which identities and interests are attributable.¹ For instance Ruggie argued that "identities are logically prior to preferences" (Ruggie, 1993, p. 172); Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein argued that "identities both generate and shape interests" (Jepperson, et al. 1996, p. 60). Wendt held the view that interests presuppose identities (Wendt, 1999, p. 231) and treated identity as "a property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioural dispositions" (Wendt, 1999, p. 224).² Wendt argued that identities belong to the belief side of the intentional equation (desire + belief = action), while interests belong to the desire side, without interests identities have no motivational force and without identities, interests have no direction (Wendt, 1999, p. 231). Thus, a state's behaviour is motivated by a variety of interests rooted in the state's identity. Moreover, there is also the objective and subjective distinction among various national identities. In Wendt's words identity is whatever makes thing what it is. He treats identity as "a property of international actors that generates motivational and behavioural dispositions" which means that "identity is at base a subjective or unit-level quality, rooted in an actor's self-understandings" (Wendt, 1999, p. 224). Wendt adds, identities are constructed by external as well as internal structures. It not only depends on how an actor perceives himself but also how others

perceive him. He thus explains that two kinds of ideas can enter into identity, those held by the self and those held by others.

Some identities are about objective attributes which leave little room for interpretation thus less controversial. For example, since the establishment of the independent India the Indian government has had many national identities in its diplomacy. These include the identity of a colonial state, peace-loving country, third world state, anti-hegemonic force, developing country, rising power, non nuclear weapon state, responsible power, and international cooperator etc. Identities such as developing country, rising power are generally shared in the perception of other state actors, because they are the identities given by objective indicators; identities such as peace-loving country, responsible power, and international cooperator require subjective judgement. These identities could be at odds with the perception of India held by other states hence need careful examination.

4.3 NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF INDIA'S NUCLEAR IDENTITY

India's nuclear programme began under the authority of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, in 1948 when the new government of India passed the Atomic Act, leading to the creation of Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC). Though Nehru thought that “military spending was at best a necessary evil [and was] “determined not to use weapons for war purposes. We do not make atom bombs. I do not think we will” (Ganguli, 1999, p. 150. However, India's defeat in 1962 Sino-Indian border war and the Chinese nuclear test in 1964 had serious impact on decision making process. China being in possession of nuclear weapons was contemplated as the most serious threat to India's national interest. Indian authorities were afraid of Chinese nuclear weapons not only because of their absolute deterrence but also because of their psychological effects on Indian society. Considering China nuclear blackmailing may weaken Indians self confidence which may enhance Chinese political and military objectives in Asia without war. China was pointed at as an opponent that has particular policies over Asia, which could be pursued by deteriorating Indian strength and these policies were against the security of Indian territories.

In the year 1965, during the Indo-Pakistani war, China supported Pakistan diplomatically and threatened to open another front along India's Himalayan border. The Chinese action reaffirmed the identity given to China by India as a deadly enemy. The assertion was made of China as being an aggressor, an expansionist country with nuclear weapons and the neighbor of India. The meaning that Indian officials like diplomats government officials and political party members, gave Chinese to actions, shaped the relations between the two countries in the following years. One of the significant reasons for India's refusal to sign 1968 Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) rested on the premise that NPT is a stumbling block of Indian national interest, which was created by the identity that India attributed to China and its policies. India could not accept being a party to a treaty that privileged its opponent at the expense of its own security. In this way, constructivist agenda counters the realist assumption that national interest is an objective reality for statesmen. It is rather a social construct, whose development begins and sometimes changes direction according to cultural and historical relations of conflicts. It is different from the perceptions in realist terms because in this process, a goal is perceived. Self and other identities are constructed without relying on perceptions and/or misunderstandings.

Historically, India and Pakistan share unfriendly and unstable relation. India has had numerous armed conflicts and dispute with its immediate neighbor Pakistan. The Kashmir dispute is regarded as one of major problems in Indo-Pakistani relations. It was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who once said that "Kashmir must be liberated if Pakistan is to have its full meaning [and some] Pakistani politicians share responsibility for encouraging ordinary Pakistanis to see jihad in Kashmir as legitimate"(Anatol, 2011,p. 186).From this, we can ascertain how important Kashmir has been to the Pakistani leadership and further they have passed this conviction to the ordinary Pakistani population. A. Lieven sees the 'Kashmir dispute' as a very sensitive issue and in his eyes the territory is even an obsession to Pakistan, he notes that "the military's obsession with India in general, and Kashmir in particular." Another defining factor between India and Pakistan had been the nuclear issue. Pakistan went nuclear after India's peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 which Pakistan perceived as a threat. General Pervez Musharraf, while speaking of nuclear bomb tests said that "If the international community had helped resolve the

Kashmir problem and ensured the security of Pakistan, we would perhaps not have tested.”³ In this sense, Pakistan's representation should also be considered in relation to nuclear policy of India.

India's (self) identification of Pakistan as a threat (other) can be rationalised on the ground that, along with unsolved Kashmir dispute, which continues to be the bone of contentions between two neighbors, Pakistan supported terrorist activities against India and then the Pakistan nuclear weapon programme which Pakistan consider as an “equaliser” against India’s conventional military superiority. This further increased Indian suspicion. To add to India's agony, the growing China -Pakistan alliance was seen as steps to counter India or rather restrain India. It was quite evident that Pakistan was posing a great threat to Indian security.

One of the most notable developments of Indian nuclear policy was the 1998 nuclear test. The reasons given for this test also seemed to demonstrate that India still maintained similar representations of its enemies, with its growing conventional and unconventional capabilities and arms transfers to Pakistan, China still appeared to be regarded as a threatening neighbor. Dalip S. Swamy (1992) asserts that shared distrust between India and its neighbors, primary China and Pakistan as well, has led to a reckless race for security. India and Pakistan have been racing to increase the size, technological refinement and to keep their weapons operation ready for a long time, but the tests and declarations of May 1998 made a qualitative difference in the situation. Pakistan’s launch of the Ghauri missile, developed with Chinese assistance, in March 1998 had been the most immediate provocation. The articulation of the identities of these countries may have strengthened the view that India was not allowed to respond in a different way. Considering serious problems of India with China and Pakistan, India perceived threat from these countries. The nuclear developments in Pakistan and China may have served as a trigger for India to evaluate these developments as being evidences of their hostile intentions. Additionally, India’s articulations of these countries might have created a self-fulfilling prophecy on the hostile intentions of China and Pakistan regarding the nuclear developments in these countries. Therefore, conducting the 1998 nuclear test was in the national interest of India.

On the other hand, India's own identity emphasizes its peaceful and moderate responses to threats arising from its aggressive neighbors. According to Indian Ministry of Defence, "India's response to these threats [tribal, ethnic, left wing and radical jihadi movements in India and the possibility of gaining access to weapons of mass destruction by Pakistan being the perceived threat] and challenges has always been restrained, measured and moderate in keeping with its peaceful outlook and reputation as a peace loving country."⁴ India's identity is thus constructed on the basis of its peaceful and moderate image. If the articulation of this identity results in differences between the self and the others, it is expected that countries that India perceives as threats, will be labeled aggressive and extremist. Indeed, looking again at the Indian Ministry of Defence report, it is possible to see such features attributed to Pakistan. It is asserted that the utmost threat to South Asia's peace and stability comes from Pakistan because of its use of terrorism for strategic objective and ingrained Pakistani military hostile obsession towards India. India considers Pakistan as the epicenter of terrorism in the region and beyond.⁵ Bearing in mind the fact that India perceives itself as a regional hegemon, security in the region is thus considered within the context of national security. The single greatest security threat in the region, named as terrorism, is the threat toward India, and the source is Pakistan. India sees Pakistan as a state that is presented as the epicentre of terrorism, it is a given that Pakistan's military follows adventurist strategies, and this cannot change. Additionally, Pakistani hostility towards India is obsessive and uncontrollable.

It was not possible for India –a peaceful and moderate country, whose nuclear weapons are “only for self-defence and ...to ensure that India's security, independence and integrity are not threatened in the future”⁶ — to sign the NPT and CTBT as a Non Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS), while there exists a nuclear China supporting nuclear Pakistan — a terrorist, hostile, and threatening country. Historically and socially, it is understandable that states present themselves as peaceful and moderate, the same claim can be valid when it comes to defending their nuclear policies. On the other hand India stress on the defensive nature of these weapons and the peaceful path of Indian foreign policy. First, Nehruvian secularists see these weapons as a guarantee against external attacks and important tools to provide national security in the eyes of the Indian people

and to ensure the unity of India. Second, Postcolonial India's decision to keep its nuclear option open is seen in defensive on moral terms. Through nuclear deterrence, India will survive in the future against external threat due to the defensive nature of nuclear weapons. Moreover, India has never harbored aggressive inclinations against others, and thus the acquisition of nuclear weapons could not be morally wrong since they would not be used for aggression by the Indian state.

India took a long 24 years to declare itself as a nuclear weapon state mainly on moral ground as India believed in 'non- violence' propagated by Mahatma Ghandi, the father of the nation. Gandhiji characterized the bomb as the “diabolical use of science,” and Jawahar Lai Nehru described it as an “evil thing” (Dubey, 1998, p. 3) To Nehru, peace was indivisible and very essential for civilized behaviour in international relations as there is a need to be passionate about peace to establish international cooperation and prosperity.

India referred the issue of disarmament at the United Nations in September 1947, just one month after its independence. Indian representative Vijay Lakshmi Pandit stated at the United Nations that “there is an uneasy awareness that things are perhaps moving toward some new and annihilating disaster and not enough is being done to check the trend” (Rajen, 2002,p. 31). The same Indian representative speaking in the general debate on 25 September 1948 described the problem of nuclear proliferation and disarmament as one of the most important items and “momentous questions” for discussion. She suggested that the General Assembly must devote serious attention to those matters.⁷ India was the first state to initiate the proposal to a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty in 1954 at UN. Nehru has sort for standstill agreement for nuclear explosions but no concrete steps were taken in this regard. India's continuous nuclear disarmament effort cannot be overlooked. It can be therefore seen that besides the workings of the social process, the cultural meanings of nuclear weapons have also contributed to the articulation and regarding India's nuclear policy.

Despite continuous effort for disarmament nothing fruitful came up, India continued its policy of nuclear restrain but eventually India went nuclear because of defensive concerns due to circumstances involving its neighbors. This can be regarded as

the naturalization process in relation to Indian nuclear power. Again, this does not mean that Pakistan and/or China do not pursue strategies contrary to the Indian national interest. The aim of analyzing these presentations is to show how articulations had already defined the national interest of India. These kinds of articulations help to produce a broader “we”. This “we” is not simply the state, decision-makers or society alone but all of them. Weldes points out that this concept results in recognition as follows: “Yes, ‘we’ are like this (i.e., a tough leader, democratic, and in favor of freedom) and not like that (i.e., alien, despotic, and aggressive).”⁸ These differences provide identity distinctiveness.

One of the interesting features of the articulation of the Indian national interest vis-à-vis Pakistan is that successful articulation of Pakistani identity in India accelerates the intensity of interpellation. Accordingly, a socially constructed Indian national interest is accepted by Indian citizens with the help of interpellation. Yet at the same time, this interpellation of individuals puts an additional burden on foreign policy makers in terms of nuclear deterrence requirements. After a time, nuclear arsenals must be large enough not only to deter the ‘enemy’, but also to be able to promote confidence among the domestic citizenry in their own country’s security (Lavoy, 2003, p. 89-90). In this sense, articulation shapes society’s perception, but these constructed intractable ties of individuals also influence the response of India of what it is that is ‘in the national interest of India’. In other words, the nature of the national interest is determined by the presentational practices of Indian officials and in some cases individuals as well.

4.4 NUCLEAR FACTOR IN INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY (1947-1998)

India had not even gained independence when the first nuclear weapon was exploded by US enhancing its prestige and status in the world. It did not even hesitate to demonstrate its nuclear power during the World War II bombarding Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The use of nuclear weapon in Japan has brought about a change in the very doctrine of warfare, in diplomacy and other means of conducting international relations and the use of force for self-defence. The reaction in India was of unqualified horror and the leaders of independence movement were quick to grasp the far-reaching implications of this development. Gandhiji characterized the bomb as the “diabolical use of science,”

and Nehru described it as an “evil thing”. Nehru devoted a large part of his time and energy in educating public opinion on the catastrophic implications of nuclear weapons, to seeking a cessation of nuclear weapon tests and to the elimination of these weapons.⁹

In 1947 when India emerged as an independent sovereign state, the cold war was in full swing. The world was divided into two opposing camps- the Capitalist West (US) and the Communist Block, headed by nuclear armed US and USSR, both following the strategy of 'Balance of terror'. India perceived this as a hindrance to its national objective based on the Gandhian principal of 'Ahinsha '. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Nehru India followed the path of Non-Alignment. On 7th September, 1946 on a radio broadcast Nehru provided the basic framework of the policy of non-alignment. He said that it is a proposal to equidistant for power rivalry between two superpowers to maintain sovereignty and independence in foreign policy of newly independent states. The fundamental feature of the NAM policy was the emphasis on peace, universal disarmament and elimination of threat.

For India non-alignment being an integral part of its foreign policy is neither a goal nor a value but it is a policy instrument. Indian non alignment policy means an anti imperialistic, anti colonial approach to strengthen world peace, mutual cooperation and development. It symbolized mankind's search for peace and security among nations and determination to establish a new and equitable international economic, social and political order. The policy also protests against politics of pressure and interference in national problems. The basic principles of non-alignment are freedom, peace and economic prosperity and following these principles India was trying to stand on its feet with independent course of actions.

It is true that NAM represents a multilateral process of discussion, negotiations and decision on various issues of security, disarmament and reduction of weapons of mass destruction. It has extended support and cooperation on the basis of justice, equality, cooperation, peace and development for restructuring international relations.¹⁰ Therefore Non-alignment is considered as assertion of independence. But at the same time, other things are taken into considerations to assert independence. For instance, if while pursuing the policy of non-alignment, national interest is threatened or compromised than the primary importance is to be given to national interest and the

policies are to be framed accordingly. Moreover, emphasis should be given to interdependence, mutual cooperation's and co-existence which are vital components in pursuing national interest. A country cannot be nonaligned ignoring other states.

What attracted the Indian leaders specially P.M Nehru towards the atom was the tremendous potential for its peaceful use. Nuclear power was considered vital for the underdeveloped country like India who was economically venerable and lacked basic industrial infrastructure and nuclear energy was necessary in modernizing and industrializing India. He wanted to reap the fruit of nuclear science and technology therefore immediately after independence on 27th August 1947, a meeting of the Atomic Board was held. Following year PM Nehru introduced the Atomic Energy Act before the Constituent assembly to create Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Therefore the nuclear factor remained in the Indian national thinking from the beginning. India's articulation on nuclear issue was evident in the conduct of its foreign policy, mainly because India started advocating universal nuclear disarmament but simultaneously started exploring the avenues for cooperation with other states for acquiring nuclear resources and technology for a viable national nuclear infrastructure.

In the following decades, India's foreign policy establishment was actively engaged with United Nation (UN) and Conference on Disarmament (CD) towards the global conscious "comprehensive", "universal" and "non discriminatory" nuclear disarmament. India's foreign policy described nuclear weapon as the biggest threat to civilization and sponsored resolution to ban the use and spread of nuclear weapon. India propagated its own self imposed non-nuclear weapon policy and emphasized on peaceful use of the atom. On the other hand India was keen on developing the technological base for the nuclear option. Indian scientist (under the leadership of Homi. J. Bhabha) and diplomats were engaged in convincing countries like USA, Canada, France etc, to help India build its nuclear infrastructure. Eventually Canada agreed to help build a reactor CANDU in 1956 strictly for peaceful purpose. Canadian assistance contributed substantially to India's nuclear efforts and USA consented to supply fuel for the Tarapur Atomic Plant.

In 1960's there was a remarkable shift in India's foreign policy as well as in India's nuclear diplomacy, mainly due to defeat in Indo-China border clash (1962) followed by China's demonstration of nuclear capabilities (1964). After the Chinese test, Rear Admiral Menon pointed out that the real strength of India's nuclear research was far ahead of China but India choose not to explode the nuclear device earlier. The main question remained whether the nuclear weapon in India's disposal would have kept the Chinese at bay in the 1962 war. Although Nehru did not believe that "an atom bomb will help India in any of its problem at the time. Nehru's foreign and security policy was mainly based on idealism, but at that particular situation his ideas were perhaps very much acquainted with the realistic understanding of International politics. Though he considered disarmament and non violence as worthy goals to be pursued but they were not to be the guiding principles of India's foreign and security policy.

Atomic Energy Act (1962) passed by the Lok Sabha gave more powers to Atomic Energy Commission, the bill was justified with the larger interest of the country that required the Union Government to be in complete control of all atomic resources. As Abraham (1998) argues atomic energy for the first time had a direct relation with the national interest and security of the state. In other words, by approving the Act, the Lok Sabha and the rest of the community recognized the military option that is technically in-built in almost any atomic energy enterprise and Nehru and Bhabha were aware of the dual use of atomic power.

Lal Bahadur Shastri succeeded Nehru as a Prime Minister after his death in the year 1964. Immediately after six months P.M. Shastri faced a great strategic challenge when China's first nuclear weapon was tested on 16 the October 1964. At that time Shastri a staunch Gandhain, who was against nuclear weapon was attending a Conference of Non-Alignment in Cairo, immediately he urged the leaders of the other state to persuade China to abstain from developing nuclear weapon. Domestic pressure was mounting rapidly to respond to China's test, despite Shastri continued to persuade international community particularly U.S and Soviet Union to address the danger of nuclear proliferation. An extensive debate took place in Lok Sabha on 23-24 November 1968 over India's foreign policy and nuclear weapon policy. The debate mostly centered

around India's moral approach to international affairs. Motions on nuclear policy were proposed in the Lok Sabha debate for a general reorientation of foreign policy in the light of Chinese bomb. Those who were in favour of the nuclear bomb argue that deterrence would be effective and cheap as severe security threat had emerged and India should opt for nuclear weapon. Therefore it called for the immediate production of nuclear weapon and also to embark on the installation of nuclear based defence in the country. Shastri reminded of the importance of eliminating all nuclear weapons instead of acquiring them. He also pointed out the economic and moral-political costs of weaponization. Shastri emphasized morality and idealism in policy making, and doubted whether a poor and democratic India could match a poor and totalitarian China in a nuclear competition's (Perkovich, 2000, p. 82). Shastri withstood domestic pressure for the development of nuclear weapon but assured that his policy would not compromise national security and further mentioned that India's nuclear programme would entail 'peaceful nuclear explosive' (PNE) i.e. he adopted a third option that was the 'nuclear option' strategy. According to Major General D. Som Dutt this "strategy was considered to be a pragmatic posture at that time given that there were obvious moral, economic and political reasons for not embarking on an explicit nuclear weapon programme" (Dutta, 1966, p. 8).

Shastri appealed to the nuclear powers to for a nuclear security umbrella for non-nuclear state as to quote K Subrahmanyam "in the wake of China's nuclear threat PM Lal Bahadur Shastri was believed to have requested British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, for an external deterrence - during his visit to that country in December 1964" (Subrahmanyam, 1998, p. 27) again in 1965 Shastri authorized his foreign minister Swaran Singh and Bhabha to discuss with the Americans about the security guarantees, but there was no favorable response from ether states.

Subsequent the Chinese test and another war with Pakistan in 1965 constrained India's national security. The most disturbing aspect of 1965 war was the Chinese diplomatic support to Pakistan. China even went to the extent to threaten India to open a second front along the Himalayan borders if India proceeded with military action against Pakistan. These development persuaded diplomats, bureaucrats and politicians to

conclude that the option to opt for a nuclear weapon was the only means to prevent future Chinese nuclear blackmail and intimidation. However India's official policy of peaceful use of atom and emphasis on disarmament continued. In fact in November 1965 India along with other seven nations presented resolution 2028(XX), which was adopted in General Assembly for negotiation of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Indira Gandhi succeeded Shastri at that particular time when China Pakistan ties stated unfolding but India continued the quest against nuclear weapon despite the tense regional security region. The non proliferation treaty that India was striving for came out asymmetrical in 1968, perpetuating the gap between disarmament and non proliferation. India's foreign policy came under a severe stress during the 1971 East Pakistan crisis. Though India won the limited war but the war left serious strategic and nuclear implication for India, mainly because of the US 'tilt' towards Pakistan and the presence of nuclear capable aircraft carrier 'US enterprise' in the Bay of Bengal. It was a move to generate substantial strategic pressure on India at the crucial state of the war. It was indeed a psychological threat to India. Such a potential threat brought India closer to Soviet Union and on 9th August 1971, the two countries signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. This treaty was the offshoot of the security environment and a departure from India's long held non aligned foreign policy posture, further India pursued a more robust defence and nuclear policy.

Buddha smiled (Pokhran I) in the Year 1974, Indeed, India's first nuclear test was officially described as a "peaceful nuclear explosion"(PNE), but according to George Perkovich Pokhran I was "possibly Mrs. Gandhi way to dissuade United States, China and the Soviet Union from undermining India's autonomy. Therefore she felt the need to demonstrate India's strength and standing to each power (Perkovich 2000, p. 177). New Delhi considered 1974 test more as an exercise of weapon option which was based on a proven technology rather than nuclear weapon test. Moreover it was considered as technological and political signal of intent and capability. Though this was the most remarkable event but it confined India's foreign and nuclear policy, the sanctions imposed by USA and Canada after the test left Indian foreign policy to "struggle for the next three

decades to unshackle." Further it increased international pressure to conform to the nonproliferation regime. Apparently it had no effect on China and reported the event without comments, later Chinese officials suggested that PNE had no military significance, but it definitely hardened Pakistan's determination to develop nuclear weapon. New York Times quoted that Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto "declared that it was a threatening, fateful development" (New York Times, 1974, p. 6.) Mrs. Gandhi in her letter to PM Bhutto tried to assure that India's commitment towards traditional policy of developing nuclear energy entirely for peaceful purpose and the peaceful explosion conducted by the Indian scientists will not alter this policy. Further she tried to assure that there was no political or foreign policy implications of the test and India was committed to settle all the difference with Pakistan peacefully. PM Bhutto responded to the letter, denying any distinction between the peaceful and military nuclear explosion and declared that India's new military capability "as a permanent factor to be reckoned with." After five months Pakistan announced plans to add up twenty-four reactors by 2000 and acquire expertise in all aspect of nuclear fuel cycle. On 18th October Pakistan signed an agreement with France firm to construct a plutonium reprocessing plant at Chashma. Perkovich observed that though Pakistan had begun to acquire nuclear weapon capabilities in 1972 but the India PNE hardened Islamabad's resolve.

The period that followed Pokhran-I test is commonly described as period of restraint in which nothing happened on the nuclear front, this Indian policy of restraint lasted for next six years. Mrs. Gandhi continued to propagate the danger of nuclear weapon proliferation. India presented Resolution 33/71B "Non use of Nuclear Weapon and Preventions of Nuclear War" to the thirty third session of the UN General Assembly on 3rd November 1978. In her address to the inaugural session of the Seventh Non-Alignment Summit in New Delhi on 7th March 1983, Mrs. Gandhi "posed the question whether there could be peace alongside nuclear weapon". Again later in the year on 28th September, 1983 Mrs. Gandhi as the Chairperson of the NAM at the thirty- eight session of UN General Assembly appealed to "resume negotiations for disarmament and ban the production and testing of all nuclear weapon." Not immediately after Pokhran I but certainly from 1980 onwards there was a considerable increase in defence expenditure, scientific and technical development and the development of ballistic missiles.

Simultaneously Pakistan advance in both nuclear and missile technology, the Cold War ended with the emergence of one super power i.e.US and the international pressure to sign NPT and CTBT increased. Mrs. Gandhi withstood all these development and was determined to reaffirm Indian hegemony in South Asia as US continued to arm Pakistan, and China defended Pakistan and encourage insurgency in the Northeast. In famous 'Indira Doctrine' she proclaimed that India will not tolerate any external intervention in her internal affairs and will neither intervene in others internal matters. Mrs. Gandhi intended "regional state to look at India as a cultural and geographic unit." India's expression of its dominant role in South Asia prompted a backlash from Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. India was caught in between its failure to achieve recognition as a global power and resentment for its regional might.

After Mrs. Gandhi assassination in 1984 her son Rajiv Gandhi came to power, he continued Mrs. Gandhi's foreign policy of nonalignment. He maintained a good relation with Mikhail Gorbachev (Soviet Union) and in the later years both the leaders interacted sympathetically towards each other particularly over the issue of nuclear arms control and disarmament. On the hand, India sought ways to improve relations with US. The Regan Government was determined that their global and regional interest required more openness to India. Moreover, India was also seen as a potential counter to Communist China in Asia. India remained prudent about American imperialist intentions but never the less both sides cautiously pursued closer ties.

Rajiv Gandhi was personally skeptical about the value of nuclear weapons. He wanted to magnify India's image as a leader for nuclear disarmament, He strongly propagated India's disarmament diplomacy. On 28th January 1985, New Delhi Rajiv Gandhi hosted a meeting of world leaders and adopted Delhi Declaration (declaration on Principles for a Nuclear-Weapon Free and Nonviolent World). Another landmark event in the history of India's nuclear diplomacy was the Action Plan of 1988 proposed by Rajiv Gandhi. Action plan was for "Ushering in a Nuclear-Weapon Free and Nonviolent World Order" at the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly. His proposal outlined a time bound, gradual and global elimination of nuclear arsenal, but all his efforts went to vain. Rajiv Gandhi believed that intention and actual weaponization

mattered most and not the laboratory work. He never stopped the scientist and engineers from developing devices and the weapon system (Subrahmanyam, 1998) and set up an informal group consisting of three Armed Forces chiefs, Dr Chidambaram Chairman of BARC, Dr A.P.J Kalam director of DROD, Chairman of AEC Dr Ramanna and Dr Subrahmanyam strategic analyst, to work towards defence planning. According to Dr Subrahmanyam "the group recommended that India should acquire a minimum deterrent force of 70 to 100 warheads and follow a no first-use policy." However this recommendation was withheld at that particular time but after a decade when India opted for nuclearization adopted minimum deterrence and no-first use policy.

The National front led by Janata Dal and backed by BJP came to power in November 1989. The new Government under the leadership VP Singh was worried particularly about Pakistani's nuclear capability and its nuclear establishment that was ready to conduct a nuclear test. A small secret group consisting of V.S Arunachalam, R. Chidambaram of (AEC), Arun Singh and retired General Sundarji was formed to develop plans to safeguard the functions of the government in the event of a preventive nuclear attack. The group came to conclusion that it was not necessary for India to respond immediately rather it would be enough to retaliate in a matter of days and weeks. They considered that "four institutions within the Indian system should check and balance nuclear policy: the political leadership, the ministerial bureaucracy, the scientific community and the military." The nuclear doctrine should be guided by four principles: no-first use, ultimate civilian control, no engagement in the arm race and no single sector dominance over nuclear policy." However the institution of check and balance was never formally institutionalized mainly" reflect Indian politicians 'scepticism about the military.

By early 1990's, Indian and Pakistani nuclear status had become an implicitly recognized reality. However the economic factor took the center stage of Indian foreign policy under Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao. India was compelled to abandon its "inward- looking economy" and adopted the liberalization- privatization-globalization (LPG) market economic model under. In this way India could successfully "integrate its economy with the global economy and also achieve a rapid economic growth." But

increasing pressure by US to adhere to NPT and CTBT had a negative impact on P.M. Rao's foreign policy strategy. In the pursuit of placing India on the "emerging power trajectory" P.M. Rao emphasized on the importance of India's engagement with US. During his visit to US on 17th May 1991, in a private meeting with American President he discussed nuclear issue, but Mr. Clinton continued to pursue the policy of "cap, rollback and eliminate" India's nuclear missile programs. PM Rao neither accepted nor rejected these proposals, though he gave assurance to Clinton on India's non-deployment of ballistic missiles in the near term. On this Clinton agreed on the joint statement that conveyed India's and the United States commitment to the progressive reduction of nuclear weapon with the goal of eliminating such weapon of mass destruction.

Important developments in the nuclear domain had a great impact on foreign and nuclear decision making during this period, first was the indefinite extension of NPT and the pressure to adhere to CTBT, second: China's nuclear test on 15th May 1995 just four days after the indefinite extension of the NPT complicated the Indian political security calculus, third: China's shipment of thirty M-11 missiles to Pakistan heightened Indian insecurities, fourth: the passage of Brown Amendment that authorized release of withheld military equipment to Pakistan and lastly China's missile test towards Taiwan, according to Subrahmanyam was perceived as "deterioration of regional nuclear and security environment" which aggravated the domestic debate on Congress government's diplomatic posture. Most probably influenced by these considerations PM Rao decided to conduct nuclear test towards the end on 1995 but unfortunately US satellite detected the activities at the Pokhran test site, under immense pressure from US Rao had to postpone the test. BJP criticized Rao government for "giving up" the nuclear option by surrendering to the American pressure. But, according to Subrahmanyam, before Rao left office he had informed Atal Bihari Vajpayee about the progress in the nuclear program. This can also be ascertained from Vajpayee acknowledging Narasimha Rao as the true "Architect" of the Shakti nuclear test of 11th May 1998 (Malhotra, 2004).

In an ongoing CTBT negotiation India continued to demand a treaty that would oblige nuclear state to disarm as well along with non-nuclear state who would withdraw from their right to develop nuclear weapon. Ambassador Arundhati Ghose at Geneva

Conference argued that the CTBT "as drafted reaffirmed the perpetuation of nuclear apartheid" and stressed "national security considerations would be a key factor in Indian decision-making," which was later reaffirmed by Foreign Minister I.K Gujral. CTBT was seen as a "symbol of Indian sovereignty over hypocrisy and colonial coercion." Though India tried to block consensus on the CTBT but could not stop it being directly taken to the UN General Assembly where it was passed. Ganguly rightly pointed out that the shift in Indian position from support to rejection of CTBT was mainly because of the effect CTBT had on her nuclear programme in a situation where China had already perfected her nuclear arsenal and thus afford the luxury of joining the Treaty (Ganguly, 1999).

India's rejection of CTBT bought more time for the Indian political leadership to consider their policies. India sought to improve relation with US, China, and its neighboring countries and wished to show that "India was economically viable and politically constructive global and regional player" This was evident as "Gujral Doctrine" reflected India's commitment to act towards resolving issue with smaller state and in creating a "regional norm" and practice of non-interference in others' affairs. The "Gujral Doctrine" enhanced relation with India's small neighbours (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal). Though Pakistan was excluded, but after Sharif wins in Pakistan (February 1997) who signaled talks with India paved the way to a series of high-level meetings. Pakistan was willing to abandon her demand of making Kashmir a precondition for progress on its talk with India. PM. Gujral along with Pakistani PM Sharif manages to take some steps in improving the relations which included direct dialogue on Kashmir. But soon the relation sour again when Pakistan tested a HAFT-III missile which India believed that Pakistan had obtained from China. PM Gujral responded by saying that India would keep China assistance "in mind we take care of our preparedness" and reminded that "the Indian nuclear option was said to be open, and that the Agni programme still continuing," (Deccan Herald, 1997).

The most radical change in India's foreign and security policy came when India decided to go nuclear on 11th May 1998 and self declared as a nuclear weapon state who has liberated itself from self-imposed nuclear ambiguity, this time there was no reference to any peaceful nature of nuclear tests. The decision was mainly based on the rationale

that the test was a response to the problematic regional and nuclear environment and the compulsion of circumstances confronting India i.e. so called threat from China and Pakistan, heightened by growing China-Pakistan strategic level nuclear and missile collaboration. "India also considered external world as unfavorable determined to include India into the nonproliferation regime." PM Vajpayee argued the test had given India "Shakti, physical and political power, ability and self-confidence. India volunteered to exercise a moratorium on nuclear test and hinted at adhering to the test ban treaty (The Hindu, 1998). According to Vajpayee India was ready to discuss certain provisions of the treaty but it does not mean that India would be willing to sign the treaty that she considered discriminatory (India Today, 1998). Immediately, the test evoked global condemnation and India's "entire diplomatic stamina was channeled to contain the reactions and convert the critical situation into an opportunity." The Indian test and the declaration of nuclear status undoubtedly raised important question concerning India's relations with Pakistan, China and the US. Pakistan responded by conducting five test after two weeks on 28th May 1998. The overt Pakistani nuclear test was perceived as to wipe out the conventional military edge India had (Talbot, 2004). The Chinese response to the test was extremely negative as PM Vajpayee without mentioning China had hinted that the rationale behind the test was the nuclear armed neighbour (China) and the strategic threat emitting from it. US, Canada and Japan imposed economic sanctions against India.

Aftermath the test the key challenge to India's foreign policy was to "seek global recognition and understanding of its unblemished record on nonproliferation" (Saran, 2005). PM Vajpayee began to work on improving Indo-US relations and for this he appointed Jaswant Singh. India pointed out clearly that its commitments to universal disarmament, was not contradictory to its present status as a nuclear state. Nuclear weaponization was motivated by political and strategic purpose rather than operational military intentions. A pro-active foreign policy was the need of the time. According to Nanda "part of a massive diplomatic offensive launched by India to contain any damage" was initiated by sending personal letter by PM Vajpayee to various head of states and UN General Assembly, the diplomatic missions were also asked to brief foreign government in detail (Nanda, 1998), moreover, eminent persons were send to important world capitals

to address think tanks and universities and to interact informally with the decision makers at various level (Katyal, 1998). With regard to neighboring countries Vajpayee and his officials reaffirmed on various occasion that India remained fully committed to a peaceful and stable regional environment and was will to negotiate on outstanding issues through bilateral dialogue and negotiation. Further it was restated that the nuclear test was not against any country and it was only an assurance and determination to the Indian public about their security. The government was determined to remain engaged in substantive dialogue to improve its relation with its neighbour.

In the post Pokhran-II period the Indian leaders were quite flexible in dealing with the international reaction and tried to engage the world with the "sustantative dialogue" on different issue. As an outcome, India's relation with US was transformed by the turn of the century. Despite economic sanctions US "began to treat India more seriously than ever before" (Mohan, 2003). The dialogue on nuclear issue between India and US facilitated the bilateral relation between the two countries. The two sides preferred to choose broader engagement that helped in management of nuclear differences. Once the US made peace with nuclear India other countries- Australia, Canada and Japan- followed the suit. Further India's relations gradually reached a higher level with Russia, China and France. In fact France became the first country to propose civilian nuclear deal much before Indo-US civilian nuclear deal was signed. However the Indo-US deal liberated India from the "technological embargo" and indirectly recognized India's nuclear weapon status despite remaining outside NPT. Significantly, with this agreement the world has finally accepted India's status as a nuclear power and a major global player.

4.5 THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME: INDIA'S NUCLEAR BEHAVIOUR

The disastrous experience with the nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 left the entire world with fear and horror. The former US Secretary of War Lewis Stimson rightly remarked that the nuclear bomb was a psychological weapon rather than a weapon of terrible destruction.¹¹ This horrific psychological impact generated a nuclear taboo which remains in practice till present. The 'nuclear taboo' against the use of nuclear weapons due to its horrific threat to humanity has strengthened over time. Moreover,

there was also a trend towards the possession and proliferation of nuclear weapons after 1945, the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon in August 1949.

The first institutional effort to reinforce norms against nuclear proliferation took place in 1954 when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was approved and became operational in 1957. This was an effort to create safeguards: non-nuclear weapons states approved to report their civilian nuclear activities to the IAEA and also agreed to keep their facilities open for inspection by the IAEA inspectors to ensure that there was no diversion of material from civilian to military purposes.¹² However Soviet continued development of advanced nuclear technology and the nuclear test by Britain in 1957 and France in 1960 jolted the world. In the sixteenth session of UN General Assembly, Resolution 1653(XVI) – declaration of the prohibition of the utilization of atomic and thermo nuclear weapons- was passed on 24 November 1961 calling for a prohibition of nuclear weapons and considered the use of nuclear weapon as "contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization."¹³(Tannenwald, 2005) Nevertheless, the UN failed to initiate a comparable taboo against the nuclear proliferation because of powerful states' interests. China joined the nuclear club by testing its nuclear weapon on October 16 1964.

In 1961 the United Nations' General Assembly took an important initiative to constrain the spread of nuclear weapons and restricted states from the transfer or acquisition of nuclear technology. This effort was known as the Irish Resolution because Ireland played a primary role within the UN by arguing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons by additional states constituted immense danger. Additionally, in the early 1960s, there were both vertically and horizontally proliferation of nuclear weapons and experts were concerned that within the span of twenty years more dozen countries were likely to go nuclear.

4.5.1 NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

The Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), was introduced in 1968, after three years of bickering over the language and debating the necessary terms, the United States and the Soviet Union released a joint draft of the NPT and submitted it to the Eighteen- Nation Conference on Disarmament (ENCD). After further revisions, another further revised

draft was submitted to the 22 Session of the United Nations General Assembly. On July 1, 1968, the NPT was signed by 62 countries. In addition to three acknowledged nuclear-weapon states, the USSR, the US, and the UK, 59 other non nuclear weapons nations signed the treaty, in the hope that acceptance would assure their protection under the nuclear umbrella of the nuclear-weapon states.

In 1970 NPT came into effect with a range of obligations for Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). NWS are defined as those that have manufactured and tested their nuclear weaponry before January 1, 1967. The NWS are United States, Russia, The United Kingdom, France and China. Every other country that is a member to the treaty is categorized as NNWS. NPT was established under the belief that the nuclear weapon proliferation would increase the risks of a nuclear war. Thus, the treaty required the NNWS not to acquire, manufacture or seek assistance in the manufacturing of nuclear weapons (Kapur, 2007, p.3), while the NWS were to disarm and subsequently eliminate nuclear weapons. This effort initiated cooperation among states and legally enforceable rules and initiated anti-nuclear norms which remain in practice though they were violated at different times by different states.

The NPT is divided into three different pillars. These are non-proliferation, the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy, and nuclear disarmament. These pillars make the fundamental value of the treaty and act as the guidelines for the signatory states. Article I and Article II of the treaty can be viewed as the non-proliferation pillar restricting the vertical as well as horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapon or used of nuclear energy for military purpose.¹⁴(IAEA, 1970)

The separation of NWS and NNWS makes the NPT a asymmetrical regime because while the treaty places similar obligations on both NWS and NNWS to prevent the proliferation of these weapons, it allows the five recognised NWS legally permitted to be in the possession of nuclear weapons, something that are denied to all other parties to the treaty.

The peaceful use of nuclear energy is the second pillar of the treaty. The reward for NNWS to sign the NPT is basically in return of giving up their acquisition of nuclear

weapons and commitment from nuclear states to provide them with nuclear technology suitable for the development of nuclear energy industry. Article IV of the treaty in compliance with article I and II gives the member states the absolute right to develop research, production, and peaceful use of nuclear energy without any discrimination. For peaceful use of nuclear technology all the members of the treaty have the right to participate in exchange of materials, equipments and technological information. Further, members of NPT who are in the position to transfer nuclear technology should cooperate with international organisation and other states to further the development of application for the purpose of peaceful use of nuclear energy to the territories of NNWS who are have signed the treaty for considering the need to develop these areas of the world (IAEA, 1970).

The regime and the IAEA have a tricky dual part to play where it is supposed to avert nuclear proliferation and promote and provide peaceful use of nuclear energy. There is no guarantee that the support received from IAEA by the states to produce nuclear energy for civilian use will not be used for nuclear weapons production.

The disarmament pillar is mainly based in Article VI, where members of NPT will have to pursue in good faith all negotiations in order to stop nuclear arms race and implement effective measures for complete nuclear disarmament under strict international control (IAEA, 1970).¹⁵ According to the disarmament pillar of the treaty, NWS are not strictly required to disarm and destroy all their nuclear weapons rather it was essential for them to negotiated in good faith to eliminate nuclear weapons in their possessions.

International regime considered NPT as the base to avert global nuclear proliferation. The powerful states constructed this regime to change states' interests and behaviour with regard to nuclear weapons. The fundamental objective is to stop proliferation of nuclear weapon technology to non-nuclear weapons states, and to build co-operation among all the states to abide by the NPT norms. Furthermore, the treaty encouraged confidence-building measures among member state to establish a system of safeguards under the responsibility of the IAEA. The Treaty was initiated to promote co-operation among all the member state in the field of peaceful use and equal access to

nuclear technology, though safeguards prevented the diversion of nuclear material military purpose. In addition, the Treaty aimed to decrease international tensions and strengthen confidence among the member States to facilitate the end of nuclear manufacture, liquidation of existing stocks, elimination of nuclear weapons from national arsenals, and to abide by the NPT terms in general and effectively works towards global disarmament. Additionally, in accordance with the United Nation Charter, the NPT recall that the member states in their foreign relation must desist for threat or use of force against the political independence and territorial integrity of other state. Nations states are to work towards the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security without diverting economic and human resource for manufacturing nuclear weapons. The provisions of the NPT, in particular paragraph 3 of Article VIII, offer a review of the operation of the treaty every five years which was indefinitely extended in 1995.(See Appendix III Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons).

4.5.2 NPT AND INDIA'S NUCLEAR BEHAVIOUR

Both formal and informal mechanisms of the non-proliferation regime had restricted Indian nuclear development. The impact of regime is through the constitutive procedure of definition and categorization. A certain definition of proliferation as the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five NWS became enshrined as a global norm. India was aware of the inequality of this nuclear order. During the negotiations of the NPT draft, Indian diplomats tried to broaden the definition of proliferation to include increase in NWS arsenals and curb the manufacture, stockpiling and sophistication of weapons by the NWS (Husain 1968, 742). A world that was not structured by nuclear weapons would be safer for India as well as for other states. At the same time, India wanted to restrict the definition of proliferation to exclude explosions of nuclear devices for civilian research. NNWS would become dependent on NWS if barred from conducting such “explosive experiments” which were vital to the full utilization of nuclear technology (Trivedi 1965, p. 595). It is clear that India perceived the nonproliferation order as doubly threatening—both strategic freedom and development were at stake.

Since India had not tested by 1967, the regime made available only one identity—that of a NNWS, an identity India could not accept since it was engaged in establishing deterrence with China and Pakistan. This also indicates regime's strength is the extension of its scope, including to those countries that resist its formal components. As the regime became hegemonic, Indian elites realized, India was pressurized to conform to the behavior expected of a NNWS. Thus, the growing power of the regime became a security issue for India. Through the 1970s and the 1980s, India tried to escape being categorized either as a NNWS by testing a nuclear device or as a NWS by imputing peaceful purposes to the 1974 test.

Global anti-nuclear norms were first tested in 1974 when India exploded a so-called peaceful nuclear device, while accusing the NPT of establishing a form of 'nuclear apartheid'. Jaswant Singh justified that this refers to the idea that only a select few states which are members of the UNSC have the privilege to acquire nuclear technology and that they can use their power to prevent other states from building up their capacity for research and development of nuclear technology.¹⁶ India regarded the NPT as a 'discriminatory treaty', imposing a different set of rules on nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, which had different rights and obligations. For many years India remained a critic of the international order embodied in the NPT, challenging it from outside while developing nuclear devices and keeping the nuclear option open until its second nuclear tests in 1998.

Initially, India was not in favour of nuclear weapons testing in the 1950s. Jawaharlal Nehru stated that neither chemical biological or nuclear energy and power should be used for destructive purpose.¹⁷ However Homi J. Bhaba and Nehru were engaged in technological advancement for both peaceful and military purposes to join the global club as soon as possible after the US and Soviet developments of their nuclear weapons. Furthermore, China's acquisition of a nuclear weapon in 1964 transformed both Nehru's and Bhaba's efforts. India, which had already fought a war with China in 1962, realised that possession of nuclear weapons had become a question of its security vis-à-vis China. India, however, later proclaimed that its 1974 test was a 'peaceful nuclear explosion', on which it sought at great length to convince the world community. The

Indian 1974 explosion was not only to counter the Chinese nuclear programme but also to join the club of nuclear weapons states. According to Indian Ambassador Savitri Kunadi India's unwillingness to sign NPT became clear when the treaty was considered as a tool to legitimize the continuing possession of nuclear stockpiles instead of giving up nuclear weapons by few nuclear weapons holders.

In a speech before the UN, Rajiv Gandhi, India's then Prime Minister, argued that it is unacceptable that few nations have the right to possess nuclear weapons threatening the survival of life on earth and these states are above any international norms while non nuclear states are policed against their production.¹⁸ Additional, it is important points out that India was also concerned what if UN and world powers failed to achieve complete non-discriminatory global nuclear disarmament, then states like India is left with no choice then to exercise her sovereign right to protect her national interest and acquire her own nuclear weapon for deterrence purpose.¹⁹

Above all Indians saw the NPT as a victory for China, which thereby acquired NWS status extrapolating from Dean Rusk's statement that the NPT precluded any US security guarantees, The *Indian Express*, claimed that India now had no protection against nuclear blackmail by China. Similarly, the *Times of India* saw the treaty removing potential nuclear challenges to the PRC (Williams 1969, 33-36). The threat from China was intensified by its recognition as a NWS by the nonproliferation regime.

China took advantage of the regime's categorization, refused bilateral discussions with India on nuclear issues on the grounds that as a non-nuclear weapon state India should raise them only in multilateral disarmament forum (Singh 2003, p.153). For instance, in 1988 Indian analysts asked Qian Qichen, the Chinese foreign minister, about the possibility of a "No First Use" agreement between the two countries. Qian quipped that since "India claimed it had no nuclear weapons, such an agreement would be meaningless" (Parthasarathy, 2004). China had also signaled that its nuclear no first-use and non-use pledge was only applicable to the members of NPT directing at India's periphery status. India 'learned' from the Chinese attitude that it would be taken seriously only when its nuclear status was unambiguous. K. Subrahmanyam, the Dean of Indian strategists, maintained that a nuclear bomb would enable India to talk to China as an

equal (Thomas 1986, 47). Perkovich also reports a 1995 conversation with a senior Indian official who claimed that India had to deploy ballistic missiles “with enough capability” not to guard against a Chinese threat, but to compel China to negotiate seriously.

India’s 1998 test series was followed by a declaration by the PM Vajpayee that India is a nuclear weapon state and its a reality which cannot be denied, he said that India does not seek for conferment and neither it is the status that others can grant. India has sovereign right to exercise her choice (Anon, 1998). In spite of nationalist rhetoric, India cannot simply declare itself a NWS on fulfilling certain technical requirements. This status is inter-subjective and is enforced through particular procedures. The official US response to India’s self declaration was a direct rejection of India's nuclear status as a nuclear weapon state (Talbot 1998). ‘Self-declared’, ‘statutory’, and ‘de facto’ are used as qualifiers before NWS when referring to these countries. India has also been called a ‘nuclear state’ or a ‘possessor state.’

In 2000, India’s Minister for External Affairs declared in Parliament that India is a nuclear weapon state though not in strict legal terms of NPT as it is not a party to the treaty, and argues that India had always adhered to the NPT provisions under Article I, III, and VI which is applicable to nuclear weapons states only. India has a sound non proliferation record, had abided by the nuclear safeguards and has vigorously pursued negotiations for global disarmament and remains committed to nuclear weapon free world (Ministry of External Affairs, 2000).²⁰

Here the Indian government tries to show that it has satisfied all the conditions for accession to the NPT as a NWS. Clearly, India was not ready to abandon the search for more formal acknowledgement of its status and considers this an important security goal. While it is unlikely that the NPT will be amended to include India as a NWS, some were hopeful that ‘other means’ could be found to give India the status of a nuclear power. One way would be for India to sign a regional nuclear-weapon-free-zone pact as a nuclear power (Taksal, 1999).

4.5.3 COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT)

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was adopted by UN General Assembly on September 10, 1996. The treaty is described as the "longest sought and hardest fought for arms control treaty in history."(Chevrier, 2012, p. 24) Despite a decade of global efforts to promote the entry into force of the CTBT the treaty's enactment appears a long way off. India, Pakistan and North Korea have not signed the treaty and United States failed to ratify it.

The preamble affirmed that the CTBT serves the goals of both non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons. The underlying principle of the treaty was that it would restrain the development and end the modernisation of nuclear weapons, contribute towards non proliferation and focus on nuclear disarmament, and strengthen international peace and security. Article I of the treaty states that the parties to the CTBT must concur not to "carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion"(Jozef & Cox, 1988, p. 370) and abstain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear test explosion. To implement the Treaty provisions, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) was created in Vienna under Article 2. The CTBTO includes an executive council for decision making and a technical secretariat for implementing the Treaty's verification provisions. Article 4, deals with the charter of the proposed global verification regime consisting of the International Monitoring System (IMS), and International Data Center (DIC), provisions for consultation and clarification request from member states, on-site inspection and confidence-building measures. The CTBT is the first multilateral arms control treaty which established remote sensing network for monitoring the operation of the treaty worldwide. Article 9 stipulates that the treaty is of unlimited duration. However, it also provides that the State party can withdraw on six months notice provided that the subject matter of the treaty has endangered national interest (Jozef & Cox, 1988, p. 380).

4.5.4 CTBT AND INDIA'S NUCLEAR BEHAVIOUR

India was apparently the first nation in the world to advocate for the test ban treaty. PM. Nehru proposed "immediate standstill" agreement between US and Soviet Union to restrain from further nuclear testing as early as in 1950's. However the call to forbid nuclear test was obstructed by nuclear weapon state stating that there was no full proof verification system. India welcomed the Partial Test Ban treaty (PTBT) as a first step towards complete ban on nuclear testing. At UN Disarmament Conference in 1954, India initiated a global call to end nuclear testing and freezing of fissile material production. India continued with her effort and proposed various measures for forbidding nuclear testing in both the Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 and 1982. Moreover in 1988 disarmament conference Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan was introduced for a complete universal elimination of nuclear arsenal within a specific time frame which can be achieved by first banning nuclear test. India eagerly supported the idea behind the CTBT and when the negotiations began India was optimistic that the nuclear weapon states were ready to take a step on the road to nuclear disarmament. During the discussion of Conference on Disarmament India wanted to ensure that the CTBT did not legitimize existing nuclear arsenals as the NPT had done.

India's External Affairs Minister Sri Pranab Mukherjee at the UN General Assembly on 29, September 1995 clearly restated the Indian policy on CTBT that must "contain a binding commitment on the international community, especially the nuclear weapon states, to take further measures within an agreed time-frame towards the creation of a nuclear free world."²¹(S.Pattanaik, 1998)

The reason behind Indian Government sponsoring a resolution for the CTBT was to avoid any discriminatory practices in the regimes; as India had always favored the cause of disarmament and non-proliferation, but with impartial means and processes. Another important reason why India vehemently proposed the resolution was, that the year 1994 marked the 20th anniversary for India's peaceful nuclear explosion and Indian scientists have been working on advancing the design of the previous nuclear test, the test ban at this stage would had been of great concern to India. Hence, India tried to avoid any

kind of negative implications for her nuclear advancements based on the biased disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.

But the final treaty as it emerged at the CD ignored all of India's concerns. India had no alternative except to oppose it in the UN General Assembly and stay out of the treaty. The draft text of the treaty then made Article XIV "entry into force" conditional on ratification by 44 countries who are listed by IAEA having research and power reactors. This left India with no choice except to block the treaty even though it was passed by an overwhelming majority.

India's posture against the CTBT is also characterized by a similar argument as of NPT. India rejected the CTBT and presented an argument that it was discriminatory in character and decisively flawed as test ban treaty locks in the capabilities of the nuclear weapons states without requiring a reduction or freeze on the quantity of their weapons. India claims its objectives for a test ban treaty have always been linked to eventual disarmament and the CTBT has failed to meet Indian concern. Additionally India argued that the language regarding nuclear disarmament in the treaty's preamble is weak as it suggests that a nuclear test ban may someday lead to disarmament, indicating that the abolition of nuclear weapons is not its main purpose. India's ambassador to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, Arundhati Ghose, cites the failure of a time-table for disarmament and new counter-proliferation utilities for nuclear weapons, as reason for India's opposition to CTBT. She argued that national security consideration was a key factor in Indian decision making and further added that the CTBT as drafted reasserts the preservations of "nuclear apartheid"(Subrahmanyam, 1998) .

The debate within India over the CTBT was framed more by Indian pro-bomb lobby in such a way that opposing the CTBT was taken to be a blow for Indian autonomy and bow against American hegemonism. According to C. Raja Mohan the CTBT is, "designed to preserve the hegemony of the nuclear weapons powersput a cap on India's nuclear capability, overrule India's disarmament and security concerns, [and subject it to the] worst form of political blackmail."²²On the other hand security expert like Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaiak claim that India's stance on the CTBT is inconsistent with its past calls for a test ban treaty. Arundhati Ghose stated that India's

position has always been consistent to an end of global disarmament and "this was not the CTBT India envisaged in 1954. This cannot be the CTBT that India can be expected to accept."²³

India saw CTBT merely as an instrument for horizontal nonproliferation rather than disarmament. The main factors that explain the India's shift from support to rejection of the CTBT are: India realised the need to assess the implication of NPT on CTBT negotiations.

Not just the indefinite NPT extension in 1995 had bothered India what concerned more was the imbalance with regard to binding character of international norms between NNWS and NNWS.

Elimination of nuclear weapon was the ultimate goal though the objective of global elimination was lost in the mists of future. It was a triumph of the nuclear weapon state that had succeeded in securing their position in power for the unforeseeable future. Therefore the review of CTBT was essential as the intention of nuclear armed states for nuclear disarmament was not clear and it appeared that the nuclear have states were interpreting the add-hoc committee on CTBT as a means of pressurizing non members including India to come into NPT fold and this would eventually led to the control and dominance of nuclear haves over nuclear have not. Second, India was acutely concerned about the "entry into force" clause, Indian strategic defence expert K. Subrahmanyam terms it "colonialism"²⁴ as India was ongoing with an untested nuclear weapon program and the clause of the treaty would likely effect India nuclear option. Third India's concern was the deteriorating security condition with her neighbour. Indian strategic community argued that the Chinese were willing to agree to the treaty only because they had reached such a level of proficiency in their weapons development that they could do away with no further test."²⁵ Moreover if India signs CTBT India would have foregone the right to test any nuclear devices, yet China would have retained the power to develop its arsenal through computer simulation. India also feared that China can help Pakistan -its prime ally- through delicate technologies through which Pakistan can test its devices through computer simulation only.

Although CTBT embodied international norm against nuclear testing has been universally accepted. India demonstrated her nuclear capability by testing on May 1998

which challenged the aspirations of NWS of legitimizing and limiting nuclear weapons to few selected world powers while denying to others. But immediately after the test the Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced India's voluntary moratorium stand on CTBT and also affirmed to the "no first use" of nuclear weapon considering Indian commitment to her stand on world without nuclear weapons.²⁶

During the debate in Parliament, on December 15, 1998, PM. Vajpayee asserted India's commitment to universal test ban and her willingness to adhere to CTBT provided other countries adhere to the CTBT without conditions.²⁷ However on October 13, 1999 the US Senate voted against ratification of the CTBT with this development it became absolutely clear that the United States itself was in doubt regarding the consequences of ratification. However the future of CTBT mainly lies in the hands of the United States. Unless and until America ratifies it, the other nuclear weapons states will not ratify it, especially China and India will also not deter from its decision of not signing if the former two refrain from ratifying it. Despite India's unwritten future with the CTBT it is already a de facto supporter of the treaty by observing voluntary moratorium on future nuclear testing²⁸ and refraining from conducting underground nuclear test explosions. At the same time, India also indicated its willingness to move towards a *de jure* formalization of this declaration.²⁹

4.6 THE INTERSECTIONS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

It was the economic backwardness that encouraged India to the nuclear path. The colonial experience and the Cold War politics led P.M Nehru to choose the path of non-alignment in foreign policy and self-reliance in economic policy. He wanted to maintain balance between economic development as well as national freedom and integrity. Therefore Nehru's vision of an economically developed modern state, including nuclear energy drove the nation to manufacture the essential nuclear foundation that gave it the opportunity along with foreign assistance to seek for nuclear weapon in the late 1950's. Nehru's vision of India as a modern economically developed nation was implemented by Bhabha of their plan to modernize the nation through the application of modern science.

Atomic power seemed only route to modernize India. As Nehru noted that "the application of nuclear energy to peaceful and constructive purpose has opened the limitless possibility for human development, prosperity and overabundance" (Newman, 1965, p. 264). Nuclear power electric or explosive was considered as representing modernity and prosperity. It was believed India would with the help of atomic energy achieve the standard of living that her backwardness and lack of industrial strength had prevented her from obtaining it. Nehru is considered as the architect of modern and scientific India who laid the strong foundation stone of Indian foreign and nuclear policy. Nehru was aware of the dual purpose of nuclear energy and had accepted the potential military role of the programme. He not only ensured nuclear development for peaceful purposes to serve India's national interest but he also exhorted scientist to work simultaneously for weapon use of nuclear energy so that when the country decided to exercise nuclear option it would do so without much difficulty.

Indian economic strategies consisted of what "growth through capital accumulation and increased per capita income"(Gangopadhyay, 1993, p. 139). India utilized Soviet style five year plans which "were based on a strategy of massive industrialization and capital accumulation." Indian economic policy was a product of nationalism, socialism, and a rejection of Western economics. Indian politician, Subramanian Swamy, proclaimed policies he termed "economic nationalism." Economic nationalism consists of "self-reliance, high growth rate, and nuclear weapons"(Swamy, 1971, p. 1).

By early 1960's India with foreign assistance and indigenous effort made substantial progress in building the infrastructure for developing technological base for the nuclear option if the need arose. As it prove to be the case India launched a nuclear explosion project in 1965 soon after Chinese first nuclear test. India feared that its progress would slow down if the country would face coercion from other possibly nuclear-armed states. In this regard nuclear weapons were essential in "securing an environment" for development. Cohen points out that once the "fixed costs" of setting up a relatively indigenous nuclear infrastructure had been incurred taking the step of weapons acquisition became more reasonable (Cohen 2001, p. 177). Further the

electricity and space programs subsidized the cost of the nuclear program.³⁰ Most importantly, development was not seen as distinct from, or competing with defense, especially with reference to the dual-use nuclear program. Thus, perceived “opportunity costs” were also low.

The Pokhran I test in 1974, officially described as Peaceful nuclear explosion was symbolized as the accomplishment of indigenously built nuclear program as demonstrated by the emphasis given to technological ingenuity. Testing was also believed to stimulate development. The 1974 test was represented as yet another long-term, capital-intensive investment by the state. Strategic analysts, K. Subrahmanyam, claimed that the PNE did not “result in the diversion of resources from development but was itself a splice-off from a steady development program” (Subrahmanyam, 1974, p. 5). Swaran Singh, the External Affairs Minister declared to the UN that the PNE should be seen in the context of India’s attempt to develop its natural resources and not as a nuclear explosive test.

A study conducted by economist and South Asian expert, Robert Looney, concludes that India's defense expenditures had no negative impact on India's economic growth (Loony, 1991). Looney conducted a study of the causality between defense expenditures and gross domestic product in South Asia. Utilizing two twenty year sub-periods 1957-1977 and 1967-1987 Looney concluded that "the impact of defense growth was positive, with growth not significantly influencing the government's allocation to the military"(Loony, 1991, p. 59). His findings indicate that India's modest defense expenditures are not a contributing factor in India's slow growth and troublesome economy. Looney's conclusions are consistent with other economic studies which conclude "that investment and government spending both have a positive impact on growth"(Loony, 1991, p. 59).

India's economic reforms were initiated in the late 1980s after decades of inward looking, semi autarkic planning. A Balance of Payments crisis prompted comprehensive liberalization which started in 1991, the Indian economic reforms represented a "clear and direct shift from the dysfunctional development strategy of the previous four decades"(Srinivasan, 2004, p. 229). The pre-reform strategy emphasized import

substituting industrialization and the state played a major role in the economy which included privatization of state-owned enterprises, reversal of the reservation of certain sectors for small-scale industries, lifting of restrictions on ownership and production, and deregulation to promote entrepreneurship (Srinivasan, 2004, p. 232). Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was enthusiastically requested, even in sectors that had been reserved for Indian business. Export promotion became an important objective India joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) and revised national legislation to adhere to international standards on free trade and property rights. The changes significantly affected the economy, between 1992-93 and 1997-98, as average annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate raised from 5.5% to 6.9%. Compared to global average India's export was rising faster and contributing a steadily increasing share of GDP.

In the 1990s, the international community began to expect that stronger economic relationships would restrain India's nuclear ambitions. If the nuclear program were accelerated the country would be isolated internationally, which would harm the economic interests of India. But, strikingly, this was the time that the government began to speed up the nuclear weapons program and started secret preparation for test. In 1995 ultimate disclosure and subsequent pressure from the US halted test preparations. The test was planned by the same Congress government who had liberalized the Indian economy. Some authors like Raj Chengappa, have claimed that the pro-liberalization advocates headed by the Finance Minister convinced the Prime Minister not to proceed with the test.³¹ Whether this was true or not, the test was simply put off. In 1997 BJP government also attempted to test, but the government itself fell before the decision could be carried out. Finally, India tested nuclear weapons on 11 and 13 May, 1998. However, India's new economic policy actually facilitated the turn in nuclear policy.

The shift in discourse with economic liberalization facilitated the test. As the state withdrew from its developmental role, its regulatory role became more prominent. There was a dramatic u-turn in official state discourse. India emerged as a 'normal state', simultaneously participating in the global market and putting national security first (Sarkar, 1998, p. 1729). India's shift towards 'normalcy' helped reassure the world about the behavior of a nuclear India. PM Vajpayee while addressing the parliament after the test cited globalization to reinforce the case of treating India not as a rogue state but

rather as a responsible member of the international community, “the policies of economic liberalisation introduced in recent years have increased our regional and global linkages and the Government shall deepen and strengthen these ties.”³² Aiyar (1998) pointed out that liberalizer celebrated the fact that the test helped to globalize India by making it essential for the government to attract foreign investment. India's nuclear test promised economic benefits.

Liberalizers hoped for positive economic fallout from testing. Professor Baru asserted that India as a nuclear power and with open economy could deal with the world “on an equal footing” (Baru 1999, p. 49) A soft state that compromises on security issues cannot project the image of a strong negotiator on trade and commerce issues (Chellaney, 1997; Jetley, 1998). The ‘Made in India’ label would acquire brand equity when the country openly joined the major powers as a strategic player (Nalapat, 1999). An Indian representative at the UN or the WTO would be heard with respect (Gurumurthy 1998). India’s “wavering” had cost it patent rights as well as the benefits of being a nuclear power (Joshi 1998c). Brigadier General Vijai Nair, a nuclear advocate, believes that India's extensive civilian nuclear power program, which can produce fissile material, help supplement the costs of a weapons program.

4.7 CONCLUSION

Economic sanctions are significant in the discussion of the economic consequences of nuclear decisions. Sanctions, like nonproliferation controls were often seen as a security threats because they have negative effect on economic and technical progress. India’s strategy has been to counter them through indigenous capability, particularly in nuclear technology. The 1974 test, for instance, was seen as “part of an industrial plan aiming at eliminating the need for foreign aid.”³³ A.B. Vajpayee, then an Opposition leader, called it a “substantial step towards self-reliance.” In 1998, it was predicted that sanctions would stimulate self-sufficiency.³⁴ They would make Indians more self-reliant and innovative. The 1998 budget announced a 20% increase in funding for science, both the civilian and defense sectors specifically to counter restrictions on technology transfers.³⁵

Indian decision-makers were keenly observing the operation of the regime, and they estimated that the costs of sanctions would not damage the economy. They argued sanctions in the nonproliferation regime are rare. According to Speier Chow and Starr analysis, sanctions had been imposed only 24 times and out of these only 7 led to negotiations between the sending and targeted country.³⁶ Therefore India hoped that it could win concessions on issue of security regime by proffering economic gains (Bajpai, 2002). Besides, sanctioning countries did not appear to be uniformly committed to nonproliferation. Advocates of ‘crossing the nuclear threshold’ anticipated that India would be able to meddle with the coalition of sanctioning countries before sanctions began to hurt.³⁷

France and Russia opposed the imposition of sanctions, with the latter signing an agreement to build nuclear reactors days after the tests (Nayar, 2001, p. 81). On economic sanctions, Germany officially followed the G-8 line, but in practice its stand was softer and occasionally it remained neutral in the voting on aid proposals (Nayar, 2001, p. 98). Within the US too there was opposition to an emphasis on nonproliferation at the expense of other economic and strategic objectives. Bill Clinton’s Secretary of States, Madeleine Albright also criticized the sanctions, mandated by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, as being too inflexible “all sticks and no carrot” According Teresita Schaffer former South Asian specialist in State Department said that, despite being apprehensive of India’s nuclear status, the US decided to accept the reality very early on, which led to the first strategic dialogue between India and US. This further led to the beginning of a closer relationship between the two countries, mainly because of US interest in India’s expanding economy and pool of information technology specialists.

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