

TITLE OF THE THESIS

# **Moral Status of Animals: Debates and Dimensions**

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PHILOSOPHY**

**BY  
DEBANJALI MUKHERJEE**

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**UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF**


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I declare that the thesis entitled “Moral Status of Animals: Debates and Dimensions” has been prepared by me under the guidance of Dr. Laxmikanta Padhi, Associate Professor in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal. No part of this thesis has formed the basis or the award of any degree or fellowship previously.



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This is to certify that the Doctoral thesis entitled: *Moral Status of Animals: Debates and Dimensions* prepared by Miss Debanjali Mukherjee, is the result of her academic work. To the best of my knowledge, this thesis is not submitted for the award of any degree of this University or in any other University. It is further certified that the candidate has complied with all the formalities as per the requirements of University of North Bengal. As the thesis bears the evidence of her originality, I consider it fit and recommend for submission for evaluation for the partial fulfillment of Doctorate Degree in Philosophy of the University of North Bengal.

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**Title of the Dissertation:**  
**Moral Status of Animals: Debates and Dimensions**  
**ABSTRACT**

Research on Animal Ethics raises a number of philosophical questions about how we should understand morality and how we should understand animals. By philosophical, I mean simply the quest for a deeper understanding of debatable questions about the nature of reality and proper conduct of life. We need to emphasize the evolutionary continuity and argue that humans share with other mammals the same basic suite of moral behaviors, namely fairness, cooperation and empathy. We also need to suggest that morality may exist along a continuum, from simpler to more complex patterns of behavior. How different are humans from animals? Traditionalist claims that animals are inferior to humans in power, intelligence and evolutionary status. They are neither moral agent, nor rational, neither possessed with free will, nor are they capable of linguistic expressions thus, they are not bounded by social contract to humans and so on. Philosophers from Plato to Rawls have shown their preferences for human chauvinism, which make human and only human to be worthy of moral consideration.

Thus animal ethics examines the beliefs that are held about the moral status of animals. Animal ethics does not presume that any particular point of view is good and right. It accommodates a number of approaches for trying to resolve animal-human moral issues. The question remains: what is moral status? An individual has moral status for us if we believe that it makes a difference, morally, how that individual is treated, apart from the effects it has on others. That is, an individual has moral standing for us if, when making moral decisions, we feel we ought to take that individual's welfare into account for the individual's own sake and not merely for our benefit or someone else's benefit. We use the term moral status or moral

importance to refer to the circumstances that a being is a member of moral community. Members of a moral community include moral agents and moral subjects. It is assumed that there are certain features which qualify them as moral subjects, such as sentience, higher cognitive capacities, the capacity to flourish, sociability, and the possession of a life.

Western philosophy is remarkably inconsistent in applying morality exclusively to the lives of human beings rather than to the lives of all living entities. Most of the philosophers in past centuries have largely given negative view about the moral status of animals. Two thousand years ago, Greek philosophers were of the view that kindness and benevolence ought to be extended to the creatures of every species. Greek philosopher Plutarch wrote about the moral interests of animal's independent from any belief in transmigration of souls. However, the Greeks are generally believed that the capacity for using language is the nature of human, which makes them human. This linguistic differentiation is literal in case of animals that they cannot talk and we do. Control of speech is central to all Greeks thought. Also the primacy of reason is a distinguishing criterion for coming under the purview of morality. Aristotle believes that non-human species are only subject of our exploitation. Aquinas thought that animals were put on earth by God for human purpose. Thus in the history of western philosophy, we find that Descartes claimed that animals are nothing but the sophisticated biological machine. Beside this, Wittgenstein claims that since animals lack a system of conventional signs, they lack fundamental tools for a mental life. Hume suggests that there are some differences of reasoning ability between humans and non-human species. One such difference is that animals but not humans possess particular cognitive instinct, which helps them to survive and reproduce, and another is that animals do not engage in demonstrative reason, and finally we may say that only humans are capable of improving their reasoning ability, which animals do not.

For Kant, rational being means a being that is able to choose the way of good life. In fact he tried to show us that we have no moral obligation towards non-human species. On the contrary, there are some philosophers also who thought that non-human species are not only automata, they have also rationality, self-consciousness, and moreover dignity like other normal human being. As for example- in *The Descent of Man* Darwin claims that “there is no fundamental difference between man and higher mammals in their mental faculties. His theory says that we are all related, not that we are all identical but every species has its unique adaptation. Regan explained the “right view” in which certain animals have basic rights and ought to be taken into consideration. In one sentence, we may say that Regan formulated his theory on the basis of inherent value of specified individuals. Utilitarian philosopher Bentham wrote that, “The question is not can they reason? Nor can they talk? But can they suffer? Peter Singer’s philosophy lies on the belief that there is no room to disregard interests on the grounds of race, sex, species or intellect. He realized that the implications of utilitarian theory for animals-philosophical consistency required him to include animals in his utilitarian theory. What we have analyzed in this chapter is that moral rules are species-neutral: the same rules that govern our treatment of humans should also govern our treatment of non-humans. In this chapter we have made some arguments in favor and against of the view given by different philosophers regarding the moral status of animals. Kant suggested that we have indirect duties towards animals and we ought to save animals from human-caused accidents like, when animals come under cars.

In chapter three entitled “*Animals in Research and Animal Welfare*” we have discussed the debate about animal research. When our human population shows explosive growth, it is other animals that suffer, demand for animal products, medical needs, and food requirements is rising rapidly. In modern times, we can see that every scientist agrees with the views that

animals have contributed to the development of life sciences and medicines over the past few years. In fact, scientists think that studies on animals provide a better idea of what benefits and complications are likely to see in human beings. The basic assumption of using animals in laboratories experiment is to stop some disease in humans. Question may be raised that as a rational human being is it morally justified or permissible to use animals as tools for any type of painful research? As we know that approximately forty million animals are killed per year in order to produce far products. We may say that it is a barbaric way of research. After enduring these terrifying, painful procedures animals are then usually dumped back into a cage without painkillers. In the contemporary modern society, humans are engaged in a serious debate about the rights and wrongs of animal use. So, to limit the human harm on animals in laboratory experiments researchers' advocate three RS of human animal experimentation. The use of alternatives to animals is a legal requirement in the UK, and that alternatives are always used whenever they are available.

In chapter four entitled "*Vegetarianism and Living Well*" we will discuss that if a vegetarian attempts to persuade others that they should adopt vegetarian diet then it requires philosophical attention. Eating animal flesh may raise different types of moral questions. In philosophical term, it is being treated as a means to human ends not as an end-in-itself. According to Carol J Adams, "to talk about eliminating meat is to talk about displacing one aspect of male control and demonstrates the way in which animals oppression and women's oppression are linked together." The demand not to be treated like animals was a common rallying cry among early feminists. Underlying this idea is the notion that the exploitation of rational beings (like humans) is morally wrong whereas the exploitation of nonhuman animals is not. We can see that peoples who are omnivorous don't usually claim that animals aren't morally important. One may ask, why be a vegetarian? From

moral perspective, vegetarianism may be understood as the view that due to some moral principles, one ought not to eat certain edible animals and animal products. Thus, vegetarians need to be tolerant if they want to convert others into vegetarians. If we accept that animals have rights then killing animals for food is morally wrong. Peter Singer opines, “I am a utilitarian. I am also a vegetarian. I am a vegetarian because I am a utilitarian. I believe that applying the principle of utility to our present situation - especially the methods now used to rear animals for food and the variety of food available to us - leads to the conclusion that we ought to be vegetarian”. Regan claims that utilitarianism does not provide adequate grounds for the obligation to be a vegetarian. Actually he thought that the commitment to vegetarianism is so strong that he will prepare to abandon any ethical theory which is unable to produce the judgment that it is wrong to eat animals. Non-vegetarians may ask to vegetarians that, isn't the plant suffer too? We all know that plants are autotrophs, producing their own food, and we are heterotrophs, depends on other organisms to get our energy. Actually Vegetarians are primary consumers, they need less energy to create their own food, but whenever humans become secondary consumers- they require both plant food and animal food. Non- vegetarians are increased the number of plants used indirectly, through the feeding of animals who will be eaten by them. So, whenever, we destroy trees through the way of feeding animals that will be eaten by humans, we actually decrease the ability of the planet to handle the carbon dioxide released into the air.

In chapter five entitled: *Animal Ethics and Religion Debate* we will discuss the importance of animals in the field of religion. Religious traditions have often been the primary movers of a compassionate engagement with other lives. Thus, religion as a whole has an extraordinarily distinguished record of fostering the ethical abilities that are

the means by which humans can and often does care about other animals. The first of the central inquiries in the religion and animals field is, thus, about matters we generally call “ethical” or “moral”. So we will begin by considering what various religions have claimed about other animals. In Hindu theology, it is said that the animals, birds and different living entities are treated with respect and obligation, because God, the Supreme Being Himself was incarnated in the form of various species. Thus, the ancient religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism have never differentiated between the soul of a human being and the soul of an animal. Additionally, the sacred literature in Hinduism provides a wealth of animal characters that bring many species to the forefront of spiritual consciousness-often as equals. Some of those are as follows.

- The *Narasimha Purāṇa* describes that the first incarnation of Lord *Vishnu* is a fish. The second is a tortoise, then a boar, then *Bāli* - the king of the monkeys and so on.
- The **cycle of birth** in Hindu theological scriptures describes that a person may come back as an animal or a bird according to the type of merits and demerits one acquires through actions during his life span. This provides respect and noble sentiments towards these species.
- The *Yājñavalkya Smṛiti* goes in favor of not eating meat and the practice of giving up meat eating that support vegetarianism. The wicked persons who killed the animals , which are protected and domesticated , has to live in hell-fire (*ghora-narka*) for the days equal to the number of hairs of the body of that animal. Manusmṛiti, the basic law book of Hinduism considered animal killer as a murderer.
- In the *Śāntiparva of Mahābhārata* it is said that the life of a man and an animal is of equal value and impose the same punishment for the destruction of either of the forms of life.

Thus, religious traditions include an extraordinary variety of stories in which nonhuman animals are mentioned in some way, and these have great differences in tenor and purpose. Like Hinduism, Buddhism also holds that other species “are subject to the same process” that human beings experience and living with the effects of karma from one birth to next. Buddhism also teaches *ahimsā*, they expressed the universal moral idea such as *metta* (loving-kindness), and *karuna* (compassion). The Buddhist thought does not only remain among social beings, rather it remains in mental and environmental world. Though we can see that many contemporary Buddhists eat meat today, but one thing is clear from the Buddhist teachings that the meaning of moral ideals is to reduce suffering that is flesh eating as well as drinking the nursing milk of factory-farmed animals which are fosters massive amounts of misery among millions of animals. So, those who believe in the teaching of Lord Buddha will be able to control their desires and live in harmony with nature keeping the environment in healthy condition. Apart from this every Muslim also agrees that tending *Allah*'s creation out of moral obligation to *Allah* is an act of religious devotion and earthy self-sacrifice that bears sweet fruits. The *Quran* teaches us that earth, and all that exist therein is not merely for human purposes, but for the benefit of all, and each created entity was purposefully designed and brought to life by *Allah*. Therefore, people who generally support an evolutionary view have tended to exclude animals from the moral domain. This narrow-minded assumption obviously needs to be reconsidered, and we will argue that animal morality is different in degree, not in kind, from human morality.

As a conclusive remark, we will reframe the views mentioned in all the chapters. What we have found that animal ethics is a field of study within environmental philosophy. Animals often have been classified as beings of nature, and in contemporary terminology they form an integral part of concepts central to environmental philosophy, such as ecosystems,

biodiversity, species, and environments. However, the link between animal ethics and environmental philosophy is complex: Animal ethics concentrates on individual animals and their value, whereas environmental philosophy traditionally has had more comprehensive (soils, waters, and plants as well as animals) and holistic (species, not specimens; biotic communities; ecosystems) concerns. Many animal ethicists, by contrast, maintain that animals should not be valued only as members of species or communities.

Moral standing indicates those individuals that moral agents must respect in certain separately determined ways. All human beings are assumed to have moral standing. Moral standing distinguishes entities that moral agents must treat with “minimum standards of acceptable behavior”. Entities who hold moral standing gain a certain moral status - their interests must be taken into consideration and this moral status carries ethical obligations. Moral agents, those of us capable of acting either morally or immorally, must respect those who have moral standing because entities with moral standing warrant, deserve, or merit moral consideration. Moral standing does not determine how an individual ought to be handled, only that there are guidelines that must be followed. According to Goodpaster moral status may be analyzed in the following ways.

Kenneth Goodpaster introduced the notion of moral considerability (which commonly referred to as “moral standing” in his 1978 article “On Being Morally Considerable.” he did not discuss moral *behaviour*, but focused on the requirements with regard to a particular entity that afford that entity moral standing, or moral considerability.

- First, moral considerability is not dependent on, and does not imply, moral rights. Moral rights are separate, narrower, and ancillary. In short, one cannot have *any* moral rights unless assessed as morally considerable. In order to be granted the right to life, for instance, an individual must first be deemed morally considerable.

- Second, the issue of moral considerability does not involve moral *significance* or the *weight* of that moral standing. Adjudicating competing moral claims is separate and ancillary. Moral considerability is all or none and determines but one thing: the presence of a privileged moral status—that of being morally considerable.
- Goodpaster distinguishes between what we are accustomed to (normative ethics) and what we are able to accomplish (practical ethics), as opposed to what we can ideally conceptualize. He defines “regulative” moral considerability as a situation in which an entity *is* morally considerable, but where that entity’s moral status is overlooked, or overridden, for practical reasons.

As we will see that philosophical discussion of moral status of animals has a long history. Many ancient Greeks, including Pythagoras and Plutarch, were vegetarians on primarily ethical grounds, and many later philosophers, such as Michel de Montaigne, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Stuart Mill, contemplated the normative dimensions of the human-animal relationship. In the nineteenth century, Henry Salt published a thesis on that topic in which he defended moral vegetarianism. In addition, serious discussion of moral status of animals and the normative elements of the human-animal relationship long existed on the margins of philosophy.

Morality requires that our sentiments be balanced with relevant facts and reason. Philosophy is a “human product”; each individual philosophizes with more than just reason - we use our will, feelings, “flesh and blood,” our “whole soul and . . . whole body”. We might wish moral philosophy to be a clean and neat process, predictable and dependable, with absolute answers to complex moral dilemmas, but nothing could be farther from the truth.

This is not to say that people do not have answers. Answers are provided by almost anyone confronted with delicate questions about

complicated moral matters. From abortion and addiction to capital punishment and war, people often believe they know what is right for themselves and for those around them. However, neither personal preference nor majority opinion makes a *sound* moral decision, though these definitely can and do determine a *dominant* (popular or common) morality. In fact, the definition of morals conflicts with the idea that what the majority approves is “right” and what the majority disapproves is “wrong.” While we are all familiar with the dominant morality of our time and place, the majority is much less aware of whether or not their common moral opinions are rooted in reason and empirical evidence.

Collectively, we participate in an outrageous moral inconsistency. We accept without question the discrepancy between our moral regard for human beings and our lack of moral regard for all other living entities. Lisa Kemmerer in *In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals* cites an example which may be significant to mention here. “When returning by car from my parent’s home some years back, I came upon a medic unit and a police car. A man was sitting on the bumper of one of the medic cars, with skinned knees. Two medics were attending him. He had gone around a corner too fast and had tipped his motorcycle in the street. I drove on, and within half an hour I watched a truck slam into the hind end of a doe. She was bounding, and as if in slow motion she flew from the front of the truck, spun in the air, and landed in a crumpled heap in the ditch. The truck kept going. The three cars behind the truck kept going. I was the fourth car behind the truck. I watched her try to stand up, her hind end destroyed. There were no medics, no police, not even a pause in the rushing of cars, though she was in shock and terribly wounded. How could a young man with skinned knees receive so much attention, while a doe who had been hit by a truck received no more than the passing glance as the people who had run over her rushed on their way? How many deer were hit that same night; how many of them

died slowly in ditches? And what of snakes, opossums, robins, raccoons, swallows, salamanders, and domestic cats and dogs? Can such a morality, where only human life is held to be worthy of preservation and protection, possibly be defensible?

## Preface

Preparing this thesis entitled *Moral status of Animals: Debates and Dimensions* has made me realized that how far the discussion of ethical issues related to non-human species, and examines the discrepancy in applied ethics and between treatment of human life and treatment of all other life forms. In the process, this thesis offers both explanations and critical analyses of basic moral theories such as utilitarianism and rights-based ethics.

Long back, philosophers simply did not discuss our treatment on animals. Actually, it was not considered to be a topic of anyone's interest at all. But the time has change today. Our earlier thinkers had been well aware of the need to justify our use of animals. We have gone Genesis and some well known thinkers like Aristotle, Aquinas, peter singer etc, actually there are strong philosophical debates among many western philosophers about the moral status of animals. Tom Regan proposes a theory in support of animal rights. Peter singer offers a utilitarian theory designed to maximize the satisfaction of preferences, aiming for an outcome that maximizes the preferences of individuals affected. Paul Taylor defends a theory of environmental ethics designed to protect wild organisms, based on the inherent worth of teleological entities.

In chapter there an attempt will be made to discuss the use and abuse of animals in research. This chapter investigate the use of 3Rs is crucial to continuously reduce the number and suffering of animals in research. Furthermore, a good regulatory regime- as found in some countries-cn help to reduce further the number of animals used. Therefore, we support a healthy and continued debate on the use of animals in research.


In chapter four we explores an idea that if we accept that animals have rights then killing an animal's for food is morally wrong. In the nineteenth century, Henry Salt published a thesis on that in which he defended moral vegetarianism.. Thus, vegetarianism on moral grounds may be understood as the view that because of some moral principles one ought not to eat certain edible animals and animal product.

In chapter five we explore protectionist ethics from a range of spiritual sources. This chapter investigates “animal friendly” teachings with some protectionist tendencies from indigenous, Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic religious traditions throughout history. This chapter does not explore writings that contradict protectionist theology, rather reveals the strong presence of protectionism in major religious traditions.

The final chapter returns to the ethical dilemma and the concept of moral standing which is central to the debate surrounding ethics and animals. As we have seen that philosophical discussion of moral status of animals has a long history. So, the discussion of moral status of animals and the normative elements of the human-animal relationship long existed on the margins of philosophy. Thus our moral responsibility towards non human nature is of unprecedented significance and urgency, and it is a responsibility that we cannot escape.

A society for the study of ethics and Animals has been founded which holds regular meeting in conjunction with the meetings of the American Philosophical Association. So in preparing this thesis I always kept in mind that we should make radical changes in our treatment of animals and also preserving the nature including non-human species for our own purpose.

Therefore, this thesis exposes the ongoing necessity for philosophical work in the field of ethics with regard to the treatment of living beings and the urgent need for an ethic that is less partial and more consistent for both human and nonhumans.




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## **Chapter-1 Introduction**

The word 'Ethics' is derived from the Greek word 'ethos' which means norms or character. Ethics may be briefly defined as 'the science of morality' or as 'the study of right conduct or duty'. It explains the facts of moral life and indicates the course in which human activities should be directed. Essentially, it is a philosophical investigation into the notions of good and bad, right and wrong, and the connected notion of duty, as applied to conduct or voluntary action.

Ethics may also be defined as 'the science of moral character expressing itself in right or wrong conduct or action', or as "the science that deals with the goodness and badness of human behavior and seeks to determine the ideally perfect type of character which it is the duty of all men to strive to realize within themselves". Thus, it may be said that Ethics is the study which deals with the moral ideal or standard, the supreme good or chief end of human activity and with those laws or regulative principles by conformity to which the supreme good is attained. The field of ethics deals with systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and behavior. Philosophers today, usually divide ethical theories into three general subjects such as Normative Ethics, Meta-ethics and Applied Ethics. Let us discuss in brief.

### **1.1 Normative Ethics:**

Normative ethics is a branch of philosophical ethics, which takes on a more practical task, i.e. which moral standards regulate right and wrong conduct. This may involve articulating the good habits that we should acquire, the duties that we should follow, or the consequences of our behaviour on other. It investigates a set of questions that arise when we think about the question "how ought one to act morally"? Normative ethics is distinct from Meta-ethics because it examines standards for the rightness and

wrongness of actions, while Meta-ethics studies the meaning of moral language and metaphysics of moral facts.

One branch of normative ethics is the theory of conduct; this is the study of right and wrong, of obligation and permissions, of duty, of what is above and beyond duty, and of what is so wrong as to be evil. Theories of conduct propose standards of morality, or moral codes or rules. The rules that a theory of conduct are as follows: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”, “The right action is the action that produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number”. Theories of moral conduct can be distinguished from etiquette by their concern with finding guidelines for action that are not dependent entirely on social convention. For example, it may not be a breach of etiquette to fail to give money to help those in poverty, but it could still be a failure to act on morality.

Another branch of normative ethics is the theory of value; this looks at what things or which are deemed to be valuable. Suppose we have decided that certain things are intrinsically good, or are more valuable than other things that are also intrinsically good. Given this, the next question is what would this imply about how we should live our lives? The theory of value also asks: What sorts of things are good? What sorts of situations are good? Is pleasure always good? Is it good for people to be equally well off? Is it intrinsically good for beautiful objects to exist? Or what does “good” mean? It may literally define “good” and “bad” for a community or society. Let us discuss some of the normative ethical theories, in the following paragraphs.

A) Consequentialism (Teleology) argues that morality of an action is contingent on the action’s outcome or result. Some consequentialist theories include:

- Utilitarianism, which holds that an action is right if it leads to the most value for the greatest number of people (Maximizes value for all people).
  - Egoism, believes that the moral person is the self – interested person and holds that an action is right if it maximizes good for the self.
  - Situation Ethics, which holds that the correct action to take is the one which creates the most loving result, and that love should always be our goal.
- B) Deontology: Deontology argues that decisions should be made considering the factors of one's duties and other's rights. Deontological theories include:
- Immanuel Kant's Categorical Imperative, which roots morality in humanity's rational capacity and averts certain inviolable moral laws.
  - The Contractarianism of John Rawls and Thomas Hobbes, which holds that the moral acts, are those that we would all agree to if we were unbiased.
  - Natural rights theories, of Thomas Aquinas or John Locke, which holds that, human beings have absolute, natural rights.
- C) Virtue Ethics, which has been advocated by Aristotle, focuses on the inherent character of a person rather than on the specific actions that he or she performs. There has been a significant revival of virtue ethics in the past half century, through the work of philosophers like G.E.Moore, E. Anscombe, Phillipa Foot, A. Macintyre, Jane Austen, and Benjamin Franklin. But Anscombe's modern philosophy contributes a lot for the development of virtue ethics.

### **1.2 Meta-Ethics:**

Meta-ethics is the investigation of the nature of ethical statements. It involves questions like “are ethical claims true?” i.e., capable of being true or false, or “are they, expressions of emotion?” If they are true, are they true forever? If they are ever true, what is the nature of the facts that they express? And are they ever true absolutely or always only relative to some individual, society, or culture? Meta-ethics studies the nature of ethical sentences and attitudes. This includes such questions as what does “good” and “right” mean?, whether and how we know what is right and good?, whether moral values are objective?, and how ethical attitudes motivate us? Often this is derived from some lists of moral absolutes, e.g. a religious moral code, whether explicit or not, some would view aesthetics as itself a form of Meta ethics. Meta ethics also investigates where our ethical principles come from, and what they mean. Are they merely social inventions? Do they involve more expressions of our individual emotions? Meta ethical answers to these questions focus on the issues of universal truths, the will of God, the role of reason in ethical judgments, and the meaning of ethical terms themselves.

### **1.3 Applied Ethics:**

Applied ethics is a branch of ethics that considers the practical application of ethical principles to specific issues of social or personal concern, including medical ethics, professional ethics, and environmental ethics. Applied ethics is the philosophical examination, from a moral standpoint, of particular issues in private and public life that are matters of moral judgment. It is thus, a term used to describe attempts to use philosophical methods to identify the morally correct course of action in various fields of human life. Thus, applied ethics tries to provide guidance on specific issues within the context of a consistent notion of the elements of a good life. It is a discipline of philosophy that attempts to apply ethical

theory to real life situations. But it is not simply a matter of the application of ethical norms. Applied ethics also gives a special attention to humanity's specificity and the urgency of the situation in which the ethical issues arise. The distinctiveness of applied ethics lies in its particular and direct attention to those features. In fact, ethics as it has been understood traditionally, integrates both theoretical and the practical ethical concerns.

#### **1.4 Environmental Ethics:**

Environmental Ethics is a branch of Applied Ethics. According to the Penguin Dictionary of Biology, the word "environment" may be defined as the 'collective term for the conditions in which an organism lives, both biotic and abiotic'. Environmental ethics emerged as a new sub discipline of philosophy in the early 1970. It is a discipline that studies the moral relationship of human beings, and also the value and moral status of the environment and its nonhuman contents. Environmental ethics has given a new dimension to the conversation of natural resources. In wider sense 'environment' signifies the surroundings, which include the social, cultural and moral sphere. In its narrow sense, it includes the non human nature including plants and animals. Human and nature together constitute the environment. Thus, environment includes both human and nature and environment of human comprises of the relation between human and human and the relation between the human and nature. Environmental ethics believes in the ethical relationship between human beings and natural environment. Human beings are a part of society and so are the other living beings. When we talk about the philosophical principle that guides our life, we often ignore the fact that even plants and animals are a part of our lives. They are an integral part of the environment and hence have a right to be considered part of human life. It is clear that they need to be associated with our guiding principles as well as our moral and ethical values. There are

some basic premises in environmental ethics that govern human-nonhuman relationship as follows:

- Human being is a part of nature.
- Our knowledge and understanding of the complexity, diversity, and interrelationship of life and living system remain rudimentary.
- The sustainability of our life support system is incompatible with current consumptive growth patterns and the rate of human population growth.
- Humans have altered the natural system of the Earth to such an extent that much extinction have already taken place and the existence of countless species, including our own, is in jeopardy.
- Human beings need to have a profound respect for nonhumans in all its diverse manifestation.
- All species are unique and have value regardless of any value that they may have for humans.

### **1.5 Animal Ethics:**

Our attitude towards animals has changed over the centuries. In ancient period, people believed in mythical relationships between humans and animals. Greek mythology abounded in half human, half-animal creatures. Animals were worshipped and deified, while, at the same time being cruelly treated. This ambivalent approach was due to the fact that animals were people's daily food, often obtained without consideration of pain. Animals were forced to participate in cruel forms of entertainment, and with the development of science they have also become subjects of experiments and vivisection tests.

At the same time, philosophical attempts were also made to define 'humanity'. The differences between humans and animals were attributed to the lack of a soul in animals, which was considered to prevent them from having a consciousness or mind. This excluded animals from the sphere of morality, as they were denied the possibility of having any form of

consciousness, any ability to feel or think, and even of having an embryonic form of mental life.

This was the dominant approach in most philosophical schools and the exceptions were very rare. However, the Pythagoreans believed in the transmigration of souls, i.e. metempsychosis. According to this view, the souls of the dead not only enter humans, but also animal bodies. For this reason, Pythagoras and his disciples declared that killing and eating animals was as outrageous as cannibalism. Empedocles in c. 495-435 B.C., declared that eating meat and making blood offerings were the greatest of sins. Later on, Diogenes, Plotinus, Ovid, Seneca and Porphyry expressed similar views. Plutarch even suggested that animals were more intelligent than humans and could demonstrate moral virtues. Also, from the earliest of times, the idea of the unity and sanctity of all life was accepted in the East, as was the belief in reincarnation, which claimed that a soul could enter both human and animal bodies alike. In the 3rd century B.C., inspired by the ideas of Buddhism, the Indian king Ashoka issued edicts enforcing respect for the lives of all creatures. The edicts involved banning blood offerings, introducing medical care for animals, limiting the killing of animals to hunting, fishing and animal farming, and forbidding the killing of pregnant animals. The detail discussion is made in chapter-5.

In Christianity, Saint Francis of Assisi (1181-1226) and Saint Anthony of Padua (1195-1231) declared the idea of brotherhood with animals, which is called as 'minor brothers'. However, the main Christian trend rejected this idea that never became popular in the Church. A completely different standpoint was accepted by Aristotle, who is well known for his statement about the natural hierarchy of living creatures. Different beings should not be treated equally, as their innate nature is not the same. Humans, animals and plants are all capable of nutrition and growth. However, plants, as lower beings, should serve humans and animals,

and the latter should serve humans, as they cannot use reason to direct their behavior and are driven by instinct. By denying animals the capacity for rational thinking, Aristotle radically separated them from humans, which is discussed in chapter-2

Similar views were declared by Saint Augustine (350-430) and Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225- 1274). In their opinion, animals are creatures deprived of a rational soul and therefore cannot belong to the sphere of morality. By nature, animals should serve and be dependent on man. These opinions were shared by Albertus Magnus (c. 1193- 1280) and Saint Bonaventure (c. 1217-1274).

Several centuries later, a comparable point of view was accepted by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who excluded animals from ethical consideration, as they were believed to be incapable of rational thinking and deprived of free will. We can only have moral duties towards rational creatures (humans). Sympathy towards animals results not from concern for their well-being but from concern for human education, as humans could become insensitive to the suffering of other humans if they are cruel to animals.

In order to exclude animals from the ethical universe, they were denied not only the capacity for rational thinking but also the capacity for consciousness. According to René Descartes, animals are automatic devices which do not feel pain. He admitted that their behavior resembles that of humans, but they differ in that they do not have a conscious, rational God given soul. A similar way of thinking was represented by Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715). Although the philosopher Baruch de Spinoza (1632-1677) admitted that animals are able to feel, he did not consider that a reason to stop using them for our own convenience. French philosophers condemning the inhumane treatment of animals included Michel Montaigne, Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet) and Jean- Jacques Rousseau. Montaigne

criticized human prejudices against animals, stating that we are subject to the same natural order of things as animals and have much in common with them.

Two centuries later, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) protested against the misery and maltreatment of animals, attributing their moral status not to reason but to an ability to feel pain and suffering. Voltaire (1694-1778) was also strongly opposed to the dehumanization of animals and vivisection. For the detail discussion we need to refer to chapter-2.

However, the ethical viewpoints mentioned above were based largely upon exclusionist assumptions which placed man outside/above nature in a privileged position in relation to animals. This conformed to a vision of hierarchical world order known as the 'Ladder of Beings' which was created by God and crowned man as master of all other creatures. Any form of mental life was ruled out as far as animals were concerned, and according to numerous thinkers, mental life was a necessary condition for moral status. In this view, animals were nothing more than living things, sources of raw material, medicine, food resources and cheap labor or the objects of hunting or bloody entertainment, regardless of the amount of pain or suffering they experienced. The publication of Darwin's theory of evolution in 1859 gradually led to the 'Ladder of Beings' theory being replaced by the evolutionary metaphor of the Tree of Life. From an evolutionary viewpoint, there are no greater or lesser forms of life and all life forms deserve respect. Human beings should not be considered exceptional.

If we go through the history of Animal Philosophy, then we find that generally, animal ethics is divided into three categories: the analytical school, the postmodern school, and the pragmatic school. Members of the analytical school investigate the relevant issues by reference to the familiar ethical theories and methods of modern Western philosophy. Standard moral theories such as utilitarianism, deontology (rights theory), social-contract

ethics, and virtue ethics have been applied to the animal issue to see if they could be extended to include nonhuman animals. The familiar commitments of modern Western moral philosophy to neutrality, universality, and consistency have given due care. Neutrality requires suspending a bias favoring fellow humans, universality requires that morality remain the same in all contexts, and consistency requires giving equal consideration to similar interests. The most common approach is to take a moral theory and apply it to other animals, often simultaneously amending the theory to make it more comprehensive. Tom Regan, for example, amended Immanuel Kant's deontology, substituting a robust subjective or conscious life for Kant's rationality criterion for moral rights. Just as theoretical backgrounds in the analytical school differ greatly, so do various theories in animal ethics. Perhaps the most common example is the conflict between orthodox utilitarianism, championed by Peter Singer, and modified Kantian deontology, championed by Tom Regan, as forms of animal ethics.

The majority of philosophical approaches which will be discussed in the subsequent chapters to animal ethics are of the analytical school. Philosophers who have used this approach include Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Mark Rowlands, Dale Jamieson, Bernard Rollin, Stephen Clark, James Rachels, and David DeGrazia. The postmodern school approaches animal ethics by reference to Continental and post-structural philosophy. In many ways this school is the opposite of the analytical school in that its proponents view neutrality, universality, and consistency with suspicion. The divide is meta-ethical in nature and can be traced back to the general divide that emerged in twentieth-century philosophy between Anglo-American philosophy and Continental philosophy.

Postmodernists think that neutrality and objectivity are impossible to achieve because humans are inextricably embedded in their specific epistemologies and perspectives. It is also maintained that values are not

universal but socially constructed. In practice this means that emphasis should be placed on explorations of various human perspectives; those explorations include how gender, ethnic identities, biologies, bodily-situatedness, and contexts affect values and understandings of animals. For instance, attention has been focused on reevaluating human identity from the animal perspective. Instead of concentrating on how humans view animals, emphasis is placed on how animals may view humans and the possible normative implications of such interspecific points of view. Also, postmodernists maintain that instead of reason and logic, emphasis should be placed on emotions such as awe, care, feelings of being bound, and other affective and intuitive responses.

The postmodern school is highly diverse, and not all its proponents share all of these characteristics. Philosophers who have used this approach include Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida. More specific to animal ethics, philosophers who use the postmodern and continental approaches include Cary Wolfe, David Wood, Matthew Calarco, Giorgio Agamben, and Ralph R. Acampora. Some ecofeminist approaches to animal ethics are similar in eschewing rationality, neutrality, universality, and consistency and embracing emotion, difference, context, and partiality. The most notable postmodern ecofeminists who have contributed to animal ethics include Val Plumwood, Carol Adams, Marti Kheel, Josephine Donovan, and Geeta Gaard; Vandana Shiva and Karen Warren also have touched on the animal issue. Many philosophers who have contributed to animal ethics deploy the insights and methods of both the analytical and postmodern schools by taking part in both, combining the two e.g., taking an analytical approach to postmodern works, or developing entirely new approaches. Those philosophers include Mary Midgley, Clare Palmer, and Steve Best.

Although Montaigne, Voltaire and Rousseau - as mentioned above - had already criticized the dehumanization of animals, the most important

attempts to win ethical treatment of animals were made by the founder of the ethical doctrine of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham. The assumptions of utilitarian ethics have given rise to a significant conclusion. Inclusion in the sphere of morality depends on the ability to experience pleasure or pain, an ability which is referred to as 'sentience'. To quote Bentham, 'the question is not, Can they *reason*? Can they *talk*? But, Can they *suffer*?'

The 1970s witnessed a great breakthrough in the consideration of the moral treatment of animals and a milestone was marked by the publication of the book *Animal Liberation* by Peter Singer. Singer's book, which became the animal liberation movement's 'Bible', has since been a source of inspiration for defenders of animal welfare. According to Singer, if we object to sexual and racial discrimination, we cannot adhere to speciesism. Speciesism means discrimination based on membership to a species. A detail discussion is made in chapter-2.

Singer maintains that the ability to feel in some animals is comparable to the same ability in people. This implies that animals have 'interests' and therefore should be included in the sphere of morality. Singer argues that humans have different levels of intelligence, talents and aesthetic and moral sensitivity, especially when we consider people who are deprived of those capabilities, such as young children or mentally handicapped persons. Such people are nevertheless protected by the principle of equality. So far as animals are concerned, we commit the arbitrary act of excluding them from the 'moral community'. Singer criticizes this attitude and labels it as speciesism. According to Singer, to a greater or lesser degree, a six-month old human baby does not have any characteristics that an adult mammal does not have. His aim is to weigh up total pleasure against suffering for moral assessment purposes, regardless of whether the pleasure or suffering is experienced by animals or people. Indeed, the findings of modern ecology, ethology and animal psychology as well as sociobiology have

shown that certain animals have a mental life and an ability to communicate, consciously use tools, cooperate and help one another. It is even possible that they have a sense of humor.

In the second chapter entitled: *Moral Status of Animals: Traditional and Recent Debates* we have discussed the philosophical debates among Western philosophers on the moral status of animals. Some classical philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle described human beings as rational animals and identified reason as a distinguishing mark and implied that our mental life exists at an altogether higher level in comparison to other animals. According to Hume, we are distinct from animals by virtue of our status as moral agents, reflects an important feature of his concept of person or self. Even, Wittgenstein also thought that only human beings are capable of using language, and even if a lion could speak we could not understand him. On the contrary, there are some philosophers also who thought that species are not only mere automata; they have also self-conscious, rationality and so on. Say for example, Peter Singer, who suggested that each individual and each species is different but they all have interests and equal interests ought to be treated equally. Regan, Singer, and Taylor soundly demonstrate that species is not a morally relevant criterion; any moral theory that draws distinctions based purely on species is untenable. What we have analyzed in this chapter is that moral rules are species-neutral; the same rules that govern our treatment of humans should also govern our treatment of non-humans. Due to the absence of any morally relevant distinction between humans and animals, the rejection of a hierarchy of moral standing among humans ought to be extended to other species. If infants and the brain dead are morally considerable, if their lives are to be protected and preserved, then consistency and impartiality require that the lives of each living entity that is not different in morally relevant ways also be protected all life forms. Pain and suffering are morally

relevant. Causing pain and suffering to others is morally reprehensible when such suffering is not in their interest and when such suffering is avoidable.

In chapter three entitled: *Animals in Research and Animal Welfare* an attempt has been made to discuss the issues in the use and abuse of animals in research. In fact, animal studies are conducted first to give medical researchers a better idea of what benefits and complications they are likely to use in humans. In this chapter, we have discussed that whether an animal experiment is ethically justified? We have also tried to point out that the use of animals in research can be ethically and morally justified as the benefits of animal research have been enormous and it would have severe consequences for public health and medical research if it were abandoned. Nevertheless, the use of the 3Rs i.e, reduction, replacement and refinement is crucial to continuously reduce the number and suffering of animals in research. Furthermore, a good regulatory regime - as found in some countries - can help to reduce further the number of animals used. Therefore, we support a healthy and continued debate on the use of animals in research. We recognize that those who oppose animal experimentation should be free to voice their opinions democratically, and we look forward to constructive discussion in the future with organizations that share the middle ground with us.

In chapter four entitled *Vegetarianism and Living Well* we have discussed that if we accept that animals have rights then killing animals for food is morally wrong. Vegetarianism on moral grounds may be understood as the view that because of some moral principles one ought not to eat certain edible animals and animal products. There are many philosophical arguments for veganism which underestimate what is at stake for humans who give up eating animal products. By saying all that's at stake for humans is taste and characterizing taste in simplistic terms, they underestimate the reasonable resistance that arguments for veganism will meet. Taste, they

believe, is trivial. Omnivores believe that eating meat provides a more meaningful meal, though just how this works proves elusive. Meaningful omnivores could find little in the philosophical literature to help them clarify and support their position until recently. A few philosophers have argued that our culinary practices involve something more significant than taste. Even if when vegan and omnivorous diets impose similar harms on animals, moral vegans might live better than meaningful omnivores if they pay attention to aesthetics, engagement with the world, and identity. Creative transformations of previously omnivorous identities add a new layer of meaningfulness. Being an omnivore is one way of eating meaningfully, but no more than that, which means that the meaningfulness of eating meat can't justify imposing harms on animals. Where things are equal for the animals and a vegan diet would impose as much harm on animals as an omnivorous one, and then perhaps the meaningful omnivore has a case. When and where all things are equal in this sense is difficult to determine, but it's clearly a different argument - one about the harms animals suffer.

In chapter five entitled *Animal Ethics and Religion* an attempt has been made to discuss that how the religious believers have lived out their faith in ways that have been fully in defense of non-human lives. Religion can affect our attitude towards animals and the way in which animals are treated by us. We have also discussed how animal experimentation was considered from Indian civilization. In ancient Indian society, in the case of animal taxonomies an analogy is often used between the classes of beasts and the classes in the society. There are social and cultural classificatory schemes which are represented as natural, because they reproduce the schemes where by animals are classified. In fact there are several and different methods for classifying animals in Vedic texts. The ancient religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism have never differentiated between the soul of a human being and the soul of an animal.

They believed that everything that has been created by Supreme Being or *Brahman* comes from the Supreme Being and again returns to the Supreme Being. We tried to show that because, religious institutions have so much influence in cultures across the earth-worldwide, only about one-seventh of people count themselves as non-religious-religions have within their grasp an important leadership role regarding our relationship to the world around us. An increasing number of religious and non-religious humans have echoed some form of insight that “we cannot be truly ourselves in any adequate manner without all our companion beings throughout the earth. This larger community constitutes our greater self.” Whether believers, churches and religious institutions will respond to this challenge remains an unanswered question.

As a conclusive remark, we have tried to find out some dimensions from the all the debates and try to establish that it has been obvious for a long time that the pursuit of global justice requires the inclusion of many people and groups not previously included as fully equal subjects of justice: the poor; members of religious, ethnic, and racial minorities; and more recently women, the disabled, and inhabitants of poor nations distant from one’s own. But a truly global justice requires not simply looking across the world for fellow species members who are entitled to a decent life. It also requires looking around the world at the other sentient beings with whose lives our own are inextricably and complexly intertwined. Kant’s approach does not confront these questions as questions of justice. Probably a strict Kantian could not so confront them, not without considerably modifying Kant’s own view about rationality as the basis of moral respect. Utilitarian approaches boldly confront the wrongs animals suffer, and they deserve high praise. But in the end, it seems that, Utilitarianism is too homogenizing - both across lives and with respect to the heterogeneous constituents of each life - to provide us with a fully adequate theory of animal justice.

The capabilities approach may, however, distinguish two aspects of the capability in question. A tiger's capability to kill small animals, defined as such, does not have intrinsic ethical value, and political principles can omit it. But a tiger's capability to exercise its predatory nature so as to avoid the pain of frustration may well have value, if the pain of frustration is considerable. Zoos have learned how to make that distinction. Noticing that they were giving predatory animal's insufficient exercise for their predatory capacities, they have had to face the question of the harm done to smaller animals by allowing such capabilities to be exercised. Should they give a tiger a tender gazelle to crunch on? The people in some zoos have found that they can give the tiger a large ball on a rope, whose resistance and weight symbolize the gazelle. The tiger seems satisfied. Wherever predatory animals are living under direct human support and control, such solutions seem the most ethically sound. The capabilities approach, which begins from an ethically attuned concern for each form of animal life, offers a model that does justice to the complexity of animal lives and their strivings for flourishing. Such a model seems an important part of a fully global theory of justice.

To say that a being deserves moral consideration is to say that there is a moral claim that this being has on those who can recognize such claims. A morally considerable being is a being who can be wronged in the morally relevant sense. It is generally thought that all and only human beings make such claims, however, when we ask why it is thought that all and only humans are the types of beings that can be wronged, answers are not particularly easy to come by. Humans are members of the species *Homo sapiens*. But species membership does not explain why there is a moral claim made by those that belong to this species and not other species. That humans are members of the species *Homo sapiens* is certainly a distinguishing feature of humans - humans shares a genetic make-up and a

distinctive physiology, but this is unimportant from the moral point of view. Species membership is a morally irrelevant characteristic, a bit of luck which is no more morally interesting than being born male or female, black or white. Thus, species membership itself cannot support the view that members of one species, namely ours, deserve moral consideration that is not owed to members of other species. Of course, one might respond that it is not membership in a biological category that matters morally, it is our humanity that grounds the moral claims we make. Humans are morally considerable because of the distinctively human capacities we possess, capacities that only we humans have. Becoming a vegetarian is not merely a symbolic gesture rather a vegetarian is the most practical and effective steps one can take towards ending both the killing of non-human animals and the infliction of suffering upon them. We may suggest that given the various virtues of animal ethics we have discussed, working towards a happy, peaceful life and meatless diet in a community is a worthy endeavour for a person who values compassion, humility, and integrity. Working towards this larger community constitutes our greater self. Whether believers, non-believers and religious institutions will respond to this challenge remains an unanswered question.

## CHAPTER-2

### MORAL STATUS OF ANIMALS: TRADITIONAL AND RECENT DEBATES

Sympathy beyond the confines of man, that is, humanity to the lower animals, seems to be one of the latest moral acquisitions. It is apparently unfelt by savages, except towards their pets... - Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man*

The term 'animal' includes all independent lives members of vertebrates. The term "animal" also means those beings that lack the distinguishing features in the moral agents such as rationality, self-consciousness, personality and so on. Mary Midgley once stressed that the concept of an animal has both an inclusive meaning and an exclusive meaning. She is one of many to cite Donald Griffin and the arguments for giving a place to animal thinking. She mocks what she calls 'species solipsism' - attributing consciousness only to humans - citing as if as evidence the belief by elephant trainers that their charges show extraordinarily human intelligence. Yet counter arguments can be put, including the belief by trainers of dolphins, those favorite 'intelligent' creatures that their charges learn only by conditioning. Thus the definition of animal suggests us to claim that: an animal is a centre of immanent, self-generating or creative power, organized in terms of a relational order that results in a periodic pattern of transformation (a life-cycle) involving historical and actual components (genes and environment) and biological universals (the order of the living state).

Human ethical practices and attitudes with respect to the other animals exhibit a curious instability. On the one hand, most people believe that it is wrong to inflict torment or death on a non-human animal for a trivial reason. Skinning a cat or setting it on fire by way of entertainment is one of the standard examples of obvious wrongdoing in the philosophical literature. Like torturing infants, it is the kind of example that philosophers use when they are looking for something ethically uncontroversial, so that

disputes about the example won't get in the way of the point we are trying to make.

On the other hand, human beings have traditionally counted nearly any reason we might have for hurting or killing animals, short of malicious enjoyment, as non-trivial and sufficient. We kill non-human animals, and sometimes inflict pain on them, because we want to eat them, because we can make useful products out of them, because we can learn from experimenting on them, and because they interfere with agriculture or gardening or in other ways are pests. We also kill them, and sometimes inflict pain on them, for sport – in hunting, fishing, cockfighting, dog fighting, bullfighting, and so on. We even kill them because, having done some sort of useful work for us, they have outlived their usefulness and are now costing us money. Uneasily balanced between these two apparent extremes of attitude is the conviction, common to so many people, that when we use animals for our own purposes, we should treat them as humanely “as possible.” The eating needs to go on, but the animals should be kept in pleasant conditions and killed humanely; the experiments should go on, but the pain should be palliated as much as conditions allow; the hunting should go on, but the scrupulous hunter should aim for the swift kill that involves no extended terror or suffering. The shape of our moral concern for the other animals, if put it that way, is rather like that of our moral concern for prisoners of war. Just as we strike an uneasy balance between treating prisoners of war as enemies and treating them in a way that acknowledges our common humanity, so we strike an uneasy balance between treating the other animals as a usable resource – as Kant puts it, as mere means - and treating them in a way that acknowledges our common nature as conscious and sensate beings.

If we go through the term “moral status”, we find that entities have moral status if and only if their interest is morally matter to some degree for the entity’s own sake. For example- human beings are moral beings because they are able to respect the rights of others, not because they are reason guided in this direction, but because they are social creature. We basically believe that non-human beings lack the above qualities, but what is the reason for the belief that only human beings are morally valuable? It is not possible for us to give the answer to this question in a sentence. A number of people believe that the ability to use tools, possession of mind, having a sense of humor and cognitive skills are the characteristic of a normal adult human being, and they believe that the absence of these abilities of non-human species make them far more behind to come under the purview of morality .Human beings are the kind of beings can develop family ties, solving social problems, expressing emotions, having sex for pleasure, using language or thinking abstractly. But many of popular recent works on animal behavior proved that animals can also develop these types of activities. For example,- many non-human species such as baboons, wolves, and elephants maintain family units, built complex individual relationship for long period of time. All animals living in socially complex groups must solve various problems that inevitably arise in such groups. Thus the view that animals moral claim is equivalent to a moral right, and any action that fails to treat animals as beings with inherent worth would violate animal rights and thus, morally objectionable. We use the term moral status or moral importance to refer to the circumstances that a being is a member of moral community. Members of a moral community include moral agents and moral subjects. It is assumed that there are certain features which qualify them as moral subjects. These are sentience, higher cognitive capacities, the capacity to flourish, sociability, and the possession of a life. Let us briefly discuss these features which make animals to be treated as moral subjects.

## 2.1 Sentience:

The term “sentience” is most commonly associated with the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham. Utilitarian’s such as Jeremy Bentham and Peter Singer focus on sentience, the ability to feel and suffer, as the morally relevant criterion by which moral standing ought to be established. Other creatures react to pain in ways similar to human beings, they share neurological and mental faculties associated with pain in human beings. Singer concludes “there is no good reason, scientific or philosophical, for denying that animals feel pain”. If we do not doubt that other humans feel pain, we should not doubt that other animals do so too.”<sup>1</sup> It is uncontested that many animals are capable of feeling pain. However, some argue that the human experience of pain is in some relevant sense different from that of animals. That is why it might be more justifiable to use animals rather than non-consenting humans in harmful research. Another argument may suggest that humans are far more able to cope with pain and suffering, especially when they understand the underlying reasons or purpose. This could suggest that beings with less-developed rational capacities are not necessarily suffering less, but more, since they are not in a position to conceptualize pain or suffering as means to ends.

### 2.1.1 Higher Cognitive Capacities:

Beside the ability to feel pain, many animals are also capable of higher cognitive capacities, like, knowledge of good and evil (Plato), possession of self-consciousness (Rene Descartes), possession of freedom,(Jean Jacques Rousseau), and possession of rational will, in the sense of being able to act according to self-set rules to achieve certain ends, including acting in a moral manner(Kant).Some higher cognitive capacities such as the use of language or the ability to act according to plans, can be

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<sup>1</sup> Singer, Peter. “All Animals Are Equal.” *Animal Rights and Human Obligations*. edit., Tom Regan and Peter Singer. Englewood Cliffs ; Prentice –Hall, 1976. P.148-62

understood as signs of intelligence. But the question about whether or not animals possess such characteristics is controversial. However, research combining philosophical and biological expertise has significantly increased knowledge about the cognitive capacities of the great apes, and other animals including dogs, rodent, birds and fish. Some animals are able to learn complicated tasks, such as making and using tools. There are also evidences that they engage in non-trivial forms of communications and are able to coordinate social behavior<sup>2</sup>. Animals like monkeys, chimpanzees, and bats, the rules of social interactions have been explored on them in more detail and have been described as primitive moral systems.<sup>3</sup> Thus, some kinds of animal research have undermined claims of the uniqueness of humans and have instead demonstrated that humans and animals share certain morally relevant properties and capacities.

### **2.1.2 Capacity to flourish:**

Another basis of moral concern, associated with Aristotle, is the idea of animal having a “telos”, a purpose, a good or alternatively having interests of species-specific needs. If animals are able to satisfy these needs, they have the ability to flourish. This concept enables us to say that things may go well or badly for an animal depending on how specific environmental conditions relate to its usual species-specific development.<sup>4</sup>

### **2.1.3 Sociability:**

Another philosophical thinking influenced by Karl Marx, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger sees sociability as creating a level of moral concern. According to this tradition, being a member of some form of

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<sup>2</sup> Riede T, Bronson E, Hatzikirou H and Klaus Zuberbuhler (2005) Vocal Production Mechanisms in a Non-Human Primate: Morphological Data and a Model( J Hum E)vol 48:85-96.

<sup>3</sup> Patterson F and Gordon W (1993) The case for the personhood of gorillas, in *The Great Ape Project: Equality beyond humanity*, Cavalieri P and Singer P (Editors)(London:Fourth Estate) pp58-9. However there is also some scepticism about such claims , see for example Wynne CDL (2004) *Do Animals Think?*(Princeton and Oxford; Princeton University Press)

<sup>4</sup> By species –specific development we mean behaviours and dispositions that the animal has developed during evolution in order to be able to respond to the range of situations typically encountered in its natural habitat.

complex community creates moral relations of rights and duties. The basis of such a community might be language or a substantial dependence on others for extensive social, economic, or other reasons. But if, this tradition is not to be considered equivalent to the view of higher cognitive capacities as discussed above, simply with the additional observation that these capacities develop through complex social interaction such as language use, then it must be sociability itself, rather than socially developed attributes, that generates moral concern.

#### **2.1.4 Possession of a life:**

Apart from this, a more difficult morally relevant criterion is possession of a life. It may seem that if we think that killing is wrong, then we must be committed to the view that life itself is valuable. Most humans and perhaps some other animals, exhibit self-consciousness and an ability to anticipate, reflect upon and fear about their own death. Hence, the prospect of death usually has a significant secondary effect on the quality of lived experience. Beside this, humans and perhaps some other animals care about each other in the sense that the death of others is often considered a tragedy. Thus, death has special significance for highly social beings. Moreover, it can be said that the higher cognitive capacity generates a right to life; most humans and those animals that closely share similar features in this respect have such a right.

So there is no definite set of morally relevant criteria, yet this concept remains critical to determining moral standing and the concurrent duties of moral agents. “It is this notion of morally relevant differences between humans and animals that serves as the most powerful tool in the investigation of the moral status of animals. If we can find no morally relevant differences between humans and animals, and if we accept the idea that moral notions apply to human, it follows that we must rationally extend

the scope of moral concern to animals”.<sup>5</sup> Beside this, another sign of moral agency or under moral consideration is the possession of personhood. John Locke once wrote that;

“The word *person* is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to intelligent agents, capable of a law, and happiness and misery. This personality extends itself beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness, -whereby it becomes concerned and accountable.....<sup>6</sup>

Therefore, it can be said that if the possession of personhood is a sign of moral agency, then animals are not far behind from moral consideration. But there are still many who rejected the moral considerability of non-humans and the significance of their interests. Classical philosophers notably, Plato and Aristotle described human beings as rational animals and identified reason as a distinguishing mark and implied that our mental life exists at an altogether higher level in comparison to other animals. Moral beings respect the rights of others not because they are guided by reason but because they are social creatures.

## **2.2: Arguments Against Animals moral Status:**

Two thousand years ago, Greek philosophers were of the view that kindness and benevolence ought to be extended to the creatures of every species.<sup>7</sup> Plutarch a Greek historian and biographer as well as a philosopher and spiritual guide, was one of the first Greek scholar to write about the moral interests of animals independent from any belief in transmigration of souls (Self-interest). It was the unnecessary suffering and death that caught Plutarch moral attention in “On the Eating Flesh”. Porphyry slightly later than Plutarch may have been the first to build an argument based on pain and terror in his argument that animals ought to be handled “differently from

<sup>5</sup> Rollin, Bernard E. *Animal Rights and Human Morality*. Amherst : Prometheus, 1981, p.7

<sup>6</sup> In addition to the normative component , there is also a descriptive component of the concept of person. A person, as Locke says, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection and can consider itself. As itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places.....” Besides self-awareness and intelligence (including the capacity to reason), autonomy to some extent can be considered as another essential part of personhood. (John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* edit. A.C. Fraser, New York : Dover Publication, 1959, p.467)

<sup>7</sup> Marshall, Peter. *Nature's Web: Rethinking our Place on Earth*. London : Cassell, 1992. P.78

plants”.<sup>8</sup> He recognized that reason powers between human beings and animals were a matter of degree, a difference “not in essence, but in the more and the less”.<sup>9</sup> Thus Diogenes and Plutarch insisted that animals were superior to humans. In a work titled “Beasts are Rational” Plutarch gives voice to a pig who argues that it is better to be a swine than a human being. The pig is ultimately unwilling to exchange places with man, “the most unfortunate of all creatures”.<sup>10</sup> According to Plutarch if pigs were asked to return to human form, they may reply: “we animal are much happier and better than you men and you are a fool..... to ask us to sail away with you, instead of becoming a pig like us”.<sup>11</sup> But the tendency to credit only human beings with various qualities that humans value such as reason began centuries ago. Both the Hebrew and Greek traditions made human beings the creature of moral universe- not merely the centre, but entirely the morally significant features of this world. There are some Greek philosophers who think that only human beings have reason (*logos*), reasoning (*logismos*), thought (*dianoia*), intellect (*nous*) and belief (*doxa*).<sup>12</sup> The stoics denied justice to animals on the ground that they stand outside human community, and because rationality was considered a prerequisite for joining the community. Animals were not credit with rationality, and justice could only be exacted within the community.<sup>13</sup> To be a member of moral community intelligence rationality to make a decision between good and bad are required, and animals lack of these fundamental qualities. Let us discuss the

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<sup>8</sup> Sorabji, Richard. *Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate*. London : Duckworth, 1993, p.184

<sup>9</sup> Porphyry “On Abstinence from Killing Animals.” Trans Thomas Tylor. *Selected Works of Porphyry*. London: Thomas Rodd, 1823, p.101

<sup>10</sup> Plutarch. “Beast are Rational” *Plutarchs Moralia*. Edt. Harold Cherniss and William C. Helmbold. Cambridge; Harvard, 1968,. 493-533

<sup>11</sup> Sorabji, Richard. *Animal Minds and Human Morals; The Origins of the Western Debate*. London; Duckworth, 1993, P.161

<sup>12</sup> Sorabji, Richard . *Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate*. London Duckworth, 1993, p.14

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid* .P.124

basic philosophical arguments denying the moral status of animals from Western perspective.

For the Greeks, there is a faith that animals do not speak as humans do, and this fact was later taken as justification by many philosophers that non-human species have no capacity for language or rational thought. The Greeks are generally believed that the capacity for using language is the nature of human, which makes them human. This linguistic differentiation is literal in case of animals that they cannot talk and we do. Control of speech is central to all Greeks thought. Also the primacy of reason is a distinguishing criterion for coming under the purview of morality.

Aristotle believes that non-human species are only subject of our exploitation. For him, tame animals have a better nature than wild and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man. From the above, it is clear that for Aristotle human beings have a right to rule over the non-human species. For him, the less perfect exists for the more perfect and reason makes one more perfect.<sup>14</sup> Nature is a hierarchy where creatures with less reasoning ability exist for the sake of those with more reason.<sup>15</sup> As a result he believed that those incapable of moral deliberation had less responsibility and fewer privileges.<sup>16</sup>

For Aristotle the male by nature is superior, and the female is inferior, and the one rules, and the other is ruled, this principle of necessity extends to all mankind. Where there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals, the lower sorts are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master. For him who can be, and therefore is another's and he who participates in rational principle enough to apprehend, but not to have, such

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<sup>14</sup> Kemmerer Lisa *In Search of Consistency Ethics and Animals* Leiden Boston 2006, p.222

<sup>15</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* Trans. R. W. Browne. London: George Bell, 1889.1:7,8:12

<sup>16</sup> Clark, Stephen R.L. "The Rights of Wild Things" *Inquiry* 22(1979):171-88

a principle, is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend a principle, they obey their instincts. And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different, for both, with their bodies' minister to the needs of life. He thought that different beings should not be treated equally, as their innate nature is not the same. Humans, animals, plants all are capable of nutrition and growth. However, plants as lower beings, should serve humans and animals, and the latter should serve humans, as they cannot use reason to direct their behavior and are driven by instinct. By denying animals the capacity for rational thinking, Aristotle radically separated them from humans. As for him, the most important faculty is the power of reasoning and only humans can reason. He said that:

Plant exists for the sake of animals, and some animals exist for the benefit of others. Those which are domesticated, serve human beings for use as well as for food, wild animals, too, in most cases if not in all, serve to furnish us not only with food, but also with other kinds of assistance, such as the provision of clothing and similar aids to life. Accordingly, if nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, all animals must have been made by nature for the sake of men.<sup>17</sup>

### **Thomas Aquinas:**

Greek thinking has been very important to Christianity through early Christian scholars are critical to the formation of contemporary Christianity. Augustine once wrote that animals are irrational and it is by just ordinance of God that the lives and deaths of animals are subordinated to human use. When we say, "Thou shalt not kill", he notes "we do not understand this of the irrational animals that fly, swim, walk or creep, since they are dissociated from us by their want of reason, and are therefore by the just appointment of the Creator subjected to us to kill or keep alive for our own uses."<sup>18</sup> Like Augustine Aquinas has maintained tremendous influence over Christianity up to the present and, most contemporary church doctrines contain his teachings. In thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas revisited

<sup>17</sup> Aristotle . *Politics*. Trans Ernest Barker. Oxford; Oxford, 1995 1.8, 1256b 15.

<sup>18</sup> Augustine. *City of God*. Trans. Marcus Dods. New York: Random House, 1993 p.20

Augustine's point concerning animals, inserting ancient Greek philosophy into Christian theology. In their opinion animals are creatures deprived of a rational soul and therefore cannot belong to the sphere of morality.<sup>19</sup>

Aquinas thought that animals have no moral status except human interest- as human property.<sup>20</sup> According to him, that "Hereby is refuted the error of those who said it is sinful for a man to kill dumb animals, for by divine providence they are intended for man's use in the natural order. Hence it is no wrong for man to make use of them, either by killing or in any other whatever."<sup>21</sup> Aquinas also wrote that "He that kills another ox, sins not through killing the ox, but through injuring another man in his property. Wherefore this is not a species of the sin of murder but of the sin of theft or robbery."<sup>22</sup> Aquinas revisited Augustine's point concerning animals. It is said in the *Genesis* that –

“ let us make man in our own image in the likeness of ourselves and let them be the master of the fish, of the sea, the birds of the heaven, the cattle, all the wild beasts and the earth.” God created man in the image of himself, in the image of God He created them. God blessed them saying to them “Be fruitful, multiply, fill the earth and conquer it. Be master of the sea, the birds of the heaven and all living animals of the earth.”<sup>23</sup>

Aquinas also thought that animals are “naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of others”. For him, the souls of animals are not immortal; human beings alone possess immortal souls. In favoring the arguments of Aristotle, Aquinas asserted that non-human species are mere object property of other rational creatures. Aquinas cites Aristotle and views that humans have both a spiritual and corporeal element.<sup>24</sup> He concluded that the souls of animals are not immortal, and only human beings have

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<sup>19</sup> Saint Thomas Aquinas, 1970 *Summa theologiae*, London 265-174

<sup>20</sup> Linzey Andrew “*Animals Theology*”. Chicago : U of IL P, 1995, p.13

<sup>21</sup> Regan Tom, and Singer P. *Animal Rights and Human Obligations Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall-1976*

<sup>22</sup> Aquinas, Thomas *Summa Theologica* . Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. 5 vols. Westminster : Christian Classics, 1948. Part-11 Question 64, Article 1.

<sup>23</sup> *Genesis* 1-3 26, 27-28

<sup>24</sup> Aquinas, Thomas *Summa Theologica* . Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. 5 vols. Westminster : Christian Classics, 1948. Part-1. Question 75, Article-3

immortal souls. Aquinas asserted that God is the last end of this universe whom the rational creature alone obtain in themselves, and other creatures are ruled as being directed to rational creature. Divine providence provides for the intellectual nature for its own sake, and for all others for its sake.

Lynn White in “The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis”, blamed Christianity for the growing environmental crisis. White opines “Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen.” As we know that most of the Christians in the West assume that they have been given “dominion” by God, over the rest of creation and that we are therefore free to continue breeding dogs and eating flesh. Andrew Linzey rejects the traditional Christian view, which holds that God granted people the right to use nature and animals for their own ends. Linzey’s generosity paradigm requires Christians to exhibit self-sacrificing service towards all of creation and asserts that exploitation of animals violates God’s will, as expressed in the *Bible*. Although there has always been a small and quite minority protectionist voice among Christians, but theologians such as Andrew Linzey, and some Christian protectionists perhaps are stronger and more visible than ever. Some notable Christians demonstrate “a reversal of the relationship of fear and enmity between humans and animals that appertains after the fall and the Flood”.<sup>25</sup> They demonstrate a firm belief that Descartes was wrong in “*cogito ergo sum*: “I think therefore I am” Rather *Amo ergo sum*: “I love, therefore I am.”<sup>26</sup> Thus, a brief history of Western philosophy and theology provides a context for contemporary Christian attitudes towards animals, and for Linzey’s work.

Linzey asserts that all creatures are of God, that the deity’s covenant includes all creatures, all beings share in the suffering of life on earth, all

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<sup>25</sup> Linzey, Andrew, and Dan Cohn-Sherbok. *After Noah: Animals and the Liberation of Theology*. London: Mowbray, 1997. p.101

<sup>26</sup> Coffin Sloane. “The Politics of Compassion: The Heart is a Little to the Left.” *Harvard Divinity Bulletin*. 28.2-3 (1999):11-12.

entities share unity in Christ, and redemption is shared by all creatures. He examines Biblical challenges to his thesis, including the practices of animal sacrifice and eating flesh, and the Biblical concept of dominion. Finally, he examines the *New Testament*, focusing on the life of Christ as a model of exemplary Christian behavior, the fall and salvation, and the support of hierarchy.

The first chapter of *Genesis* reports that the element of creation was made first, then plants and finally animals including man and woman. Linzey encourages Christians to see the “creator’s interest in the rest of creation, the intrinsic value of each creatures in God’s sight,” and acknowledge “the justice and mercy of God which extends to all work of creation.”<sup>27</sup> Therefore, Christians ought to remember that creation is not ours, but God’s,” we must not destroy without serious justification and without acknowledging that all life belongs not to us but to God.<sup>28</sup>

**Rene Descartes:**

In the history of Western philosophy, we find that Descartes treats non- human species as machines. Descartes extremely supports the Aristotelian position and denied morality, reason, thought, and consciousness to animals. Animals for Descartes are nothing more than sophisticated biological machines. It may be said that the chief problem in Descartes’ position has always been to explain animal behaviour without attributing mentality. He concluded that animal feels no pain because they are not conscious; they have no immortal soul, as evidenced by their lack of language. Descartes perspectives towards non-human species are that animals are irrational, lack of souls, mere automata, machines of God that could feel nothing. He denied speech to animals, pointing to the fact that they never “use words or put together for signs, as we do in order to declare

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<sup>27</sup> Linzey, Andrew and Dan Cohn-Sherbok. *After Noah: Animals and the Liberation of Theology*. London: Mowbray, 1997. P.120

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid* ,P.105.

our thoughts to others". The absence of speech, Descartes reasoned could only be explained in terms of animals lacking what speech expressed thought. From the above view he concluded that animals lacked all forms of consciousness.

If we go through this view of Descartes we can find that he has clearly shown the differences that exist between men and brutes, as we can see that exists between men and brutes. We can find that magpies and parrots are able to utter words just like us, and yet they cannot speak as we do. On the other hand, men who being born as deaf and dumb, are in the same degree, or even more than the brutes, lack of organs which serve others of talking are in the habit of themselves inventing certain signs by which they make themselves understood by those who, being usually in their company, have leisure to learn their language. This does not merely to show that the brutes have less reason than humans, but that they have none at all. Since it is clear that very little is required in order to be able to talk. For him, the fact is that animals do better than we do, does not prove that they are endowed with mind, although in this case they would have more reason than any of us, and would surpass us in all other things. It rather shows that they have no reason at all, and that it is nature which acts in them according to the disposition of their organs, just as a clock which is only composed of wheels and weights is able to tell the hours and measure the time more correctly than we can do with all our wisdom. In fact, Descartes observed that animals are capable of surpassing us in those of our actions which are not guided by thoughts. He also added that when we say words or using signs, these must be relevant to exclude the speech of parrots. Because these words or signs do not express any passion, to rule out not only cries of joy or sadness and the like, but whatever can be taught by training to animals. Similarly, animals like dogs, horses, and monkeys are taught to perform, only express their fear, hope, joy and consequently they perform

without any thought. For Descartes, although animals do many things better than we do, it can even be used to prove that they act naturally and mechanically just like a clock which tells the time better than our judgment does.

From a critical point of view Descartes dualism is quite unsatisfactory because, rationality is generally not considered a morally relevant reason with regard to the respect for life.

While analyzing Descartes view Locke claims the belief that animals have a mental life and allows that they can reason, without the ability to abstract. After affirming perception indubitably in all animals, and thus they have ideas, he asserts that if any ideas at all, and are not bare machines, we cannot deny them to have some reason.<sup>29</sup> As for him:

It seems as evident to me, that they do some of them in certain instances reason, as that they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they received them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction.<sup>30</sup>

In another passage, he criticized those who would assert “that dogs or elephants do not think when they give all the demonstration of it imaginable, except only telling us that they do so”.<sup>31</sup>

When we assess Descartes philosophy we find that his view is based on the judgment “I think therefore I am”, but it does not find the entrance to the ethical realm, and remains held fast in a dead view of the world and of life. True philosophy must commence with the most immediate and comprehensive facts of consciousness.

### **Wittgenstein:**

The most anti-cartesian philosopher Wittgenstein shares the Cartesian bias against animal mentation, by virtue of the absence of language in animals. For him, thought is constituted by the social

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<sup>29</sup> John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* New York: Dutton, 1871, p.117

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, p.127

<sup>31</sup> John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* New York: Dutton, 1871. P.87

conventional signs, one is brought up in, without such a system neither thought nor concepts, there can be no “private language” for there are no publicly checkable criteria and rules for correct and incorrect application of concepts in a private language, and if there is no way to be incorrect, there is also no way to be correct.<sup>32</sup> Also for Wittgenstein language is a “form of life” which express and shapes one’s own nature. In his famous passage,

Wittgenstein tells us that if a lion could speak we couldn’t understand him, in another he thought that it is conceptually impossible for animal to smile, and also for him a dog cannot stimulate pain or feel remorse, that an animal cannot hope or consciously imitate, and that a dog cannot mean something by wagging its tail and a crocodile cannot think.<sup>33</sup>

Wittgenstein’s thought about the lion suggests us that since animals have such a radically different forms of life, we could not become privy to it and even if they did have a rule- governed language.<sup>34</sup> All these above argument represent the fact that non-human species are virtually unchallenged attests to the power of ideology in philosophy as well as in science.

While assessing the view of Wittgenstein we may say that according to Wittgenstein animals can’t hope or stimulate pain, these are truly perplexing. For example, when the master is eating and his pet dog is sitting in front, with the hope that his master will give him a bite. Wittgenstein shows us an example in which he mentions that an animal can’t believe. As for him, a dog believes his master is at the door. But does the dog believe that his master will come on the day after tomorrow? Wittgenstein believed that dogs and some other animals have some intentional status and some conscious ones, but he claims that animals can have present or short term cognitive states, whereas long term intentional states require language.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Regan Tom, Singer P, *Animal rights and Human Obligations* Prentice Hall, New Jersey 1889,1976, p.44.

<sup>33</sup> Wittgenstein, L. *Philosophical Investigations* Oxford: Blackwell, 1958,p.90,153 166,174,224..

<sup>34</sup> Rollin, Bernard E. *Thought Without Language :The Unheeded Cry*, OUP: 1989.

<sup>35</sup> Clark, Stephen R.L *The Moral Sstatus of Animals* “ Oxford University Press. 1984.

According to him, since animals lack a system of conventional signs, they lack fundamental tools for a mental life. So, the concept about the lion in the above suggests that since animals have such a radically different form of life, we could not become privy to it even if they did have a rule-governed language.

A critical assessment of the view given by Wittgenstein be made here. Any argument which equates thought and language and which denies any sort of significant thought in the absence of language, be the argument Cartesian or Wittgenstein, must be hard pressed to explain how humans ever acquire language in the first place.<sup>36</sup> The acquisition of language entails that experiences and thoughts be processed at some stage without language. Even if one believes with Chomsky that the essential skeleton of language is innate, so that linguistic competence is native rather than acquired, it must still be triggered and fleshed out by non-linguistic experiences, which determine the particular version of universal language that the child learns. Furthermore, Thomas Reid thought that understanding of reference and meaning requires some non-linguistic comprehension of the linkage between sign and what is signified prior to the acquisition of language; otherwise the entire process would never get off the ground.<sup>37</sup> Wittgenstein's point that mental images cannot serve as markers for concepts, since there is no public check for correction of application. There must be ways in which one can conceivably misapply the concept and be detected and corrected. This is possible only when the vehicles of the concept are public and accessible to others, who can see how one is using a concept and who can correct deviations from proper use.<sup>38</sup> Question may be raised that whether there is any difference between the two situations? According to the private-

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<sup>36</sup> B. Rollin, *Natural and Conventional Meaning : An Examination of the Distinction* (The Hague: Mouton 1976).

<sup>37</sup> T. Reid , *Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense*, Chapter 5. Many editions

<sup>38</sup> H.H Price, *Thinking and Experience* (Cambridge Mass ; Harvard University Press, 1953)

language argument the animal must rely on memory and thus has no way of being shown to be wrong. An animal may see shimmering on asphalt and believe it to mean water, but he is “publicly” corrected when he reaches the road and finds no water there. In other words we may say that the animal is an active agent that can serve as a basis for correction. This example has shown that memory without language is possible, and animal can remember without language.

Wittgenstein points out that since language separates human from animals and since language is a “form of life” which both shapes and is shaped by ones *umwelt*, we could not understand a lion if it speaks, seems implausible. We may say that our forms of life are not all that dissimilar; both the lion and we have interests in eating, sleeping, sex, avoiding encroachment on our environments and so forth, about which we could doubtless make small talk.

Wittgenstein’s claim that an animal can not hope or stimulate pain, these are truly perplexing. What else can one say of a dog when it sits at attention while we are eating but that it is hoping we will give it a scrap? And the case about stimulating pain, any pet-owner and any veterinarian can relate cases in which animals stimulated pain in order to get attention, avoid punishment, and so on. We can say that the most powerful reason for believing in animal mental states is that they constitute the best way of explaining what animals do, how they behave, and how they survive, both philosophically and scientifically. The fact is that we cannot experience these states directly is of little consequence, of as little consequence as the fact that we cannot directly experience the particles of microphysics or the past is to the explanatory value of postulating particles and a past.

**Hume:**

According to Hume, animals can un-doubtedly feel, think, love, hate, will and even reason as we do, but as for Hume there are two important

differences between humans and animals. The first is our superiority in knowledge and understanding and then our superiority in reasoning. In contrast to the Cartesian views humans possess a unique ability to reason that animals lack. Hume suggests that there are some differences of reasoning abilities between humans and non-human species. One such difference is that animals but not humans possess particular cognitive instinct, which helps them to survive and reproduce, and another is that animals do not engage in demonstrative reason, and finally we may say that only humans are capable of improving their reasoning ability, which animals do not. Hume suggest that animals cannot be regarded as moral agents, and the way in which the moral sense operates- that is virtue which is a certain quality of human character. As for him, good reasoning is a virtue in humans. But at first we need to have a clear idea of what Hume wanted to mean by the term “reasoning”. By this term, he means the ability to imagine ability to link and relates idea in various ways that produce either belief or knowledge. In *Treatise of Human Nature* Hume opines that reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls, which carries us along a certain train of ideas and endows them with particular qualities, according to their particular situation and relations. In the first “*Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*” Hume divides reasoning into two “demonstrative reasoning” and “moral reasoning” .Reasoning on the basis of the second group of relations, contiguity, distance, identity and causation - Hume calls moral reasoning. Our judgment of beauty or ugliness also reflects the ability of our moral sense.

According to Hume, humans are distinct from animals by virtue of their status as moral agents. In this point, Hume shares a similar view with Locke. The action of persons is associated with the notion of responsibility. Although animals shares many of our mental capacities, but they lack those features which we associated with the possesses of moral character.

According to him, the meaning of character is that which possess the mental capacity-like virtue and vices which in turn is bound up with the capacity for moral distinctions. The reason why animals fails to possess the kind of passions, and hence the moral sentiment, is precisely that they lack a kind of understanding of knowledge required for the distinctive point of view associated with morality.<sup>39</sup>

**R.G. Frey:**

According to Roger Frey, we all know that human beings have some want, belief, and desire, but the question is that whether these qualities are present in the non-human species or not? Having an interest on something means to have a consciousness to that thing and to desire it. Question may be raised that can animals have desire or want? To answer Frey cites an example by saying that as a tractor needs oil in order to function normally, similarly a dog needs water in order to function normally. For him, water is just a need for both of them and need does not require the presence of either consciousness or knowledge. He raises another question that do non-human species possess some belief? According to Frey, when I have a desire to owe something then my desire proofs that I have a belief about the absence of that particular thing. If animals or living creatures have a concept of belief a creature must be possessed with the difference between true and false belief and if creature have this concept then they must be aware of their true sentence, but it is not the case. We could not see cats or living creatures with such awareness. Moreover, cats, or living creatures are not possessed with language and also he thought that animals cannot assert anything and a lack of assertion suggests that they could not possess linguistic ability.<sup>40</sup>

Historically, it is rooted in Descartes ‘claim that only language, a “universal instrument” as he called it, can evidence mind and go beyond

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<sup>39</sup> Boyle Deborah. *Hume on Animal Reason*, Hume Studies, Vol-xxvi ,no.1 (April 2003)p. 3-28. [www.humesociety.org/.../boyle...v2](http://www.humesociety.org/.../boyle...v2)

<sup>40</sup> R.G. Frey, Rights, Interests, Desires, and Beliefs., American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.16., July 1979, pp.233-39

immediate particularity. The equation of thought with the ability to universalize and generalize and go beyond the particulars given in sensation was made explicit by Kant, who made thought propositional and rooted thinking in the organization of sensory data by concepts.<sup>41</sup> This tradition has assumed that since animals lack language, they must lack concepts, and are therefore trapped forever in the momentary. Only a linguistic being has concept and only concepts enable a being to universalize, generalize, refer to what is absent, counterfactual, non-existent, past, future and so forth. Since animals lack language, they must lack concepts and since they lack concepts, they can live at best only in a world of isolated, fragmented, momentary, particulars. The philosopher physiologist Buytendijk shows that an octopus could distinguish between actively touching something and being passively touched and concluded from this that even octopus have a mental image, betokening a concept, of self and other.<sup>42</sup>

**Kant:**

If we go through Kant, morally permissible actions are those that could be willed by all rational individuals. For Kant, the meaning of rationality is not the same as the meaning of intelligence. To define rational beings he uses to mean a being that is able to choose the way of good life. The nature of rational beings which he called person's end-in-ourselves. For him rationality or autonomy is a property that made a kind of intrinsic value of dignity on the beings who have it, and therefore, they are to be respected in a different way and lacking this property in other animals lack the dignity or value. We may say that Kant's have a special concern for rational autonomous being humans are the member of the kingdom of ends, end-in-themselves. It is a presupposition of rational choice. To wrote Kant our maxim must conform to the categorical imperative where we must be able to

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<sup>41</sup> I.Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, McMillan, St, Martin's Press, 1929.

<sup>42</sup> F.J.j.Buytendijk, "Toucher et etre touché". *Arch. Neerl.Zool.*,10,suppl.2 (1953)

will it as a universal law. Also for Kant, only human beings have the capacity for moral choice that treating a person as a mere means violates the dignity of every human being. From the above discussion we may say that Kant's perspective is totally anthropocentric.<sup>43</sup> We may find Kant's attitude in his categorical imperative where he formulates the dignity of human being. In his theory of "kingdom of ends" the autonomy of every person is respected. But what about non-rational being? Are they mere object or machines for us? How should we treat them? On Kant's conception the intelligence animals are those that is characterized by its ability to learn from its experiences. He also thought that we are the only moral animal, in the sense that we are the only moral animal, in the sense that we are the only animals whose conduct is subject to moral guidance and moral evaluation. We are not traced this type of moral qualities on non-human species because they are not conscious of their principles. He believed that human beings can have duties only to human beings; actually he means to someone who is in a position to act morally and obligates us because they do not possess legislative wills. In fact, Kant tried to show us that we have no moral obligation towards non-human species. As for him, the world of non-human being is different from us because our world is a world of self-conscious in which duties, moral obligations and many other qualities belong, in which event are divided into free and un-free, those which have reason and those who are merely caused. Like Kant, Hegel also says that animals "have no right to their life, because they do not will it"<sup>44</sup>. He too denies that animals are ends in themselves, and calls them things. As for him-

The thing, as externally, has no end in itself; it is not infinite self-relation but something external to itself. A living thing too

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<sup>43</sup> Edited by Margot Michel, Daniela Kuhne, Julia Hanni, *Animal Law- Tier and Recht, Developments and Perspectives in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Entwicklungen and Perspektiven im 21. Jahrhundert st. Gallen 2012 p.no-7-15

<sup>44</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, *Philosophy of Right* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1952) p.237

(an animal) is external to itself in this way and in so far itself a thing.<sup>45</sup>

So an animal lacks rationality, self-consciousness, infinite self-relation, it “lacks subjectivity” and so “is external not merely to the subject but to itself” as well. To say an animal as a thing is to say that it lacks some sort of mental complexity, some sort of reflexivity that persons have. Let us critically analyze Kant’s view.

Kant’s own attitude about the moral status of non-human animals seems puzzling. Kant does think we have the right to kill the other animals, but it must be quickly and without pain, and cannot be for the sake of mere sport. He tells us that, “Any action whereby we may torment animals, or let them suffer distress, or otherwise treat them without love, is demeaning to ourselves.”<sup>46</sup> In his lectures Kant said our duties towards animals are merely indirect duties towards humanity. “Animal nature has analogous to human nature, and by doing our duties to animals in respect of manifestations of human nature, we indirectly do our duty to humanity.....We can judge the heart of a man by his treatment of animals.”<sup>47</sup> In his lectures, Kant told a story about Leibniz. Leibniz once carefully returning a worm he had been studying to its leaf when he has done.<sup>48</sup> And both on his lectures and in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant has hard words for people who shoot their horses or dogs when they are no longer useful.<sup>49</sup> But the question may be raised here that why don’t we owe these duties directly to the other animals? In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant argues that human beings can have duties only to human beings. He thinks that we can have duties only to someone who is in a position to morally constrain or obligate by his will,

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<sup>45</sup> *Ibid*, p.236

<sup>46</sup> Kant *Lectures on Ethics*, L. Infield (trans). New York; Harper Torchbooks, 1963. 27; 710, P.434.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid*, p.239-240

<sup>48</sup> Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, 27;459, pp.212-213

<sup>49</sup> Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Trans. Gregor Mary, in; Gregor Mary edit, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy Series, Cambridge 1996

and that someone with a legislative will can do that. The non-human animals cannot obligate us because they do not have legislative wills. Kant did not mean to say that a human being as an end-in-itself is precious commodity, while a non-human animal is an expendable commodity like a grocery-store wine glass. In a sense it is not an argument from the value of rational beings, or of the lives of rational beings, to our obligations to rational beings at all instead it is an argument from the capacity to obligate, or the lack of that capacity, to the assignment of a certain kind of value. More precisely we may say that it is an argument that identifies a certain kind of value, being an end-in-oneself-with the capacity to obligate. So Kant isn't arguing that we have no obligation to non-human animals because they or their lives lack a certain kind of value. Rather he is arguing that they lack this value because they cannot place us under obligations. So the question is that whether Kant is right?

We do not take our interests and concerns to matter only because they are the interests and concerns of an autonomous rational being.<sup>50</sup> If the citizens of a state can vote certain protections for all human beings, why couldn't citizens of the human moral community, the Kingdom of Ends, vote certain protection for all animal beings.<sup>51</sup> For instance, one might suggest, we demand that we not be tortured, injured, hunted, or eaten, not just because of the assault on our autonomous nature, but because of the assault on our animal nature, therefore we should not treat our fellow animals in those ways. According to Kant human beings are not distinguished from the other animals by being in connection with some sort of transcendental, rational order beyond nature with which the other animals have nothing to do. Instead we are distinguished by our ability to construct a

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<sup>50</sup> *The Source of Normativity* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press,1996) especially 3.3.1-3.10,pp, 113-125

<sup>51</sup> Kant seems at first to be granting this point. In the *Metaphysics of Morals* we find a Section devoted to "A human beings duty to himself as an animal being" (MM 6 ;421-428)

transcendental, rational order out of the essential love of life and the goods of life that we share with the other animals. So in taking ourselves to be ends-in-ourselves we legislate that the natural good of a creature that matters to itself is the source of normative claims. Animal nature is an end-in-itself, because our own legislation makes it so. And that is why we have duties to the other animals.

From the above discussion, we may claim that non-human species are far more behind to come under the purview of morality. Thus dominant western ethics with regard to the moral standing of animals are not only unacceptable because they are inconsistent, but also because they disregard our biological affiliation with animals. It exemplifies a lack of appreciation for the majesty, complexity, and wonder of life and reveal a lack of understanding for the fleeting nature of our personal physical existence. . But our attitude towards animals has changed today. Human's capacity to speak makes them distinct from animals; we can see that animals have comprehended language. Question may be raised here that is only alphabetical language called actual language? One may say that sign language is also a kind of language which is used by many non-human species and human beings too. As for example- we can see in our daily life that a traffic police also uses sign languages and we can understand that what he means to indicate. In this way different types of questions arise here against those who directly deny the moral status of animals. Now we may discuss those philosophers opinion who agree that non-human species are not only automata, they have also rationality, self-consciousness and moreover dignity like normal human being. At first we may discuss Darwin's View on animals.

### **2.3 Arguments for Animals Moral Status:**

#### **Charles Darwin:**

In *The Decent of Man*, Darwin shows us that "there is no fundamental difference between man and higher mammals in their mental

faculties”, and that “the lower animals, like man manifestly feel pleasure and pain, happiness, and misery”<sup>52</sup>. In the “*Decent of Man*” Darwin claims that a moral sense, a conscience is present to some degree in many other animals.<sup>53</sup> Darwin argues “natural selection cannot possibly produce any modification in a species exclusively for the good of another species. Darwin mentioned that;

Man is a part of nature and one of the products of the evolutionary process. That man is an ecological species but this species has evolved with such unique and unprecedented properties on the animal level that in man the biological evolution has transcended itself.<sup>54</sup>

Moreover, Darwin in “*The Decent of Man*” cited various examples which prove that non-human species are also social creatures or social being like human being. Everyone noticed that how miserable horses, dogs, are when they separated from their companion, and how much strong love and affection they show when they meet together. All these examples tell us that non-human species also lead their social life like us. Moreover, we can see that social animals perform many little services for each other, they also show pampers to his companion or children. In our everyday life we can see that by licking each other cows expresses their love and affection. Even many animals certainly sympathize each one’s distress or danger. Captain Stanberry saw on a lake, an old and completely blind pelican which was very fat, must have been well feed for a long time by his companion. . Blyth also informed to Charles Darwin that he saw an Indian cows feeding two or three of their companions which were blind. On the other hand we can see in our home, that our pet dog possesses some power of self-command. We can

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<sup>52</sup> Charles Darwin , *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex* New York; Modern Library, 1971,p.448

<sup>53</sup> Darwin, *The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex* , London: D.Appleton, 1897, Chapter4

<sup>54</sup> Dobzhanksy, T. Human Nature as a product of Evolution; *The Range of Ethics* Harold H. Titus, Morris T. Keeton, East-West Press Pvt Ltd. New Delhi, 1972,p.123

find in one incident in Darwin who mentioned that a dog refrains from stealing food in the absence of their master.<sup>55</sup>

**Tom Regan:**

Perhaps, Gandhi's voice compelled Regan to ask, "Why would only human beings have rights?"<sup>56</sup> Regan not only developed a moral grounding in human rights, but soon introduced the first comprehensive philosophical theory of animal rights. In *The Case for Animal Rights*, Regan explained the "right view" "in which certain animals have basic rights and ought to be taken to consideration. Animals, human or otherwise that qualify as subject of a life have equal inherent value in Regan's theory. In one sentence we may say that Regan formulated his theory on the basis of inherent value of specified individuals. For him, there can be no entity that is more or less inherently valuable than another. So what we call inherent value?? To say we have such value is to say that we are something more than, something different from, mere receptacles. That means the value which is independent of our usefulness to others. We never treat other in ways that fail to show respect for the other's independent value is to act immorally, to violate the individual's rights. So, inherent value belongs equally to those who are the experiencing subjects of a life. Regan believed that animals with a welfare (which includes humans) have a "psychophysical identity". By this he means that normal, mammals aged one year or older have desires, beliefs, and the ability to act, they have preference autonomy. Preference autonomy entails want, desire, and preferences that an individual strives to fulfill. For example, a dog will choose between various activities, and also selecting the option that can be best satisfies her wants or desires. In Regan's right view the prima facie right not to be harmed, carries a concurrent duty for human moral agents. Regan's right view, we believe, is

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<sup>55</sup> Darwin "The Decent of Man" chap-4 " Comparison of the Mental Power of Man"

<sup>56</sup> Regan, Tom. *Animal Rights, Human Wrongs :An Introduction to Moral Philosophy*. New York : Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. P.3-5.

rationally the most satisfactory moral theory. His “harm principle” demands that a subject of a life never be treated merely as a means to an end, they are to be treated in ways that shows respect for their inherent value. Moral agents have a duty to assist subjects-of-a-life if others fail to respect their inherent value.<sup>57</sup>

**Jeremy Bentham:**

Most of the utilitarian philosophers hold the view that the basic nature of a creature is to seek pleasure and to avoid pain.. For example, Bentham points to the capacity to suffer as the vital characteristic that entitles a being for equal consideration. Bentham wrote, “The question is not can they reason? Nor can they talk? But can they suffer?”<sup>58</sup> The capacity for suffering or enjoyment or happiness- is not just not another characteristic like the capacity for language or for higher mathematics. He argued that animals have capacity to feel pain and for this reason they ought to be morally considerable. According to him, “Each to count for one and none for more than one”. In other words, the interests of every being affected by an action are to be account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being. Bentham is not saying that those who try to make “the-insuperable line” that determines whether the interests of a being should be considered happen to have selected the wrong characteristic. The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a pre-requisite for having interest at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any meaningful way. If a being suffers there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer, but a mouse on the other hand, does have an interest in not being tormented, because it will suffer if it is. Also for him, other creatures react to pain in ways similar to human beings, they share

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<sup>57</sup> Regan, Tom. *The Case for Animal Rights*. New York ; Routledge, 1984 P.249

<sup>58</sup> Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, New York ;Hafner Press, 1948, p.310-311 and Singer, P. *Animal Liberation* 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, New York ;Avon Books, 1990,p.7-9

neurological and mental faculties associated with pain in human beings.<sup>59</sup> If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account. That is why the limit of sentience is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others. It is worth mentioned that J.S. Mill distinguished between two kinds of pleasures, higher and lower and human beings enjoy higher kind of pleasure and lower kind of pleasure is enjoyed by animals. But for Bentham there is no distinction between higher and lower kind of pleasures.

**Peter singer:**

In *Animal Liberation*, Peter Singer remarks that Wittgenstein have mentioned that we cannot meaningfully attribute conscious states to the creatures without language. Wittgenstein believed that animals are utterly mindless. In his famous book *Logical Investigation* he denies that we could not understand a lion even if it could speak. This means that our life is different in kind from lion and other animals. The reason is that we could not understand what a lion speaks is that we and only we are capable of using language. In *Private Language*, Wittgenstein wanted to show that the ability to apply concepts meaningfully requires public criteria, and the most impressive public criteria can be provided only by language. From the above we may say that animals according to Wittgenstein mind require concepts and that require public evidence of language.

For Singer, a liberation movement demands an expansion of our moral horizons and an extension or reinterpretation of the basic moral principle of equality. Practices that were previously regarded as natural and inevitable come to be seen as the result of an unjustifiable prejudice. No one can say that all his or her attitudes and practices are beyond criticism, and this way we may come to see that there is a case for a new liberation movement. If we look into the past then we can see that the idea of “The

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<sup>59</sup> Regan Tom, Singer p, *Animal Rights and Human Obligation* Prentice Hall New Jersey 1889,1976, p.no-25

Rights of Animals” really has been used in time with the case for “Women’s Rights”. We may say that the case for equality between men and women cannot validly be extended to nonhuman animals. Women have a right to vote for instance because they are just as capable of making rational decisions as men are, animals on the other hand, are incapable of understanding the significance of voting, they cannot have the right to vote. So it might be said that men and women are similar beings and should have equal rights, while humans and non humans are different and should not have equal rights.

The utilitarian position on animals, most commonly is associated with Peter Singer. Singer’s philosophy lies on the belief that there is no room to disregard interests on the grounds of race, sex, species, or intellect. Singer realized the implications of utilitarian theory for animals- philosophical consistency required him to include animals in his utilitarian theory. Singer’s theory does not demand equal treatment for all sentient creatures, but it does require equal consideration of interests. Equal consideration of interests requires us to move beyond personal or sectional point of view to take into account the interests of all those who will be affected. He insists that each individual carry no more weight than any other, each individual counts for one and nobody counts for more than one. Basically we may say that singer’s theory does not demand equal treatment for all sentient creatures, but it does require equal consideration of interests. He thought that the interests of any one individual are no more or less important than the interests of any other. Singer suggested that each individual and each species is different, but they all have interests and equal interests ought to be treated equally.

If we look into the utilitarian’s then we can see that an utilitarian accepts two moral principles. The first is that of equality, everyone’s interest counts, and similar interests must be counted as having similar weight or

importance. Whether it may be white or black, human or animal- everyone's pain or frustration matters, and matters just as much as the equivalent pain or frustration of anyone else. And the second principle is that of utility, do the act that will bring about the best balance between satisfaction and frustration for everyone affected by the outcome.

But the utilitarian argument for the moral significance of animal suffering in meat production is not argument for vegetarianism. If an animal lived a happy life and was painlessly killed and then eaten by people who would otherwise suffer hunger or malnutrition by not eating the animal, then painlessly killing and eating the animal would be the morally justified thing to do. Moreover, in many parts of the world where economic, cultural, or climate conditions make it virtually impossible for people to sustain themselves on plant based diets, killing and eating animals who are painlessly killed would not be morally objectionable. So, if violating the rights of an animal can be morally tolerated, especially a right to life, then similar rights violations can be morally tolerated. In failing to recognize the inviolability of the moral claims of all morally considerable beings, utilitarianism cannot accommodate one of our most basic prima facie principles namely that killing a morally considerable being is wrong.

**Paul Taylor:**

In *Respect for Nature* Taylor represents a moral theory which is intended to protect the interests of wildness, including plants and animals that dwell there in. As an environmental ethicist Taylor wants to protect every species from being exploited by human beings. Taylor writes about wild animals and claims that “to harm several such being is not merely to bring about a certain amount of intrinsic disvalue in the world....it is to commit a number of violations of duty, corresponding to the number of creatures harmed.” For him, if an entity has inherent worth, then that being is worthy of moral consideration by moral agents. He thought that “inherent

worth indicates that moral agents have a prima facie duty to promote or preserve that entity's good as an end-in-itself for the sake of that entity. He asserts that because an organism grows, responds to stimulus, reproduces, resists, dying assimilates and use materials from their environment in order to survive, we ought to respect their efforts and their lives. Moreover, Taylor introduces and discusses various types of rights in his theory of Respect for Nature. Taylor's definition of a moral agent includes the ability to engage in moral deliberation, that is to consider and weigh moral reasons for and against various courses of conduct open to choice, the ability to make decision on the basis of those reasons, the ability to exercise will power, to carry out those decisions and the capacity to hold oneself answerable to others for failing to carry out them.<sup>60</sup> Taylor's moral theory actually protects "any wild creature just in virtue of its being a member of a biotic community of a natural ecosystem".

**Albert Schweitzer:**

Descartes philosophy is based on the judgment, "I think therefore I am". However, it does not find the entrance to the ethical realm, and remains a dead view of the world and of life. True philosophy must commence with the most immediate and comprehensive fact of consciousness. And this may be formulated as "I am life which wills to live and I exist in the midst of life which wills to live"<sup>61</sup>. Albert Schweitzer was a renowned philosopher who thought that mere sympathy is too narrow a concept to serve as the intellectual experience of an ethical element. It denotes, only a sharing of the suffering of the will-to-live. But to be ethical is to share the whole experience of all the circumstances and aspirations of the will-to-live, to live with it in its pleasures, in its struggle towards perfection. For him, "it is good to maintain and cherish life, and it is evil to destroy life. According to

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<sup>60</sup> Taylor, Paul W *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environment Ethics* .Princeton ;Princeton U, 1986.p.14

<sup>61</sup> Albert Schweitzer, *Civilization and Ethics (part 2 of the philosophy of Civilization)* trans John Naish, Reprinted by permission of A & C Black Ltd and Macmillan publishing Co, Inc.

Schweitzer, the fundamental principle of morality which we seek as a necessity for thought is not, however, a matter only of arguing and deepening current views of good and bad, but also of expanding and extending these. He thought that a man is really ethical only when he obeys the constraint laid upon him to help all lives which he is able to succour, and when he goes out of his way to avoid injuring anything living. He does not ask how far this or that life deserves sympathy as valuable in itself, or how far it is capable of feeling.

So what does Reverence for Life teaches us regarding the relation between man and the non-human animals?? According to Schweitzer, whenever he injures life of any kind he must be quite clear as to whether this is necessary or not. Also for him, those who test operations or drugs on animals, or who inoculate them with disease so that they must be able to help human beings by means of the result thus obtained, ought never to rest satisfied with the general idea that their dreadful doings are preformed in pursuit of a worthy aim. That is why Schweitzer thought that whenever any animal is forced into the service of man, the suffering which it has to bear on that account are the concern of every one of us.<sup>62</sup> In fact, he tried to suggest that when there is so much maltreatment of animals, when the cries of thirsting creatures go up unnoticed from the railway tracks, when there is so much roughness in our slaughter house, when in our kitchens so many animals suffer horrible deaths from unskillful hands, when animals endure unheard of agonies from heartless men, or are delivered to the dreadful play of children, then we are all guilty and must bear the blame.<sup>63</sup>

Schweitzer's views are criticized for including insentient and inanimate matter, such as snowflakes, under his protective ethical umbrella. But it seems that he was correct that if we are to protect the musk ox, then

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<sup>62</sup> Albert Schweitzer *Affirmations of Reverence for life* by prof- Marvin Meyer , Chapman university press, p.2, 13

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid*, P.13

we must protect the muskeg, and if we are to protect the muskeg, then we must protect air and water, even the snowflake. Our earth's system of water is interconnected. Never has this interconnection been clearer than it is at present, under the threat of global warming and flooding from the earth's melting glaciers and ice fields. Thus his ethics is based on a radical view of interconnections. Water reserves, waterways, snow and ice are part of a connected system of moisture on which all earthlings depend.

### **2.3.1 Concluding Remarks:**

In this chapter, we have discussed different philosopher's arguments (both in favor and against) in relation to animals deserving or worthy of mental status. We have also critically discussed some philosophers, what they have argued, against animal's moral status. If we go through James Rachel, we can find that some environmentalists have argued that trees should have moral standing. This is not quite as silly as it sounds. It just means that the welfare of trees (and other elements of the ecosystem) should be taken into account when we decide what to do and what policies to adopt. And this should be done independently of whether it helps or hurts human beings - we should be concerned to protect the trees for their own sakes. If we say that animals have moral standing, it would mean that their interests would count, from a moral point of view. And their interests would count for their own sakes. This is contrary to the dominant tradition, which says that we should avoid cruelty to animals only because, if we do not, there may be bad consequences for people e.g. Aquinas and Kant. So, the question remains: do animals have moral standing? Let us critically discuss the criteria's for moral standing as we have discussed earlier.

To respond the above question, that is do animals have moral standing we can find there are two most commonly defended views. One is only given by Kant who says that only rational, autonomous agents have moral standing. This view holds that animals do not have full moral standing,

although they might concede that animals have some sort of lesser moral status. The real motivation for this view is that it picks out an especially noble human characteristics - a characteristic that makes us sort of wonderful, not just “mere animals” - and says that is the basis of our moral standing. That’s why we human beings matter and only sentient beings (capable of feeling pain) have moral standing.

Philosophers who say this as we have discussed earlier believe that animals have full moral status. And the argument between these two views are is at least in part, an argument about whether animals have rights. What is suggested here is that there is something wrong with the way the issues are being framed? We are interested in understanding how people may be treated. But there is no one characteristic - whether it is rationality, sentience, or anything else - that is relevant to the whole range of ways in which people may be treated. Let us explain why this is important, as there is a relationship between rationality and autonomy.

### **2.3.2 Rationality and Autonomy**

Humans, as it is said earlier in this chapter, have moral standing because they are rational, autonomous agents. Humans can guide their own conduct according to their own conceptions of what ought to be done. Does the fact that someone is a rational autonomous agent make a difference in how he/she should be treated? One may say that it may. For such a being, the self-direction of his/her own life is a great good, valued not only for its instrumental worth but for its own sake. Thus paternalistic interference may be seen as an evil so far as Rachel is concerned.

Rachel cited a simple example, which goes like this suppose a woman might have a certain conception of how she wants to live her life. This conception might involve taking risks that we think are foolish. We might therefore try to change her mind; we might call attention to the risks and argue that they are not worthy of it. But suppose she will not heed our

warnings: are we then justified in forcibly preventing her from living her life as she chooses? It may be argued that we are not justified, for she is, after all, a rational, autonomous agent. It is different for someone who is not a fully a rational being - a small child, for example. Then we feel justified in interfering with his conduct, to prevent him from harming himself. The fact that the child is not anyway fully a rational agent justifies us in treating him differently than we would treat someone who is a fully a rational agent.

But once we understand why being a rational agent makes a difference in how one may be treated, in those cases in which it does make a difference, it becomes clear that possession of this quality is not always relevant. Whether a difference is relevant depends on the kind of treatment that is in question. When the issue is paternalistic interference, it is relevant to note whether the individual whose behaviour might be coerced is a rational agent. Suppose, however, that what is in question is not paternalistic interference, but something else. Suppose, for example, the question is whether to admit someone to a University. Jones is not admitted because he can't read. Now, the fact that Jones is or is not an autonomous agent has nothing to do with his decision. What is important is the fact that he can't read. Or suppose the question is whether to prescribe penicillin. Now, what is important is whether the person has an infection or not. Suppose we say "only those who can read have moral standing" or "only those susceptible to infection have moral standing." That would make just as much sense. The fact is that different capacities figure into explanations of how people may be treated, depending on what sort of treatment is at issue. What does all this imply about nonhuman animals? The following point may be relevant here.

- It's all right to coerce an animal, for its own good, because it is not an autonomous being.

- It's all right to exclude chimps from university classes, because they can't read.
- Appropriate veterinary medical treatment may be given to animals, because they are vulnerable to diseases (and they are not being autonomous, and not being able to read, has nothing to do with it).

### 2.3.3 Pain

Animals may not be autonomous, and they may not be able to read, but they may seek pleasure and suffer pain. And that, of course, is what worries us about many uses of animals in research. Does the fact that doing something would cause pain to an animal constitute a reason against doing it? The answer may be given yes. This brings animals well within the boundaries of “the moral community.” Does it make any difference to this if an animal isn't an “autonomous being”? Philosophical discussions on animals have frequently made this point, and in order to circumscribe the boundaries of the “moral community,” they have expressed a variety of opinions about how far sensitivity to pain extends.

- Some says: down to the level of shrimps
- Some says: probably insects can't feel pain

What we need, however, is more empirical information. Before Darwin, animals were regarded as mere “animated machines,” on philosophico-religious grounds. Now the pendulum has swung the other way, often on ideological grounds. We need to answer the question that is the experience of pain something that is well-nigh universal among complex species, or is it something that occurs in only some species.

It seems that a snake does not have a central representation of a mouse but relies solely on transduced information. The snake exploits three different sensory systems in relation to prey, like a mouse. To strike the mouse, the snake uses its visual system. When struck, the mouse normally does not die immediately, but runs away for some distance. To locate the

mouse, once the prey has been struck, the snake uses its sense of *smell*. The search behavior is exclusively wired to this modality. Even if the mouse happens to die right in front of the eyes of the snake, it will still follow the smell trace of the mouse in order to find it. This unimodality is particularly evident in snakes like pythons, where the prey often is held fast in the coils of the snake's body, when it hangs from a branch. Despite the fact that the snake must have ample proprioceptive information about the location of the prey it holds, it searches stochastically for it, all around, only with the help of the olfactory sense organs.

Finally, after the mouse has been located, the snake must find its head in order to swallow it. This could obviously be done with the aid of smell or sight, but in snakes this process uses only *tactile* information. Thus the snake uses three separate modalities to catch and eat a mouse. So snakes can't think of mice. Can they feel pain? Is there an organized snakey "self" there that feels pain and minds it? Anyway, snakes are not our close kin. The closer a species is to us, the more confidence we can feel. Mammals can feel pain.

Darwin was anxious to oppose the idea that animals are mere "animated machines," and in making the point was willing to attribute a broad range of psychological capacities to animals. They experience not only pleasure and pain, but terror, suspicion, and fear. They sulk. They love their children. They can be kind, jealous, self-complacent, and proud. They are curious. "There is no fundamental difference," he said, "between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties." That is why the thought of vivisection bothered him so much. He realized that, to the extent that nonhumans are similar to humans, they should be treated similarly.

The views that have sketched are, Darwinian. It does not elevate some human characteristic to a place of supreme importance in determining moral status. Instead, it sees a complex pattern of similarities and differences

between species and treatments appropriate to those similarities and differences. Our treatment of humans and other animals should be sensitive to the pattern of similarities and differences that exist between them. When there is a difference that justifies treating them differently, we may; but when there is no such difference, we may not.

On this view, moral rules are not indexed to species - there is not one set of rules for humans, one for nonhumans. The rule against causing pain is not a rule against causing pain to humans. Three questions are raised in this regard which are as follows ;

- Does this mean we must treat animals in the same way we treat humans? No, not even all people should be treated alike.
- Do animals have moral standing? Yes, but this simply means that it is objectionable to treat them in certain ways, and that the explanation of why it is objectionable has to do with their own welfare.
- Finally, there is the perennial question, “But where do you draw the line? Must we avoid killing cockroaches?” There is no one line to be drawn, unless we wish to be arbitrary.

Emotions used to be an uncontroversial part of any description of animal behavior, as uncontroversial as the instincts with which they were compared and equated. William James - whose famous title “What is an Emotion?” inspired the one above - rightly regarded the emotions as an unlearned response system, which is precisely why the next century saw the study of emotions go out of fashion. American behaviorism tried to explain all behavior based on operant conditioning and hence had no room for unlearned predispositions. Skinner dismissed the emotions as “excellent examples of the fictional causes to which we commonly attribute behavior.”

Until late into the last century, American researchers could scarcely obtain funding for work on the emotions unless they rephrased their questions in terms of learning and memory. The second major behavioral

school - European Ethology - similarly abandoned anything considered as sentimental and imprecise as the emotions in a reaction against the subjective “animal psychology” of the time. Even to this day, the *Oxford Companion to Animal Behaviour* urges ethologists to avoid references to the emotions, because “It does nothing to promote our understanding of behavior to attribute it to an emotion if our only evidence of the emotion is the very behavior the emotion is supposed to explain.” Since the 1970s, ethology and its offshoots developed a strictly functionalist approach in which behavioral motivations barely counted, thus adding to the irrelevancy of the emotions. This functionalism went so far that Darwin’s own pioneering comparisons between the emotional expressions of humans and other animals came to be regarded as un-Darwinian.

Despite the frequent assertion that animal emotions hardly matter, outright denial of their existence is rare. This leaves us with the curious situation that a widely recognized aspect of animal behavior is deliberately ignored or minimized. Emotions are often presented as too simple for attention. The *Oxford Companion to Animal Behaviour* asserts that “animals are restricted to just a few basic emotions,” and the main difference between human and animal emotions has been proclaimed to be that “animals don’t have mixed emotions.” Whether animal emotions are pure and simple, however, cannot be ascertained without a scientific program to study them. One only need to see an aroused chimpanzee, with all its hair on end, pick up a stick to safely poke at a snake that it has approached with great hesitation, to understand that mixed inclinations, such as between fear and curiosity, are entirely possible. In fact, when Menzel tested chimpanzees with toy snakes, he found that once one chimpanzee knew about the location of a snake, others who had never seen it would adopt the same cautious, ambivalent posture just from watching the first chimpanzee that had, thus

showing the effectiveness and potential survival value of emotional communication.

Survival value is obvious to anyone who watches primate behavior, yet we seem unable to talk about emotions without putting them between skeptical quotation marks. We describe animals not as angry but as “angry” or aggressive, and not as loving, but as “loving” or affiliated and bonded. Greetings between animals may be called loud, elaborate, or intense, but rarely emotional. Apart from descriptive labels, functional labels are preferred provided they are devoid of intentionality. Thus, animals may be called “altruistic,” but only in the functional sense in that they benefit others at a cost to themselves.

The term is never used in its motivational sense to the perplexity of scholars outside behavioral biology, where altruism invariably implies benign feelings and intent. I experienced similar taboos when first describing how chimpanzees kiss and embrace their adversaries during reconciliations after a fight. I was urged to speak instead of “post conflict reunions with mouth-to-mouth contact.” That the term *reconciliation* is now widely accepted in primatology is the product of three decades of systematically countering “simpler” explanations, so that the only one left standing is that primates monitor the state of their social relationships and undertake reparatory actions following conflict.

In *Can Animal be Moral?* Mark Rowland’s, suggests us that social mammals such as rats, dogs and chimpanzees can choose to be good or bad, and because they have morality we have moral obligation to them. That is why Locke once wrote that, if an entity has self-consciousness, then it is a person whether it is in the form of a man, parrot cat or whatever.<sup>64</sup> There have been many examples which show us animals’ empathetic behavior

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<sup>64</sup>John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Ch.-xxvii, vol-1 (New York, Dover, 1959), P.448-49

towards other animals including humans. As for example- one hungry rhesus monkey refused to electrically shock their fellow monkey, even when it meant getting food for them. Actually whenever any animal is faced into service of man, the suffering which it has to bear on that account is the concern of every one of us. Beside this sociability is also one of the important criteria of morality. In our everyday life we can noticed that when any non-human species lose his loved ones, they appear to feel grief.

Darwin's theory says that we are all related, not that we are all identical but every species has its unique adaptations. His theory also says that no divine intervention separates us humans from all the other creatures. As for him we all are machines, sea anemones, fish, dolphins, horses, golden retrievers, and bank managers. We are all machines designed by natural selection to solve the problems we confront in our daily lives to such degree that we find the time to raise healthy, viable offspring who are likely to have healthy children of their own. Human can also build meaningful relationship not only with humans but also with animals. That is why if it is unexpected for human beings to dying in painful way or killing for human purposes, then it is not justifiable for humans creating such an unnecessary death on animals.

In this chapter we begin by discussing how the moral status of animals has been understood by the thinkers who deny that animals do not have moral status. We have made some arguments in favour and against of the views given by different philosophers regarding the moral status of animals. As Kant suggests that we have no direct duties towards animals that we owe nothing to them. But we must recognize that we have some direct duties towards the animals, just as we have some duties directly to each human. Although we do not believe that we have a duty to save wild animals from predators, but we can think that we have some duties to the animals, both wild and domesticated. For example, if it is within our control to save

animals from drowning or other natural accidents, without great risk to ourselves, then we ought to do so. Similarly, we ought to try to save animals from human-caused accidents, such as when animals are under our cars. We also have a duty to protect animals from intentional killing or harm by human beings.

It can be said that if animals have right to life, then we have a duty to save animals from being killed by predators in the wild. However, it is absurd to think that we have a duty to stop predator from killing their prey, and therefore, it is absurd to think that animals have a right to life. In response, it can be argued that though we have no duty to save wild animals from their predators but it does not follow that animals do not have a right to life that is a right for not to be killed. This is because whether we have a duty to save another beings life in a given situation depends on a number of factors other than whether that being has a right to life. In fact there may be some cases in which we have to allow some humans to die, even when it is within our purview to save them, but this does not mean that those humans do not still have a right for not to be killed. Similarly, it can be said that in the case of predators we must allow wild animals to be killed because saving them on any large scale would have disastrous ecological consequences, but this does not mean that animals do not still have a right for not to be killed. We do have a number of duties to preserve both domesticated and wild animals lives, just not when doing so would result in ecological catastrophe.<sup>65</sup>

Even if we think that animals do not have rights and therefore, there may be nothing wrong in treating animals in which it would be wrong to treat humans, the fact remains that animals are mistreated and this mistreatment of animals raises questions that as individuals, what we should

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<sup>65</sup> Simons, A. 'Animals, Predators, the Right to Life, and the Duty to Save Lives Ethics & the Environment, 14(1), 2009, p.26.

do. So to understand the relation between species and morality here we may show one example. The old science-fiction story “The Teacher from Mars” by Eando Binder.<sup>66</sup> The main character is a Martian who has come to earth to teach in a school for boys. Because, he is “different”- seven feet tall, thin, with tentacles and leathery skin- he is taunted and abused by the students until he is almost driven out. After that however, an act of heroism makes the boys realize they have been doing wrong, and the story ends happily with the ring leader of the bullies vowing to mend his ways. The teacher from Mars is portrayed as being, psychologically exactly like a human, he is equally as intelligent and equally as sensitive, with just the same cares and interests as anyone else. The only difference is that he has a different kind of body. And obviously, that does not justify treating him with less respect. This example expected to draw the conclusion that although there are physical differences but that should make no moral difference either.

It has been suggested by some philosophers that species alone can make a difference in our moral duties towards a being. While reviewing Tom Regan’s *The Case for Animal Rights*<sup>67</sup>, Robert Nozick opines that perhaps it will turn out that the bare species characteristic of simply being human...will command special respect only from other humans - this is an instance of the general principle that the members of any species may legitimately give their fellows more weight than members of other species. Lions, too, if they were moral agents, could not then be criticized for putting other lions first.<sup>68</sup>

Regan, Singer, and Taylor soundly demonstrate that species is not a morally relevant criterion; any moral theory that draws distinctions based

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<sup>66</sup> The story is included in *My Best Science Fiction Story*, edited by Leo Marguiles and Oscar J. Friend (New York ; Pocket Books, 1954)

<sup>67</sup> Tom Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights* Berkeley; University of California Press, 1983.

<sup>68</sup> Robert Nozick, “About Mammals and People,” *The New York Times Book Review*, November 27, 1983, p.29. For a fuller discussion of Nozick’s arguments, please see *The End of Life; Euthanasia and Morality* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1986). Ch.4,

purely on species is untenable. We have already progressed beyond the days of Descartes, those who are “rational and honest” are obliged to consider the effects of actions on other species, just as we are obliged to consider the effects we have towards one another.<sup>69</sup> “Moral rules are species-neutral; the same rules that govern our treatment of humans should also govern our treatment of non-humans”.<sup>70</sup>

As a society we hold the moral ideal that all human beings are equally and morally considerable, regardless of wealth, age, employment, and appearance. So there is no generally accepted hierarchy for protecting and preserving human life in contemporary Western ethics. Due to the absence of any morally relevant distinction between humans and animals, the rejection of a hierarchy of moral standing among humans ought to be extended to other species. If infants and the brain dead are morally considerable, if their lives are to be protected and preserved, then consistency and impartiality require that the lives of each living entity that is not different in morally relevant ways also be protected all life forms. Pain and suffering are morally relevant. Causing pain and suffering to others is morally reprehensible when such suffering is not in their interest and when such suffering is avoidable.

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<sup>69</sup> Sprigge, T. L. S. “Metaphysics, Physicalism, and Animal Rights.” *Inquiry* 22 (1979); 101-43.

<sup>70</sup> Rachels, James. *Created from Animals; The Moral Implications of Darwinism*. Oxford ; Oxford University, 1990. P.208

### **CHAPTER-3**

#### **ANIMALS IN RESEARCH AND ANIMAL WELFARE**

The fact that animal research provides essential information that is of benefit to both humans and animals is well proven and current available vaccines, surgical procedures and treatments available.....support this argument. In many instances this information could not have been provided by any other method. - Institute for Animal Health, Compton Laboratory.

It is believed that the debate about research involving animals ranges broadly over two distinct questions. The first one asks whether animal research yields useful knowledge that could not be gained from other sources and the second one concerns whether it is morally acceptable for humans to use animals in ways that can cause animals harm. These two questions are in fact related: if it were the case that we learn nothing useful and distinctive from research that may harm animals, it would be difficult to see how, on any reasonable view, it could be morally justified. The question of scientific justification is therefore fundamental to the question of moral justification.

However, a positive answer to the scientific question does not settle the moral question, for it may be the case that an experiment that yields useful and relevant information is not ethically acceptable. We need therefore to consider from first principles the arguments in support of, and against, research involving animals. For the purpose further discussion, let us consider the principal ethical questions in the following manner.

- Provided there are substantial benefits associated with animal research, why should the use of animals require special justification?
- Can any use of animals by humans be justified? Which specific issues need to be considered in the case of research?
- What role does the unavailability of alternatives play in the justification of research involving animals?
- How does the justification of such research relate to the justification of other uses, such as food production?

- What is the appropriate role of regulation for research involving animals?

To respond each of these questions, we may consider commonly encountered arguments to bring clarity to the debate; to identify agreement where it exists; and to understand what lies behind remaining disagreement. We hope that this approach will be useful in enabling philosophers to make informed judgements about whether or not specific types of research can be justified.

According to the system of biological classification humans are within the animal kingdom and belong to the taxonomic group refer to as primates, it is more appropriate to use the term human animals and non-human animals in this context. However, the term animal is used to refer to non-human animals in this context. This use of the term animals should not be considered to imply differences between humans and animals in their ability to suffer or feel pain to an extent that keeps human beings apart from all other species .Also it should not be taken to imply differences in moral status. Moreover, one may say that animals are the kind of entity, who can feel pain, hunger, cold and fear and therefore they deserve our moral concern. We think that animal world is different from us and therefore meaningless, but this is unacceptable because animal world has its own meaning. Both humans and animals can express their interests, as want or desire that can be interpreted through their actions. Even many kinds of animals are social like human beings.

While human anatomy does make us unique in our ability to speak, not all humans do. For example, a new born baby, dumb person etc. Animals not only have a sense of justice, but also have a sense of empathy, forgiveness, trust and much more as well . Human beings are genetically different from animals but we may say that human beings are the member of

the species *Homo sapiens*, chimpanzees are closer to humans genetically and evolutionary process, as we have discussed in the second chapter.

Moral philosophy distinguishes between moral agents and moral patients. Moral agents are defined as those individuals who are capable of actions that they know are “right” or “wrong”. Moral agents are responsible for their actions and have certain obligations to treat others in certain ways. Moral adult humans are moral agents. But other individuals -including infants, the legally insane, people in a coma, or those mentally incompetent adults with severe disabilities such as retardation or dementia- cannot be held responsible for their “right” or “wrong” behaviour. These people are not moral agents, but moral patients. Say for example- a patient with Alzheimer’s disease is not morally responsible if he hits someone in a moment of confusion or agitation. Question may be raised that what about the animals? Can an animal be a moral agent? Most people realize that animals do not distinguish “right” from “wrong” from “good” from “bad”. When animals do something, human would call “nice”- but we cannot say that they know they are being nice. Similarly, when they do something we would call “bad”- it is not accurate to say that they are doing something “wrong”, because, they are unaware of the moral value of their behaviour. For these reasons philosophers refer animals as moral patients, not moral agents. If we agree that animals have rights , then as moral patients they have the right to receive certain kinds of treatment from us, including not punishing them for actions for which they are not responsible and providing them with medical care when they need it. That is why, whenever humans interfere in the lives of wild animals, it is important to determine whether these intrusions can be justified? Are they fair? Are they the right thing to do?

### **3.1 Why Animal Research?**

When human populations show explosive growth, it is other animals that suffer, and the entire ecosystems, species, populations and individuals too. The end is clear, animals lose when human interests come into conflict with animals interests. In addition, there are so many people whose demand for animal's products , medical needs and food requirements is rising rapidly.

The main focus of animal research is to improve the understanding of the process that determines cell differentiation during the early stages of embryonic development. Researchers used two different species in order to provide comparable information. Amphibian embryos were preferred to mammalian models such as the mouse because amphibians produce a large number of eggs that develop externally to the mother which are of a size that allows experimental reagents to be injected easily, and develop fairly and rapidly. This type of research was generally undertaken on embryos of the frogs, and the results gained from developmental studies on these frogs are considered to be readily transferable to mammals, including humans, as most of the basic developmental mechanisms have been highly conserved in evolution. Actually humans are very much one of animals and “they” are very much one of us. That is why researchers have compared proteins on the surface to human and chimpanzee's cells.

In modern times, we can see that each and every scientists agree with the view that animals have contributed to the development of life sciences and medicines over the past few centuries .It is quite natural that the health and welfare of human beings is the top priority of all governmental and health organizations around the world. Different types of pharmaceutical companies test their experimental medicines on animals before they are allowed to treat animals in humans and also the way of using animals to test the safety of consumer product is totally fearful. We can see in the

contemporary period every medical breakthrough in human and animal's health has been the direct result of research using animals. However, one may say that animals are used in experimental research mainly for the following three purposes:

- A) To develop pharmaceutical and other medical products
- B) To advance fundamental research in life sciences and
- C) To test the safety of potentially toxic products.

Thus, it can be said that animals suffer many of the same health problems as humans. We believe that non-human species have shorter life cycle than human beings and as a result they can be studied through their whole life span.

In fact, scientists think that studies on animals provide a better idea of what benefits and complications are likely to see in human beings. For example-the basic mechanism of heart disease have been studied on dogs, rats, rabbits, sheep and pigs and studies with dogs contributed to our most basic understandings of how to manage heart disease. The basic assumption of using animals in laboratories experiment is to stop some disease in humans. Say for example-a rabbit's sensory system may be studied in basic research. The rabbit may be used as a model for eye and skin irritation tests for environmental toxicity testing. Although these advances may be achieved by other means, but we don't know that how does our world will look like without animal research. Thus many studies on living animals, involving mainly mice and rats, have been conducted to examine the vertebrate immune system, and most current knowledge is based on this research. The immune systems of animals and humans protect them from infection. If the adaptive immune system is challenged by a particular infectious agent that it has previously overcome, it is able to do so on subsequent occasions much more quickly and effectively. Research on the adaptive immune system usually involves an initial immunisation of animals

with foreign (from another animal) biological molecular or cells or microorganisms such as bacteria. Immune responses are characterised by the production of immune cells and antibodies, which specifically recognise and help eliminate the foreign molecules, cells or microorganisms (all referred to as antigens). Experiments of this kind provided the first evidence that the cells responsible for adaptive immune responses were a class of white blood cells called lymphocytes. In these experiments rats or mice were irradiated with X-RAYS to kill most of their white blood cells, including lymphocytes, rendering them unable to make adaptive immune responses. When different cell types were transferred into these animals, only lymphocytes were found to reverse the deficiency. The welfare of the animals was usually affected because of increased susceptibility to infections, particularly in the gut, due to the destruction of the lining of mucosal cells caused by the irradiation. These infections were usually treated with antibiotics. In the first series of experiments of this kind, significant numbers of animals died, most likely due to diarrhoea. In general, it can be assumed that the experiments entailed at least some malaise for the animals involved.

Moreover, much of our knowledge about the functioning of the central nervous system has come from invasive animal experiments in which parts of the nervous system are electrically monitored, stimulated or destroyed. Many studies have been undertaken in primates, as the cerebral cortex, which is responsible for higher brain functions such as thought and speech, is very poorly developed in animals other than primates. Beside this, animals can also experience both physiological and psychological adverse states. These are intimately linked and dependent upon one another, as the physiological and behavioural response to stress affects a number of biological functions and systems. As for example- animals housed at artificially low temperatures will be under physiological stress as they expend energy to maintain their core body temperature by huddling together,

shivering and reducing the blood supply to the skin. If such stress is extreme or prolonged, substantial effort will be required to maintain a state of equilibrium. The animals may become aware of this effort and suffer as a result.

Alternatively, a social animal housed individually in a barren cage at an appropriate temperature, relative humidity and light level may not be under any immediate physiological stress but will probably experience psychological stress due to boredom and anxiety. This can lead to physiological changes such as alternations in heart rate and body temperature, and disturbed sleep patterns.<sup>71</sup>

We can find that the behavioural science of psychology focuses on understanding behaviour and mind in both human and non-human animals through research. This is called cognitive-behavioural research. For, modern psychology “the study of behaviour is a cornerstone of experimental psychology, shedding light on complex human emotions”. Thus, in psychology animals are commonly used as models for the human mind and behaviour, particularly for human conditions involving logical diseases. Animals are subjected to experiments on vision, hearing, hunger, reproduction drugs and so on. It can be said that research on animal behaviour and mind requires animals to be conscious and aware, and it may be considered that sometimes animal experiments are conducted with the high degree of pain and suffering. Some animals in captivity exhibit “stereotypic behaviours”. These are defined as repetitive, unvarying behaviours that appear to have no goal or function, such as recurring and excessive gnawing, pacing, circling or jumping. Animals tend to develop

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<sup>71</sup> Spani D. Arras M. König B and Rollick T (2003) Higher heart rate of laboratory mice housed individually vs in pairs *Lab Anim* 37 ;54-62

stereotypes as a result of an inadequate environment, stress, frustrations, or a reduction in social interactions.<sup>72</sup>

Question may be raised that as a rational human being is it morally justified or permissible to use animals as tools for any type of painful research? And also as a natural species is it morally justified hurting another natural species in many ways? Many animal welfare institutions tried to raise the morality of using animals in scientific research, suggesting that we need to change our attitude towards non-human species. As we know that approximately forty million animals are killed per year in order to produce far products. We may claim that it is a barbaric way of research. In the contemporary modern society humans are engaged in a serious debate about the rights and wrongs of animal use. According to the utilitarian's, laboratory animal researchers require to replace existing live-animals experiment with alternatives and have to reduce number of animals used, and also invented a new type of method that cause animals less sufferings. We may say that in a ethical debate over animal research the main conflict is usually between the pursuit of human benefits in the one hand and the animals interest in avoiding suffering on the other.

Thus there is an ongoing debate about the morality of animal experiment. We can only say that all these painful experiments are executed because the pain and joy of others cannot be directly experienced by us.

### **3.2 The controversy on animal research:**

It is a fact that human beings have different relationships with animals. They are the source of our pleasure in companions in natural environment, wild life, but they are also extensively used for food, clothing, transport, sports, racing, and hunting. Sometimes animals are killed when they come into conflict with humans. The relationship between human and animals

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<sup>72</sup> Rodent Refinement Working Party (1998) Refining rodent husbandary ; the mouse *Lab Anim* 32; 233-59

differ in terms of the benefit they bring to humans and their effects on the welfare of animals.

The term “research” is used in a broader sense encompassing experiments undertaken in basic and applied research as well as for the purpose of toxicity testing. Anthropological studies suggest that the main difference between human and other primates is a consequence of certain environmental influences. The distinctively human abilities to speak and read are necessarily made possible by our genotype, but they only develop when the appropriate environmental conditions are present. So the emergence of humanity was probably cultural rather than biologically determined. We think that we are treating other living beings differently merely because they are not humans.

Debate about research on animals is not new .Animals have been used in basic and applied research for more than 2000 years ago. Each and every scientist agrees with the view that animals have contributed to the development of life sciences and medicines over the past few centuries. In ancient Greek period, natural philosophers and physicians wanted to increase their knowledge about the way in which complex organisms such as humans and animals function.<sup>73</sup> Most of the historians in medicine argue that many fundamental and early discoveries in physiology were derived from studying animals. If we look to the past, we can find that the Catholics forbade human autopsy. Animals are used as primary physiological and anatomical models.<sup>74</sup> In view of the biological similarities between human and other animals scientists assumed that many findings about specific mechanisms or processes in animals could be applied to humans. Thus we can't deny that many discoveries were possible only by using animals as

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<sup>73</sup> Rupke NA, edit. (1987), *Vivisection in Historical Perspective* (London and New York Croon-Helm)

<sup>74</sup> Hill RB and Anderson RE (1988) *The Autopsy –Medical Practice and Public Policy* (London Butterworth)

models for research. These evidence includes William Harvey's demonstration of blood circulation in 1628, and Stephen Hale's measurement of blood pressure in 1733.<sup>75</sup>

However during 19th century, there was a dramatic increase in scientific exploration in Britain and elsewhere, Physician Marshall Hall wrote that “unhappily...the subjects of animal physiology are sentient and every experiments is attended by pain and suffering.”<sup>76</sup> Moreover, the study of animals developed in medical school across Europe during the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, became complex and invasive. Researchers sometimes used un-anaesthetised living animals as part of their research. For example, in the 17<sup>th</sup> century physician Robert Boyle demonstrated respiration to interested audiences by placing an animal in a bell jar, which was then depleted of air by a pump, causing the animal suffocate.<sup>77</sup> During this period, many people were concerned about animal suffering. They thought that lack of respect for animals would corrupt human mind. Thus, Thomas Percival quoted “cruelty...will steal your heart and every generous principle of your nature will be subverted.”<sup>78</sup>

From the 1970s onwards, ethical issues raised by animal research receiving increasing attention in academic discussion, and a number of influential contributions were made to the debate. In 1975, Richard Ryder published *Victims of Science* in which he mentioned the term “speciesism” to link the treatment of animals in the forms of unjustified discrimination,

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<sup>75</sup> Rhodes p (1985) *An Outline of the History of Medicine* (London Butterworth)

<sup>76</sup> Dunlop RH and William DJ (1996) Bioethics ,Animal Experimentation and Sentience in *Veterinary Medicine An Illustrated History* Chap-32,

<sup>77</sup> Thomas K (1996) *Man and the Natural World, Changing attitudes in England 1500-1800* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

<sup>78</sup> Shakespeare's *Cymbeline* Act 1, scene 5: ‘your highness shall from this practice but make hard your heart’ : Dunlop RH and William DJ (1996) Bioethics , animal experimentation and sentience,

in *Veterinary Medicine: An illustrated history* (St. Louis MO: Mosby), chapter-32 •

such as racism and sexism.<sup>79</sup> Peter Singer in *Animal Liberation*, Singer argued that the suffering of many animals should be given equal consideration to the suffering of most humans. He also wrote that the best course of action is the one that has the best consequences, considering the interest of all those who are affected by the decision to do something or not to do something. We can say that Singer argued from an utilitarian perspectives, which is not accepted by all those who opposed animal research. But an utilitarian may argue that it is all right to use one million mice for cancer research to save only a single human life, because the worth of mice is less than the benefit of it gives a human who is under treatment. So a major problem with utilitarianism is how to calculate cost and benefit?

Some utilitarian accept animal experiments when there are no alternatives as long as we do our level best to prevent animal suffering. Others, like Singer, demand for higher human benefit, would prefer to see nearly all such experiments to be abolished. So what all utilitarians agree on however is the methodological precept that ethical decisions in animal research require us to balance the harm we do to laboratory animals against the benefits we derive for humans and other animals. This precept actually express the notion that we can work out what is ethical by trading off one set of interests against another which is precisely denied by advocates of animal rights. The attribution of rights to animals allows us to insist that some ways of treating animals are basically unacceptable, because many people disapprove or the benefits secured are too small. Tom Regan and other adherents of the animal rights view have argued for an wholesale abolition of animal-based research. An experiment will cause only minor harm to the animals it involves, not that this experiment is of extraordinary importance to humanity at large. The only thing that matters is that when an

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<sup>79</sup> Ryder, R (1975/1983) *Victims of Science :The use of Animals in Research* (London :Open Gate Press)

animal is used for an experiment it is treated as a mere means to an end. This being so, animal experimentation should cease.

An important idea related to animal rights is the principle of fairness. The key point here is that what matters is not only the sum of positive and negative consequences, as claimed by the utilitarian approach, but the distribution of these consequences between individuals. As for example; when animals are used in research involving pain, it may be considered fair and therefore better, that a large number of animals suffer a small and bearable amount of pain than it is that a few animals suffer severe pain- even if the sum of pain is assumed to be larger in the first case. Thus moderate rights advocates will probably want to prohibit the experiment so that the level of suffering is not visited on animals by us. Utilitarian's may not object to the experiment, because they think that on balance the benefits will probably outweigh the suffering imposed on animals.

The use of rats as models of arthritis might be a relevant illustration. This model is created using injection of collagen, a substance from bone joints that causes a form of autoimmune arthritis to develop. Attempts have been made to alleviate the pain of the rat with painkillers. However, since all available painkillers also directly or indirectly, have anti-inflammatory effects, their use may lead to undesirable interference with the research. It seems then reasonable to expect that the rats used to test potential drugs for arthritis may suffer pain similar to that endure by human arthritis patients. Question may be raised that does the scientific use of animals lead to valid, useful and relevant results in specific area? And is it permissible for one species to cause pain, suffering, and death to another to achieve aim?

Our human capacity of empathy, which we often use successfully when we judge dispositions or moods of other humans in specific situations. Since we would feel pain on being exposed to boiling water and would rapidly retract an exposed body part, it could seem reasonable to assume that

an animal that shows a similar reaction on being exposed to boiling water would feel a similar kind of pain. So by using empathy and methodological observation, many humans believe that they can assess accurately the dispositions and needs of animals.

In this context, one may ask, how can we get “inside the mind” of an animal to be sure that behaviours which we perceive as signs of pain or suffering truly reflect these states? And how sure can we that an animal which appears to be behaving normally is not in a state of pain or suffering? Philosophically, these and more general questions have been discussed under the title of “Philosophy of Mind”. Thus the most radical and sceptical approach to assess the dispositions of animals can be found in the 17<sup>th</sup> century philosophy of Descartes and Malebranche. So, based on a dualistic conception of mind and body which in their view only applied to humans, they took the view that all animals were mere mechanistic automations as we have already mentioned in the second chapter. Descartes who had himself spent much time experimenting on animals, argued that animals lack a soul, which he believed was required for higher cognitive capacities such as self-consciousness and the experience of pain and suffering. While animals were seen as capable of registering physical sensations, and reacting to them in different ways, Descartes suggested us that the process were not accompanied by conscious experience, claiming that animals which appeared to be in distress were really just “mechanical robots that could give... a realistic illusion of agony.”<sup>80</sup>

Thus the philosophical and scientific basis for such views was later revised. Voltaire, commenting on his contemporary Descartes, observed, “Answer me, mechanist, has nature arranged all the means of feeling in this animal, so that it may not feel? Many people found Voltaire’s view more plausible. Thus, the acceptance over the past century of Darwin’s theory that

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<sup>80</sup> Thomas D (2005) “Laboratory animals and the art of empathy” *J Med Ethics*, 31; 197-202

humans stand in an evolutionary continuum with other animals has further undermined the view that humans are in biological terms a radically distinct species, with exclusive capacities and dispositions. Therefore, no serious contemporary philosopher argues that all animals are mere machines.

### **3.3 How cruel is research on animals:**

According to some psychologists, whenever, we place a glass of milk on the breakfast table, we are actually “drinking pain”. Female dairy cows are forced to have a calf every year and are milked during seven of their nine months of pregnancy. This is extremely demanding on their bodies and on their psychological states. These dairy cows are literally milk machines, and they are not allowed to be mothers, to care for the young whom they have brought into the world. These babies are also deprived of their mother’s nurturing. These calves, who were bred by humans so that their mothers would keep producing more milk for the dairy industry, end up being slaughtered to produce the luxury meat called veal. The life of every non-human species inside a locked closet hasn’t any control over their own life. They can’t choose when and what to eat, and even they can’t decide that when the light of their life will go on and off. Can we imagine about spending our whole life inside a locked closet though we do not commit any crime?

The answer may be of course we can’t live like a prisoner, but the life of animals for research is just like this. Of course, it is a kind of deprivation, isolation, and misery. Animals in laboratories are usually injected with diseases that they never normally faced. Tiny mice grow tumours as large as their own body. Kittens are purposely blinded, rats are made to suffer seizures and primates skulls are cut open and electrodes are implanted in them. After enduring these terrifying, painful procedures animals are then usually dumped back into a cage without any painkillers. Video footage from inside the laboratories reveals that how fearful activities are happened with non-

human beings. That is why Samuel Butler once wrote that “a hen is only an eggs way of making another egg”. And to emphasize the business- like attitude of poultry firm Haley adds “the object of producing eggs is to make money. When we forget this objective, we have forgotten what it is all about”<sup>81</sup>

Usually, after experiments animals are burned, cut addiction to drugs and given fatal diseases often with no anaesthesia. In various experiments, primates are deprived of food and water for up to 23 hours a day, are bound at the waist and neck in “restraints chairs” for up to 104 hours in a row, are subjected to electric shocks, electrodes, and other devices surgically attached and implanted. Generally we may think that research involving animals will contribute significant role for gaining present and future knowledge, which may lead to the protection and improvement of the health and welfare of either humans or animals. But in this situation question may be raised that as a rational human being is it morally justified of using animals as tools for painful research? And also as a natural species is it morally justifiable to hurt another natural species in such a way.

Approximately one third of all research involving animals is undertaken by the pharmaceutical industry to develop new treatments for a wide range of human diseases. The breeding of animals under cages handling them for experiments and sacrificing their lives are violating the species specific life. The lives of factory and farmed animals are run only for economic profit. The animal welfare institute reported that elephants do not live in captivity due to poor living conditions, neglect, loneliness, and depression. In modern times animals are subjected to experiments on vision, hearing, hunger, reproduction, drugs and so on. Once an experiments is completed researchers just euthanize animals for limiting the suffering of animals when they were unable to eat or drink without assistance. Humans

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<sup>81</sup> *Poultry Tribune*, January 1974.

have a duty to treat sick people as well as save lives of people and animals. In order to do so, they must improve their knowledge of biology and veterinary medicine. That is why human carries out animal research where there are no other appropriate investigational methods.

On basis of the above mentioned views one may claim that animal research does not require further justification. But there are also some people who assert that the use for harmful purposes of one species by another without consent is fundamentally unethical. But those who disagree assert that there are many significant research questions which can only be answered by using animals. Thus, we may say that continuities in the form of behavioural, anatomical, physiological similarities provide sufficient grounds for the hypothesis that animals can be useful models to study specific aspects of biological processes in humans. Some people who support animal research may argue that it is a natural behaviour of every human being to obtain knowledge through methodological enquiry and hence for this all research activities hold its own significant intrinsic value, but on the other hand, some people thought that if animals were so, like humans that result from animal experiments were valid for humans, then these similarities made it unethical to use animals for experimentation.

For an animal lover, to be a good citizen implies respect to the neighbours, pets, and be tolerant, honest, modest and do deeds which set good examples to our children, family, and society. Animal moralist sometimes feels that scientists are quite irresponsible towards future generations. By adopting extreme moralistic standard animal activists look at animal researchers as cruel and corrupt. We can say that the fundamental pragmatic value of biomedical enquiry for both humans and other animals is to relief the suffering for both humans and animals. "If possible, relieve suffering" is the fundamental motto of all. Biomedical researchers and relief of human suffering is the basic aim of all.

### **3.4 Affect of research on Human and Animals?**

We have already discussed that how animals are used to understand basic biology, as models for studying human biology and diseases and as test subjects for the development and testing of drugs, vaccines, and other biological experiments to improve and advance human health. Let us try to focus on the issue that how does animal experimentation affect on human beings as well as animal community.

Scientists often believed that there are structural and psychological similarities between human being and animals. They believe that we share similar biological processes and the data obtained from an animal model can be extrapolated and applied to human conditions. But sometimes we can see the using of an animal model is often a critical factor for determining that whether or not the expected scientific and medical benefits are secured. It has been pointed that sometimes the suitable animal models and the appropriate use of them are crucial in improving the success rate of pharmaceutical drug development. We know that different types of medicines are developed in the present for humans by using pet animals, farm animals and wild life. Modern diagnostic technologies such as ultrasound, MRI, and CT Scans are transforming the nature of veterinary medicine. Veterinarians today can diagnose and remove delicate brain tumours, help difficulties in pregnancies and correct birth defects. Moreover, we may say that reproduction technology aids both humans and animals.

During the Persian Gulf War new techniques were researched on dogs to replace expected limb loss and are now being used to treat severe osteoarthritis. But molecular biology and genetics show that animals and humans differ in profoundly important ways. Animal models will never be able to recapitulate accuracy that happens in human condition, because people in general have a longer life, expectancies than most non-human species. Generally, diseases that develop in people differ in significant ways

from artificially imposed symptoms in animals that have been genetically engineered. Researchers thought that animals can accurately predict human response is false, even scientists are aware of the inherent flaws that come with using animals as models of human disease. They recognize that no animal model can recapitulate the human condition. Sometimes, drugs that may be effective on animals may not be safe or effective in humans, and also there are many examples where reliance on animal models has to be misleading. Say for example, the widely used antibiotic, penicillin on animal testing revealed that penicillin was ineffective at treating injected rabbits. While discussing HIV/AIDS, cancer, heart disease, there are numerous examples where animal models were not predictive. Because of these reasons Dr Richard Klausner, former Director of the National Cancer Institute, once wrote that, “we have cured cancer in mice for decades and it simply didn’t work in humans”.<sup>82</sup> Thousands of chimpanzees have been used in useless experiment to find a cure for AIDS, but it is now known that while it kill humans, won’t kill chimpanzees. We may find that, time and time ,again animal experiments have failed when their results have been safely – effects including death in people. In 2006, the British medical association announced that at least 250,000 people are hospitalised every year as a result of adverse drug reactions. One may claim that animals testing are a failure to protect people’s life. Furthermore, due to shorter life span of laboratory animals it is difficult to identify the side-effects of drugs those are slow to develop.

So far as the discussion goes on ,it is not clear to us that how much we are benefited from animals. But the question remains how should we treat them? We think that the use of animals in research and testing is strictly controlled. In modern times, researchers realise that use of animals is a

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<sup>82</sup> Cimon M, ET AL. (1998) “cancer drugs face long road from mice to men”. Los Angeles Times, May 6, 1998, P.A1

privilege, and those animals that are helping us unlock the mysteries of disease, deserve our respect and the best possible care. And as a result, different types of laws were passed for protecting animals from being used as a research model. The EEC Directive on Experimental Animal Protection Regulation in Vivo Research was passed in 1986. As a result the standard median lethal dose test (LD50) introduced by John .W. Trevan in 1927 was revised in view of it being considered inhuman as it caused animals to die in pain and suffering.<sup>83</sup> From the above discussion we may say that the way of experiencing pain, grief, anxiety, and stress to these sentient beings are relevantly similar to humans. We all know that horrible death involves terror and it is unexpected for human beings dying in pain. Thus, it is a debatable issue for researchers creating painful death on non-human animals.

Apart from this debate, many people wants to know whether animals are conscious. Are they truly aware of their surroundings? If being conscious means only perceiving the things around, with their senses then animals are obviously conscious at least on a perceptual level. Thus, there are different degrees of consciousness. In addition to perceptual consciousness, there is also what some call a higher degree of consciousness, namely self-consciousness, an awareness of who are in the world. In various experiments, research reveals the fact that a few species apart from humans can recognize themselves in mirrors, which reflects some degree of self-awareness. This, self-directed behaviour suggests us that apes and monkeys might have a sense of their own bodies, that this is “me”. So, it is important to keep in mind that animals use different senses than we do and that visual cues are not the only ones used in self-awareness.

According to the popular view, those animals who are conscious and aware of their pleasure and pain are said to be sentient. In other words,

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<sup>83</sup> Halina Kowalska-Pylka, Wojciech Cybulski “Animal and ethics- An outline of the main ethical approaches to animals” Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, University of Agriculture, Lubin, Poland.

sentience means being responsive to sense impressions. Even though their own perceptual experience and the way they sense the world around them are usually very different from ours, they can still be conscious in their own ways and also experience pain and suffering in their own ways. Their own pain and suffering are no less important than our pain and suffering. So, sentience is an important feature to consider when we make decisions about how to use animals because ,sentient animals experience pain, and just like human they do not like it.

When a lobster, is dropped alive into boiling water, how can we claim whether it feels terrible pain the way a person would under similar circumstances? Thus, a major problem in this debate over which animals truly feel pain is that many animals may not experience pain exactly the way we do. Different animals might have more tolerance in certain situations and less in others. Because a lobster is not like us, some people think lobster do not feel pain, because their pain is not similar to our pain. However, there are differences between species and it is wrong to assume that animals like dogs, cats, birds and lobster behave just as humans do in painful situation. We don't do many things in the ways that other animals do, and there is no reason to think that we will all feel pain or respond to it in the same way.<sup>84</sup> Different species differ in many ways, including how they perceive and feel pain and how they react to it. Although it is true that a lobster cannot scream and pull itself out of the boiling water, but that doesn't mean that it isn't being tortured. Fish have nerves similar to those that are associated with the perception of pain in other animals. Fishs show responses to painful stimuli that resemble those of other animals, including humans.<sup>85</sup> Even some animals without backbones such as insects seem to experience pain and also

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<sup>84</sup> Bekoff Marc, *Animals Matter*, Shambhala Boston & London, 2007, P.69

<sup>85</sup> [www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn3673](http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn3673)

possess nerve cells that are associated with the feeling of pain in animals with backbones such as humans and other mammals.

### **3.5 Laws on Animal Research:**

Every country regulates different types of legislations which protect animals from being subjected to experiments. Question may be raised here that what these laws do? These laws are just promoting researchers to limit or seek alternatives to the use of animals. Thus, the primary aim of these laws is to limit unnecessary suffering of animals in experiments. But the animal welfare position holds that there is nothing inherently wrong with using animals for human purposes, such as food, clothing, entertainment, and research. But that it should be done in such a way that it minimizes unnecessary pain and suffering. Some people argued that research involving animals needs moral justifications. According to Descartes, animals were not sentient or capable of suffering pain or distress. That is why we may easily use animals for research. In this context, there is a debate between two groups of people. One group argues that the value of any life is such that it would be wrong deliberately to take life for any purpose, even for the saving of a greater number of human lives, and other group argues that if humans find value in research involving animals, then it requires no further ethical justification.

The legal offence of animal cruelty was first introduced in an act to prevent the cruel and improper treatment of cattle's passed in 1822. This act states that "if any person or process having the charge, care, or custody of any horse, cow, ox, heifer, steer, sheep or other cattle, the property of any other person or persons shall wantonly beat, of any other person or persons shall wantonly beat, abuse or ill-treat any such animal, such individuals shall brought before a justice of the court of law. In addition to this, we may assert that, legislations were established to regulate the way in which animals were treated in specific circumstances. This includes the cruelty to

animals Act in 1876. It introduces the requirement of personal licenses for those undertaking research and a system of inspection, or experimentation.

Thus the above discussion describes different aspects of the national and international regulatory framework governing research involving animals. We have also focused on legislation for the protection of animals. Through this discussion we have tried to show that these legislations should be viewed from an ethical perspective. We may say that sociability is one of the important criteria of morality. Humans can build a meaningful relationship not only with humans but also with animals. Then why should humans use animals for harmful research? Although different types of laws regulate protection of animals from being used in research, but in every country law permit medical experimentation on animals, while in some countries a particular kind law regulates animals from experimented.

The goal of animal experimentation law seems much more reasonable if one accepts that research on animals is both important for medical progress and also morally permissible. However, it is very difficult to say that what kind of research would be acceptable from moral perspective. As for example, the role of chimpanzees in the development of a test to identify hepatitis-c contaminated blood products had a major impact on decreasing human morbidity. Such research would not currently be permissible in the U.K. We may say that research on animals is morally unacceptable because in some cases we can see that animals can be used to produce result that benefits other animals. For example- research may seek to develop a vaccine for cattle. In that case animals are forcefully used to experience a range of negative welfare without their consent. Thus we have to seek the way in which we can able to avoid the harmful use of animals. Some people may argue that replacement is the only ethically acceptable ethical solution, but there is also some type of research that cannot be replaced. As for example- the harmful studies to understand the basic biological progress, behaviour,

and evolution of animals for the sake of advancing knowledge. The problem with these experiments is that such research cannot be undertaken on humans, but about the animal organism. We can say that non-harmful and purely observational research on animals in natural environment could be permissible. Sometimes, it is assumed that if a powerful alien come to earth and demanded an end to all animal research, otherwise all humans would be killed. then we need to think that human creativity would very quickly develop to seek alternative method, which may replace animal experiments.

Whenever any animal is faced for the service of man, the suffering which it has to bear on that account are the concern of everyone , and also whenever we injure life of any kind we must be clear as to whether this is necessary or not. PETA argues that 90% of medicines testing on animals fail on animals. It is the fundamental problem of experimenting on different species as well as the ethical concerns that stop further testing on animals. Most animals are killed at the end of experiments. That is why a world in which the important benefits of such research could be achieved without causing pain, suffering, distress, lasting harm to death to animals involved in research must be the ultimate goal. In the contemporary period, researchers have a strong motivation to use alternatives for animal models whenever possible. Forward thinking companies are already exploring modern alternatives. Finally, we strongly believe that unnecessary animal testing need to be banned, because animal testing is basically unethical, immoral.

### **3.6 Prohibition of using animals means respect towards animals:**

During the Second World War, pigeon plays the role of messengers and flies with a message for the soldiers. On the way, the pigeon was severely injured and did the job properly which saved the life of around 200 soldiers.<sup>86</sup> The job of the pigeon proves that animals have some kind of responsibility but not similar with the responsibilities of humans. They are

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<sup>86</sup> Wynne Clive D.L *Do Animals Think ?* Princeton University Press 2004, P-139-141

just like us; they can breathe, eat, sleep, give birth to young and feed their young as human beings do. We need to say that animals are born to be free and enjoy discovering the world and helping people, so why do we harm animals? Is it right to interfere the freedom or the life of animals just because we undertake animal research?

We know that animals are being used as good research models for a variety of reasons, but PETA argues that as 90% of medicines testing on animals fails on animals. It is the fundamental problem of experimenting on different species as well as the ethical concern that we should stop any further testing. That is why a world in which the important benefits of such research could be achieved without causing pain, suffering, distress lasting harm or death to animals involved in research must be the ultimate goal.

It is a fact that different types of laws are regulated for research involving animals which we have already discussed in our previous section. Inspire of these animals are deliberately killed or used in many research laboratory, factories, and other different fields. Some people argued that the primary reasons given for using animals in research is to ensure scientific progress in basic and applied biological and medical science. Some people argue that the value of any life is such that it would be wrong deliberately to take life for any purpose, even for the saving of a greater number of human lives. This can be called the view that life has absolute value. On the other hand, some are of view that human life is much more important than the comfort and lives of laboratory animals, and that view clearly supports the experiment on animals. They assume that a laboratory mouse does not have any absolute value of life.

In modern times, researchers have strong intentions to use alternatives to animal models whenever possible. In case of research an alternative means an alternative method that does not involve using an animal. Recently the term 'alternative' has been used to all of the Three Rs

as an overarching term referring to any procedure that reduces the harm caused to animals in experiments, not only by replacing them (replacement), but also by reducing the numbers used which is called Reduction or by causing less animal suffering known as Refinement. Sometimes animals will suffer needlessly in research especially where scientific methodology is poor. In such cases researchers does not achieves their scientific goal and also fails to generate significant knowledge. That is why the application of the Three Rs should begin. In this connection the House of Lords Select Committee reported that-

‘We are not, however, persuaded that enough effort is always made to avoid the use of animals. We are similarly not persuaded that where this is possible, sufficient effort is always made to minimise the number of animals used, and to minimise the pain and suffering inflicted on each animal.’<sup>87</sup>

Let us discuss Replacement, Reduction and Refinement

### **3.6.1 Replacement Reduction & Refinement:**

Replacement means the substitution for conscious living higher animals of insentient materials. Replacement process is a highly a desirable goal for reducing animal experimentation. Some pointed that the use of alternatives to animals is a legal requirement in the UK, and that alternatives are always used whenever they are available. Some have argued that large amounts of money are spent on the search for alternatives. Generally, animal experiments are carried out for going an answer for specific scientific questions and the term replacement is used to encompass methods that permit a given scientific purpose to be achieved without conducting experiments or other scientific procedures on living animals.<sup>88</sup> In complete replacement method of animals, an alternative method should not require any animal-derived biological material. Say for example- mathematical and

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<sup>87</sup> House of Lords Select Committee (2002) *Animals in Scientific Procedures* (Norwich ;TSO).

<sup>88</sup> Balls M (1994) Replacement of Animal Procedures ,*Alternatives in Research, education and testing Lab Anim* 28: 193-211: Balls M (2002) Future improvements : replacement in vitro methods *ILAR J* 43, Supplement : 569-73: Gad SC (2000) Alternatives to in vivo studies in toxicology, in *General and Applied Toxicology*, Vol. 1 , 2<sup>nd</sup> ed, Ballantyne B, Marrs TC and Syversen T (Editors) (London: Nature), pp 401-24.

computer studies of biological process, analysis of epidemiological data, research involving human participants or research on isolated human cells and tissues in culture.

There are some scientific barriers to developing reliable non-human methods that can alter the complex integrated physiological systems of human and other animals. Thus for the researchers it is extremely difficult to using computational systems because of the following reasons-

- Firstly, the diversity of different tissues and cell types that make up a living organism, hundred of different cell types at various stages of development may function and respond in different ways.
- Secondly, the ways in which cells and tissues interact, both locally and via the bloodstream and nervous system, immune reactions germ cell development, metabolism and many other normal and disease-related processes involve extensive interaction between cells of different types and in various locations in the body.
- Finally , the influence of tissue organisation on the cellular environment, oxygen levels, rate of nutrient supply, intercellular communication and barrier formation all affect how cells behave and respond to external stimuli.

Reduction means reduction in the number of animals used to obtain information of a given amount and refinement means any decrease in the severity of inhuman procedures applied to those animals which still have to be used.<sup>89</sup> Russell and Burch initially defined reduction as “reduction in the numbers of animals used to obtain information of a given amount and

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<sup>89</sup> William Russell Rex Burch, *The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique* (1959 ) Chap-2

precision. More recently this definition has been developed to state the use of fewer animals in each experiment without compromising animal welfare.<sup>90</sup> These two approaches have a special relevance for assuring us that numbers of animals those are used in a specific research are reduced as soon as possible. These three RS are probably the easiest process to reduce the suffering of all types of animal use. In animal studies that involve harm to animals, the use of fewer animals will normally cut as it were collective animal suffering. That is the primary ethical motivation for reduction.<sup>91</sup> But reduction may also have an reverse impact. Using too few animals to produce meaningful results is an unethical as using more animals than necessary.<sup>92</sup> Thus many animal studies use too few animals to provide reliable data<sup>93</sup>. Such studies cause harm without benefits and involve poor use of resources.

Furthermore, there has been arises a conflict between reduction and refinement because lowering the total number of animals used will sometimes place a greater burden on each animal that continues to be used. As for example- if a given quantity of plasma can be obtained by bleeding the same animal several times instead of bleeding several animal once, can we say that we would make the world a better place by doing the former.<sup>94</sup>

Refinement urges people to minimize any pain or suffering that will be caused by amending experimental procedures. So experiments can be refined in many ways. The most direct way is to adapt experimental

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<sup>90</sup> Festing MF(1994) Reduction Animal Use: Experimental Design Quality of Experiments *Lab Animlas* 28;212-21; Festing MFW, Baumans V, Combes RD, et al. (1998). Reducing the use of laboratory animals in biomedical research ; Problems and possible solutions *ATLA* 26; 283-301

<sup>91</sup> Even in animal studies that do not involve harm, reduction may still be thought valuable; an animal rights advocate, for example, might welcome the fact that fewer animals are being used as means to an end.

<sup>92</sup> Nevalainen, T. " Training for Reduction in Laboratory Animal Use". *Alla-Alternatives to Laboratory Animals* 32, no. Supplement 2 (2004) ; P.65-67

<sup>93</sup> Sena, E,H.B. van der Worp, D. Howells, and M. Macleod. "How Can We Improve the Pre-Clinical Development of Drugs forstroke?" *Trends in Neurosciences* 30, no.9(2007) ; 433-39

<sup>94</sup> Hansen, A K, P Sande, O Svendsen, B Forsman, and P Thomsen. "The Need to Refine the Notion of Reduction." Paper presented at the Humane Endpoints in Animal Experiments for Biomedical Research, 1999.

procedures so that they cause less pain or distress. Furthermore, in some experiments appropriate anaesthesia analgesia can play a vital role in pain management.<sup>95</sup>

In spite of these, the majority of researchers who use animals consider that, despite progress in the implementation of the three RS, animal research will remain an essential part of their work. Moreover, the current regulatory frameworks for approval of chemical products and medicines require tests involving animals. Members of the research community who use animals in their work frequently refer to evidence from opinion polls to support their claim that most people support research on animals because of the benefits to humans. They thought that more information on the benefits of research involving animals would help engender further support from the public.

### **3.7 Conclusive Remarks:**

Animal research has had a vital role in many scientific and medical advances of the past century and continues to aid our understanding of various diseases. Throughout the world, people enjoy a better quality of life because of these advances, and the subsequent development of new medicines and treatments - all made possible by animal research. However, the use of animals in scientific and medical research has been a subject of heated debate for many years. Opponents to any kind of animal research - including both animal rights extremists and anti-vivisectionist groups - believe that animal experimentation is cruel and unnecessary, regardless of its purpose or benefit. There is no middle ground for these groups; they want the immediate and total abolition of all animal research. If they succeed, it would have enormous and severe consequences for scientific research.

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<sup>95</sup> Morton, DB. "Experimental Procedures ; General Principles and Recommendations." *In The Welfare of Laboratory Animals*, edited by E Kaliste. Dordrecht, The Netherlands ; Springer, 2007.

No responsible scientist wants to use animals or cause them unnecessary suffering if it can be avoided, and therefore scientists accept controls on the use of animals in research. More generally, the bioscience community accepts that animals should be used for research only within an ethical framework.

Despite the inherent limitations of some non-animal tests, they are still useful for pre-screening compounds before the animal-testing stage, which would therefore reduce rather than replace the number of animals used. An example of this is the Ames test, which uses strains of the bacterium *Salmonella typhimurium* to determine whether chemicals cause mutations in cellular DNA. This and other tests are already widely used as pre-screens to partly replace rodent testing for cancer-causing compounds. Unfortunately, the *in vitro* tests can produce false results, and tend to be used more to understand the processes of mutagenicity and carcinogenicity than to replace animal assays. However, there are moves to replace the standard mouse carcinogenicity assay with other animal-based tests that cause less suffering because they use fewer animals and do not take as long. This has already been achieved in tests for acute oral toxicity, where the LD50 - the median lethal dose of a substance - has largely been replaced by the Fixed Dose Procedure, which was developed, validated and promoted between 1984 and 1989 by a worldwide collaboration, headed by scientists at the British Toxicological Society, UK.

Although animals cannot yet be completely replaced, it is important that researchers maximize reduction and refinement. Sometimes this is achieved relatively easily by improving animal husbandry and housing, for example, by enriching their environment. These simple measures within the laboratory aim to satisfy the physiological and behavioural needs of the animals and therefore maintain their well-being.

Another important factor is refining the experimental procedures themselves, and refining the management of pain. An assessment of the method of administration, the effects of the substance on the animal, and the amount of handling and restraint required should all be considered. Furthermore, careful handling of the animals, and administration of appropriate anesthetics and analgesics during the experiment, can help to reduce any pain experienced by the animals. This culture of care is achieved not only through strict regulations but also by ensuring that animal technicians and other workers understand and adopt such regulations. Therefore, adequate training is an important aspect of the refinement of animal research, and should continually be reviewed and improved.

In conclusion, we can say that the use of animals in research can be ethically and morally justified. The benefits of animal research have been enormous and it would have severe consequences for public health and medical research if it were abandoned. Nevertheless, the use of the 3Rs is crucial to continuously reduce the number and suffering of animals in research. Furthermore, a good regulatory regime - as found in some countries - can help to reduce further the number of animals used. Therefore, we support a healthy and continued debate on the use of animals in research. We recognize that those who oppose animal experimentation should be free to voice their opinions democratically, and we look forward to constructive discussion in the future with organizations that share the middle ground with us.

Many people hope that animal pain isn't really so bad. Michael Pollan, for example, thinks that human pain might differ from animal pain "by an order of magnitude." Citing Daniel Dennett, he suggests that we distinguish pain, which a great many animals obviously experience, and suffering, which depends on a degree of self-consciousness only a handful of animals appear to command. Suffering in this view is not just lots of pain

but pain amplified by distinctly human emotions such as regret, self-pity, shame, humiliation, and dread.<sup>24</sup> According to this argument, animals don't really suffer, because their pain isn't amplified by such emotions as regret, self-pity, shame, humiliation, and dread. This argument, however, is unsound. Imagine that a human being has twisted her ankle and is now on the ground, writhing in agony. She's trapped in a world of pain, waiting for it to end. But she doesn't blame herself for the pain, nor does she fear for her future. Her pain is *not* "amplified by distinctly human emotions such as regret, self-pity, shame, humiliation, and dread." Her pain just hurts like hell. This example proves that pain can be very, very bad even if it's not "amplified by distinctly human emotions." If castrating a pig without anesthesia causes the pig *that* type of pain, then that's enough for arguments.

The remaining question is whether intense pain deserves the name *suffering*, if it hasn't been amplified by distinctly human emotions. Let us consider the woman who has twisted her ankle and is racked by pain. Does she suffer? She is certainly in a horrible state, and anyone who could end her pain has a strong moral reason to do so. Given those facts, we would say that she suffers. If someone else wants to use the word 'suffering' differently, so be it. Instead of asking whether industrial farming has caused more suffering than the volcano, we can ask whether industrial farming has caused more agony, or more intense pain, than the volcano. And the answer would be the same: industrial farming has caused five thousand times more agony, or intense pain, than the volcano. Thus, we may conclude that it is unrealistic to assume that all experiments on animals end within a short span. Therefore, it is very crucial to create a climate in which the necessity and justification for using animals is assessed and discussed fairly, and with respect for all the views.

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<sup>24</sup> Michael Pollan, *The Omnivore's Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals* (U.S.A.: Penguin Books, 2006), p. 316.



## **CHAPTER-4**

### **VEGETARIANISM AND LIVING WELL**

#### **4.1 Introduction:**

Vegetarianism represents a philosophy and way of living which seeks to exclude - as far as possible and practicable - all forms of exploitation of, and cruelty to, other animals for food, clothing or any other purpose; and promotes the development and use of animal-free alternatives for the benefit of humans, other animals and the environment. In dietary terms, veganism means doing away with all products derived wholly or partly from other animals. It also means not wearing animal skins and fur (leather, feather, fur, wool and silk), or using products that have been tested on animals. Unfortunately, all medicines have been tested on other animals due to regulatory requirements, and it may be hard to avoid them at times or to find alternatives for some medical treatments.

The term vegetarianism is used to describe a diet that excludes the flesh of animals, has a long, complex and often tumultuous history. Many of the world's religions and philosophies have praised it as the ideal diet, but vegetarians have also been condemned and killed for their refusal to eat meat. The choice to eat or not eat flesh foods has typically reflected deeply ingrained philosophical and religious beliefs. Foremost among these has been the idea of human kinship with the nonhuman world. While the underlying motives for vegetarianism differ widely throughout different cultures and historical periods, certain themes predominate. These include: the idea of transmigration of souls, compassion for nonhuman animals, asceticism, purification of the body and soul, health benefits, the dehumanizing effects of meat-eating, environmental considerations, and the unnaturalness of eating flesh foods. Some of the additional underlying themes include the association of meat with class, caste, and gender, which will be discussed in this chapter.

In a narrow sense, vegetarianism is interpreted as the practice of abstaining from the consumption of meat, it may also include abstain from by-products of animal slaughter. Vegetarianism can be adopted for many reasons. The term vegetarianism was coined in 1847 by the founders of the vegetarian society of Great Britain. Doctors who are experts in nutrition suggested people that vegetarian diet significantly decreases the risk of cancer and diabetes. Thus vegetarianism involves a question about the quality of human life and about the way in which humans should treat non-human animal.

#### **4.2 Definition:**

Most of the world's populations have usually eaten a predominantly plant-based diet. The word "vegetarian" however, is generally reserved for the self-conscious decision to abstain from flesh foods, based upon philosophical, ethical, metaphysical, scientific, or nutritional beliefs. The term first appeared in the 1840s and was derived from the root word vegetus, signifying the idea of "whole and vital." Although the word refers to those who abstain from eating flesh, there is disagreement about what constitutes flesh, and some people who call themselves vegetarian consume chicken and fish. Most vegetarians, however, believe that the term should be retained for those who avoid all forms of animal flesh. The most common types of vegetarian are: lacto-ovo vegetarians, who include eggs and dairy products in their diet; lacto vegetarians, who include milk; ovo-vegetarians, who include eggs; vegans, who exclude all animal products; natural hygienists, who eat a non-processed, plant-based diet; raw fooders, who eat only raw foods; and fruitarians, who eat only fruit. We will discuss about these varieties in detail in this chapter.

### 4.3 Origins of vegetarian thought-

In India, millions of Hindus are vegetarian because of their religious beliefs. The Yoga system of living and health is vegetarian because its dietary practices are based on the belief that healthy food contains *prāṇa*. *Prāṇa* is the universal life energy which Yoga experts believe is abundant in fresh fruits, grains, nuts and vegetables, but absent in meat because meat is produced by killing. The way in which we should live falls in the realm of ethics .vegetarianism is a moral issue because ethics involves a nature of happiness and that's why health issue is related to one's happiness as well. Medical doctors who are experts in nutrition suggested us that vegetarian diet significantly decreases the risk of cancer and diabetes, among other diseases and negative health condition. Vegetarianism also involves a question about the way in which we should treat non - human animals.

Vegetarianism has two major philosophical roots in the ancient world, Jainism in the East and Pythagoreanism in the West. Both schools of thought arose in the sixth century BCE at approximately the same time, and scholars continue to speculate on the cross-fertilization of ideas between the East and West. The Jains' notion of *ahimsā* refers to the desire not to cause injury to other living beings and the concomitant idea of compassion for all living beings. Jains argue that all life goes through a series of incarnations, with the highest incarnation belonging to humans who have attained enlightenment or *nirvāṇa*. By eating flesh foods humans attract negative *karma* to their soul (*jīva*), and impede their chances of attaining enlightenment. They also risk dining on their next of kin from a previous life. Jains believe that one can only contact the god within by conquering the "animal passions" that lead one to acts of violence and self-indulgence, including the eating of flesh foods. Vegetarianism dammed the practice of animal sacrifice, intimately connected to meat-eating in the ancient world. Buddhism also contains the ideas of *ahimsā*, transmigration of souls and

compassion for animals. Buddhism helped to spread vegetarianism throughout Asia, and influenced the development of a strong vegetarian tradition in Hinduism.

#### **4.3.1 Origins in the West**

Pythagoras is regarded as the greatest influence on vegetarian thought in the Western world. The Pythagorean sect was founded at the end of the sixth century BCE in Croton, Italy, in Magna Grecia. The basic precepts of Pythagoras's school included a refusal to eat meat or to offer blood sacrifice. Pythagoras believed that the human soul could transmigrate to humans or other animals after death but the ultimate goal was to free the soul from the earthly rounds of existence to reunite with its divine origins. This was accomplished through a series of strict, ascetic rules for purifying the body. Most of the modern arguments against meat eating can be found among Ancient Greek as well as Roman philosophers. Plutarch (c. 350-433 BCE) believed that this "barbaric vice" was unnatural for humans and engendered violence. Other ancient philosophers who advocated vegetarianism include Theophrastus (360-287 BCE), Empedocles (c. 495-c. 435 BCE), and Porphyry, who made one of the first ecological defenses of vegetarianism. According to Porphyry it was not necessary to kill animals to curb the problem of animal overpopulation, since nature would find a balance by itself.

#### **4.3.2 Early Jewish and Christian:**

There were several early Jewish Christian sects that are believed to have adhered to a strict vegetarian diet. Among these were the Essenes, the Ebionites, and the Azoreans, considered by many to be the first Christians. The early ascetic Jewish Christian sects were a minority tradition in the first century ancient world. Nonetheless, scholars have argued that Jesus counted among their numbers and was himself a vegetarian. The early Church fathers believed that meat was a powerful sexual stimulant, so it was appropriate for

those in holy orders to refrain from eating it in order to curb their sexual desires. However, abstaining from meat was acceptable only as part of a practical exercise in subduing the "animal passions." From the third to the thirteenth century the Church engaged in a vigorous campaign against a number of heretical Gnostic sects. Ranging from the Balkans in the Byzantine Empire to Southern France, they included the Manicheans, Cathars, Paulicians, Montanists, Massilians, Apostolics, and Bogomils. The refusal to eat meat was viewed by Church authorities as evidence of heresy.

#### **4.3.3 Middle Ages to Renaissance:**

Support for vegetarianism went into a long dormancy during the middle Ages. In the early Renaissance, due to late thirteenth century food shortages, the vast majority of the population, particularly the poor, ate primarily vegetarian food. It was at this time that the emphasis on meat-eating as desirable and necessary for one's health became an article of faith, particularly for men. A small number of dissidents protested against cruelty to animals and meat-eating, including Sir Thomas More who blended concern over animal suffering with the first environmental critique of the large amounts of land used to produce meat. Other dissidents included Erasmus (1467-1536), Montaigne (1533-1592), and Leonardo Da Vinci (1452-1519), although Da Vinci was the only one of the three to become vegetarian.

#### **4.3.4 Seventeenth Century: Cartesian Thought**

In the seventeenth century, Rene Descartes developed the Christian belief that animals lacked souls or spirit with devastating consequences for nonhuman animals. He contended that since animals lacked spirit, and hence the capacity to understand, they could not feel pain. Their anguished cries were in all probability merely mechanical responses. Cartesian philosophy sanctioned the widespread practice of vivisection in the seventeenth century

as well as the confinement of animals on factory farms. Despite this setback to the status of nonhuman animals, the seventeenth century simultaneously witnessed the growth of a greater sensitivity to nonhuman animals. Ironically, this was due in part to animal studies, which showed the structural similarities of their nervous systems to those of humans, suggesting the commonality in their experience of pain. In addition, as the threat from nature receded, people began to have greater empathy for nonhuman animals. Most advocates for vegetarianism, one of the foremost advocates for vegetarianism of his age, still framed their calls for compassion in religious terms. Other proponents of vegetarianism during the seventeenth century include John Ray, John Evelyn, and Margaret Cavendish, duchess of Newcastle.

#### **4.3.5 Eighteenth to Nineteenth Century**

The eighteenth century gave rise to humanist philosophy and to the notion of natural rights, based on the belief in the inherent dignity of humans. Due in part to Evangelical religion's emphasis on concern for the oppressed, and the Lockean idea of human beings' innate capacity for benevolence, there was an increasing sensitivity to animal suffering. As the century progressed, public attention began to focus upon a wide range of social issues, including prison reform, child welfare, care for the poor, sick, and elderly as well as opposition to slavery. A growing number of people viewed concern for nonhuman animals as a logical extension of these social movements. While compassion for nonhuman animals was the foremost concern of these animal advocates, they also pointed to the harmful effects of meat-eating on human moral character. Joseph Ritson (1752-1803), John Oswald (1730-1793), Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792-1822), and JeanJacques Rousseau (1712-1778) all linked meat-eating with inter-human violence, including war. The emphasis on the harmful effects of meat-eating on human moral and spiritual character continued into the nineteenth century.

There was an increased focus, however, on the wrongfulness of animal suffering in and of itself. Acknowledging the moral significance of animal suffering was an integral part of Jeremy Bentham's (1748-1832) utilitarian theory. According to Bentham, "the question is not, can they reason?, Nor can they talk? But, can they suffer?". Arguments for vegetarianism were also increasingly being linked to land use practices. As a result of the enclosures, the common land was being seized by rich land owners who were using it to grow fodder crops to feed their cattle. The philosopher and priest, William Paley (1743- 1805), Shelley, and Dr. William Alcott (1798-1859) all inveighed against the inefficiency of feeding fodder to animals instead of directly to human beings.

**Food Reform Movement** The food reform movement began in Germany in the 1820s and 1830s as a reaction to the growing ties between the food industry and science and technology. In the 1830s, vegetarians became a vocal minority Vegetarianism within the radical wing of the food reform movement. Many of the food reformers, including Sylvester Graham (1794- 1851), Bircher-Benner (1867-1939), and John Harvey Kellogg (1852-1943), combined health and ethical arguments, focusing on the purifying effect, both spiritual and physical, of a vegetarian diet. Meat-eating was typically condemned for its over-stimulating effect. Indeed for Graham, stimulation was the root of all disease. Meat-eating was also linked to overindulgence in sex. Kellogg maintained that meat-eating caused undue pressure on the male organ and that vegetarianism was the cure. The success of the food reform movement and the vegetarian cause is largely attributable to the support of women. Some of these women included Catherine Harriet Beecher Stowe (1800-1878) and Harriet Beecher Stowe (1811-1896) in the U.S., and Luise Otto-Peters (1819-1895) and Lina Morgenstern (1830-1909) in Germany. A number of feminists promoted vegetarianism, often connecting it with the themes of peace and non-violence. The contemporary author Carol Adams sees in their writings the

beginning of a feminist, vegetarian, pacifist tradition. Some of these women include Charlotte Despard (1844-1939), Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1860-1935) and Agnes Ryan (1878-1954), and Susan B. Anthony (1820-1906) as well as the theosophists Annie Besant (1847-1933) and Anna Kingsford (1846-1888).

#### **4.3.6 The Social Movement for Vegetarianism**

In the middle of the nineteenth century, in Germany, the Netherlands, England and the U.S., the vegetarian cause began to coalesce as a social movement. The first secular vegetarian society in England was formed in 1847 at Ramsgate. At that time the term vegetarian replaced the more common Pythagorean as the official word for someone who abstained from flesh foods. In 1850, William Metcalfe founded a similar organization in New York, The American Vegetarian. Support for vegetarianism in the mid-nineteenth century was fueled, in part, by the findings of evolutionary science, which had begun to demonstrate the similarities between human and nonhuman animals. With the publication of Charles Darwin's (1809-1882) *Descent of Man* in 1871, the privileged position of humans was further eroded. The humane movement developed from the belief that if human beings were, in fact, superior it behoved them to act civilized by controlling their "animal passions" and practicing benevolence to animals. Although most members of the humane movement were not vegetarian, some of the most vocal activists were, including Bernard Shaw (1856-1950), the philanthropist Lewis Gompertz, Anna Kingsford and the author and social reformer Henry S. Salt (1851-1939). Salt's writings had a wide-ranging impact, including on Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi was inspired by the connections Salt made between animal rights and social justice, to move beyond his previous traditional Hindu vegetarianism which sees vegetarianism as a movement for the moral and spiritual progress of the human race. Gandhi's conversion to ethical vegetarianism illustrates the

cross-fertilization of ideas between East and West that characterizes much of the modern vegetarian movement. Gandhiji; went on to influence millions of Hindus to adopt vegetarianism. Eastern thought, in turn, has had a profound influence on vegetarianism in the West. The influence of Hinduism and Buddhism on theosophy was an important factor in theosophy's endorsement of vegetarianism. The influx of eastern ideas that began in the 1960s also had a large influence on the adoption of vegetarianism. The *Bhakti* movement in Hinduism, in particular, had a profound impact in the west through their dispensing of free vegetarian food.

#### **4.3.7 The Modern Vegetarian Movement:**

Vegetarianism was largely eclipsed by the two world wars. A number of factors contributed to its increased acceptance in the post-war years. Beginning in the 1920s, there had been a growing appreciation for the benefits of vegetables and fruits due to the discovery of vitamins. Additional studies in the 1950s, including research on the Seventh Day Adventists, confirmed the health benefits of a vegetarian diet. In the 1970s, many people also became concerned over the purity of food, and in particular meat. Concerns focused on the effects of pesticides, chemicals, and bacterial contamination, all of which are found in greater concentrations in meat. People became additionally worried about the purity of meat as a result of the outbreak of BSE (mad cow disease) and foot-and mouth disease in England and Europe.

The publicity and popularity surrounding these outbreaks served to educate people about the contents of the food fed to farm animals, including sludge, carcasses, and the excrement of other animals, thereby providing people with additional incentive to adopt a vegetarian diet. A number of health studies in the 1980s and 1990s also helped to fuel interest in vegetarianism, including the China Health Project directed by Cornell professor of nutrition namely, Colin Campbell. Campbell's cross-cultural

research involves 10,000 people in the U.S. and China concluded that human beings are not anatomically designed to eat meat, and that there is an inverse correlation between the amounts of animal products that one eats and the benefits that accrue to one's health.

Dean Ornish, a physician first published his research in 1983 in *Stress, Diet and Heart*, also demonstrated that arterial sclerosis could be reversed through a vegetarian diet. The growth of the animal advocacy movement in the U.S. and England in the 1970s also helped to advance the vegetarian cause. In the previous centuries, vegetarians tended to focus on the cruelty inherent in the slaughter of innocent beings. The modern animal advocacy movement, in addition, has called attention to the conditions in which animals live throughout their lives, promoting vegetarianism as a means of protesting this treatment. Significant influences on the development of vegetarianism in the animal advocacy movement include Peter Singer's utilitarian arguments for the equal consideration of the interests of both humans and nonhumans, Tom Regan's case for the "inherent worth" of animals, and the writings of Carol Adams as well as the literature of Feminists for Animal Rights, which underline the commonalities in meat dominance and male dominance. Veganism also developed increasing support in the 1980s and 1990s. Rejection of dairy products had begun in the nineteenth century, but it was not until 1944 that the first Vegan Society was formed in Leicester, England.

#### **4.4 Vegetarianism and the Environment:**

In the beginning of 1970s, ecological arguments also became an important motive for many people to adopt a vegetarian diet. In *Diet for a Small Planet*, published in 1971, Frances Moore Lappe<sup>96</sup> criticized the inefficiency of a meat-based diet, arguing that only a small proportion of the

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<sup>96</sup> Frances Moore Lappe, *Diet for a Small Planet*, first edition, 1971, Tenth Anniversary Edition, New York ; Ballantine Books, 1982, .

nutrients that are fed to nonhuman animals return to humans as nutrients. Moore contended that in 1968 the amount of edible protein that was wasted by America's animal based diet was equivalent to the world protein shortage. *Diet for a Small Planet* provided a major impetus for people to either cut back on or eliminate meat from their diets.

In the following two decades, numerous articles and books advanced similar environmental critiques of a meat-based diet, including Jeremy Rifkin's *Beyond Beef*, Howard Lyman's *Mad Cowboy*, and John Robins's *Diet for a New America and the Food Revolution*. These authors highlighted the link between animal agriculture and a host of environmental problems: soil and water depletion, desertification, air and water pollution, global warming, the waste of valuable grain resources, and the destruction of the tropical rain forests. Current estimates are that ninety percent of all agricultural land, more than one half the total land area of the U.S., is devoted to the production of animal products. Cattle now occupy seventy percent of range land in the American west and are a major contributor to both agricultural runoff and desertification. Beef production is also a major factor in the destruction of half the tropical rain forest of southern Mexico and Central America. Animal agriculture has also been blamed as a major contributor to global warming. Greenhouse gases are produced from grain fertilizers and from the methane released from animals. American waterways are equally threatened.

According to the Environmental Protection Agency, animal waste poses a greater threat to American waterways than all other industrial sources combined. In a 1999 report by the Union of Concerned Scientists, meat eating is cited, along with driving automobiles, as one of the two most damaging lifestyle factors contributing to environmental destruction. Not all environmentalists believe that meat-eating and animal agriculture are inherently harmful to the environment. Advocates for mixed farming and

biodynamic farming argue that some use of animals on small-scale farms is necessary, due to the usefulness of their manure for fertilizing the soil. A number of environmentalists also support meat-eating as long as the meat is "organic" and the animals are raised "humanely." While studies show that the number of people adopting vegetarianism has been slowly increasing throughout most of the Western world, vegetarianism has not followed a steadily uphill course. Meat-eating has actually increased throughout the world. Consumption of chicken has also sharply risen, in part because of concerns over the purity of beef.

In the West, the rise in meat consumption has been attributed to the proliferation of fast food restaurants, and in the East and developing world to the desire to imitate Western society's affluent lifestyle, symbolized by meat. Studies vary around the world as to the number of Vegetarianism people who are currently vegetarian, ranging from a low of 0.2 percent in Poland to a high of 4.4 percent in the Netherlands. In the U.S. estimates range from a low of 0.3 percent to a high of 7 percent of the population. The higher numbers generally represent people who claim to be vegetarian but who sometimes eat meat, including fish. Most studies suggest that women have been, cross-culturally and throughout history, about seventy percent of vegetarians. In *Meat: A Natural Symbol* Nicke Fiddes suggests that meat has functioned throughout history as a means of asserting human dominance over the natural world. By eating nonhuman animals, humans show their superiority over the "lower" animals. Both religious vegetarians as well as those motivated by health have at times demonstrated the reverse side of this phenomenon. Rather than dominating the external environment, some vegetarians (and perhaps mostly men) have sought to tame the "beast within" as a means of attaining a physical or spiritual purity. The modern vegetarian movement is part of a long continuous history. Although compassion for nonhuman animals and environmental concerns are parts of

this history, they have moved to the fore in recent years. The modern vegetarian movement deviates from the past, however, in focusing less on self-denial and ritual purity and more on the idea of embracing vegetarianism as a positive ethical choice.

Thus Peter Singer observed that “there would be environmental benefits from ending factory farming, which is energy intensive and leads to problems in disposing of the huge quantities of animal wastes which it concentrate on one site”.<sup>97</sup> He is actually concerned about the environmental harm that resulting from factory-farming animals on land which could be put to other agriculture uses for humans. As for him “if a calf, say, grazes on rough pasture land that grows only grass and could not be planted with corn or any other crop that provides food edible by human beings, the result will be a net gain of protein for human beings, the result will be a net gain of protein for human beings, since the grown calf provides us with protein that we cannot yet- extract economically from grass.”<sup>98</sup> In fact, Frances Moore Lappe, in her book *Diet for a Small Planet*, suggested that, going without meat is to going to help the starving people in the world.

From environmental perspective, we can see that livestock are one of the most serious causes of environmental harm, and livestock production and meat eating are at odd with sustainable development. On the contrary, plant agriculture and vegetarian diets are sustainable, environmentally pleasant practices. That is why it is ecologically beneficial to boycott livestock by adopting a vegetarian diet.

#### **4.5 Vegetarianism and Feminism:**

There is an intimate connection between vegetarianism and feminism and between male dominance and meat eating. According to Carol J Adams, “to talk about eliminating meat is to talk about displacing one aspect of male

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<sup>97</sup> Peter Singer, “Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism,” *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, Vol.9, No.4 (1980) p.334.

<sup>98</sup> Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation* (New York; Avon Books, revised 1990 edition ), p.164

control and demonstrates the way in which animals oppression and women's oppression are linked together".<sup>99</sup> Adams claims that it is overtly acknowledged when we hear those men and specially soldiers, athletes, and other "working men" need meat to be stronger and when wives report that they could give up meat, but prepare it for their husbands who insist on it. According to the ancient Greek myths, Zesus, the patriarch of patriarchs, desires Métis, chases her, coaxes her to a couch with "honeyed words", subdues her, rapes her, and then swallows her, but he claims that he receives her counsel from his belly, where she remains. This myth collapses together sexual violence against women and meat-eating and exhibits the masculine consumption of female language.<sup>100</sup>

In societies with animal-based economics, men hunt and control meat distribution, thus promoting economic and social power typically used to dominate woman. Whereas societies with plant-based economics in which women gather vegetables tend to be egalitarian since woman gain an essential economic and social role without abusing it.<sup>101</sup> Hegel wrote the difference between men and women is like that between animals and plants. Men correspond to animals, while women correspond to plants because their development is more placid<sup>102</sup>. That is why we think that vegetarianism acts as a sign of autonomous "female being" and signals a rejection of male control and violence. Originally *men* were a generic term for all humans, and *meat* was a generic term for all solid foods. But meat no longer means all food, and men no longer includes woman. Today, meat represents the essence or principal part of something, whereas vegetable represents passivity and monotonous existence. Colloquially, vegetable is a synonym

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<sup>99</sup> Carol J Adamas ,*The Sexual Politics of Meat: A feminist Vegetarian Critical Theory* New York Continuum ,1990

<sup>100</sup> Carol J Adamas ,*The Sexual Politics of Meat: A feminist Vegetarian Critical Theory* New York Continuum ,1990 P.15

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid*, p.35

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid*, p.37

for a person severely brain-damaged or comatose. “To vegetate is to lead a passive existence, just as to be feminine is to lead a passive existence.”<sup>103</sup> Advocates for vegetarianism have sought to reform meat eaters through rational arguments. Behind this attempt lies a faith in the ability of reason to enforce a moral obligation to be vegetarian. However, the arguments for why someone should be vegetarian may have little to do with the actual factors that influence people to adopt vegetarianism.

Feminism and vegetarianism have been intimately intertwined both as movements and as philosophies for many years. Feminists typically have condemned all forms of domination and have expressed compassion for the downtrodden. Nonhuman animals, including the animals living on farms, have often been on the receiving end of this compassion. In spite of the support for vegetarianism among many feminists, there has also been a countervailing trend. Feminism was an outgrowth of the European Enlightenment, which subscribed to the idea of a dualism between humans and the rest of nature. In the Enlightenment worldview, human beings alone are made in the image of God and endowed with reason, setting them apart from the rest of the natural world. Progress, thus, is predicated upon severing one’s ties to the nonhuman world. The demand not to be treated like animals was a common rallying cry among early feminists. Underlying this idea is the notion that the exploitation of rational beings (namely humans) is morally wrong whereas the exploitation of nonhuman animals is not.

Thus, we may say that the basic gist of Adam’s feminist argument from *Sexual Politics* is that since meat is a symbol of patriarchal oppression, domination, and violence perpetrated against both nonhuman animals and

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<sup>103</sup> Adams mistakenly says the word is *venetus*, which actually means sea-blue (as the color of one of the circus factions), instead of *venetus*, meaning a hunt or animals caught in hunting, i.e. game. *The Oxford Latin Dictionary*, edited by P.G.W. Glare, Fascicle V (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1976). P.36

women, vegetarianism represents an explicit rejection of our “Meat is King”<sup>104</sup> which is a patriarchal culture. Adams opines:

“Meat is King” this noun describing meat is a noun denoting male power. Vegetables a generic term meat eaters use for all food that are not meat, have become as associated with woman as meat is with men, recalling on a subconscious level the days of woman the Gatherer. Since women have been made subsidiary in a male-dominated, meat-eating world, so has our food. The foods associated with second-class protein. Just as it is thought a woman cannot make it on her own, so we think that vegetables cannot make a meal on their own, despite the fact that meat is only secondhand vegetables and vegetables provide, on the average, more than twice the vitamins and minerals of meat. Meat is upheld as a powerful, irreplaceable, item of food. The message is clear; the vassal vegetable should content itself with its assigned place and not attempt to dethrone king meat. After all how can one enthrone women’s foods when women cannot be king? (Carol J. Adams, *The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory*)

Therefore, meat’s recognizable message is closely associated with the male role in our patriarchal, meat-advocating cultural discourse, and so the oppression of women and the other animals is interdependent.<sup>105</sup> So, the advocates for vegetarianism have sought to reform meat eaters through rational arguments. Behind this attempt lies a faith in the ability of reason to enforce a moral obligation to be vegetarian. However, the arguments for why someone should be vegetarian may have little to do with the actual factors that influence people to adopt vegetarianism.

For the feminists non-human animals are living beings seeking life and freedom, and avoiding harm and danger. In every ‘livestock system’, no matter how high the welfare standards are supposed to be, non-human animals will suffer. The Five Freedoms, frequently used to measure welfare, will never be met completely. They include the freedom:

- from hunger, thirst and malnutrition;
- from pain, injury and disease;

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<sup>104</sup> Carol J. Adams, *The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory* New York: Continuum, 1990, p.16

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid* p.16

- from discomfort;
- from fear and distress;
- To express natural behavior.

However, some of Adam's ideas such as "the end justifies the means", "objection of other beings is a necessary part of life" and "violence can and should be masked", as "patriarchal attitudes" are highly suspicious. For example, Gandhi and Martin Luther King both were pacifists, but that would not make pacifism a "patriarchal attitude". Therefore, it can be said that, if the Feminist argument from Sexual Politics were the only argument for vegetarianism, it might not sway the hardened skeptic who could object that there is no logically necessary connection between meat eating and patriarchy. Yet, we can say that Adam's argument retain in interesting degree of plausibility in its own right, and it adds another rhetorical dimension to accumulate the ways of vegetarianism.

#### **4.6 Why is Vegetarianism a Moral Issue?**

What exactly is moral status? At its most general level, to have status, standing, or to be a subject is to have membership within a community. Let us consider the concepts of educational status and religious status. One's status in each of these areas is dependent upon the nature of the relevant institution. Given the nature of educational institutions, someone who is enrolled in a school may be said to have standing as a student, while someone who is not enrolled may lack standing altogether or possess a different kind of standing. Similarly, an atheist, under certain conceptions of what it means to be religious, will not have standing in religious bodies because he does not share a belief in the divine. Those within a community will often be subject to and enjoy certain rights, rules, and regulations that are relevant to the goals of that community. For instance, students in a school have the right to learn in a safe and distraction-free environment. At the same time, they are subject to rules regarding dress code, attendance, and

homework. Depending on the community, not all members of the community may share the same amount of standing (teachers and religious figureheads, for example, will have higher standing than students and laypersons). Hence, status within a community may come in degrees of significance.

Some philosophers think that the aim of moral theory is to systematize our common moral intuitions. Like the scientific theories the scientist matches the observed data, so like the ethical theories the moral philosophers match the data of moral convictions. When we apply utilitarianism to the issue of how should we treat animals, one vital point comes out immediately. Utilitarianism in its classical form aims at minimizing pain and maximizing pleasure. Many non-human animals experience pain and pleasure; therefore they are morally significant entities. They have moral standing. In this respect, they are like humans and unlike rocks. The principle of utility in utilitarianism gives animals' moral standing and gives their interest equal weight with the like interest of humans. This principle of utility also lies in the consequences of denying animal's equal moral standing.

Humans do not need meat for a healthy diet, sentient beings have a serious interest for not to be suffered. Thus humans have only a trivial interest in meat. Therefore, we ought neither to participate in morally wrong practices. Historically many moral philosophers have either denied animals moral standing altogether or discounts their interests because they are not human. For example –Moore, and recently, John Rawls has denied animals a place in history of justice, arguing that we owe justice only to those who have the concept of justice except that we owe it to infant humans.<sup>106</sup>. If someone abstains from eating meat because of test or financial status, then

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<sup>106</sup> *Animal Liberation*, chap.5. Rawls discussion is in Section 77 of *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge,MA ; Harvard University Press, 1971)

there is no moral or philosophical question to be raised but when a vegetarian attempts to persuade others that they should adopt vegetarian diet then it requires philosophical attention. A vegetarian might argue a number of ways morally to the rearing and killing of animals for the human table. The vegetarian in this sense does not merely require us to change or justify our eating habits, but to consider our attitude and behaviors towards members of other species.

There are two approaches a vegetarian might take in arguing that rearing and killing animals for food is morally offensive. He might argue that eating animals is morally bad, because of the pain inflicted on animals in killing them to be eaten, or he could object to the killing itself. Thus vegetarians need to be tolerant if they want to convert others into vegetarians. We need to preserve them either as respected fellow-workers or simply as companions in the joy of life and friendship. In many societies controversy and debate were raised over the ethics of eating animals. Robert Nozick<sup>107</sup> and Peter Singer<sup>108</sup> have recently advocated not eating meat on moral grounds.. Eating animal flesh may arise different types of moral questions. If we accept that animals have rights then killing animals for food is morally wrong. An animal is raised for food is being used by others rather than being respected for itself. In philosophical term, it is being treated as a means to human ends not as an end-in-itself.

When we ask “what is morality” the answer is that moral behavior means acting in a way which is fair to all. This means we need to extend the same rules to all. Also, we need not harm others simply because of our own gain. We can see that some peoples who are omnivorous don’t usually claim that animals aren’t morally important. In fact, they focus on our relationship

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<sup>107</sup> Robert Nozick, *Anarchy , State and Utopia* (New York, basic books 1947) p. 35-42, Singer, P. *Animal Liberation* New York Review Books, April-5, 1973, P.24, *Animal Liberation* (New York Review Books, 1975).

<sup>108</sup> Singer P. “*Animal Liberation* “ New York Review Books, April-5 1973, P.24,

with those animals which are usually consumed for food. They argue that right kind of relationship with animals is necessary for, or at least contributes to a meaningful life. The relationship involves caring for the animals, seeing they are well-treated during their lives.

#### **4.7 Why be a Vegetarian?**

One may ask, why be a vegetarian? To respond, one may say that a vegetarian would not be willing to kill an animal for his gain, but this does not really explain the reason for becoming a vegetarian. Morality is something to be aspired to, rather than as a fundamentally selfish tool that keep society functioning. Justification for eating meat means to disregard morality or moral behavior towards animals. From moral perspective, vegetarianism may be understood as the view that due to some moral principles, one ought not to eat certain edible animals and animal products. Say for example- suppose someone marooned on a desert island inhabited by edible birds, and suppose there is no edible plant life on the island and that person have a gun. In this situation, for the non-vegetarian the choice is easy, but what about the vegetarians? They can choose the path of non-vegetarians because, a bird's life is less valuable than one's own. But suppose that instead of birds the island is inhabited by some humans. Then in this situation is it morally permissible to kill some people and eat them? Naturally, it would be wrong to kill a human being and those who accept vegetarianism on moral grounds, it would also be wrong to kill and eat a bird for them. From utilitarian perspective, both Singer and Regan appealed for the moral consideration for animals. Singer tried to reduce the pain and suffering of animals<sup>109</sup> and Tom Regan suggested respecting animals as being with inherent value is equal to our own.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> Singer P. *Animal Liberation* (New York ; Avon Books, revised edition 1990) and *Practical Ethics* (Cambridge University Press, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition 1993)

<sup>110</sup> Tom Regan." The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism", *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.5, No.2 (October 1975) 181-214 and *The Case for Animal Rights* (Berkeley ; University of California Press, 1983)

#### **4.7.1 Peter Singer's Argument**

Singer argues that the interest of every sentient being that is affected by an action ought to be taken into account and give the same weight as like interests of any other sentient being. He thought that sentient beings have a serious interest is not being made to suffer. So for him, practices which inflict suffering on sentient beings without good reason are morally wrong. Therefore, we ought neither to participate in, nor perpetuate morally wrong practices. Actually, Singer's utilitarian contention is that through vegetarianism, decrease in the demand for factory farmed meat will reduce animal suffering.

#### **4.7.2 Tom Regan's Argument**

Regan thought that all beings with inherent value have equal inherent value, and a right to be treated respectfully. All moral agents have a duty to respect the rights of all such beings. Regan granted that, utilitarianism pre-supposes the principle of "equality of interests". The principle of equality of interests merely makes it explicit that because the principle of utility is the sole basis of morality, no other principle will limit the application of the principle of utility, or affect the way in which it operates. Regan claims that utilitarianism does not provide adequate grounds for the obligation to be a vegetarian. Actually he thought that the commitment to vegetarianism is so strong that he will prepare to abandon any ethical theory which is unable to produce the judgment that it is wrong to eat animals.

One could reply to Singer and Regan that their arguments would not prohibit eating nonhuman animals that have been accidentally killed by automobiles on the highway or that have died "natural" deaths from old age. Hud Hudson wrote that, "even if we accept Regan's argument, we have no moral reason to regard the eating of some portion of a factory-farmed animal, which has fallen off a carelessly driven delivery truck and into our

hands, never to be paid for and never to be missed during inventory, as morally impermissible.”<sup>111</sup>

Thus, a common criticism of the utilitarian argument for vegetarianism is that so long as farm animals experience a greater balance of pleasure over pain while they exist, then breeding them into existence, treating them on balance decently, and then killing and eating them to increase the gustatory utility of meat eaters, yields greater net utility than a vegetarian world devoid of all farm animals.<sup>112</sup> One could also object that this argument fails to include the loss of utility that would have accrued from the balance of the farm animals lives had they not been slaughtered. Yet this objection can be countered by the “replaceability argument” discussed by Singer. If one is sympathetic to Regan’s view that animals have inherent value, then one can reject the very idea that animal lives are “replaceable” at all.

We can find that Regan’s position is more appealing than Singer. It is wrong that animals as our resources to create, manipulate, slaughter, consume and replace in the name of maximizing the utility of the class of sentient beings. The fact is that, today farm animals are the product of dozens of years of selective breeding by humans; these animals are sentient artifacts that humans have manufactured for illegitimate purpose. That is why battery chickens and grain-fed steers have less inherent value than bald eagles and grizzly bears.<sup>113</sup> Beside this another criticism of the utilitarianism argument is that a compassionate person can be more effective

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<sup>111</sup> Hud Hudson, *Collective Responsibility and Moral Vegetarianism*, p. 92

<sup>112</sup> Federick Ferre, in “Moderation, Morals, and Meat”, writes that “if conditions for farm animals are good, so that the net balance of the life experience of the typical animal being raised is positive, then it is morally licit to support such practices, even if they lead to the ‘premature’ deaths...of the animals in question. Having respect for inherent value means, among other things, taking a benevolent attitude toward the bringing into existence of as many bearers of inherent value would be in the world. Therefore, under ideal farming conditions, the eating of meat makes possible a larger net good than its opposite” (P.399)

<sup>113</sup> S.F. Sapontzis, “Animal Liberation and Vegetarianism,” *Journal of Agriculture Ethics*, Vol.1, No.2 (1988). P.139-153

adopting any number of other tactics to reduce the suffering of factory farmed animals without becoming a vegetarian?<sup>114</sup>

Hudson respond, that certain individuals by virtue of their membership in a loosely structural group, are at least partially morally responsible for not collectively preventing certain humans by committing themselves to modified, moral vegetarianism along with other members of that group, even though none of the individuals could have prevented harm by acting independently.<sup>115</sup>

Thus from the above it can be said that we are collectively responsible for the suffering of factory-farmed animals, and also collectively responsible for world-hunger, ecological diversity and preservation, and hierarchical, oppressive institutions of all kinds. Long time ago Hume observe that compassion and sympathy can move people to act much more than carefully constructed pieces of philosophical reasoning. The anguish cry of animals, terrified struggles, and spurting blood of the farm animals would definitely deter many people from cutting off the animal's heads.

#### **4.8 Philosophical defense in Vegetarianism:**

Let us discuss the philosophical defense in any form of vegetarianism. We have already mentioned in chapter -2 about the view of Descartes who claims, that animals are like automata's, or machines, without mind, they are unable to think, they are not consciousness. What Descartes thought about nonhuman animals is that "does not prove that they are endowed with mind...it is nature which acts in them according to the disposition of their organs, just as a clock, which is only composed of wheels and weights is able to tell hours and measure time more correctly

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<sup>114</sup> Hud Hudson, "*Collective Responsibility and Moral Vegetarianism*, p.93-94, Hud Hudson attributes this view to R.G. Frey.

<sup>115</sup> Hud Hudson, "*Collective Responsibility and Moral Vegetarianism*, P.97

than we can do with our wisdom.”<sup>116</sup> From this view of Descartes what is not known is that Descartes was well aware of the practical implications of his view. On the matter of killing and eating animals Descartes in a letter to More, observes that “my opinion is not so much cruel to those who are not indulgent to men- at least to those who are not given over to the “superstitions of Pythagoras (a vegetarian) - since it absolves them from any “suspicion of crime” when they eat or kill animals.<sup>117</sup> Secondly, the view that animals do not feel pain might be expected to erase any moral questions, any “suspicion of crime”. We might have used animals as subjects in scientific research and Descartes himself was an active participant in such research, as may be inferred from his discussion of the circulation of the blood in the *Discourse on Method* and also it is significantly that the first champions of his view on the nature of animals, as Lenora Rosenfield has noted.<sup>118</sup>

We may assert that Descartes was familiar with the practical implications of his view on the nature of animals and through his essay, he was confined his attention of defending the “superstitions” of Pythagoras and other vegetarians. Perhaps, Descartes would agree that animals<sup>119</sup> sometimes appear to be in pain. Descartes, principle argument in this regard fails to present a compelling case for his view. Since animals cannot speak or use language, they do not think. Since, they do not think, they have no mind. Therefore, they have no consciousness. Thus since a necessary

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<sup>116</sup> *The Discourse on Method in The Philosophical Works of Descartes*. Rendered into English by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross. Volume 1. New York ; Dover Publication, Incorporated, 1955, p.115

<sup>117</sup> *Descartes; Philosophical Letters*. trans. and edit. Anthony Kenny. Oxford; The Clarendon Press, 1970, p.245

<sup>118</sup> *Animal Machine to Beast Machine*. by Lenora Rosenfield. New York; Octagon Books, Incorporated, 1968, p.27 ff.

<sup>119</sup> We use the word ‘animal’ to refer to animals other than human beings, despite the fact that humans are animals, suggests that this is a fact that we are likely to forget. It may also help to account for our willingness to treat animals in certain ways that we would not countenance in the case of humans. “The Concept of Beastliness”, by Mary Midgley, *Philosophy* (1973) and Arthur Schopenhauer’s *The Basis of Morality*, trans. with introduction and notes by Arthur Broderick Bullock. London; George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1915, p.219-221.

condition of a creature being able to experience pain is that it be a conscious being, it follows from Descartes that animals do not experience pain.<sup>120</sup> This argument can be challenged in two ways. First, one may discard Descartes claim that no animals can speak or use language; second one might discard the view that being able to use a language is a necessary condition of being a conscious being. From these two arguments the second challenge seems to be a stronger one.

We rationally believe that animals can and experience both pleasure and pain and we are rationally obliged to believe that animals are that type of being who count for something. Bentham observed this clearly when he raised the morally relevant questions about animals: the question is not, Can they reason? Or can they talk? But can they suffer?<sup>121</sup> Bentham points to the capacity for suffering as the vital characteristic that entitles a being for equal consideration. Thus, from the above it is clear that animals can and do experience and pain is an intrinsic evil. Joel Feinberg once wrote<sup>122</sup> that “if it is the essential character of pain and suffering themselves that make them evil and evil not for their consequences but in their own intrinsic nature, then it follows that given magnitudes of pain and suffering are equally evil in themselves whenever and wherever they occur. An intense toothache is an evil in a young man, an old man, a man or a woman, a Negro, a human being or a lion. Although a skeptic might deny that a toothache hurts a lion as much as it does a human being, but one may conclude that lion’s pain and human’s pain are equally pain- pain in the same sense and the same degree- then there can be no reason for denying that they are equally evil in themselves. All this shows that pain is as much as an intrinsic evil.

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<sup>120</sup> *Descartes Discourse*, p.116-117.

<sup>121</sup> Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, New York; Hafner Press, 1948, p.310-31 and Singer P. *Animal Liberation* 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, New York; Avon Books, 1990, p.7-9.

<sup>122</sup> “Human Duties and Animal Rights”, an unpublished essay under copyright by the Humane Society of America.

One of the most essential parts of any enlightened morality is the principle of non-injury. This principle declares that we are not to inflict pain or contribute pain to any being capable of experiencing it. This principle is derived from the principle of maleficence which declares that we are not to do or cause evil and it is always wrong to cause pain. The parent who causes pain to the child in the course of forcing him to take some essential medicine does cause pain, but does not be wrong, as the pain caused in this case is necessary if greater pain is to be avoided. Thus we may say that causing pain is always *prima facie* wrong - that is wrong, in the absence of any other overriding moral consideration. This view opens the possibility that a person can be morally justified in causing pain, but to do is always morally wrong. Thus one may say that as a consequence of our actions, if other creatures are in pain, then we are rationally obliged to show our failure to observe the principle of non-injury. For an utilitarian, pleasure is intrinsically good and pain is an intrinsic evil. From this principle it is clear that the cases in which the pain or suffering caused to animals is not compensated by the good pleasure caused to humans. All the classical utilitarian's are aware of this view except Mill. He wrote<sup>123</sup>

We (the utilitarian's) are perfectly willing to stake the whole question on this one issue. Granted that only practice causes more pain to animals than it gives pleasure to man, is that practice moral or immoral. And if, exactly in proportions as human being raise their heads out of the slough of selfishness, they do not with one voice answer "immoral", the morality of the principle of utility be forever condemned.

Mill shows that he is opposed to some diverse writers like Thomas Aquinas and Kant who thought that we have no direct duties to animals.<sup>124</sup> He thought that it is always wrong as does Aquinas, to be cruel to animals. And Kant formulates the categorical imperative in such a way that we treat humanity both in our own person and in the person of every other always as an end, never as a means merely. Therefore, Kant who rejected the

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<sup>123</sup> "Whewell on Moral Philosophy", from *Mill's Collected Works*, Volume- X, p.187

<sup>124</sup> Kant's "Duties Toward Animals and Spirits" in his *Lectures on Ethics* For Aquinas's views, *Summa Theologica*, Part-2, Question-25, Third Article and Question no. 64, First and Second Articles.

Cartesian idea that animals lack the capacity even to feel pain, did not regard the matter of man's treatment of animals as one of moral indifference. These thinkers actually thought that cruelty to animals leads to cruelty to humans, and it is a fact that the former leads to the latter that makes the former wrong. According to these thinkers, it is true that animals suffer pain, but what makes wrong is that such treatment of animals tends to lead its perpetrators to treat human beings in a similar way.

From Mill's argument, it is clear that he is sensitive to the implications of the view that pain has an intrinsic value. According to him, there may be a practice which causes more pain to animals than it gives pleasure to man, then the practice is wrong, not just because there is a rise in nastiness of some men towards their fellows, it is wrong because of the unjustified pain felt by the animals. Thus, whenever we say that cruelty to animals does lead to cruelty to humans - then this assumption needs a solid factual backing - if this is true - but this cannot be the only way that makes cruelty to animals wrong.

Let us assume that the pain suffered by animals is comparable to the pain suffered by the humans. Say for example, some mentally retarded among us are routinely sent to human farms, where they are to live in incredibly crowded, unsanitary and confining conditions. They are kept in stalls or cages where they are fed by automated devices. Many of them are kept permanently indoors, and among those who are permitted outside, most of them are deprived of the ordinary means they might employ to secure enjoyment. Let us imagine, that the purpose of all this is to raise these human beings as a source of food for other human beings, just as we treat animals. After each has attained a certain weight, they are sold at public auction to the highest bidder and summarily carted off in loathsome vehicles to be humanely slaughtered. In this situation it can consistently be said that the intrinsic evil of an animal's pain counts less than the intrinsic evil of a human

pain, and that is why the practice involving the treatment of animals can be morally right and while the practice involving humans is not. Thus, we may say that the pain of animals' falls is just as much an intrinsic evil, as comparable to the pain felt by a human being. Thus, there is a conflict between two practices, when we looked it from some other direction. This direction goes with the rights of "humans". Human being has certain natural rights which animal's lack, and that makes two practices differ in a morally significant way.

Moreover, one can still be arguing that, all and only human beings can use language and that is why they can have rights while animals cannot. But one may say that, there is neither any connection between being able to use language in one hand, and being able to experiencing deserved pain on the other. Furthermore, whenever, we say that having an equal natural right spared undeserved pain to all human beings, is there any justification for saying this? Normally when all humans can reason, speak, or make choices we can say that they have equal natural rights to be spared undeserved pain. But there are also some human beings who don't have reason, or speak or make free choices.

There are arguments that claim that humans can have natural rights because humans do have interests. The word "interest" is used to refer some items such as liking, disliking, loving, hating, hoping, fearing, desiring, avoiding, and also we do experiences desires and needs. That is why we are the kind of beings who have rights and to cause any human being undeserved pain is to treat human being unjustly. Finally, we can say that if we treat a person unjustly we violate his rights. From the above points we can infer that to cause a human being undeserved pain is to violate his natural right to be spared undeserved pain. Similarly, animals too are the kind of entities who have interests. Thus, we have lot of reasons to believe that animals can experience the desires to

fulfill. From this point of view, it must also be unjust to cause an innocent animal undeserved pain.

#### **4.9 Arguments for and against vegetarianism:**

There are different arguments in favor and against vegetarianism. One may ask, if an individual stops eating meat, does it reduce the number of animals killed by other means at all. In many societies controversy and debate have raised over the ethics of eating animals.

A vegetarian might ask, what is the moral difference between killing a microorganism and an animal. Some vegetarians might argue that of course there is a difference between the two. We must avoid in killing an animal because without taking meat one may live. And if some microorganisms killed in the same process, this is unfortunate but necessary for human life. Vegetarians who eat only vegetables, fruits, and nuts do not completely remove all micro-organisms from their food even with repeated cleaning. Vegetarians may attempt to justify the eating of microorganisms in a different way. They may think that since micro-organisms can't feel pain, they can eat them without scruples. They also think that we do not need meat in order to live but in order to digestive working of the body killing and eating micro-organism is necessary for human life.

A vegetarian might ask, how would someone feel if he is slaughtered and eaten? Lot of animals are killed for food, then why shouldn't we? According to Gandhi, a selfish basis would not serve the purpose of taking a man higher and higher along the paths of evolution. What is required, is an altruistic purpose of life .According to him, man is more than meat<sup>125</sup> .It is the spirit in man for which we are concerned. Therefore, vegetarians should have the moral basis that a man was not born as a carnivorous animal, but born to live on the fruits and herbs that the earth grows .According to

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<sup>125</sup> The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism by Gandhi *Speech delivered at a Social Meeting organised by the London Vegetarian Society, 20 November, 1931*

Gandhi, the basic reason for vegetarianism is not physical, but moral. Also for him, if anybody claims that he will die if he didn't take beef, or mutton even on medical advice, then he would prefer death. That is the basis of Gandhi's vegetarianism. Even sometimes meat eaters shows a selfish refusal to share with starving human beings food that could have been made available to them, and thereby shows disregard to the principle of distributive justice.

Suppose that tomorrow a group of beings from another planet were to land on earth, beings who considered themselves as superior from us as we feel ourselves to other animals. In this situation, would they have the right to treat ourselves as we treat animals for breed, keep and food?<sup>126</sup> We may think that it is morally permissible for us to eat non-human animals but wrong for superior aliens to eat us. One may think that aliens are persons but animals are probably non- persons. And if personhood is the ground for the right to life then it is morally permissible for us to kill and eat animals. But it is wrong for the aliens to kill and eat us, even though they kill us painlessly.

Another argument may be cited from the question of speciecism. If we ask that what is the justification for eating plants but not animal vegetarians may reply that animals are sentient creatures, they feel pain and have other feelings but no plant is sentient, no plant can see, hear or feel.<sup>127</sup> But is it true that really plants doesn't feel pain? Some recent discoveries on plants give us some pause on this. Thus, if we know that plants also feel pain then our killing them would not be justified at all. Some may argue that human beings are more valuable because of their intelligence but why does higher intelligence mean that one species is more valuable than other

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<sup>126</sup> Harris, p.110 John Harris," Killing for Food" in *Animals, Men, and Morals*, edit Stanley Godlovitch, Roslind Godlovitch, & John Harris (New York: Taplinger press, 1971) p.110

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid*, P.108

species? There are other species besides us that have more intelligence than is chimpanzees and dolphins. Then why should our moral attitude be towards eating members of these species? This question becomes very crucial for consideration.

Suppose there is a man who wishes to end his life but regrets that never having given his poor and hungry family any pleasure. He then requests that after his death his wife prepare a lavish dinner with him as the main course. And the members of his family have no objection with his voluntary cannibalism. One may argue that the situation is very different with animals because we cannot communicate with them in any meaningful way. But from their behavior it is clear that they never want to die. And recent experiments with chimpanzees suggested us that the day may come soon when we can ask trained chimpanzees that whether they want to be killed for food.

Moreover, it is also argued that the killing and eating meat indirectly tends to brutalize people. One may say that, eating meat influences people to be less kind and more violent to other people. On the contrary, not eating meat tends to make people kinder and less violent. But it may be argued that there is no logical connection between being a non-vegetarian and the cruel treatment of animals, also make the cruel treatment to human beings. For example, the most well known person Hitler was a vegetarian. The *Vegetarian News Digest* argued that, “there is no information that indicates Hitler eliminated flesh food for humanitarian reasons”<sup>128</sup>.

Thus a necessary condition for being a person is having the capacity of self-concept, we can say that some animals are very intelligent such as dolphins and chimpanzees as have such concept and also it is a fact that some adult human beings do not have. In this sense, some animals and human beings may not have the right to life although most human beings

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<sup>128</sup> Gerald Carson, *Men, Beasts and Gods* (New York ; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), P.134

and animals do have such a right. So from the view of rights, it can be said that many animals probably have no right to life, but all of them have a right for not to have pain inflicted on them. People often point to some food item and ask, can you eat this? Our answer always will be “sure, we can eat what we want”. So, whenever we decide what kind of vegetarian we want to be, we need to think about what we want to include or avoid in the table.

#### **4.10 Varieties of Vegetarianism:**

A vegetarian eating style is defined broadly and consists of a range of eating patterns. The various patterns are distinguished by the foods excluded from the diet. The most basic types of vegetarian diets include semi- or partial-vegetarian, lacto-ovo (LOV), vegan, and macrobiotic. The following list summarizes each of these patterns, highlighting foods excluded:

<b>Type of Vegetarian Diet</b>	<b>Food Excluded</b>
Semi- or partial-vegetarian:	Red meat
Lacto-ovo-vegetarian:	Red meat, poultry, fish. Seafood
Lacto-vegetarian:	Red meat, poultry, fish. Seafood, eggs
Vegan (total vegetarian):	Red meat, poultry, eggs, dairy Products (may exclude honey)
Macrobiotic:	Meat, poultry, eggs, dairy, seafood, processed foods

Vegans generally do not eat meat of any kind and also do not eat eggs, dairy products many vegans also refrain from eating foods that are made using animal products. Vegan refers to either a person who follows this way of eating or to the diet itself. Veganism is a type of vegetarian diet that excludes meat, eggs, dairy products and all other animal-derived ingredients. Vegans also eat many of the same common and familiar everyday foods such as a green-salad, spaghetti, and chips and which just about everyone eats. So vegans of course do not consume red or white meat,

fish and also do not use honey or bees-wax, gelatin and any other animal by-products ingredients or products.

- Lacto vegetarian - lacto vegetarian is something used to describe a vegetarian who does not eat eggs, but does eat dairy products. Many Hindu vegetarians are lacto-vegetarians who avoid eggs for religious reason while continuing to eat dairy. Lacto-vegetarian diets are popular with many followers of the eastern religious traditions such as Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism and Sikhism. Thus the cores of their beliefs behind a lacto-vegetarian diet are the law of ahimsa or non-violence.
- Ovo vegetarian - The prefix ovo comes from the Latin word for eggs. Ovo vegetarians refers those people who do not eat meat or dairy products but do eat eggs, however they do not eat red or white meat, fish or dairy products.
- Lacto-ovo vegetarians - The word lacto comes from the Latin which stands for milk and ovum stands for eggs. Thus the definition of lacto-ovo diet containing milk and eggs. When most people think of vegetarians they think of lacto-ovo-vegetarians. People who do not eat beef, pork, poultry, fish, shellfish or animal flesh of any kind, but do eat eggs and dairy products are lacto-ovo-vegetarians.
- Pollotarian and Pescatarian- While pollotarian is not a type of vegetarian; these individuals do restrict their meat consumption to fish and sea -food only. The word “pescatarian” is occasionally used to describe those who abstain from eating all meat and animal flesh with the exception of fish. In other words, a pescatarian maintains a vegetarian diet with the addiction of fish and other sea-foods. A pescatarian is a person who eats fish, but doesn’t eat steak, chicken, pork or any other kind of meat. Although, pescatarian is not

technically a vegetarian diet, more and more people are adopting this kind of diet, usually for health reasons.

- **Macrobiotic Diet-** people who choose a macrobiotic diet avoid meat, chicken, sometimes fish, dairy products, eggs, vegetables of the nightshade family (potatoes, tomatoes, green capsicum, eggplant) tropical fruits, and processed sweeteners. A macrobiotic diet generally promotes the use of whole foods and also incorporates Asian sea vegetables.
- **Fruitarian Diet-** fruitarian diets include fruits as well as vegetables that are botanically classed as fruits such as tomatoes, eggplant, nuts and seeds.

#### **4.11. The Advantages of Vegetarian and Vegan Diets:**

Vegetables, grains, fruits, legumes, and nuts are the optimal foods for children. Rich in complex carbohydrates, protein, fiber, vitamins, and minerals, they form the foundation for dietary habits that support a lifetime of health. Research indicates that adults who consume fruits and vegetables are those who consumed these foods during childhood. As singer states that we could use the grain that we are using to produce beef or pork to feed people who are starving, so this issue is connected in an important way to the world hunger issue. And also if we all converted to vegetarianism, we would significantly decrease deforestation and co2 emissions, thus we are able to reducing global warming and or climate change effects. So this issue involves the environmental issue also. Actually animal cruelty is a terrible thing. Millions of animals are being abused. If we have health, religious, spiritual or simple dietary preference concerns, then we should consider the moral implications of what happens to our livestock. Here are some of the long-term advantages of plant-based diets:

- The prevalence of hypertension among vegetarians is about one-third to one-half that of non-vegetarians. A study of Caucasian Seventh-

day Adventists found hypertension in 22 percent of omnivores, but only 7 percent of vegetarians. Among African Americans, the prevalence was 44 percent of omnivores and 18 percent of vegetarians. Adopting a vegetarian diet significantly lowers blood pressure in both normal and hypertensive individuals.

- Cholesterol levels are much lower in vegetarians. Vegetarian diets reduce serum cholesterol levels to a much greater degree than is achieved with the National Cholesterol Education Program Step Two diet. In one study published in *The Lancet* total cholesterol in those following a vegetarian diet for 12 months decreased by 24.3 percent.
- Cancer rates for vegetarians are 25 to 50 percent below population averages, even after controlling for smoking, body mass index, and socioeconomic status. One study found that people who include generous amounts of fruits and vegetables in their daily diets have lower rates of cancers of the lung, breast, colon, bladder, stomach, mouth, larynx, esophagus, pancreas, and cervix compared to people who avoid such foods.
- Obesity is a major contributor to many serious illnesses, and is much less common among vegetarians, compared to the general population. Vegetarians are, on average, about 10 percent leaner than omnivores.
- Plant-based diets may encourage a later menarche, which has been shown to be associated with reduced risk of breast cancer in epidemiologic studies.
- Fruits and vegetables contain antioxidant substances, such as vitamin C, vitamin E, which protect cells against oxidative damage, which is related to cancer risk and other health problems. The multitude of phytochemicals found in various fruits, vegetables, grains, legumes, and nuts are thought to protect against heart disease and cancer.

Many people considers the environmental aspects of food production and choose a plant-based diet for more favorable environmental effects, such as increased sustainability from the production of plant based foods. Animal welfare group also created another group of vegetarians, some of whom accept dairy and eggs because an animal has not been slaughtered in their production while others totally exclude animal products in the name of preventing cruelty to animals and as an objection to inhumane farming practices.

As we have already discussed that from utilitarian perspective, both Singer and Regan appealed to the moral consideration for animal. Cora Diamond once wrote that “one curious feature of the Peter Singer sort of argument...is that your Peter Singer vegetarian should be perfectly happy to eat the unfortunate lamb that has just been hit by a car.”<sup>129</sup>. Question may be raised that why this is curious? It is only curious because vegetarians must think that it is wrong to eat meat. Thus vegetarians are moral absolutists just like absolute pacifists and absolute truth-tellers who would never tell a lie. Furthermore, there are three ways in which a utilitarian condemnation of the treatment of farm animals might fall short of entailing that we should switch to a vegetarian diet. At first, if the objection is not to all raising and killing of animals for food, but only to particular methods of raising and killing them, it would seem that we can avoid the necessity of vegetarianism by restricting our diet to the flesh of animals not regard or killed by methods involving suffering. Secondly, one may argue that, how bad as factory farming is, the consequences of abolishing it are not clearly better than the consequences of continuing it. Lat and finally, those people who admit that it would be better if factory farming were abolished may deny that there is any utilitarian connection between this conclusion and the obligation to avoid consuming the products of factory farms.

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<sup>129</sup> “Eating Meat and Eating People”, *Philosophy*, 53, no.206 (October 1978); 471-472

These three attempts deny the moral necessity of vegetarianism; the argument shows us that it is not wrong to eat animals. Question rose about the value of life and the legitimacy of regarding a new generation of happy animals as replacements for those that were eaten. So, it can be said that there is no direct utilitarian objection to the use of some animals in particular circumstances; moreover even in the absence of direct utilitarian objections to eating animals, there is an indirect objection. Utilitarian indirect objection may put the following way.

If we are prepared to take the life of another being merely in order to satisfy our taste for a particular type of food, then that being is no more than a means to our end.

Furthermore, according to Regan, utilitarianism does not lead to vegetarianism. He said that an enormously complicated question whether the undoubted suffering caused animals by the present system is enough to outweigh both the pleasures people get from eating animals and the disruption that abolishing factory farming would cause to the lives of those dependent on raising animals for food. Philip Devine was right to guess that “perhaps the recipes and so on which Singer appends to his book are not merely helps to virtuous and happy living, but essential parts of his argument.”<sup>130</sup> Thus the utilitarian vegetarian is on strong ground in arguing that factory farming and the other cruelties involved in large-scale commercial animal production should end. Thus our final problem is to establish the link between this goal and the obligation to become a vegetarian.

Apart from this another argument may be raised that a vegetarian diet does not involve great sacrifices, neither in our health, nor in our capacity to feed the growing world population. *The Preventive Medicine Research*

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<sup>130</sup> “ The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism”, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (October 1975) p.491

*Institute* suggested us that “plant-based diet provide a good balance of nutrients to support a healthy pregnancy and are superior to diets continuing milk or other animal’s products.<sup>131</sup> According to Barnard, “A vegan menu is preferred for nursing woman too. In fact, a plant based diet reduces the level of environmental contaminations in breast milk, compared to that of meat-eaters.<sup>132</sup> Moreover, vegan diet reduces human suffering from heart disease and cancer of the stomach and colon for which a human lives a long and healthy life.

In addition, vegetarians are primary consumers. They need less energy to create their food. But whenever humans become secondary consumers- they require both plant food and animal food. Actually energy is lost in two ways such as the tropic level reduction of energy available in food and through the energy required to produce the food that secondary consumer eat. Conversely, non-vegetarians or secondary consumers demand more and more plant world than vegetarians do. So in this situation non-vegetarians may ask to vegetarians that, Isn’t the plant suffer too? As we know that plants are autotrophs, producing their own food, whereas, we are the heterotrophs, depends on other organisms to get our energy. In ecology, the word tropic is used to mean food relationship of different organisms in a food chain. As a secondary consumer we rely on plant for our food. Non-vegetarians may forget that non-vegetarians diet requires multiple numbers of plants. In fact, non-vegetarians are increased the numbers of plants used indirectly, through the feeding of animals who will be eaten by human being. Therefore, whenever, we destroy trees through the way of feeding animals that will be eaten by humans; we actually decrease the ability of the planet to handle the carbon dioxide released into air.

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<sup>131</sup> Neal Barnard, M.D., in *Food for Life; How the New Four Food Groups Can Save Your Life* (New York ; Harmony Books, 1993). P.158

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid*, P.158

There is no doubt that the actual treatment of animals used for food is immoral and should be changed. So, if someone wants to change the present practice of treating animals used for food, the best means is to stop eating meat. This seems to be one of Singer's basic arguments. Becoming a vegetarian is not merely a symbolic gesture rather becoming a vegetarian is the most practical and effective steps one can take towards ending both the killing of non-human animals and the infliction of suffering upon them."<sup>133</sup>

In a way of conclusion, we can say that what motivates the objections to adopting a vegetarian diet? What inclines consumers of affluent, industrial nations to continue to eat meat despite familiarity with criticisms of it? The inertia of habit, the custom of food choices and learned preferences passed down by our parents from their parents, ubiquitous cultural conditioning, and nutritional ignorance are all formidable forces that resist philosophical argument. As Cato said, "It is a difficult task, O citizens, to make speeches to the belly which has no ears."<sup>30</sup> But even if we do slowly modify our eating habits over time, gradually eating less and less meat, where do we stop after giving up meat? We leave that question open for future discussion. We conclude by suggesting that given the various virtues of vegetarianism we have discussed, working towards a meatless diet is a worthy endeavour for a person who values compassion, humility, and integrity.

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<sup>133</sup> Singer, *Animal Liberation* p.173

<sup>30</sup> Carol J. Adams, *The Sexual Politics of Meat*, p. 13

## CHAPTER-5

### ANIMAL ETHICS AND RELIGION DEBATE

#### 5.1 Introduction:

Religion is all about beliefs, beliefs about creation, purpose, destiny, life and love, what people believe or disbelieve about God and the world affects all aspects of their being, including their day to day life. Studying religions makes a person to see moral ideas that draws the lines of faith. Religion can also affect our attitudes towards animals and the way in which animals are treated by us. Thus, all major religions of the world acknowledged that humankind depends on nature for its own survival. Thus, religion teaches us compassion and love for all living creatures.

The possibilities and problems of “religion and animals” can be seen in the following comparison. In its revised Catechism, issued in 1994, the Catholic Church proclaimed, “Animals, like plants and inanimate things, are by nature destined for the common good of past, present and future humanity.” Contrast this assertion with the following from the popular *Metta Sutta* recited by millions of Buddhists every day: “Just as a mother would protect with her life her own son, her only son, so one should cultivate an unbounded mind towards all beings, and loving kindness towards the entire world.” It can be said, quite simply, that the record of some religious institutions in defending animals is one of abject failure, often driven by extraordinary arrogance and ignorance. Yet, at other times religious believers have lived out their faith in ways that have been fully in defence of nonhuman lives. So, studying comparative religions allows people to see moral ideas that stretch across the lines of faith traditions.<sup>134</sup>

Engagement with lives outside our species has produced for some religious believers an understanding that other animals are the bringers of blessings into the world. Believers have also held that some nonhuman

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<sup>134</sup> Kimball, Charles. “When Religion Becomes Evil.” Lecture at Rocky Mountain College, Billings. 27 September, 2004

animals are persons in every sense that humans are persons, and even ancestors, family, clan members, or separate nations. Life forms outside the human species have regularly engaged humans' imagination at multiple levels, and thus often energized religious sensibilities dramatically. Because of this, one does not have to look far to uncover positive connections between some forms of religion and concerns for nonhuman animals. The links between these two are, in fact, unfathomably ancient. Our remote ancestors were fascinated with nonhuman lives, and the origins of human dance, musical instruments, art, and even a sense of the sacred have been tied directly to the fascination that our ancestors exhibited regarding the neighbouring, nonhuman members of the earth community. But the prevalence of dismissive views in religious circles cannot be denied. Views like that of the Catholic Catechism which are anchored in a radical subordination of nonhumans to humans - what Mary Midgley called the "absolute dismissal" of nonhuman animals now tragically prevalent in most modern industrialized countries - remain very common in religious circles today.

### **5.2 Religion and Animals:-**

Historically, there has been a link between religious traditions' willingness to demean nonhuman animals and the totality of modern secular societies' subordination of nonhuman animals' lives to human profits, leisure, and "progress". So, fairness and balance in approaching this subject will require any researcher of "religion and animals" to acknowledge that, even if a preoccupation with other animals is an ancient theme in religious traditions, it has not been a prominent part of ethical discussion in modern religious institutions or in academic circles where religion is studied. Those who have championed the cause of nonhuman animals around the world since the resurgence of protective intentions and actions in the 1970s have only rarely consulted religious authorities when seeking communal support

for increased animal protection. And religious authorities haven't often sought to participate in debates over how to defend wildlife, ensure that food animals are not mistreated, and minimize harm to research animals, or honour the special place of companion (nonhuman) animals in humans' lives.

The reluctance of animal advocates to seek the help of religious institutions and authorities alone says much about how "in defence of animals" modern religious traditions have been, or might be, in the world today. We will begin this chapter by considering what various religions have claimed about other animals. To what extent have religious traditions been guilty of what Richard Ryder called "speciesism". As we have discussed in earlier chapter- 1 and 2, Speciesism is the view that any and all human animals, but no nonhuman animals, should get fundamental moral protections? Speciesism makes membership in the human species the criterion of belonging within our moral circle. And to what extent do religious traditions provide resources and support for those seeking to defend animals? If we consider what major religious traditions which are sometimes referred to as the "world religions" have claimed about "animals," it becomes clear that some religious positions serve well to defend nonhuman animals, while others offend profoundly.

At the same time, religious traditions have often been the primary movers of a compassionate engagement with other lives. The possibility of such an engagement has often been thought of as an eminently religious act, although that will sound strange to many modern believers who are heirs to a version of religion that has become virtually autistic about nonhuman realities. Still, religion as a whole has an extraordinarily distinguished record of fostering the ethical abilities that are the means by which humans can and often do care about other animals This first of the central inquiries in the religion and animals field is, thus, about matters we generally call 'ethical'

or 'moral' The second of the central inquiries is embodied in this question what roles have religious traditions had as mediators of views of nonhuman animals. Even a cursory review of rituals, dances, myths, folktales, songs, poetry, iconography, and canons reveals that animal images of many kinds have been and remain central features of religious expression .Hence, the study of images of nonhuman animals found so broadly in religious symbolism must be an essential feature of the study of religion and animals Engaging this issue of images and religions' mediating role regarding views of nonhumans is no simple matter, however. Religious traditions include an extraordinary variety of stories in which nonhuman animals are mentioned in some way, and these have great differences in tenor and purpose. Some are positive and integrating while others demean and distort. Some honor the value of nonhuman lives as fully as others justify human use of any nonhuman animal for any purpose.

Of great importance in the field of religion and animals, then, is that nonhuman animals often have been treated as (others) whose presence was important to religious believers. Various nonhuman animals in religious traditions have signified meaning, mediations may or may not, however, honor those nonhuman animals' own lived realities; they may even obscure or intentionally eclipse those realities. Thus by virtue of an examination of these multiple roles played by images and stories, we can claim, have the realities of nonhuman animals, their daily actualities and "historicities," as it were, been seen well? For those who care to see other animals accurately, what amounts to a subtle but powerful form of violence occurs when worldviews or belief systems promote specific forms of misunderstanding and caricature that mislead about the verifiable realities of nonhuman animals. So, it is quite natural that practitioners within the field of animals and religion ask again and again if religious traditions have, in fact, passed along inadequate caricatures of nonhuman others in, say, a canonical

scripture, such that a religious believer would be in error when relying literally on this information. Relatedly, in sacrificial contexts the use of animals, human and nonhuman alike has resulted in lives being intentionally extinguished for purposes that are not those of the victims involved. Is the intentional, violent killing of the sacrificial victim always and everywhere a denial of that being's importance? Can such killing in a ritual or symbolic act be an affirmation of some kind? What are the values and assumptions that underlie affirmative answers to these questions about sacrifice? If answers on these challenging questions are different for human sacrificial victims than for nonhuman victims, why is that so? Careful work on these basic questions about the transmission of images, as well as the inherently ethical questions raised above, leads to the conclusion that religious traditions have, historically, been the principal vehicle by which the status of nonhuman animals was evaluated by not only believers, but also entire cultures and their institutions. This evaluative role has been taken over in crucial respects, of course, by scientific and political traditions; but the importance of religious traditions as continuing mediators of views and values regarding nonhuman animals remains one of the most obvious features of humans' contemporary assessment of their relationship to the rest of life on this earth.

### **5.3 Religion and Animals: An Indian Approach:**

The ancient religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism have never differentiated between the soul of a human being and the soul of an animal. Thus all life forms are subject to the cycle of birth death and rebirth. All these religions teach us that the liberation of the soul depends on our karmas or actions. For them a person, an animal and an insect have same value of life and they are also part of the cycle of life, death and rebirth. They believe that everything has been created by Supreme Being or

*Brahman* comes from the Supreme Being and again returns to the Supreme Being.

Thus animals, in the Indian tradition are considered to have the same feelings and passions as human being. And also there are different important role of animals in our tradition. The qualities of the animals were assumed by the associated deities. Say for example lord Vishnu incarnated himself as different animals and perform the role of creator, preserver, and destroyer of the whole universe and re-established *dharma*. Even a small honeybee also played an important role in human life. These small bees are producing and storing honey and constructing colonies of nests out of wax secreted by the workers in the colony. In Indian tradition we can also see that the boar is associated with rain and it is a faith in Hindus that they dig the earth before the onset of the monsoon. Thus their ability to dig up the earth teaches human being to plough, till and fertilize the land.

### **5.3.1 Hinduism:**

By the time Socrates was born people in Indian civilization had accumulated more than one thousand years of spiritual vision. Religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism held nature as sacred and humans are not more significant than any other living things. The Hinduism emerged from the ancient Vedic religion, which took shape in India around 1500 BCE, pulling in elements of Indian religion that had already existed for fifteen hundred years. For Hinduism, animal souls are the same as human souls. Nature remains sacred for the Hindus. Even “all of nature, the entire entire universe is sacred<sup>135</sup> for a Hindu. With the natural surroundings animals are also important for Hinduism. In the *Mahabharata*, we can see that animals talk and speak like “real animals, sometimes human beings or Gods”<sup>136</sup>. For Hinduism, animals does not seem so far removed from human beings, and

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<sup>135</sup> Kinsley, David. *Ecology and Religion; Ecological Spirituality in Cross-Cultural Perspective*. Englewood Cliffs ; Prentice- Hall, 1995

<sup>136</sup> *Mahabharata*. Trans. William Buck. Berkeley ; U CA., 1973

animals hold “something of the divine”<sup>137</sup>. Hindus tend to be aware of both holiness and nobleness in other animals. Thus, Hinduism teaches us that animals and humans were once closer and communicated with each other on equal terms. Say for example, the *Ramāyana* has lot of animal characters such as Jāmbavān, the bear, the eagle Jatāyu etc.

Lord says in *Śrīmadbhāgavatam*, “this form is the source and indestructible seed of multifarious incarnations within the universe and from the particle and portion of this form different living entities, like demigods’ animals’ human beings and others are created.”<sup>138</sup> The ten incarnations<sup>139</sup> (*Avatāras*) of Lord *Viṣṇu*, in Hinduism, is a recurrent theme in the Vedic history. The *Avatāras* of *Viṣṇu* takes progressively more developed form i.e. from a fish to a human form describe that animals play an important role in God’s creation. The *Matsya Purāṇa* describes that the first incarnation of Lord *Viṣṇu* is a fish. The second is a tortoise, then a boar, then *Bāli* - the king of the monkeys. In his *Rām* incarnation Lord killed *Rāvaṇa* in association with the monkeys. The fifth incarnation is *Parśurāma* and the next is *Balarāma*. In *Kṛṣṇa* incarnation He is associated with the cows and forests and terminated demons like *Kansa*. In the *Kali* age He would be born as *Buddha*. At the end of *Kali* age He would take the form of *Kalki* and kill the *mlechhas*.<sup>140</sup>

One remarkable feature of the Indian icons of God and Goddess is that each God/Goddess has been permitted an animal inseparable from the divine image. Say for example, the lion is the carrier (*Vāhana*) of Goddess *Durgā*, the swan is that of Goddess *Sarasvati* (Goddess of learning and art), *Lakṣmi* (the Goddess of wealth) has an owl, *Kārtika*, the *Devasenāpati*

<sup>137</sup> Coomaraswamy, Ananda K and Sister Nivedita. *Myths of the Hindus and Buddhists*. New York ; Dover, 1967. P.15-16

<sup>138</sup> Bhaktivedanta, A.C. *Srīmadbhāgavatam* trans. Swami Bhaktivedanta Book Trust, 1976, 1: iii-5

<sup>139</sup> Goswami, C. L. and Shastri, M. A. trans. *Srīmatbhāgavata Mahapurana* Gita Press: Gorakhpur, 1982, 1:3-5.

<sup>140</sup> Joshi, K.L. & Trivedi, Bindiya, edit.& trns. *Narasimha Purana* Eastern Book Corporation, Delhi, 2003.

(army commander of the Gods) has the *Mayura* (peacock), even the humble *Muṣika* (mouse) has been allocated as the carrier of Lord *Ganeśa*, (the God of success). Thus, all life forms are treated with dignity and respect as God is manifested in every living organism. The inalienable principle, which comes out from all the studies in Hinduism is “to live and let live”. *Manu Samhitā* describes how there was an integral relationship between man and his environment which is as follows,

*Vighāsasi bhavet nitya vāmṛtabhojanāḥ |*  
*Vighoṣo bhuktā śoṣantu yajña śeṣa tathāmṛtam ||*<sup>141</sup>

It means feed everyday one *Vighāsa*. (The word *Vighāsa* means what is left over after one’s in-laws, guests and other living beings have been fed.) Ancient Indian texts suggest that human being’s socio-ethical life has been divided into four stages. They are *Brahmacarya* under a teacher, *Grhastya* or family life, *Vānaprastha* or living aloof, and *Sanyāsa* or renunciation. The duty and obligation of a *Grhastya* or householder is not towards his mother, father, wife and children alone rather he has other obligations called *ṛna* or debt towards fellow men and to other living creatures. A *grhi* or householder was under the debt to perform five kinds of *yajña* or act for other’s good. *Manu Samhitā* describes,

*Adhyāpanam brmhayajñāḥpitryajñāḥtu tarpaṇam |*  
*Homo daiva balirbhūto nṛyajño’atithipujanam ||*<sup>142</sup>

This means, teaching and learning is *Brahmayajña*, offering of water with *til* to the ancestors is *pitryajña*, igniting the sacrificial fire in worshipping Gods is *devayajña*, and feeding the animals is *bhutayajña* and serving the guest is *nṛyajña*. The word ‘worship’ in the *śloka* literally means being worshipped or showing high regard to the guests indicates not the acts of charity but paying off debts (*ṛna*) for what a man entitled to his forefathers, to the animals and to his fellow men.

<sup>141</sup> Roy, Kumud R. edit. *Manu Samhita* K. Roy Publication, 1968,3:285

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.* 3:70

The cycle of birth in Hindu theological scriptures describes that a person may come back as an animal or a bird according to the type of merits and demerits one acquires through actions during his life span. This provides respect and noble sentiments towards these species. Also, it justifies non-violence (*Ahiṃsā*) towards animals as well as humans. *Viṣṇupūrāṇa* justifies this position by saying that God *Keśava* is pleased with a person who does not harm or destroy other non-speaking creatures or animals. He who sacrifices, sacrifices to Him: he who murmurs prayers preys to Him: he who injures the living creatures injures to Him: For *Hari* is in all beings<sup>143</sup>. The *Yājñavalkya Smṛiti* goes in favor of not eating meat and the practice of giving up meat eating, as we shall see in the following verse.

*Ataḥ ścṛudhvam māṅsasya vidhibhaksāṇavarjane |*  
*Vaseṣṭa narake ghore didāni paśuromābhiḥ, ||*  
*Samitāni durācāro yo hantā bidhinā paśūn |||*<sup>144</sup>

This means, the wicked persons who killed the animals, which are protected and domesticated, has to live in hell-fire (*ghora narka*) for the days equal to the number of hairs of the body of that animal. *Manusmṛiti*, the basic law book of Hinduism considers animal killer as a murderer. Those who are also involved in animal killing like, the slaughterer, the butcher, the cook and the one who eats the meat are liable to nature's punishment.<sup>145</sup> In the *Śāntiparva* of *Mahābhārata* it is said that the life of a man and an animal is of equal value and impose the same punishment for the destruction of either of the forms of life. It is said;

*Śca-varāhakharānhatvā śoudrameva bratamāret |*  
*Mārjārcās amandukānkākam byala ĉa musikam ||*  
*Uktaḥ paśusamo doṣa rājanpraṇipātanāt |||*<sup>146</sup>

<sup>143</sup> Wilson, H.H. *Vishnupurana* trans. H.H. Punthi Publishers : Calcutta, 1981, 3: viii, p. 234.

<sup>144</sup> Acharya, N.R. *Yajnavalkya Smṛiti* edit. Acaradhyaya : Bhaksbhaksaa Prakarnam, Nirnaya Sgar Press :Bombay, 1949, 178-180, P.60.

<sup>145</sup> Shastri, Acarya Jagdishlal. *Manusṛiti* trans. Motilal Banarsidas Publications : New Delhi 1983, 5:51.

<sup>146</sup> Ganguli , Kishori Mohan, *A Translation of Mahbhārata of Vyasa : Shantiparva-165*, Munshira Manoharlal, 2004.

Early seals from the Indus Valley City depict trees as powerful symbol of abundance. India has a long history of forest protection from the literature, epics and from the poetic texts to the edicts of Ashoka and the individual works of various kings. From the *Rig Vedic* period tree worship was very popular and universal in Hindu's life style. Tree symbolizes various attributes of God and therefore plantation of a tree is considered to be a ritual. *Rig Veda* considers trees, as having divine powers in relation to their healing properties. *Rig Veda* describes,

*Yā oṣadhī pūrvā jātā devebhya triyugam parā|*

*Maneina babhrunāmamaham satam dhāmāni sapta ca ||*<sup>147</sup>

This means, herbs that sprung up in time of old, three ages earlier than the Gods - of these whose hue is brown, will I declare the hundred powers and seven.

During the period of *Purāṇas* and epics, concern and respect towards trees was developed through stage by stage. Trees are considered as “being” having consciousness, feel pain and pleasure. In the *Shāntiparva* of *Mahābhārata*, while instructing Bharadvaja, Bhṛgu very minutely analyzes the functions and reactions of plants and declares that plants do possess the sensibilities of hearing, seeing, smelling testing and touching. They have their faculties of sensing, sorrow and joy as mentioned in the following verse.

*Sukhaduḥkhayośca grahaṇāchirṇasya ca virohaṇāt |*

*Jivam paśyāmi br̥kṣāṇām a-çaitanyaṁna vidyate ||*<sup>148</sup>

In *Nyāyabindu*, a textbook on Buddhist Logic by Dharmakirti, it is found that there is a controversy raised between the *Digambaras* and the Buddhists, which is solved by Dharmakirti with the presentation of an

<sup>147</sup> Sarswati, Swami S. *Rig Veda* trans. Veda Pratisthana: New Delhi, 1980, 10:97,1-23.

<sup>148</sup> Ganguli, Kishori Mohan, *A Translation of Mahabharata of Vyasa* : Santiparva, chapter-184, Munshira Manoharlal, 2004

argument. He argues that trees are conscious and they die with their removal of their skin.<sup>149</sup>

Hinduism is best understood as a complex of diverse sub-traditions, offers an immense range of views about the living beings who share our ecological community. Two general beliefs dominate how these Hindu sub-traditions think of humans' relationship to Earth's other animals. First, humans are clearly recognized to be in a continuum with other life; second, humans are nonetheless considered to be the paradigm of what biological life should be. One thus commonly finds within Hindu sources claims that the status "human" is above the status of any other animal. Both the continuum notion and the separation emphasis are part of the Hindus' belief in reincarnation, which asserts that any living being's current position in the cycle of life is a deserved position determined by the strict law of *karma*. This famous notion, which Hindus understand to reflect the eternal law of the universe, claims that all living beings, human and nonhuman alike, are born and reborn into stations in life determined by their past deeds. This view, which clearly implies that the universe has a fundamental moral structure, works out in ways that subordinate and otherwise demean nonhuman animals. Nonhuman animals, which by definition haven't acted in prior lives in ways that surmount their inferior nonhuman status, are denizens of a corrupt, lesser realm. Achieving human status means one has in past lives acted well. Humans who in this life act immorally are, according to Hindu thinking, destined to be reborn as a nonhuman animal, a demeaned status thought of as particularly unhappy compared to human life. These two beliefs - humans' connection, humans' superiority - have resulted in tensions in Hindu views of other animals. A negative set of views, often used to justify dominance or harsh treatment, flows from the claims that earth's numerous nonhuman animals are inferior to any human. A

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<sup>149</sup> Malbania, D. edit. *Nyayabindu* Kashiprasad Institute: Patna, 1955.

competing, positive set of views flows from the continuum belief, for other animals, like humans, have souls and thus are worthy of ethical considerations (for example, the notion of non-harming, or *ahimsa*, applies to them). On the positive side of attitudes toward nonhuman animals is the tradition's remarkable claim that other animals should not be killed. Many passages in the Hindu scriptures exhort believers to treat other animals as they would their own children. And central religious texts hold that the earth was created for both humans and nonhumans. These texts allow many contemporary Hindus to argue that all lives have their own interests, their own value, and thus a right to existence. Hence, daily life in India, especially at the village level, provides many examples of coexistence with other animals, the best-known example of which is the sacred cow. The special treatment of some nonhuman animals suggests that Hinduism is not classically specialists, for not all nonhumans are excluded from the moral circle. Relatedly, not all humans were necessarily included, for the inequalities existing within human society (often referred to as the caste system) were also justified as the direct result of good or bad deeds performed in former lives. Beyond the special obligations to all living beings found in the Hindu tradition, one finds close associations of many Hindu deities with specific animal forms. The deities Rama and Krishna are believed to have reincarnated as, respectively, a monkey and a cow. Ganesha, an elephant-headed god, and Hanuman, the monkey god, have long been worshipped widely in India. These close associations provide another basis on which Hindu believers can act in defence of certain nonhuman animals. Hinduism's earliest forms were intimately associated with animal sacrifice, which dominated the ritual life of the nascent tradition. Around 500 BC, this practice was challenged by Buddhists and Jainas as cruel and unethical. This challenge had a great effect on the later Hindu views of the morality of intentionally sacrificing other animals, and

ahimsa, the historically important emphasis on nonviolence, has now become a central feature of the tradition.

Animals also play a very important role in the *Pañcatantra*. *Pañcatantra* contains a chapter of friendship, a crow, pigeon, mouse, tortoise, and deer became friends through a host of engaging occurrences. These colourful stories of *pancatantra* teach us the principles of good government and public policy through animal fables. In this book all “the instructions are carried by animals and the teaching is all about good or wise conduct”<sup>150</sup> These stories tell us that compassion and non-violence not only stop at the human family rather it extends into the larger world of life. And every animal is endowed with personality, personal interest such as not to suffer and to be well fed, desires, and inclinations to be noble or evil, just or unjust. In our popular Hindu epic Ramayana, the monkey hero Hanumana, recognized the great God Vishnu, in the form of Rama.<sup>151</sup> And Rama also felt an “instinctive compassion” for the king of the monkeys and his community.<sup>152</sup> Hanumana is thus a model for us that how we should worship our divine lord. Even now a day Hanumana remains one of the main deities in most villages of northern India. In Indian religious tradition we can find lord Vishnu whose incarnation played an important role. Actually our Hindu religious texts are filled with stories of deities who are incarnated as various animals. Vishnu not only our lord but also sometimes a fish, tortoise, boar and a man-lion. And Vishnu as a man- lion best demonstrated that how gods, people and animals can all be one and the same.

As we have already discussed that in the Indian tradition reincarnation and the condition of one’s next life are based on *Karma*. *Karma* is a force of

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<sup>150</sup> Rukmani, T.S. “Literary Foundations for an Ecological Aesthetic: *Dharma*, Ayurved, the Arts, and *Abhijnanasakuntalam*.”. *Hinduism and Ecology : The Intersection of Earth, Sky, and Water*. Ed. Christopher Key Chapple and Mary Evelyn Tucker. Cambridge: Harvard U, 2000. P.106

<sup>151</sup> *Ramayana*. Ed.R.K. Narayan. New York ; Viking,1972. P. 99

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid*

justice because “every act carries with it an inevitable result”.<sup>153</sup> In Hindu sacred texts which are called the *Shastras*, we can see that a woman who wishes to avoid the realm of hell asks, “What action is it that is good for all creatures?”<sup>154</sup> All the Hindus believe that the “pain a human being causes other living beings.....will have to be suffered by that human being later, either in this life or in a later rebirth.”<sup>155</sup> So the Hindu teachings of reincarnation and *karma* naturally lead us to the practice of *ahimsa* an injunction of “non- injury towards all living beings”.<sup>156</sup> Thus the Hindu concept of *ahimsa* cross the barrier of speciesism and also encouraged us to practice non-violence towards the community of all beings. That is why the ancient Indian laws of Manu warned us that, “A person who kills an animal for meat will die of a violent death as many times as there are hairs of that killed animal.”<sup>157</sup> Thus for Hindus raising and killing animals for food means a profanation of anything holy. The *Upanishad* teaches us that the inner essence of all living being is identical with the inner essence of every other being. “As by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known,” so all things are one in essence.<sup>158</sup> So to know a lump of clay means is to know everything that is made of clay, as to know what it is to be human is to understand what it is to be a flounder. Just as all rivers flow to join one great sea, so do all living beings come from separate bodies, yet we are united by a shared “subtle essence”<sup>159</sup>. Similarly the *Mahabharata* also teaches us the oneness of all beings, including the oneness of all beings with the divine.

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<sup>153</sup> Embree, Ainslee T,ed. *The Hindu Tradition; Readings in Oriental Thought*. New York ; Vintage,,1972. P.51

<sup>154</sup> O’ Flaherty, Wendy Doniger, ed. *Textual Sources for the Study of Hinduism*. Chicago; U of Chicago,1988. P.124

<sup>155</sup> Jacobson, Knut. “The Institutionalization of the Ethics of ‘ Non- Injury’ toward All ‘Beings’ in Ancient India”. *Environmental Ethics* 16 (1994) ; P.289

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid* P.287

<sup>157</sup> Dwivedi, O.P. “Dharmic Ecology.” *Hinduism and Ecology ; The Intersection of Earth, Sky, and Water*. Ed. Christopher Key Chapple and Mary Evelyn Tucker. Cambridge; Harvard U. 2000.P.7

<sup>158</sup> *Chandogya Upanishad* Trans. F. Max Muller. *The Upanishads* Part 1. New York ; Dover,1962. P.92

<sup>159</sup> *Chandogya Upanishad*. Trans F. Max Muller. *The Upanishads* Part-1. New York ; Dover, 1962. P.102

When the fire God. Say for example- one day the Lord Agni, is hungry and needs to consume a forest in order to regain his strength, he asks permission from Krishna. Krishna also asks him, if there are any people, animals, birds or trees that will be harmed. Then, Agni replied that the animals will run away, the birds will fly away, and “the trees have their roots beyond my reach”.<sup>160</sup> We are trying to understand the Hindu attitude towards animals one basic truth we have to kept in our mind that the Hindu recommendation to cultivate a particular kind of attitude towards animals. Thus in the Vedas and other scriptures suggested us that the universe itself originated by sacrificing a cosmic animals such as a horse or cow or a cosmic *purusa* (a man). In fact we found that sacrifices are offered daily and also on special occasion. That is why it has been written in *Satpath Brāhmana*, “The sun, the sky, the wind, the dawn, the earth and so forth are all said to come out of the sacrificial horse<sup>161</sup>. All these sacrificial rituals are happened to serve special purpose. Even sometimes on special purpose a human being also sacrificed. So the entire rituals proceed under the believe that it is not a “deliberate killing” rather just for some religious purposes. And like other ordinary killing, here is no motive or intention we have seen to kill animals. In one sentence we may say that the animal sacrifice in Hinduism never justify killing or torturing animals.

In spite of these, we can see that in Hinduism the cow is regarded as the most sacred of all animals. And also cow dung is considered so pure for most of the Hindu families. They used cow dung not only as fuel and disinfectant but also to wash floors, walls, and even the places of worship. The killing of a cow is considered a sin for Hindus. Even nowadays in certain places of our India we can see that one day is reserved for worshiping cows or deities. So this special feature of Hindu belief and

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<sup>160</sup> *Mahabharata*. Trans. William Buck. Berkeley; U CA, 1973 P.81

<sup>161</sup> *Satpath Brāhman* in the sacred book of the east translated by Mauria Bloomfield (oxford clarendon press- 1879-90 ) vol. xliii x-6.4.1 . Hereafter referred to as the sacred book of the east.

practice clearly shows us that the attitude of the Hindus towards animals can be one of the extreme affection rather than selfish attitude. Furthermore, Indians speak of “mother-cow-love” and Indian literature often compared a good mother to a cow, running to those who are in need “as a cow runs to her calf”.<sup>162</sup> Even both in *Mahabharata* and in *Dharmasastras* ahimsa is one of the *yama*. Thus it is clear that Hinduism exalts *ahimsa* as a virtue in one hand but also permit “killing of animals” in certain special circumstances.

Thus in Hinduism we can see that our primary and ultimate concern is *moksa* (salvation), but it is not possible on an individual basis. Really nobody can save unless the whole race is saved. Actually our duties regarding animals are based on the demand of our spiritual quest. That is why the most well known Hindu scripture *Gita* suggested us that we should perform good acts without attainment to their fruits. Thus the most important aspect of Hindu theology is the association of different species with reincarnation. Generally in Hindu mythology the number of incarnations is regarded to be ten.

In Hindu mythology generally *Avatāra* means one who descends. It is believed in every Hindu that whenever *Dharma* or the law of righteousness is in danger, Vishnu incarnated himself to save the world from evil. Thus the first four forms are the fish or *Matsya*, who lives in water, and saves Manu from the flood waters. Then as a tortoise Vishnu helps the gods churn the ocean to obtain a delicious drink of gods of immortality with which they defeat the demons and restore balance and order of the universe. As a boar or *Varaha* the boar, the Vishnu dives to the depth of the ocean to lift up the world which had sunk under the seas. But Vishnu as a man-lion demonstrates the best example of gods, people, and animals can all be one and the same. *Narasimha* the half-man half-lion who manifest himself to protect the Vishnu devotee *Prahlāda*. The rest are *vāmana* the dwarf, who

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<sup>162</sup> *Mahabharata*. Trans. William Buck. Berkeley; U.CA, 1973. P.58

tricks the demon Bali into giving away the earth, *Paraśhurāma* the wild man with the axe, who rids the world of its corrupt rules twenty one times. And the *Rama* the religious and perfect mankind, who rescues his wife Sita from the demon Ravana. *Krishna* our lord , who slays the Buddha the man of peace who leads the unorthodox astray and the tenth and last incarnation *Kalki* who rid the world of evil doers and inaugurate the new golden age. Actually by incarnated himself Vishnu reiterates that all creation- animal and people are equal.<sup>163</sup>

Thus, Hinduism offers us a new interpretation of *moksa*. Nobody is really saved unless the whole race is saved. That is why Radhakrishnan once wrote about *sarvamukti* which is the ultimate goal of all religious life. For this reason Ahimsa plays a very vital role in Hinduism. Generally the concept of *ahimsā* or non-violence in thought and deed is India's unique contribution to world culture. It is our *Vedas* and *Upanishads* were the first to speak about *ahimsā*. Although it's true that *Aryāns* were not vegetarians, the concept of non-killing appears in the earliest literature. The *Rig Veda* condemns all forms of killing, even for food, preferring vegans to drinkers of milk. The *Yajur Veda* also tells us that service to animals leads to heaven, "no person should kill animals helpful to all and persons serving them should obtain heaven". Also according to the *Atharvaveda* , the earth was created for the enjoyment of not only human beings but also for bipeds and quadrupeds, birds, animals and all other creatures. Although *Sanatana Dharma* did not require its adherents to be vegetarians, but vegetarianism was recognized as a higher form of living, a belief that continues in contemporary Hinduism where vegetarianism is considered essential for spiritualism. In Hinduism, the concept of ahimsa does not stop at the species

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<sup>163</sup> Jayadeva, a great poet of medieval India , composed the *Gita Govinda* about the ten incarnation . The relevant stanza has been translated and quoted in the sections on the fish, tortoise, boar, and man-lion.

barrier. Every Hindu is tries to practice nonviolence toward the community of all beings.

Another religion of India such as Jainism also talked about the concept of *ahimsa*. Some Jainas even not taking boil water because this process kills tiny life-forms. We can see that from Mahatma Gandhi, a Hindu *ahimsā* was not just a way of living but an eternal quality of truth himself. Gandhi once wrote that, “A votary of ahimsa therefore remains true to his faith if the spring of all his actions is compassion, if he shuns to the best of his ability the destruction of the tiniest creature, tries to save it, and thus incessantly strives to be free from the deadly coil of *himsā* (violence).<sup>164</sup>

In Hinduism the concept we can see which is called *Dāna*. *Dāna* is generally understood as a ritually given gift, donation, offering, transfer or endowment. Some types of Dana are given between kin groups of similar social standing, some are made from higher to lower caste groups, some cannot be return and others cannot be refused. Thus, we can see that in early vedic literature, *dāna* is a materially valued item- such as cattle, horses, gold and women servants also.

#### **5.4 Animal Experimentation in Indian Culture:**

We have already discussed about research on animals and its legal and ethical perspective. Let us discuss how animal experimentation was considered from Indian civilization. In ancient Indian society, in the case of animal taxonomies an analogy is often used between the classes of beasts and the classes in the society. There are social and cultural classificatory schemes which are represented as natural, because they reproduce the schemes where by animals are classified. In fact there are several and different methods for classifying animals in Vedic texts, which are as follows.

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<sup>164</sup> Gandhi, *An Autobiography ; The Story of My Experiments with Truth*. Boston ; Beacon, 1993. p.349

- Animals were anatomically distinguished by their procreational characteristics.
- Animals were classified as either domestic (*gramya*) or wild (*aranya*).
- Animals were categorized as those which were suitable for sacrifice and those which are not. The dynamics behind the “successful illusion” entail the recasting of a cultural decision about how the world’s components are to be categorized as a ‘natural’ fact.

Furthermore, in the case of animal taxonomies an analogy is often posited between the classes of beasts and the classes in society. Thus the social and cultural classificatory schemes can consequently be represented as ‘natural’ because they reproduce the scheme whereby animals are classified. There are several and very different methods for classifying animals in Vedic texts. At first, animals were distinguished by their anatomical characteristics or their mode of procreation. Secondly, animals were classified as either domestic (*grāmya*), or wild (*āraṇya*). Thirdly, ritually based criteria were deployed for categorizing animals into those which were suitable for the sacrifice and those which were not. And lastly, animals were classified as either edible or inedible.

Animals were created by the creator God, *Puruṣa* (the Cosmic Man) or *Prajāpati* (the Lord of Creatures). One story we can find from the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. In the very beginning, there was only the Self (*ātman*) in the form of a *Puruṣa* (*Purusavidhi*). One day he wished for a second because he was not sexually pleased. He was the same size as a man and woman copulating and then became the husband and wife. That is why Yājñavalkya said, “One is like half a piece” and this space is filled with a woman. He then copulated with her. And this way the human race was born. Then she thought that she must hide because, “how does he copulate with her while he given births her from his own self”? She then became a cow; he also became a bull and started to copulate with her. From that cattle were born. Then she became a mare but he became another stallion. After that she

became a she-ass, but again he became another he-ass and copulated with her. The whole-hoofed animals were born from that. Likewise, she became a she-goat but he became another he-goat. When she became a ewe, he again became another ram, and started copulated with her. Goats and sheep were born from that way. Thus through these process he created all, and whatever copulating pairs there are, right down to the ants.<sup>165</sup>

In several texts, it can be found that the entire animal kingdom is divisible into two classes on the strength of their footedness, 'Pasupati' rules over the animals (*paśus*), the four-footed (*catuspadām*) and the two-footed (*dvipadām*). Human beings belong to the "two-footed" class, and all other animals comprising the four-footed category. It has been suggested by Manu that, "One should not eat solitary animals, or unknown wild animals or birds, nor any five-clawed animals, not even those listed among the animals to be eaten".<sup>166</sup> Such inedible human-like animals include pseudo-men, and apes, as well as jackals, cats and others are too much like humans due to their peculiar ways. However, text has isolated certain species among the five-clawed animals, which are not like human and therefore edible. Both the Manu and Upanishadic text gives us some clues as to why the classes of cattle and 'goats and sheep' are distinguishable from humans and whole-hoofed animals. Thus the structure of the foot separates the class of humans from all other animals, and then horses and asses (the whole-hoofed) may be distinguished from animals with cloven-hooves-cows, goats, and sheep.<sup>167</sup>

According to Manu, cattle, goats, and sheep are distinct from humans and therefore edible and they are also separated from horses and asses (and others in the whole-hoofed class) in that they are cloven-hoofed and have incisors in only the lower jaw (*anyatodanti*) rather than in both jaws

<sup>165</sup> *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 1.4. 1,3-4

<sup>166</sup> *Manu Smṛti* 5.17

<sup>167</sup> *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 4.2.4.16; AV 7.5.11 ; 8.5.11 ; 19.39.4 *Sāyana* on AV 3.31.3. and BSS 24.5

(*ubhayadant*). Thus cattle, goats, and sheep are categorically separated from both humans and the class of horses and asses in that they have only lower incisors, as well as cloven hooves.

Goats and sheep are such kind of bests which are “most manifestly” like the creator god, Prajāpati, in that “they bear young three times a year and produce two (offspring) three times (per year).<sup>168</sup> Beside this, in the other formulations the general classificatory principle is the mode of pro-creation characteristic of different types of animals; thus there are three sources of the beings here such as those born from an egg, those born from a living being and those born from sprouts.<sup>169</sup>

In addition we can say that each class of animals is ruled by a divine lord- and the creation of four distinct classes of animals such as village, whole-hoofed, small and jungle. A classificatory dichotomy between “village” or domesticated and “jungle” or wild animals found quite frequently in Vedic texts<sup>170</sup> with the genus of “village” animals sub-divided into the species of “whole-hoofed” and “small”. Thus the sub-division has been made on the basis of pedal or dental structure, or the mode of procreation. On the other hand, the other taxonomies make a division between village and jungle animals. Sometimes, the two- fold division is analyzed into three such as animals of the air (*vāyavyas*), jungle, and village.<sup>171</sup>

The seven village animals are the cow, horse, goat, sheep, man, ass, and camel as the seventh; some say the mule (is the seventh). The seven jungle animals are (wild) cloven-hoofed animals, animals having feet like dogs, birds, crawling animals, elephants, monkeys, and river animals as the seventh.<sup>172</sup>

<sup>168</sup> *Śatapatha Brāhmana* 4.5.5.6,9 and 5.2.1.24, cf.

<sup>169</sup> *Chandogya Upaniṣad* 6.3.1

<sup>170</sup> *Maitrayani Samhita* 3.2.3. , 3.9.7. ; *Atharva Veda Samhitā* 2.34.4 ; 3.31.3 ; *Śatapatha Brāhmana* 12.7.3.18; The dichotomy is also sometimes indicated by the opposition of wild game (*mriga*) and domesticated animals (*paśu*), e.g. *Atharva Veda Samhitā* 11.2.24, or in at least one passage *Atharva Veda Samhitā* 7.5.11

<sup>171</sup> *Rg Veda Samhitā* 10.90.8

<sup>172</sup> *Baudhāyana Śrauta Sūtra* 24.5

So the anatomical criteria - as in ‘cloven-hoofed animals’<sup>173</sup>, animals having feet like dogs’, ‘crawling animals’- are put into play within a culturally constituted category of seven undomesticated jungle animals are the opposition of seven domesticated village animals.

Among these (animals) there are fourteen kinds of possessing various forms – seven dwelling in the jungle and seven dwelling in the village. The seven dwelling in the jungle are known to be lions, tigers, wild boars, buffalos, elephants, bears and apes. The cow, goat, human, sheep, horse, mule, and the ass- these seven village animals are enumerated by the wise.<sup>174</sup>

After that we are discussing about sacrificial animals. Both the village and jungle animals are greatly sacrificed while dealing with the mammoth animal sacrifice and the most well known *Ashvamedha* or horse sacrifice. In some text we can find that the two types of victims are inclusive of all food as well as all animals.<sup>175</sup> Thus the village is equated with this world and the jungle with the other world.

They sacrifice the village animals for (obtaining) this world, the jungle (animals) for (obtaining) yonder (world). When they sacrifice the sacrifice the village animals, with that he obtains this world, when the jungle (animals are sacrificed) , with that (he obtains) yonder (world). He sacrifices both kinds of animals, village and jungle, for the obtainment of both worlds. He sacrifices both kinds of animals, village and forest, for the obtainment of both kind of food. He sacrifices both kinds of animals, village and forest, for the obtainment of both kinds of animals.<sup>176</sup>

Thus the distinction is between those animals that are sacrificable and those that are not. “They bind the village animals to the stakes; they keep the jungle animals in the interstices (of the snakes)-(this) for the distinguishing of the animals (*paśunām vyāvrttyai*). They kill the village animals, the jungle ones they release.’<sup>177</sup>

So, the jungle animals or wild game (*mrigas*) are separable from *paśus* . *Pasus* are the kind of animals that get sacrificed, and the *mrigas* are the

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<sup>173</sup> The text obviously refers only to wild animals with cloven hooves, as we have seen above, the term ‘cloven-hoofed animals’ ordinarily refers to one type of village animal (cows, sheep, and goats).

<sup>174</sup> *Mahābhārata* 6.5. 12-14

<sup>175</sup> *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa* 20.1

<sup>176</sup> *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 3.9.3.1 , 3.9.2. 1-2

<sup>177</sup> *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 3.8.19.2 ; cf. *Pañcavimśa Brāhmaṇa* 21.4.13

kind of animals that get haunted. So it is clear from the above that the village animals are nothing but the sacrificial victims of the Vedic fire rituals.

Thus, we have discussed three different verities of animal classification. First of all, there is a categorization on the basis of observable anatomical features such as pedal or dental structure or modes of procreation. Secondly, we have isolated another kind of taxonomy, that is whether the animals are domesticated or wild, an inhabitant of the village or of the jungle. Last and finally, we have again analysed a different type of category which entails dividing the animals into those worthy of being sacrificial victims (the *paśus*) and those which lack the sacrificial quality. On ritualistic or cultural ground, animals may be excluded from the category of food and the 'five clawed' animals (apart from man) are most often wild, and these wild animals are basically nonsacrificable, and thus equally inedible

Animals are not only categorized as to anatomical, cultural, ritual and dietary based criteria, they are also classified with reference to *varna*. The animal emitted from the creator god along with the *Brahmin* is the goat, the horse is the *Kshatriya* animal, the bovine is said to be a *Vaishya*; and the *Shūdra* animal is the sheep.<sup>178</sup> So according to the myth from time of beginning, the four animal members of the domesticated, edible, and sacrificial classes thus identifies with the four classes of human society in the course of constructing a network of cosmic connection has existed. So the classifying animal was also a way of classifying people in our ancient India.

### 5.5 Buddhism

Buddhism mainly based upon a universal idea of compassion for all life. Thus for Buddhism a man is holy if he has pity on all living creatures.

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<sup>178</sup> *Taittirīya Samhitā* 7.1.1.4-6, *Viṣṇupurāna* 1.5.45 and *Kūrmapurāna* 1.7.52.

Like Hinduism Buddhism also associated with the key concept of karma, reincarnation, ahimsa, and oneness. Buddhist philosophy holds that other species “are subject to the same process” that human being experience and living with the effects of karma from one birth to next. Just as we wish for “peace, happiness, and joy for ourselves, we know that all beings also wish for these qualities. The Buddhist faith also teaches us that sentient beings and conscious cannot be killed. Buddhism also teaches *ahimsā*, they expressed the universal moral idea such as *metta* (loving-kindness), and *karuna* (compassion). Buddhist writings also warn us that “meat eating in any form or manner and any circumstances is prohibited, unconditionally and for all. Thus it is clear from Buddhist teachings that the aim of moral ideal is to reduce suffering -flesh eating. The *Bodhicharyavatara* of Shantideva described for the Buddhist practitioners that “fellow-creatures are the same as him or herself. ‘All have the same sorrows, the same joys as I, and I must guard them like myself.’”<sup>179</sup>

In general, Buddhism represents the way of compassion and Lord Buddha is regarded as the compassionate protector of all being. As for him, the individuals following his path should practice loving kindness which implies not to harm the life of all beings. It is advised always to protect mankind as well as animal’s vegetations. Thus it is his wisdom through which one can see all human beings in the universe as equal in nature. The well-being of all human and non-human being is inter-related and mutual. He was the only man who was ever ready to give up his life for animals to stop sacrifice. Once he said to a king, “if the sacrifice of a lamp helps you to go to heaven, sacrificing a man will help you better, and so sacrifice me”<sup>180</sup>. We can see that Buddhist thought does not only remain among social beings, rather it remains in mental and environmental world. In our modern society

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<sup>179</sup> Burtt, E. A, ed. *The Teachings of the Compassionate Buddha ; Early Discourses, the Dhammapada, and Later Basic Writings*. New York; New American Library,1955. P.139

<sup>180</sup> *The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda*, vol-4, Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta, 1989, page-136

people often misused their power and destroyed the animals, forests and mountains and creating environmental crisis. Due to the excessive ‘thirst’ (*tanha*) our greedy mind lead to such changes and the destructions of the ecological balance. The thirst (*tanha*) in human mind not only pollutes our mind alone, the whole universe also. So due to the non-fulfilment of desire among people can affect the whole environment. Having the lack of peace in people’s mind the external environment is seriously polluted. In fact, the external pollution is related to our internal mind pollution.

Those who believe in the teaching of Lord Buddha will be able to control their desires and live in harmony with nature keeping the environment in healthy condition. Buddhism shows us that Buddhist monasteries have developed a harmonious living with nature for thousand years. Because of the calm and cool atmosphere of the forest and mountain Buddhist practitioners can develop their inner mind, which ultimately makes them “feel” for the protection of animals. With the loving, kind and tolerant heart the Buddhists live their life with natural vegetation. Even in the *Suttanipata* we can find that a deep appreciation of beauty and diversity of nature. So the follower of Buddhism not only limited their consideration for other individuals as a matter of obligation within the human beings alone but to other species also. Thus the environmental ethics of Buddhism is not totally a matter of identifying and securing rights; rather it is a matter of undertaking a practice of affirming and realizing the trans-human potential for enlightenment as an effect.

A popular and important Buddhist text *Dhammapada* teaches us that those who follow the Buddha will, “ever by night and day,” “find joy in love for all beings”.<sup>181</sup> *Dhammapada* also states that those who “hurt no living being” will reach nirvana.<sup>182</sup> Those who follow the Buddhist way of life will

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<sup>181</sup> *The Dhammapada; The Path of Perfection* trans. Juan Mascaro. New York ; Penguin, 1973 .P.78

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.* P.68

be filled with mercy, living a life with compassionate and kind to all creatures that have life.<sup>183</sup> Though we can see that many contemporary Buddhist eat meat today, but one thing is clear from the Buddhist teachings that the meaning of moral ideals is to reduce suffering that is flesh eating as well as drinking the nursing milk of factory-farmed animals which are fosters massive amounts of misery among millions of animals. So, like Hinduism Buddhist philosophy also teaches us that a flesh eater cannot avoid the *karma* that results from the unnecessary harmful actions than one can escape from the dirtying effects of thrown dust into the wind.

The possibilities and problems of “religion and animals” can be seen in the following comparison. In 1994, the Catholic Church proclaimed, Animals, like plants and inanimate things, are by nature destined for the common good of past, present and future humanity. Contrast this assertion with the following from the popular *Metta Sutta* recited by millions of Buddhists every day: Just as a mother would protect with her life her own son, her only son, so one should cultivate an unbounded mind towards all beings, and loving kindness towards the entire world. Religion is a notoriously complex area of human existence. Nevertheless, it can be said, quite simply, that the record of some religious institutions in defending animals is one of abject failure, often driven by extraordinary arrogance and ignorance. Yet at other times religious believers have lived out their faith in ways that have been fully in defence of nonhuman lives. This more positive view has, across place and time, been common. Engagement with lives outside our species has produced for some religious believers an understanding that other animals are the bringers of blessings into the world. Some believers have also held that some nonhuman animals are persons in every sense that humans are persons, and even ancestors, family, clan

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<sup>183</sup> Burtt, E.A, ed. *The Teachings of the Compassionate Buddha ; Early Discourses, the Dhammapada, and Later Basic Writings*.New York ; New American Library,1955 P.104

members or separate nations. Life forms outside the human species have regularly engaged humans' imagination at multiple levels, and thus often energized religious sensibilities dramatically.

In the *Sutta Pitaka* Buddha said that our moral responsibility is not to cause animals to be slaughtered. He also said that one who does not hurt any creatures by an actions are worthy human being. The *Sutta Pitaka* described that one's actions determine ones future just as "the wheel follows the foot of the ox that draws the carriage".<sup>184</sup> For many Buddhists individuals and species as mere name and form-outward vestiges wrapped around something less tangible but more enduring, more fundamental, that transcends individual bodies and biological categories. So this view hold the idea that individual human existence, is a mirage, we are only matter in human form, soon to be disbanded and recreated according to our actions in this and past lives.

Thus, the Buddhist *Jataka* is in many ways similar to the Hindu *Pancatantra*, These entertaining stories feature animals of every kind, including humans. We can also find the Buddha's past incarnation in *Jataka* tales. The readers of the *Jataka* are tends to visualise a deeper, closer connection with other life forms. In the *Jataka*, every living being have their own lives, their own karma, tests, purposes and aspirations. We can see that in *Jataka* tales the Buddha offers his body both as rabbit and elephant. The rabbit flung himself into a fire to be cooked while the elephant ran off a cliff to land at the feet of those who needed food. Such stories remind us that there is a difference between those people who have nothing to eat except dead animals, and those who choose to kill for food. Thus the stories of the Buddha's past incarnations, self-sacrificing stories also remind us that the Lord Buddha has been in many form in all living beings, and that is why

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<sup>184</sup> Burtt, E.A, ed. *The Teachings of the Compassionate Buddha; Early Discourses, the Dhammapada, and Later Basic Writings* New York; New American Library, 1955, p..52

each living entity is capable of respectful and compassionate actions toward others. So the Buddha's past incarnation as different living beings gives us a message that no animals are insignificant or undesirable in our life.

We can see that like other major faith, Buddhism also is a practical religion which have specific aimed only at salvation. If the devotes are trying to avoid all ill effects in their future lives, then they should follow the Buddhist teachings in their daily life. As we all have aware of the story of famous Buddhist King Ashoka, who was not only concerned with his human subjects, but also with the welfare of animals in his kingdom.<sup>185</sup> His Buddhist compassion was a part of a larger tendency to protect and nurture animals. Even some Buddhists have started to honour "animal day"<sup>186</sup>also. Through this annual celebration every people getting encourages to do "work for the liberation of living beings, practice liberation of living beings, and find a cause to make others to do so" because we all are related to every other being through the ongoing process of birth, death, and rebirth.<sup>187</sup> So the co-dependent and radical interdependent attitude of Buddhist philosophy leaves a message for us that each animal was at some point one's parent, and to harm one's parent is a particular base act.

Generally we all know that each and every Hindu scripture preaches non-injury, truthfulness, freedom from theft, lust, anger, greed, and doing what is beneficial to all creatures. A principle of Hinduism is *Ahiṃsā* (harmlessness). According to the various schools of Hinduism, spiritually there is no distinction between human beings and other life forms. All life forms including plants and animals are manifestation of god as limited beings (*jivas*) and possess souls. All beings are children of *prajapati*, and

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<sup>185</sup> Harris, Ian. "Buddhism and the Discourse of Environmental Concern ; Some Methodological Problems Considered" *Buddhism and Ecology ; The Interconnection of Dharma and Deeds*. Ed. Mary Evelyn Tucker and Duncan Ryuken Williams. Cambridge, Harvard U, 1997. P.386

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid*, 386

<sup>187</sup> *Bommyoko*. Buddhist Canon, Taisho edition (T.1484,24;997A-1003A)in "Animal Liberation, Death, and the State; Rites to Release Animals in Mediaval Japan".P.150

like humans animals are also subject to the cycle of births, and deaths, karma, triple *gunas*, and aspects of nature, morality and the possibility of salvation.

In *Gītā* our lord Krishna compares the whole of our world with the banyan tree because it is so large and provides a home for many different creatures. It means for our god each and every species has a same value in our world. Moreover there is a myth that ancient Indian people believed that animals had the ability to communicate in their cryptic language and that gods had the natural ability to communicate with them, while human beings needed to develop psychic ability to do so. Someone may raise a question that animals lack the ability to religious thought, but in the Hindu mythology we find animals trying to acquire spiritual knowledge by loitering around them and listening to their discourses. Even if we look in *Manu Samhita* which told that, “he who injures harmless creatures from a wish to give himself pleasure, never finds happiness in this life or the next.

### **5.6 Islam**

Islam generally inherited the Judeo-Christian hierarchy, where people are at the top of the hierarchy but with greater responsibilities. Literally, the word “Islam” means to “surrender to God’s law”<sup>188</sup>. Most of the Muslims believed that humankind has no rights, they have only duties, and peoples connect to his Allah just as of slaves to his master.<sup>189</sup> The insistence on “Monotheism” is one of the most fundamental characteristics which are similar in three westerns faiths such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. According to Islam we are just Allah’s caretakers, servants.

Thus Judaism, Christianity and Islam share the same religious teaching that “animals are with us common creatures of the same God. All beings originate with a Creator who loves, just and holy Animals are not

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<sup>188</sup> Esposito, John .L. *Islam ; The Straight Path*. Oxford; Oxford U , 1988. P.69

<sup>189</sup> Denny, Frederick M. *Islam and the Muslim Community*. San Francisco ; Harper San Francisco, 1987. P.8

completely separate from us, there is a common ontological basis for all life”.<sup>190</sup> Every Muslims aggress with the view that tending Allah’s creation out of moral obligation is an act of religious devotion and earthly self-sacrifice that bears sweet fruit. Furthermore, Islamic ethics and law teaches us that we are not here for our own sakes, but to serve Allah. So exploiting the earth, satisfying our wants, and dominating nature and animals may provide for us a wealthy worldly existence, but does not testify to one living a life of submission and service to Allah. According to Islam, it is forbidden to be cruel to animals. Under Islamic law, animals kept by human beings must have their basic needs provided, even if they are old or ill. Thus according to Islamic law animals must not be overworked or housed in a way that might cause them injury.

Thus we may see that the six chapters of the *Quran* are named after some species such as cow, bee, ant, spider, cattle, and elephant.<sup>191</sup> All the Muslims believe that creation has “intrinsic value” through Allah.<sup>192</sup> To him belongs all that is, in the heavens and in the earth, each and all subservient to his will. He it is who initiates creation and continually renews it” said by *Quran*.<sup>193</sup> *Quran* also said that *allah* saved a pair of every species from the great flood, and we are called upon to tend, protect, and save creatures that have been driven to the brink of extinction. Actually Muslim thinkers regarded nature as a sacred book. The *Quran* teaches us that earth, and all that exists therein is not merely for human purposes, but for the benefit of all, and each created entity was purposefully designed and brought to life by Allah. Actually animals are not lesser or lower, but separate

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<sup>190</sup> Linzey, Andrew. “*Animal Gospel*; A Christian Faith As Though Animals Mattered. London ; Hodder and Stoughton, 1998 P.57

<sup>191</sup> Foltz, Richard C. *Animals in Islamic Tradition and Muslim Cultures*. Oxford ; Oneworld, 2005. P.11

<sup>192</sup> Ozdemir, Ibrahim. “Toward an Understanding of Environmental Ethics from a Qur’anic Perspective”. *Islam and Ecology ; A Bestowed Trust* Ed. Richard C. Foltz et al . Cambridge; Harvard U, 2003 p.3-38

<sup>193</sup> *Quran*. Trans. N.J. Dawood. Harmondsworth ; Penguin, 1956 P.30;26-27.

communities, all under the protective power of Allah. We are part of the earthly diversity that Allah intended. In our world all are created by Allah, and all adore the divine-whether or not we understand. Thus Allah receives each entity's praise, as for example we can see how birds praise him as they wing their flight.

### **5.7 A CRITIQUE OF RELIGION AND ANIMAL DEBATE:**

The story of religion and animals is thus a mixed one. But even if careful study of religion and animals can offer prospective defences of nonhuman animals, the existing literature remains surprisingly one-dimensional. For example, entire books that purport to address a religious tradition's views of "animals" fail to refer in any way to the realities of the animals allegedly being discussed. This is increasingly untenable given that much more accurate information has been developed about our nonhuman cousins in the last four decades. These shortcomings reveal that ethical anthropocentrism continues to dominate much of our culture, as when mere images of other animals or those nonhuman animals which have been domesticated animals remain the principal focus because they are, misleadingly, held out as representative or the paradigm of all nonhuman lives. Since ethical anthropocentrism in the form of speciesism is also a defining feature of contemporary legal systems, business values, mainline economic theory, government policy decisions, and educational philosophies and curricula, it will surprise no one that major religious institutions continue to promote this narrow view. Some special challenges for supporters and critics of religion on the issue of nonhuman animals include the role of customary views and symbols, the special place of ethical claims in religion, and prevailing practices regarding nonhuman animals.

Treatment of nonhuman animals is a critical element in assessing any religious tradition's views of other animals. Accounts of the actual, day-to-day treatment of other living beings reveal much about the deepest values

in a religious tradition. Brutal treatment of cattle in the daily world outside a temple where worshippers pay homage to an idol in the shape of a bull or cow would suggest that, on the whole, the religion involved does not respect the harmed animals. And kind treatment of bulls and cows in daily matters, even when there are no images of these animals in the local people's rituals, would suggest something more positive. Which of these two religious communities would we say truly valued the cattle? As carriers of views of the world around us, religious traditions are ancient educators. They profoundly affect the formation of cultural, ethical, social, ecological, intellectual, and political ideas. In this regard, religious traditions quite naturally have had a major role in transmitting views of nonhuman animals from generation to generation.

This transmission role affects virtually everyone's basic ideas about these beings' natures, as well as their place in, or exclusion from, our communities of concern. An essential task in the study of religion and animals is to find the special roles that religious traditions play in developing or retarding views of the life around us. Since the death of Augustine of Hippo almost 1,600 years ago, the vast majority of scholarship in the Western intellectual tradition has been premised on the assumption that humans are the only animals with intellectual ability, emotions, social complexity, and personality development. This dismissal of nonhuman animals, which remains a centerpiece in today's educational institutions, has been challenged by the rich information developed in modern life sciences. The vibrant debates in modern science regarding the specific abilities of nonhuman animals can be used to frame a peculiar irony. We still talk in our schools of "humans and animals," rather than using the far more scientific "humans and nonhumans" or "humans and other animals." But outside academia and even within some religious traditions, many believers have not adhered to the broad dismissal of nonhuman animal's characteristic of the

Western cultural and intellectual traditions. The best-known examples are the Jains, Buddhists, and many indigenous tradition believers who clearly treat other living beings as morally and religiously significant beings.

One may ask, is religion a matter of an individual or a deeply public affair? Generally, people believe that religion is an issue between man and God and no one interferes in individual's privacy, because such interference will go against the individual's fundamental rights. We can see that many people who practice ancient ways of life are sometimes incredibly cruel to animals and destructive attitude towards natural world. So, the religious rituals sometimes are not always conducive to animal welfare. Human being is a social animal and our behaviour can influence others, and peoples' moral-standing closely related to our community. So, on the ground of belief, we should not do senseless practices and criminal activities. Our belief should be rational and scientific. We can see that today religion has become a platform of the "clash of civilization", and because of this we should not separate social life from religious life and we have to make a bridge the gap between the constitutional ideals and our social reality. The main motto of *Dharma* is to uphold, sustain and nurture the all-round harmonious life and growth of the individual along with those of the environment.

God and *Allah* will come in every age like Ram, Christ and Muhammad etc. They are the God in flesh and blood. One may say that we are not contended that Hindus or indigenous peoples are protectionist rather only their sacred lore offers protectionist teachings. In practice sacred teachings are not better than religious practitioners. Each spiritual tradition offers a wealth of protectionist ideals but actual practices may be a different matter. This chapter thus, expresses a firm protectionist core across major religious tradition but cannot demonstrate that adherents of these faiths live a protectionist lifestyle.

It can be said that myth is critical to understanding the ancient ways of life because myth contain the worldview of peoples, and a directive for how one ought to live within these communities. Animal characters are common in mythology and teach indigenous people to maintain reverent relationship with the natural world. Thus, “each story is complex of metaphors that teach the essential important of proper relationship and respect for the natural world. Most of the people in Indian civilization generally believed that humans are just one part of a perpetual sacred life that encompasses the entire cosmos, relationship revealed through myths are life sustaining and therefore critical.

In Western society, there is a tendency in us to romanticize and idealize order, indigenous cultures. No doubt we have much to learn from them. But this should not prevent us from asking critical questions as part of the ongoing debate on animal ethics. As with all communities indigenous peoples do not necessarily follow their spiritual teachings. Furthermore, not all such type of teachings are beneficial to earth or animals. So dedication to the prophet is the only way to universal brotherhood and communal-integration. Acceptance with regard and loving remembrance of forefathers and service of the verities of similar instincts are also essential ingredients of universal *Dharma*. And the humble hope is that the world’s great religions are protectionist at heart.

### **5.8 Making Religion More Animal-Friendly: Identifying the role of inherited perspectives:**

The influence of inherited conceptions causes many religious believers’ perspectives on nonhuman animals to be over determined by something other than a careful engagement with the animals themselves. Inherited preconceptions often take the form of dismissive generalizations found in those documents held to be “revealed.” Too often, one-dimensional sketches of a few local animals have operated as a definitive assessment of

*all* nonhuman animals' abilities and moral significance. At other times, inaccurate stories, even when positive, obscure the actual realities of the local nonhuman animals. Custom and tradition have all too often underwritten inflexible claims about other animals, frustrating believers who wish to engage readily available, empirically-based evidence that contradicts, in letter or spirit, their religion's inherited views.

Animal images that work as symbols in religious art, writing, dance and oral traditions are only sometimes connected to the animals portrayed. Western scholars have often failed to comprehend other cultures' animal symbols because they have assumed that other cultures read nonhuman animals in the dismissive manner of the western intellectual tradition. Such coarse analytic methods have resulted in serious underestimation of earlier cultures' sophistication regarding nonhuman animals. Caution, then, is critically important in studying animal images, which sometimes work primarily, even exclusively, to convey some feature of human complexity rather than any information about the nonhuman beings whose images are being employed.

Ethical concerns have long been central to religious traditions. As the brief review of religious belief above suggests, humans' ability to exercise concerns for "others" has historically included both humans and nonhumans.

Thus even as mainline religious institutions have participated in dismissals of nonhuman animals from the agenda of "religious ethics," ethical concerns for nonhuman animals' welfare have continued to have a place in many religious believers' lives. This fact makes it misleading to suggest that all religious believers have dismissed nonhuman animals in the manner of the mainline western intellectual and theological traditions that remain dominant today. Even if anthropocentric biases continue to dominate many modern religious institutions' official pronouncements, then, there remains vast potential for emergence of more informed and open-minded

treatment of nonhuman animals in the doctrines, rituals, experiences, ethics, myths, social realities, and ecological perspectives of religious believers. It is quite possible that when a clearer picture of religion and animals is drawn, it will be a rich tapestry of alternatives for interacting with the earth's nonhuman lives.

This potential remains largely unrealized, of course, for it remains overwhelmingly true today that mainline religious institutions have left unchallenged virtually all practices of modern industrialized societies that are harmful to nonhuman animals. This failure arguably violates the ancient consensus which originated in all religious traditions that cruelty to other beings by humans is to be avoided whenever possible. Religions, especially as they are ancient and enduring cultural and ethical traditions, have often been individual believers' primary source for answers to fundamental questions like, "Which living beings really should matter to me?" and "Who and what should be within my community of concern?" As such, religion has had profound impacts on countless humans' actions affecting the other, nonhuman living beings that live within and without our communities. Since religions so characteristically govern day-to-day actions involving our "neighbors," religions will continue to have an obvious role in answering questions about whether we are, or can be, a moral species.

This means that religion generally and specific communities of faith can be challenged with some simple, common sense questions. What place will religions give to discoveries about nonhuman animals that come in the future? How might mainline religious institutions respond to their own sub traditions that become fully informed about other animals' realities and humans' current treatment and uses of other animals? Could individual believers or sub-traditions prompt mainline traditions to respond to the ethics of contemporary practices such as factory farming and decimation of wildlife? These questions drive at a simple question that challenges both

religious and secular outlooks- how can humans, whether within or without religion, see nonhuman animals better?

Because religious institutions have so much influence in cultures across the earth-worldwide, only about one-seventh of people count themselves as non-religious-religions have within their grasp an important leadership role regarding our relationship to the world around us. An increasing number of religious and non-religious humans have echoed some form of insight that “we cannot be truly ourselves in any adequate manner without all our companion beings throughout the earth. This larger community constitutes our greater self.” Whether believers, churches and religious institutions will respond to this challenge remains an unanswered question.

## CHAPTER-6 CONCLUSION

Philosophy begins as pure thought, but finds its meaning in concrete action that affects our lives and our world. Applied philosophy has been fundamental to Western thought at least since the time of Socrates:

Here is one picture of philosophy. It goes on in an ivory tower pursued by cloistered academics who endlessly dispute the contemporary equivalents of questions like “how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?” It is far removed from the “real world,” even when philosophers spin theories about what is “real.” (In the real world, everyone knows what’s real, without needing philosophers to inform or misinform them.) Here is another picture of philosophy. Socrates is hauled into court and sentenced to death—not for anything he might have done, such as sell state secrets to the Lacedaimonians or assassinate Kleon—but for questioning religious ideas and moral ideals, thus bringing about the precipitous transformation of Athenian society. In the first picture, philosophy seems socially irrelevant. In the second it seems to be the most potent force of social change imaginable.<sup>1</sup>

Animal ethics is a field of study within environmental philosophy. Animals often have been classified as beings of nature, and in contemporary terminology they form an integral part of concepts central to environmental philosophy, such as ecosystems, biodiversity, species, and environments. However, the link between animal ethics and environmental philosophy is complex: Animal ethics concentrates on individual animals and their value, whereas environmental philosophy traditionally has had more comprehensive (soils, waters, and plants as well as animals) and holistic (species, not specimens; biotic communities; ecosystems) concerns. Many animal ethicists, by contrast, maintain that animals should not be valued only as members of species or communities.

Moral standing indicates those individuals that moral agents must respect in certain separately determined ways. All human beings are assumed to have moral standing. Moral standing distinguishes entities that moral agents must treat with “minimum standards of acceptable behaviour”. Entities who hold moral standing gain a certain moral status— their interests

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<sup>1</sup> Callicott, J. Baird. “Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair.” *Environmental Ethics* 2 (1980): 311–38.

must be taken into consideration and this moral status carries ethical obligations. Moral agents, those of us capable of acting either morally or immorally, must respect those who have moral standing because entities with moral standing warrant, deserve, or merit moral consideration. Moral standing does not determine how an individual ought to be handled, only that there are guidelines that must be followed.

Kenneth Goodpaster introduced the notion of moral considerability which is commonly referred to as moral standing in his 1978 article “On Being Morally Considerable.” He did not discuss moral behaviour, but focused on the requirements with regard to a particular entity that afford that entity moral standing, or moral considerability. According to Goodpaster, moral status may be analyzed in the following ways.

- First, moral considerability is not dependent on, and does not imply, moral rights. Moral rights are separate, narrower, and ancillary. In short, one cannot have *any* moral rights unless assessed as morally considerable. In order to be granted the right to life, for instance, an individual must first be deemed morally considerable.
- Second, the issue of moral considerability does not involve moral significance or the weight of that moral standing. Adjudicating competing moral claims is separate and ancillary. Moral considerability is all or none and determines but one thing: the presence of a privileged moral status - that of being morally considerable.
- Goodpaster distinguishes between what we are accustomed to (normative ethics) and what we are able to accomplish (practical ethics), as opposed to what we can ideally conceptualize. He defines “regulative” moral considerability as a situation in which an entity is morally considerable, but where that entity’s moral status is overlooked, or overridden, for practical reasons.

The concept of moral standing has become central to environmental and protectionist ethics, but specific requirements for this heightened moral status remain unclear so far as our studies is concerned. In Regan's theory, "subjects-of-a-life" have moral standing; Singer's theory reserves this privilege for "sentient beings." In Linzey's theory, all of creation has moral standing; Taylor's theory offers moral standing to natural teleological entities. In the field of protectionism, there is no definitive category of entities that have moral standing.

In the past, philosophers have commonly listed mental faculties such as understanding, intending, suffering, and consciousness as primary requirements for moral standing. A more rudimentary and all-encompassing requirement for moral standing is having interests is found in Bernard Rollin. A number of philosophers argue that merely to have interest's warrants moral standing because any being with interests prefers that those interests be honoured rather than thwarted. This is an extension of personal human understanding: we prefer to have our interests respected and fulfilled rather than ignored and neglected.

Thus, what we found in our study is that moral standing is central to the debate surrounding ethics and animals. Questions like do beluga whales or white-eared hummingbirds have moral standing? If so why? If not, why not? Do all human beings have moral standing? Moral philosophers thus, are grappled with whether the interests of animals are sufficient to grant them full moral standing - on a par with the human animal-and if so, what that moral standing will entail for an olingo or a black colobus? Some thinkers argue that their moral standing is lesser than that of human beings, or that they have no moral standing whatsoever. There are others who differ.

As we have seen philosophical discussion of moral status of animals has a long history. Many ancient Greeks, including Pythagoras and Plutarch, were vegetarians on primarily ethical grounds, and many later philosophers,

such as Michel de Montaigne, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Stuart Mill, contemplated the normative dimensions of the human-animal relationship. In the nineteenth century, Henry Salt published a thesis on that topic in which he defended moral vegetarianism. In addition, serious discussion of moral status of animals and the normative elements of the human-animal relationship long existed on the margins of philosophy.

There is an ethical dilemma and inconsistency in applied ethics with regard to our treatment of human life as opposed to our treatment of all other life-forms. In the traditional Western moral philosophy human's despot like attitude or human chauvinism (what Ryder, and Singer called speciesism) is prevalent. Traditionalist claims that animals are inferior to humans in power, intelligence and evolutionary status. They are neither moral agent, nor rational, neither possessed with free will, nor are they capable of linguistic expressions thus, they are not bounded by social contract to humans and so on. Philosophers from Plato to Rawls have shown their preferences for human chauvinism, which make human and only human to be worthy of moral consideration.

From our discussions in this dissertation we must say that non-human species also have rationality, self-consciousness, and moreover dignity likes normal human being. In this connection Peter Singer's thought is relevant here. Basically his theory does not demand equal consideration of interest. In fact, he focused only on the quality of suffering and sentient, and from his perspective only sentient creatures have wants and desires. Although Descartes liked to treat non-human species simply as a machine, but we don't think so. Because, if we go with Bentham then we found that animals have the capacity to feel pain, and for this reason they ought to be morally considerable. We also see that Taylor wants to protect every species from being exploited by human being. For him, that if an entity has inherent worth, then that being is worth of moral consideration from moral agents.

That is why in our contemporary modern society peoples are already engaged in a serious debate about the rights and wrongs of animal use.

According to the pragmatic utilitarian, in the case of laboratory animals, researchers requires to replace existing live-animals experiment with alternatives, and have to reduce number of animals used, and also invented a new type of method that cause animals less sufferings. Actually, efforts to reduce the harm done to animals during the research are generally important for us. Certain levels of pain and suffering imposed on animals in the name of sciences are regarded intolerable for some people. That is why the 3RS principles like Reduction, Refinement and Replacement are approached by Russell and Burch in 1959. Now days, experiments are refined in various ways. In some experiments appropriate anesthesia plays a vital role in pain management. Treatment of animals in research projects is usually delegated to an ethics or animal care and use committee. These committees act in a more flexible way. They are able to discuss with scientists proposing experimental project and their way. These ethics committees and other similar bodies are often looking in detail at research projects. However, it is true that not every aspect of animal research can be under the control of ethics committees and the ultimate responsibility for the way animals are used rests with individual researchers. Therefore, those scientists performing animal - based research must ask themselves whether their work prompt ethical concern. But not only in scientific research, if we accept that animals have rights then killing animals for food is also morally wrong.

The *Mahābhārata* carries a spiritual message of oneness: all that exists is God. This message is heightened in the most famous portion of the *Mahābhārata*, the *Gītā*, where Krishna reveals himself to a worthy and needy human being, saying “I am the life of all living beings. All beings have their rest in me. In all living beings I am the light of consciousness”

(*Gītā*-74, 80, 86). The *Gītā* reminds us: “I am not lost to one who sees me in all things and sees all things in me,” and those who love God must have “love for all creation”. God *is* the *life* of *all* that exists - not just the life of humanity, and Hindus are instructed to extend the same love to a human being, or a cow, “or an elephant, or a dog”. A holy person sees himself in the heart of all beings and he sees all beings in his heart. And when he sees me in all and he sees all in me, then I never leave him and he never leaves me. He who in this oneness of love loves me in whatever he sees, wherever this man may live, in truth this man lives in me. And he is the greatest *Yogi* he whose vision is ever one: when the pleasure and pain of others is his own pleasure and pain. In the *Gītā*, by definition, a pundit is one who “treats a cow, an elephant, a dog, and an outcaste” with the same high regard because God is all, and those who are spiritually advanced, those who are true devotees, find “in all creation the presence of God” .

Hinduism contains much in its philosophy that is protectionist, including the philosophies and spiritual teachings of transmigration, *karma*, oneness, and *ahimsā*. Additionally, the sacred literature in Hinduism provides a wealth of animal characters that bring these many species to the forefront of spiritual consciousness - often as equals. Many stories exemplify *ahimsā*, encouraging us to show compassion for all living beings.

In chapter four we have already suggested that a man was not born as a carnivorous animal, but born to live on the fruits and herbs that the earth grows. Various scriptures contain thousand of passages recommending vegetarianism which is based on the profound link between *ahimsā* and spirituality. Even *Yajurveda* recommended us that “you must not use your God given body for killing God’s creation, whether they be human, animal or whatever. We no longer want to hear the bleating of sheep, the bellowing of bullocks, as when they are cutting to pieces in slaughter house. The day may come when we live in a society where we shall no longer see butcher’s

shop full of dead - bodies side by side. We need an environment pleasant to the eye and in harmony with beauty. Our duties regarding animals are based on the demands of our spiritual quest in the human form. No one is really saved unless the whole race is saved. It is a belief in us that whenever *dharma* or the law of righteousness is in danger, Vishnu incarnated himself to save the world from evil.

In the *Vedas* it is widely said that animals and birds are part of nature. It is natural, therefore, that Vedic seers have mentioned about their characteristics and activities and have desired their welfare. *Rigveda* classifies them in three groups - sky animals like birds, forest animals and animals in human habitation. All the three types found in the universe have a distance environment and every living creature has an environment of its own. But when we look from man's perspective all of them constitute his environment. There is a general feeling in the *Vedic* texts that animals should be safe, protected and healthy. Domestic animals, as well as wild animals along with human beings should live in peace under the control of certain deities like *Rudra*, *Pushan* etc. Vedic people have shown anxious solicitude for welfare of their cattle, cows, horses etc. The cow as the symbol of wealth and prosperity, occupied a very prominent place in the life of the people in Vedic times. In this dissertation some light is thrown on the awareness of our ancient seers about the environment, and its constituents. It is clear that the *Vedic* vision to live in harmony with environment was not merely physical but was far wider and much comprehensive. The Vedic people desired to live a life of hundred years and this wish can be fulfilled only when environment will be unpolluted, clean and peaceful. The knowledge of *Vedic* sciences is meant to save the human beings from falling into an utter darkness of ignorance. The unity in diversity is the message of *Vedic* physical and metaphysical sciences. Essence of the environmental studies in the *Vedas* can be put here by quoting a partial *Mantra* of the

*Iṣavāśya Upanishad* ‘One should enjoy with renouncing or giving up others part. *Vedic* message is clear that environment belongs to all living beings, so it needs protection by all, for the welfare of all.

What we have found from our research and in the same time believe that animal ethics is a relatively new discipline that consists of three broad schools. It emphasizes freedom from anthropocentric bias and wishes to investigate the value of and norms concerning animals in a direct sense by taking the animal itself as the object of study. There are lots of arguments in animal ethics that have been met with some criticism, but often that criticism faces problems. It can be argued that animal ethics has presented important approaches to the study of human-animal relations and offered strong reasons to rethink the human understanding of the value of animals and current practices of using animals, in research and entertainment.

Our moral responsibility towards non human nature is of unprecedented significance and urgency, and it is a responsibility that we cannot escape. The natural environment, species and the generations that will succeed us lie in the fate of our hand. In this respect, environmental ethics represents a kind of ethical approach, which considers intrinsic value not only in the interest of individual sentient creature, but also living creatures in the world. We need to understand that we humans are complex beings and we make decisions about what to do, about what is right and wrong through thoughts and feelings, rational arguments and intuitions, head and heart, data and gut instinct. These varieties in human nature compel us to think and do accordingly in a responsible manner. Human’s beings need to understand that they live in one world along with the rest of nonhuman nature. On the one hand, uncontrolled human behavior and absolute despot like attitude might lead to the destruction of environment and thus lead to the extinction of human beings. Absolute preservation on the other hand, is impossible.

Morality requires that our sentiments be balanced with relevant facts and reason. Philosophy is a “human product”; each individual philosophizes with more than just reason - we use our will, feelings, “flesh and blood,” our “whole soul and whole body”. We might wish moral philosophy to be a clean and neat process, predictable and dependable, with absolute answers to complex moral dilemmas, but nothing could be farther from the truth.

This is not to say that people do not have answers. Answers are provided by almost anyone confronted with delicate questions about complicated moral matters. From abortion and addiction to capital punishment and war, people often believe they know what is right for themselves and for those around them. However, neither personal preference nor majority opinion makes a *sound* moral decision, though these definitely can and do determine a *dominant* (popular or common) morality. In fact, the definition of morals conflicts with the idea that what the majority approves is “right” and what the majority disapproves is “wrong.” While we are all familiar with the dominant morality of our time and place, the majority is much less aware of whether or not their common moral opinions are rooted in reason and empirical evidence.

Collectively, we participate in an outrageous moral inconsistency. We accept without question the discrepancy between our moral regard for human beings and our lack of moral regard for all other living entities. Lisa Kemmerer in *In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals* cites an example which may be significant to mention here. “When returning by car from my parent’s home some years back, I came upon a medic unit and a police car. A man was sitting on the bumper of one of the medic cars, with skinned knees. Two medics were attending him. He had gone around a corner too fast and had tipped his motorcycle in the street. I drove on, and within half an hour I watched a truck slam into the hind end of a doe. She was bounding, and as if in slow motion she flew from the front of the truck, spun

in the air, and landed in a crumpled heap in the ditch. The truck kept going. The three cars behind the truck kept going. I was the fourth car behind the truck. I watched her try to stand up, her hind end destroyed. There were no medics, no police, not even a pause in the rushing of cars, though she was in shock and terribly wounded. How could a young man with skinned knees receive so much attention, while a doe who had been hit by a truck received no more than the passing glance as the people who had run over her rushed on their way? How many deer were hit that same night; how many of them died slowly in ditches? And what of snakes, opossums, robins, raccoons, swallows, salamanders, and domestic cats and dogs? Can such a morality, where only human life is held to be worthy of preservation and protection, possibly be defensible?

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*Debanjali Mukherjee*

## VEGETARIANISM AND ITS MORAL IMPLICATIONS

DEBANJALI MUKHERJEE

The term vegetarianism is used to describe a diet that excludes the flesh of animals, has a long, complex history. Many of the world religions and philosophies have praised it as the ideal diet, but vegetarians have also been condemned and killed for their refusal to eat meat. The term vegetarianism was in fact coined in 1847 by the founders of the vegetarian society of Great Britain. Thus vegetarianism involves a question about the quality of human life and about the way in which humans should treat non-human animals. The choice to eat or not to eat flesh foods has typically reflected deeply ingrained philosophical and religious beliefs. Among these the foremost has been the idea of human kinship with the nonhuman world. While the underlying motives for vegetarianism differ widely throughout different cultures and historical periods, certain themes predominate. These include: the idea of transmigration of souls, compassion for nonhuman animals, asceticism, purification of the body and soul, health benefits, the dehumanizing effects of meat-eating, environmental considerations, and the unnaturalness of eating flesh foods. Some of the additional underlying themes include the association of meat with class, caste, and gender.

Vegetarianism has two major philosophical roots in the ancient world, Jainism in the East and Pythagoreanism in the West. Both schools of thought arose in the sixth century BCE at approximately the same time, and scholars continue to speculate on the cross-fertilization of ideas between the East and West. The Jainas' notion of *ahimsā* refers to the desire not to cause injury to other living beings and the concomitant idea of compassion for all living beings. Jainas argue that all life goes through a series of incarnations, with the highest incarnation belonging to humans who have attained enlightenment or *nirvāna*. By eating flesh foods humans attract negative *karma* to their soul (*jīva*), and impede their chances of attaining enlightenment. Vegetarianism condemns the practice of animal sacrifice, intimately connected to meat-eating in the ancient world. Buddhism also contains the ideas of *ahimsā*, transmigration of souls and compassion for animals. Buddhism helped to spread vegetarianism throughout Asia, and influenced the development of a strong vegetarian tradition in Hinduism. Pythagoras is regarded as the greatest influence on vegetarian thought in the Western world. According to Porphyry, it was not necessary to kill animals to curb the problem of animal overpopulation, since nature would find a balance by itself. From environmental perspective, we can see that livestock are one of the most serious causes of environmental harm, and livestock production and meat eating are odds with sustainable development. On the contrary, plant

agriculture and vegetarian diets are sustainable, environmentally pleasant practices. That's why it is logically beneficial to boycott livestock by adopting a vegetarian diet.

### **Why be a Vegetarian?**

One may ask: why do we adopt vegetarianism? To respond, a vegetarian would not be willing to kill an animal for his gain, but this does not really explain the reason for becoming a vegetarian. Morality is something to be aspired after, rather than as a fundamentally selfish tool that keeps society functioning. Justification for eating meat means of disregard morality or moral behaviour towards animals. Actually animal cruelty is a terrible thing; millions of animals are being abused. If we have health, religious, spiritual, or simple dietary preference concerns, then we should consider the moral implications of what happens to our livestock.

From moral perspective, vegetarianism may be understood as the view that due to some moral principles, one ought not to eat certain edible animals and animal products. Say for example suppose someone marooned on a desert island inhabited by edible birds, and suppose there is no edible plant life on the island and that person has a gun. In this situation, for the non-vegetarian the choice is easy, but not for the vegetarians. They can choose the path of non-vegetarians, because a bird's life is less valuable than one's own. But suppose that instead of birds the island is inhabited by some humans. Then is it morally permissible to eat humans? A vegetarian holding a moderate position might argue that it is *prima facie* wrong to kill an animal for food but there are certain human rights that is the right to life, can override this *prima facie* wrong. On this view there are cases in which it would not be right to kill a human being but it would be right to kill an animal. But still there is an important question for the moderate is, on what plausible moral principle can the distinction between animals and human beings be made? If we go through the utilitarian perspective, we find that both Singer and Regan appealed to the moral consideration for animals. Tom Regan suggested respecting animals as being with inherent value equal to our own,<sup>194</sup> and Singer tried to reduce the pain and suffering of animals<sup>195</sup>. Both contend that we are wronging those animals, whom we breed into existence, make to suffer, and slaughter.

### **Peter singer's Argument:**

Singer argues that the interest of every sentient being that is affected by an action ought to be taken into account and give the same weight as like interests of any other sentient beings. He thought that sentient beings have a serious interest is not being made to suffer. So, for him practices which inflict suffering on sentient beings without good reason are morally wrong. Therefore, we ought neither to participate in, nor perpetuate morally

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<sup>194</sup> "The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.5, No.2 (October 1975) 181-214 and *The Case for Animal Rights* (Berkeley ; University of California Press, 1983)

<sup>195</sup> *Animal Liberation* (New York; Avon Books, revised edition 1990 ) and *Practical Ethics* (Cambridge University Press, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition 1993)

wrong practices. Actually, Singer's utilitarian contention is that through vegetarianism, decrease in the demand for factory farmed meat will reduce animal suffering.

**Tom Regan's Argument:**

Regan thought that all beings with inherent value have equal inherent value, and a right to be treated respectfully. All moral agents have a duty to respect the rights of all such beings. Regan granted that, utilitarianism pre-supposes the principle of "equality of interests". The principle of equality of interests merely makes it explicit that because the principle of utility is the sole basis of morality, no other principle will limit the application of the principle of utility, or affect the way in which it operates. Regan claims that utilitarianism does not provide adequate grounds for the obligation to be a vegetarian. Rather he thought that an ethical theory based on rights does provide adequate grounds for the obligation to be a vegetarian. Actually he thought that the commitment to vegetarianism is so strong that he will be prepared to abandon any ethical theory which is unable to produce the judgment that it is wrong to eat animals.

**Why is Vegetarianism a Moral Issue?**

Some philosophers think that the aim of moral theory is to systematize our common moral intuitions. As in the scientific theories the scientist matches the observed data, similarly in the ethical theories the moral philosophers match the data of moral convictions. When we apply utilitarianism to the issue of how should we treat animals, one vital point comes out immediately. Utilitarianism in its classical form aims at minimizing pain and maximizing pleasure. Many non-human animals experience pain and pleasure; therefore they are morally significant entities. They have moral standing. In this respect, they are like humans and unlike rocks. The principle of utility in utilitarianism attributes animal moral standing and ascribes to their interest equal weight with the like interest of humans. This principle of utility also lies in the consequences of denying animals of equal moral standing.

Humans do not need meat for a healthy diet, sentient beings have a serious interest for not to be suffered. Thus humans have only a trivial interest in meat. Therefore, we ought neither to participate in morally wrong practices. Historically many moral philosophers have either denied animals moral standing altogether or discounts their interests because they are not human. For example –Moore, and recently John Rawls has denied animals a place in his theory of justice, arguing that we owe justice only to those who have the concept of justice. If someone abstains from eating meat because of test or financial status, then there is no moral or philosophical question to be raised, but when a vegetarian attempts to persuade others that they should adopt vegetarian diet then it requires philosophical attention. A vegetarian might argue a number of ways morally to

the rearing and killing of animals for the human table. The vegetarian in this sense does not merely require us to change or justify our eating habits, but to consider our attitude and behaviours towards members of other species.

There are two approaches a vegetarian might take in arguing that rearing and killing animals for food is morally offensive. He might argue that eating animals is morally bad, because of the pain inflicted on animals in killing them to be eaten, or he could object to the killing itself. Thus vegetarians need to be tolerant if they want to convert others into vegetarians. We need to preserve them either as respected fellow-workers or simply as companions in the joy of life and friendship.

In many societies controversy and debate have arisen over the ethics of eating animals. Robert Nozick and Peter Singer have recently advocated not eating meat on moral grounds<sup>1</sup>. Eating animal flesh may generate different types of moral questions. If we accept that animals have rights, then killing animals for food is morally wrong. An animal that is raised for food, is being used by others rather than being respected for itself. In philosophical term, it is being treated as a means to human ends not as an end-in-itself.

When one asks “what is morality”, the answer is that moral behaviour means acting in a way which is fair to all. This means we need to extend the same rules to all. Also we need not harm others simply because of our own gain. We can see that some people who are omnivorous don’t usually claim that animals aren’t morally important. In fact they focus on our relationship with those animals which are usually consumed for food. They argue that right kind of relationship with animals is necessary for, or at least contributes to a meaningful life. The relationship involves caring for the animals, seeing they are well-treated during their lives. Thus to be a vegetarian on moral ground is to show respect and caring for nonhumans entities. Non-human animals are living beings seeking life and freedom, and avoiding harm and danger. In every ‘livestock system’, no matter how high the welfare standards are supposed to be, non-human animals will suffer. The Five Freedoms, frequently used to measure welfare, will never be met completely. They include the freedom:

- from hunger, thirst and malnutrition;
- from pain, injury and disease;
- from discomfort;
- from fear and distress;
- to express natural behaviour.

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<sup>1</sup> Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York, basic books 1947) p.p-35-42,  
2. Singer p.”*Animal Liberation* New York Review of Books, April-5 1973, p.p-24 idem, *Animal Liberation* (New York review of books 1975).

### **Is vegetarianism an emotional issue?**

One may ask if an individual stops eating meat, does it reduce the number of animals killed by other means at all. In many societies controversy and debate have been raised over the ethics of eating animals. Our attitude towards animals suggests that we have taken the role of “creator”, “protector”, and preserving nature for our own purpose. So ugliness in persons, in deeds, in life, in surrounding nature- this is our worst foe. We no longer want to hear the bleating of sheep, the bellowing of bullocks, as when they are cutting to pieces in slaughter house.

A vegetarian might ask, what is the moral difference between killing a micro-organism and an animal. Some vegetarians argue that there is a difference between the two. We must avoid killing an animal because without taking meat one may live. And if some microorganisms killed in the same process, this is unfortunate but necessary for human life. Vegetarians who eat only vegetables, fruits, and nuts do not completely remove all micro-organisms from their food even with repeated cleaning. Vegetarians may attempt to justify the eating of microorganisms in a different way. They may think that since micro-organisms can't feel pain, they can eat them without scruples. They also think that we do not need meat in order to live but in order to digestive working of the body killing and eating micro-organism is necessary for human life.

A vegetarian might ask, how would someone feel if he is slaughtered and eaten? Lot of animals are killed for food, but why shouldn't we? If we accept that animals have rights, then killing animals for food is morally wrong. According to Gandhi, a selfish basis would not serve the purpose of taking a man higher and higher along the paths of evolution. What is required, the answer is an altruistic purpose. According to him; man is more than meat<sup>196</sup>. It is the spirit of man with which we are much concerned. Therefore vegetarians need to have the moral basis that a man was not born a carnivorous animal, but born to live on the fruits and herbs that the earth grows. For him the basis of vegetarianism is not physical, but moral. Also for him, if someone says us that we will die if we don't take beef, tea or mutton even on medical advice, then we would prefer to die. That is the basis of Gandhi's vegetarianism. Even sometimes meat eaters shows a selfish refusal to share with starving human beings food that could have been made available to them, and thereby shows disregard for the principle of distributive justice. We can cite an example here to focus more, as given by John Harris. Suppose that tomorrow a group of beings from another planet were to land on earth, beings who considered themselves as superior from us as we feel ourselves to other animals. In this context, would they have the right to

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<sup>196</sup> The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism By Mohandas Karamchand (Mahatma) Gandhi *Speech delivered by Gandhi at a Social Meeting organised by the London Vegetarian Society, 20 November 1931*

treat us as we treat animals for breed, and food?<sup>197</sup> We may think that it is morally permissible for us to eat non-human animals but wrong for superior aliens to eat us. Most of us think that aliens are persons but animals are probably non- person. And if personhood is the ground for the right to life then it is morally permissible for us to kill and eat animals. But it is wrong for the aliens to kill and eat us, even though they kill us painlessly.

Another argument may be raised from the question of speciecism. If we ask that what is the justification for eating plants but not animals? Vegetarians may reply that animals are sentient creatures, they feel pain and have other feelings but no plant is sentient, no plant can see, hear or feel.<sup>198</sup> Some recent discoveries on plants give us some pause on this. Thus, if we know that plants feel pain then our killing them would, or at least should take a humane form. Some may argue that human beings are more valuable because of their intelligence but why does higher intelligence mean that one species is more valuable than other species? There are other species besides us that have high intelligence that is chimpanzees and dolphins. Then why should our moral attitude be towards eating members of these species?

In a way of conclusion it is argued that the killing and eating of meat indirectly tends to brutalize people. Eating meat influences people to be less kind and more violent to other people. On the contrary, not eating meat tends to make people kinder and less violent. But there is no logical connection between eating meat and being insensitive to the inhumane treatment of animals or humans rather a psychological one. For example the most well known person Hitler was a vegetarian. The Vegetarian News Digest argued that, “there is no information that indicates Hitler eliminated flesh food for humanitarian reasons”<sup>199</sup>. Hitler did not eat meat is irrelevant to this argument. Here we are only concerned with whether or not eating meat tends to make people less brutal. However, at present we have no logical reason to accept. Peter R. Cheeke once wrote that, “if most urban meat-eaters were to visit an industrial broiler house, to see how the birds are raised, harvested and “processed”, in a poultry processing plant, perhaps many of them would swear off eating chickens and perhaps meat”.

Thus a necessary condition for being a person is to have the capacity of realizing a context or situation of himself. There are some animals which are very intelligent such as

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<sup>197</sup> Harris, p.110

<sup>198</sup> John Harris, “killing for food” in *Animals, Men, and Morals*, edited by Stanley Godlovitch, Roslind Godlovitch, and John Harris (New York: Taplinger press, 1971) p.108

<sup>199</sup> Quoted in Carson p.134

dolphins and chimpanzees that have such kind of concept and also it is true that some adult human beings do not have such concepts. In this sense some animals and human beings may not have the right to life although most human beings and animals do have such a right. So from the view of rights, it can be said that many animals probably have no right to life, but all of them have a right not to have pain inflicted on them. People often point to some food item and ask, can you eat this? Our answer always will be “sure, we can eat what we want”. So, whenever we decide what kind of vegetarian we want to be, we should always think about what we want to include or avoid in the table.

Now, there is no doubt that the actual treatment of animals used for food is immoral and should be changed. So, if someone wants to change the present practice of treating animals used for food, the best means is to stop eating meat. This seems to be one of Singer’s basic arguments. Becoming a vegetarian is not merely a symbolic gesture.....Becoming a vegetarian is the most practical and effective step one can take towards ending both the killing of non-human animals and the infliction of suffering upon them.<sup>200</sup>

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<sup>200</sup> Singer, *Animal Liberation* p.173